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Central African Republic: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2012-mid 2017)

Evaluation Report: Volume II - Annexes

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Table of Contents

Annex A Terms of Reference	1
Annex B List of Operations in WFP Portfolio in the Central African Republic	14
Annex C Evaluation Matrix	16
Annex D List of People Consulted During the Evaluation	26
Annex E Evaluation Methodology	34
Annex F Bibliography	37
Annex G Evaluation Process and Timeline	46
Annex H Assessment of Special Operations in the Central African Republic	48
Annex I Assessment of the Interim Country Strategic Plan	52
Annex J Strategic Alignment of the Portfolio	60
Annex K Case Study on the Impact of Funding Shortfalls on Regional EMOP 200799	64
Annex L Analysis of Logistical Constraints for the Central African Republic	66
Annex M Nutrition Beneficiaries	71
Annex N Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness	74
Annex O Outcome Indicators Used for School Meals	80
Annex P Mapping of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations	83

List of Figures

Figure A1: International Assistance to CAR (2012-2016)	4
Figure A2: Food stocks available at each month end in the seven WFP warehouses with the respective tonnages handed over to the partners and to the beneficiaries (Period March 2016–August 2017 – 18 months)	67
Figure A3: Comparative analysis of food aid pipeline and anticipated shortfalls (Period January 2016 to September September 2017)	68
Figure A4: Direct operation costs versus direct support costs	78

List of Tables

Table A1: WFP portfolio in the Central African Republic (2012-2016)	7
Table A2: Provisional timeline overview	12
Table A3: Funding and resourcing of WFP portfolio in the Central African Republic (2012–mid 2017)	148
Table A4: Funding shortfalls by type of operation, 2012-2016, in USD	1915
Table A5: Summary overview of special operations programmes (Figures as of 31/12/2016)	49

Table A6: Key figures of UNHAS operations in the Central African Republic–(period Jan. 2014– June 2017).....	490
Table A7: Key steps in the design process of ICSP.....	545
Table A8: Detailed description of capacity-strengthening measures in ICSP (2018-2020), per activity	557
Table A9: Strategic alignment 2012–mid 2017	60
Table A10: Coherence of activities with Strategic Objectives.....	63
Table A11: Impact of funding shortfall per type of activity in regional EMOP 200799 during the first six months of 2017, in numbers of beneficiaries.....	65
Table A12: WFP truck fleet availability and utilization report (3 month period June–August 2017).....	69
Table A13: Comparative table of food commodities procured under standard WFP procurement procedures versus under the Global Commodity Management Facility modus.	70
Table A14: People living with HIV under antiretroviral treatment, with nutritional support 2012-2016.....	73
Table A15: Comparing food baskets for in-kind and voucher-based general food distribution..	746
Table A16: Cost-effectiveness of voucher cash based transfer modality compared to in-kind general food distribution, 2016.....	757
Table A17: FAO food commodity indices (period 2000–2002)	758
Table A18: Key figures for the degree of efficiency of food aid operations	779
Table A19: Recap of direct operational costs versus direct support costs on a yearly basis (period 2012–2016)	791

Annex A Terms of Reference

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: AN EVALUATION OF WFP'S PORTFOLIO ¹ (2012- MID 2017)

1 Background

The purpose of these terms of reference (TOR) is to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed Central African Republic (C.A.R) Country Portfolio Evaluation (CPE) (2012- 2016), to guide the evaluation team and specify expectations during the various phases of the evaluation. The TOR are structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides information on the context; Chapter 2 presents the rationale, objectives, stakeholders and main users of the evaluation; Chapter 3 presents the WFP portfolio and defines the scope of the evaluation; Chapter 4 identifies the evaluation questions, approach and methodology; Chapter 5 indicates how the evaluation will be organized. The annexes provide additional information such as a detailed timeline and map.

1.1 Introduction

Country Portfolio Evaluations (CPE) encompass the entirety of WFP activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to make evidence-based decisions about positioning WFP in a country; and about strategic partnerships, programme design, and implementation.

In 2017, the Office of Evaluation (OEV) will be implementing a CPE in C.A.R. The C.A.R was selected on the basis of country-related and WFP-specific criteria. It falls in the category of countries where WFP has a relatively important portfolio and WFP Country Office (CO) would benefit the most from a CPE for future programming.

1.2 Country Context

The C.A.R is a landlocked country in central Africa, with a total area of 644,000 sq. km and a population of 4.9 million in 2015. It is bordered by Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo and Cameroon. After the 2013-2014 civil conflict that threatened the country's existence, C.A.R has been under a precarious transition and at present sporadic violence continues as the country struggles to recover. The 2016 elections marked the end of the conflict and the beginning of a national rehabilitation process.

The country is endowed with significant mineral deposits and other natural resources, such as uranium, crude oil, gold, diamonds, cobalt, lumber, hydropower and arable land. However, the gross national income (GNI) per capita for 2015 was US \$330². C.A.R was ranked low on the 2014 Human Development Index at 187 out of 188 countries³. More than half of the country's population, the equivalent of 2.3 million people, are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, while 76% of the population continues to live in extreme poverty rates including 81% for women and 69% for men.⁴

¹ This version of the Terms of Reference does not include the Annexes. The full document can be found at <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000021026/download/>

² <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD> World Bank, 2016

³ Human Development Report 2015, CAR, page 2, 2015

⁴ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/centralafricanrepublic/overview>

The government developed a poverty reduction strategy (2011-2014) which had three pillars: (a) peace consolidation, good governance and the rule of law; (b) the promotion of economic stimulus and sustainable development; and (c) the promotion of human capital and essential social services.⁵ However, in 2013, a major security and humanitarian crisis erupted, disrupting the country's social fabric and displacing 25% of its population. On 11 December 2013, the crisis in C.A.R was declared an L3 emergency and since 2015 it has been a Level 2 emergency. C.A.R has gone through a severe political crisis which has exacerbated inter-community violence. The crisis has undermined economic progress and constrained public administration. Although CAR is progressively emerging from crisis, economic recovery has been very modest. After the collapse of 2013, when real GDP fell by 36%, the economy picked up only 1% in 2014, and 4.8% in 2015 when the tax revenue stood at half the level of 2012, therefore depriving the country of much needed resources and further weakening the state's capacity to provide basic services.⁶ In late 2016, the government adopted the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan charting the post conflict recovery and development roadmap.⁷

1.3 Food Security and Livelihood

Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy in C.A.R with 75% of the population relying on agriculture for their food, income and livelihoods. According to the 2016 FAO/WFP Food Assessment, reduced food availability and access constraints have led to a deterioration of the food security situation resulting in a sharp increase in food prices.⁸ In parallel, purchasing power was reduced by a third compared with 2012, further entrenching vulnerability. Cereal production was down by 70%, fisheries output by 40%, and cattle population 46%. Production levels of cotton and coffee – two key cash crops – were estimated lower at 42% and 28% respectively. Killings and looting brought the number of cattle down to almost half, and the number of goats and sheep shrank by as much as 57%. Damage to infrastructure and insecurity led to lower fishing by 40% in 2015 than in 2012.⁹

Nutrition and Health

C.A.R reveals some of the worst nutrition and health indicators in the world. The 2015 Unicef annual report states that under-five child mortality rate stood at 139 per 1,000 live births, the eighth highest in the world, and the maternal mortality rate of 890 per 100,000 live births is the third highest. Some 41% of children under 5 years suffer from severe, acute, or moderate malnutrition. Nearly one third of the population lacks access to safe water and adequate sanitation.¹⁰ Moreover, the health sector is characterized by declining investment in health system development, including a lack of appropriate facilities, medical equipment, and qualified health workers implying 250 medical doctors for 4.6 million inhabitants, or five doctors for every 100,000 people. District health systems are not functional in many regions and community participation in health system management is weak.¹¹

Education

The Government had a National Action Plan (2004–2015) promoting Education for All. The conflict greatly magnified the education sector's challenges, as unpaid teachers left their posts, school facilities were looted or destroyed, and thousands of children lost several years of schooling.

⁵ Final country programme document for the Central African Republic UNFP DP/FPA/CPD/CAF/7, 2011

⁶ African Economic Outlook AfDB, OECD, UNDP, page 134 2016

⁷ National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017-2021, page 6, 2016

⁸ FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM), Rome, March 2016

⁹ FAO Situation Report page 1, December 2016.

¹⁰ 2015 Unicef Annual Report CAR

¹¹ WHO Africa Regional Office Website: www.afro.who.int

Teacher recruitment and training were disrupted, further constraining the deployment of qualified teachers. The formal school system effectively ceased to function for two full academic years, with some schools slowly beginning to resume normal operations in early 2015.¹² Slightly over a quarter (28%) of children of official primary school ages are out of school. It is estimated approximately 37% of boys of primary school age are out of school compared to 47% of girls of the same age. Nearly 66% of female youth of secondary school age are out of school compared to 42% of male youth of the same age.¹³

Gender

In Central African Republic, up to 80% of farm labour is provided by women, who also head a significant number of farm households (African Development Bank, 2013a). Women are also the heads of a large proportion of displaced households. Gender based violence (GBV) has been widespread coupled with pervasive human rights violation even before the country plunged into conflict. The current conflict has seriously exacerbated gender inequality with regard to access to education and to the vulnerability of girls to exploitation and abuse. Sexual and gender-based violence is widespread, and female genital mutilation affects about one-third of women.¹⁴

Internally-displaced persons (IDPs) and Refugees

C.A.R has experienced massive displacements of people. IDP figures leaped from an estimated 52,000 in December 2012 to 958,000 in January 2014 and then progressively declined to 369,500 in July 2015. According to the Population Movement Commission, over 60% of the IDPs were living with host families, 35% in camp-like settings and spontaneous settlements - including in and around public buildings such as schools, churches and mosques - and 1% in the bush.¹⁵ In support of the IDPs, WFP coordinates its activities with Unicef, UNHCR, OCHA, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Protection and Humanitarian Access

A recent UN report highlights that the protection of civilians was hampered by the very limited presence of State institutions, particularly outside of Bangui.¹⁶ Security condition remain in flux with a resurgence of attacks against humanitarian workers, to the tune of 336 attacks in 2016, including five humanitarian workers killed in the line of duty. There have been repeated attacks and provocations against the 12,000-person United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) by armed groups. During the last quarter of 2016, the outbreaks of violence displaced more than 70,000 people in the country. In some areas, humanitarian workers cannot reach the displaced who are hidden in the bush due to insecurity.¹⁷

International Assistance

C.A.R has experienced a major political crisis which has resulted in a violent conflict that has left nearly half the population, in dire need of assistance.¹⁸ In 2013, C.A.R was recipient of Official Development Assistance (ODA)¹⁹ countries from European Commission, France, US, Global Fund, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway as the country continues to face tremendous socio-economic

¹² National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017-2021, page 6, 2016

¹³ National Education Profile 2014 Update.

¹⁴ Central African Republic: Gender Un Women September 2016

¹⁵ Internal Monitoring Displacement Center: <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/central-african-republic/figures-analysis>

¹⁶ "Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Central African Republic from 01 June 2015 – 31 March 2016.


¹⁷ <http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-countries/ipcinfo-eastern-middle-africa/Central%20African%20Republic>

¹⁸ <http://www.unocha.org/car/>

¹⁹ DAC - INCAF BRIEFING 2013

economic and political transition challenges. ODA and humanitarian assistance levels have been declining after a peak in 2014.

Figure A1: International Assistance to CAR (2012-2016)



Source: OECD-DAC, WB, UN-OCHA

2 Reasons for the Evaluation

2.1 Rationale

The evaluation is an opportunity for the CO to benefit from an independent assessment of its Country Strategy (CS) and portfolio of operations during 2012- 2016. The timing will enable the CO to use the CPE evidence on past and current performance in the design of the CO's new Interim Country Strategic Plan (ICSP) – scheduled for Executive Board approval in November 2017 - under WFP's Integrated Road Map (IRM), and the next United Nation Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).²⁰ The IRM is WFP's integrated approach for implementation of the WFP Strategic Plan (2017-2021), taking into account the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

There has been no previous evaluation of WFP's portfolio of activities in Central African Republic.²¹

2.2 Objectives

Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the CPE will:

- assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Central African Republic (accountability); and
- determine the reasons for observed success or failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings that allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in Central African Republic, form strategic partnerships, and improve programme design and implementation whenever possible (learning).

²⁰ The current United Nations Development Assistance Framework covers the period 2012–2016

²¹ Previous relevant evaluations include Report of the Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the Response to the Central African Republic's Crisis (2013-2015), March 2016.

2.3 Stakeholders and Users of the Evaluation

The evaluation will seek the views of, and be useful to, a broad range of WFP's internal and external stakeholders. The main stakeholder and users of the evaluation are the WFP CO, Regional Bureau in Dakar (RBD), Headquarters Management, the Executive Board (EB), the beneficiaries, the Government of C.A.R, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), donors and the UN Country Team. A matrix of stakeholders with their respective interests and roles in the CPE is attached in Annex 4. WFP works closely with the other two Rome-based Agencies Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Country Team, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and International Organization for Migration (IOM).

In addition, WFP partners with multilateral and bilateral donors in the design, funding and coordination of delivery of food and technical assistance. They are important in the complex context of C.A.R as the CPE will give particular attention to how these agencies view the context and WFP's role in it. It should provide useful lessons for their own country portfolios and for enhancing synergy, coordination and collaboration. Cooperating partners are organizations with which WFP has collaborated directly in the implementation of its portfolio. They comprise a number of local authorities, civil society organizations as well as international and national NGOs. The evaluation is expected to enable them to enhance their strategy for collaboration and synergy with WFP, clarifying mandates and roles, and accelerating progress towards replication, hand-over and sustainability.

WFP beneficiaries are the most important stakeholder group of all: comprising food insecure households, IDPs, refugees, children under five, pregnant and lactating women, farmers, school children and participants in livelihoods activities. Data disaggregation by sex, gender sensitive stakeholder assessment and understanding of differences in gender roles are particularly important for the CPE.

National government partners comprise ministries and authorities such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Family and Social Affairs. This CPE should enable national policy makers to sharpen their view of opportunities for synergies and coordination to support national strategy; and ensure that WFP's future contributions are best attuned to national need and policy.

3 Subject of the Evaluation

3.1 WFP's Portfolio in Central African Republic

WFP assistance in the C.A.R. focuses on improving the food security and nutrition situation of the displaced and vulnerable populations through country program, PRRO, EMOPs and Special Operations. It aims to improve food consumption, reduce undernutrition, and restore the access to basic services of populations affected by conflict. During the 2012-2015 period, a total of 108,000 metric tons (MT) of food were distributed to over 5.1 million beneficiaries, of which 52% were women. For 2016, WFP assisted 997,000 people in the C.A.R. In October 2016, there were 2 million people who are food-insecure, 600,000 severely food-insecure and 420,680 people displaced.²² Current ongoing operations include the following:

²² WFP CAR Country Brief, November 2016

The Country Program 200331 (2012-2016) has supported education through school meals; improving the nutrition status of pregnant and lactating women and children, particularly in the first 1,000 days following conception, acutely malnourished children aged under 5 years; and strengthening the capacity of national institutions for programme ownership.

Regional EMOP 200799 (Jan. 2015-Dec 2016) has provided flexible seasonal support to moderately food-insecure households, supporting the restoration of access to basic services and human capital protection. WFP assists the internally displaced, host communities and affected local populations through complementing general food assistance (GFA) with cash-based transfers (CBTs). Conducting nutrition activities includes blanket supplementary feeding for affected households with children aged 6-23 months, and treatment services for moderately acute malnourished children aged 6-59 months, as well as pregnant and nursing women. WFP's recent initiatives focus on Purchase for Progress (P4P) activity and home-grown school feeding.

SO 200804 (Jan-Dec. 2016) is the WFP-managed UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) provides transport to 28 destinations for the humanitarian community to areas that are otherwise inaccessible due to insecurity, poor infrastructure or flooding. The monthly average is 2800 passengers and 27.5 metric tons of cargo.

SO 200997 (Aug 2016 – Mar 2017), a Special Operation for the Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC), continues to provide Logistics and ETC support to the entire humanitarian community in C.A.R.

SO 200934 (Jan.-Dec. 2016) is a regional Special Operation focusses on enhanced coordination, logistics gaps and bottle-necks in the main access route from the port of Douala in Cameroon to the capital Bangui which originate from the unstable security in C.A.R.

Table A1: WFP portfolio in CAR (2012- 2016)

Timeline and Funding Levels of WFP Portfolio in CAR 2012-2016						
Operation	Time Frame	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
IR-EMOP 200799*	1 January 2015–31 December 2017			L3	REQ: 518,114,427 REC: 271,022,630 FUNDED: 52%	L2
SO 200997*	01st August 2016–31st March 2017				L2 launched in June 2015	REQ: 2,038,906 REC: 1,236,569 FUNDED: 61%
DEV 200331	01 January 2012–31 December 2016	REQ: 23,354,244 REC: 1,236,569 FUNDED: 5%	L3 launched in November 2013			
SO 200804*	05 February 2015 - 31 December 2016 (including 1 BR)				REQ: 30,364,852 REC: 24,701,948 FUNDED: 81%	
SO 200934*	15 January 2016 – 31 December 2016				REQ: 3,095,895 REC: 1,849,744 FUNDED: 60%	
SO 200605	15 July 2013 - 30 April 2016 (including 5 BRs)					REQ: 14,861,493 REC: 6,624,776 FUNDED: 45%
EMOP 200650	01 January 2014–31 December 2014 (including 3 BRs)			REQ: 127,100,000 REC: 75,432,291 FUNDED: 59%		
SO 200646	13 December 2013 – 31 December 2014 (including 1 BR)			REQ: 15,63,830 REC: 96,485 FUNDED: 6%		
SO 200643	12 December 2013 – 30 June 2014 (including 1 BR)			REQ: 5,310,683 REC: 6,109,339 FUNDED: 73%		
IRA 200544	28 February 2013–29 June 2013		REQ: 176,194 REC: 163,428 FUNDED: 27%			
SO 200522	01 January 2013 - 31 December 2013 (including 1 BR)		REQ: 21,919,177 REC: 18,709,574 FUNDED: 85%			
IR-EMOP 200565	06 January 2013–31 August 2013		REQ: 1,498,160 REC: 402,363 FUNDED: 27%			
PRRO 200315	01 January 2012 – 31 December 2013	REQ: 48,281,696 REC: 35,294,196 FUNDED: 73%				
SO 105620	01 Nov 2006 - 31 Dec 2012	REQ: 26,287,103 REC: 22,010,675 FUNDED: 84%				
TF 200933	01 September 2015 - 30 June 2016					REQ: 26,287,104 REC: 26,287,104 FUNDED: 100%
Direct Expenses (US\$ millions)		3 994 511	4 159 300	4 717 572	4 633 491	n.a
% Direct Expenses: CAR vs. WFP World		22 794	23 007	85 846	64 714	n.a
Food Distributed (MT)		18,002	12,667	39,601	37,729	n.a
Total of Beneficiaries (actual)		338,481	895,339	2,440,353	1,449,005	n.a
% women beneficiaries (actual)		50%	49%	53%	55%	n.a

Source: Standard Project Reports, Financial Section
* Source "Resource Situation" Report (External w/o forecasts)

3.2 Scope of the Evaluation

This CPE covers a 5-year period, from 2012 to 2016. The evaluation will review all WFP portfolio of operations implemented (2012-2016), and geographic areas covered by the portfolio, namely central, north, west, eastern and southern regions.²³ In particular, the evaluation will assess a country program, one protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO), three emergency operations (EMOPs), IR-EMOP and over 9 special operations (SOs). The evaluation will look at general food assistance, logistic support, nutrition, school feeding, national capacity strengthening and innovative approaches and tools, including cash based transfers and P4P. Cross-cutting issues such as monitoring and evaluation, gender equality and women's empowerment, protection, and humanitarian principles and access will be assessed. The field work will focus on a limited number of regions and sites and transparent selection criteria will be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase.

4 Evaluation Questions, Approach and Methodology

4.1 Evaluation Questions

The CPE will address the three main areas of focus common to CPE model, as developed by OEV. The sub-questions focus on issues of relevance to the C.A.R context, and the ongoing WFP key strategic, operational and technical issues of relevance for future positioning and programming. The evaluation team will further develop them in a detailed Evaluation Matrix during the Inception phase. The evaluation will consider the differences in beneficiaries' roles disaggregated by sex and various age groups. Collectively, the questions aim at highlighting the key lessons from the WFP country presence and performance, which could inform future strategic decisions. Question 3 will constitute the largest part of the inquiry and evaluation report.

Question 1: Alignment and Strategic Positioning of WFP's Country Strategy and Portfolio. Reflect on the extent to which: i) main objectives and related activities have been relevant with the country's population humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities; ii) objectives have been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies; iii) objectives have been coherent and harmonised with those of partners especially UN partners, but also with, bilateral partners and NGOs; iv) WFP has been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference; and v) there have been trade-offs between aligning with national needs and strategies and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies).

Question 2: Factors influencing and Quality of Strategic Decision Making. Reflect on the extent to which WFP: i) has analysed or used existing analysis of the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition issues in C.A.R - including gender equality and protection issues; ii) contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues; and iii) identify the factors that determined existing choices (perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organisational structure and staffing, monitoring information etc.) to understand these drivers of strategy, and how they were considered and managed when the current CS was developed by the CO; and iv) has analysed, or used existing assessment of security-related risks.

Question 3: Performance and Results of the WFP portfolio. Reflect on: i) the level of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities (2012-2016) and explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control such as conflict and natural disasters); ii) the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to and control over food, resources, and decision-making iii) the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various

²³ According to the CO, there is no county strategy document for WFP C.A.R

activities in the portfolio, regardless of the operations; iv) the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially UN partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level. The evaluation will assess the “dynamic” nature of these operations, including the extent to which WFP activities have been developmental in approach in such a conflict-prone context and the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures.

