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MULTI-DONOR EVALUATION OF SUPPORT TO CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN SUDAN SINCE 2005

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
The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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* Office of Evaluation

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activity in Southern Sudan since 2005” (WFP/EB./2011/6-C).

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

INTRODUCTION

1. The Sudan is at a critical stage in its history. In January 2011 citizens of Southern Sudan will vote on semi-autonomy or full independence. This evaluation was conducted in the lead up to the referendum and provides a reflection on the performance of donor supported conflict prevention and peacebuilding (hereafter CPPB) efforts since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). It aims to help prepare for the new initiatives that will be designed after the referendum, and to adjust the ongoing ones. It also aspires to improve the practice of evaluation in this complex field.
2. The evaluation covers the main donor programmes in the country,¹ as well as a broad spectrum of activities covered under the themes of socio-economic, governance, justice and local peacebuilding – all activities that are designed to have an influence in reducing violence as well as strengthening the cultural and institutional resilience necessary for managing conflict without violence. The evaluation uses a mixed methodology, but is anchored in a conflict analysis that contrasts the key drivers of conflict in 2005 with those identified by the evaluation team in 2010.
3. The evaluation was carried out by a team of 16 international consultants between October 2009 and December 2010. It involved a two-phase approach: a literature review, an analysis of the aid portfolios of the donors who have commissioned the evaluation and preliminary interviews, followed by field verification work in Southern Sudan covering 7 of the 10 States. Senior donor representatives, Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and international aid agencies were consulted, as well as many of the recipients of aid programmes. The report focuses on the ‘storyline’ of how activities supported by donors within the various sectors have affected the dynamics of conflict.
4. Throughout its history Southern Sudan has been cut-off from mainstream development owing to political and physical isolation. In 2009, the Sudan as a whole ranked 150th (of 182) in the world in terms of human development indices. The Sudan’s economic growth over the last ten years has been remarkable: annual per capita income rose from US\$506 in 2003 to US\$1,199 in 2007. Since 2005, Southern Sudan, through the CPA, has been in receipt of about half of the country’s new-found oil wealth, receiving approximately US\$2 billion per year.

THE CONFLICT

5. After the signature of the CPA in early 2005, a policy of state engagement was pursued in the South by donors, operating in what they regarded as a post-war reconstruction scenario. However, despite the CPA the situation was closer to a ‘suspended war’ during which local conflicts erupted frequently. This led to a serious underestimation of the residual and often complex triggers of violence in a much-neglected region of the world. At the same time donors felt obliged not to pre-judge the outcome of the referendum. This has made it difficult for them to focus their aid efforts in Southern Sudan, especially in relation to governance, when they could not make any assumptions about the future.

¹ The donors that have commissioned the study and whose programmes are assessed are the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States of America. The activities and policies of multilateral bodies such as the European Commission, World Bank and some United Nations agencies (including the United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS)) have also been reviewed. Finally, there is a brief overview of assistance provided by regional and non-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors such as China, India and the Arab League.

6. Table 1 presents a synthesis of the major conflict factors that have, or should have, been addressed by donor-supported interventions. In bold are the factors that did not exist or were secondary in 2005 but which have gained prominence since. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but rather a broad-brush reference to the major fault lines that continue to threaten peace in Southern Sudan. Above all, what it reveals is that donors need to complement a focus on the North/South fault lines with a more nuanced and informed approach to problem-solving in the South itself.
7. In many respects problems identified in 2005 are still present but manifest themselves in different ways – for example, youth alienation and specific tensions around water and land have been exacerbated by poor progress over reintegration of demobilized soldiers and the enormous return of populations from Khartoum and abroad since 2005.

TABLE 1: KEY CONFLICT FACTORS TO BE ADDRESSED BY INTERVENTIONS			
Reform of justice and security institutions	Culture of justice, truth and reconciliation	Good governance	Socio-economic development
Reintegration of demobilized soldiers is insufficient	Uncertainty about the future and false expectations	North/South disparities, and intra-South marginalization	Status of the Three Areas. International attention diverted from the Three Areas.
Undeveloped police and justice systems	Hardening of ethnic identities	Tensions around centralization and weak structures at State levels	Migration of armed pastoralists (this has not featured in 2005); discontented and under-employed youth.
Incomplete disarmament among the population	Unresolved issues of access to natural resources	Lack of representation	Returnees want access to resources. Return destabilizes communities.

