



World Food Programme  
Programme Alimentaire Mondial  
Programa Mundial de Alimentos  
برنامج الأغذية العالمي

## Executive Board

Second regular session  
Rome, 17–21 November 2025

---

Distribution: General

Agenda item 6

Date: 6 October 2025

WFP/EB.2/2025/6-C/3

Original: English

Oversight functions

For decision

Executive Board documents are available on WFP's website (<https://executiveboard.wfp.org>).

---

## Summary report on the evaluation of the country strategic plans for the Democratic Republic of the Congo for 2020–2025

### Executive summary

An evaluation of the country strategic plans for the Democratic Republic of the Congo covering 2020–2024 was conducted between February 2024 and January 2025. Taking a utilization-focused, consultative approach, the evaluation served both accountability and learning purposes and will inform the preparation of the next country strategic plan. The evaluation assessed WFP's strategic positioning, its contribution to outcomes, its efficiency in implementing the plan and the factors that explain its performance.

The country strategic plan for 2021–2025 marked a change in WFP's approach, expanding WFP's portfolio of activities addressing the root causes of food insecurity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo while responding and scaling up to meet emergency needs. It followed an interim country strategic plan for 2018–2020, the final year of which was included in the scope of the evaluation.

WFP's strategic positioning in food security and humanitarian logistics in the Democratic Republic of the Congo aligns with the circumstances in the country, national policies and stakeholder expectations. While this positioning provides a solid foundation for the next country strategic plan, WFP's approach to certain matters such as service provision has been ambiguous.

Despite the operational agility of the country office, WFP's response was insufficient given the scale of needs, with operational challenges stemming from the operating environment and funding limitations. Prioritization efforts have been essential, with interventions focusing on the most severe needs, physical and safe access, and adherence to humanitarian principles.

*In line with WFP evaluation policy (2022) (WFP/EB.1/2022/4-C), to respect the integrity and independence of evaluation findings the editing of this report has been limited and as a result some of the language in it may not be fully consistent with the World Food Programme's standard terminology or editorial practices. Please direct any requests for clarification to the Director of Evaluation.*

---

### Focal points:

Ms A.-C. Luzot  
Director of Evaluation  
email: [anneclaire.luzot@wfp.org](mailto:anneclaire.luzot@wfp.org)

Mr C. Waldmeier  
Evaluation Officer  
Email: [christoph.waldmeier@wfp.org](mailto:christoph.waldmeier@wfp.org)

Although WFP's intervention logic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is relevant, aiming to expand its resilience portfolio, its implementation was hindered by heavily earmarked funding. During the period under review WFP had to prioritize emergency response, the quality and scope of which had to be adjusted, which led to the insufficient integration of and transition to resilience approaches and a lack of sustainability.

Positive results were achieved under all activities of the country strategic plan in terms of the quality of WFP's assistance, and WFP's performance in delivering outputs under the country strategic plan activities was strong, particularly with regard to expanding emergency assistance during the scale-up. However, outcome indicator achievements were not consistent over time and across the many different operating environments in the country.

Significant efforts were made to strengthen gender mainstreaming, conflict sensitivity, protection and accountability to affected people. WFP reinforced its own teams, trained its staff and partners and introduced promising new practices. However, the consistent integration of these practices into decision-making and programming remains a gap.

WFP made notable investments to improve operational risk management, enhance efficiency and improve the quality of assistance. However, these investments were insufficient and did not generate the evidence needed to inform efforts to anticipate and be prepared for crises or programmatic decision-making for results.

WFP's ability to fulfil its ambitions under the country strategic plan was closely tied to its relationships with financial, operational and implementing partners, especially in a country where working at the humanitarian–development–peace nexus is critical. Weaknesses in partnership management persist, limiting response efficiency and progress in nexus-related work.

The evaluation made five recommendations for WFP: continue to refine and better document geographic and household prioritization for emergency response as well as the selection of transfer modalities; work on the integration of and transition between the emergency and resilience aspects of the country strategic plan on the basis of an approach that outlines WFP's comparative advantages; reinforce the management and use of data from various sources for programmatic decision-making; strengthen partnerships with implementing partners with a view to supporting localization; and clarify its position as a service provider to the humanitarian community as well as its coordination roles.

## **Draft decision\***

The Board takes note of the summary report on the evaluation of the country strategic plans for the Democratic Republic of the Congo for 2020–2025, (WFP/EB.2/2025/6-C/3) and the management response (WFP/EB.2/2025/6-C/3/Add.1).

