

ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT 2010



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Evaluation Findings

This year's Annual Evaluation Report provides an analysis of 20 evaluations completed in 2010. These cover 24 ongoing operations, or 13 percent of WFP's global programme of work.

Country portfolio evaluations provided insights into the extent to which WFP was aligned with and strategically positioned in the context where it worked. The portfolios were found to be a reasonably good fit with government policies, sector strategies and the work of partners. However, alignment did not automatically result in synergies between WFP operations and the efforts of other stakeholders; this would require more strategic decision-making and subsequent planning. A number of factors played a role in determining WFP's strategies in a country: evidence from needs assessments showed better performance and greater usefulness than the perpetually weak monitoring systems, and funding – the model and levels – drove much of what WFP does and how.

In terms of portfolio performance and results, the country portfolio and operation evaluations provided mutually reinforcing results:

- WFP's typical strength in the area of relief – delivered through general food distribution, food for work in lieu of general distributions, and contributions to grain banks – was reconfirmed, making strong contributions to attaining Strategic Objective 1, at least in the area of saving lives.
- Strategic Objectives 1, 2 and 3 – on protecting and rebuilding lives and livelihoods, and disaster preparedness work – hinge largely on the performance of food for work. Overall, evaluations continued to show shortfalls in this programme activity, which is scaled back considerably when programmes are underfunded.
- In addressing chronic hunger – Strategic Objective 4 – school feeding continued to be WFP's other flagship programme, alongside its relief work. Evaluations reaffirmed that school feeding helped increase enrolment, attendance and attainment rates. Impact evaluations generated evidence to demonstrate that school feeding's effectiveness levelled off when children reached an age where their income-earning potential outweighed the value of schooling and the school meal. The evaluations, in particular those of impact, stressed the importance of joint efforts to improve schooling overall.
- Nutrition programmes, the other main programme activity under Strategic Objective 4, struggled to demonstrate results, in part because of small programme sizes related to overall needs, and because of difficulties in measuring outcomes.

WFP demonstrated its ability to cope well in difficult operating environments. Many more evaluations highlighted areas for improvement that lie within WFP's control: increased focus of operations, and better planning and performance management. The model, levels, predictability and timeliness of funding were held responsible for many of the successes and shortcomings of WFP's operational performance and results.

Evaluation at WFP

The Office of Evaluation continued to invest time, effort and resources in improving the quality, and thus credibility and usefulness, of evaluations. These efforts including building its human resources – through adding evaluation experts to the team, developing skills and knowledge, and creating focus groups for professional exchange and development – and its tools, primarily through the Evaluation Quality Assurance System. In addition, investments were made in increasing the learning from evaluation through the organization of learning events, the upgrading of evaluation pages on WFP's website, and the production of evaluation syntheses that make lessons more accessible and easier to use.

INTRODUCTION

1. This report¹ is presented in two parts. The first synthesizes observations and lessons learned from evaluations completed in 2010, concluding with recommendations for consideration by WFP senior management and the Board. The second describes efforts over the past year to continue improving the quality and usefulness of WFP's evaluations.

EVALUATION FINDINGS

2. This Annual Evaluation Report (AER) covers 20 evaluations completed in 2010: 3 country portfolio evaluations (CPEs), 15 operation evaluations and 2 impact evaluations. CPEs and operation evaluations, including 8 decentralized evaluations, covered 19 countries and 47 operations, which overall represented about 25 to 30 percent of WFP's work. However, these numbers include older operations within CPEs – the percentage coverage of WFP's ongoing work in 2009–2010 was much smaller, with 24 operations covered, or 13 percent of WFP's work.
3. As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, the geographic representation in terms of number of countries and number of operations is not representative of WFP's global distribution. The findings of these evaluations should not therefore be considered as representative of all WFP operations. The high number of operations from the Regional Bureau in Dakar (ODD) is due to the bureau's strong interest in evaluation, as reflected in its demand for evaluations managed by the Office of Evaluation (OE) and conducted at the decentralized level. Annex I provides a list of evaluations completed in 2010.

Figure 1: Number of Countries





Figure 2: Number of Operations



ODS: Regional Bureau Sudan

ODD: Regional Bureau Dakar (West Africa)

ODPC: Regional Bureau Panama City (Latin America and the Caribbean)

ODJ: Regional Bureau Johannesburg (Southern, Eastern and Central Africa)

ODC: Regional Bureau Cairo (Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe)

ODB : Regional Bureau Bangkok (Asia)

¹ This report was prepared by Caroline Heider, Director, Office of Evaluation, with inputs from Julie MacKenzie, consultant, and Cinzia Cruciani, evaluation research assistant.

Country Portfolio Evaluations

4. The three CPEs completed in 2010 brought to five the total number of this type of evaluation carried out since it was introduced in the 2008–2009 biennium. These evaluations focus on all operations and activities that WFP undertakes in one country over a period of about five years. They address three questions, with the aim of supporting WFP's efforts in developing country strategies that ensure implementation of the Strategic Plan (2008–2013):
- How well did WFP position itself strategically and align with government and partner strategies?
 - How did WFP make choices, and how strategic were these?
 - How did the portfolio perform, and what were its results?
5. The CPEs included in this report are for Chad, Mali and Nepal. Among these, the Nepal portfolio was by far the largest in terms of number of beneficiaries, and was almost equal to Chad in terms of food distributed, measured in metric tons (mt). Mali had a higher average annual number of beneficiaries than Chad, but distributed a much smaller amount of food and had the lowest direct expenses among the three countries. Both Chad and Mali had to do deal with high fluctuations in beneficiary numbers over the evaluation period, while the number increased more or less steadily in Nepal. Table 1 provides annual figures and averages for these three parameters. Fact sheets providing additional information on portfolio activities, main donors and partners, and a time line for funding are given in Annex II.

TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF COUNTRY PORTFOLIOS								
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Annual average
Beneficiaries								
Chad	202 551	365 564	703 356	733 147	608 611	791 502	884 706	612 777
Mali	728 379	781 845	676 055	1 047 704	989 903	368 882	503 116	727 983
Nepal	801 044	1 036 580	1 011 038	1 629 852	1 357 311	1 665 623	1 909 153	1 344 372
Food distributed (mt)								
Chad	8 788	28 730	49 097	54 139	65 773	64 630	90 587	51 678
Mali	9 690	13 002	17 158	23 474	23 044	11 842	11 179	15 627
Nepal	41 711	41 075	40 969	51 499	52 462	54 509	62 666	49 270
Direct expenses (US\$ million)								
Chad	6	37	50	55	72	95	130	64
Mali	6	8	17	17	13	14	11	12
Nepal	16	21	17	25	37	44	53	30

Source: Evaluation reports

⇒ *Alignment and strategic positioning*

6. *Alignment and coordination with governments.* The portfolios in all three countries were a reasonably good fit with government policies and sector objectives in the broadest sense. However, one evaluation described this alignment as “passive” in that the portfolio fit in with the national policy framework but did not focus on the areas where WFP could be most strategic. In Mali, where national policies for school feeding, nutrition, health, and HIV and AIDS were evolving, WFP had decisive influence on their formulation, and contributed to strengthening national capacities in these areas. This was not achieved to the same extent in Chad and Nepal, where opportunities for WFP to leverage its position for influencing national discussion and building institutional capacity were not fully seized. In situations where government priorities shifted, the evaluations found that WFP’s efforts to adjust its focus were more problematic. This was the case, for instance, in Nepal when government efforts were redirected from dealing with the internal conflict – for which WFP’s portfolio focused on short-term food security – to medium-term livelihood recovery.
7. *Alignment and coordination with partners.* WFP’s country portfolios were well integrated with United Nations country teams and United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) and were consistent with partners’ priorities. Where synergies were achieved with partners, they allowed WFP’s food assistance to play an important complementary role, supporting and creating social and economic assets for longer-term development activities. However, evaluations also found gaps between international organizations’ plans and agreements at the national level, and the implementation and coordination of assistance at the subnational and community levels: geographic separation of implementation areas – ostensibly to avoid duplication of benefits – limited the feasibility of attaining synergies among operations. Nonetheless, there were examples of positive coordination with partners, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

⇒ *Making strategic choices*

8. *External factors.* WFP operates in contexts that significantly limit the options, requiring it to make strategic choices. In all three countries, these choices were restricted by one or more of the following factors: i) a volatile political and security situation, which made planning, food delivery and monitoring difficult and risky; ii) geographic and climatic challenges to logistics; iii) the food and fuel price crises; iv) refugee inflows; and v) high turnover of government staff and weak institutions. At the global level, WFP’s strategic decision has been to stay engaged with partners in such difficult circumstances, which is fully in line with its mandate and strong reputation for delivering even under the most difficult circumstances. In Chad, WFP programmes were implemented regardless of rebel attacks; in Mali, WFP worked in the most remote areas and has been asked to go to the northern zones as the first international agency to re-enter that area; and in Nepal, WFP assisted people facing food insecurity behind the line of conflict, where government programmes could not reach.
9. *Analysis.* Strategic choices call for analytical underpinnings. All three country offices were congratulated on their efforts in food security analysis. Choices about the Mali and Nepal portfolios were based on frequent food security analyses, which influenced geographic targeting and the composition of programme activities. In Mali, changes in data trends were followed by adjustments to the relevant programme. In Chad, however, although there was a clear link between findings from a significant range of assessments

and the portfolio's geographic targeting, the link between findings and the development of response strategies was less evident. For example, all nutrition assessments of Chadian populations in the eastern and Sahelian zones confirmed that they reached the emergency level for global acute malnutrition (GAM). WFP did not leverage these insights into the nutrition status of the population sufficiently to influence national discussion or partners' decision-making for the development of response strategies, nor did WFP use them in making its own strategic choices.