4.2 Evaluability Assessment

Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. It necessitates that a policy, intervention or operation provides: (a) a clear description of the situation before or at its start that can be used as reference point to determine or measure change; (b) a clear statement of intended outcomes, i.e. the desired changes that should be observable once implementation is under way or completed; (c) a set of clearly defined and appropriate indicators with which to measure changes; and (d) a defined timeframe by which outcomes should be occurring.

The current complex socio-economic and political context of C.A.R can create security constraints regarding availability of and access to WFP beneficiaries, cooperating partners as well as the regions where WFP operates. OEV will continue close monitoring of the situation and consultation with the CO and RBD in order to assess the practical implications on the feasibility, scope and timeline of the CPE and take appropriate action. The proposed timeline assumes that security will not worsen.

Based on a desk review, an initial evaluability assessment has been conducted to determine the level of data availability and quality for assessing processes, results and corresponding indicators stated in portfolio documents. Monitoring data sets, standard performance reports, and qualitative assessment relevant to WFP’s work are available for 2012-2016. Due to internal reporting arrangements, some of the data for second half of 2016 will be available in early 2017. The Special Operations generally aim at being supportive of the outcomes of the Country Programme, EMOPs, PRROs and the objectives of wider humanitarian community in C.A.R. They are evaluable at output levels, and, to a certain extent, at outcome levels, as part of their contribution to the efficiency and effectiveness of the CO portfolio.²⁴

In an environment like C.A.R, a systematic longitudinal study can be challenging, especially in areas related to evaluating portfolio’s efficiency, sustainability of WFP services and results, gender inequality issues, capacity development, resilience, humanitarian principles and protection issues. Complete and consistent trend data on these areas from 2012 and 2016 may not be available, as is the case with P4P, FFA or cash based transfers. The evaluation team is required to undertake further assessment of the adequacy and quality of data when developing the evaluation matrix and data collection strategy; identifying alternative approaches for data collection and designing a strong methodology to analyse all data in a rigorous manner.

The evaluation will benefit from documentation available in WFP including portfolio documents, monitoring data sets, and relevant evaluation reports including the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE)²⁵ of the Response to Crisis in C.A.R, WFP’s emergency preparedness and response (2015), the Global Logistics Cluster (2012), and review of the FFA evaluations and the Synthesis Report ‘On the Impact of Food for Assets’. The CPE will complement the IAHE. The IAHE assessed the collective inter-agency response, building on its findings, the CPE will drill down into WFP’s part in that collective response, including evidence on specific food assistance related topics and particular focus on the IAHE’s recommendations most relevant to food assistance, concerning coordination, complementarity and coherence of rapid and response mechanisms, contingency planning, resourcing, human resource capacity, targeting, efficiency, Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP), humanitarian principles, protection and resilience. OEV will

²⁴ This include outcomes such improving the timeliness and delivery of humanitarian assistance to address food insecurity.

²⁵ Report of the Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the Response to the Central African Republic’s Crisis (2013-2015), March 2016

establish an e-library with bibliography list which the CPE team is expected to make effective use of it; particularly the data sets and standard performance reports.

4.3 Methodology

This evaluation will examine the extent to which gender and equity dimensions are integrated into WFP's policies, systems and processes.

CPEs primarily use a longitudinal design, relying on secondary quantitative data, and conduct primary qualitative data collection with key stakeholders in the country. The evaluation will employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), efficiency²⁶, effectiveness, sustainability and connectedness. Assessing the appropriateness, relevance and coherence of the design of Country Portfolio, it will review the extent of alignment with national needs; and internal and external coherence. Effectiveness of the portfolio will focus on systematic assessment of the performance and results at output and outcome levels. Central African Republic is a land-locked country, and the CPE is expected to provide cost and timeliness analysis of delivering food assistance in a country facing access issues. Extensive rainy season and poor transport infrastructure along with insecurity are associated cost drivers. The evaluation should provide a comparative cost-efficiency²⁷ and cost-effectiveness²⁸ analyses of the different food assistance transfer modalities e.g. cash based transfers versus in-kind or versus a combination of the two, in the portfolio.

Cost efficiency compares in-kind procurement value and logistic costs (transport, storage and handling, quality control and salaries for logistic staff – LTSH) to transport the different commodities to the respective markets with the cash based transfer local market prices at the same point in time. If sufficient data is available a seasonal analysis should also be presented including the in-kind operational costs (partners, equipment and supplies, travel etc. – ODOC) with the equivalent cash based transfer operational costs (C&V related costs: C&V delivery and C&V other). Attention must be paid to differentiate the start-up costs and the running costs and include depreciation calculations, if necessary. It will compare procuring locally vs procuring internationally (Import Parity Price analysis). Cost Effectiveness focuses on Omega value and/or other cost-effectiveness indicators, e.g. the in-kind vs cash based transfer costs per percent increase in households with adequate Food Consumption Score. The team will develop a plan for assessing sustainability and connectedness.

During the inception phase, the evaluation team will design the evaluation methodology to be presented in the inception report, with annexes covering data collection instruments. The evaluation team will deepen the review and critically assess technical feasibility and data and accessibility to inform its choice of evaluation methods, taking in to account the national context. The methodology should:

- Examine the logic of the portfolio based on the common objectives arising across operations;
- Be geared towards addressing the evaluation questions using triangulation of information and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data. A model looking at groups of “main activities/sectors” across a number of operations rather than at individual operations should be adopted.
- Take into account the limitations to evaluability as well as budget and timing constraints. The evaluation team is required to have strong methodological competencies in designing feasible data capture and analysis plan for this CPE.

²⁷ A cost-efficiency analysis measures outputs against inputs in monetary terms and facilitates comparison of alternative transfer modalities in order to use available resources as efficiently as possible.

²⁸ Cost-effectiveness analysis measures the comparative costs of achieving the desired outcomes. The current WFP cost-effectiveness tool is the omega value, a ratio between the in-kind Nutrient Value Score (NVS) divided by the full cost for the in-kind delivery basket and the CBT NVS divided by the full cost of the full CBT basket.

The methodology should demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries disaggregated by sex and age, existing secondary data, etc.) and using a mixed method (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of tools. The sampling technique to impartially select sites to be visited and stakeholders to be interviewed should be specified.

4.4 Quality Assurance

WFP's evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) is based on the UN Evaluation Group norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes quality assurance of evaluation reports (inception, full and summary reports) based on standardised checklists. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. The OEV evaluation manager will conduct the first level quality assurance, and CPE Coordinator will conduct the second level review. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis. The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases.

EQAS calls for carrying out gender responsive evaluations guided by WFP Gender Policy objectives and action plan. This includes the identification and disaggregated analyses of gender roles and dynamics, inequalities, discriminatory practices and unjust power relations. The CPE methodology will review the extent to which the portfolio of operations has appropriately analysed and integrated a contextual assessment of gender related gaps. In doing so, the CPE will apply OEV's Technical Note for Gender Integration in WFP Evaluations and the UN System-Wide Action Plan (UNSWAP) on mainstreaming Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women. The evaluation team is expected to assess Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Gender Marker levels for the CO, and to systematically and appropriately reflect gender in findings, conclusions and recommendations. To enhance the quality and credibility of this evaluation, the selected evaluation firm will provide further quality checks on the draft the evaluation products, such as draft inception and draft evaluation reports, before the team leader submits them to OEV.

5 Organization of the Evaluation

5.1 Phases and Deliverables

The evaluation is structured in five phases summarized in the table below. The three phases involving the evaluation team are: (i) The Inception Phase, with a briefing of the evaluation team in Rome (March 7-10, 2017), followed by an inception mission to Bangui (mid-March 2017 by team leader and evaluation manager), producing inception report - a detailed operational plan for conducting the CPE; (ii) The Main Evaluation Mission²⁹, primary and secondary data collection and preliminary analysis with approximately 3 weeks in the field (April 10-28, 2017); and (iii) The Reporting Phase concludes with draft CPE report by mid-June 2017, final report by end of August 2017, and final evaluation report (a full report and an summary evaluation report) that will be presented for consideration to WFP's Executive Board in November 2017. Annex 2 presents a more detailed timeline. The CO and RBD have been consulted on the timeframe to ensure good alignment with the CO planning and decision-making, so that the evidence generated by CPE can be used effectively.

²⁹ An internal exit debrief with the CO is planned on the last day of the Fieldwork

Table A2: Provisional Timeline Overview

Phases	Mid December 2017- February 2017	March 7- April 10, 2017	April 10- May 11, 2017	May 26- August 2017	September- November 2017	Deliverables
Phase 1 (Preparation) Desk Review Preparation of ToR Stakeholder consultation	X					ToR (draft and final) Contracting evaluation firm
Phase 2 (Inception) Briefing team at HQ Document review Inception mission in Bangui		X				Inception Report
Phase 3 (Fieldwork) Evaluation, data collection/analysis, exit debriefing, HQ Briefing			X			Exist Debriefing Aide-memoire/ HQ Briefing
Phase 4 (Reporting) Report drafting, comments and revision				X (Mid-June)		Draft Evaluation Report (D1); Learning workshop
				X August 21		Final Draft Report
Phase 5 (Executive Board) EB Follow up Actions EB.2/November 2017					X	Presentation of SER to EB.2./2017 Management Response, Evaluation Brief

5.2 Evaluation Team Composition

As presented in annex 3, this CPE will be conducted by a team of independent consultants with relevant evaluation expertise. The evaluation firm is responsible for proposing a mix of evaluators who will effectively cover the areas of evaluation listed in Annex 3. The team should be as few members as possible providing a combination of the expertise and skills required. The team will consist of a combination of international, regional and national consultants with gender balance. All team members must be fluent in French and English. The team leader (TL) will have the additional responsibility for overall design, implementation, reporting and timely delivering of all evaluation products. The team leader should have excellent synthesis and evaluation reporting writing skills in French.

5.3 Roles and Responsibilities

This evaluation is managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV). Dawit Habtemariam has been appointed as Evaluation Manager (EM). The EM has not worked on issues associated with the subject of evaluation in the past. He is responsible for drafting the TOR; selecting and contracting the evaluation team; preparing and managing the budget; setting up the review group; organizing the team briefing in HQ and the stakeholders learning in-country workshop; assisting in the preparation of the field mission; conducting the 1st level quality assurance of the evaluation products and soliciting WFP stakeholders feedback on the various evaluation products. The EM will be the main interlocutor between the team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.

WFP stakeholders at CO, RBD and HQ levels are expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation; be available to the evaluation team to discuss the programme, its performance and results; facilitate the team's contacts with stakeholders in C.A.R; set up meetings and visits and provide logistic support during the fieldwork. A detailed consultation schedule will be presented by the evaluation team in the Inception Report. The contracted firm will support the evaluation team in providing quality checks to the draft evaluation products being sent to OEV for its feedback. To ensure the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias stakeholder responses.

5.4 Communication

It is important that Evaluation Reports are accessible to a wide audience, as foreseen in the Evaluation Policy, to ensure the credibility of WFP – through transparent reporting – and the usefulness of evaluations. The dissemination strategy will consider from the stakeholder analysis who to disseminate to, involve and identify the users of the evaluation, duty bearers, implementers, beneficiaries, including gender perspectives.

All evaluation products will be produced in French. Should translators be required for fieldwork, the evaluation firm will make arrangements and include the cost in the budget proposal. A communication plan (see Annex 5) will be refined by the EM in consultation with the evaluation team during the inception phase to include details about the communication strategy. An internal reference group from main WFP's internal stakeholders at HQ, RBD and CO, will be established for the evaluation to serve as contact point for communication with WFP stakeholders. They will be invited to provide comments on the main CPE deliverables. While the final evaluation report is the responsibility of the evaluation team, it will be approved by Sally Burrows, OEV CPE Coordinator on satisfactory meeting of OEV's quality standards. OEV will explore the feasibility of a workshop after the field work to discuss the draft preliminary findings and recommendations. The summary evaluation report along with the management response to the evaluation recommendations will be presented to the WFP Executive Board in November 2017. The final evaluation report will be posted on the public WFP website and OEV will ensure dissemination of lessons through its inclusion in the annual evaluation report. The CO and RBD are encouraged to circulate the final evaluation report with WFP external stakeholders.

5.5 Budget

The evaluation will be financed from OEV's budget which will cover all expenses related to consultant/company rates, international travels, logistics, stakeholder learning workshop and OEV staff travel.

Annex B List of Operations in WFP Portfolio in the Central African Republic

1. Over the period covered by the country portfolio evaluation (January 2012–June 2017), the country portfolio of WFP in the Central African Republic covered 18 operations: one DEV (country programme), one PRRO, one EMOP, three IR-EMOPs, one regional EMOP, nine standard operations, one immediate response account (IRA) and one trust fund (TF) for HIV/AIDS and TB. The total required cost of these operations was slightly over USD 869 million, against which WFP has received USD 555.3 million) – or 64 percent of the requirements. Table A3 shows short descriptions and funding levels of all the operations.

Table A3: Funding and resourcing of WFP portfolio in the Central African Republic (2012-mid 2017)

	Programme	Title of operation	Approved budget (USD)	Confirmed contributions (USD)	% Resourced	Three major donors	Status	Time frame	
								Start	End
1	DEV 200331	Country programme	23,354,243	5,165,618	22%	Japan, Saudi Arabia, Multilateral	Closed	01/01/12	31/12/16
2	PRRO 200315	Assistance to conflict-affected populations in CAR.	48,281,696	35,294,196	73%	USA, Japan, Canada	Closed	01/12/12	31/12/13
3	IR-EMOP 200565	Armed conflict in CAR	1,498,159	402,363	27%	Multilateral	Closed	01/06/13	31/08/13
4	EMOP 200650	Saving lives and protecting livelihoods	127,100,000	75,432,291	59%	Multilateral, Germany, Japan	Closed	01/01/14	31/12/14
5	Regional EMOP 200799	Critical support to populations affected by ongoing crisis in CAR and its regional impact	518,114,428	318,958,750	62%	Japan, Germany Multilateral	Active	01/01/15	31/12/17
6	IR-EMOP 201078	Critical support to populations affected by ongoing crisis	1,500,000	1,500,000	100%		Active	18/05/17	17/08/17
7	IR-EMOP 200995	Request for fund allocation from IRA account	275,653	275,653	100%		Closed	28/03/16	28/06/16
8	SO 105620	Provision of humanitarian air services	26,287,103	22,010,675	84%	USA, CERF, EU	Closed	01/11/06	31/12/12
9	IRA 200544	Special preparedness activity	176,194	163,428	93%	Multilateral	Closed	28/03/13	29/06/13
10	SO 200522	Provision of humanitarian air services	21,919,177	18,709,574	85%	USA, UK, EU	Closed	01/01/13	31/12/14
11	SO 200605	Logistic support to WFP operations and logistics & emergency telecommunication cluster augmentation	14,861,493	6,647,958	45%	Multilateral, CERF, USA	Closed	01/07/13	30/04/16

	Programme	Title of operation	Approved budget (USD)	Confirmed contributions (USD)	% Resourced	Three major donors	Status	Time frame	
								Start	End
12	SO 200643	Response capacity and staff security augmentation in support of PRRO 200315	6,109,339	4,445,599	72%	Multilateral	Closed	12/12/13	31/12/14
13	SO 200646	Strengthening food security cluster coordination	1,563,830	96,485	6%	Multilateral	Closed	16/12/13	31/12/14
14	SO 200804	Provision of humanitarian air services	30,364,852	24,942,173	82%	USA, EU, Japan	Closed	01/01/15	31/12/16
15	SO 200934	Regional optimization of supply corridors	3,095,895	1,917,536	73 %	Multilateral, Sweden	Active	15/01/15	31/12/17
16	SO 200997	Logistic and emergency telecommunication cluster	3,366,975	1,775,129	61%	Sweden	Active	01/01/16	31/06/17
17	SO 201045	Provision of humanitarian air services	15,097,755	11,306,464	75%	-	Active	01/01/17	31/12/17
18	TF 200933	Creation of a new Trust Fund for CAR	26,287,104	26,287,104	100%	-	Active	01/09/15	30/06/17
	Total		869,253,896	555,330,996	64%				

Information sources: closed projects from last SPR, active projects using latest budget and latest resource figures extracted as at 23/08/2017. Important note: figures reported for Regional EMOP 200799 cover the operations in and outside the Central African Republic.

Source: Resource situation, SPR

2. Table A4 shows figures of funding shortfall per type of emergency or relief operation over 2012–2016, before the merging of the various types in the new Integrated Road Map and the ICSP. A case study on the impacts of funding shortfalls for regional EMOP 200799 can be found in Annex K.

Table A4: Funding shortfalls by type of operation, 2012-2016, in USD

Type of operation	Requirements	Actual funding	% of requirements	Shortfall
PRRO (1)	48,281,696	35,294,196	73%	27%
EMOP (1)	127,100,000	74,535,416	59%	41%
Reg. EMOP (1)	518,114,428	318,958,750	62%	38%
IR-EMOP (1)	1,498,159	402,363	27%	73%
SO (8)	107,084,567	73,878,281	69%	31%

Source: SPRs

Annex C Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation questions/sub questions	Analysis to be performed/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection and analysis methods
<p>Question 1: How has WFP strategically positioned itself and aligned to the humanitarian and development needs of the population, the government’s national agenda and policies, and partners’ objectives and strategies?</p>			
<p>EQ1.1. Extent to which the main objectives and related activities of the portfolio operations have been relevant with the country’s population humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?</p>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Were the program documents (PD, RB), SOs and logframes in DEV, PRRO and EMOPS realistic and relevant considering the context of C.A.R and the constraints and opportunities of food and nutrition needs, security, logistics, access and costs? - What was the concept of development in the C.A.R context in 2012? What are the main differences between PRSP and RCPCA? Are these reflected in the CO programming? - What were /are the C.A.R humanitarian needs, and how were/are humanitarian principles and protection issues considered in the CO programming? - Is the portfolio addressing social protection adequately? - Did the portfolio seek to engage the affected populations in identifying needs and priorities, and ways to respond to these? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How gender-disaggregated, gender sensitive has been the portfolio? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Degree of relevance (1-5 and narrative) of WFP food needs assessment and nutrition indicators, disaggregated - Degree of relevance (1-5 and narrative) of other indicators of humanitarian vulnerabilities, disaggregated - Degree of relevance and accuracy (1-5 and narrative) of logistics reports (transport conditions, time, costs) - Standard international economic, social and governance data (WB, frDB, EU, US, UNDP HDI, Gender Equality Index) - Degree of relevance (1-5 and narrative) of WFP strategies, policies and operations to national development plans and relevant sector policies - Mapping of actors/partners in C.A.R 2012 – 2017; Analysis of gaps in WFP partner organisations (geographical and sectoral coverage) - Analysis of participatory processes in the design of operations - Review of approach to GEEW in PDs (see EQ3.4) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WFP (EFSA, ENSA, SPRs, M&E PDMs, VAM), UN and other actors’ datasets - LFAs - ICSP 2018-20 - UNDAF+, OCHA HRP, other policy and PD, HDI indicators, others (see Dropbox) - Government’s PRSP and RCPCA policies - Sectoral policies of line ministries - WB, AfrDB, EU, USAID, UNDP HDI, other ext. informants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis (secondary data) - Semi-structured interviews (primary data): HQ, RB, CO, UN, Ministries, other partner agencies - SWOT analysis - Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets

Evaluation questions/sub questions	Analysis to be performed/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection and analysis methods
EQ1.2. Extent to which the objectives of the portfolio operations have been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Were the program documents (PD) and logframes in the CP and PRRO in 2012-13 realistic and relevant to the PRSP and UNDAF+? - Were the EMOPs and SOs realistic and relevant to the "Programme d'urgence pour le relèvement durable 2014 – 2016" - Is the new ICSP relevant to the country priorities (RCPCA) and capacities? - Did/does the portfolio offer a realistic and appropriate approach to capacity development of national institutions? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Degree of relevance (1-5 and narrative) of analysis of the situation and risks in the PDs and ICSP to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National development plans, - relevant government sector policies (agriculture, health, education, social affairs) - Degree of consistency (1-5 and narrative) of objectives and activities in LFAs with <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National development plans, - relevant government sector policies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pds, BRs, LFAs - ICSP - Analysis generated for EQ 1.1 - Comparable analysis from UN partner agencies and key NGOs - Government, WFP, UN and other partner and external informants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, other - UN, Ministries, partner agencies, donors - SWOT analysis - Triangulation of data and informants
EQ1.3. Extent to which the objectives of the portfolio operations have been coherent and harmonised with those of the partners, especially UN partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How coherent was the portfolio with the strategies and programmes of the concerned UN agencies (UNICEF, FAO, IFAD, UNHCR...)? - Were there duplications or gaps among UN agencies and key other international actors? - Was the portfolio effectively integrated into the UNDAF? Into HRP? Extent to which WFP has been involved in UN joint programming and programs in C.A.R? - How coherent was the portfolio with the strategies and programmes of the key concerned donors (US, EU...) - How coherent was the portfolio with the strategies and programmes of the key concerned NGO implementing partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Degree of consistency (1 to 5 and narrative) of WFP objectives (PDs, BRs) with relevant partners' strategies and plans, and co-ordination frameworks (UNDAF+, Clusters and NGOs, OCHA HRP, MINUSCA) - Degree (1 to 5 and narrative) of active harmonisation and collaboration achieved on the ground between WFP and UN partners (UNICEF, FAO, UNHCR) - Relevance (1-5 and narrative) of decision process for location of MSUs to be erected, bridges to be repaired, landing strips to be cleared, award of fleet maintenance contracts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PDs, BRs, SPRs - LFAs - UNDAF, HRP - Analysis generated for EQ 1.1 - Policy and strategy documents of UN, NGO partners, donors - external informants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, other UN, Ministries, partner agencies - SWOT analysis - Triangulation of data and informants