---

\* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the decisions and recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

## Introduction

### Evaluation features

1. An evaluation of the country strategic plans (CSPs) for the Democratic Republic of the Congo covering 2020–2024 was commissioned by the WFP Office of Evaluation. It serves both accountability and learning purposes and will inform the design of the next CSP for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
2. The evaluation covered the activities implemented by WFP in 2020 under an interim CSP (ICSP) for 2018–2020 and those implemented from 2021 to June 2024 under the CSP for 2021–2024, the term of which was extended to the end of 2025. The evaluation was conducted between February 2024 and January 2025 by an independent external team using a theory-based, mixed-methods approach.
3. The main intended users of the evaluation are the WFP country office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, technical divisions at WFP headquarters in Rome, the WFP Executive Board, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, partner United Nations entities and donors. Other potential users include civil society and non-governmental organizations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and WFP's beneficiaries. Workshops were held with internal and external stakeholders to ensure ownership and a deeper understanding of the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.

### Context


4. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the poorest countries in the world, with 65 percent of its young and increasingly urban population living in multidimensional poverty. It is experiencing the largest food security crisis in the world, with an estimated 25.4 million people in crisis and emergency food insecurity in 2023. In addition, an estimated 2.9 million children and 1.1 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are estimated to be acutely malnourished.
5. The country faces a precarious security situation, particularly in the east where armed conflict disrupts food production and distribution and continually drives displacement. Recurrent epidemics, including of the Ebola virus disease, measles, cholera, mpox and malaria, have strained healthcare services; the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic further disrupted education and medical care. In addition the country experiences frequent natural disasters such as floods and volcanic eruptions, which have intensified due to climate change, making it fourth among the countries most vulnerable to the effects of global warming.
6. Present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 1999, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has a mandate to prevent, deter and stop armed groups from committing violence against civilians. Its phased withdrawal underscores the urgency of establishing alternative measures to ensure the security and protection of the civilian population and humanitarian actors relying on its support.
7. In the first half of 2024, the humanitarian and protection situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo worsened significantly owing to ongoing conflicts and natural disasters. The period saw a surge in human rights violations, particularly against women and children, as well as targeted attacks on critical infrastructure and displacement sites. Inequality between men and women, and girls and boys persists in the country, which ranks 152nd of 166 in the Gender Inequality Index, and over 71,000 cases of gender-based violence were documented in 2023, with increased incidence in conflict zones.

8. As of June 2024, the country had 7.3 million internally displaced people, mainly in the east, owing to armed conflict, intercommunal tensions and natural disasters, while the advance of the March 23 Movement (M23), a non-state armed group, around Goma since 2022 has forced over a million people to flee. The country also hosts 520,385 refugees, mainly from Burundi, the Central African Republic, Rwanda and South Sudan.
9. From 2020 to 2022, the Democratic Republic of the Congo received an average of USD 3.5 billion in official development assistance annually, representing 6.8 percent of its gross national income in 2021, with most funds allocated to humanitarian aid. The United States of America and the World Bank are the main donors. The 2024 humanitarian response plan called for USD 2.6 billion to support 8.7 million people, a relatively low figure compared to overall needs, with the United States of America contributing 51 percent of the funding. The response plan remains chronically underfunded.

### **Country strategic plans**



10. The CSP for 2021–2024 was approved in November 2020 and later extended through 2025. It followed an interim CSP for 2018–2020, which was evaluated previously. The CSP was designed following a 2019 zero hunger review and was aimed at reinforcing WFP's efforts to address resilience and root causes in the country while maintaining a strong emergency response capacity.
11. In June 2023, WFP launched a corporate scale-up for the eastern part of the country to respond to the influx of displaced people around Goma, which was mainly due to advances by M23. The scale-up was subsequently extended in November 2023, while during the remainder of the period under review, the country office managed operations classified as "corporate attention". Two budget revisions have been approved since the start of the CSP. In 2022, the first revision increased the needs-based plan (NBP) to address rising humanitarian needs. The second revision extended the CSP's duration by one year, through 2025, and extended the duration of unconditional assistance for conflict- and crisis-affected people from three to six months.

**Figure 1: Country context and WFP operational overview, 2020–2024**



- The CSP had an original NBP of USD 1.674 billion, which increased to USD 3.875 billion following the second budget revision, which also increased the share of the budget allocated to emergency response to 81 percent. Allocated resources reached USD 1.7 billion in June 2024, while expenditure levels reached 87 percent of allocated resources between 2021 and 2023. The United States of America was by far the largest donor, accounting for 57 percent of funds.