10. *Consequences of funding.* The funding model and associated funding levels affected design choices. The large amount of resources available to assist Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad translated into a greater presence of partners and the possibility for an integrated response. This situation contrasted with limited donor priority for other parts of Chad, which affected programme and partnership options. In Mali, nutrition activities were transferred from the country programme (CP) to the protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) because the resources available for the PRRO provided a prospect of better implementation and results – and not because synergies among programme activities would be improved by the transfer. In Nepal too, funding and programming moved in step: funding for programme activities such as food for education (FFE), mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN) and food for work (FFW) was adequate when these were part of operations that addressed needs in conflict-affected areas. However, once shifted from the PRRO to a development project (DEV) or CP – after the peace accord was signed – these programme activities were seen less favourably and not funded at the same level.
11. *Internal synergies versus duplication of benefits.* All CPEs highlighted the importance of applying a programmatic approach in which the various activities form a comprehensive programme with in-built synergies among them. In one instance, corporate guidance was criticized when it aimed to avoid a duplication of benefits. Instead, the evaluators suggested that to attain synergies and better results it was necessary to have an integrated programme that allowed people to benefit from a combination of WFP programme activities.
12. *Monitoring.* As in previous years, there continued to be problems with monitoring. In Mali, monitoring had major weaknesses: i) indicators, where they existed, were often unrealistic, had no reference system, and were too complicated, numerous or expensive to realize; ii) funding for monitoring was limited – Mali had very low direct expenses (Table 1); iii) WFP relied on partners that lacked the time, competencies or means to carry out monitoring; and iv) in the absence of meaningful monitoring data, information could not be used to readjust strategy in the light of findings. The evaluations of the Chad and Nepal portfolios generated similar findings, especially that only limited data were generated to assess outcomes and impacts. These limitations affect the extent to which monitoring systems can generate meaningful performance data that, in turn, can and should be used in making strategic choices about the portfolio – solving problems, prioritizing activities, etc.

⇒ *Portfolio performance and results*

13. *Attainment of objectives and impacts.* The problems with monitoring systems observed in the previous paragraph made it difficult for evaluation teams to assess outcomes and impacts with the desirable rigour. However, all three evaluations generated anecdotal and qualitative feedback on the outcomes of WFP operations, which was generally positive:

- **Relief.** Evaluations shone light on the different requirements and success rates of WFP's relief and recovery interventions. The consensus was overwhelmingly positive on the relief side. WFP moved food effectively and in a timely manner under very difficult logistics circumstances during the Chad emergency, achieving more than 90 percent of annual food distributions. These operations attained their life-saving objectives and stabilized the population's nutrition status below emergency levels. In Nepal, stakeholders recognized WFP as one of the most important emergency response agencies precisely because of its geographic reach, logistics capacity and ability to mobilize resources quickly. In more protracted relief situations, namely the refugee camps in Nepal, the evaluation found that target GAM rates had not been reached, for a variety of reasons.
- **Food for education.** School feeding was heralded as a flagship programme in Mali and Chad. In all three countries, the evaluations found that school feeding had contributed to increasing enrolment rates, particularly of girls. In Chad, these increases were as high as 200 percent, while in Mali the initial increases were 20 percent and then declined the longer school feeding was in place. In Nepal, the data available allowed comparison between the baseline situation and two subsequent years, both of which showed increased enrolment. However, all three evaluations cautioned that these increases in enrolment rates could not be attributed solely to school feeding. Particularly in Chad, the need to increase enrolment is great, and government efforts focus on expanding the education sector without necessarily being able to invest in improving the quality of education. In all three countries, the number of school-age children reached by the WFP school feeding programme is relatively small, so a national-level impact would be difficult to attain or attribute to WFP school feeding. Qualitative outcomes were attained in terms of ensuring that school feeding is reflected in government strategies, and capacities for implementing school feeding programmes were developed. The importance of seeking and ensuring positive synergies with other activities was highlighted in Chad, mirroring findings from the impact evaluations of school feeding.
- **Food for work.** The extent to which this programme activity was able to attain its objectives was affected by frequent underfunding and scaling back of implementation. Particularly in Chad, FFW aimed to assist the Chadian population – host communities and internally displaced persons (IDPs) – but was scaled back to an extent where it remained ineffective. An unintended side-effect of this reduction in implementation was an increase in tension between the Chadian population and refugees. In Mali and Nepal, FFW implementation was also reduced, but not to the same extent. The evaluations found that in both countries this programme activity met its short-term objective: addressing immediate food insecurity and thus reducing negative coping strategies. In both cases, FFW was found to be a useful, albeit small, input to larger rural development programmes that were designed, managed and implemented under the purview of NGOs. Positive outcomes included creating livelihood assets, small-scale infrastructure and tree plantations. In both countries, distinctions were made between household and community assets, with the latter requiring that equity in construction and use be addressed.
- **Nutrition.** Nutrition activities faced a number of challenges that affected their effectiveness. Upstream problems included lack of prioritization and limited staff expertise, which hindered funding; and lack of clarity regarding where WFP's

nutrition strengths lay – in emergency relief or longer-term recovery. Other weaknesses were difficulties of coordination with the Government, lack of nutrition education for relevant actors, limited analysis of the causes of malnutrition, a need for geographic consolidation, and the stand-alone or localized nature of nutrition activities with no reference to past or future operations. Results were difficult to measure, either because baseline and regular monitoring data did not exist – responsibility for collecting these data lies with governments and other partners – or because the programmes were too small to make a significant contribution to improving the nutrition status of target populations. This finding is important in light of the Sahel crisis, during which people in Chad and Mali faced serious food insecurity and malnutrition.

14. *Funding.* All reports highlighted the important correlation between resource levels and effectiveness. Chronic funding deficits in Mali meant that planned numbers of beneficiaries or deliveries were rarely achieved, reaching only 50 percent in both cases. The evaluators warned that launching operations without confirmed funding would continue to seriously affect performance. At the relief end of the scale, the life-saving and nutrition impact of WFP’s interventions to support refugees in Chad was made possible by a good resource level and complementary services from partners. Conversely, the few resources devoted to non-food items were among factors found to have limited FFW effectiveness. In Nepal, WFP’s efforts to address causal factors of chronic food insecurity were constrained by the nature of funding: short-term, unsecured and unpredictable.
15. *Geographic and programme spread.* Another factor bearing on effectiveness and impact, particularly in the area of livelihood recovery, was thin geographic spread with a high number of activities. In Chad, the size and complexity of the programme made a coordinated technical approach to activities impossible. In Mali, WFP’s decision to resist widening its geographic coverage was commended: consolidated programming in fewer districts enabled better synergy among programme activities and promoted more efficient use of resources. In Nepal, greater geographic concentration was recommended, with more focused nutrition interventions to enable measurement of their impact.
16. *Sustainability, ownership and government capacity.* Evaluations recognized that the outlook for sustainability of WFP-sponsored programme activities is proportional to the integration of WFP activities into the priorities of government ministries. This, in turn, implies government ownership and capacity – including allocated budget – to assume responsibility. Against those measures, the prospects for sustainability in Chad were weak, because of insufficient government capacity and commitment to take over from WFP. In Nepal, on the other hand, FFE activities were likely to be sustainable because they were integrated within the Ministry of Education, but concerns arose over the sustainability of MCHN outcomes, due to weak government capacity, and of the food security information system, due to unlikely government funding. In all three portfolios, WFP is undertaking capacity development for the government, to create the conditions for ownership and sustainability. To date, these efforts appear to have been limited, and their results have yet to be seen.

Operation Evaluations

17. This section reports on 15 evaluations of operations, 8 of which were decentralized.² The categories covered include five CPs, three emergency operations (EMOPs) and seven PRROs. As such, the evaluations were not fully representative of WFP's ongoing portfolio of operations worldwide: DEVs and special operations (SOs) were not covered, and the percentage distribution shows a relative overrepresentation of CPs (Table 2). The overall number of operation evaluations has increased significantly since 2008 and 2009; however it continues to be too small to provide a statistically valid sample size.³ Valuable insights can nonetheless be drawn from these evaluations, and are presented in this section.

Active operations in 2009			Evaluation of operations completed in 2010		
Programme category	Number	Distribution across categories (%)	Number	Distribution across categories (%)	% of operations evaluated
CP	27	14	5	33	19
DEV	25	13	-	-	-
EMOP	35	19	3	20	9
PRRO	66	35	7	47	11
SO	36	19	-	-	-
TOTAL	189	100	15	100	8

Source: WFP Annual Performance Report 2009

18. Food for work was a component of 13 operations, nutrition of 12, FFE of 11, general food distribution (GFD) of 10, and food for training (FFT) of 9. Table 3 provides an overview of the components, by operation. On average, each operation included four major programme activities. More detail on each operation is provided in Annex III.

² Decentralized evaluations are commissioned by country offices or regional bureaux, using the Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) templates, technical notes and guidance, with oversight and support from OE as appropriate.

³ A minimum of 30 operation evaluations is required to provide a statistically valid sample from which lessons can be drawn for the portfolio as a whole.

TABLE 3: MAIN PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES						
Country	Category	FFE	FFT	FFW	GFD	Nutrition ^a
OE evaluations						
Colombia	PRRO	√	√	√	√	√
Egypt	CP	√	√	√		
Ethiopia	PRRO			√	√	√
Ghana	CP	√				√
Occupied Palestinian Territory	PRRO	√	√	√	√	
Sudan	EMOP	√	√	√	√	√
Timor-Leste	PRRO	√		√	√	√
Decentralized evaluations						
Burundi	PRRO	√	√	√	√	√
Guinea	CP	√	√	√		√
Mauritania	PRRO			√	√	√
Myanmar	EMOP 10748				√	
Myanmar	EMOP 10749		√	√ ^b	√ ^c	√
Senegal	PRRO	√	√	√	√	√
United Republic of Tanzania	CP	√	√	√		√
Zambia	CP	√		√		√
TOTAL		11	9	13	10	12

Note: The Plurinational State of Bolivia is not included as its project is under a trust fund undertaking different activities (Annex III).