DONOR INTERVENTIONS

8. Donors have commissioned independent studies on conflict in Southern Sudan since 2005 and used these selectively. Generally, however, there is a disjuncture between the production and reading of these reports and the assumptions present in programme design. A more rigorous application of conflict analysis would have isolated those causal factors that could be dealt with by donor programmes, and ensured that there was a common understanding among donors over how to address these. Despite the existence of donor coordination mechanisms, these tend to be limited to sharing information rather than promoting a joint donor approach based on shared analysis and consensus.
9. The reasons are threefold. First, high level donor meetings have taken place mainly in Khartoum or at international conferences, where the particularities of local conflict are lost to more strategic pan-Sudan concerns around the CPA. Second, most of the joint mechanisms are primarily concerned with harmonizing aid around a recovery/development agenda negotiated with GoSS. As we shall see, GoSS flagged security as a priority but was unable to formulate a donor-friendly strategy around this.
10. Third – and perhaps the most crucial inhibiting factor in applying conflict analysis – is that flexible localized responses can rarely be accommodated by aid programmes built around relatively rigid three to five-year plans. The predictability of funding makes longer-term programmes attractive, but the execution of these programmes can entail a

long, drawn out process of procurement and capacity-building that ultimately inhibits rapid changes in approach, or indeed, in geographical location.

11. The way in which the concept of marginalization is applied in policies and strategies and general discourse presents a good example of the confusion – and sometimes distortion – surrounding donor perspectives. On the ground this does not mean ‘lack of services’ but political isolation combined with military domination. Hitherto, this has applied to the dominance of Northern Sudan, but in the South itself political patronage can lead to favouring of certain ethnic groups or geographical areas above others, with those in positions of power having unregulated access to resources that can be used arbitrarily. It can thus include elements of deliberate exclusion. When state institutions are weak, regulating or even recognizing such disparities is difficult.
12. The confusion between ‘marginalization’ and ‘lack of development’ led to an assumption that the lack of development in the South was not simply a matter of concern but a factor causing conflict. Local conflict may arise from disputes over access to resources, but these can escalate either because of historical factors or because of political manipulation. Lack of development might, at most, be a cause of disaffection that contributes to tension in such cases but it cannot be cited as either a sole or significant cause of conflict.
13. A dominant ‘theory of change’ emerged from the 2005 Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) in which it was implied that lack of development was in itself a cause of conflict. Hence the theory is that ‘all development contributes to CPPB’, encapsulated in the term ‘peace dividend’. The logic seems to be that development is not only a reward for peace (the CPA) but that failure to deliver a ‘peace dividend’ could lead to conflict. The evidence for such a claim appears to come from studies on conflict prevention and peacebuilding conducted in other parts of the world, but the link between delivering services and abating violence is not found in Southern Sudan, despite this being the dominant paradigm that informs the aid operations. In Southern Sudan a more precise identification of the causes of conflict is needed.
14. The efforts of donors have nevertheless been consistent and continuous. United Nations Work Plan budget figures for a three-year period (2007–2009) show that in this period an average proportion of about 57 percent of the total funding (primarily for humanitarian activities) went to Southern Sudan (including the Three Areas). In actual disbursements, this amounts to about US\$3.7 billion over the three-year period.
15. However, over a five-year period (2005–2009) the total budgeted allocation to Southern Sudan from our donor portfolio analysis amounts to about US\$4.2 billion (including humanitarian). If we add the assessed contributions assigned to UNMIS in the same period (averaging about US\$1 billion/year), this would bring the total to above US\$8 billion (although this includes UNMIS contributions from non-DAC donors). The contribution of non-DAC donors in Southern Sudan is relatively small, though their investments in the Three Areas along the North/South border are greater. Although the proportion of aid to Southern Sudan from our donor portfolio cannot be known with accuracy, it will be over 85 percent of the total from all donors.
16. Reflecting the predominant assumptions about the conflict, between 65 to 85 percent of funds were used for ‘socio-economic development’ (including humanitarian) over a five-year period. The second largest category of donor expenditure, using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) categories, was government and civil society. This covered a multitude of projects relating to local governance, the justice system, and activities in reconciliation and

community mobilization. This became stronger towards the end of the evaluation period, when the severity of the absence of government capacity became most fully appreciated. In 2009, there was a substantial increase in funds for ‘good governance’ (now accounting for some 27 percent). With the new 2009 Juba Compact, wherein donors have redoubled their efforts to ensure transparency and bolster governance, funding for that sector is likely to increase again in 2010–2011.