Evaluation questions/sub questions	Analysis to be performed/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection and analysis methods
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Why did WFP fail to offer fleet maintenance and garage services to the humanitarian community? 			
EQ1.4. Extent to which WFP has been strategic in its alignments and has positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What were the comparative advantages of WFP in C.A.R and how clearly did WFP define and recognise them? - How explicit was WFP's strategy about maximising its comparative advantage and making the biggest difference? - How realistic was WFP about the constraints on its C.A.R portfolio? - How strategic was WFP in selecting its partners (national and local levels)? - Had there been more active PREP and contingency plans (all these mechanisms are clearly defined in WFP corporate policy /strategy in place would the CO have coped better? - How well prepared are WFP CO/RB to suddenly scale up (and raise the necessary funding) should the situation rapidly deteriorate again to L3? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of WFP PDs and ICSP for relevance (1-5 and narrative) of analysis of comparative advantage and how it should be exploited and maximized (EQ1.1) - Analysis of LFAs (CP, PRRO, EMOPs) in the portfolio to optimize comparative advantages - Analysis of implementation capacity of partners at ground level, and adequacy of their coverage vs needs and opportunities - Analysis of relevance (1-5 and narrative) of geographical coverage of WFP and related targeting vs needs and opportunities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PDs, BRs, SPRs - LFAs - ICSP - Analysis generated for EQ 1.1 - Government, CO, RBD, UN and other partners - external informants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, other UN, Ministries, partner agencies - SWOT analysis - Triangulation of data and informants
EQ1.5. Extent to which there have been trade-offs between aligning with national needs and strategies, and with WFP's mission, Strategic Plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies)?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What was the level of coherence with Strategic Objectives of WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2013? - What was the level of coherence with Strategic Objectives of the WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017? - What was the level of coherence with the relevant WFP policies: gender, nutrition, HIV, C&V, Emergency (incl. humanitarian 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Degree of coherence (1-5 and narrative) for each policy and strategic objective 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pds, LFAs - Analysis generated for EQ1.1 - Logframes - Government, WFP, UN and other partner and external informants - Analysis of application of humanitarian principles, Do No Harm approaches and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, Ministries, partner agencies - SWOT analysis - Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions

Evaluation questions/sub questions	Analysis to be performed/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection and analysis methods
principles and protection), Food security, school feeding, capacity development, DRR, FFA, resilience and safety nets ?		Sphere standards	
Question 2: What is the quality of WFP's strategic decision making and what factors have driven it?			
EQ2.1. Extent to which WFP has analysed or used existing analysis of the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition issues in C.A.R, including gender equality and protection issues?			
<p>For each of its interventions and with reference to specific target groups, what analysis did WFP undertake in deciding whether and how to intervene? In particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - mapping and use of data and analysis gathered by WFP and others for strategy formulation; - analysis of the food security, nutrition, livelihoods, markets, logistics and gender concepts and context, and how this was used for effective programme planning, design and targeting; - assessment of WFP use of research and monitoring data to inform strategic decision-making, with particular focus on nutrition, GFD, CBT and FFA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Degree of appropriateness, timeliness/ regularity and coverage (1-5 and narrative) of EFSA/ENSA etc - Degree of appropriateness (1-5 and narrative) of written and oral evidence concerning the analysis WFP undertook in preparing its PDs and BRs during the review period - Degree of clarity and thoroughness (1-5 and narrative) with which PDs and BRs refer to relevant data and analysis - Assessment of regularity with which WFP updated its analysis and programming on the basis of new information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WFP PDs, BRs, EFSA/ENSA - LFAs - UNICEF, FAO reports - Government policies (PRSP, RCPCA) - UN Integrated Mission, OCHA, UNDAF - External informants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, Ministries, partner agencies - Lessons learnt workshop - Triangulation of data and informants
EQ2.2. Extent to which WFP has contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, and analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?			
<p>What specific efforts did WFP make in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supporting / advocating for national policies on food security, nutrition, livelihoods, CBT, school feeding, logistics and gender dimensions? - Developing national and local capacity and ownership for monitoring, analysis and decision-making 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Appropriateness (1-5 and narrative) of documentary record on WFP advocacy efforts, if any, in these areas - Appropriateness (1-5 and narrative) of documentary record on WFP capacity development efforts in these areas - Appropriateness (1-5 and narrative) of documentary evidence, if any, on the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Government policies (PRSP, RCPCA) - UN Integrated Mission, OCHA, UNDAF - External informants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, Ministries, partner agencies - Lessons learnt workshop - Triangulation of data and informants

Evaluation questions/sub questions	Analysis to be performed/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection and analysis methods
<p>in the above fields?</p> <p>Did WFP succeed to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - influence the <i>policy</i> and <i>programs</i> of the Government and/or other partners on these issues? - influence the <i>strategy</i> of the Government and/or other partners on these issues? - strengthen national, local capacity and ownership for analysis and decision-making in these fields? - influence UN strategy and planning in these fields? <p>Did WFP have the capacity at CO and/or RB to do the above?</p>	<p>influence that WFP advocacy has had</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level of satisfaction (1-5 and narrative) of participants' perceptions about the extent and effectiveness of WFP advocacy and capacity in these areas - Review of changes 		
EQ 2.3. What were the factors that determined existing choices (drivers of strategy), and how were they considered and managed when past programming and the new ICSP were developed by the CO?			
<p>To what extent were the choices in the portfolio and ICSP influenced by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - perceived comparative WFP advantage(s); - corporate strategies; - national political factors; - UN programming and priorities; WFP's involvement in UN joint programming and programmes - previous programming; - resource availability, donor preferences and restrictions; - organisational structure and staffing; - analysis of context and need; - monitoring information; - emergencies; - other factors? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Analysis of available documentation on drivers for preparation of PDs, BRs, ICSP: analysis of risks and opportunities, comparison of timing, budget extension with changes in needs, with actions of other actors, changes of locations (if indicated) - Analysis of perceptions of participants in preparation of, PDs, BRs - Analysis of CO resourcing strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WFP PDs, BRs, EFSA/ENSA - ICSP - Government policies (PRSP, RCPCA) - OCHA, UNDAF - External informants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO (including previous incumbents) - Triangulation of data and informants
EQ2.4. To what extent has WFP analysed, or used existing assessment of security-related risks?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What (systematic or <i>ad hoc</i>) efforts did WFP make to learn to respond to risks from experience (own experience, partners) and adapt to the emergency context in C.A.R? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Appropriateness (1-5 and narrative) of WFP planning and operation docs regarding risk analysis (based e.g. on OCHA HRP), including lessons from regional experience and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WFP PDs and reports (SPR), ICSP - LFAs - CO / RBD informants - UNDSS, MINUSCA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO (including previous incumbents)

Evaluation questions/sub questions	Analysis to be performed/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection and analysis methods
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent did WFP benchmark its risk planning in C.A.R against those of other relevant agencies? - How effectively did WFP adapt its risk programming to fit within UNDAF, Clusters and OCHA/HRP frameworks? - How effectively did WFP collect, capture and use feedback from partners and beneficiaries about risks? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - deteriorating context in CAR - Risk indicators from MINUSCA, UNDSS, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Benchmarks among other UN agencies, ICRC, INGOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Triangulation of data and informants

Question 3: What results have been achieved?

EQ3.1. Level of effectiveness: were the intended results at output and outcome levels achieved in the main WFP program activities (2012 – 2016)? What are the explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP control such as conflicts)?

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Is the targeting of beneficiaries (nutrition, GFD, CBT, FFA, school feeding) appropriate? If not, why not? - Is the targeting gender-sensitive? If not, why not? - Is the targeting well coordinated with other concerned actors? (in particular FAO, UNICEF) If not, why not? - Are M&E tools well coordinated with other concerned actors? If not, why not? - Is coverage relevant to needs? If not, why not? - Is the most effective/ cost-effective corridor/ transport mode used for access? If not, why not? - How effectively are the humanitarian principles, Do-No-Harm and protection applied? - How effective/ cost-effective is home grown school feeding versus “cantines”? - Were decisions to use CBT vs in-kind modalities appropriate? If not, why not? - What were the effects of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of WFP M&E analysis and VAM data about effectiveness of activities and extent to which positive changes can be attributed to WFP activities - Analysis of perceptions (1-5 and narrative) of qualified observers about extent to which positive changes can be attributed to WFP activities, and why - Analysis of available data from WFP and other actors on changes in indicator variables per year on relevant aspects of nutrition (wasting, stunting, treatment of MAM...), targeted food aid, livelihood, school enrolment and results in education, and institutional capacity since baseline analysis of context (EQ 1.i) - Changes in Household asset score - Changes in Community asset score - % increase in agri. production yields - Household’s additional agricultural income - Proportion of beneficiaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WFP M&E, PDM, SPR, VAM baseline data - LFAs - Analysis of change in relevant variables and sectors - Beneficiary views - Government, WFP, partner and external informants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Semi-structured interviews and/or focus groups: HQ, RB, CO, local authorities, government, partner agencies, - other agencies monitoring and analysing the relevant sectors - Beneficiaries Focus Group Discussions (FGD), storytelling sessions (women and men separately where appropriate) with gender sensitive and Do-No-Harm approaches - Triangulation of data and informants
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Evaluation questions/sub questions	Analysis to be performed/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection and analysis methods
funding shortages on each of the above activities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> using learnt skills - Coping strategy index, disaggregated - Analysis of effects of funding shortages (as compared to initial requirements) - Beneficiary satisfaction levels (1-5 and narrative) about adequacy to needs - Equity scores - Omega value (if data available) - For results of SF/ESF: comparison 2012-16 of enrolment, attendance, drop-out, gender balance, results 		

EQ3.2. Level of efficiency: how efficiently were the main program activities in the WFP portfolio (2012-2016) conducted? What are the explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP control such as conflicts)?

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What did the operations and activities cost? (also airdrops) - How efficient was WFP in terms of logistics, systems and delivery (compared to benchmarks and alternatives)? - How cost-effective were the activities, in particular transport and in-kind vs CBT? - How adequate was WFP staffing structure with regard to portfolio design and implementation? To what extent did the staff turnover impact on capacities? - How prepared, flexible, responsive and timely was WFP in emergencies during the review period? - Were WFP's L3 activation protocols timely and to what degree have they impacted the effectiveness and efficiency of the response? - How effective, efficient and timely has been the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cost per activity / operation / beneficiary (as feasible) per year - LFAs (means, resources vs needs) - Comparison of P4P costs/ benefits with imported food - Quantity of food commodities lost or wasted - Cost-benefits from synergies with partner agencies (list, examples) - Beneficiary satisfaction levels (1-5 and narrative) about information, accountability and timeliness of activities - Levels of CO and RB staffing (turnover) per year; Staffing profiles vs required - Response time of WFP; Average transit times of food aid commodities from procurement to delivery on site - COMPASS/LESS data - Funds Consumption Reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WFP reports (SPR) - LFAs - Benchmarking with other UN agencies - Views of partners and beneficiaries (timeliness, quantity, quality...) - Detailed purchase order records - Fund consumption reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Semi-structured interviews and/or focus groups: HQ, RB, CO, local authorities, government, partner agencies - Triangulation of data and informants
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Evaluation questions/sub questions	Analysis to be performed/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection and analysis methods
<p>coordination between the various WFP's levels in the light of the Level 3 requirements?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Were WFP's corporate systems (e.g. logistics, procurement, ICT, information/reporting, financial, human resources (HR), etc.), guidelines, protocols and procedures adequate and flexible to address staff needs in L3? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Extend of the use of GCMF and impact on transit / lead times - Comparison between cost price paid by WFP for main food commodities and FAO indexes or commodity prices on world markets 		
<p>EQ3.3. Level of sustainability: how sustainable were the main programme activities in the WFP portfolio (2012-2016)? What are the explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP control such as conflicts)?</p>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How sustainable are the results of WFP activities in terms of food security, nutrition security, school feeding, logistics/ETC likely to be (e.g. for resilience purposes), and why? - To what extent have the WFP programmes enabled the government to become more self-supporting? How sustainable are the results of WFP capacity development of govt institutions likely to be, and why? - Is the portfolio focus still appropriate for sustainability given the protracted crisis and population displacement? - How does the current crisis impact on the partnership arrangements required for successful implementation? - How effective was WFP in identifying and managing strategic and operational risks? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Analysis of perceptions (1-5 and narrative) of qualified observers about how sustainable WFP-influenced change and WFP-supported systems and capacity are likely to be, and why - Assessment of sustainability status (1-5 and narrative) of assets created by FFA, P4P, school feeding, logistics/ETC... - Beneficiary satisfaction levels (1-5 and narrative) about sustainability of assets - For FFA, the quality and the level of maintenance of created assets after handover - For skills training, level of ability to use the skills productively - Changes on the ground 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of change over the period (dvlpt 2012-2013, emergency 2013-2017) • WFP reports (SPR) on FFA, CBT, P4P, nutrition • Final beneficiaries - Government, local authorities, WFP, partners and external informants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Beneficiaries FGDs (women and men separately where appropriate) - Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, Ministries, local authorities, partner agencies, - other agencies monitoring and analysing the relevant sectors - Case studies (TBD) - Triangulation of data and informants
<p>EQ3.4. To what extent did WFP contribute to the reduction of gender inequality gaps?</p>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent did WFP assistance contribute to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to: 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gender markers - LFAs - Changes on the ground - Degree (1-5 and narrative) of satisfaction of beneficiaries and partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WFP M&E data - SPR, PDM - LFAs - Gender inequality index - Gender markers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Findings from evaluations by partners about gender issues - Semi-structured interviews: CO, Ministries, local

Evaluation questions/sub questions	Analysis to be performed/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection and analysis methods
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o access to and control over food and resources; o responsibility for decision-making; o FFA, P4P opportunities; o education through school feeding? <p>- Was the internal CO structure and functioning in accordance with WFP gender policy?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proportion of assisted women and men who make decision about the use of CBT/vouchers or in-kind food within the household - Proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions in project management (beneficiary) committees - Indicators of gender differentials in the specified nutrition and livelihood parameters - Human resources indicators (M/F ratios and grades) for the CO staff over the period - Level of effectiveness (1-5 and narrative) of Gender training in CO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - partners' reports - Beneficiary views - Ministries, UNFPA, external informants 	<p>authorities, partner agencies, other agencies monitoring and analysing the relevant variables</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Beneficiaries: separate FGDs with women and men - Triangulation of data and informants

EQ3.5. What was the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various activities in the portfolio, regardless of the operations?

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent did the main activities in the country portfolio complement each other? Any duplications or gaps? - What multiplying effects were there between the main activities in the country portfolio (e.g. capacity building for survey, nutrition and health, P4P and school feeding...)? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Analysis of linkages and complementarity (1-5 and narrative) between activities in the portfolio - Review of LFAs - Analysis of extent to which (1-5 and narrative) activities in the portfolio facilitated increased outputs and/or enhanced effectiveness of other activities - Satisfaction levels (1-5 and narrative) of partners about synergies - Changes due to synergies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WFP records and reports (SPR...) - LFAs - Government, partners, beneficiaries, external informants - Minutes of UNHAS users meetings, ETC and Logistic cluster meetings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, UN, Ministries, partners, donors - Case studies (P4P, school feeding, ...) - Benchmarks (from RB for the region...)
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EQ3.6. What was the level of synergy and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially UN partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent did WFP operations complement those of UN partner agencies, NGO implementing partners, MINUSCA? Any duplications or gaps? - To what extent did multiplier opportunities develop (and were or not captured) between WFP operations and those of UN, multilateral, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Analysis of linkages and complementarity (1-5 and narrative) between activities in the CP, PRRO, EMOPs, SOs and activities of partners, especially at operational level - Review of LFAs - Analysis of extent to which (1-5 and narrative) activities in the CP, PRRO, EMOPs and SOs facilitated increased outputs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WFP records and reports (SPR...) - LFAs - Government, partners, external informants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document analysis - Semi-structured interviews: CO, RB, UN agencies, Ministries, local authorities, other partners - Case studies (TBD) - Triangulation of data and informants
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Evaluation questions/sub questions	Analysis to be performed/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection and analysis methods
bilateral and NGO partners? - What has been the motivation for WFP to refer certain problematic issues (customs procedures, opening of additional access corridors), which forms intrinsic part of WFPs core activities, to UN partner agencies?	and/or enhanced effectiveness of partners' activities - Changes due to synergies		

Annex D List of People Consulted During the Evaluation

Meetings at WFP Headquarters, Rome

Headquarters division / technical unit	Key staff interviewed
Tue 18/07/2017	
VAM (food security analysis)	Tahir Nour, Chief Programme, Market Access Programme Unit Anne Valand, Vulnerability Analysis Christopher Waldmeier, Vulnerability Analysis Unit
Partnerships	Alix Loriston, Senior Donor Relations Officer
Policy programme	Chris Toe, Policy Programme Officer
School feeding	Charlotte Cuny, Policy Officer
Wed 19/07/2017	
Nutrition	Lauren Landis, Director Nutrition Division
Gender	Véronique Sainte-Luce, Senior Gender Advisor
RB Dakar & CO Bangui (teleconference)	William Affif (RB Evaluation) Felix Gomez (CO, CD) Rocco Leone (CO, DCD) Pascal Diro, Deputy Head of Programme, CO
OSCL	Carlos Botta, Deputy Chief Aviation Service (UNHAS)
Humanitarian crisis and transition	Natalia McDonald, Programme Policy Consultant
Logistics	Stephen Cahill, Global Logistic Cluster Coordinator; Kenji Yamagishi, Logistic Officer- Logistic & Transport - Fleet);
Thu 20/07/2017	
Performance management	Inka Himanen, Kun Yi Lee, Programme Officers RMP
FFA	Philippe Crahay, Consultant Asset Creation and Livelihoods Unit
HR deployment	Filomena Zukauskaitė
P4P	Giacomo Re
OEV debriefing	Sally Burrows, Andrea Cook - Director of Evaluation
Emergency preparedness & support	Denise Brown, Director, Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division
By Skype	
Emergency preparedness	Carlos Veloso, former Regional Emergency Coordinator
Procurement	Mahadevan Ramachendran, Senior Procurement Officer
Logistics	Christian Fortier, former Senior Logistics Officer CAR

Meetings in Bangui (Inception Mission)

Organization	Key staff interviewed
Mon 24/07/2017	
WFP CO	Pascal Diro, Deputy Head of Programme, Focal Point
WFP CO	Felix Gomez, CD; Rocco Leone, DCD
WFP CO	Pascal Diro
WFP CO	Security Officer
WFP CO	Programming team (institutional memories): Pascal Diro; technical experts: School feeding, resilience and P4P, M&E and CBT.
Tue 25/07/2017	
Ministry of Education	Dr Mada, Directeur de Cabinet; Mme Nathalie, Chargée de Mission
Ministry of Agriculture	Mr Yakende, Chargé de Mission
Wed 26/07/2017	
IOM	Mario Tavolaj, Conseiller Technique Principal
UNHCR	Magatte Guisse, Assistant Representative (Operations); Eric Gervier, Senior Protection Officer
PLAN Intl	Akoy Beavogui, Directeur des Programmes
FAO	Various
WVI	Moussa Sangara, Director
UNICEF	Chief Education, Chief Nutrition
UNDP	Aboubakar Koulibaly, Country Director
Caritas (Kaga-Bandoro)	Père Luc and four staff
Thu 27/07/2017	
ICRC	Jean-François Sangsue, Chef de Délégation
MINUSCA	Lt-Colonel Sergio Avelar, Staff Officer Analysis Centre; 3 other officers
WFP Logistics	Boubakar Diop, Head a.i. and Logistics Officer
Fri 28/07/2017	
MSF	Medical coordinator and Deputy Head of Mission
EU delegation/ Fonds Békou	Davide Stefanini, Fund Manager
OCHA	Karen Perrin, Chef de Bureau Adjoint
Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation	Mr Betindji, Director General; Mr Ngoli, CEGAL cell; Head of Communications.
WFP CO	Rocco Leone, Pascal Diro (debriefing)

Meetings in the Regional Bureau in Dakar (RBD), Cameroon (logistics) and the Central African Republic (field visits)

Organisation	Key staff interviewed
Mon 04/09/2017	
WFP Cameroon	Ifrah Said Mbaye, Head of WFP sub-office Douala
	Colince Feupa, a.i. Head of WFP sub-office Douala / Sr. Logistics Associate
	Michael Larkins, Sr. Shipping Officer (on duty mission for WFP HQ Rome)
	Uli Schmit, Logistic Cluster Officer (on duty mission for WFP HQ Rome)
BOLLORE Group Cameroon Douala	Mohamed Diop, Regional Director
	Arnaud Bouhier, Director General Cameroon
	Emmanuel Zanino, Director Logistics Solutions Cameroon
Tue 05/09/2017	
CMA-CGM (Shipping group)	Lionel Odeyer, Director General Cameroon
Douala	Sébastien Antunes, General Manager Container Terminal Douala
	Guylaine Hameni, Commercial Manager
	Hervé Ntjaga, Head of Division Study and Statistics
WFP Regional Bureau Dakar	Manon Demange, Security Analyst
	Mailin Fauchon, Regional Donor Relations Officer
	Nacer Bellaneg, Denis Sidyane, Regional Procurement Officers
	Sarah Laure Tchala, Regional HR Officer
	Oyinkan Odeinde, Lucille Ndione, Logistics/EPR Officers
	Racky Fall, Regional Senior Finance Officer
	Filippo Pompili, Evaluation Officer
	William Affif , Jihan Jacobucci, Miranda Sende, Amayel sow, Reg. Progr. Policy Officers, SPRP, C&V
	Justine Dione, Constance Kobolar, Reg. School Feeding Officers
	Jamie Watts, Senior Reg. Compliance Officer
Wed 06/09/2017	
WFP Regiona Bureau Dakar	Aissatou Sougou, HIV Officer
	Anna Horner, Senior Regional Nutrition Officer, Carrie Morrison, Nutritionist
	Volli Carucci, Reg. Senior Progr. Policy Officer, Head of Resilience
	Mio Nozoe, Reg. Progr. Policy Officer, PBF Coordinator
	Eric Branckaert, Mathieu Tockert, Désirée Lwambo: VAM / Gender
Bureau de Gestion du Fret Terrestre, Douala	Elly Ella, Head of Division (Study & Statistics)
UNICEF Cameroon	M. Taoufik MINASRI, Chief Sub-Regional Hub for West and Central Africa

Organisation	Key staff interviewed
Ministry of Finance & Budget – CAR	Yambouka Wamata, Customs Inspector – Head of CAR Customs Office in Douala
MSC – Shipping Douala	Rafiatou Djeeumeza, Import Sales Marketing Manager
Dir. Générale des Douanes, Cameroon	M. Zobo Olama Inspecteur Principal des Douanes Chef de Bureau Port III ; Serge Prospère Nong Libend, Chief Inspector of Customs (Transit goods)
UNDSS Cameroon	M. Jacquard Essomba Bikoe, Responsable de la Sécurité pour le PAM – UNICEF – UNHCR – FMI
MSC Shipping Cameroon	Ms Rafiatou Djeeumeza, Import Sales and Marketing Manager
Fri 08/09/2017	
WFP Bangui	Country Director, Deputy CD, full staff briefing, Programme Unit, Logistics Unit, Security briefing, Admin-Finance, HR and Procurement Units, UNHAS, ETC and Logistics Clusters Coordinators
Sat 09/09/2017	
WFP Bangui	Collins Nyeko, Budget and Programming Officer
	Nono Kukimuni, Head of IT Unit
	Cristina Vicuna, a.i. Head of Logistics Cluster Unit
	Eric Moussard, Head of UNHAS CAR
	Anthony Egbenya, Head of Finance and Administration Department
	Alain Kaniki, National Finance Officer
	Honoré Ramanampamonty, Facility Management Officer (Construction)
Mon 11/09/2017	
Ministry of Economy, Planning, International Cooperation	Felix Moloua, Minister (former Head of Cabinet); Mr Ngoli, CEGAL Cell Director
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development	Head of Cabinet, Diector of Planning
Ministry of Education	Eugénie Ngbondo, Chargée de Mission Enseignement – Formation - Plan
WFP Bangui	Aissa Elise, VAM / M&E Officer
	Billy Keita, Logistic Officer (Commodity Accounting & Operations)
	Boubacar Diop Gaol, a.i. Senior Logistic Officer
	Gaston Sebuogori, Senior Logistic Officer
	Alexandre Galley, Regional Fleet Manager
BOLLORE Logistics - Bangui	Marius Metongo, Operations Manager
UNDP	Aboubakar Koulibaly, Country Director
UNICEF	Spezioce Nakizimana Ndabihore, Deputy Representative, Nutrition Officer (Bonaventure); Yves Nzigndo Information Mgt Specialist & Nutrition Cluster Coordinator, a.i.
Tue 12/09/2017	

Organisation	Key staff interviewed
WFP Sub-Office Paoua	SO staff briefing; OCHA; IEDA Relief; Jupedec; "War Child"
WFP Sub-Office Kaga-Bandoro	Head of SO; security; all staff briefing; logistics, programme officers, MINUSCA
WFP Sub-Office Bouar	Wilfrid Kodjoh, Head of Sub-Office
	Herman Kambale, Programme Policy Officer
	Christian Kachibi, Logistics Officer
	Aristide Oula, Security Officer
WFP UNDSS Bouar	Security Officer
WFP UNICEF Bouar	Alain Didier Rama, Representative
WFP WORLD VISION Bouar	Roland Okiror, Representative
PLAN Intl Bouar	Eric Remadeke, Representative
OCHA Bouar	Representative
Wed 13/09/2017	
WFP Sub-Office Paoua	DRC; UNHCR; Mentor LKM; visit CBT distribution: Paoua district hospital: Jean Ospital, Project Coordinator (MSF); Sean Coq, Logistic –MSF; Dr Alain Gosta, Medical Doctor ai –MSF; Ms Cecile Nicolas, Nurse-MSF; Dr François Regongbenga, Director of the Hospital, Ministry of Health
WFP Sub-Office Kaga-Bandoro	Provincial hospital (nutrition); GFD; workshops with all partners: OCHA, FAO, UNICEF, Ministry of Agriculture, ACDA, WHO, IOM, UNHCR, Caritas; school feeding (Director, APE); CBT distributions and committees (2); CBT beneficiaries (5 women); CBT traders (5)
WFP Cameroon (border)	Olivier Dep-dep, Logistic Assistant
Direction Générale des Douanes (border)	Pierre Marie Ngamkam, Inspecteur Principal for Cameroon (Garoua) ; Gustave Boy Banga Devola, Inspecteur des Douanes for CAR (Beloko)
Thu 14/09	
WFP Sub-Office Paoua	AFRRD; AFRED; AVIDESCA; OXFAM; FFA and P4P sites; Paoua schools: Assana Guy Francis, Director School A; Kianan Benine Malachie , School B; 10 parents from APE; 22 (17 women + 5 men) PLHIV from their associations + 3 under five year old children.
WFP Sub-Office Kaga-Bandoro	Logistics and Programmes Officers, debriefing
FAO	Representative (Jean Alexandre Scaglia)
WFP Bangui	Marie Joëlle Jean-Charles, Reports and P&I (Communication) officer
LJD Group Bangui	Pierre Destin, Country Manager
Transport Nunes Bangui	Fatima Da Silva, Manager
Central African Transport sarl Bangui	Emmanuele Loro, Operations Manager Patrick Van der Beeck, General Manager (based in Kampala)
Fri 15/09	
WFP Sub-Office Paoua	UNICEF; SO staff debriefing
RCPCA Secretariat	Allamaradji Djerina, RCPCA Cell at World Bank

Organisation	Key staff interviewed
WFP Bangui	Fatouma Diadie, HR Officer
Sat 16/09	
WFP Sub-Office Bambari	Security, Head of SO; general staff briefing; OCHA; Caritas, GFD, IDP camp committee, Espérance; Logistics Officer; UNHCR
OXFAM – CBT in Bangui	Arun Salem, Chef de Quartier, Autorité Communale Arouina Tamboura, OXFAM Coordonnateur Responsable CBT CBT distribution:group discussion with beneficiaries
Sun 17/09	
Various Bambari	Mayor of Bambari; UNDP; Logistics; UNDSS
Mon 18/09	
Various Bambari	Head of SO; Logistics Officer; provincial hospital (nutrition, MAM, SAM, HIV, TB); debriefing
Ministry of Health	Dr Bernard, Director General of Health
WFP CO (by Skype)	Benedict Tabiojongmbeng, former Nutrition Advisor
UNHCR	Pierre Atchom, Représentant Adjoint Guy René Dagbo, Chef de Bureau
WHO	Dr Tapsoba, WHO Representative a.i; Dr Richard Fosting; Health Cluster Coordinator
World Vision Intl	Moussa I.G. Sangara, Country Director
French Embassy	Eric Force, Attaché de Coopération
Finn Church Aid	School Feeding Officer
Tue 19/09	
MINUSCA Integrated Office	Ms Nadjat Roshdi, Humanitarian Coordinator, DSRSG
Ministry of Health	Nutrition Dept: Dr Hoza Modeste ; Balekouzou Michel, M&E Advisor; Mbossi Jean Luc, Chief of section, water & foods quality control; Dr Honoré Monogbaziama, Chef lutte contre les IST/VIH SIDA
ZHSR team	Mrs Koyara, Lead Facilitator; 2 advisors
WFP Bangui	Country Director, Deputy CD
Wed 20/09	
Schools Bangui	Visit of four schools in Bangui with Albert Bango-Makoudou (CO): management, parent's association, Rep from Ministry
Husaca - Bangui	Raed Hariri, General Manager (by phone)
WFP - Yaounde	Jean-Marie Mulonda, Senior Logistic Officer (by phone)
UNAIDS	Dr El Hadj Abdallahi Fahi, Country Director; Zitongo Brigitte , Administrative Assistant
CNLS	Léon Gabriel Bango, Coordinator; Dr Massanga Marcel
UNFPA	M&E Advisor
OCHA	Representative
ECHO	Field Officer

Organisation	Key staff interviewed
EU Bekou Trust Fund	Representative: Davide Stefanini
Thu 21/09	
MINUSCA Civil Affairs	M Laurent Guepin
World Bank	Robert You Jaoude, Country Director
MSF Hollande	Dr Issaka Zongo, Coordinateur Médical
Ministry of Social Affairs	Dr Antoine Georges Mbaga, Director of Cabinet
Fri 22/09	
WFP CO (debriefing)	Country Director, Deputy CD, all key staff

Interviews/ group discussions with local actors and beneficiaries

Date	Location	Local project actors and beneficiary groups interviewed	Figures disaggregated by Gender (W=women; M = Men)
12/09 13/09	Paoua	CBT retailers, local market	3 women and 3 men
		Beneficiaries, IDPs - pastoralists, GFD Hospital/MAM/SAM	6 men and 10 women Head Nurse responsible for nutrition (man)
	Kaga-Bandoro	GFD distribution by Caritas	2 Caritas staff (1 man, 1 women), 3 beneficiaries (women)
13/09	Kaga-Bandoro	School meals: visit to 1 school	Director (man), 5 parents from APE (3 men, 2 women)
		Nutrition/MAM/SAM: visit of provincial hospital	MAM health worker (women), 2 parents (women) with 2 under five year old children
		CBT: distribution by local committees	CBT committees (2 men), CBT beneficiaries (5 women), CBT traders (4 men, 1 woman)
	Paoua	Beneficiaries IDPs, GFD / FFA	15 men and 15 women
14/09	Paoua Bangui, section V	P4P beneficiaries –producer association	Head of producer association (man)
		School meals: visit to 2 schools	2 directors (men), 10 parents from APE
		PLHIV associations	22 (17 women + 5 men) + 3 under five year old children
		CBT: distribution by OXFAM Group and individual discussions with beneficiaries	Group discussion with beneficiaries Beneficiaries: 15 women, 2 men
		Individual discussions with retailers	Retailers: 10 women Head of community association (1 man)
16/09	Bambari	GFD distribution by Espérance	Group discussion with IDP/GFD committee: 2 men, 5 women
		Nutrition/MAM/SAM/HIV-TB: visit to provincial hospital	Management (1 man), group discussions with health workers (2 men, 2 women) and parents (3 women) at MAM and HIV/TB departments
18/09	Bangui	School meals: visit to 4 schools	Group discussions with school management (2 men, 2 women), parents from APEs (1 man, 3 women)

Annex E Evaluation Methodology

Methodological approach

1. Considering the objectives of the country portfolio evaluation, The team was requested to evaluate the entire WFP portfolio rather than focusing on individual operations. The evaluation team was also requested to focus exclusively on beneficiaries within the Central African Republic, excluding Central African Republic citizens who have become refugees in neighbouring countries. Although no country strategic plan or theory of change was formally prepared for the Central African Republic over the evaluation period, the inception report identified that, to a certain extent, a strategic approach had been developed internally to each operation, as shown in the logical frameworks annexed to the various project documents.
2. As part of the evaluation, the team reviewed the following activities: emergency preparedness and response; food assistance (general food distribution, cash based transfers, school meals); resilience, including food assistance for assets and P4P; nutrition and health including HIV; and logistics. The following cross-cutting issues were addressed within each of these thematic areas: partnerships and capacity development; gender; protection and humanitarian principles; coordination and monitoring and evaluation. As part of the efficiency analysis, the team also reviewed the human resource challenges related operating in a complex emergency environment.
3. The team also assessed the consistency between the objectives of the ICSP and the evidence emerging from the evaluation.

The team was able to followed the above methodology, by keeping the overall strategic perspective, and focusing on major themes and cross-cutting issues. Evidence was triangulated whenever feasible through desk review, discussions and field observation (see also data collection below), to support conclusions and recommendations.

However, the team found some limitations regarding access to sites, availability of data and historical memory for the 2012-2013 period.

The ICSP was also assessed as planned.

Gender

4. In accordance with the Office of Evaluation's Technical Note on Gender Integration, the WFP Gender Policy for 2015-2020, and the United Nations System Wide Action Plan (UNSWAP) of 2014, the evaluation was to integrate gender into the interviews and focus group discussions with beneficiaries and partners by using the relevant gender equality and empowerment of women (GEEW) issues and gender-sensitive approaches that were listed in the evaluations questions of the evaluation matrix. When evaluators were to assess the degree to which power relations between genders may have changed as a result of an intervention, they were to do so with a full understanding of the context, and to conduct the evaluation in a way that supported the empowerment of disadvantaged groups.

The gender analysis was somewhat limited due to the lack of security and access. Indicators of operations were disaggregated by gender, – which allowed the measurement of outputs and equality in numbers of beneficiaries or committee members, but the intended methodological focus on the outcome of power relations between genders was limited due to a lack of gender-specific and context-related assessments.

Data analysis

5. Data analysis included analysis of narrative, quantitative and financial data sets. Quantitative and qualitative data were to be combined to measure performance. Assessments were to be conducted by each team member in his/her sectors of responsibility.

Data sets were made available by WFP. Data was analysed as planned by each team member, and triangulated as explained under the data collection section below. The timeline was split into three distinct sub-periods (prior to crisis, L3 emergency, and attempted recovery). It was not possible to obtain a really comprehensive longitudinal perspective, as envisaged in the ToR.

Cost-efficiency

6. The ToR required that “The evaluation should provide comparative cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness analyses of the different food assistance transfer modalities e.g. CBTs versus in-kind or versus a combination of the two, in the portfolio...Cost Effectiveness focuses on Omega value and/or other effectiveness indicators, e.g. the in-kind vs costs percent increase in households with adequate Food Consumption Score”. Based on its combined experience, the evaluation team did not expect to find comprehensive information covering the entire evaluation period. The team had anticipated making a general assessment based on secondary information, focusing on cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness calculations of different transfer modalities prepared by WFP and by partners, including value-for-money assessments.

The evaluation team found formal calculations (Omega values) for a selection of locations for a specific point in time, but the validity of the analysis was found to be limited by a lack of systematic surveys, which furthermore did not consider all parameters needed to ensure a complete cost-effectiveness comparison between vouchers and in-kind.

Evaluability

7. Security issues in the Central African Republic were identified in the inception report (IR) as a challenge to access, and therefore to the evaluability of the country portfolio. The inception report anticipated that in case this risk did materialize during the field visits, the team would further develop its documentary analysis and rely on additional interviews and group discussions. A possible specific constraint to evaluability was identified for school meals, as the academic year in the Central African Republic starts only in October and schools would still be closed in September, during field visits. The mitigating factor in that case was the plan to contact some of the school headmasters, teachers, parents, cooks or children living in nearby villages.

There was indeed a lack of field access to operations outside of the main towns; this reduced access to evidence was partly compensated for by meeting additional stakeholders and reviewing more reports, although all actors and report authors were also constrained by security problems. It was possible to meet the management and representatives of parents associations in the visited schools.

Evaluation matrix

8. The ToR included a proposed list of 12 sub-questions prepared by the Office of Evaluation, on which the evaluation team elaborated further in the evaluation matrix included in the inception report. In line with the Office of Evaluation Technical Guidance on Evaluation Matrices, the document also included indicators and analysis approaches, data sources, data collection and analysis methods, and other relevant information. Indicators used were to be selected from the Office of Evaluation Technical Note on Efficiency Analysis, the logical frameworks of the different programmes (CP, PRRO and EMOPs), the corresponding standard project reports and the team members’ own expertise. Benchmarking was to include the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Northern Cameroon and South Sudan.

Indicators in the matrix were discussed with the Office of Evaluation and revised in the final version of the inception report. Indicators, information sources and methods listed in the matrix were used as intended. Benchmarking included Cameroon (a team member was also involved in a country programme evaluation there), and the South Sudan evaluation report was used as a model.

Data collection methods

9. A mixed-methods approach was to be used to address the evaluation questions, as described in the evaluation matrix. The evaluation process was to be based on the collection of a triangulated mix of (i) documents / literature review; (ii) secondary quantitative data (documentary analysis of standard project reports and data sets from available food security and nutrition surveys); (iii) primary data from (semi-structured) interviews and group discussions with stakeholders at headquarters, the regional bureau in Dakar, and field level (country office, partners, beneficiaries); (iv) field observation. Groups were to be disaggregated by gender wherever feasible.

The mixed-method approach was followed as planned. The lack of overall assessment and monitoring surveys (only fragmented ones were available) was a constraint.

Field visits

10. A tentative agenda and travel plan for the field visits was included in the inception report. In addition to the main office in Bangui, the team was to visit three sub-offices (Bouar, Kaga-Bandoro and Bambari) selected on the basis of the presence of partners, the range of implemented projects (general food distribution, cash based transfers, nutrition, school feeding, food assistance for assets, P4P), and the possibility of meeting with beneficiaries in relatively secure conditions. This selection of sub-offices also took into account the need for a balanced representation of the different geographic context across the country. .

The plan was implemented; the three sub-offices were visited, and a fourth one (Paouawas) was added. The visit to four of the five sub-offices ensured appropriate coverage of the activities and of the different contexts, even though security issues limited field visits out of the immediate vicinity of the sub-office buildings.

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Data sets		
1. CPE on the Central African Republic - ToR tables	WFP OEV	2017
2. Project beneficiary data 2015 (DACOTA and COMET)	WFP	Various
3. The Central African Republic 2012 to 2014 Outputs		
4. The Central African Republic 2015 Outputs		
5. The Central African Republic Outcomes 2012 to 2014		
6. The Central African Republic Outcomes 2015		
7. The Central African Republic Portfolio Overview 2012 – June 2017		
8. The Central African Republic Projects – Beneficiary Datasets 2012–2014		
9. The Central African Republic Projects – Beneficiary Datasets 2015		
10. The Central African Republic Resources Level Overview (Jul 2017)		
Maps		
1. OSE Dashboard	WFP	2016
2. Map The Central African Republic ECHO May 2017	ECHO	2017
OEV evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS)		
Guidance		
1. Guidance for Process and Content - CPE	WFP OEV	2016
2. Template for Inception Report - CPE	WFP OEV	2013
3. Quality Checklist for Summary Evaluation Report - CPE	WFP OEV	2014
4. Quality Checklist for Inception Report - CPE	WFP OEV	2014
5. Template for Evaluation Report - CPE	WFP OEV	2013
6. Quality Checklist for Summary Evaluation Report - CPE	WFP OEV	2014
7. Template for Summary Evaluation Report - CPE	WFP OEV	2014
Technical notes (TN)		
1. TN - ER Integrating Gender in Evaluation	WFP OEV	2014
2. TN - Conducting Evaluations in Situations of Conflict & Fragility	WFP OEV	2014
3. TN - Stakeholder Analysis	WFP OEV	2011-13
4. TN - Stakeholder Mapping	WFP OEV	2011-14
5. TN - Efficiency	WFP OEV	2013

Document category/title	Author	Dates
6. TN- Template for Team Members Work Plan and Proposed Stakeholders Meeting	WFP OEV	2013
7. TN - Evaluation Criteria	WFP OEV	2013
8. TN - Evaluation Matrix	WFP OEV	2013
9. TN - ER Formatting Guidelines	WFP OEV	2013
10. TN - Logic Model Theory Of Change	WFP OEV	2013
11. TN - Evaluation Recommendations	WFP OEV	2013
12. TN - Example Evaluation Matrix for EQAS	WFP OEV	2013
Examples of prior evaluation reports	WFP OEV	Various

Annex G Evaluation Process and Timeline

	Central African Republic Country Portfolio Evaluation	By whom	Original dates	Actual dates
Phase 1 - Preparation				
	Desk review. Draft ToRs. OEV Director's clearance for circulation in WFP	EM		
	Review draft ToR based on WFP feedback	EM		
	Final ToR sent to WFP stakeholders	EM		
	Contracting evaluation team/firm	EM		
Phase 2 - Inception				
	Team preparation prior to HQ briefing (reading docs)	Team	July 3-9, 2017	July 3-9, 2017
	HQ briefing (WFP Rome)	EM & Team	July 18-20, 2017	July 18-20, 2017
	Inception mission in the country	EM + TL	July 24-28	July 24-28
	Submit draft inception report (IR) to OEV	TL	August 09, 2017	
	OEV quality assurance and feedback	EM	August 10 - 14, 2017	
	Submit revised IR	TL	August 21, 2017	
	Circulate final IR to WFP key stakeholders for their information + post a copy on intranet.	EM		
Phase 3 - Evaluation phase, including fieldwork				
	Fieldwork & desk review. Field visits at CO(s) and RBD. Internal debriefing with the CO and RBD	Team	Sep 4 - 23, 2017	
	Exit debrief (ppt) preparation	TL	Sep 23, 2017	
	Debriefing with HQ, RBD and COs staff Via HQ teleconference	EM&TL	October 6, 2017	
Phase 4 - Reporting				
Draft 0	Submit draft evaluation report (ER) to OEV (after the company's quality check)	TL	November 6, 2017	5 January 2018
	OEV quality feedback sent to the team	EM	Nov 13, 2017	
Draft 1	Submit revised draft ER to OEV	TL	Nov 20, 2017	
	OEV seeks OEV Director's clearance prior to circulating the ER to WFP stakeholders. When cleared, OEV shares draft evaluation report with WFP stakeholders for their feedback.	EM	November 24, 2017	
	OEV consolidates all WFP comments (matrix), and shares them with team. Team to consider them before in-country workshop	EM	December 8, 2017	
	Stakeholders learning workshop Bangui; share comments with TL	TL/EM	Dec 13 - 15, 2017	
Draft 2	Submit revised draft ER and draft summary evaluation report (SER) to OEV based on WFP comments, and team's comments on the matrix of comments.	TL	Jan 8, 2018	14 February 2018 (SER)
	Review matrix and ER and draft SER.	EM	Jan 12, 2018	

	Central African Republic Country Portfolio Evaluation	By whom	Original dates	Actual dates
	Seek OEV Director's clearance to send the SER to Executive Management.	EM	Jan 12, 2018	
	OEV circulates the SER to WFP senior management for comments (upon clearance from OEV Director)	EM	January 19, 2018	
	OEV sends and discuss the comments on the SER to the team	EM	February 2, 2018	
Draft 3	Submit final draft ER (with the revised SER) to OEV	TL	Feb 9, 2018	
	Seek final approval by OEV Director. Clarify last points/issues with the team if necessary	EM&TL	Feb 16, 2018	
Phase 5 Executive Board (EB) and follow-up				
	Submit SER/recommendations to RMP for management response and SER to EB Secretariat for editing and translation	EM	February 23, 2018	11 April 2018
	Tail end actions, OEV websites posting, EB round table etc.	EM		
	Presentation of summary evaluation report to the EB	D/OEV	June 2018	June 2018
	Presentation of management response to the EB	D/RMP	June 2018	June 2018

Legend:

TL=Team Leader; EM=Evaluation Manager; OEV=Office of Evaluation. RMP = Performance and Accountability Management

Annex H Assessment of Special Operations in the Central African Republic

1. The eleven special operations (SO) provided the necessary leverage to WFP, the other United Nations agencies and the many international and national NGOs to deliver their specialized assistance in a country lacking essential services. Table A5 provides an overview of special operations.

Table A5: Summary overview of special operation programmes (Figures as of 31/12/2016)

	Programme	Activity	Actual start date	Actual end date	Total cost - USD	
					Approved budget	Actual expenditures*
1	SO 105620	UNHAS	01/11/06	31/12/12	26,287,103	22,010,674
2	SO 200522	UNHAS	01/01/13	31/12/14	21,919,177	17,903,631
3	SO 200804	UNHAS	01/01/15	31/12/16	30,364,852	23,753,138
4	SO 201045	UNHAS	01/01/17	31/12/17	15,097,755	n.a.
5	IRA 200554	Emergency preparedness	28/03/13	29/06/13	176,194	163,428
6	IR-EMOP 200995	Fund allocation from IRA	28/03/16	28/05/16	275,633	275,633
7	SO 200605	Logistic support & ETC	01/07/13	30/04/16	14,861,493	6,647,958
8	SO 200643	Staff security augmentation	12/12/13	31/12/14	6,109,339	4,445,599
9	SO 200646	Strengthening food security cl.	16/12/13	31/12/14	1,563,830	96,485
10	SO 200934	Reg. optimisation supply corridors	15/01/16	31/12/17	3,095,895	696,054
11	SO 200997	Logistic Support and ETC	01/08/16	30/06/17	3,366,975	220,836
		Total			123,118,246	76,213,436

*Total project costs /actual expenditures with DSC (Direct Support Costs) and ISC (Indirect Support Costs) included.

Source: Standard project reports and funds consumption reports available

2. The standard project reports of the special operations provide a range of output indicators which are as follows:

- UNHAS: number of passengers, of metric tons transported, average costs, number of airplanes, of user agencies, incidents
- Emergency telecommunications cluster: number of staff trained, of locations provided with radio room services, and of user agencies
- Logistics: storage facilities available, number of user agencies, convoys, vehicles operating, metric tons, bridges rehabilitated, coordination meetings and participants, needs assessments carried out, sub-offices setup/re-opened.

3. However, indications of performance and outcomes can only be found in rather brief narratives (“UNHAS achieved and often exceeded the planned results” or “corridor bottlenecks decreased”), and no outcome indicators are used in the standard project reports.

UNHAS

4. UNHAS has been in the Central African Republic since 2006 and has provided air transport services during the entire country portfolio evaluation period. It has ensured crucial field access to most destinations of humanitarian interest - security permitting – and evacuations in case of emergency. UNHAS was also doing its best to adapt services to needs: 24 destinations were covered in 2015, and 33 in 2017 (21 regular and 12 ad hoc) with a fleet of three to four versatile aircrafts, supplemented, as and when necessary, by an aircraft from Médecins sans Frontières. Considering the prevailing violence and poor road infrastructure, it is likely that the humanitarian activity in the country would come to a halt if UNHAS were not in a position to operate. No exit strategy could realistically be envisaged in the foreseeable future. The key figures are set out in Table A6.

Table A6: .Key figures of UNHAS operations in the Central African Republic (period Jan 2014–June 2017)

	2014	2015	2016	2017 (6 mths)
Passengers transported (incl. transit)	20 351	30 808	35 747	16 967
Monthly average passenger transported (incl. transit)	1 695	2 567	2 979	2 827
Passenger booked transported	12 379	16 888	21 293	10 422
Monthly average passengers booked transported	1 031	1 407	1 774	1 737
Cargo transported (MT)	323	351	399	200
MEDEVAC (number of persons)	22	24	35	13
Security relocations	119	358	182	96
Seat occupancy (passengers and cargo)	57%	61%	62%	61%
Organisations registered with and vetted by UNHAS: 19 United Nations agencies, 5 donors, 82 NNGOs, 38 INGOs, 6 diplomatic missions.				

Source: UNHAS Rome.

5. There is good cooperation with the air transport units of MINUSCA, ICRC and Médecins sans Frontières, but the approach to regular airstrips maintenance is rather piecemeal and lacks a common approach supported by the civil aviation authority, UNHAS, MINUSCA, the humanitarian community or the local population.

6. Information regarding weather and field airstrip conditions are freely exchanged but reliable JET A1 fuel supply remains a recurrent problem despite WFP efforts to preposition drummed JET A1 fuel.

7. The UNHAS projects are approximately 82 percent funded which translates to a widespread satisfaction on the part of the donor countries. ECHO has been a regular supporter of UNHAS throughout.

8. The services appear to be managed efficiently. The rental of planes, the jet fuel and the boarding and lodging of crews are the costs of the operation. The income from cost recovery (through the price of tickets charged to passengers) stood at USD 1.6 million for the first six months of 2017 and covered 12 percent of the total UNHAS costs.

9. The evaluation found that monthly user group meetings are not attended by all users - there are on average only between 15 and 20 participants out of a group of 150 user representatives.

Logistics cluster

10. WFP has coordinated the logistic and emergency telecommunication (ETC) clusters services since July 2013, under SO 200605 and SO 200997 (budget of USD 14.8 million and USD 2.0 million respectively and budget funded at 45 percent and 62 percent respectively). Throughout the period, the logistics cluster acted mainly as an information and coordination platform for the humanitarian community. The number of agencies and NGOs making regular use of the cluster facilities varied between 40 and 70, with some 25 users in attendance at the regular fortnightly cluster meetings. The type of assistance provided directly by the cluster or by participating NGOs was as follows: the provision of road transport facility to third parties, the rehabilitation of road infrastructure (bridges, culverts, drainage works), the provision and construction of mobile storage units, the maintenance of airfield strips, and the training of United Nations and NGO staff in good warehouse management practices.

11. From the minutes of the logistics cluster meetings, it appears that the overall approach was, however, rather piecemeal, and the decision process was at times slow. The objectives were not always well defined or understood. A lack of continuity seems to have prevailed, which may be explained by a high turn-over of staff³⁰ - qualified, but not always well prepared to operate in the difficult Central African Republic environment – and the chronic underfunding, which has compelled the cluster to leave the management or implementation of some projects to the initiative of willing NGOs.³¹ The Global Logistic Cluster in Rome, aware of the difficulties in the Central African Republic, conducted a “lesson learning exercise” in October 2015.

Emergency telecommunications cluster

12. Under the umbrella of the same two special operations, the emergency telecommunications cluster was re-activated in the Central African Republic in 2013. At the time of the evaluation, it offered facilities and services in eight sites³² serving as many as 55 organizations by providing: shared internet connectivity, security telecommunications, WFP technical staff training (400 local staff), radio programming and tuning and close liaison with the Central African Republic Telecommunications Regulatory Agency. There were also plans to deploy “digital mobile radios” in Bangui in two sites. It is unfortunate that the emergency telecommunications cluster was left for many months without a coordinator, forcing the IT senior officer to step in. The emergency telecommunications cluster could have done with more visibility; nonetheless, the NGOs are making good use of the internet connectivity provided in so-called “internet cafés”, which are very well attended. In some sites the security telecommunications facility is operated on a 24 hours a day, 7 days a week basis by United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) inside the MINUSCA compounds.

Other special operations

13. The SO 200643 was launched as the security situation deteriorated rapidly in the country from December 2013 to March 2015. It provided air passages for international staff relocation in Yaounde and Douala at the height of the L3 crisis and access for all the staff to the secure

³⁰ Between July 2013 and July 2017 the logistics cluster meetings were chaired by 13 different senior logistics officers or their representatives.

³¹ For example: Road transport (Handicap International), common storage facilities provided /operated by Première Urgence Internationale PUI (Bangui), Solidarités Internationales (Kaga Bandoro), ACF (Bossangoa), HI (Bambari), OXFAM (Bria); bridge repairs (Acted), shunting barge (Fondation Suisse de Déminage)

³² ETC sites are: Bouar, Bossangoa (managed by UNICEF), Paoua, Ndélé (managed by IOM), Bangassou, Kaga Bandoro (managed by UNICEF), Zemio (managed by UNHCR) and Bangui

telecommunication equipment. IT and communication equipment, prefabs, armoured vehicles, helmets and bulletproof vests were provided through strategic airlift coordinated by United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD). Later, it covered the extra costs for re-opening three WFP sub-offices and warehouses. The special operation managed to mitigate some of the key risks related to the operational response and staff security, particularly in terms of ensuring adequate in-country staff and safe, secure equipment. Key functions were secured by experienced staff on temporary duty and by consultants, which enabled a reinforcement of capacity and supported the implementation of humanitarian response. This vital special operation with a total project cost amounting to USD 4.5 million was 75 percent funded, through funds drawn from the "Multilateral Account".

14. The remaining three smaller special operations (IRA 200544, SO 200646 and SO 200934) were rather limited in scope; they aimed to increase preparedness, strengthen the food security cluster and finally increase the logistic capacity along the Douala-Bangui corridor. The rail transport with CAMRAIL with adjacent warehousing in Belabo (Cameroon), which was initiated to overcome a shortage of haulage capacity, was enabled under the SO 200934.

Annex I Assessment of the Interim Country Strategic Plan

I.1. The new ICSP 2018-2020

1. The first version of the interim country strategic plan (ICSP) was released in April 2017, and several other versions were prepared before it was formally approved by the Executive Board in November 2017. The view of the evaluation team is that the final ICSP was a balanced document, which also acknowledged the often unpredictable political situation in the Central African Republic and its implications on the progress of the Government towards capacity strengthening.

2. The ICSP includes five Strategic Outcomes:

- Basic food and nutrition needs for crisis-affected households and communities during and in the aftermath of crises
- Improved nutritional status for vulnerable groups (disabled, children, pregnant and lactating women, antiretroviral patients)
- Enhanced livelihoods to support food security and nutrition of food insecure women and men in target areas
- Strengthened capacities of national and sub-national institutions, to establish an adequate social protection system and manage food security and nutrition policies and programmes
- Enhanced capacity of the humanitarian community to operate where needed.

3. The ICSP was found to be aligned with the WFP Integrated Road Map (IRM) of November 2016, the UN Sustainable Development Goals 2 and 17, the Government's RCPCA policy for 2017-2021, the corresponding UNDAF+ for 2018-2021, and the Humanitarian Response Plan 2017-2019. The ICSP was backed by a wide range of analyses from: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2014, Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) 2015, National Food Security Assessment (NFSA) 2016, rapid Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition (SMART) survey 2016, Crop and Food Assessment Mission with FAO in 2016, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) 2016, UNAIDS and the World Bank.

4. The evaluation team understands that the ICSP design process included consultations with the Ministry of Education, and the donors ECHO, USAID/Food for Peace, and the French Development Agency (AFD). The Ministry of Agriculture was also contacted to take part, but was not able to attend. There was no mention of in-depth discussions with the key Ministries of Social Affairs or Economy, Planning and International Cooperation.

5. The main focus of ICSP was the emergency humanitarian aid, which is fully appropriate considering the current situation and which represented 56.9 percent of the total budget (USD 164,389,227 out of USD 288,799,392)

6. A second central focus of the ICSP was SDG 2 - towards Zero Hunger. As outlined in paragraph 12 of the ICSP, "food and agriculture are the mainstay of the Central African Republic, including employment and livelihoods". The topic was described in more detail in chapter 1.2 paragraphs 5-10, paragraphs 12-13, and paragraphs 17 and 24. Zero Hunger is most closely linked to ICSP Strategic Outcome 3 (food security, which is 14.8 percent of the budget), but it is also related to Strategic Outcome 2 (nutrition). The country office was instrumental in hosting and supporting the Zero Hunger Strategic Review, a process which was still ongoing during the country portfolio

evaluation process and could not be integrated in the ICSP. It will however be finalized as a prerequisite to kick-start the preparation of the country strategic plan.

7. UN SDG 17 (partnerships) was duly considered as a cross-cutting issue among most of the 11 activities listed in Table A7. The table presents the planned partnerships and the resulting capacity augmentation initiatives and projects, training opportunities for third parties inside the ministries and public services, and transfer of expertise in favour of the Government in order to prepare for a possible coordinated exit strategy.

8. Another key focus (which was much more prominent and ambitious in the first version of ICSP but has been gradually toned down in the second and third versions) was the capacity strengthening of the Government, in order to establish an adequate social protection system and manage food security and nutrition policies and programmes by 2020. Strategic Outcome 4, which was in line with the Integrated Road Map objective of “promoting national ownership by governments”, was dedicated to this objective. The first version of the ICSP included the very ambitious objective of transferring overall responsibilities to the Government for leadership and coordination of international assistance, implicitly within the ICSP timeframe. The issue was repeatedly outlined, among others, in paragraphs ii-iii (executive summary) and paragraphs 19-22, 29-35, 61-67, and 84. Paragraph 91 stated, for example, that “WFP will also support government to provide effective inter-cluster coordination to support strategic decision-making under the RCPCA and UNDAF+. This will enable WFP to support government as it begins transitioning to sectoral coordination mechanisms”. Constraints consisting of poor capacities, a lack of examples of good practice and a lack of funding do not appear to have been thoroughly considered at first. The importance of these activities were also not appropriately reflected in the value of the budget.

9. The final version included a more realistic targeted capacity strengthening objective, referred to in paragraph ii, paragraphs 25-29, and as a cross-cutting theme in four of the five Strategic Outcomes: paragraphs 34 (SO1), 43 (SO2), 60-67 (SO4), 71 (SO5), and 77 and 87 (transition and exit strategies).

10. Strategic Outcome 4 of the ICSP was essentially dedicated to gradually putting the Government - and more specifically the Ministry of Economic Planning and Cooperation - in the driver seat. The objective of this strategic outcome was to build on the comparative strengths of partners (FAO, UNICEF, World Bank) to help the Ministry establish an effective social protection system and manage national Zero Hunger data and monitoring and accountability systems. Introducing such a national social safety net programme would have involved setting up a digital platform for beneficiaries and transfer management (SCOPE), and streamlining data, monitoring and accountability systems into a national integrated platform.

11. The final version of the ICSP was appropriately more cautious in not providing a firm timetable for the Government’s “empowerment”. The ICSP stated (paragraphs ii and 25) that “A gradual transfer of responsibilities in the coordination and leadership of future crisis response and resilience-building interventions will depend primarily on the full roll-out and functioning of sectoral coordination arrangements under the (RCPCA) and on government capacity to assume these roles. For 2018, the cluster system for the coordination of humanitarian action will be maintained”.

12. It should however be noted that in the ICSP priority was given to the social safety net system, whilst WFP was not yet able to establish a comprehensive framework of cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs (no memorandum of understanding had been signed yet at the time of the evaluation). It was also unclear to what extent the key role assigned in the ICSP to the Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation was actually being formally discussed with

the Ministry itself (this issue was not mentioned by the Ministry during the country portfolio evaluation visits).

13. Furthermore, there was still a lack of lessons learned and examples of successful good practices in terms of government capacity strengthening, that could be used as practical guidelines (see chapter 2.3). The ICSP logframe listed two outcome indicators (Zero Hunger capacity scorecard, and emergency preparedness capacity index), but assumptions were not explicit regarding the increase in the capacities of human resources and in the funding of the related costs.

14. As shown in Table A7, the ICSP preparation process appeared quite thorough, but failed to attract relevant comments about the over-ambitious transfer of responsibilities to the Government until the very last stage, i.e. the review by the Executive Board. A concept note was disseminated, which did not initially attract comments. An internal strategic project review was also conducted to align the ICSP with UNDAF and RCPCA; this drew comments only from Sweden and the United States. Overall, the key steps of the process were, over a one year period, as detailed in Table A7.

Table A7: Key steps in the design process of ICSP

2017							2018
January	mid Feb.	Beginning June	End June	Mid August	Mid Sept.	November	January
Identify WFP strategic outcomes in CAR	Finalize transitional concept note	Draft narrative, logframe and budget	Final draft for internal clearance	ICSP published for Member States' comments	ICSP sent to EB Secretariat	EB approval	ICSP operational

Source : WFP CAR

15. The budget requested for Strategic Outcome 4 of the ICSP only amounted to USD 1.4 million, 0.5 percent of the total budget. This did not seem consistent with the corresponding emphasis in the document.

16. The probability of receiving funding for the required budget was also looking relatively low. Whilst the RCPCA had budgeted USD 150 million for capacity strengthening, the total of planned disbursements in April 2017 amounted only to USD 11,212, 456 – a mere 7 percent of the identified needs.

17. Partners with whom WFP had signed memoranda of understanding had even less funding than WFP and tended to use them in priority for emergency activities – a situation which potentially undermined any wide-ranging support to the Government. For the implementation of its 2017 emergency programme, FAO requested funding of USD 55.7 million but only received USD 15.1 million (funding gap of 73 percent).³³ The situation was hardly better for UNICEF: the humanitarian response in the Central African Republic in 2017 was only 37.3 percent funded – out of a request of USD 46.3 million, only USD 17.3 million had been received.³⁴

18. Finally – coming rather late for both the ICSP and the country portfolio evaluation timeframes – only in mid-2017 did the Government formally recognize that the very first precondition for social and economic recovery was the restoration of state authority (see paragraph 20 onwards of this

³³ Source: FAO Situation Report, Oct 2017

³⁴ Source: UNICEF Situation Report, June 2017

Annex for a description of the strategy for Bambari). This new paradigm was not addressed in the ICSP, as illustrated in Table A8 which envisaged an expansion of food assistance for assets and P4P (activity 7) only in Bossangoa and Kaga-Bandoro, but not in Bambari. The possible use of food assistance for training to support transition efforts by other United Nations agencies was not mentioned either.

19. From an output and implementation perspective, the additional comments from the evaluation team on the ICSP are summarised below:

- The anticipated annual food transfer volume was planned at 30,000 metric tons. This objective was regarded as being within reach and in line with the annual food pipeline over the years 2015–2017.
- The net value of cash based transfers was expected to reach approximately USD 19 million per annum. (USD 57.4 million over three years). Considering that the net cash based transfer value in mid 2017 was USD 4.8 million (annual basis), the throughput increased by a factor of almost four. This target appeared relatively high, given the risks relating to the stability of the political situation and the disruption caused by any violence surrounding cash based transfers.
- USD 19 million per year would have amounted to the equivalent of some 25 to 30,000 metric tons of in-kind food commodities, which was approximately the same as the planned value of the food pipeline (91,380 metric tons of food over three years). This raised several questions, including questions about the risk of interference with market prices, as cash based transfer traders would have had to import vast amounts of commodities from neighboring countries.
- The decision to maintain a sizeable WFP truck fleet for the secondary transport was reasonable, but implied that the maintenance of the fleet should have been substantially improved and better funded.
- The continuation of the logistics cluster and emergency telecommunications services was appropriate, but the staffing should have been reconsidered, as these clusters were subject to a high turnover. More resources should also have been allocated to the logistics cluster to expand its services beyond an exchange of logistic information. The cluster was often found to be dependent on third parties over which the cluster itself had little or no control.
- It was also unclear whether the country office would have the necessary capacity to deliver the services it planned for in the ICSP, considering that the current workload of the staff (both in the main office and in the sub-offices) was already found to be relatively high. The extra services proposed in the ICSP implied the existence of highly qualified staff posted to the same location/station for long duty periods. The ICSP did not mention either the need for more support and training from the regional bureau in Dakar or from headquarters (more practical policy, guidelines on capacity strengthening, convergence by the sister United Nations agencies, etc).

