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Administrative and Managerial Matters

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## **Security Report**

### **Executive Summary**

WFP continues to face the direct and intentional targeting of personnel and facilities, which have increasingly been drawn into recent conflicts. The number of armed incidents directly targeting WFP operations – WFP personnel<sup>1</sup> and partner and contractor staff in the line of duty – has consistently increased during the past several years.

Although access to besieged areas in the Syrian Arab Republic improved last year, allowing WFP to reach almost 1.5 million people in need, an air attack on a United Nations convoy in September killed five WFP contracted drivers and 12 partner staff members.

In Yemen, access also remained a significant challenge: parties to conflict increasingly hampered the activities of WFP and its partners. In Taiz, more than 70 vehicles carrying food and vouchers were detained. Delayed and denied visas regularly prevented the deployment of staff, exacerbating the feeling within communities that humanitarian agencies are to blame for a lack of resources.

In South Sudan, an escalation of conflict in Juba in July resulted in the looting of 4,500 mt of food – enough for a monthly distribution to 220,000 people – along with USD 20 million in non-food items.

The October kidnapping of a United States national in the Niger and the December kidnapping of a French WFP partner staff member in Mali highlighted the elevated risk for foreigners in Mali, the Niger and Burkina Faso.

These events illustrate how the rapidly changing security landscape directly impacts WFP's operations, testing the capacity of the United Nations to uphold peace and security, and demanding WFP's ongoing management of security risks to its staff.

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<sup>1</sup> In WFP's Framework of Accountability, the term "personnel" refers to individuals employed by WFP – except those who are locally recruited and paid at hourly rates – together with their spouses and recognized dependants, regardless of their contractual status. This includes consultants, staff on temporary contracts and interns.

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In Europe, there was a wave of deadly terrorist attacks in 2016. Despite losing territory in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, Daesh directed acts of violence outside its traditional area of control. Incidents in Belgium, France and Germany demonstrate an increasing tendency for Daesh to carry out low-sophistication attacks on soft civilian targets, target mass-transport systems and public gatherings, and use vehicles as weapons.

## **The Field Security Division in 2016**

1. In 2016, the Field Security Division (RMQ) continued to integrate WFP's security and access functions in line with its mission to ensure the safety and security of WFP personnel so that they can access and assist people in need. RMQ continued to ensure that security analysis supports operations and decision-making, and that training develops the skills and knowledge of all staff and security personnel. Information technology tools supported these endeavours.

## **Security Incidents**

### **WFP Personnel Fatalities**

2. No WFP personnel died in the line of duty in 2016. One staff member was killed outside working hours in a shooting at a club in Juba, South Sudan. