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**Executive Board  
Third Regular Session**

**Rome, 22–26 October 2001**

# **EVALUATION REPORTS**

## **Agenda item 6**

***For consideration***

# **E**

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
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## **SUMMARY REPORT OF THE EVALUATION OF SUDAN PRO 04168.5 AND PRRO 06189.0 (WIS nos. 4168.05 and 6189.00)**

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# Note to the Executive Board



**This document is submitted for consideration to the Executive Board.**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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# Executive Summary

Although protracted relief operation (PRO) 04168.5 has mostly achieved its main objectives, implementation of protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 06189.0 was hampered by an outdated refugee database, renewed heavy influx of Eritrean refugees in May–June 2000 and a rebel incursion in November–December 2000. The health and nutritional status of the refugees in the camps could be improved. Repatriation of the residual caseload of Ethiopian refugees was only 50-percent successful. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) budget constraints exacerbated coordination and collaboration gaps with WFP and strained the difficult working relationship with the government implementing partner, the Office of the Commissioner for Refugees (COR). A new Letter of Understanding (LOU) with the COR will give full responsibility to WFP with regard to warehouse management and repair/maintenance. COR budget reductions were unevenly administered and felt mainly in refugee camps.

Payment of food-distribution and water-supply service fees by refugees in land-based camps should be waived, as refugees appear to have lapsed from increased self-reliance to high dependency on food aid. There should be further review of the possibility that under the global WFP-UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) WFP could take over responsibility both for food delivery from extended delivery points (EDPs) to final distribution points (FDPs) and for food distribution; this could address identified problems. Because self-reliance among the refugees has not been achieved so far, continued food aid to refugees in all camps under the new expansion phase of the PRRO will be necessary. However, that aid should be targeted based on an update of the number of refugees and the results of a socio-economic survey, both of which should take place as soon as possible and take into account the tripartite Sudan-Eritrea-UNHCR repatriation agreement of March 2001.

## Draft Decision

The Board notes the recommendations contained in this evaluation report (WFP/EB.3/2001/6/3) and notes also the management action taken so far, as indicated in the associated information paper (WFP/EB.3/2001/INF/13). The Board encourages further action on these recommendations, taking into account considerations raised during the discussion.



## ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES

1. Several postponements of this evaluation, resulting from new emergency operations and security risks, explain why the mission decided to assess both the achievements of PRO 04168.05, which ended in April 2000, and the mid-term achievements of the subsequent PRRO 06189.0.
2. The first major influx of Ethiopian refugees to the Sudan occurred in 1967, followed by a second in 1984–1985, when more than one million people crossed the border. Although large numbers of refugees have returned over the years, WFP continued under PRO 04168.5 (November 1998–April 2000) to assist 132,931 Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees residing in 22 camps of different types (reception camps, wage-based camps and land-based camps).<sup>1</sup> The cost of supplying daily food rations to all refugees and providing support to selected feeding programmes (SFPs) under PRRO 04168.5 has amounted to US\$20.5 million.
3. WFP's objectives under PRO 04168.5 were to maintain and improve the health and nutritional status of camp-based refugees until their repatriation and to assist in increasing beneficiaries' self-reliance and reducing their dependence on food aid.
4. The main objective of PRRO 06189.0 (May 2000–October 2001) was to provide a repatriation package for a residual caseload of 11,919 Ethiopian refugees. A combined strategy was pursued of reducing general distribution and increasing the targeted feeding of the remaining 121,012 Eritrean refugees. Recovery-oriented activities were included, and WFP's Commitments to Women were to have been promoted through increased participation of women in food management and training opportunities. The total cost to WFP amounted to US\$15.1 million.
5. UNHCR, with its principal mandate of protection and its responsibilities of overseeing camp management, food distribution, the provision of non-food items and the provision of social services, continues to be the lead agency in refugee affairs. The WFP-UNHCR MOU (whose last revision was made in 1997) involved WFP to a greater extent in the monitoring of food distributions.

## PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

6. The mission was to examine achievements against the objectives of PRO 04168.5 and PRRO 06189.0, and the transition from one to the other; assess the efficiency and effectiveness of WFP's response to the problems faced by the refugee population; identify and analyse factors that substantially influenced collaboration between WFP and its partners; and examine existing coordination mechanisms between WFP, UNHCR and the government implementing partner, the Office of the Commissioner for Refugees (COR).

<sup>1</sup> **Reception camps** were originally intended as immediate reception centres, from which refugees would subsequently be resettled. Most of the refugees, however, were not resettled and face limited employment opportunities in the surrounding areas. **Wage-based camps** are situated in agricultural areas where the refugees are expected to find wage employment and thus become self-reliant. Refugees in **land-based camps** have been allocated 5 or 10 feddans of agricultural land, which is expected to give them the opportunity to become self-reliant.



## OVERALL APPRAISAL

7. Because of reduced donor contributions resulting in the elimination of agricultural inputs, the political insecurity in Eritrea that prevented repatriation, and the Sudanese Government's stance of not allowing refugees to integrate locally, WFP, in partnership with UNHCR, had no choice but to continue food aid in the 1990s. The need for enhanced cooperation and coordination between WFP, UNHCR and COR was observed by the mission as one of the major issues to be addressed.
8. Under PRO 04168.5, the health and nutritional status of refugees in the camps has improved. Implementation of PRRO 06189.0 was hampered, however, by a renewed influx of 94,000 Eritrean refugees from May 2000 onwards.
9. At the inception of PRRO 06189.0 in April/May 2000, UNHCR did not want to jeopardize the repatriation of Eritrean refugees by replacing the old illegible ration cards with new ones. To have done so might have suggested to beneficiaries that a continued stay in the Sudan was expected. As targeted food aid is not possible without a reliable refugee database, WFP decided to distribute half rations to all beneficiaries.
10. The same data constraint was hampering formulation of food allocation plans, implementation of food distributions (up to 65 percent of camp ration cards are illegible) and food-distribution monitoring.
11. Integration of the refugees is not a government policy and therefore not a viable long-term solution. After the cessation clause<sup>2</sup> for Ethiopian refugees in March 2000, some 5,397 refugees have still not returned to their country of origin. Of this group, only 635 have been screened in. From last year's influx of Eritrean refugees, 27,000 have not yet left, adding to the remaining 121,012.

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Implementation Environment

#### **MOU Impact**

12. The operational experience of 34 years has not so far been fully adjusted in accordance with the new joint working arrangements proposed by the global WFP-UNHCR MOU. In the Sudan, some of these arrangements have already been put in place or have partly fallen into disuse and are now recommended for revival. These are mainly coordination and collaboration mechanisms, discussed below. Others, such as the formal association of UNHCR in a tripartite LOU, might be difficult to introduce in view of existing long-standing bilateral arrangements of WFP and UNHCR with the Government of the Sudan. Others might in fact improve the efficiency and overall performance of the operation and are thus in some cases recommended for adoption (see below).

<sup>2</sup> The declaration of cessation of UNHCR's competence is undertaken to provide a legal framework for discontinuation of UNHCR's protection and material assistance to the refugees and to promote, with States of Asylum, the provision of an alternative residence status to the former refugees. UNHCR normally assists in the repatriation of former refugees who wish to go home but who may not have the necessary resources to do so. (UNHCR, Executive Committee, EC/47/SC/CRP.30, 30 May 1997.)



### 📌 **Project Funding**

13. All funds for both Eastern Sudan refugee projects under review are channelled either through UNHCR or WFP. External financial support to the five local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has not been checked in detail, because their activities are restricted to the health sector and their budgets are submitted to UNHCR for approval and funding.

### 📌 **Problems and Constraints**

14. When PRRO 06189.0 started, registration for repatriation of Eritreans was under way. As stated above, not wishing to suggest that a continued stay in the Sudan was expected, UNHCR did not want to replace the old illegible ration cards with new ones. Therefore, lacking a basis on which to allocate and distribute food through targeting, WFP undertook to distribute half rations to all beneficiaries.
15. The three-month repatriation food package to the residual caseload of Ethiopian refugees under PRRO 06189.0 could not be handed out, because repatriation did not occur after the cessation clause came into effect on 1 March 2000. Food allocation for these refugees had to be extended from April to August 2000 and then to December 2000.
16. Project implementation was hampered by a renewed influx of refugees from May 2000 onwards. A total of 94,000 Eritreans (WFP emergency operation [EMOP] 6250.00) fully occupied WFP and UNHCR staff for five months.

#### Recommendation

- ✍ UNHCR and WFP should update the number of beneficiaries in the refugee camps through a joint census; the new master list should be shared between UNHCR, WFP and COR.

### 📌 **Appropriateness and Impact of Food Aid**

17. Despite UNHCR's extensive assistance, the Sudan Government's objection to local integration caused the failure of an attempt at achieving self-sufficiency for the refugees. This left no choice for WFP but to continue the provision of food aid in the 1990s. The socio-economic survey of Save the Children Fund, United Kingdom (SCF/UK) in 1997 confirmed the appropriateness of this decision.
18. In eastern Sudan, WFP food distributions amount to a little over 5 percent of local cereal production. Refugees bringing cereals to the local market influence only the micro-economic situation around their camps.

## Coordination and Partnership Arrangements

### 📌 **Policy Coordination**

19. WFP and UNHCR closely coordinated the food needs assessment for the refugees under PRRO 06189.0, jointly conducting the socio-economic survey in June 1999 and the joint food needs assessment in September 1999. Repatriation was foreseen when these exercises were in progress. The exchange of new ration cards for the 121,012 Eritrean refugees was anticipated but not given priority in time by UNHCR. A substantial percentage of old



ration cards were illegible, however, rendering impossible the targeting of food aid. This resulted in an ad hoc change of the food ration at the inception of PRRO 06189.0.

20. Back in the late 1980s, when significant agricultural inputs made self-reliance feasible for those refugees with access to land for cultivation, UNHCR began to promote community self-reliance. COR undertook to recover the cost of the services provided by requiring the refugees to pay for food distribution (porters and scooping) and the water supply in the camps.
21. Over the years, however, it became evident that local integration of refugees was not a long-term government policy and hence not a viable long-term solution. Attempts by UNHCR and WFP to achieve success with refugee self-reliance could therefore be only temporary, as the renewed dependency on food aid by refugees with access to land became evident. Notwithstanding this fact, these refugees are still paying fees for food distribution and water supply.
22. Food coordination had been ensured in regular high-level tripartite meetings between WFP, UNHCR and COR at Khartoum.

#### Recommendations

- ✍ UNHCR/COR should reconsider the practice of requesting refugees to pay food-distribution and water-supply service fees.
- ✍ With UNHCR funding, temporary ration cards should be immediately issued in camps without repatriation under the reaffirmed tripartite agreement between Eritrea, the Sudan and UNHCR until September 2001; in other camps, this should be done after the first repatriation.

#### ✍ *WFP and UNHCR Roles*

23. UNHCR continues to be the lead agency in refugee affairs, given its principal mandate of protection and its responsibilities of overseeing camp management, food distribution, the provision of non-food items and the provision of social services.
24. When the goal of self-reliance of land-based refugees proved to be a no-exit strategy in the Sudan, UNHCR limited its objective to the care and maintenance of the refugees. Complementary food commodities were no longer made available.
25. After the census of 1996, which indicated that the refugee population had declined by 52 percent, UNHCR reduced its budget accordingly and cut the COR budget, resulting in a 50-percent staff reduction. Further UNHCR cuts of global and country budgets occurred. To the detriment of the refugees, COR did not apply across-the-board budget cuts but instead made disproportionate reductions to staffing and services in the refugee camps.
26. WFP was responsible for the supply and transport of basic food commodities from either Port Sudan or the local purchase points up to the warehouses at the EDPs. At the request of UNHCR, which had hitherto assumed this function, WFP is now taking over the management, repair and maintenance of those warehouses.
27. In its capacity as a government agency, COR did not honour UNHCR's numerous requests that it abolish the system of making refugees pay for porters and scoopers and that it reinvest the funds collected.



## Recommendations

WFP Sudan should:

- ✍ finalize and sign as soon as possible the LOU between WFP and COR on warehouse management, repairs and maintenance;
- ✍ examine the possibility of transferring responsibility from UNHCR to WFP for transport of all basic food commodities from EDPs and for final distribution;
- ✍ conclude a tripartite WFP-UNHCR-COR agreement on distribution modalities and responsibilities for reporting on the distribution and use of food commodities; and
- ✍ with UNHCR, undertake a new socio-economic survey through an international consultancy.

## 📁 *Project Partnerships*

28. Coordination between WFP and UNHCR at the Khartoum level would be further improved by regular exchanges of policy documents and agreements with the Government of the Sudan. At the Showak level, lack of UNHCR funds for human resources to fill existing posts hampers joint planning and monitoring. A significant difference in ranking between the heads of the WFP and the UNHCR sub-offices has exacerbated field cooperation difficulties. The hitherto regular joint WFP-UNHCR food-distribution monitoring visits to refugee camps have occurred rarely in recent months and were undertaken almost unilaterally by WFP.
29. In recent years, UNHCR and COR have experienced a sometimes strained working relationship. This stems mostly from contracted financial obligations not being fully honoured by COR. Supervision proves to be difficult, because COR is not only UNHCR's implementing partner but also represents the Sudan Government in its relations with UNHCR, which adds a political dimension to solving implementation disagreements. Exemption from taxes on imported non-food items is another area of misunderstanding, which led to the breakdown of supplies to refugee camps of such items as drugs and lubricants for water pumps.
30. WFP's working relationship with COR suffers from COR's non-adherence to agreed-upon timing of project monitoring and reporting procedures in accordance with the WFP-COR LOU. The final report for PRO 04168.5 was submitted seven months late, no interim reports were presented at all and accounting for the sale of empty containers was inadequate.
31. Since the mid-1990s, international NGOs have no longer been involved in implementing refugee projects.



### Recommendations

- ✍ WFP and UNHCR should institutionalize regular exchanges of policy papers and agreements with the Government of the Sudan at the Khartoum level.
- ✍ Joint WFP-UNHCR camp visits should be resumed.
- ✍ The WFP post of head of the Showak sub-office should be upgraded and filled as soon as possible.

### ✍ *Impact of Government Policy*

32. Integration is not perceived by the Government of the Sudan as a viable long-term solution. Attempts to achieve refugee self-reliance in land-based camps through agricultural production could not, therefore, succeed. After proclamation of the cessation clause for Ethiopian refugees in March 2000, some 5,397 refugees had still not left and were being screened by UNHCR during the mission's stay in the Sudan. Of last year's influx of Eritrean refugees, 27,000 have not yet returned home, adding to the remaining 121,012. UNHCR is expected to announce soon a cessation clause for all Eritrean refugees. Previous experience indicates that the latest repatriation schedule may be overly optimistic.
33. Long-term Eritrean refugees, some living in the Sudan since 1967, show little interest in returning to their country of origin, which was not an independent state when they fled. Some are too weak to return, while others have children and even grandchildren for whom the refugee camps are "home".

### Recommendations

- ✍ WFP should prepare an expansion phase of PRRO 06189.0 that should take into account the possibility that actual repatriation rates may differ from UNHCR planning figures.
- ✍ A joint WFP-UNHCR-COR food needs assessment should be conducted at an early date.
- ✍ An approach should be defined to take care of vulnerable Eritreans who will stay beyond the coming cessation clause.

## Project Implementation

### ✍ *Quantity, Quality and Acceptability of the Food Ration and Frequency of Distribution*

34. Food distribution was quite regular from November 1998 until December 2000 for most commodities. Under PRO 04168.5, food rations were distributed according to the type of camp. Refugees in reception and wage-based camps received full rations throughout. In the 5-feddan<sup>3</sup> land-based camps, half cereal and full non-cereal rations were distributed. The

<sup>3</sup> 1 feddan = 0.5 ha.



inhabitants of 10-feddan land-based camps received half rations for cereals and non-cereals during the last 12 months.

35. Under PRRO 06189.0, food rations were to be distributed through individual targeting. Because of the lack of new ration cards, half rations were distributed to all beneficiaries for the first six months, full rations for the subsequent two months, and half rations again thereafter (see Annex I).
36. The full ration provides energy, protein and fat, as required. The amount of wheat includes a 10-percent compensation for milling losses, but that is insufficient. The price paid for milling accounts for 10–15 percent of the value of the cereal. The pulses distributed are mainly yellow and green peas and sometimes lentils. Refugees prefer lentils; many dislike the peas and do not know how to prepare them. WFP has started training refugee women on the nutritional value of pulses and how best to prepare them with the least possible cooking fuel and in varied ways. This initiative appears to have improved their utilization.

#### Recommendations

- ✍ Increase to at least 15 percent the compensation rate for cereal losses during milling.
- ✍ Continue the training of refugee women in improving the utilization of peas.

#### ✍ *Rations Reaching Beneficiaries and Total Diet Coverage*

37. WFP reports indicate that beneficiaries receive the programmed quantities of available food commodities. WFP food commodities comprise the bulk of the food consumed by beneficiaries. In land-based camps, crops cultivated by refugees on allocated land provide an additional source of cereals.

#### ✍ *Effectiveness of Food Assistance*

38. It could be considered acceptable for beneficiaries to sell or exchange part of their food ration to diversify their diets. However, instead the refugees are selling part of their ration to be able to afford soap, cooking fuel and the fees for food distribution and water services.

#### Recommendations

- ✍ Harmonize as far as possible all WFP and UNHCR assistance to refugees to prevent utilization of food aid as compensation for lack of other assistance.
- ✍ Conduct an extensive food economy survey in all the camps to identify vulnerable refugees in order to allow proper justification of the targeting.



### 📌 *Health Services*

39. Health clinics run by national NGOs are present in all the refugee camps in eastern Sudan. They have office hours, but make emergency care available 24 hours a day. Drugs were in short supply during the visit of the evaluation team. This could lead to unnecessary complications, especially in the case of life-saving drugs, since not all refugees can afford to buy drugs at local pharmacies. The incidence of diseases, especially malaria and diarrhoea, has diminished since 1998 (see Annex II).

#### Recommendation

- ✎ The responsible organizations should ensure that essential drugs are made available to refugees at all times.

### 📌 *Drinking-water*

40. In all camps, water of usually acceptable quality is provided. Refugees pay for the services of pump operators and guards. Water is sometimes unavailable in the camps, because of the lack of lubricants or fuel, which forces refugees to fetch water from nearby rivers, canals and lakes. In Karkora and Um Gargour camps, the water has a high salt content, though refugees have been consuming it for many years.

#### Recommendation

- ✎ UNHCR should examine the effects on the health of those refugees consuming water of significant salinity and those drinking untreated water.

### 📌 *Selective Feeding Programme*

41. Supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes are carried out in all clinics. Registration of admission, attendance and discharge is usually accurate.
42. The weight and height of all children under 5 are measured monthly. Children with a weight-for-height measurement below 80 percent of the reference value are admitted to the SFP, through which they receive a supplementary take-home ration of 941 kcal per day. Those with a weight-for-height measurement below 70 percent are admitted to the therapeutic feeding programme, under which they receive daily several ready-made meals plus a premix with which their parents/guardians can prepare meals at home.
43. Expectant mothers are enrolled in the supplementary feeding programme from the sixth month of their pregnancy until six months into the lactation period. However, no measurements are made of their nutritional status.



### Recommendations

- ✍ Increase the supplementary feeding ration closer to the agreed-upon range of 1,000–1,200 kcal, in accordance with UNHCR/WFP guidelines.
- ✍ Determine the nutritional status of nursing mothers through their body mass index (BMI) or mid-upper-arm circumference to decide on the need for continued provision of SFP.

### ✍ **Nutritional Status**

44. Overall nutritional status improved from 1998 to 1999 and has been maintained in 2000. The annual nutrition surveys showed acute malnutrition rates of 13 percent, 8 percent and 8 percent, respectively (see Annex III).
45. From 1998 to 1999, all camps benefited under PRO 04168.5: from the increase in the ration from 1,900 to 2,100 kcal, from the reduced incidence of diseases in 1999 and from regular food distribution throughout 1999.
46. The limited food available to beneficiaries under PRRO 06189.0, combined with the beneficiaries' need for cash and the rare employment opportunities, can only result in a deterioration of their long-term health and nutritional status. The nutritional survey investigated the status only of children under 5. Their nutritional status could be kept at acceptable levels by the SFPs.
47. Many mothers are willing to forego most of their own food so that their children get more. Monitoring the nutritional status of the mothers should therefore be a good nutrition-status indicator for refugee families.

### Recommendations

- ✍ Increase the food ration during the remaining months of PRRO 06189.0 to the level of the previous PRO 04168.5, to prevent rising malnutrition rates.
- ✍ Monitor the nutritional status of older children and women in camps where no full rations are provided.
- ✍ Continuously monitor the length of stay of beneficiaries in the SFP and changes in admission rates in order to assess effectiveness of the feeding programme and to detect any deterioration in nutritional status.

### ✍ **Food for Work (FFW)**

48. During phasing-out under PRO 04168.5, FFW activities were to have replaced general food distributions to refugees who had been allocated 10 feddan of agricultural land, but this did not take place. Projects such as tree planting did not seem to be a real incentive for the beneficiaries because repatriation was being considered. Since conditions had not changed during the design stage of PRRO 06189.0, no FFW activities were integrated into that project.



### Recommendation

- ✍ Examine FFW project possibilities, such as environmental rehabilitation, under the new PRRO 6189.01.

### ✧ Logistics

49. Bureaucratic clearance of incoming food commodities takes an average of two weeks. COR staff usually obtain exemption of import duties in an efficient way. If the Ministry of Finance (MOF) budget line for the annual global exemption to compensate customs and seaport authorities is not precisely determined, however, clearance may be delayed for up to two months.
50. After exemption has been granted, food commodities are stored in COR Logistic Unit (CLU) warehouses in Port Sudan and may be subject to improper management and stacking procedures. WFP contracts transporters on the free market to deliver food commodities to the EDPs on the basis of movement plans developed jointly with COR Showak. With early receipt of shipping documents and a smooth exemption process, it was possible on several occasions in 2000 to transport food commodities directly from the ship to the EDPs.
51. As noted above, WFP is about to take over complete responsibility for warehousing.

### ✧ Gender

52. Endeavours to recruit women to assist as porters and scoopers at food distributions attracted only 15 women. However, cultural and traditional barriers have been overcome to a large extent during the past three years, with women members active on the Elder Committees of most camps. Acceptance of the women was eased because they had joined in their own right, instead of replacing traditional male elders, and never outnumbered those elders on the committees.
53. Under a food-for-training initiative, and following the training of trainers (TOT) concept, 1,215 women have been trained in basic hygiene and nutrition as of December 2000.

### ✧ Monitoring

#### Adequacy of Delivery Monitoring

54. WFP Port Sudan monitors the loading and dispatch activities of food commodities from the port of entry; WFP Kassala monitors the commodities' transport to and arrival at EDPs.
55. The Food Allocation Plan for January–May 2001 suffered from a lack of precise refugee numbers, as noted above. The food commodities should have been delivered in December 2000, but they arrived only towards the end of February 2001. Other delivery problems could mostly be addressed in time to prevent delays.

#### Adequacy of Distribution Monitoring

56. WFP has not filled the post of head of the Showak sub-office since January 2001, and UNHCR has not replaced its international logistics officer since early 2000, leaving the UNHCR sub-office without a mandated focal point for food issues.



57. WFP's national food monitors calculate the amount of food required and monitor food distributions; UNHCR national field officers have not participated as foreseen over the past few months. The previous joint WFP-UNHCR food distribution monitoring is now undertaken by WFP and has been severely hampered by the high percentage—up to 65 percent—of illegible ration cards.
58. In the absence of a specialized logistics officer, UNHCR is not in a position to carry out its food distribution monitoring. WFP monitors conduct random surveys of beneficiaries on a twice-monthly basis from one month after a distribution; these post-delivery monitoring reports are established monthly.
59. UNHCR Showak does not share reports of camp visits with WFP Showak. When the mission asked for such reports, they were referred to UNHCR Khartoum.

#### Health and Nutrition Monitoring

60. Five local NGOs submit standardized monthly reports to the health and nutrition unit of COR and the medical section of UNHCR, both in Showak, containing information on the incidence of diseases, admissions to and discharges from selective-feeding programmes, births and deaths. Joint UNHCR-WFP-COR annual nutrition surveys are undertaken.
61. WFP has set up a malnutrition early warning system to monitor malnutrition rates, comparing the numbers of children in camp feeding programmes with those of the previous month. Food basket monitoring is reportedly undertaken by WFP, but no relevant reports were made available to the mission. Monthly post-distribution monitoring reports contain data on beneficiaries' utilization of the food commodities.
62. The mission observed that information on health and nutrition is not widely shared among the partner organizations. Follow-up actions are undertaken largely in isolation by the organizations, and not in collaboration with partners.

#### Recommendations

- ✎ Use height and weight data of children under 5 for monthly assessments of the nutritional status in all camps in order to detect changes, take timely and appropriate action and prevent duplication of data collection.
- ✎ WFP and UNHCR should jointly undertake nutrition monitoring. Information gathered by individual agencies should be shared and followed up on by coordinated actions.

#### Relevance of Approach and Objectives

##### 📌 ***Appropriateness and Feasibility of Targeting***

63. As planned, full food rations for PRRO 06189.0 were targeted to 51 percent of the refugees who were “most vulnerable and most dependent on food aid”, comprising children under 5, expectant and nursing mothers, female-headed households and tuberculosis patients. The non-vulnerable half of the refugee caseload was assessed as having “some elements of recovery and self-reliance in food”, and would receive only half rations (see Annex I).
64. Individual vulnerability under PRRO 06189.0 is based on physical determinants. It could be argued, however, that vulnerability should be based on the ability of a household/family



to access income or food. The nutritional status of refugees receiving half rations should be monitored continuously. Continual registration of beneficiaries and their classification as vulnerable or non-vulnerable should be undertaken, to ensure that individuals with increased vulnerability receive a larger ration when they need it.

#### Recommendation

- ✎ To ensure that the most needy families are targeted and reached, consultation should take place with all parties in order that they may discuss the underlying vulnerability rationale and assess the acceptability and consequences of this food distribution system.

#### Relevance of Support to Objectives

65. Under PRO 04168.5, the health and nutritional status of refugees in camps was improved. The planned phasing-out of the 10-feddan refugee farmers was not implemented because of the findings of the joint WFP-UNHCR-COR food assessment mission of September 1999, which recommended provision of half rations of cereals and half rations of non-cereals. The additional food requirements could be covered because no FFW activities took place.
66. Under PRRO 06189.0, the residual caseload of Ethiopian refugees was to receive two months of their three-month repatriation food package from PRO 04168.5 and one month of the package from PRRO 06189.0. This package was not distributed because, following the declaration of cessation of UNHCR's competence, repatriation did not take place. As a consequence, WFP was required to reallocate the three-month repatriation package into a half ration lasting six months.
67. Revalidation of 1996 ration cards was not undertaken by UNHCR, which made it impossible to implement the planned combined strategy of full rations to vulnerable groups of Eritrean refugees, and reduced food rations for others.
68. Project documents, if structured following a logical framework, would provide clearer guidelines for implementation, facilitate monitoring and evaluation and give advance guidance with regard to implementation challenges.

#### Recommendation

- ✎ Apply the logical framework approach to the new PRRO 6189.01 document in order to provide clear implementation guidance and to facilitate monitoring and evaluation.

#### Effectiveness PRO/PRRO Approach for Long-term Refugee Support

69. Distinctions between reception camps, wage-based camps and land-based camps have become blurred. Refugees who have stayed for more than 30 years in reception camps have developed coping mechanisms, enabling them to overcome the reduction of the food basket to half rations. Refugees in land-based camps have suffered from depletion of their land, as a result of overuse of the land and their lack of fertilizer. Their adult offspring



have no land at all, in common with up to 50 percent of refugees in land-based camps. Recurrent droughts have further reduced the remaining refugee farmers' prospects of satisfactory crops in rain-fed agriculture. Refugees in land-based camps depend on food aid for survival.