Table A8: Detailed description of capacity strengthening measures in ICSP (2018-2020), per activity

Activity	Description
Activity 1: Provide general food distributions, nutritious food and/or CBTs to refugees, IDPs, returnees and crisis-affected host communities	(\$38) WFP will partner with UNICEF and NGOs to help the Ministry of Public Health (MINSANTE) introduce a comprehensive, community-led approach to the prevention of malnutrition in line with government SUN priorities. A blanket supplementary feeding programme (BSFP) will be used as a platform for the introduction of nutrition-sensitive activities. Gender will be integrated into community social and behaviour change communication (SBCC), including cooking demonstrations with locally available nutritious foods, and will
Activity 2: Distribute emergency school meals to primary schoolchildren from crisis-affected families in targeted localities	

Activity	Description
	<p>address the relationship between malnutrition and health, water, sanitation, hygiene and diet diversity practices. Nutritious school meals will be provided in areas facing food and nutritional insecurity, utilizing purchases to support smallholders under Strategic Objective 3.</p> <p>(§42) The prevention of malnutrition will not include transfers, but rather focus on the provision of gender-sensitive SBCC and nutrition education by local partners and health centre workers.</p> <p>(§43) In line with the SUN commitments of the Central African Republic, WFP will partner with UNICEF and NGOs to help the MINSANTE strengthen the capacities of health districts, centre staff and community health workers (CHWs) and to establish health centres as platforms for the provision of nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive services to communities. This integrated approach will strengthen government capacities for a gradual transfer of management responsibilities and the integration of malnutrition prevention services within existing health structures</p>
<p>Activity 3: Implement a BSFP for the prevention of MAM among children aged 6–23 months</p>	
<p>Activity 4: Provide a comprehensive package for the prevention and treatment of malnutrition to children with MAM aged 6–59 months and PLW/girls and provide food by prescription to ART patients</p>	<p>(§46) Outreach through health centres will be supported by CHWs. As indicated in paragraph 42 of ICSP, the prevention component of this activity will not require the provision of food</p>
<p>Activity 5: Provide capacity strengthening to health district authorities, health centre staff and CHWs in programme design, implementation and monitoring to deliver the SUN agenda</p>	<p>(§47) WFP will focus on the prevention of malnutrition, through the combined training of heads of health districts, health centre staff and CHWs, to manage decentralized programmes and/or provide basic nutrition education. CHWs will be trained in systematic gender and age disaggregated mid-upper arm circumference screening, follow-up for children with MAM and the referral of children with severe acute malnutrition for targeted therapeutic feeding. Improvements in mid-upper arm circumference screening will inform national nutrition monitoring systems</p>
<p>Activity 6: Provide nutritious school meals to schoolchildren in targeted areas</p>	
<p>Activity 7: Provide smallholder farmers with transfers to support asset creation and technical assistance to increase their access to markets, including purchases by WFP-supported school meals programmes</p>	<p>(§51) WFP will also expand the procurement of nutritious foods from local smallholder cooperatives, enabling smallholder producer cooperatives to enter local value chains. Priority will be given to access for women and young people. The introduction of the WFP three-pronged approach (3PA) to resilience-building will allow WFP to strengthen the capacities of local authorities and partners to introduce complementarity in the design and implementation of community-based recovery and resettlement initiatives.</p> <p>(§57) WFP will partner with FAO and MINADR to provide FFA to women and men smallholder farmers and herders, including returnees and host communities, to help them re-establish productive assets and strengthen their technical capacities in</p>

Activity	Description
	sustainable food production and post-harvest management. FFA activities will be concentrated in the west (Bouar) and northeast (Paoua), then gradually expanded to Bossangoa and Kaga Bandoro based on evaluation results. Implementation will be informed by WFP's three-pronged approach through participatory and consultative processes. At the local level, community-based participatory planning will be undertaken, bringing together women and men, IDPs, returnees and host communities
Activity 8: Provide capacity strengthening in Zero Hunger policies, strategic planning and delivery of programmes to public officials	<p>(§60) WFP will partner with United Nations agencies and government institutions to strengthen national humanitarian and early recovery capacities. This will include establishing the leadership, roles and responsibilities of line ministries to develop and deliver national Zero Hunger food and nutrition policies and programmes. Gender will be incorporated in country capacity strengthening and in the process and content of a ZHSR. National progress towards Zero Hunger will be informed by improved sex and age disaggregated data, monitoring and accountability systems, and gender analyses.</p> <p>(§64) WFP and its partners will progressively transfer to the Government food and nutrition security assessment and monitoring skills covering the coordinated collection, analysis and use of contextual and sex- and age-disaggregated data and gender analyses that include regular food security, nutrition, vulnerability, demographic and agricultural surveys. This will strengthen the targeting of government preparedness and response initiatives</p>
Activity 9: Provide capacity strengthening to the Government to establish a national social safety-net platform in collaboration with the World Bank and MINEPC, informed by national and subnational zero hunger data and monitoring and accountability systems	(§67) WFP will partner with the World Bank, the Government, UNDAF+ agencies and donors to map existing social safety-net initiatives (CBT, school meals, nutrition support, seasonal in-kind transfers) and will establish an effective support structure for the progressive transfer of social safety nets to the Government with the staff, tools, resources and common management system to monitor and administer national programmes. WFP will also support the Government and FAO to integrate food security, nutrition, livelihood and vulnerability data systems under the integrated phase classification. By improving the gender analysis and collection of sex disaggregated food security data, WFP and partners will help the Government track progress towards SDG 2 and strengthen its capacities to coordinate regional preparedness and response plans and target vulnerable groups
Activity 10: Provide common logistics and ETC services to the Government and United Nations and NGO partners to run effective field operations and provide for staff security	(§74) A deep analysis of national private-sector transport providers is planned for 2018 to inform medium-term strategies for the regeneration of national transport capacities
Activity 11: Provide humanitarian air services to all partners until appropriate alternatives are available	

Activity	Description
Transition and exit strategies	(\$77) Over the ICSP period, WFP will work closely with the Government and communities to gradually hand over some responsibilities in food programme management, particularly in the areas of home-grown school meals and food assistance for assets, which aim to provide long-term and sustainable access to food to the most vulnerable groups. FFA related interventions will be part of the durable solutions strategy envisioned by the Government and UNHCR for returnees arriving from neighbouring countries

Source: ICSP (2018-2020)

An example of the National Strategy for Restoration of State Authority in the Central African Republic: the Government plan for Bambari

20. The National Strategy for Restoration of State Authority in the Central African Republic (prepared with MINUSCA and UNDP), included a new paradigm regarding the importance of the restoration of state authority as a key precondition for effective humanitarian operations. Only the state has the mandate to arrest and incarcerate criminals who loot trucks or assets as “criminals”. At the time of the evaluation, it was found that criminals arrested by MINUSCA had to be referred to a procurator in Bangui, where the jails were already more than full. This often ended in criminals being immediately released, and therefore able to start attacking convoys and humanitarian staff again.

21. At the end of the country portfolio evaluation period in mid 2017, the President of the Central African Republic decided to formally start this process of restoration of state authority in the second largest city of the Central African Republic, Bambari (60,000 local inhabitants and a large number of internally displaced persons) through the pilot “Plan Opérationnel de Stabilisation Immédiate de Bambari”, also referred to as POSIB. This document was aligned with the three Pillars of RCPCA. The POSIB committee included OCHA and UNDP and, by the end of the evaluation, it had managed to turn a hub of armed fighting groups into a “weapon-free” zone.

22. In August 2017, a list of priority projects was compiled together with the local population: rehabilitation of hospitals, roads, electricity, water, public buildings, and Ecobank (to pay salaries). Civil servants from the Education and Health Departments stayed in their positions and more civil servants from financial control, the judiciary, security forces and public works joined them. They included the Prefect and the Mayor, the “procurateur”, judges/lawyers, the police and the “gendarmerie”.

23. UNDP was strongly involved in supporting Pillars one and three of the “Plan Opérationnel de Stabilisation Immédiate de Bambari” through the project “Appui à la Restauration de l’Autorité de l’Etat”, also known as the ARAT project, which was launched in 2017, as well as the policy of social cohesion. ARAT aims to foster community rehabilitation and socio-economic recovery. The objective of social cohesion was designed and implemented in coordination with FAO, UNFPA and UNICEF.

24. UNDP also achieved some success with its project of socio-economic reintegration of 1,700 youths at risk. WFP was not involved in vocational training for those income-generating projects (cattle raising, agriculture, trade, soap making, carpentry, welding, tailoring, hairdressing, etc.)

25. The positive impact of POSIB was also felt on the number of private transporters who came back to town and on the increased number of NGOs interested in exploring new interventions.

26. OCHA acted as the secretariat to POSIB. Meetings were held and were chaired by the Prefect and Mayor; this enabled strengthened coordination between humanitarian actors and state services (Agriculture, Education, Health, etc.). OCHA worked also closely with MINUSCA /Political Affairs for Human Rights, for the context analysis and for the “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration” Plan. However, information is lacking at local level about the status of RCPCA funding and actions foreseen to support and follow- up humanitarian interventions in the Bambari area.

27. The ICSP – or possibly elements of the upcoming Zero Hunger strategy- should provide the opportunity to better link with POSIB, even though supporting POSIB and restoration of state authority may potentially create a challenge with the humanitarian principles of (operational) independence, and perhaps the perception of neutrality.

Annex J Strategic Alignment of the Portfolio

Alignment with policy documents

1. To illustrate graphically the 'longitudinal' alignment of WFP responses to the successive plans (PRSP, ICSP Humanitarian Response Plan, UNDAF+ and RCPCA) throughout the period 2012–mid 2017 and the overall consistency of the main themes of the portfolio, Table A9 summarizes the adequacy of the priority objectives of the CP, PRRO and EMOP operations with the key pillars of the relevant policy documents listed in chapter 2.1.
2. The fact that the same three pillars are to be found in the ICSP, UNDAF+ and RCPCA is quite conducive to consistency. It should be noted that the positioning of food assistance for assets and P4P, which are considered by all stakeholders as important drivers for economic recovery and resilience in agriculture (and arguably not only food security), does not seem to be fully appropriate under Pillar II (Table A9 has tentatively put them under Pillar III).

Table A9: Strategic alignment 2012–mid 2017

Phase I: Development with growing tensions (2012-Nov. 2013)					Phase II: Emergency (Dec. 2013 -May 2015)				Phase III: Attempts at recovery (June 2015 -2017)				
National PRSP II 2011-15	UNDAF+ 2012-2016	WFP CP 200331 (DEV)	WFP PRRO 200315 EMOP	WFP SO	(UN) Interim Strategic Framework 2014-2015	(UN) Interim Strategic Framework 2016-2017	WFP IR EMOP, EMOPs 200565 - 650-799	WFP SOs	Humanitarian Response Plan 2017-2019	National RCPCA 2017-2021	UNDAF+ 2018-2021	WFP EMOP 200799	WFP ICSP 2018-2020
Pillar I: Peace & security	Pillar I: Peace-keeping, good governance, rule of law				Pillar I: Support restoration of peace, security process	Pillar I: Strengthen peace, governance				Pillar I: Support peace, security, reconciliation	Pillar I: Strengthen peace, security, social cohesion		Underlying/ cross-cutting objectives
Pillar II: Economic revival, regional integration	Pillar II: Fair & sustainable development, regional equity												
			Assistance to IDPs		Pillar II: Humanitarian response		GFD, CBT, ESF, nutrition		SO 1: Save lives SO 2: Respect fundamental rights SO 3: Preserve human dignity			GFD, CBT, ESF, nutrition	SO 1 & 2: (GFD, CBT, ESF, nutrition)
Pillar III: Human capital, essential social services	Pillar III: Investment in human capital, incl. fight against HIV/AIDS	School feeding, nutrition				Pillar II: Social welfare, development of human capital				Pillar II: Renew social contract between state and population	Pillar II: Social welfare and equity		SO 2, 3, 4: (Food security, fight against HIV/AIDS, capacity strengthening)

Phase I: Development with growing tensions (2012-Nov. 2013)					Phase II: Emergency (Dec. 2013 -May 2015)				Phase III: Attempts at recovery (June 2015 -2017)				
					Pillar III: Institutional support, restoration of Government authority								
						Pillar III: Economic recovery, sustainable environmental management	FFA, P4P			Pillar III: Promote economic recovery, boost productive sectors	Pillar III: Sustainable economic recovery	FFA, P4P	SO 3: (FFA, P4P)
				Logistics ETC				Logistics ETC,					SO 5: Logistics, ETC

Alignment with WFP Strategic Objectives

3. From a strategic perspective, over the period 2012-mid 2017 the country office – and regional bureau in Dakar for the regional EMOP 200799 – have designed activities to be in line with the Strategic Objectives of successive WFP Strategic Plans 2008-2013 and 2014-2017, as these corresponded most appropriately to the evolving situation prevailing in the country. This coherence is shown in Table A10.

4. Before the crisis, the country programme (DEV 200331) focused on (i) school meals, (ii) nutrition for pregnant and lactating women and young children, and (iii) strengthening capacity of national institutions, in a development perspective relevant to Strategic Objectives 4 and 5 of the WFP Strategic Plan 2008–2013. Following the peace accords of 2008 and presidential elections of 2011, PRRO 200315 aimed at mitigating the impacts of previous coups for a caseload of vulnerable, displaced and refugees through (i) general food distribution (GFD), (ii) supplementary feeding, (iii) food assistance or assets, (iv) school feeding, and (v) nutrition support to antiretroviral treatment (ART) and tuberculosis (TB) patients. The PRRO was aligned with Strategic Objectives 1 and 3 of WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2013. Strategic Objective 2 (prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures) was not used.

5. From the end of 2013, the focus shifted to emergency assistance directed towards a much larger caseload of displaced and vulnerable households, in line with Strategic Objective 1 of the new WFP Strategic Plan 2014–2017.³⁵ Due to the regional dimension of the crisis (refugees from the Central African Republic were hosted in neighbouring countries), the large regional EMOP 200799 was initiated by the regional bureau in Dakar at the end of 2014: activities planned and managed at country level, and with the regional bureau in Dakar ensured overall coordination and support. Activities adapted to the volatile situation in the Central African Republic. They included mainly (i) general food distribution and/or vouchers (cash based transfers), (ii) emergency school meals in 11 prefectures selected on the basis of food insecurity, poor education indicators and high internally displaced person concentration, (iii) blanket supplementary feeding, (iv) nutrition packages, and (v) a strong logistical support to the clusters system. There were also limited activities of seed protection (food assistance for assets) and local food production (P4P) in accessible areas. In that context, protection and respect of humanitarian principles as cross-cutting approaches are crucial. The new ICSP is in line with the Integrated Road Map of 2016.³⁶

³⁵ SO 2 (support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies), SO 3 (reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs) and SO 4 (reduce undernutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger) have not been used in CAR in 2014-2017.

³⁶ The ICSP is also aligned with the new WFP Strategic Plan 2017-2021, and specifically with Strategic Results 1, 2, 3, 5, 8.

Table A10: Coherence of activities with Strategic Objectives (SO)

Sub-period I, Development with growing tensions (WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2013)		
WFP Strategic Objectives	WFP CAR Sectors, activities	WFP CAR Operations
SO 1 Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies	GFD Supplementary feeding	PRRO 200315
SO 2 Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures		
SO 3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations	FFA; School feeding; TB Food by prescription for ART;	PRRO 200315
SO 4: Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition	School meals Nutrition for pregnant and lactating women and young children	DEV 200331 PRRO 200315
SO 5: Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase	National capacity strengthening Logistics	DEV 200331 PRRO 200315 SO 105620
Sub-period II & III: Emergency and attempts at recovery (WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017)		
WFP Strategic Objectives	WFP CAR Sectors, activities	WFP CAR Operations
SO 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies	GFD; CBT to crisis-affected households (introduced in 2015) Emergency school meals MAM treatment Blanket supplementary feeding package for children 6-23 months Nutrition package to vulnerable groups such as ART patients FFA (seed protection) P4P (introduced in 2015)	Reg. EMOP 200799 IR-EMOP 200565 EMOP 200650 TF 200933
	Logistics, UNHAS, ECT	SO 200522, 200605, 200643, 200646, 200804, 200934, 200997
SO 2: Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies		
SO 3: Reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs		
SO 4: Reduce undernutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger		

Source: Strategic plans, project documents

Annex K Case Study on the Impact of Funding Shortfalls on Regional EMOP 200799

1. Table A11 shows the main trends of decision making in a context of continued funding shortfall (38 percent) for the regional EMOP 200799, combined with growing needs. The numbers reflect drivers of decisions being focused on:

- Emergency in-kind food and cash based transfer response to the many newly displaced
- Supporting the Government policy of “back to school” and return to normality.

2. When funding is below budget or when food deliveries are delayed, WFP tries to maintain the original number of beneficiaries but distributions normally include either a reduction in the size of food rations (for the partners who distribute by standard size of households, see chapter 2.3 - general food distribution) or a reduction in the numbers of days of assistance .

3. The three types of nutrition interventions have also seen their numbers reduced to below the original planned numbers. The low geographical coverage of care services, including moderate acute malnutrition, continued to be a major challenge in the response. During the 2014 crisis, only 45 percent of the 102 nutritional management units remained functioning, albeit irregularly. By the end of February 2017, only 683 out of 1008 health facilities in the country were functioning.³⁷ Based on the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan review, the nutrition cluster estimates that in 2017, 199,578 people nationwide were in need of an emergency nutrition response. In particular there were:

- 40,694 children under 5 years old with severe acute malnutrition (SAM)
- 65,938 children under 5 years of age with moderate acute malnutrition (MAM)
- 72,772 pregnant and lactating women
- 10,174 people living with HIV
- 10,000 households of severely acute malnourished children with medical complications.

4. The funding needs of the nutrition response to the Central African Republic crisis are estimated at USD 20.5 million. In 2017, nutrition was only 5.6 percent funded.

5. In addition, and despite the objective to provide food by prescription (FBP) to people living with HIV, their numbers remain well below the country needs (see chapter 2.3 - HIV) and appear furthermore to be greatly limited by resources. For instance, only 20 antiretroviral patients are supported with food by prescription at the Kaga-Bandoro prefecture hospital, where 350-400 people are treated. In Bambari, 100 antiretroviral patients (out of 600) receive food by prescription. In Sibut, which is a key crossroad city with many HIV cases, there has been a request from the hospital but WFP did not have the resources to respond.

³⁷ Source: HeRAMS 2015; at these facilities only 383 have outpatient nutritional care units and 40 inpatient care units. This level of coverage remains extremely low (56%).

Table A11: Impact of funding shortfall per type of activity in regional EMOP 200799 during the first six months of 2017, in numbers of beneficiaries

Activity	Project plan (EMOP)	Actual (total)	% Actual v. planned (total)
Food assistance for assets	70,000	62,695	89.56%
General food distribution	304,951	505,558	165.78%
HIV/TB: Care & treatment	1,000	2,337	233.70%
Nutrition: Prevention of Moderate acute malnutrition	40,000	37,382	93.46%
Nutrition: Therapeutic feeding (treatment of severe acute malnutrition)	9,600	5,431	56.57%
Nutrition: Treatment of moderate acute malnutrition	9,000	7,099	78.88%
School feeding (on-site)	194,250	223,214	114.91%
Total	628,801	843,716	134.00%

Source: SPRs

Annex L Analysis of Logistical Constraints for the Central African Republic

1. The bulk of food delivered by WFP reaches the Central African Republic via the Douala–Bouar–Bangui corridor of 1,400 km, which is fully tarmacked over 1,300km. Except for non-food items (and WFP equipment shipped in containers), all the commodities reaching Douala in containers must unfortunately be de-vanned in order to make the best use of the maximum truck/trailer capacity, set at 30 metric tons (MT) in line with the maximum permitted weight per axle load. Throughout the period under review, this access corridor was facing multiple constraints: lengthy port transit; container withdrawal and devanning operations; tedious Cameroon and Central African Republic customs exoneration applications and often changing clearance formalities in Douala, at the border crossings and on arrival at destination; weighbridge delays; the obligation to abide by a Cameroon–Central African Republic traffic-sharing system;³⁸ and finally the prevailing security situation forcing the goods traffic in the Central African Republic to join strictly regulated convoys under MINUSCA military escort.

2. The Central African Republic and Cameroon country offices appointed contract seasoned clearing and forwarding agents to handle the transit of commodities from the time of landing of the consignments at Douala port up to the reception at final destination in the Central African Republic. However, given the high number of intervening parties, officials and institutions directly or indirectly involved, a closer follow-up by WFP would have been appropriate. While all the individual WFP services and units in Cameroon and the Central African Republic dutifully play their part in monitoring the transit flow of goods in their respective section of the pipeline, a high-ranking WFP focal point, with enough authority to put pressure on and make clearing and forwarding agents, road transporters and customs authorities fall into line, appears to have been missing. Difficulties along the corridor were repeatedly voiced at the fortnightly meetings of the logistic cluster by other United Nations agencies and leading NGOs. Confronted with these recurrent problems, WFP favoured a cautious approach, opting to leave to OCHA the responsibility of clearing these technical and logistic issues with the authorities, while WFP had both the authority and expertise to do so. As a result, transit times of four to six weeks are now accepted as the norm, which is used for planning and implementation purposes.

3. Given the difficulties experienced with the Douala–Bouar–Bangui corridors the option of shipping goods via the Matadi–Kinshasa–Bangui and/or Pointe-Noire–Brazzaville–Bangui corridors was briefly envisaged. Some trial shipments were carried out but proved inconclusive in view of the equally long transit times and seasonal draft restrictions on the Ubangui river. The “loggers route” from Douala via Bertoua (Cameroon) and Berberati (the Central African Republic) towards Bangui was briefly tested, but derelict bridges along this route and precarious security conditions forced WFP to abandon this alternative. The possibility of opening an eastern corridor from Kampala towards Obo via either the Democratic Republic of the Congo or South Sudan is currently³⁹ actively being explored, given the difficulty in reaching Obo from the west and the urgency to assist a population in dire need of food assistance. In June 2014, considering the severely congested Douala port, WFP tried to open a corridor from the North in order to urgently


³⁸ CNUCED Convention 1964 on the sharing of the traffic to and from landlocked countries.

³⁹ September 2017.

route required food from its warehouses in Ndjamena. For security reasons the Government of Chad was reluctant to open the border. OCHA took the lead in solving this logistic issue and in negotiating with the Chad and the Central African Republic authorities the opening of a small humanitarian corridor.⁴⁰

4. Despite the recurrent difficulties along the Douala corridor, particularly in early 2017, the country office succeeded in keeping the food stock at a minimum satisfactory level. Figure A2: gives an indication of the stock levels at the seven warehouses⁴¹ (bar chart) during the 18-month period from March 2016 to August 2017.⁴² The same figure gives the volumes of food commodities handed over to the implementing partners and to beneficiaries (lines)⁴³.

Figure A2: Food stocks available at each month-end in the seven WFP warehouses with the respective tonnages handed over to partners and to beneficiaries (Period March 2016–August 2017 – 18 months)



Source: LESS data

5. The serious decrease in the volumes of food distributed between November 2016 and March 2017 stems from reduced stock levels during the corresponding periods. This decrease is

⁴⁰ See logistic cluster minutes of the meetings dated 23/07/2014 and 03/09/2014.


⁴¹ WFP Berberati warehouse closed in February 2017.

⁴² The Logistic Executive Support System - LESS was introduced in CAR with very good results as from March 2016. The local WFP staff however have no more access to the former COMPAS tracking system. Hence the evaluators were not in a position to analyse the stock movements inside and outside the Central African Republic during the period from January 2012 to February 2016.

⁴³ Both lines evolve in sequence except that the gap recorded in August 2017 stems from the fact that the partners had received their monthly food allocation but the physical distribution to the beneficiaries had not yet taken place.

corroborated by Figure A3, which shows a similar dip of the “anticipated implementation food requirements” for the same period. The gap between the “planned” and “implementation” requirements is also noteworthy.