17. Some donors (notably the United States) have preferred to work bilaterally through large programmes, using contractors or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). At the same time, the majority of OECD/DAC donors have used the various pooled funding mechanisms in Southern Sudan that emerged after the April 2005 Donors Conference in Oslo. One of the largest has been the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) administered by the World Bank, but generally this has performed poorly in terms of disbursements. Some of the pooled funds administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have also had disappointing results, and there is evidence to show that pooled funds managed by contractors have performed relatively more efficiently.

PERFORMANCE BY AID CATEGORY

18. Our findings are presented in accordance with the four key categories found in the OECD/DAC Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (OECD/DAC, 2008)² – i) socio-economic development, ii) good governance, iii) reform of justice and security institutions, and iv) culture of justice, truth and reconciliation. Within each of these overriding categories we look at the most important subcategories (sectors) assisted by international donors over the last five years. We have treated gender and capacity-building as cross-cutting issues.
19. The findings in respect of **socio-economic** forms of assistance (including infrastructure, social services, livelihoods) are mixed. Our conflict analysis shows the importance of linking development activities to local peacebuilding in three respects: the recognition of key drivers of violence; the appropriate geographical placement of assistance in areas most prone to violence; and the institutional support necessary to uphold peaceful relations within communities. The continuing presence of pockets of insecurity, the low capacity of the new government at all levels, and the slow and, in some cases, ineffective implementation of new pooled funding mechanisms, have hampered efforts to rapidly scale-up basic service delivery in Southern Sudan. Some progress has been made in establishing government structures and systems, but access to basic services remains very limited with considerable regional variations.
20. Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, over two million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to Southern Sudan, but an estimated 10 percent of these people have suffered secondary displacement since returning. Yet the focus on reintegration became obscured by large-scale and logistically demanding ‘organized’ return processes spearheaded by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) despite the fact that the vast majority were ‘spontaneous’ returnees who arranged their own transport and resources. The result has been a piecemeal approach to assistance with different

² OECD/DAC (2008). Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation and the OECD/DAC Network on Development Evaluation.

agencies emphasizing different interventions (e.g. service provision versus protection), and few developing a longer-term and more holistic approach towards reinforcing the absorption capacity of communities. There was, for example, a lack of a clear agenda and coordination over land issues, and geographical coverage has been inconsistent. Direct service provision (usually by international NGOs) is still important, but funding this through humanitarian budgets introduces risks over sustainability, especially while GoSS is still unable to take over these responsibilities. Most donor and NGO-supported recovery has focused on capital investment, equipment and, especially training while avoiding recurrent costs such as salaries, essential supplies and maintenance.