^a Includes MCHN, therapeutic and supplementary feeding, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis beneficiaries

^b Includes cash for work

^c In addition to food in kind, modalities include cash, food/milling vouchers, etc.

⇒ Operation design

19. *Relevance and appropriateness.* In all cases, operations were judged to be broadly relevant to beneficiary needs. A few evaluations spoke of relevance at the time of design, noting that needs changed during implementation. In the Sudan, for example, the biggest threat to the appropriateness of WFP's assistance was the growing gap between needs and assistance, which was driven in part by increasingly obsolete distribution lists. In Colombia, the inclusion of non-registered IDPs, indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities was hailed as moving with the times, while in the United Republic of Tanzania, it was felt that WFP could create greater synergies among components by targeting on a district-wide basis. Not all operations appeared to have addressed lessons from earlier evaluations.

20. *Alignment with policies and strategies.* Consistency with national priorities and coherence with WFP policies and strategies were good. A couple of minor issues arose from a shift of comparative focus in WFP's activities, or from having overlooked a number of implementation considerations. It was judged important to involve beneficiaries and government authorities from the outset, in the conception, implementation and monitoring of activities. There were positive and negative examples regarding achievement of this. The benefits of integrating activities at the geographic and targeted population levels was also underlined, as was the importance of strategies for local-level

development and for maximizing complementarity between relief and recovery activities in a given location.

21. *Programme design: logical frameworks.* As in the 2009 AER, evaluations found room for improvement in programme design, mostly related to difficulties with logical frameworks. There were examples of indicators that were missing; unable to capture the depth of programme impact; considered impractical; or required from a corporate perspective but inappropriate at the time of design and implementation of the operation. The need for a results chain linking output indicators with outcome indicators was highlighted, as was the utility of a risk management section. In one instance, the lack of clear objectives in the project document led to confusion. In another, the artificial separation of similar activities between two programmes led to differentiated implementation for the same set of beneficiaries and the same objectives. The importance of a strong logical framework that can evolve with the programme was positively demonstrated in Ethiopia, where design of the relief component allowed expansion in response to economic or climatic shocks, and design of the productive safety net component allowed for variability in the balance between cash and food.
22. *Programme design: dispersion.* At least 5 of the 15 operations embraced a large number of activities, which complicated management and monitoring. Some activities were also considered to be spread too thinly geographically, undermining outputs and outcomes. Such dispersion can stem from weaknesses in operational conception – the lack of a strategy for local- or village-level development that integrates relief and recovery interventions to reduce food insecurity and malnutrition. In one case, thin geographic coverage was found to have had an impact on perceptions, leading provincial and district authorities to view WFP programmes as add-ons rather than ongoing interventions that warranted their support. It was felt that intensifying coverage in fewer synergistic operations and fewer contiguous geographic areas would heighten impact, strengthen programme linkages, and allow more focused capacity development of government and other partners.

⇒ *Operational implementation*

23. *Synergies/integration.* A clear message from ten evaluations was the need for greater integration of activities to maximize outcomes. Combining productive safety net, relief and targeted supplementary feeding in a single PRRO was not enough if the links among the components were not clearly drawn, for example, by making explicit the complementarity between targeted supplementary feeding and GFD as parts of both productive safety net and emergency relief interventions. Programme components needed to be connected and complementary so that beneficiaries could overcome food insecurity through multiple avenues. To this end, multisectoral approaches were necessary, with strong communication across sectors, and synergies that reduce the duplication of efforts. In one instance, a lack of synergies produced piecemeal execution and reduced the probability of positive effects. In another case, it was considered that targeting the most food-insecure areas on a district-wide basis would facilitate linkages among education, agriculture, income generation and health activities. The common call was for a more holistic approach, including integration with systems through which government social services are delivered and with other interventions and partners operating in the target areas.
24. *Policy dialogue.* At least four evaluations found that WFP could leverage its position better in engaging government counterparts in senior-level policy dialogue. Such dialogue could help bring food security and hunger higher up on national agendas, assist a more

holistic approach by involving specialist institutional partners and confirm WFP's credentials as a partner for social safety nets.

25. *Funding.* Resources rarely met the estimated cost of an operation. Only one, an EMOP, was well-funded. Evaluations recounted reduced, delayed or uncertain funding, and serious ongoing or worsening deficits in the order of 30 to 40 percent annually. Such shortfalls were said to be frequent, with common consequences: delayed delivery of food to beneficiaries; negative impact on households' capacity to protect assets; and heightened tension between the imperative for cost-effective food procurement and the benefits of local procurement for home-grown school feeding. Unpredictable funding also led to WFP not releasing finances to its partners on time. A number of evaluations suggested solutions, such as raising funds with the private sector in the country concerned, if it was a middle-income country, or consolidating WFP operations geographically, reducing the scope of activities and using an integrated partnership approach. One evaluation felt strongly that the strategy of maximum coverage should be abandoned; another urged that the scope of activities be adapted to the resources available.
26. *Logistics.* WFP's ability to deliver food in a timely way at the lowest cost is critical to the success of its operations. Emergency situations are the most public test, and great admiration was expressed for WFP's day-and-night leadership in complex logistics in the Myanmar EMOP. Generally, WFP excels in devising logistics solutions, even under multiple constraints.
27. *Monitoring.* As in previous years and as in the CPEs (paragraph 13), monitoring was criticized. In general, monitoring failed to generate data on outcomes and, to a lesser degree, impacts. Indicators in logical frameworks were largely output-based, too vague or too generic; replicated WFP corporate indicators without appropriate adaptation to the situation; or confused output indicators with baselines. An appropriate monitoring system had been developed in five cases, but even here the evaluators observed problems of data quality and the systems' underutilization in operation management and decision-making. Monitors lacked the necessary training, commissioned NGOs had no financial incentive to carry out the monitoring, reporting standards were overdemanding, or logistics means were lacking.
28. *Alternative programming.* Nine of the 15 evaluations mentioned that WFP operations were practising, testing or considering alternatives to in-kind food aid: cash, food vouchers, cash/food for work, and – in the Sudan – milling vouchers. In most countries, these experience were too new to allow evaluation of their effects. In Senegal, however, wider benefits were identified: the creation of a potential model for other sorts of social transfer; experience in making vouchers secure; and cooperation among WFP, local businesses and a commercial bank. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, cash- and voucher-based schemes were tested. In Zambia, several innovative approaches were implemented. These innovations had the potential to increase the timeliness and efficiency of delivery to beneficiaries, reduce costs, and maximize the impact of WFP resources beyond food assistance, to create a broader economic effect and support private markets. The new approaches also encourage local responsibility and move ownership and sustainability away from WFP into local hands. However, limited government capacity is a major constraint to implementation.

⇒ *Operational Results*

29. *Effectiveness.* Evaluations found positive outcomes in many instances:

- ***Relief through general food distribution and food for work.*** Ten of the 15 operations evaluated in 2010 included GFD and/or FFW, either as in-kind distributions or as contributions to emergency stocks managed at the community or national level. The evaluations universally found that WFP food distributions during emergencies addressed immediate needs, improved household food consumption, and mitigated the worst effects of crises. However, WFP corporate indicators for relief – GAM and child mortality rates – were not appropriate in all cases, and were rarely measured or reported. Relief was generally less effective in the protection of livelihoods, as it was too unpredictable, too late or too little to prevent negative coping strategies, which made rebuilding livelihoods after the shock even harder. Two evaluations made similar observations about assistance to returnees, where food assistance was provided for too short a time to help reintegration beyond the initial steps, such as re-establishing citizenship.
- ***Food for education.*** School feeding showed differing rates of success across the standard indicators of enrolment, attendance, completion, gender and learning. Most operation evaluations could not provide evidence of increased enrolment rates, owing to shortcomings in monitoring systems, both for the national-level education system and particularly for WFP operations. Nonetheless, a number of evaluations found school feeding to have had a positive influence on enrolment rates and, in some instances, attendance rates. In Egypt and Ghana, evaluations found positive effects on improving gender parity. Invariably, school feeding was popular with teachers, parents and governments, although such interest did not automatically translate into a willingness or ability to assume responsibility for operating the school feeding programme.
- ***Food for work.*** Evaluations reflected the short- and longer-term objectives of this programme activity, which included: i) addressing short-term food security and related food consumption, such as in Senegal, where the proportion of people consuming at least two meals per day increased from 40 to 70 percent; ii) substituting or supplementing household expenditure for food; iii) increasing human assets through training and community organization in Egypt; iv) providing an incentive to undertake difficult tasks in Guinea; v) helping to maintain social structures in Timor-Leste; and vi) contributing towards increasing the capacity of households and communities to rehabilitate or maintain assets in Zambia.
- ***Nutrition.*** As observed in the CPEs, measuring the effectiveness of nutrition interventions is difficult. Operation evaluations also had difficulties reporting results, some of which were unclear, while others were qualified. Shortcomings in nutrition programmes, particularly mother-and-child nutrition, have a negative effect on the benefits accruing to women. Results were not always linear: mothers' nutrition practices might have improved, but this did not necessarily mean that a reduction in stunting rates followed.