Figure A3: Comparative analysis of food pipeline and anticipated shortfalls (Period January 2016 to September 2017)



Source: LESS data

6. The graph lines outline the differences between the planning and implementation stage requirements. During the period from December 2016 to February 2017, the tonnages earmarked for distributions were 2,000 MT below what was foreseen at the planning stage. A reverse situation can be observed during the period May-June 2017, where more resources were available at the implementation stage with respect to what was planned. Furthermore, it could be noted that shortfalls never lasted more than one month, with the exception of the salt pipeline, which suffered short supplies for three consecutive months. In addition, the rice pipeline suffered shortfalls in three different occasions, whereas the Super Cereal, Super Cereal Plus and sugar suffered a pipeline shortfall only for one month, during the period under review. During the rainy seasons 2016 and 2017 (April to October), the WFP warehouses were fairly well stocked and the shortfalls of any commodity were negligible. This seems to indicate that the country office succeeded in its attempts to preposition food ahead of the rainy season. However, it has not been possible to conclude to what extent the Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF) effectively contributed to this satisfactory outcome.

7. Given the limited spare inland trucking capacity available, starting from 2014, WFP positioned a fleet of 56 trucks⁴⁴. This fleet is mainly engaged in transport from the WFP warehouses to the partners' warehouses or directly to the forward delivery points. The logistics unit is divided into two teams: fleet management, which coordinates the allocation of the trucks, and workshop section, which is responsible for the maintenance and repairs of the fleet. The truck drivers and mechanics are supplied by a labour service provider⁴⁵ contracted by the country office. It is accepted that WFP is not in a position to recruit numerous drivers and mechanics, as this would directly grant them a WFP status). Although justified as freeing WFP from the difficulties associated with managing a large workforce, this approach is not always conducive to a strong relationship between WFP and the drivers and mechanics. Late payment of monthly wages by the service provider are not uncommon. The relationship between the service provider and the country office appears to be strained: the drivers are complaining about recurrent major mechanical deficiencies, and WFP outlines careless driving on the part of the drivers.

8. The garage facilities and toolboxes are pretty basic. Maintenance and repairs are often conducted in the open. A schedule for truck maintenance, tight control over consumables and turn-over of spare parts is not immediately apparent. Too often mechanics are expected to think "outside the box" and resort to cannibalizing trucks to obtain missing parts.⁴⁶ The outlook calls for a general upgrade of the workshop facilities.⁴⁷

Table A12: WFP truck fleet availability and utilization report – 3 month period June–August 2017

Fleet of 56 trucks	Total working days	Repair down days	% repair down days	Availability days	% availability days	Utilization days	% Utilization versus available days
June 2017	1,232	276	22%	956	78%	257	27%
July 2017	1,176	384	33%	792	67%	176	22%
August 2017	1,288	363	28%	925	72%	183	20%

Source: Data provided by fleet management in Bangui

9. From Table A12, one may conclude that 25 percent of the theoretical working days are lost for maintenance or repair of the trucks. Considering the severe operating conditions, an availability ratio of over 70 percent is therefore perhaps acceptable. With an utilization ratio of only 23 percent of the available truck days, the fleet seems to be rather underutilized. This view is corroborated by the records of the volume of goods transported by the WFP fleet during the period from March 2016 to August 2017 (18 months). The total tonnage transported amounts to 21,476 metric tons or a monthly average of 1,193 MT.⁴⁸ Even with a truck availability ratio of 70 percent, the potential monthly trucking capacity stands between 2,500 and 3,400 MT.⁴⁹ There is therefore ample spare trucking capacity available and a doubling of the monthly tonnages moved is well within reach.

⁴⁴ The WFP fleet of trucks comprises 56 trucks: 4 DAF trucks (year built 1984) and 52 KAMAZ trucks (year built 2011 & 2014) with a load capacity ranging from 10 to 14 MT. 39 trucks in Bangui, 11 trucks in Bouar and 6 trucks in Kaga Bandoro.

⁴⁵ Contractor –labour service provider IDL in Bangui.

⁴⁶ A full container of urgently required KAMAZ truck spare parts was packed and shipped out of Tajikistan on 20/04/2017. The container reached Douala on 07/07/2017 to reach the Bangui main workshop on 19/ 09/17.

⁴⁷ The ET had the opportunity to visit the workshop in Bangui, Bouar and Kaga Bandoro.

⁴⁸ The lowest monthly tonnage : February 2017: 376 MT, the highest monthly tonnage May 2017: 2030 MT.

⁴⁹ A truck availability ratio of 70% amounts to a monthly average of some 850 working days. Given an average 2 days turn round time the capacity of the fleet is 425 trips with a payload of 6 to 8 MT or a monthly average trucking capacity of 2,500 to 3,400 MT.

10. Another interesting feature of the supply chain is the gradual introduction of the Global Commodity Management Facility.⁵⁰ Table A13 sets out the use of this facility.

Table A13: Comparative table of food commodities procured under standard WFP procurement procedures versus under the Global Commodity Management Facility modus

Commodities procured under (MT)	PRRO 200315	DEV 200331	IR-EMOP 200565	IR EMOP 200650	Reg EMOP 200799	Total
WFP standard procurement.	24,103	1,255	943	24,738	46,709	97,748
GCMF	499			25,253	31,715	56,467
Total	24,602	1,255	943	49,991	78,424	154,215

Source: Extracts from CPO CFCO as at 03/08/2017

11. The GCMF makes available large stocks of food stored in dedicated warehouses in Las Palmas, Cotonou or Douala, ready to be allocated and shipped in line with the project requirements in the sub-region. The GCMF warehouse inside the Douala port perimeter⁵¹ cares for and meets the requirements of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Niger and the Republic of the Congo. The aim is to reduce the lead times for commodities to reach their final destination. For the years 2015 and 2016 some 44 percent of the food-aid destined for the Central African Republic benefited from the GCMF. In principle the GCMF could help reduce the lead time by as much as six weeks.⁵²

⁵⁰ The GCMF replaces the former "Forward purchasing facility" (FPF).

⁵¹ The WFP/GCMF warehouse is rented from the "Chambre de Commerce de Douala."

⁵² Average time for the supplier to process the purchase order and the external (sea) transport.

Annex M Nutrition Beneficiaries

NUTRITION											
Operation/Year		Category	Planned			Actual			% Actual vs Planned		
			Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
CP 200331	2012	< 5 years	16,832	16,968	33,800	11,646	11,842	23,488	69,2%	69.8%	69.5%
		Age 5 to 18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Adults	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		PLW	-	11,200	11,200	-	16,235	16,235	-	145%	145%
		Total	16,832	28,168	45,000	11,646	28,077	39,723	69.2%	99.7%	88.3%
PRRO 200315	2012	< 5 years	23,466	23,524	46,990	20,268	20,987	41,255	86.4%	89.2%	87.8%
		Age 5 to 18	49,325	39,295	88,620	55,409	47,434	102,843	112.3%	120.7%	116.0%
		Adults	24,908	34,928	59,836	35,543	33,936	69,479	142.7%	97.2%	116.1%
		PLW	-	9,000	9,000	-	1,866	1,866	-	20.7%	20.7%
		Total	97,699	106,747	204,446	111,220	104,223	215,443	113.8%	97.6%	105.4%
CP 200331	2013	< 5 years	16,832	16,968	33,800	3,338	3,364	6,702	19.8%	19.8%	19.8%
		Age 5 to 18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Adults	-	11,200	11,200	-	620	620	-	5.5%	5.5%
		PLW	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	16,832	28,168	45,000	3,338	3,984	7,322	19.8%	14.1%	16.3%
PRRO 200315	2013	< 5 years	75,120	74,583	149,703	56,461	57,040	113,501	75.2%	76.5%	75.8%
		Age 5 to 18	101,631	80,364	181,995	118,452	113,492	231,944	116.6%	141.2%	127.4%
		Adults	51,936	64,048	115,984	106,635	98,650	205,285	205.3%	154%	177%
		PLW	-	-	-	-	-	8,	-	-	-
		Total	228,687	218,995	447,682	281,548	269,182	550,730	123%	123%	123%
EMOP 200650	2014	< 5 years	207,181	215,100	422,281	225,865	239,017	464,882	109.01%	111.12%	110.10%
		Age 5 to 18	299,311	303,337	602,648	275,430	287,474	562,904	92%	94.8%	93.4
		Adults	272,838	295,065	567,903	272,695	337,317	610,012	99.9%	114.3%	107.4%
		PLW	-	10,000	10,000	-	25,248	25,248	-	252.5%	252.5%
		Total	779,330	823,502	1,602,832	773,990	889,056	1,663,046	99.3%	107.1%	103.8

NUTRITION											
EMOP 200799	2015	< 5 years	168,812	153,960	419,533	168,762	188,471	357,233	76.2%	95.1%	85.2%
		Age 5 to 18	221,359	198,174	419,533	168,762	188,471	357,233	76.2%	95.1%	85.2%
		Adults	209,479	215,590	425,069	145,209	200,048	345,257	69.3%	92.8%	81.2%
		PLW	-	51,847	51,847	-	62,013	62,013	-	119.6%	119.6%
		Total	599,650	619,571	1,315,982	482,733	639,003	1,121,736	80.5%	103.1%	85.2%
EMOP 200799	2016	< 5 years	95,808	96,808	192,614	81,853	89,573	171,426	85.4%	92.5%	89.0%
		Age 5 to 18	155,688	191,616	347,304	178,299	193,240	371,539	114.5%	100.8%	107.0%
		Adults	217,564	240,518	458,082	169,938	202,675	372,613	78.1%	84.3%	81.3%
		PLW	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	469,06	528,942	998,000	430,090	485,488	915,578	91.7%	91.8%	91.7%
EMOP 200799	June 2017	< 5 years	57,848	61,746	119,594	66,874	73,191	140,065	115.60%	118.54%	117.12%
		Age 5 to 18	159,765	174,993	334,758	215,646	208,801	424,447	134.98%	119.32%	126.79%
		Adults	77,413	97,036	174,449	132,289	146,916	279,204	170.89%	151.40%	160.05%
		PLW	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	295,026	333,775	628,801	414,809	428,908	843,716	141%	129%	134%

Source: SPRs

Table A14: People living with HIV/AIDs and TB with nutritional support 2012-2016
 (for 2016: only antiretroviral patients, not counting family participants)

HIV-AIDS –TB Patients											
Operations/Year			Planned			Actual			% Actual vs Planned		
			Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
CP 200331	2012	HIV-AIDs- TB	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
PRRO 200315		HIV-AIDs- TB	1,195	1,205	2,400	136	556	692	11.4%	11.4%	11.4%
CP 200331	2013	HIV-AIDs- TB	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
PRRO 200315		HIV-AIDs- TB	1,195	1,205	2,400	387	1,769	2,156	32.4%	146.8%	89.8%
EMOP 200650	2014	HIV-AIDs- TB	7,628	7,872	15,500	3,033	6,000	9,033	39.8%	76.2%	58.3%
EMOP 200799	2015	HIV-AIDs- TB	3,930	9,170	13,100	4,672	6,631	11,303	118.9%	72.3%	86.3%
EMOP 200799	2016	HIV-AIDs- TB	2,184	3,016	5,200	1,301	2,891	4,192	59.6%	95.9%	80.6%
	mid-2017	HIV-AIDs- TB	1,000			2,337			233.7%		

Source:SPRs

Annex N Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness

Comparison of cash based transfer and in-kind modalities; Omega values

1. WFP headquarters and the regional bureau in Dakar have provided continuous support for the implementation of the corporate cash based transfer policy in the Central African Republic. This support has included feasibility studies, market assessments, regular monitoring missions and training in cash based transfer methodologies, including in cost-efficiency calculations. The monitoring missions have allowed for necessary tailoring of the procedures for the cash based transfer implementation, improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the transfer modality. The missions have confirmed the appropriateness of the pilot approach for the introduction of cash based transfer as well as the slow scaling-up, partly justified by the lack of reliable local financial institutions to allow efficient implementation.

2. As can be seen in Table A15 from post distribution monitoring in 2016 comparing voucher and in-kind distribution in Bangui, Yaloke, and Bouar, an immediate advantage of the voucher modality for the beneficiaries is the wider options for procuring traditional food items, including cassava, meat, and fish. Some internally displaced person beneficiaries of in-kind general food distribution admitted to the country portfolio evaluation team that they are selling the rice and other items received, as they do not fit with local taste.

Table A15: Comparing food baskets for in-kind and voucher-based general food distribution

Standard in-kind ration	Bangui	Yaloke	Bouar
Rice, polished	Rice, polished cassava, flour	Rice, polished cassava, flour pasta, macaroni	Cassava, flour pasta, macaroni
Beans, small red (usa)	Beans, kidney, all types		Cowpeas, black-eyed
Oil, vegetable	Palm oil, red	Palm oil, red	Palm oil, red
Csb supercereal (csb+)			
Salt, iodised	Salt	Salt	Salt
Other	Sugar dried whole milk fish, dried, whole, freshwater groundnuts, dry beef, moderately fat	Sugar spices mixed, garlic sardines, canned in oil tomatoes, red, ripe	Sugar spices mixed, garlic wheat flour, white groundnuts, dry tomato paste beef, moderately fat

Source: WFP Country Office

3. The Omega value has been calculated ex-post in 2016 for distributions in three locations (Table A16). The Omega value is a cost-effectiveness measure developed by WFP, based on the nutritional value of a standard food basket; WFP has developed standard nutrition values for different food items that are part of a software used by the country office. The challenge for the country office in calculating the Omega value is that market prices that are highly volatile in the Central African Republic.

Table A16: Cost-effectiveness of voucher cash based transfer modality compared to in-kind general food distribution, 2016

	Bangui		Yaloke		Bouar	
	In-kind	Voucher	In-kind	Voucher	In-kind	Voucher
Cost/beneficiary/month	USD 13.18	USD 13.20	USD 64.66	USD 39.50	n/a	n/a
Nutrition value	7.76	6.68	7.78	4.40	7.76	4.70
Omega value voucher compared with in-kind	1.16		1.01		0.95	

Source: Calculations from WFP Country Office

4. The associated costs include local staff, distributions costs, commercial transactions, meeting facilitators, facilities and supplies, travel, equipment, supplies, IT equipment, transportation, and other support costs for staff. It should be noted that transportation to and from the market paid by beneficiaries are not included in the Omega calculations. .

5. As can be seen in Table A16, in 2016 the cost-effectiveness measured through the Omega value of the voucher modality compared to the in-kind modality was higher than 1, indicating that the in-kind distribution is more advantageous nutritionally than the voucher. However, the interpretation is complicated by the fact that the nutritional value of the in-kind ratio is theoretical and does not reflect beneficiaries' actual use of the ration as, for example beneficiaries may sell part of the produce. Likewise, other factors have to be taken into account when choosing the transfer modality, including impact on market recovery and beneficiaries' choices and preferences.

6. A detailed analysis of the cost-effectiveness factors to be considered for the transportation of food commodities in the Central African Republic over the country portfolio evaluation period can be found below, as overall the food commodity indices have followed a downward trend, while "land transport, handling and storage" costs remain two or three times higher than the average recorded in the region – which is using up a substantial part of the limited resources available.

7. The conflict has an impact on the efficiency of cash based transfers. As traders are mostly Muslims, displaced Christians do not have access to their shops anymore. In some cases, WFP had to rapidly revert to in-kind general food distribution. In Kaga-Bandoro, there were 20,000 cash based transfer beneficiaries in May 2017, and only 7,000 were left after the attacks in July.

8. With every attack there are large new movements of population: previously displaced persons are fleeing and getting dispersed, and new camps appear in relatively safer places. As a result, the humanitarian community is losing all the previous work done on registrations: weeks of work for registration must be restarted from scratch, which amounts in fact to a new programme.

Cost-effectiveness of food commodities

9. The analysis of food commodity indices shows a downward trend during the period 2012–2017 as illustrated by Table A17.

Table A17: FAO food commodity indices (period 2012–2017)

Food commodity indices	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Cereals	175.8	165.6	144.6	122.0	108.7	112.0
Vegetable oil	166.7	145.8	136.4	110.4	121.3	125.1

Food commodity indices	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Sugar	227.6	189.6	181.7	143.3	189.5	173.3

Source: FAO website –food commodity indices

10. In line with these indices the main food commodities procured by WFP (rice, maize meal, vegetable oil and ready-to-use supplementary food) show a decrease in price ranging between 10 and 15 percent over the period 2012–2017. The Supercereal (CSB) commodity is the exception, with the price increasing between 10 and 20 percent due to global production capacity not matching the worldwide demand.

11. India, Thailand and Pakistan were the main suppliers of rice with prices ranging from USD 301/metric ton on free carrier/FCA terms, to USD 877/metric ton (on Delivered at Place/DAP terms). The price for ready-to-use supplementary food (RUSF), a more expensive commodity imported from France, USA or India, ranged from USD 2,385/metric ton to USD 3,834/metric ton. The price for CSB + (with sugar) ranged from USD 402/metric ton to USD 520/metric ton and for CSB++ from USD 850/metric ton to USD 964/metric ton. Vegetable oil was mainly imported from Malaysia, Indonesia and the United States with prices ranging from USD 612/metric ton to USD 1,648/metric ton. All these prices are broadly in line with the world market prices and vary in accordance with the agreed Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) terms. The choice of supplier is not only governed by the (lowest) commodity price but also by the shortest possible or acceptable lead time.

12. In 2012 WFP decided to procure maize meal from a local mill⁵³ in Bangui. The miller failed to meet all the WFP specifications and the purchase arrangements were subsequently put on hold. The regional bureau in Dakar detached a nutrition expert in October 2016 to reassess the mill. In his report, the expert identified 20 shortcomings, out of which 3 were reported as critical, to be addressed first if WFP were to resume its purchases. The management of the mill indicated to the evaluation team that 17 of the shortcomings noted had already been addressed.⁵⁴ WFP may want to explore how it could support the mill so that, provided all WFP specifications are met, the mill can be shortlisted again as a potential supplier of maize meals.

13. Although the difference between the lowest and highest net average food cost for the five programmes with a food component is fairly large, ranging from USD 386/metric ton to USD 1,009/metric ton, it should be noted that the food basket of DEV 200331 included more expensive ready-to-use supplementary food rations while the regional EMOP 200799 contains more cereals, such as sorghum, which are a much cheaper commodity. When the five food-aid programmes are taken together (total tonnage food delivered and the total net food cost) the average works out at USD 530/metric ton, which is totally in line with the WFP corporate average.

⁵³ HUSACA – Huilerie & Savonnerie Centrafricaine – Bangui.

⁵⁴ CAPA Plan - Tableau de suivi des actions correctives_audit qualité_RCA_HUSACA - commentaires PAM au 31 Mai 2017

Table A18: Key Food and delivery costs of food assistance operations

	DEV 200331	PRRO 200315	IR-EMOP 200565	EMOP 200650	Reg.EM OP 200799 (CAR only)
Food assistance delivered to beneficiaries (MT)	2,385	19,342	622	39,601	69,482
Total net food cost USD	2,406,521	10,348,096	253,924	29,836,943	26,813,898
Total cost to deliver food USD	1,887,426	12,173,425	76,816	23,517,106	46,542,832
Total food and related costs USD	4,293,947	22,521,521	330,740	53,354,049	73,356,730
Average net food costs USD/MT	1,009	535	408	753	386
Average food delivery costs USD/MT	791	629	124	594	670
Gross food cost delivered USD/MT	1,800	1164	532	1347	1056
Landside, Transport, Storage and Handling costs (LTSH) as budgeted . USD/MT	550	650	n.a.	458	561
Actual LTSH USD/MT	681	515	81	414	529
LTSH % of gross food costs	38%	44%	15%	31%	50%
Transport & distribution costs per USD 100 worth of food delivered to beneficiaries in USD	78.43	117.64	30.26	78.82	173.58

Source: Financial section of latest SPRs, project management overviews, funds consumption reports with figures adjusted for stock transfers

14. Whilst actual landside, transport, storage and handling (LTSH) costs have remained 10 to 20 percent below the budgeted LTSH levels – except for DEV 200331 where it was 20 percent higher – it should be noted that in absolute terms, these values are extremely high i.e. two to three times higher than the LTSH recorded in the region during the same period.⁵⁵ LTSH costs represent 30 to 50 percent of gross food costs, compared to a corporate average of between 18 and 22 percent. Another cost indicator, the total transfer cost (transport external, internal and distribution) per USD 100 net worth delivered food to the beneficiaries, is also very high ranging from USD 78 to USD 173.⁵⁶ For the cash based transfer operation (part of the EMOP 200799) the cost to deliver a net worth of USD 100 vouchers to the beneficiaries is USD 28.37 or three to five times less.⁵⁷ This figure is in line with the figures recorded for a similar cash based transfer operation in West Africa at the height of the Ebola crisis.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ LTSH Regional EMOP 200761 (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone) USD 184/MT, Mauritania CP 102090 and CP 200251 USD 153/MT, EMOP 200333 USD 271/MT and PRRO 200640 USD 212/MT.

⁵⁶ The same figure for IR-EMOP 200565 (USD 30.26) is considered irrelevant, the quantity of food-aid distributed being significantly small.


⁵⁷ Reg. EMOP 200799 – Net value of vouchers distributed (the Central African Republic only up to 31/12/17) amounts to USD 4,411,842 for a total transfer cost of USD 1,251,558.

⁵⁸ CBT operation in West Africa under Regional EMOP 200698: Guinea USD 25.32, Sierra Leone USD 20.27, Liberia USD 4.11

15. The overall costs of logistics in the Central African Republic are quite significant, and represent a significant part of the overall cost of the operations. The Douala–Bouar–Bangui corridor is from the quayside to final destination and, given the many constraints, is far from operating efficiently. Inside the country the prevailing security situation compounded by the poor road infrastructure, adds to the cost. There is an imbalance between, on the one hand, the large logistic apparatus (for example: fleet, warehouses, numerous field level agreements with cooperating partners, security arrangements) that WFP is expected to maintain in the country and, on the other hand, the difficulty in attaining a reasonable degree of efficiency (for example: inadequate trucking capacity, poor turn around time of vehicles, the slow flux of food - to beneficiaries).