21. As stated above we challenge the assumed causal link between the provision of basic services ('peace dividends') and CPPB. The reasons for violent conflict are more often found in ethnic divisions, land and cattle disputes, and disaffected youth – variables that are in many cases outside the influence of socio-economic forms of assistance. Interestingly, there is no correlation between the relatively larger amounts of aid in some geographical areas and the occurrence or reduction of violence.
22. In Lakes, Warrap, Jonglei, and Upper Nile – the most conflict-affected states – measures need to be taken to ensure security before access to basic services can be realized. Inter-tribal conflict has contributed to delays in rolling out services and deterred NGOs and others from investing. Effective disarmament, a focus on the building of a trained and credible police force, the building of roads, and programmes targeting youth are the key priorities that will create an enabling environment for the delivery of basic services. Which of these interventions should be prioritized, and how these programmes should be implemented in each state, should be based on an analysis of the particular drivers of conflict in the region, and in some cases in specific counties. There has been a dearth of activities focused specifically on supporting young people's livelihoods and/or employment opportunities. The lack of livelihood opportunities for youth has more direct potential for creating or exacerbating tensions than the lack of basic services.
23. The aid architecture has proven to be largely inappropriate to addressing the dynamics of conflict. Most of the bilateral and multilateral funds have not looked at basic services and livelihoods programme rationales or funding decisions from a CPPB perspective. The static and inflexible nature of the MDTF and most long-term development funding has not allowed for context-specific reorientation of funding.
24. In the **governance** sector, we find that the rapid unfolding of decentralized expenditure and decision-making to State and sub-State levels in Southern Sudan has not been matched by sufficient support from the international community. Donors have been slow to examine the specific context of decentralized government and adapt strategies accordingly. This may reflect highly centralized donor structures and mindsets. Governance programmes, some of which were designed before GoSS was established, have been over-ambitious and over-technical, with too much emphasis on formal institutions and not enough attention given to linking this with customary law, despite the fact that the latter is itself in need of reform in some areas. There were also missed opportunities to provide stronger support to the management of public finances.
25. In supporting the **reform of justice and security institutions**, results have been more positive, particularly towards the end of the period covered by the evaluation as the teething problems subsided, and as community-based security initiatives took off (disarmament and conflict resolution). Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) were highly relevant to the main conflict factors, and Southern Sudan is a case study in the successes and challenges of these types of interventions, as these initiatives are particularly advanced. They have still been affected

by limited funding in relation to the needs (it is predominantly the United States of America, United Kingdom and Switzerland that support this sector, and special funds outside official development assistance (ODA) allocations have to be used).

26. There was an initial failure to appreciate the inextricable link between SSR and DDR, as well as poor sequencing between the reform of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and that of the police forces which still are unable to fully take over civil security. Donors have tended to focus on rule of law as a component of long-term state building, without specifically targeting areas affected by violence. We also detail the inability of the UNMIS to address issues of civilian security until very recently.
27. **Community reconciliation and peacebuilding** efforts have tended to be isolated events, rarely linked to national initiatives, and beset with problems of poor monitoring and follow-up. To some extent, international engagement has been guilty of poor preparation particularly with respect to fully understanding who the key players are, and what their motivations are in participating.
28. However, NGOs have learned from these experiences and moved increasingly towards longer-term engagement, including the involvement of local government. The absence of a formal justice system has created a significant barrier. Although the 2009 Local Government Act seeks to extend the formal justice system to county level, the unclear boundaries and tensions between this and customary law will remain for as long as there is insufficient training and integration of chiefs and sub-chiefs.
29. As regards **gender** equity, there are a number of valuable initiatives, accompanied by growing guidance among aid agencies. The evaluation concludes, however, that the significant effects of the conflict, the link between gender-related issues and wider violence, and the opportunities of gender-sensitive programming, are still not fully understood. Similarly, **capacity-building** was always a major priority, but remains focused on training rather than funding, and is very geographically focused. The assumption of donors that GoSS would be able to assume responsibility for effective local government in a relatively short period of time turned out to be a serious error.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

30. The transition from war to peace is not a technical exercise but a highly political process. A sophisticated and nuanced analysis of power relations, causes of vulnerability, and drivers of conflict and resilience indicators was largely missing from the design and execution of many aid programmes. In dynamic conflict settings, an analysis of the political economy of the transition must also be continuously revised to be useful. This was not done, as donors have instead tended to focus on administrative delivery and implementation. The **relevance** of many activities with regard to CPPB is thus questionable.
31. In part, the problem lies in the conceptual vacuum around 'statehood', as well as unclear identification of critical conditions that lead to peace, or to conflict, or the lack of sustained attention to them. Neither GoSS nor donors produced a convincing and consensual model of what Southern Sudan as a 'state' would look like in say, ten years. From the donors, the reticence to produce such a model may have been because of their commitment to the CPA and 'unity'. However it also reflected the tendency to approach the challenge purely as a technical exercise in capacity-building and service delivery.
32. When assessing **effectiveness** it is difficult to distinguish between the achievement of an activity, often formulated in sectoral terms, and the wider purpose of CPPB.

Unsurprisingly, projects evaluated as effective (UNHCR return and reintegration, Basic Services Fund (BSF), demining) have been less successful in building national capacity and in addressing subterranean factors such as marginalization of certain groups and the hardening of ethnic identities.