**Figure 2: Country strategic plan budget overview**



Abbreviation: SO = strategic outcome.

## Summary of key conclusions and insights from the evaluation

### Strategic relevance and coherence

WFP is recognized as a key humanitarian actor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo thanks to its logistics capacity, responsiveness, technical expertise and geographic reach. WFP's strategic positioning in food and nutrition security and humanitarian logistics is coherent with the situation in the country and its national policies, as well as the expectations of stakeholders. This provides a solid foundation for the next CSP, although some of WFP's service provider roles, particularly in logistics, air services and data sharing, remain unclear.

13. WFP's CSP is coherent with the Democratic Republic of the Congo's national strategic plan for sustainable development and was designed based on the 2019 zero hunger strategic review. The CSP is strategically and operationally aligned with the United Nations sustainable development cooperation framework and the various humanitarian response plans for the Democratic Republic of the Congo that have been adopted. Over the course of the CSP, WFP made efforts to reinforce this alignment, supporting the Government in its efforts to establish a national grain reserve and develop a national school feeding policy.
14. The country office has aligned well with key WFP policies, particularly on gender and school feeding, and has committed to playing a role in improving the national social protection system. However, integration has remained limited in other important areas such as resilience and South-South cooperation.
15. WFP is one of the key contributors to food security analysis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo through its regular provision of food security assessment data and its role as the co-lead of the food security cluster. It has further strengthened this position by expanding food security assessments to cover the entire country, supporting an Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) acute malnutrition analysis and scaling up the use of its digital beneficiary and transfer management platform (SCOPE). However, household data are not generated often enough to track the rapid evolution of food security in a very dynamic context. Data are also not routinely shared within the humanitarian community, which prevents them from being used for joint analysis that could improve multisectoral assistance and the effectiveness and efficiency of the response.
16. The evaluation found that assistance was not consistently relevant because in-kind assistance was not always adapted to local circumstances. Of the assistance provided under strategic outcome 1, 68 percent consists of food sourced or donated from outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo or delivered as in-kind donations from overseas. This reliance on non-domestic supply chains limits WFP's ability to optimize its interventions for the stimulation and development of local agricultural markets. Another shortcoming is that WFP does not assess the impact of its in-kind assistance on local markets.
17. WFP makes significant efforts to target and assist the people most affected by food and nutrition insecurity. Geographic targeting decisions down to the health zone level are based on relevant data, including on the presence of populations facing emergency (IPC phase 4) food insecurity and, since 2023, systemic factors such as population movements, epidemics, malnutrition prevalence and aspects related to protection. Physical and security access constraints are also considered. Household and individual targeting is based on a vulnerability questionnaire collected by staff from a contracted partner, external to the community and unrelated to the cooperating partner distributing assistance. Standard operating procedures for targeting are being revised, shifting emergency assistance targeting from proxy-means tests to a scorecard approach, with a stronger focus on qualitative data and community mobilization.
18. The evaluation found that WFP's intervention strategy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was relevant. During the period under review, WFP made efforts to prioritize emergency interventions strategically and operationally, taking into account the severity of needs alongside access considerations. Under the CSP, as recommended by the evaluation of the ICSP, WFP aimed to expand its resilience activities in partnership with local organizations specializing in rural development. Nevertheless, this strategy was not fully realized, primarily owing to the persistent earmarking of funding, which prevented WFP from strengthening the links between emergency and development activities. In most intervention areas, emergency and resilience intervention zones are separate, preventing the two types of activity from being linked.

19. Owing to the earmarking of funds, WFP's contribution is heavily focused on "saving lives" rather than "changing lives", limiting its impact on resilience and development objectives. During the period under review WFP had to prioritize improving the quality and increasing the scale of its emergency response, which were achieved at the expense of integrating long-term resilience activities, leading to a lack of clarity regarding WFP's role in promoting resilience. This in turn impaired WFP's ability to prioritize sustainability measures and the development of an exit strategy.
20. During the period under review WFP demonstrated a strong capacity for adaptation, for example through its ability to quickly scale up emergency response or its rapid increase in United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) operations during the response to the outbreak of Ebola virus disease. However, WFP does not make sufficient use of existing data analysis, community networks or its global early warning tools to anticipate or prepare for crises. As a result, its interventions are largely reactive.
21. WFP plays a crucial role in providing services to the humanitarian community through UNHAS and the pooling of logistics services, and as the lead agency for the logistics cluster. This role will become even more significant with the withdrawal of MONUSCO. However, concerns about WFP's centralization of UNHAS funding at headquarters, and the prioritization of staffing for the logistics cluster, have been identified as issues that reflect the need for WFP to clarify its strategy as a service provider.