16. The direct support cost (DSC) component in the WFP financial structure is comparable to what the fixed costs component is in private corporate businesses. The direct support cost covers all WFP staff wages and ancillary costs, staff Rest & Recuperation leave and duty travel, the maintenance of the service fleet, the rental of office building, office and IT supplies, energy supplies, the security of staff and assets. The level of direct support cost spent per USD 100 of “direct operation costs (DOC)” gives an indication of the efficiency achieved. The direct operation costs comprises the gross food or cash based transfer costs of the food assistance programmes, the value of the services provided under the various special operations, the “other direct operation costs” (ODOC), the capacity development and augmentation activities. The direct operation cost therefore represent the value of all the assistance provided during the 2012–2016 period to the beneficiaries and to the humanitarian community.

Figure A4: Direct operation costs versus direct support costs



Sources: Latest SPRs, project management overview and funds consumption reports as a 31/12/2016.

Table A19: Recap of direct operation costs (DOC) and direct support costs (DSC) on a yearly basis (period 2012-2016)

Year	Global DOC USD	Global DSC USD	DSC per 100 USD DOC
2012	19,931,415	2,768,255	13.89
2013	17,855,422	5,195,094	29.10
2014	72,974,142	12,869,194	1.64
2015	61,345,088	13,360,374	21.78
2016	54,563,556	11,398,635	20.89

Source: Funds consumption reports

17. With a direct support cost level ranging between USD 13.89 and USD 29.10 per USD 100 of assistance provided, the Central African Republic country office achieves overall a good degree of efficiency. The higher direct support cost level recorded in 2013 is the result of a slowdown of the humanitarian activities coupled with numerous measures taken to enhance the security of staff and assets.

18. It should be noted that for UNHAS, direct support cost per USD 100 direct operation cost were respectively USD 8.91, USD 11.31 and USD 5.95.

Annex O Outcome Indicators Used for School Meals

Central African Republic school meals - outcome indicators		2012				2013				2014				2015				2016			
		Target value (TV)	Base value (BV)	Previousvalue (PV)	Latest value (LV)	TV	BV	PV	LV	TV	BV	PV	LV	TV	BV	PV	LV	TV	BV	PV	LV
EMOP 200650	Enrolment boys annual change rate									68.7	52.79		92.4								
	Enrolment girls annual change rate									53.3	47.21		74.8								
	Enrolment annual change rate									52.5	49.5		88.6								
	Retention rate boys									86	84	86	86								
	Retention rate girls									80	75.2	80	80								
	Retention rate									83	83	83	83								
EMOP 200799	Enrolment boys annual change rate													68.7	92.4		96.6	6	4.5	4.5	2.5
	Enrolment girls annual change rate													53.3	74.8		76.2	6	1.9	1.9	0.4
	Enrolment annual change rate													52.79	88.6		93.4	6	5.4	5.4	2.6

Central African Republic school meals - outcome indicators	2012				2013				2014				2015				2016			
	Target value (TV)	Base value (BV)	Previousvalue (PV)	Latest value (LV)	TV	BV	PV	LV	TV	BV	PV	LV	TV	BV	PV	LV	TV	BV	PV	LV
Retention rate boys													86	86		88	70	88	80	80
Retention rate girls													80	80		83	70	83	83	79.3
Retention rate													83	83		85.5	70	85.5	85.5	90.4
PRRO 200315 Net enrolment rate (NER) boys						50.12	53.13													
Net enrolment rate (NER) girls						43.77	45.96													
Retention rate boys						84	86													
Retention rate girls							80													

Central African Republic school meals - outcome indicators		2012				2013				2014				2015				2016			
		Target value (TV)	Base value (BV)	Previousvalue (PV)	Latest value (LV)	TV	BV	PV	LV	TV	BV	PV	LV	TV	BV	PV	LV	TV	BV	PV	LV
CP 200331	Net enrolment rate (NER) boys		55.45	75.79																	
	Net enrolment rate (NER) girls		50.64	54.64																	
	Attendance rate boys		85	88																	
	Attendance rate girls		74	78																	
	Drop out rate boys		13	12																	
	Drop out rate girls		15	13																	

Annex P Mapping of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

Report section	Key findings and paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
1.2.1 Recent historical background, economic and social trends	§14: The authority of the Government, which lacks resources, is still essentially limited to an area around the capital Bangui, and some pockets in the country. After a brief period of hope for recovery in 2016, the situation again deteriorated in 2017. Various armed rebel groups, fragmented along religious and political lines and living by means of trafficking and looting, control more than half of the territory despite the presence of 12,000 MINUSCA soldiers. Armed groups are still fighting across 80 percent of the territory	§182: Due alignment is bound to remain theoretical if policies cannot be implemented on the ground due to recurrent constraints. In mid 2017 the Government correctly acknowledged that a prerequisite for recovery - and effective humanitarian aid - lay in the (re-)establishment of state presence across the country, which alone would have the mandate to legally combat crimes and looting, and put an end to the pervading sense of impunity. Coordinated support by all international actors is needed, to contribute gradually to reducing the unsustainable level of international assistance to the Central African Republic. As this new paradigm is not part of ICSP, linkages need to be established	R1 – a) WFP should support, particularly through FFA activities and/or the vouchers modality, the work of partners directly involved in the re-establishment of peace (UNICEF, United Nations Development Programme, the civil affairs department of MINUSCA, etc.)
2.1.1 Coherence with national policies	§40: It should be noted that the ICSP does not address the new Government's paradigm of restoring state authority and presence as a prerequisite for effective humanitarian and development (RCPCA) operations §43: The implementation of the policy documents themselves has been significantly limited due to recurrent constraints across the period: ie. a lack of capacity and presence by the Government	§193: Many examples of short-term training could be found, but longer-term efforts are few and limited. Good practices surrounding capacity development and effective cooperation with other agencies are lacking; the overall approach needs to be strengthened §200: Overall, the – worsening - situation of the Central African Republic still mostly depends on the support of the international community, at a level which is hardly sustainable on the long term	
2.2.2 Drivers of WFP country strategy – lack of security	§68: Throughout the period there was a prevailing sense of impunity among criminals, which impacted on aid projects. Due to the lack of police and judicial services out of Bangui, road bandits and looters arrested by MINUSCA were generally released. A highly detrimental impact of the recurrent violence is the fact that frequent attacks are pushing away those already displaced – as well as settled populations - from the areas of fighting		
2.3.10 Sustainability	§176: Any hope of sustainability is conditional upon the achievements of the initiatives to restore state presence – with support from all actors and RCPCA funding, which alone can ensure a measure of return to normality		

Report section	Key findings and paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
1.2.1 Recent background and trends	§13: At the end of 2012 and during 2013 the already weak health system had virtually collapsed; health facilities were looted and medical staff fled their posts. Most schools were also looted – furniture was used as firewood by armed groups - and many remained closed for one or even two years (2014-2016)	§178: WFP was perceived as a neutral actor, although regular sensitization about humanitarian principles was necessary §180: The ICSP has adequately defined that the pace of transfer of food security and nutrition management will depend on achievements, taking in to account: current institutional weaknesses, the short timeline of the ICSP, worsening political and social situations in 2017, and continued funding shortages §182: Coordinated support by all international actors is needed to strengthen involvement of institutions in the project cycle management §191: Quality of education has also been affected by looting, over-populated classes, and the lack of teachers	R1 b) to e): WFP should: b) Contribute to the mapping of national institutional capacities in order to improve the focus and effectiveness of its own capacity strengthening activities, leveraging the experience and knowledge available from headquarters and the regional bureau c) Ensure the systematic involvement of line ministries and national actors in the design and monitoring of its projects d) Enhance synergies with relevant civil society and other actors, including in education e) Ensure that its partners are fully aware and regularly reminded of the importance of adhering to the humanitarian principles that underpin all humanitarian assistance
2.1.4 Coherence with partners	§53: Decentralized (regional) clusters have been established in three locations in the Central African Republic, which correspond to WFP sub-offices, under OCHA supervision. They were meant to cover the whole country except the North. Whilst the main United Nations agencies and MINUSCA were present in these decentralized systems, they were often constrained by the lack of implementing partners and funding		
2.2.1 Country office analytical work, food security and nutrition monitoring	§61: The evaluation did not see any formal capacity assessment or mapping of government structures and local authorities, with evidence-based information on capacity strengths and weaknesses		
2.1.1 Coherence with national policies	§41: All concerned ministries were globally satisfied with their cooperation with WFP but were lacking resources – which made smooth communications and programme implementation a particular challenge and outlined the multiple needs for capacity strengthening §42: The main counterpart for emergencies is the Ministry of Social Welfare and National Reconciliation, with which no MoU has been signed as yet.		
2.3.3 Outcomes	§130: School meals induced a strong increase of number of pupils by classroom (up to 180 in Kaga-Bandoro) which, combined with the lack of teachers and equipment, further undermined the quality of education §132: School feeding should furthermore be seen as a means to support the Associations des Parents d'Elèves (APE), which had a crucial role to play in the general recovery process by contributing to refurbishing the looted premises, and		

Report section	Key findings and paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<p>complementing – partially - the too few official teachers with “maîtres-parents”. This initiative is supported by UNICEF and some NGOs: 8,000 maîtres-parents were recruited and required training</p>		
2.3.5 Humanitarian principles and protection	<p>§147: Food is one of the “nerfs de la guerre”; it is sometimes exploited by rival armed groups, who try to monopolize food and pay only lip service to humanitarian principles. The Ministry of Social Affairs is officially in charge of assistance to displaced people, but has only had limited communication so far with WFP about protection</p>		
2.3.6 Capacity strengthening	<p>§150: The line ministries, whose roles would be gradually enhanced as envisaged in the ICSP, reportedly do not have far-reaching institutional capacities at the current stage, but elsewhere national administration is still generally limited to health and education staff in hospitals and schools, and some scattered agriculture specialists.</p> <p>§151: The technicians or administrators (from ministries) who were already present across the country, were not necessarily highly visible and could be overlooked in programme implementation</p>		
2.1.4 Coherence with partners	<p>§56: The ICSP suggests collaboration with Rome-based agencies (RBA) in line with WFP corporate strategic plans, particularly policy and programme coherence. RBA collaboration is specifically envisaged for mapping and planning exercises, as well as peacebuilding, resettlement and climate-change-mitigation interventions. Moreover, the ICSP outlines future cooperation with FAO, including for: integrated school feeding packages and other safety nets; seed protection; development of nutritious local value chains; agro-pastoral recovery based on the three-pronged approach; and policy review and preparation of the ZHSR. When it comes to IFAD, no specific collaboration is planned, which reflects the limited engagement of IFAD in the Central African Republic</p>	<p>§186: Corporate agreements between RBAs, specifically for resilience, could be used better.</p>	<p>R1 f) WFP should, whenever possible, work with FAO and the International Fund for Agricultural Development on institutionalizing partnerships for both programming and fundraising, particularly in the areas of agricultural resilience and gender equality</p>

Report section	Key findings and paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
2.3.6 Capacity strengthening	<p>§155: It is expected that the ICSP will allow greater focus on Rome-based agency collaboration, including harmonized and complementary programming for national capacity development. Concrete capacity strengthening activities still often need to be defined in the ICSP. Some are expected to build on cooperation with United Nations agencies such as UNICEF and FAO, to do a mapping in the ZHSR framework and establish objectives</p>		
2.1.5 Strategic use of comparative advantages	<p>§59: Beyond emergency response in terms of food and logistics, WFP also provided contributions to resilience and recovery through FFA and P4P, which were very relevant in the Central African Republic where the population is more stable, including areas with returnees.</p>	<p>§179: As agriculture is still the main source of livelihood for the majority of the Central African Republic population, and the best opportunity in the short term to reintegrate violence-prone youths into normal life, it can be concluded that any sustainable security (not only food security) must be based on the recovery of agriculture. This is consistent with SDG 2 and the Zero Hunger strategy, and FFA and P4P fit in closely with some of the needs identified for recovery in the RCPCA</p> <p>§191: Synergy (of school meals) with P4P can further strengthen recovery dynamics, but coverage (20–25 percent of schools in both 2012 and 2017) could only reach accessible areas</p> <p>§200: The ICSP budget might appear optimistic, as average annual expenditures from 2014 to 2016 were only at 70 percent of ICSP planning, and the donors’ base for supporting FFA and P4P is not commensurate with projections</p>	<p>R2: WFP should examine the donor landscape with a view to assessing the range of donors and donors’ appetite for funding WFP recovery activities in the Central African Republic. WFP should also review its articulation of linkages between the triple nexus and its FFA and P4P activities in order to ensure that existing and potential donors are able to make informed decisions on funding allocations.</p>
2.2.2 Drivers of WFP country strategy – low visibility and funding shortfalls	<p>§70: Although efforts to contact donors are shared with RBD (but there are no regional donors based in Dakar) and headquarters, the Country Director assumed the main responsibility for providing the substance for donors’ fund raising, and maintaining relations with concerned donors. The fact that there are few donors’ representatives still physically present in the Central African Republic for security reasons is not conducive to this task, even though some other donors are managing their funding from abroad and show consistent interest. The largest of them, USAID, is based in Nairobi and Kinshasa and funds essentially emergency activities rather than recovery ones</p>		
2.3.2 Outputs	<p>§139: The P4P initiative in Paoua, which is estimated to constitute 80 percent of the portfolio’s P4P activities, has largely contributed to WFP strategic positioning in supporting local rural economies</p> <p>§116: The overall objective of the CO is that 10 percent of the resources will ultimately be used for P4P</p> <p>§119: Under the regional EMOP, though, funding constraints led to reduced food rations, and overall the number of community assets developed in the portfolio is relatively limited</p>		

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2.3.10 Sustainability	<p>§177: Considering the limited donors' base and the low visibility nature of the crisis in the Central African Republic, the financial sustainability of ICSP projections is subject to concerns. The country office has a stable group of donors for funding emergency/early recovery, nutrition, school meals and common services activities under Strategic Outcomes 1, 2 and 5 (82 percent of the total budget). However, the average expenditures for the three years after the 2014 L3 emergency amount only to USD 67.2 million per year, i.e. 70 percent of the planned annual ICSP budget. In particular, the FFA and P4P activities under Strategic Outcome 3, which total 14.8 percent of the budget, are expected to grow significantly in the coming years and, over the evaluation period, did not benefit from a sufficiently secure donor base</p>		
<p>1.3.1 Timeline of key events</p> <p>2.2.1 Country office analytical work, and food security and nutrition monitoring</p> <p>2.3.3 Outcomes</p>	<p>Table 3: "Three consecutive years of reduced harvests, and disruption of marketing activities, negatively affects food security. Households face serious food access constraints"</p> <p>§62 – 65: An overall programming challenge in the Central African Republic was the fragmented collection of information on food security and nutrition, as insecurity and funding constraints limited standard surveys. Nonetheless, as far as possible, WFP played a key role in the production of reliable and timely food security information in the Central African Republic. During the CPE, partners confirmed the importance of WFP food security information for humanitarian programming</p> <p>§123: The CPE's review of the SPRs and PDMs highlighted the difficulties in assessing outcomes among conflict-affected populations where there are no food security monitoring systems. Other countries perform these assessments with sentinel sites</p>	<p>§187: Efficiency of data collection and analysis to support decisions was mixed. WFP is seen as a crucial actor for providing food security information, which is in high demand by all partners. Nonetheless, this has been a fragmented process. Various food security surveys have been carried out, mostly in partnership (CFSAM, EFSA, IPC) and generally in response to eruptions of violence and massive displacement. There still cannot be any systematic collection of food security and nutrition data in the Central African Republic, as many areas are not accessible; locally collected data can be misleading if used for trends or comparative analysis</p>	<p>R3: WFP should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Optimize its strategic role in food security by enhancing the use of existing tools and taking the lead in assisting the Government in developing a national food security information strategy and ensuring government ownership of a "sentinel surveillance" network of sites to be used to gather relevant information b) Continue to strengthen monitoring systems, centrally in the country office and in sub-offices c) Prepare a formal strategic monitoring plan with clear coverage targets, systematically taking into account the various levels of security and access limitations that exist in the

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	the potential of moving the general perception of why gender equality is important		
2.1.2 Contribution of WFP to defining policies and strategies in the Central African Republic	§46: WFP was involved in the revision of the "National Protocol for Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition" (IMAM), which was validated by the Government in December 2014	<p>§181: Some weaknesses were noted in the synergy with UNICEF on programmatic coordination for nutrition, as each agency had its own strategic approach. There is room for some increased cooperation with UNICEF</p> <p>§190: Availability, quality of MAM case management, and prevention of malnutrition in general have been much limited by volatile security, chronic underfunding, delays, and the poorly capacitated network of local health facilities. In this respect, WFP and UNICEF have had diverging strategies, an issue which may be solved under the new ICSP, which devotes increased focus on local partners and community outreach. For SAM treatment, the under-resourced UNICEF was substituted in some hospitals by the emergency-focused MSF, a situation which may create issues of institutional sustainability</p>	<p>R5: WFP should strengthen nutrition approaches. In particular, it should:</p> <p>a) Enhance coherence between WFP and UNICEF MAM and SAM targeting respectively, to ensure maximum synergies between the two programmes</p> <p>b) Identify an appropriate strategy for working with the Ministry of Health and Population</p> <p>c) Consider a developmental approach to addressing chronic malnutrition, when feasible</p>
2.1.4 Coherence with partners	§54. The nutrition cluster seemed unable to address some weaknesses in general acute malnutrition programmatic coordination, communication and integration between UNICEF and WFP, which developed at the end of 2015. Each of the two agencies has its own strategic approach, selection criteria, operational procedures, funding, procurement procedures, and partners. The intervention criteria were not harmonized in terms of areas and health centres to be targeted - other than by ad hoc field level agreements, and the issue remains unresolved		
2.3.2 Outputs	§109: WFP has formulated the goal of institutionalized provision of services, consistent with the national protocol, but this makes the community component secondary to the health system. WFP chose service models with partnering institutions that did not greatly support community-based management – at least until the increased importance of this was proposed in the ICSP. This resulted in a gradual decrease in the number of beneficiaries of MAM treatment since 2015, as the treatment depended on capacity rather than needs		
2.3.3 Outcomes	§137: It should also be noted that UNICEF did not provide SAM treatment in several provincial hospitals visited (Paoua, Bambari). Instead it was replaced by MSF. Although the quality of treatment by MSF was probably also adequate (this was not checked), the NGO is generally focused on emergency interventions rather than longer-term perspectives and institutional sustainability		
2.3.6 Capacity strengthening	§152: At the Ministry of Health, the institutional support for nutrition is still weak despite the efforts of WFP. During the field visits, there were only two nutrition specialists at the Ministry, one of them being assigned to a service unrelated to nutrition		
2.3.10 Sustainability	§175: The current approach of integrating MAM management into the IMAM protocol is an opportunity to address aspects of		

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<p>2.2.2 Turnover of management and other staff</p> <p>2.3.7 Factors of efficiency</p>	<p>§72: There has been a high turnover of international staff, including those holding managerial positions.</p> <p>§160: Almost two thirds (123 staff or 65 percent) were posted at the CO in Bangui. According to the organograms provided, the five sub-offices were each operated by a number of staff, varying between 15 (Bouar, Kaga-Bandoro) and 11 (Bossangoa)</p> <p>§161: It is difficult to attract and retain quality staff in the sub-offices, due to the lack of security and hard living conditions, and the visited sub-offices appeared under-staffed for the workload</p>	<p>§196: Efficiency is limited by a number of factors. Almost two thirds of WFP staff in the Central African Republic are working at the CO in Bangui – where living conditions are (relatively) better, whilst the sub-offices, which had to cover very large territories and beneficiary populations, experienced difficulties attracting skilled personnel, in particular international staff for managerial positions. The CO was working to improve conditions in sub-offices, but more incentives may be needed</p>	<p>R7: WFP should:</p> <p>a) Commission and publish a staffing review based on the staff needed to deliver results under the new ICSP</p> <p>b) Widen efforts to improve living conditions, security and incentives at sub-offices in order to help attract good-quality staff to the field offices closer to beneficiaries</p>

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<p>2.2.3 Management of risk and emergency preparedness</p> <p>2.3.2 Outputs</p> <p>2.3.7 Factors of efficiency</p>	<p>§78: One of the key risks during the portfolio period was the size of the programmes with a food-aid component, which was significantly affected by the capacity of the main Douala–Bangui corridor and more specifically by the limited capacity of the road transporters, the taxing customs procedures and the stringent security requirements</p> <p>§88: The multiple logistical constraints along the 1,400 km road corridor from the port of Douala in Cameroon to Bangui included: lengthy transit times, tedious customs, and poor security which obliged all trucks to join strictly regulated convoys under MINUSCA military escort. This constraints were compounded by the lack of an integrated WFP management (by a single unit or a high-ranking WFP focal point with enough authority) for monitoring the overall transit flow of goods</p> <p>§164: Maintenance facilities and repairs of trucks were pretty basic and were often conducted in the open. With a utilization ratio of only 23 percent of the available truck days, the fleet seemed to be rather underutilized, and there was still ample spare trucking capacity available. The situation calls for a general upgrade</p>	<p>§194: Overall cost-effectiveness was made difficult by high transport costs in a landlocked country with poor roads. LTSH and ODOC represent from 30 percent to 50 percent of the total food and related costs and the truck fleet appeared underutilized</p> <p>§194: The truck fleet appears underutilized, partly due to the lack of maintenance facilities; this needs to be addressed</p> <p>§197: Responsibility for supervising the flow of goods along the transport corridor from Douala to Bangui appeared fragmented and relied overly on forwarding agents. GCMF gains are partly canceled by regular losses of two to four weeks along the corridor</p>	<p>R8: WFP should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Work to improve management of the Douala–Bangui corridor, which is under the responsibility of the Cameroon country office, with the regional bureau playing a technical advisory role b. Advocate with national authorities, through senior management, for problem-free transit c. Allocate adequate funding to truck maintenance facilities d. Optimize the use of its fleet of trucks

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