33. Bilateral interventions – notably the substantial United States programme – have provided the most effective support, based on closer and more frequent monitoring (facilitated by a sufficient number and continuity of staff on the ground). The more successful initiatives are those that have linked objectives in one sector to those in another, and hence have been able to follow through with tracing the cumulative effects of the various activities on conflict and peace.
34. In SSR there have been issues over delayed contracts, but SPLA transformation is now ‘on track’ in terms of the set objectives of donors. Nevertheless, public confidence in a credible army, rather than a predatory local force, is still a long way off. The role of donors has not been clear, mainly because GoSS conceived security in terms of the North/South relationship in which an ‘efficient and effective armed force’ was the stated priority. In particular, GoSS did not designate a clear role for donors in civilian disarmament campaigns that began from 2006 onwards.
35. **Efficiency** was to be facilitated through an extensive use of pooled funds and multilateral programmes, minimizing the number and divergence of interventions. However, shortcomings on delivery have led many donors to by-pass them, channelling increasing amounts of resources bilaterally. Yet despite the evidence provided in earlier evaluation literature on Southern Sudan, donors have continued investing in pooled funds, including the creation of new pooled funds to ‘compensate’ for the poor performance of earlier funds. Southern Sudan now has seven pooled fund mechanisms. The evaluation accepts that each pooled fund has its own dynamic and record of achievement, but broadly speaking transactional costs and disbursement delays have detracted from CPPB objectives.
36. In the governance sectors we found delays in project implementation emerging as a strong theme, often related to inefficiencies in United Nations procurement and contracting procedures. NGOs were mainly (but not always) credited with being faster and more efficient. We also note that capacity-building has been too slow and ill-targeted due to the piecemeal and uncoordinated approach adopted. In demining, for the most part, operations have been undertaken efficiently and effectively, contributing to the stabilization of respective areas, preparing the ground for follow-up humanitarian and development activities.
37. When considering **impact**, disregarding geographical variations and the ebb and flow of particular disputes, it is clear that the overall tensions have not decreased in Southern Sudan. Obviously international interventions cannot always address, or be responsible for, conflict deeply embedded in the fabric and history of a country that has known very little peace for two generations. Aid is, however, part of the political economy, and a tangible and sufficiently large resource to be of interest to all stakeholders, and hence is not neutral to this situation. Similarly because in some places it has clearly made a difference, it is possible to track some degree of contribution to the overall situation.
38. Building the capability and legitimacy of state authorities, whether through training and technical assistance or through the provision of basic services, should have had longer-term positive impacts on stabilization. However, on the basis of its own strategic conflict analysis, the evaluation holds to the central premise that there are some sectors – security, policing, rule of law – where international intervention is of greater priority than

basic services, because of the importance of these functions in the formation of a legitimate state, and for the reason (often stated by GoSS and community respondents) that the effectiveness and sustainability of services are compromised by insecurity.

39. Many of the activities under review are poorly linked into State and local government structures. This is an essential requisite of both the **sustainability** of results accomplished and the sustainability of peace, ultimately through an inclusive political settlement. Too much focus on Juba, and specific elements within Juba, may cause a real sense of marginalization in other areas. Donors could play a role in preventing the Khartoum-South relationship – which led to war – being duplicated in Juba-State-County relationships, but have not yet done so.
40. Before 2005, donors maintained good technical and political **coherence**, effectively managing and subordinating tensions and divergent agendas to a collective goal: supporting the negotiation of a just and lasting peace (through the CPA). In the years after the agreement was signed, however, the growing distraction of Darfur and the reassertion of individual donor agendas and approaches caused coherence to deteriorate.
41. The Sudan Consortium (three annual meetings to date) failed to function as a strategic coordination forum, turning into a pledging conference instead. Although the establishment of the Joint Donor Team (JDT) in Juba was a direct attempt to encourage coherence and alignment, decision-makers (including the diplomatic corps) remained in their separate country offices in Khartoum and maintained a (somewhat artificial) distinction between aid and political dialogue, the latter lying outside the remit of the JDT.
42. Finally, much of the above critique can be directed towards an over-use of ‘good practice’, particularly with respect to ownership and harmonization, at the expense of field knowledge and engagement that was required (and welcomed) from 2005 onwards. CPPB, in particular, requires in-depth knowledge and field presence, and there is no substitute for the continuity and trust built through individuals being on the ground for extended periods of time. While none of the prevailing priorities, such as harmonization, coordination and alignment, are contradictory to CPPB, the key consideration should always remain: are the interventions dealing adequately with the factors that lead to conflict? All activities and sector priorities should flow from the answer. The solutions to seemingly intractable problems are not easily found – and the evaluation does not purport to have found them – but at this critical moment in Southern Sudan’s history it is important to resist the ‘comfort zone’ of conventional approaches.

Recommendations

43. The following recommendations are targeted at donors primarily, but should also be taken into account by agencies and GoSS.

⇒ *Conflict analysis*

44. **Recommendation 1:** Ensure that revised and new programmes are always preceded by a conflict analysis that links wider dynamics to those specific to the area of operation. This should include a mapping of ethnic and political fault lines, a set of scenarios of likely events in the near future, and their implications for the programme. The design of logframes for multi-location programmes should be broken down to the specifics of State or sub-State indicators based on such a conflict analysis.
45. **Recommendation 2:** Framing interventions in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding is to be encouraged in environments such as Southern Sudan. The Utstein Palette and categories provide a useful tool for donors planning to intervene to

understand the spread and reach of CPPB across all types of interventions. However they should not be used as the ‘conflict lens’ for planning and evaluation, they serve to enhance the perception of the range of instruments available. The ‘lens’ can only come from a nuanced understanding of the causes of conflict, and the relation that links aid outcomes and these causes. As factors and causes of conflict can be affected by interventions in different categories of the Utstein Palette, it is advisable to plan, monitor and evaluate interventions according to the critical factors identified, not to the CPPB categories, nor to sectoral definitions.

46. **Recommendation 3:** Conflict analysis should not lead to separate universally applicable principles of programming, but rather be referred to continually over the programming cycle. For example in analysing the political economy of an area of activity (geographic and/or sectoral), agencies should give due consideration to the manner in which a local dispute can be manipulated for wider political gains by elites. Balance and representation are generally desirable, but need to be checked against the wider dynamics of the country. Overall, considerations of efficiency and accountability should give equal weight to institutional compliance to guidelines and procedures, as to responsiveness to conflict factors. An intervention that is fully compliant with internal guidelines but does not respond to local conditions should be rated as performing poorly, and needing change.

⇒ *Three Areas and oil*

47. **Recommendation 4:** Reach agreement on all outstanding issues regarding full implementation of the CPA wealth-sharing provisions. This includes significantly upgrading GoSS’s capacity regarding oil sector management and capacity at both Juba and State levels. Transparency over oil contracts and revenues should include commissioning an audit of the oil sector.
48. **Recommendation 5:** Provide increased technical and advisory assistance to revitalize the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) Wealth Sharing Committee in order for it to perform its mandate better and serve as a constant check on implementation of CPA provisions.
49. **Recommendation 6:** Likewise, help revitalize the AEC Three Areas Committee in order for it to perform its mandate better and serve as a constant check on implementation of CPA provisions. Also re-enable the Three Areas’ Donor Working Group.

⇒ *Funding mechanisms*

50. **Recommendation 7:** Invest in monitoring the changing dynamics in the different States of Southern Sudan at regular intervals and ensure that chosen funding mechanisms are sufficiently flexible to respond to these changes. Although multi-year commitments should be encouraged, the disbursement of these funds – whether bilateral, multilateral or through pooled funds – should be dependent on at least bi-annual (twice yearly) updates of events on the ground.
51. **Recommendation 8:** Always monitor pooled funds for CPPB as well as more conventional output/impact indicators. Sustained impact on youth employment/livelihoods should be a ‘cross-cutting’ theme introduced as a key indicator in all programmes funded through pooled mechanisms.

⇒ *Socio-economic development*

52. **Recommendation 9:** Allocate major resources towards creating and maintaining livelihoods programmes for young men who are currently too easily drawn into criminal activity. As well as vocational training and improvements in access to higher education

(also for women), this might include, for instance, imposing a local employment quota on all construction programmes undertaken, either by government or international agencies.