70. Continued food aid to all camps under the new expansion phase of the PRRO will be necessary, since the refugees are not likely to achieve self-reliance. Targeting food aid should be based on the vulnerability of refugee households and on an update of the refugee caseload, taking into account the tripartite repatriation agreement of March 2001 between the Sudan, Eritrea and UNHCR.



## ANNEX I

PLANNING OF RATIONS ACCORDING TO PRO 04168.5 (1 NOVEMBER 1998–30 APRIL 2000)  
and PRRO 06189.0 (1 MAY 2000–31 OCTOBER 2001)  
(in g/person/day)

Subdivision:	R/WB	PRO 04168.5			PRRO 06189.0		
		LB5	LB10	LB10	LB10	Vulnerable	Non-vulnerable
Period:			1/11/98– 30/4/99	1/5/99– 31/10/99	1/11/99– 30/4/00		
Cereals	500	250	250	250	-	500	250
Pulses	70	70	70	35	35	70	35
Vegetable oil	30	30	30	15	15	30	15
Sugar	20	20	20	10	10	20	10
Salt	5	5	5	5	5	5	5

ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF RATIONS UNDER PRO 04168.5 AND PRRO 06189.0  
(in g/person/day)

Subdivision:	R/WB	PRO 04168.5			All	PRRO 06189.0			All *
		LB5	LB10	LB10		R/WB	LB 5	LB 10	
Period:			1/11/98– 30/4/99	1/5/99– 30/4/00	1/5/00– 31/10/00	1/11/00– 31/12/00	1/11/00– 31/12/00	1/11/00– 31/12/00	1 <sup>st</sup> half 2001
Cereals	500	250	250	250	250	500	250	250	250
Pulses	70	70	70	35	35	70	70	35	35
Vegetable oil	30	30	30	15	15	30	30	15	15
Sugar	20	20	20	10	10	20	20	10	10
Salt	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5

\* WFP Khartoum indicates that, in accordance with the mission's recommendations, the provision of a full ration is planned from June until October (end of project).

R = reception camp

WB = wage-based camp

LB5 = land-based camp, 5 feddan


LB10 = land-based camp, 10 feddan




## ANNEX II

## MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY AMONG CHILDREN UNDER 5, IN ALL REFUGEE CAMPS, 1998–2000

UNDER-5 MORBIDITY



UNDER-5 MORTALITY



## ANNEX III

## MALNUTRITION RATE BY CAMP, 1998–2000

Camp	Type	Sample size	Malnourished children (total no.)	1998 (%)	Malnourished children (total no.)	1999	Malnourished children (total no.)	2000 (%)
Shagarab	R	900	151	17	100	11	Not available	
Wed Shrifey	R	896	171	19	101	11	67	7
K. Girba	WB	898	145	16	59	7	97	11
Kilo 26	WB	900	122	14	65	7	84	9
W. Helew	WB	493	65	13	44	8	59	10
Umrakoba	LB5	455	35	8	44	9	Repatriated	
Karkora/Gargour	LB10	895	87	10	82	9	50	6
Abuda/U mali	LB5	870	97	11	77	9	26	6
Hawata/Mafaza	LB5	534	74	14	35	6	54	8
Umsagata area	LB10	895	109	12	18	5	82	9
Abu Rakhm	LB5	511	46	9	42	9	20	6
Fau 5	WB	134	16	12	8	5	11	7
Suki area	WB	384	22	6	21	6	21	6
Umgulja	WB	309	17	6	18	5	Repatriated	
<b>Overall</b>		<b>9 074</b>	<b>1 157</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>714</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>571</b>	<b>8</b>

R = reception camp

WB = wage-based camp

LB5 = land-based camp, 5 feddan

LB10 = land-based camp, 10 feddan



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## ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

BMI	Body mass index
CLU	Logistics Unit, Commissioner for Refugees
COR	Office of the Commissioner for Refugees
EDP	Extended delivery point
EMOP	Emergency operation
FDP	Final distribution point
FFW	Food for work
LOU	Letter of Understanding
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PRO	Protracted relief operation
PRRO	Protracted relief and recovery operation
SCF UK	Save the Children Fund, United Kingdom
SFP	Selective feeding programme
TOT	Training of Trainers
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