### Coverage

**While the number of beneficiaries reached fell from 6.8 million in 2020 to 5.2 million in 2023, WFP extended the duration of its emergency assistance for targeted households from three to six months. Nevertheless, despite the operational agility of the country office, WFP's response is not equal to the scale of need in vast parts of the country, and it has been able to address only to a limited extent the food and nutrition insecurity afflicting the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is due to the limited available funding and the operational challenges posed by the difficult circumstances prevailing in the country.**

22. Coverage was extended to hard-to-reach areas in the eastern part of the country thanks to the WFP corporate scale-up following the M23 advance in North and South Kivu and Ituri in 2023. The scale-up was facilitated by significant human and financial resources for the humanitarian-military interaction team. Although WFP's operations benefited from the significant progress achieved by this team, WFP is not perceived as a facilitator of humanitarian access for the wider humanitarian community.
23. Geographic and household prioritization, including of households with specific vulnerabilities, is an operational reality given WFP's limited resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The extension of emergency assistance from three to six months for newly registered beneficiaries was a key element in the revised prioritization strategy, causing WFP to reduce the overall number of beneficiaries reached, while ensuring a more substantial assistance package for targeted households. However, not all the criteria used, dilemmas encountered or trade-offs made as part of prioritization were clearly documented or communicated by the country office and suboffices, which posed a challenge in terms of transparency and accountability. In the long run this lack of transparency risks undermining the acceptance of WFP in beneficiary communities and thereby its continuing ability to reach those communities.



24. In terms of nutrition interventions, the coverage of WFP's malnutrition prevention activities significantly decreased in 2023, largely owing to reduced funding. At the same time, WFP's coverage of malnutrition treatment activities was insufficient given the scale of the malnutrition crisis. The coverage of WFP's school feeding activities fell far short of the objectives of the national strategy, with WFP reducing its support for school canteens and nutrition during the period under review owing to decreased funding.
25. WFP's coverage of smallholder market support activities was significant, but the CSP's ambition was not fully achieved despite increasing coverage targets over the years. WFP focused primarily on a quarter of the provinces, neglecting some areas with strong agricultural potential and relative stability. The country office struggled to secure funding for these activities owing to a lack of data that demonstrated the results of its work in this area.

### **Effectiveness and sustainability**

**The evaluation concludes that all of WFP's assistance activities were of good quality, and WFP's performance in delivering outputs was impressive, particularly with regard to expanding emergency assistance during the scale-up. However, the achievement of outcome indicators was not consistent over time or in the many different operating environments in the country, and the integration of sustainability considerations was inadequate.**

26. Positive results in emergency food assistance were achieved under strategic outcome 1, with notable efforts by the country office to improve services; many beneficiaries expressed appreciation for the quality of WFP's in-kind commodities and the increases in cash-based assistance. However, the evaluation identified concerns related to food variety and preparation. Performance monitoring indicators for emergency assistance showed positive results in terms of key food security indicators, and the percentage of outcome targets reached increased significantly when the assistance package was extended from three to six months.
27. Under strategic outcome 2 the school meal programme delivered satisfactory results, with performance indicators collected at WFP-assisted schools showing decreased dropout rates. The quality of food distributed for school meals was satisfactory, although there was limited diversity.
28. Regarding malnutrition treatment, performance indicators were generally strong, with high rates of target achievement for enrolled beneficiaries. WFP's activities helped improve the health of malnourished children and pregnant and breastfeeding women. However, WFP's performance in achieving malnutrition prevention targets was rather weak because it was difficult for beneficiaries to adhere to the programme owing to the volatile security situation.
29. Under strategic outcome 3 WFP aimed to contribute to the resilience of smallholder farmers and value chain actors. WFP achieved good results in terms of output and outcome indicators, notably a significant improvement in beneficiaries' food consumption and an increase in smallholder farmers' incomes, as shown by a decentralized evaluation of a joint resilience project, and by WFP's post-distribution monitoring reports.
30. As a cross-cutting delivery modality under all CSP strategic objectives, country capacity strengthening in the Democratic Republic of the Congo suffered from a lack of a comprehensive strategy and resources and faced challenges related to governance, armed crises and a lack of coordination, as well as insufficient funding and staffing, all of which limited the effectiveness of WFP's efforts.
31. Activities under strategic outcome 4 consisted of services provided to the humanitarian community in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. UNHAS transported stable numbers of

passengers while exceeding user satisfaction targets. WFP's logistics cluster experienced a significant decline in activities and partners' engagement owing to the suspension of the cluster coordinator position, but overall satisfaction remained high.