30. *Efficiency.* In a number of cases, programme efficiency was affected by frequent pipeline breaks, the quality of the food delivered, poor storage facilities, and lack of government ownership. Timeliness was variable almost everywhere, possibly inevitably so given the circumstances in which WFP works. Timor-Leste's experience offers a representative example: "Shortage of commodities, the relatively high costs of logistics,

limited human capacity in the new state, competition with other agencies for suitable staff, the need to import services and items, and the limited number of NGO partners have restricted the efficiency of the PRRO and added to costs.” In general, the evaluations did not generate strong insights into the efficiency of operations.

31. *Sustainability.* Evaluations differentiated between the sustainability of the outcomes – included in fewer evaluations – and the likelihood of programme activities continuing beyond WFP assistance. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, some of the assets built through FFW contributed to sustainable livelihood recovery, but there was no real evidence that the training conducted through FFT had created new sources of income for participants. Sustainability of the benefits of FFW in Senegal was linked to continuation of the asset creation activities without WFP support, along with the viability and beneficiary maintenance of the structures created; results were positive. The Timor-Leste evaluation observed that sustainability of results would depend on the quality of the activities and a number of contextual factors, and that activities to support government capacity development would be critical to maintaining achievements. In the Zambia CP, sustainability was found to be good regarding the educational benefits from the assistance to basic education component and the additional agricultural skills acquired by FFW participants. In many more evaluations, assessment of sustainability focused on the continuation of WFP-assisted programmes, were WFP to hand over responsibilities. In all of these cases, the key requirements cited were government capacity and funding. As expressed in the Egypt evaluation, it was therefore assessed that progress towards sustainability and the phasing out of food assistance would have to be incremental.

Impact Evaluations

32. Impact evaluations are a new type of evaluation at WFP. They probe deeper into the outcomes and impacts of specific programme activities to provide data and insights that cannot be collected otherwise.
33. In 2010, the impact evaluations focused on school feeding programmes, one in Kenya and one in Cambodia. Both covered operations implemented over the ten years prior to the evaluation, which were designed and approved before the adoption of WFP’s School Feeding Policy in 2009. The evaluations had the following objectives:
 - evaluating outcomes and impacts in relation to stated educational, gender and nutrition objectives;
 - evaluating outcomes and impacts in relation to WFP’s new social safety net objectives – which were not included in the programme design – and assessing the extent to which the programme has met or has the potential to meet these; and
 - identifying the changes needed to contribute optimally to the objectives of government, the WFP Strategic Plan (2008–2013) and the 2009 School Feeding Policy.

⇒ *Outcomes and impact*

34. *Education.* There was a striking similarity of overall findings between the two evaluations. School feeding promoted enrolment and more regular attendance, and helped reduce gender disparity. However, as a stand-alone intervention it did not automatically lead to improvement in performance – in Kenya yes, in Cambodia no – nor did it solve the problem of high attrition rates. There was evidence in Kenya of a delayed and lower overall drop-out rate from schools with meals compared with those without, but the value

of school meals was not sufficient to prevent the sudden 30 percent drop-out rate between grades 7 and 8. In Cambodia a similar significant drop-out from school occurred between grades 4 and 5. The causes of those patterns are wider than hunger or nutrition: school environment, household economy and children's role in it, and cultural values.

35. *Nutrition.* Nutritional effects were positive, but limited in their impact. In Kenya, the school meal accounted for a significant share of students' recommended daily allowances (RDAs) of nutritional intake, and was particularly helpful in contributing macronutrients, energy and protein to the diet. As such, it made a significant contribution to reducing hunger and improving nutritional intake, although only a very small percentage of children actually met or exceeded the RDA thresholds. However, the school meal did not compensate for inadequate diet at home, particularly in households that prepared less food when their children received meals at school. In Cambodia, school feeding had relatively limited effects on nutrition indicators such as weight, height or mid-upper arm circumference, although positive contributions of school meals on the weight of girls were noted.
36. *Value transfer.* WFP has traditionally designed school feeding interventions to combat hunger in children, improve nutrition and increase educational and learning outcomes. WFP's School Feeding Policy 2009 casts school feeding as a key element of value transfer programmes, enabling households to maintain livelihood assets and endure transitory shocks. WFP's interventions in Kenya illustrate these results: economic benefit to the household in terms of reduced need to purchase food – the value of school feeding represented up to 9 percent of household income; time freed for expanding income-earning activities; and reverse assistance to stem households when children graduate from school and obtain stable livelihoods. Similarly in Cambodia, the value of the on-site ration was estimated to represent up to 14 percent of annual household income, and that of the take-home ration up to nearly 26 percent, with take-home rations being better targeted towards lower-income groups. In Cambodia, school meals saved especially women's time, although – unlike in Kenya – the time saved was applied more to household chores than to income-generating activities.

⇒ *Factors explaining results*

37. *Role of contextual factors: outside WFP's control.* Economic, cultural and learning environment factors influence the potential of school feeding. In both countries, against a background of poverty and vulnerability, economic opportunity costs deter households from sending children to school. In both countries, there are cultural brakes: in Cambodia, the perception that education is more important for boys than for girls; and in Kenya, the perception of education as a threat to traditional values rather than a pathway to a better life. The low quality of education – shortages of qualified teachers, particularly women, and high student-to-teacher ratios – also counts, as does the physical infrastructure: availability of water, size and quality of classrooms, access to school books and supplies, physical security and the availability of latrines. School feeding cannot compensate for the negative effect that these factors have on enrolment, attendance rates and learning.
38. *Role of implementing factors: within WFP's control.* Both evaluations considered that WFP could improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its school feeding. In Kenya, it was felt that expansion of local and regional procurement of WFP food could significantly reduce the annual per-beneficiary cost of school meals. The Home-Grown School Feeding Programme was also seen as having potential to increase the value of food by promoting the community's integration into local education. In Cambodia, it was considered that targeting focused on household-level vulnerability criteria would increase the

effectiveness of school feeding by reaching the most vulnerable, where the value transfer would be significant. The evaluations also found that the monitoring system in Kenya could do more to identify weaknesses and channel this information into problem solving, while in Cambodia greater attention to design, community involvement and government commitment would yield better and more sustainable results.

39. *Importance of a clear objective.* The Cambodia evaluation provided evidence that on-site feeding and take-home rations produce different results in education, nutrition and value transfer. It is therefore important for WFP to define and prioritize the purpose that school feeding should serve, rather than trying to attain a multitude of objectives at the same time. In Cambodia, take-home rations had potential to function as a social safety net and were an incentive for poor families to keep children, especially girls, in school. On-site feeding served nutrition purposes and raised enrolment figures. Both modalities worked, each in its own way. In Kenya, take-home rations or fortified biscuits cost more per beneficiary than on-site feeding, which had a significant, albeit intangible, added value in terms of the social capital generated by communal sharing of food with classmates and teachers.

⇒ *Lessons*

40. The key finding was that the goals of providing health and education through school meals cannot be met with food alone. School meals need to be combined with other interventions that address the school, home and community constraints to learning, health and livelihood. This finding reaffirms the importance of the Essential Package,⁴ a comprehensive, integrated and cross-sectoral approach that includes collaboration with government institutions and partners. The findings in both countries raise questions as to whether this approach is actually being implemented in recipient communities; recommendations indicate that far more needs to be done in this respect.

Conclusions and Recommendations

41. The evaluations completed in 2010 generate a number of important insights, which are summarized in this section. Although the sample of operations was small and not representative, and challenges continued with monitoring data, the findings are useful as early indications of WFP's performance in attaining its Strategic Objectives.
42. *Enhancing synergies.* The evaluations found that WFP operations were generally well aligned with the policies and strategies of government and partners. However, this alignment did not automatically result in synergies between WFP operations and the efforts of other stakeholders working towards the same goal:
- Synergies with others' programmes and within WFP's own programmes require deliberate design and implementation choices. Indications are that alignment and synergies are easier to attain in plans than in communities, where the well-coordinated delivery of a variety of benefits would promise more effective and efficient results.
 - Developing greater synergies among WFP programme activities requires geographic consolidation of programmes in fewer areas within countries. The 2010

⁴ Developed by WFP and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in 2005, the Essential Package is a set of targeted non-food interventions designed to complement school meals in promoting the health and nutrition of schoolchildren: potable water; adequate sanitation; school gardens; fuel-efficient stoves; deworming; malaria and HIV/AIDS awareness; and other health, nutrition and hygiene messaging activities.