53. **Recommendation 10:** In the most conflict-affected States, work closely with local (State and county) authorities in assessing and addressing security priorities before access to basic services can be realized. This might involve, for instance, follow-up programmes to disarmament, a focus on the building of a trained and credible police force, the building of roads, and programmes targeting youth. Which of these interventions should be prioritized – and how these programmes should be implemented in each State – should be based on a thorough dialogue not only with local government but also with civil society, including local chiefs.
54. **Recommendation 11:** In the demining sector, reduce parallel or overlapping mandates within the institutions concerned. The Southern Sudan Demining Commission should be given a clear and strategic mandate for mine action as part of a transitional hand-over phase from the United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO). Integrating demining into the development portfolio should be discouraged, since this is likely to reduce the required flexibility to respond to short-term needs. Continue funding demining and stock pile destruction through specific budget lines.

⇒ *Governance and rule of law*

55. **Recommendation 12:** Focus capacity-building and support to decentralized levels of government and increase the level of performance monitoring. At the same time, further encourage a medium-term capacity ‘provision’ and technical assistance programme that uses civil service skills from neighbouring countries, and ensure adequate funding for at least five to ten years.
56. **Recommendation 13:** Ensure that the urgent training of the judiciary at State and sub-State levels is always in tandem with dialogue with chiefs and those responsible for customary law. There should be a consistently applied procedure to ensure that the parameters of responsibility for each party are mutually understood and in accordance with the country Constitution. In particular, this applies to gender equity.
57. **Recommendation 14:** Enable traditional authority (chiefs) to address root causes of conflict (including disputes over land or bride wealth) at their customary courts by providing capacity-building programmes for these courts.

⇒ *Justice and security*

58. **Recommendation 15:** Develop a common donor strategy that links DDR and SSR in a more robust fashion, including the issue of how to promote greater national ownership.
59. **Recommendation 16:** In order to promote accountability and transparency in decision-making and operational law enforcement, support the development of effective oversight mechanisms to monitor the security agencies. Such mechanisms should include civil society groups.

⇒ *Civilian protection*

60. **Recommendation 17:** Where civilian disarmament is carried out, there should be three preconditions: i) a full consultation with communities concerned; ii) mechanisms in place for civilian oversight and monitoring of the armed services; and iii) plans in place for incentives and rewards – for example, community services and livelihoods programmes. Donors should be involved in all three of these.

61. **Recommendation 18:** Strongly encourage the United Nations Security Council to strengthen the civilian protection mandate of UNMIS and its operational strength to fulfil the mandate. This would be through, for instance, creating a rapid response capability for conflict-prone areas and establishing a comprehensive civilian protection and conflict monitoring system. This should include the deployment of more human rights officers across Southern Sudan, especially in disputed border areas and areas prone to frequent communal conflict, and the provision of regular public reporting on human rights violations.

⇒ *Civil society*

62. **Recommendation 19:** In recognizing the importance of decentralization and development of civil society for long-term CPPB, develop and apply norms to ensure that International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) activity provides better support both to government and Sudanese NGOs.

⇒ *Gender*

63. **Recommendation 20:** Provide long-term support for gender mainstreaming in governance. This should include gender responsive policies and legislation aimed at reducing/ending gender-based discrimination, and a systematic strategy and guidelines for integration and participation of women in governance. For example, GoSS should be encouraged to establish committees and structures that involve women in the promotion of gender equity in land matters and their greater representation on land committees. Support should be given to national processes that collect gender-disaggregated data that can be used to assess progress.

⇒ *Local peacebuilding*

64. **Recommendation 21:** Ensure that local peacebuilding initiatives are linked to development inputs to consolidate solutions reached. This implies the use of ‘do no harm’ tests, especially in conflict areas. Efforts should be made to encourage greater female involvement in peace committees.

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

AEC	Assessment and Evaluation Commission
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPPB	Conflict prevention and peacebuilding
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
GOSS	Government of Southern Sudan
JDT	Joint Donor Team
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NGO	non-governmental organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SPLA	Sudan's People's Liberation Army
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNMAO	United Nations Mine Action Office
UNMIS	United Nations Missions in Sudan