32. The design and implementation of the CSP showed limited integration of sustainability issues, particularly in terms of follow-up and support for beneficiaries beyond emergencies, and a lack of clearly defined exit strategies for projects relying on long-term partnerships. WFP's efforts to strengthen resilience showed limited sustainability, with insufficient continuity after emergency interventions, limited follow-up after investment, and a low level of institutionalization of programmes such as school canteens. The sustainability of achievements is also threatened by a lack of resources and insecurity. Partners still rely heavily on WFP's support, limiting the sustainable ownership of activities.
33. Resilience programmes integrated environmental and climate considerations, such as environmental risk management or the use of resilient vegetation for plantations, into their activities. However, emergency programmes struggled to implement suitable processes for reducing the impact of displacement and operations on the environment.

### **Results achieved on cross-cutting themes**

**Significant efforts were made to strengthen work under cross-cutting themes, particularly gender mainstreaming, conflict sensitivity, protection, and accountability to affected people. WFP increased staffing levels, conducted training for its employees and partners and introduced promising new practices. However, the use and integration of these practices in decision-making and programme adjustment was inconsistent.**

34. WFP strengthened its commitment to gender equality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by developing minimum standards and launching a certification programme aimed at enhancing understanding of gender issues. Despite these efforts, however, the integration of the needs of women and girls into programme planning and implementation was limited. Results in relation to gender equality were mixed, with notable progress in certain areas such as awareness of gender-based violence, and women's empowerment, but without a significant impact on community dynamics. Similarly, WFP lacked a concrete approach to improving access and monitoring for persons with disabilities, which limited their participation in activities.
35. WFP integrated protection, strengthening the protection capacity of its teams and partners, and performing regular protection assessments. However, the assessments lacked standardization and were often merely descriptive, thereby limiting their effectiveness. WFP implemented an action plan for protection against sexual exploitation and abuse, including a formalized protocol and dedicated focal points in each field office.
36. WFP improved community engagement by strengthening its capacity and establishing communication channels. However, its approach remained fragmented, and the information shared was not always tailored to the specific needs of vulnerable groups. Community participation in programme design and implementation was limited, particularly in emergency interventions. Although the complaints and feedback received from affected people increased, owing to the hotline for WFP's community feedback mechanism, the country office lacked enough employees to process all cases in a timely manner.
37. Since 2020, WFP has been analysing conflict dynamics in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the aim of ensuring conflict sensitivity in its activities through awareness raising, dialogue and the promotion of community participation and reconciliation among communities. WFP has strengthened its approach to promoting social cohesion in emergency activities, particularly by including host communities in certain responses, and through resilience activities that minimize tensions.

38. Adherence to humanitarian principles in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a complex task, requiring delicate and difficult trade-offs due to external risk factors related to funding, conflict, insecurity and relations with authorities, which must be mitigated. Overall, WFP performs well in terms of humanity but faces challenges in operationalizing impartiality, neutrality and operational independence. A specialized team analyses and capitalizes on the operational challenges that WFP faces, although there is limited documentation of recommendations and decisions on the trade-offs involved. On impartiality, the lack of documentation on prioritization stands out as a challenge, while WFP's initial absence from M23-controlled territory posed a challenge to its neutrality. Regarding operational independence, the dominant influence of certain donors, and their earmarking of funds for specific provinces present a challenge and undermine the principle of impartiality.

### **Efficiency and risk management**

**WFP made notable investments in improving internal tools and processes for operational risk management, enhancing efficiency and improving the quality of assistance. However, these investments were insufficient to generate evidence that supports preparedness for crisis response and informs programmatic decision-making for results.**