- evaluations observed a number of positive examples of improving the focus of WFP's work.
- Developing synergies among programme activities requires that WFP review how the composite of benefits from different activities will ensure adequate assistance, without providing more than necessary to meet households' food security needs.
43. *Saving lives and protecting livelihoods.* The findings of the evaluations reconfirmed WFP's strength in attaining Strategic Objective 1. Relief operations were generally well implemented, reaching the intended number of beneficiaries with the planned rations. In particular, WFP's performance was commended in the Chad refugee operations and the Sudan/Darfur EMOP for IDPs. These results were often thanks to WFP's logistics capacities and appropriate funding levels, which demonstrated donor confidence in WFP's role and abilities. Most evaluations measured attainments in terms of household food security and food consumption scores, and less in terms of GAM or child mortality rates, which are agreed corporate indicators. A second goal under this Strategic Objective, that of protecting livelihoods, was more difficult to attain as assistance was not always sufficient or timely and predictable enough to prevent negative coping strategies or to rebuild livelihoods after shocks.
 44. *Preventing acute hunger.* Under Strategic Objective 2, a number of evaluations saw positive contributions towards developing government capacities for vulnerability assessments and mapping. The 2010 evaluations also covered WFP's best-known safety nets operation in Ethiopia, where the PRRO provides considerable inputs to the government-owned programme. In the area of disaster risk reduction, the CPE in Mali highlighted positive examples where FFW had contributed to efforts to stem desertification. However, FFW generally suffered most from shortfalls in resources, which in turn limited results.
 45. *Restoring and rebuilding lives and livelihoods.* Under Strategic Objective 3, only two evaluations covered WFP's assistance to returnees. Both raised concerns about the effectiveness of these efforts, with assistance generally being too short to ensure the restoring of livelihoods necessary for successful reintegration. Similar observations were made on the rebuilding of livelihoods, which suffered similar difficulties to those faced by activities implemented to protect livelihoods under Strategic Objective 1. In longer-term crises, such as in the Sudan, livelihoods develop, which changes the vulnerability of households; this needs to be taken into account in targeting and ration design.
 46. *Reducing chronic hunger and undernutrition.* Under Strategic Objective 4, school feeding continued to be WFP's flagship programme. Impact evaluations provided a deeper understanding of the positive results school feeding attains in terms of enrolment, retention and achievement rates, but also the limitations to its effectiveness once children reach an age at which they can contribute to the household's income-earning potential. All evaluations cautioned that school feeding alone cannot produce educational outcomes, but requires strong partnerships that deliver complementary inputs in the schools where school feeding takes place. The more assistance is targeted towards the most vulnerable households, the greater the effectiveness of school feeding as a value transfer/safety net programme. Nutrition programmes – the other main programme activity under this Strategic Objective – had greater difficulties in demonstrating their effectiveness, for a number of reasons, including the relatively small size of programmes compared with the problems to be addressed. Nonetheless, WFP's contributions through analytical and advocacy work highlighted the importance of nutrition issues, including at policy levels in both the nutrition and the school feeding sectors.

47. *Strengthening capacities.* The information generated through evaluations was too limited and not sufficiently rigorous to allow conclusions regarding Strategic Objective 5. A number of evaluations reflected on issues of sustainability, many raising concerns about lacking opportunities for hand-over, due to capacity constraints.
48. *External and internal factors affecting performance and results.* Evaluations reconfirmed WFP's capacity to work in the most difficult circumstances, managing a variety of complex situations and finding solutions to challenges. Areas where improvements seemed most necessary and attainable fall under WFP's control, and included improving operational designs to ensure greater focus and less dispersion, and improving planning for realistic targets and measurable indicators, such as through strengthening monitoring systems to inform management decisions – taking corrective measures when necessary – systematically learning from experience, and generating an evidence base of what works. Funding levels and predictability affected operational results and efficiency, particularly in implementation of FFW related to livelihood protection, recovery and disaster risk reduction, and in nutrition programmes.
49. **Recommendation 1:** Focus to improve outcomes. While remaining ambitious, WFP should consolidate its activities across smaller geographic spreads, to achieve improved efficiencies and heighten effectiveness.
50. **Recommendation 2:** Extend synergies. WFP should focus on improving integration and synergies, both within its own programmes and with the activities of others, as the best means of creating multiplier effects and maximizing portfolio impact.
51. **Recommendation 3:** Improve monitoring. WFP should improve the design of monitoring systems and make indicators less complex, less fragmented across operations and more readily measurable. These improvements may require reviewing internal and contracted monitoring capacities and incentives.
52. **Recommendation 4:** Increase effectiveness. WFP should review the reasons for shortfalls in the two areas where performance seems to be weakest – FFW and nutrition programmes – to determine ways of improving programming, funding and results to ensure it is working towards attaining all its Strategic Objectives.

EVALUATION AT WFP

53. This chapter of the AER provides an overview of the evaluation work done compared with original plans, along with OEs: i) contributions to enhancing learning from evaluations; ii) continuing efforts to improve the quality of evaluations, which is fundamental to ensuring their credibility and usefulness; iii) participation in evaluation networks; and iv) human and financial resources.

Evaluation Activities in 2010

54. *Value added through synergies among evaluations.* In the 2008–2009 biennium, OE introduced the concept of four interrelated strategic evaluations to generate depth and breadth of evaluation insights. Based on the same concept of seeking synergies among evaluations, in its 2010–2011 work programme, OE included a series of impact evaluations, one on school feeding, and another on food assistance in protracted refugee situations. The synergy among these evaluations is based on using the same methodology, with adaptation as necessary. The evaluations generate comparable findings that, once synthesized, provide greater insights into common strengths and weaknesses of

programme areas. The findings of the impact evaluations of school feeding will also be used in the forthcoming evaluation of the school feeding policy, building further synergies among evaluations and increasing the value added by OE's evaluation work.

55. *Work programme implementation.* Implementation of OE's 2010–2011 work programme was affected by a large carry-over of evaluations from the 2008–2009 biennium. With the exception of two operation evaluations, which started in 2010, these ongoing evaluations had largely completed their fieldwork by the end of 2009, so had limited implications for OE's 2010–2011 budget. However, they did have implications for the workload of evaluation staff and, together with staff vacancies (paragraph 65 on human resources), resulted in a slow start-up for the 2010–2011 work programme. Nonetheless, more than 60 percent of OE's 2010–2011 biennial work programme was under implementation by the end of 2010. This performance augurs well for OE's accomplishment of its entire work programme for the biennium by the end of 2011. Table 4 shows the implementation status of the work programme at the end of 2010.

TABLE 4: WORK PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION – STATUS AT 31 DECEMBER 2010					
	Strategic evaluations	Policy evaluations	Country portfolio evaluations	Impact evaluations	Operation evaluations
2010–2011 work programme					
Carried over from 2008–2009 work programme	–	–	1	1	7
Foreseen in WFP Biennial Management Plan (2010–2011)	4	–	8	6	
Additional requests for 2010–2011	2	1	–	–	1
Total 2010–2011 work programme	6	1	9	7	8
Work programme implementation					
Ongoing	4	–	4	3	1
Completed	–	–	3	2	7
TOTAL	4	–	7	5	8
Accomplishment					
Completed and ongoing over planned work programme	67%	–	78%	71%	100%
Completed over planned work programme	–	–	33%	29%	88%

Source: Office of Evaluation

56. *Support to decentralized evaluations.* In addition to implementing its own work programme, OE supported country offices in their decentralized evaluations. This entailed reviewing terms of reference, inception and final evaluation reports to ensure their quality.

Activities to Enhance Learning from Evaluation

57. *Consultations on evaluation.* The Annual Consultation on Evaluation is an opportunity for WFP's membership to provide guidance on priorities for evaluation and to discuss the findings of the AER. In addition, at the request of Board members, the WFP Secretariat organized the first evaluation round-table, which was held prior to the Second Session of the Executive Board in November 2010. The round-table served for discussing details of the evaluation reports that were presented formally at the subsequent Board session. If these round-tables are established as a regular feature of the Board calendar, OE recommends discussion and agreement on the most effective way of organizing and using them to maximize the value they add to the formal Board discussions.
58. *Learning events.* OE organized two learning events during 2010: one, to discuss the findings of the 2009 AER, was organized with the Deputy Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer; and the other was an informal forum during which the team leader of the first impact evaluation of school feeding in Kenya shared the evaluation's findings with a large group of WFP Headquarters staff.
59. *Closing the learning loop.* OE's work on closing the learning loop progressed. The Top 10 Lessons product was tested and revised in response to feedback received from users. A new product – the evaluation country synthesis – was developed and successfully completed for six countries. These synthesis reports provide lessons from evaluations in a format that helps country offices develop their country strategies. Evaluation briefs have been revived, were prepared for all main evaluation reports produced in 2010, and will become available systematically from 2011 onwards. These learning products complement OE inputs to other processes related to the preparation of new operations, country strategies or policies. For instance, OE participates in the Strategy Review Committee, to highlight lessons from evaluations for inclusion in country strategies.
60. *Website development.* To make evaluations more accessible and thus to facilitate learning from evaluation, OE successfully launched completely revamped evaluation pages on WFP's external website, www.wfp.org. The site provides information about OE's objectives and work programme, the various types of evaluation OE undertakes, the tools it employs, and the lessons generated through its closing the learning loop initiative. Links have been created to other relevant pages on the website to facilitate learning from evaluation. The evaluation library continues to provide access to all evaluation reports produced by OE. In addition, considerable efforts were invested in developing an evaluation presence on WFP's internal website for WFP users; pages were launched by early 2011.

Continuous Evaluation Quality Improvement

61. *Team leader workshop for impact evaluations.* OE's approach to impact evaluations involves an iterative process in which the methods for such an evaluation are first tested in one country, before being replicated – with improvements – in other countries. For the first set of impact evaluations on school feeding, OE brought together the evaluation team leaders in a four-day workshop to discuss and harmonize methodology, generate an understanding of OE's expectations regarding quality of evaluations, and discuss in-depth with policy and operational staff working on school feeding. This approach serves to ensure not only the quality of the evaluations, but also their comparability, thereby enhancing synthesis and learning.

62. *Office of Evaluation staff skills and knowledge development.* OE has organized its professional staff into three focus groups around the types of evaluation being conducted. These focus groups stimulate discussion of evaluation quality standards and requirements and help develop the skills and knowledge of all OE professional staff. Additional topics covered through these discussions have ranged from an update on the Sphere standards,⁵ through the requirements for valid survey design, to gender dimensions in WFP operations. The list of topics is dynamic and responsive to staff needs. In addition, a total of 58 person-days (or 2 percent of staff working time) were spent in formal training in 2010.
63. *Evaluation Quality Assurance System.* In 2010, EQAS materials for impact evaluations were finalized and materials for the conduct and reporting of policy evaluations were developed. The focus groups mentioned in the previous paragraph also help develop tools to increase standardization and enhance the quality of evaluations. Standardizing reporting requirements for evaluation has improved the quality of evaluation reports. The development of materials through a collaborative process has increased understanding and application of these standards.

Cooperation with Evaluation Networks

64. WFP's OE continues to be active in the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). It represented UNEG at a joint meeting to discuss the harmonization of evaluations of the response to the Haiti earthquake. The meeting was organized by the three main evaluation networks – the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance, the Evaluation Network of the bilateral donors represented in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), and UNEG – and led to a follow-up mission to Haiti to discuss setting up an evaluation support office.
65. OE also participates actively in UNEG's impact evaluation task force, continues to be part of the Inter-Agency Working Group On Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluations led by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and is on the advisory board of the evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund. In addition, OE participates in the Working Group on Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluations, contributing its evaluation knowledge and skills to the continuous development and improvement of the real-time evaluation approach. OE supported the quality assurance process for the Southern Sudan Multi-Donor Evaluation, an initiative led by the Netherlands independent evaluation office.

Human and Financial Resources for Evaluation


66. *Human resources.* In 2010, OE achieved its full staff complement, with a balance between WFP staff on rotation and externally recruited experts of 4:4, as foreseen in the evaluation policy. The externally recruited evaluation experts did not serve for the entire year: one joined in March 2010, the other in December 2010. Two professional staff positions were vacant for a total of ten months during 2010, owing to departing staff and the availability of newly recruited staff. This vacancy rate meant that 84 percent of human

⁵ The Sphere Project developed the *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*, also known as “the Sphere standards” (see www.sphereproject.org).

resources were available to deliver the work programme in 2010.⁶ The overall number of staff did not change, but OE hired junior consultants as evaluation research assistants, who provide invaluable support to the focus groups and evaluation teams. Table 5 provides details of the staffing situation, and Annex V the full list of staff, including junior consultants.

Position	WFP staff on rotation	Externally recruited evaluation experts	Total
Director (D2)		1	1
Senior Evaluation Officers (P5)	1	2	3
Evaluation Officers (P4)	3	1	4
General Service Staff (G6 and G3)	3		3
TOTAL	8	4	11

67. In 2010 OE concluded five long-term agreements to provide evaluation services with consultancy firms; this increased the range of options for putting together evaluation teams. These options also include recruiting individuals identified from an established roster and through advertisement; and using competitive tenders to identify suitable firms. Through one or another of these means, OE employed a total of 48 consultants for 12 evaluations and preparation of the AER: an average of four consultants for each evaluation. Of these consultants, 25 percent were from developing countries and 75 percent from developed countries. The gender distribution among consultants was 65 percent male and 35 percent female.



68. *Financial resources.* The WFP Biennial Management Plan (2010–2011) allocated US\$9.6 million to staff and non-staff expenditures for evaluation, representing an increase of US\$1.4 million over the allocations for the 2008–2009 biennium. Non-staff resources of US\$2.8 million for 2010 were programmed for the implementation of evaluations and other activities, such as improving the website and the closing the learning loop initiative (paragraphs 59 and 60). The financial ratio of resources allocated for evaluations over total funds raised by WFP remained at 0.06 percent.

⁶ The vacancy rate is calculated from the total staff that should be in place versus the months during which a position was vacant.

Outlook

69. Progress has been made in improving the quality of evaluation at WFP. However, some issues remain outstanding – such as providing accountability to beneficiaries, which is difficult given the evaluation process and available budget – and others can be added, building on the improvements achieved so far.
70. The introduction of evaluation round-table meetings raises questions about the use of Board time on evaluations. Discussions should be held among the Board – through its Bureau – management and OE, to ensure that the objectives of each party are attained while making efficient use of time.
71. Regarding methodology, further efforts and investment are needed to strengthen the evaluation of effectiveness – the degree to which objectives have been attained – and to evaluate efficiency more rigorously. Advancements in these two areas will allow evaluations to provide feedback on the extent to which operations and programme activities provide value for money.
72. The overall evaluation plan is limited to a number of operations that is not representative. During preparation of the 2012–2013 budget, the adequacy of the funding level will be reviewed to ensure that evaluation can serve learning and accountability, including due diligence.

EVALUATIONS COMPLETED IN 2010**Country Portfolio Evaluations**

1. WFP's Portfolio in Chad
2. WFP's Portfolio in Mali
3. WFP's Portfolio in Nepal

Impact Evaluations

1. Impact Evaluation of School Feeding in Cambodia
2. Impact Evaluation of School Feeding in Kenya

Operation Evaluations

1. Colombia PRRO 105880
2. Egypt CP 104500
3. Ethiopia PRRO 106650
4. Ghana CP 104180
5. Occupied Palestinian Territory PRRO 103871
6. Sudan EMOP 107600
7. Timor-Leste PRRO 103881




Decentralized Evaluations




1. Plurinational State of Bolivia European Union (EU) Trust Fund
2. Burundi PRRO 105281
3. Guinea CP 104530
4. Mauritania PRRO 106050
5. Myanmar EMOP 107480 and 107490
6. Senegal PRRO 106120
7. United Republic of Tanzania CP 104370
8. Zambia CP 104470

COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FACT SHEETS

CHAD (2003–2009)

Timeline and funding level of portfolio operations

Operation	Title	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
DEV 10018	Country programme	Req: US\$ 33.5 - Contrib: US\$ 23.3						
DEV 10478						Req: US\$ 37.8 - Contrib: US\$ 28.5 		
PRRO 10510	Assist. to Central African Refugees in Southern Chad				Req: US\$ 36.7 - Contrib: US\$ 36.3 			
EMOP 10325		Req: US\$ 0.2 Contrib: US\$0.16						
EMOP 10327	Emerg. Assist. to Sudanese Refugees and Host Communities in Eastern Chad	Req: US\$ 61.6 Contrib: US\$ 47.0						
EMOP 103271				Req: US\$ 90.3 Contrib: US\$ 64.2				
EMOP 10295	Food Assist. to Refugees from the CAR in Southern Chad	Req: US\$ 4.5 - Contrib: US\$ 3.0						
EMOP 102951				Req: US\$ 5.7 Contrib: US\$ 3.1				
EMOP 10559	Assist. to Sudanese Refugees, IDP, Host Communities and Refugee-Affected Local Pop. in Eastern Chad					Req: US\$ 195.5 - Contrib: US\$ 129.8		
EMOP 105591								Req: US\$ 316.5 Contrib: US\$ 247.0
Beneficiaries (actual)		202 551	365 564	703 356	733 147	608 611	791 502	884 706
Food distributed (mt)		8 788	28 730	49 097	54 139	65 773	64 630	90 547
Direct Expenses (US\$, mill.)*		6	37	50	55	72	95	130
% of Direct Expenses: Chad vs. World		0.2	1.3	1.7	2.1	2.6	2.7	3.3

LEGEND Funding level	
> 75 %	
Between 50 and 75 %	
n/a	


Source: Standardized Project Reports (SPRs);¹ resource situation (1 August 2010, for ongoing projects); Annual Performance Report, 2009.
¹ Excludes Programme Support and Administrative (PSA) costs. 2008 and 2009 expenses are according to International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) and not comparable with 2007 and previous years' values based on United Nations System Accounting Standards (UNSAS).

Activities by operation and beneficiaries proportion by activity

Operations	GFD	FFW/FFA/FFT	Education	Nutrition	HIV
DEV 10018		X	X	X	
DEV 10478		X	X	X	X
PRRO 10510	X	X		X	X
EMOP 10325	X			X	
EMOP 10327	X	X		X	
EMOP 103271	X	X		X	
EMOP 10295	X			X	
EMOP 102951	X	X		X	
EMOP 10559	X	X	X	X	
EMOP 105591	X	X	X	X	
% of planned beneficiaries	48%	22%	19%	10%	1%
% of actual beneficiaries	55%	18%	18%	8%	1%

Source: DACOTA (12 April 2010)

Planned beneficiaries by activity



Top five donors (2003–2009): United States of America, European Commission, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada.

Source: ERD.

¹ Requirements (Req.) and Contributions (Contrib.) are million US\$. The colours indicate the percentage funded (Contrib./Req.).

MALI (2003–2009)

Timeline, funding level, beneficiaries by activity and food distributed

Operation	Title	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	
CP 102050	Country Programme	Req: US\$39.8 - Contrib: US\$23.6							
CP 105830	Country Programme						Req: US\$28.6 - Contrib: US\$14.4 ^I		
PRRO 103720 (Regional)	Response to the Côte d'Ivoire Crisis and its Regional Impact in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali	LEGEND Funding level		Req: US\$ 69.6 - Contrib: US\$ 60.5				2012 →	
PRRO 104520	Fighting Against Malnutrition and Reinforcing Livelihoods in the North of Mali	> 75 %	Between 50 and 75 %			Req: US\$29.7 - Contrib US\$25.3 ^{II}			
PRRO 106100	Fighting/controlling malnutrition in food-insecure areas in Mali	n/a						Req: US\$32.7 ^{III} 2011 →	
EMOP 102441 (Regional)	Targeted food assistance to people affected by the Côte d'Ivoire crisis	Req: US\$43.4 - Contrib: US\$35.1							
EMOP 104000	Assistance to the population affected by drought and locust invasion			Req: US\$15.7 - Contrib: US\$12.4					
Beneficiaries (actual) ^{IV}		728 379	781 845	676 055	1 047 704	989 903	368 882	503 116	
Food Distributed (mt) ^{IV}		9 690	13 002	17 158	23 474	23 044	11 842	11 179	
Direct Expenses Mali (US\$, millions) ^V		6	8	17	17	13	14	11	
% Direct Expenses: Mali vs. World		0.2	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3	

Sources: SPRs 2002 to 2009;^{IV} Annual Performance Reports 2005 to 2009.^V

^I Updated at time of this publication: Req. US\$32.2; Contrib. US\$27.8. Resource situation as at 20 December 2010.

^{II} Updated at time of this publication: Req. US\$29.7; Contrib. US\$23.0. As per final SPR 2009.

^{III} Updated at time of this publication: Req. US\$39.2; Contrib. US\$16.5. Resource situation as at 20 December 2010.

^{IV} SPRs. Req. and Contrib. are in million US\$. The colours indicate the percentage funded (Contrib./Req.).

^V Excludes PSA costs. 2008 and 2009 expenses are according to IPSAS and not comparable with 2007 and previous years' values based on UNSAS.


Main donors and partners

Donors: United States of America, Canada, Luxembourg

Partners: (Government) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Health, Education, Agriculture; (NGOs) Catholic Relief Service, German Agro Action; (United Nations agencies) UNICEF, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Sources: WFP External Relations Department; WFP Government Donor Relations Division.

Main portfolio activities (2003–2009)



Other activities under WFP

- WFP Purchase for Progress (P4P)
- Japan Trust Fund Project in Mali, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso: Regional Capacity-Building for Community-Based Swamp and Small Irrigated Village Plots Development

NEPAL (2002–2009)

Timeline, funding level, beneficiaries by activity and food distributed^A

Operation	Title	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	
CP 100930	Country Programme	Req: US\$120.2 - Contrib: US\$81.9								2010
PRRO 100581	Food Assistance to Bhutanese Refugees	Req: US\$8.6 Contrib: US\$5.4								
PRRO 100582			Req: US\$8.6 Contrib: US\$6.3							
PRRO 100583				Req: US\$11.9 Contrib: US\$11.0						
PRRO 100584						Req: US\$9.3 Contrib: US\$8.3				
PRRO 100585			LEGEND Funding level					Req: US\$29.2 Contrib: US\$28.1	2010	
PRRO 100586			> 75%						Req: US\$26.8 Contrib: US\$17	
PRRO 106760		Food Assistance to Conflict and High Food Prices	Between 50 and 75%	n/a					Req: US\$170 - Contrib: US\$107	2010
EMOP 105230	Food Assistance to Drought					Req: \$20.7 - Contrib: US\$15.6				
EMOP 107900	Food Assistance to Flooding							US\$1.8 US\$1		
IR EMOP 105450						US\$0.5 US\$0.4				
IR EMOP 107710						US\$0.5 US\$0.5				
IR EMOP 106870							US\$0.5 US\$0.4			
SO 104240	Emergency Preparedness				Req: US\$1.4 Contrib: US\$0.9					
Beneficiaries (actual)*		732 133	801 044	1 036 580	1 011 038	1 629 852	1 357 311	1 665 623	1 909 153	
Food Distributed (mt)*		28 420	41 711	41 075	40 969	51 499	52 462	54 509	62 666	
Direct Expenses NEPAL** (US\$, millions)		13	16	21	17	25	37	44	53	
% Direct Expenses: NEPAL vs. World		0.8	0.5	0.7	0.6	1	1.3	1.3	1.3	

Sources: WFP WINGS I and II^B; (*) SPRs 2002 to 2009; (**) Annual Performance Reports 2005 to 2009.^C

Main donors and partners

Donors: United States of America, European Commission, United Kingdom, Nepal (World Bank funds), United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).


Partners: Government of Nepal, 42 NGOs.

Source: WFP External Relations Department, Data Collection for WFP Reports (DACOTA)

Activities by type (planned beneficiaries)

Operation	GFD	FFW/FFA/FFT	Nutrition	HIV	Education	Cash
CP 100930		X	X	X	X	
PRRO 100581	X		X		X	
PRRO 100582	X		X		X	
PRRO 100583	X		X		X	
PRRO 100584	X		X			
PRRO 100585	X		X			
PRRO 100586	X		X			
PRRO 106760	X	X	X			X
EMOP 105230	X	X	X			
EMOP 107900	X					
IR EMOP 105450	X					
IR EMOP 107710	X					
IR EMOP 106870	X					

Source: WFP DACOTA^D



Sources: Project documents

^A The global special operation, which provided equipment to Nepal, is not included in this fact sheet.

^B Req. and Contrib. are in million US\$. The colours indicate the percentage funded (Contrib./Req.).

^C Excludes PSA costs. 2008 and 2009 expenses are according to IPSAS and not comparable with 2007 and previous years' values based on UNSAS.

^D Education includes school meals and take-home rations; Nutrition includes mother-and-child health care, therapeutic and supplementary feeding for children and pregnant and lactating women.

Fact Sheet on Operations Evaluated in 2010

Country	Operation	Title	Time Frame		Beneficiaries		Metric tons		US\$		Objectives	SOs*	MDGs	Activities
			Start/end date planned	End date-revised (at the time of evaluation)	Planned	At the time of evaluation	Planned	At the time of evaluation	Planned	At the time of evaluation				
OE Operations Evaluations														
Colombia	PRRO 105880	Food Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Other Highly Food-Insecure Groups Affected by Violence	Apr 2008 Mar 2011	Mar 2012	530 000/ per year	530 000/ per year	90 086	90 086	93 108 079	106 038 325	i) Protect and help restore the livelihoods of IDP and other violence-affected populations by increasing their ability to meet food needs and manage shocks; ii) Help improve the nutritional status of targeted populations, with emphasis on pregnant and lactating women and children under 5; iii) Support access to education for at-risk population.	2, 3, 4	1, 2, 4, 5	FFT, FFW, GFD, Nutrition, School Feeding
Egypt	CP 104500	Country Programme - Egypt (2007–2011)	Jan 2007 Dec 2011	Dec 2011	80 150 (CP) 396 000 (CP expanded programme)	396 000	20 904 (CP) n/a	26 267	8 000 000 (CP) 44 100 000 (CP expanded programme)	32 400 000	i) Strengthened government capacity to reform safety-net programmes, launch national nutrition strategies and prepare for and respond to emergencies; ii) reduced gender disparity in access to education; iii) improved capacity of children to concentrate and assimilate information; iv) improved livelihoods for vulnerable households; v) reduced levels of micronutrient deficiencies.	2, 3, 4, 5	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	FFT, FFW, School Feeding
Ethiopia	PRRO 106650	Responding to Humanitarian Crisis and Enhancing Resilience to Food Insecurity	Jan 2008 Dec 2010	Dec 2010	3 800 000 (yearly maximum)	4 900 000	959 327	1 591 312	561 946 745	1 295 291 546	i) Stabilize and/or reduce acute malnutrition among people affected by unpredictable acute food insecurity; ii) increase the ability of productive safety net programme beneficiaries to manage shocks; iii) rehabilitate children under 5 with moderate acute malnutrition and pregnant and lactating women; iv) enhance the basic nutrition knowledge of mothers and other women in communities targeted by Enhanced Outreach Strategy for Child Survival/Targeted Supplementary Food; v) improve the nutritional status and quality of life of food-insecure people living with HIV/AIDS; vi) increase school enrolment and attendance of vulnerable children in HIV/AIDS affected urban communities; vii) increase the capacity of government to identify food needs and	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7	FFW, GFD, Nutrition

Country	Operation	Title	Time Frame		Beneficiaries		Metric tons		US\$		Objectives	SOs*	MDGs	Activities
			Start/end date planned	End date-revised (at the time of evaluation)	Planned	At the time of evaluation	Planned	At the time of evaluation	Planned	At the time of evaluation				
											carry out disaster risk reduction programmes.			
Ghana	CP 104180	Country Programme - Ghana (2006–2010)	Jan 2006 Dec 2010	Dec 2010	152 000	170 000	35 169	30 977	16 200 000	25 535 636	i) Reduce malnutrition among at-risk pregnant and lactating women and children under 5; ii) improve attendance and completion rates among schoolchildren in primary grades P1 to P6 and girls in junior secondary school grade JSS1 to JSS3; iii) improve national capacity to implement and scale up supplementary feeding and on-site school feeding programmes; iv) increase demand for domestic farm produce in response to newly created school feeding market requirements.	3, 4, 5	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	Nutrition, School Feeding
Occupied Palestinian Territory	PRRO 103871	Protracted Relief Operation for Non-Refugee Palestinians	Sep 2007 Aug 2009	Jun 2010	665 000	413 000 (West Bank only)	164 605	178 101	107 234 011	167 266 012	i) Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks; ii) support access to education and reduce gender disparity in access to education.	2, 4	1, 2, 3	FFT, FFW, GFD, School Feeding
Sudan	EMOP 107600	Food Assistance to Populations Affected by Conflict	Jan 2009 Dec 2009	Dec 2009	5 900 000	6 175 000	677 991	659 830	921 300 000	868 700 000	i) Reduce or stabilize acute malnutrition and mortality, and protect livelihoods, amongst IDPs, refugees, and other vulnerable groups and communities; ii) support the return of IDPs and refugees and the re-establishment of livelihoods and food security of communities; iii) increase access to quality education, particularly for girls; iv) improve the nutritional status of those affected by chronic disease.	1, 3, 4	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	FFW, FFR, FFT, GFD, Nutrition, School Feeding
Timor-Leste	PRRO 103881	Assistance to Vulnerable Populations	Sep 2008 Aug 2010	Aug 2010	255 600 (annual average)	334 362	30 263	31 942	36 038 233	38 913 700	i) Increase the ability of targeted communities to meet their food needs through FFW; ii) improve the nutritional status of vulnerable groups and increase their access to health care clinics; iii) improve the enrolment and attendance of boys and girls in primary schools; iv) improve government capacity through safety nets; v) develop an institutional framework for a nationwide school feeding programme; vi) maintain a relief contingency stock to cover emergency needs of families affected by natural disasters; vii) support the return and resettlement of IDPs.	1, 2, 3, 4	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8	FFW, GFD, Nutrition, School Feeding