39. Compliance with implementation timelines varies by activity, and the speed of implementation is not systematically documented by the country office. Delays mainly affect emergency distributions and resilience activities. Delays have been caused by external factors such as logistics constraints and physical and humanitarian access challenges, and internal factors such as delays in partnership agreements, staff shortages and supply chain issues. During the period under review there were instances where delays negatively affected the relevance of the emergency response to the needs of the affected people.
40. The cost per beneficiary of emergency food assistance increased over the course of the period under review, rising from USD 50 per beneficiary per year in 2021 to USD 85 in 2023. Economies of scale during the emergency scale-up did not offset rising food prices. Overall, cash-based transfers were more cost-efficient than in-kind food distributions, even though WFP increased transfer values to safeguard beneficiaries' purchasing power in line with food inflation.
41. The transition to and scale-up of SCOPE appears to have been financially neutral, as investments in technology and human resources were offset by gains in deduplication. However, there is consensus among partners that WFP could provide major cost-efficiency benefits for the humanitarian system in the Democratic Republic of the Congo if there was a mechanism in place for sharing SCOPE data.
42. Comparative analyses for selecting modalities, taking into consideration market functionality and access, acceptance, protection risk, timeliness, cost-efficiency, and market impact were insufficient, although efforts to increase analyses and the documentation of these decision processes were recently made. Owing to the significant weight of in-kind donations in WFP's modality mix, 67 percent of the rations delivered in 2023 were in-kind. For this reason, the country office has not prioritized comparative analyses, although they could inform modality choice for specific intervention areas, and support advocacy of funding for more cost-efficient emergency responses with donors. Although WFP's independence in selecting modalities is limited, the assessment and documentation of the relevance of one type of intervention over another could help to provide evidence that influences the future choice of modalities.
43. Since 2022, WFP has significantly strengthened its risk management process by implementing a corrective action plan that identifies both external and internal risks and enforces mitigation measures through concrete actions and monitoring indicators. These

measures led to improved quality controls, reduced fraud through the use of biometric registration, and enhanced the efficiency of beneficiary verification in the distribution process.

### **Factors affecting WFP's performance**

**Although the logic underlying the CSP's interventions was relevant, and WFP attracted a more diverse donor base, CSP implementation was hindered by heavily earmarked funding. Further factors that require continued attention include the monitoring system and efforts to attract and retain staff.**

44. Despite successes in strengthening and diversifying funding, the funds raised were not sufficient to cover the various strategic outcomes of the CSP, such as all the emergency needs of households facing food insecurity in IPC phase 3 and above throughout the country, or activities such as those for the prevention of malnutrition and smallholder market support. This limited WFP's results. WFP's funding diversification strategy is promising, particularly with regard to the financing of resilience activities, but its impact has been limited to date. High dependence on a single key donor, the decreasing predictability of contributions, and the very high share of earmarked funding – with 82 percent of contributions earmarked by activity in any given year – all contributed to challenges for the coherent implementation of the CSP.
45. WFP's systems for monitoring, information management, feedback and complaint management and reporting improved, although data analysis was geared towards global reporting requirements rather than on-the-ground learning. Data analysis and comparisons in time and between regions were insufficient, limiting the use of insights derived from monitoring data for informing programme adaptation. While initiatives aimed at better use of monitoring data at the field level showed positive results, they were not widely adopted.
46. Despite progress in recruitment, key positions remained vacant, reducing WFP's effectiveness during the period under review. Contractual issues for both international and national employees hindered the attractiveness of WFP as an employer in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the retention of employees was low, particularly at the field level. To fill critical gaps and support the scale-up, the country office and field offices hosted many support missions from the regional bureau and headquarters. However, feedback on the effectiveness of these short missions was limited, with linguistic barriers posing a specific challenge in the case of the country office.

### **Partnerships for results**

**WFP's ability to fulfil its ambitions under the CSP is closely tied to its relationships with financial, operational and cooperating partners, especially in a country where work at the humanitarian–development–peace nexus is critical. Weaknesses in partnership management persisted, particularly with local and government partners, limiting efficiency and progress in nexus-related work.**

47. WFP developed a clear partnership strategy at the beginning of the CSP period, strengthening its collaboration with the Government and United Nations entities. Despite this, weaknesses in partnerships persisted, limiting the efficiency of responses and progress at the nexus. The Government was more involved in the implementation of initiatives than in their design, and WFP adapted its support to meet the Government's needs. The level of government coordination and involvement varied between activities, but improvements under all activities during the period under review have been acknowledged.
48. WFP strengthened its partnerships with other United Nations entities, in particular collaborating with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on resilience programmes. These partnerships

provided significant added value given the resilience-related ambitions of the CSP. However, the lack of a common United Nations delivery model on the ground, which is a global issue, and the lack of alignment of implementation practices – such as targeting, modalities and procurement – among entities were obstacles.

49. One contentious issue with operational partners was the sharing of SCOPE data. WFP headquarters governed external stakeholders' access to systems and data and clarified access procedures. However, external stakeholders, including donors and members of the humanitarian country team, reported a lack of formal and consistent feedback from WFP regarding the feasibility of and procedures for data sharing.
50. WFP sought to strengthen localization by increasing the proportion of implementation partnerships with national organizations – rather than international non-governmental organizations – and strengthening their capacity. However, partnerships were fragile owing to slow contracting processes, the use of annual contracts, frequent funding shortages, and payment delays, all of which affected the efficiency of implementation.

## Recommendations

| Recommendations and sub-recommendations   | Recommendation type       | Responsible WFP office and divisions  | Other contributing entities  | Priority | Deadline for completion |
|---|---------------------------|---|--|----------|-------------------------|
| <b>Recommendation 1: Continue to refine geographic, household and modality prioritization decisions for emergency response</b>  |                           |   |  |          |                         |
| 1.1 Strengthen the strategic approach to prioritization and the coverage of areas with high levels of need (IPC phases 3 and 4), taking into consideration the various shocks affecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in coordination with relevant partners and clusters.  | Strategic                 | Country office research, assessment and monitoring (RAM), and programme units | Country office humanitarian-military interaction (HMI) and access units; food security and nutrition clusters          | High     | December 2025           |
| 1.2 Better document and explain the principles, criteria and decisions for prioritizing intervention areas, including villages and other sites. <sup>1</sup>  | Operational               | Country office RAM and programme units  | Country office HMI and access units; food security and nutrition clusters  |          |                         |
| 1.3 Strengthen, systematize and formalize analyses of cash-based modalities based on studies of their comparative feasibility <sup>2</sup> and relevance. <sup>3</sup> The analyses should inform decision-making in intervention areas and support advocacy for more flexible funding from WFP's donor partners.                       | Strategic and operational | Country office cash-based transfers unit                                      | Country office RAM, supply chain, programme, protection, technology, finance, HMI and access units; cash working group |          |                         |
| 1.4 Review, validate and disseminate at the national level the access strategy developed for the eastern part of the country in order to standardize and promote best practices and strengthen capacity in sub-offices. <sup>4</sup> Promote the strategy's implementation at the field level by establishing dedicated working groups. | Strategic                 | Country office access and HMI units   | Country office programme, protection and supply chain units; headquarters in Rome; regional office                     |          |                         |

<sup>1</sup> Such a report, already requested by one of WFP's donors, could have both internal and external significance.

<sup>2</sup> Feasibility criteria include market functionality, availability of a payment mechanism and/or a financial service provider partner, access to markets and financial services, and cross-cutting protection risks.

<sup>3</sup> Relevance criteria include the acceptance and preference of communities, and political acceptance. Additional considerations include supply chain factors, implementation costs, and the expiry dates of stored food.

<sup>4</sup> A nationally validated access strategy would provide significant legitimacy to the approaches taken to humanitarian access negotiations and would serve as a guide for suboffices, empowering WFP teams in their interactions and relationships with communities and both state and non-state authorities. Such validation would promote the adoption of best practices and facilitate the evolution of the strategy over time. A national access strategy would further standardize WFP's approach in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, providing clear messaging and guiding appropriate behaviour for all teams.

| Recommendations and sub-recommendations   | Recommendation type       | Responsible WFP office and divisions   | Other contributing entities   | Priority | Deadline for completion  |
|---|---------------------------|--|---|----------|--------------------------|
| <b>Recommendation 2: Strengthen the integration of strategic outcomes 1, 2 and 3</b>  |                           |  |   |          |                          |
| 2.1 Based on available tools and proven results, develop a strategy for the transition from emergency response to resilience that clearly defines the roles of WFP and other stakeholders in the development domain. This strategy should leverage identified comparative advantages from this and previous evaluations, and lessons learned by the country office. It should also support joint advocacy aimed at convincing donors to provide sufficient resources for resilience-building efforts. | Strategic                 | Country office programme unit          | Country office RAM unit; Partnerships and Innovation Department; headquarters in Rome; regional office; UNICEF; FAO; United Nations country team; other United Nations entities | High     | December 2026            |
| 2.2 Support joint advocacy aimed at convincing donors to provide sufficient resources for better integrating nutrition activities into both emergency distribution and resilience programmes.   | Strategic                 | Country office management              | Country office partnerships and programme units; headquarters in Rome; regional office  |          | End of next CSP          |
| 2.3 Develop processes and tools for the design, implementation and monitoring of joint resilience programmes in collaboration with UNICEF, FAO and, potentially, other United Nations entities or key partners such as financial institutions and international non-governmental organizations engaged in rural development, peacebuilding and activities aimed at reducing disparities between men and women, and boys and girls.  | Operational               | Country office programme and RAM units | Country office management; headquarters in Rome; regional office; UNICEF; FAO; other United Nations entities  |          | End of next CSP          |
| 2.4 For the next CSP, establish a coordinated approach to country capacity strengthening for the country office level by developing and implementing an action plan with clear and measurable indicators.   | Strategic and operational | Country office management              | Country office programme and partnerships units; headquarters in Rome; regional office; United Nations humanitarian country team (HCT)  |          | Before start of next CSP |