*Strategic objectives are aligned to the Strategic Plan 2006–2009 except for Sudan and Timor-Leste that are aligned to Strategic Plan 2008–2011

Country	Operation	Title	Time Frame		Beneficiaries		Metric tons		US\$		Objectives	SOs*	MDGs	Activities
			Start/end date Planned	End date-revised (at the time of evaluation)	Planned	At the time of evaluation	Planned	At the time of evaluation	Planned	At the time of evaluation				
Decentralized Evaluations														
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Quick Win ALA/2006/129-589	Trust Fund "Generation of Capacities Aiming at the Sustainability of the School Feeding Programme"	Mar 2007 Apr 2010	Dec 2010	220 000	220 000	–	–	3 100 000	3 100 000	To develop productive chains and reduce poverty and food insecurity through the promotion of: i) productive schools and ii) agricultural production to allow municipalities to purchase these products and source their school feeding programmes in the mid-to long-term.			i) Productive schools: (ex: school gardens) ii) Support to local production
Burundi	PRRO 105281	Support for Stabilization and Recovery: Protecting and Creating Livelihoods and Improving the Nutritional Status of the Most Vulnerable	Jan 2009 Dec 2010	Dec 2010	1 100 000	1 117 100	123 154	126 338	139 180 815	142 345 548	i) Ensure access to food for vulnerable groups; ii) invest in the prevention and mitigation of disasters; iii) restore and rebuilding livelihoods through FFW, FFT, and cash/voucher programmes; iv) reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition including of people affected by HIV and AIDS, through nutrition and school feeding programmes.	1, 2, 3, 4	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	FFT, FFW, GFD, Nutrition, School Feeding
Guinea	CP 104530	Country Programme - Guinea (2007–2011)	Jan 2007 Dec 2011	Dec 2011	505 896	580 966	26 128	28 000	21 699 408	28 900 000	i) Improve the social development and food security of poor households; ii) support vulnerable groups especially women through MCHN programmes; iii) support basic education.	2, 3, 4	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	FFT, FFW, Nutrition, School Feeding
Mauritania	PRRO 106050	Support to Population Groups Vulnerable to Food Insecurity and Malnutrition and Strengthening of Response Mechanisms	Jan 2008 Dec 2009	Aug 2010	674 495	750 667	32 108	51 738	30 823 826	50 157 477	i) to improve the nutritional status of children under 5 years of age, pregnant and lactating women and other vulnerable groups; ii) to save lives in crisis situations; iii) to protect means of subsistence of vulnerable population groups and strengthen their resilience to shocks; iv) to build government capacities to establish response mechanisms adapted to the immediate needs of food-insecure population groups and strengthen the management and M&E capacities of cooperating partners.	1, 2, 3, 5	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8	FFW, GFD, Nutrition
Myanmar	IR-EMOP 107480	Immediate Response to Cyclone Nargis	May 2008 Jun 2008	Jun 2008	40 000	40 000	448	448	499 954	499 954	Save lives	1		Emergency food distribution
Myanmar	EMOP 107490	Food Assistance to Cyclone-Affected	May 2008 Nov 2008	Dec 2009	750 000	924 000	65 615	121 056	69 504 086	117 957 510	i) Save and sustain lives; ii) restore livelihoods and rural community infrastructures in the affected areas	1, 2	1	Cash for Work, FFW, FFT, GFD, Nutrition

Country	Operation	Title	Time Frame		Beneficiaries		Metric tons		US\$		Objectives	SOs*	MDGs	Activities
			Start/end date Planned	End date-revised (at the time of evaluation)	Planned	At the time of evaluation	Planned	At the time of evaluation	Planned	At the time of evaluation				
		Populations in Myanmar									through recovery and rehabilitation activities.			
Senegal	PRRO 106120	Post-Conflict Rehabilitation in the Casamance Naturelle and Targeted Food Assistance to Vulnerable Populations Affected by Poor Harvests and High Food Prices in Senegal	Jan 2008 Dec 2009	Dec 2010	370 000	1 100 000	12 953	53 301	11 147 320	53 331 940	i) To rebuild and protect human and productive assets in order to encourage a social and economic recovery; ii) prevent a decline in the nutritional status of children under 5; iii) promote social cohesion and stability by facilitating the return of displaced and returnee children to a normal school life, thereby ensuring their protection and integration into the community; iv) ensure a timely and efficient response to food security challenges.	2, 3, 4, 5	1, 2, 3, 4, 7	FFT, FFW, GFD, Nutrition, School Feeding
United Republic of Tanzania	CP 104370	Country Programme – Tanzania (2007–2010)	Jan 2007 Dec 2010	Dec 2010	874 000	874 000	69 732	69 266	40 044 892	54 816 246	i) Increase enrolment and attendance, reduced drop-out rates and reduced disparity between boys and girls in WFP-assisted schools; ii) improve compliance of patients on anti-retroviral/tuberculosis treatment and of women on prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) programmes; iii) improve health and nutritional status of women and children participating in PMTCT programmes; iv) improve coping capacity of vulnerable food-insecure households affected by HIV/AIDS; v) increase crop yields, reduced post-harvest losses, increased household access to water; vi) reduce prevalence of low birth weight and underweight.	2, 3, 4	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	FFW, FFT, School Feeding, Nutrition
Zambia	CP 104470	Country Programme – Zambia (2007–2010)	Jan 2007 Dec 2010	Dec 2010	936 178	936 178	52 201	52 259	34 405 292	46 098 061	i) Greater well-being for poor and hungry people through improved health and nutrition practices; ii) enhanced self-sufficiency and future income-earning capability for children from poor food-insecure households through improved literacy, numeracy, life skills and education in HIV prevention; iii) enhanced national capability to institute and manage national food-assistance programmes for on-site school feeding, improved health and nutrition and disaster management and mitigation.	2, 3, 4, 5	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	FFW, Nutrition, School Feeding


*Strategic objectives are aligned to the Strategic Plan 2006–2009 except for Burundi that is aligned to Strategic Plan 2008–2011

IMPACT EVALUATION FACT SHEETS

Cambodia

WFP Operations in Cambodia with School Feeding Component (2000–2010)						
Project No.	Type	Start Date	End Date	Title	Total cost	Mt
603801	PRRO	Jan 2001	Dec 2003	Food Aid for recovery and rehabilitation	58 301 454	113 550
103050	PRRO	Jul 2004	Dec 2006	Assisting people in crisis	46 887 532	85 000
103051	PRRO	Jan 2008	Dec 2010	Assisting people in crisis	56 926 108	90 844



Source : Project Document




Kenya

WFP Operations in Kenya with School Feeding Component (1999–2008)						
Project No.	Type	Start Date	End Date	Title	Total cost	Mt
100090	CP	Jan 1999	Dec 2003	Country Programme	32 500 000	85 101
102640	CP	Jan 2004	Dec 2008	Country Programme	83 264 873	256 010
103740	EMOP	Aug 2004	Jan 2005	Food Assistance to Drought-Affected People in Kenya	81 287 429	166 000

Source : Project documents



Source: SPR



Source: SPR



Main donors:

Canada, European Commission, Japan, Kenya, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States of America

Main stakeholders:

Schoolchildren, parents and teachers, Kenya Ministry of Education, NGO partners, United Nations partners

Main donors:

Australia, Canada, Cambodia, Germany, Japan, Spain, United States of America

Main stakeholders:

WFP, Cambodia Ministry of Education, School staff, NGO partners, United Nations partners, communities and local authorities

OFFICE OF EVALUATION STAFF

(as of 31 December 2010)

Ms Caroline HEIDER, Director

Ms Sally BURROWS, Senior Evaluation Officer

Ms Marian READ, Senior Evaluation Officer

Ms Jamie WATTS, Senior Evaluation Office (since March 2010)

Ms Claire CONAN, Evaluation Officer (on temporary duty in Ethiopia from January to March 2010)

Mr Michel DENIS, Evaluation Officer

Ms Diane PRIOUX DE BAUDIMONT, Evaluation Officer (on temporary duty with OE from February to May 2010; assigned from September 2010)

Mr Ross SMITH, Evaluation Officer (since December 2010)

Ms Cinzia CRUCIANI, Evaluation Research Assistant

Ms Mariana MIRABILE, Evaluation Research Assistant (from May to October 2010)

Ms Stefania SPOTO, Evaluation Research Assistant (since November 2010)

Ms Federica ZELADA, Evaluation Research Assistant (since November 2010)

Ms Rosa NETTI, Programme Assistant

Ms Eliana ZUPPINI, Senior Staff Assistant

Ms Jane DONOHOE, Administrative Clerk

(former staff)

Ms Maureen FORSYTHE, Evaluation Officer (on temporary duty in Haiti from January onwards; returned to another position afterwards)

Ms Anne-Claire LUZOT, Evaluation Officer (until April 2010)

ACRONYMS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT

AER	Annual Evaluation Report
CP	country programme
CPE	country portfolio evaluation
DEV	development project
EMOP	emergency operation
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FFE	food for education
FFR	food for recovery
FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GFD	general food distribution
IDP	internally displaced person
IPSAS	International Public Sector Accounting Standards
JSS	junior secondary school
MCHC	mother-and-child health care
MCHN	mother-and-child health and nutrition
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODB	Regional Bureau Bangkok
ODC	Regional Bureau Cairo
ODD	Regional Bureau Dakar
ODJ	Regional Bureau Johannesburg
ODPC	Regional Bureau Panama City
ODS	Regional Bureau Sudan
OE	Office of Evaluation
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
PMTCT	prevention of mother-to-child transmission
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
PSA	Programme Support and Administrative

RDA	recommended daily allowance
SO	special operation
SPR	Standardized Project Report
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSAS	United Nations System Accounting Standards
WINGS II	WFP Information Network and Global System II