| Recommendations and sub-recommendations   | Recommendation type | Responsible WFP office and divisions                                   | Other contributing entities   | Priority | Deadline for completion |
|---|---------------------|--|---|----------|-------------------------|
| <b>Recommendation 3: Strengthen the management and utilization of data for informed decision-making</b>   |                     |  |   |          |                         |
| 3.1 Enhance comparative analysis over time and geographic areas, and the triangulation of data on accountability to affected people, monitoring and evaluation, and protection from sexual exploitation and abuse. Review data analysis processes and the associated roles and responsibilities, and make analyses available more quickly internally to facilitate decision-making.                     | Operational         | Country office RAM unit  | Country office programme teams working on accountability to affected people, gender and protection from sexual exploitation and abuse; Programme Cycle and Quality Unit (POCQ); headquarters in Rome; regional office | Medium   | June 2026               |
| 3.2 Strengthen information sharing with assisted households regarding distribution dates, modalities and targeting criteria, and, more generally, strengthen consultation with households on the design and implementation of activities.   | Operational         | Country office programme unit (accountability to affected people unit) | Country office RAM unit; POCQ   |          |                         |
| 3.3 Translate the results of socioeconomic analyses into realistic action plans and feed them into context-specific social and behaviour change strategies.   | Operational         | Country office gender unit   | Country office programme unit; POCQ   |          |                         |
| <b>Recommendation 4: Strengthen partnerships with key partners essential for achieving CSP objectives.</b>  |                     |  |   |          |                         |
| 4.1 In collaboration with headquarters and in line with WFP's localization policy, establish multi-year agreements with key partners for resilience programmes. Include a mechanism for adapting these agreements annually based on available budget resources, while systematically integrating capacity development activities and involving partners in the design and implementation of programmes. | Operational         | Country office management; programme unit                              | Headquarters in Rome; regional office   | Medium   | December 2025           |



| Recommendations and sub-recommendations  | Recommendation type | Responsible WFP office and divisions               | Other contributing entities  | Priority | Deadline for completion |
|--|---------------------|--|--|----------|-------------------------|
| 4.2 Establish more flexible and agile contract modalities that enable civil society organizations to contribute to programme and cross-cutting objectives, particularly in areas such as community-wide participation and accountability to affected people, for better integration into WFP's activities.   | Operational         | Country office management; programme unit          | Headquarters in Rome; regional office  | Medium   | December 2026           |
| <b>Recommendation 5: Clarify WFP's positioning in terms of coordination and service provision to the humanitarian community.</b>   |                     |  |  |          |                         |
| 5.1 Conduct a global evaluation – or at least an internal review at the country level – of the relevance and effectiveness of the logistics cluster with a view to better defining its strategy.   | Strategic           | Country office RAM and supply chain units          | Country office management; HCT; Aviation Service (depending on format)                                     | High     | December 2025           |
| 5.2 Sharing responsibility with the Technology Division at headquarters, study the possibility of and modalities for sharing the personal data of beneficiaries that is available in SCOPE with other humanitarian actors that can demonstrate the ability and willingness to adhere to WFP's data protection standards. This will enable the targeting and distribution of multisectoral assistance to affected households. | Strategic           | Country office technology, programme and RAM units | Headquarters in Rome; regional office (technology unit); HCT; country office management; partnerships unit |          |                         |
| 5.3 Reconsider the funding model for UNHAS under the next CSP, particularly with the withdrawal of MONUSCO. Intensify fundraising efforts and enable direct fundraising for UNHAS operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo rather than the use of pooled funds managed by headquarters.  | Strategic           | Country office UNHAS staff                         | Aviation Service, country office management; partnerships unit; headquarters in Rome; regional office      |          |                         |

**Acronyms**

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| CSP     | country strategic plan  |
| FAO     | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations                                   |
| ICSP    | interim country strategic plan  |
| IPC     | Integrated Food Security Phase Classification   |
| M23     | March 23 Movement   |
| MONUSCO | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| NBP     | needs-based plan  |
| SCOPE   | digital beneficiary and transfer management platform                                      |
| UNHAS   | United Nations Humanitarian Air Service   |
| UNICEF  | United Nations Children's Fund  |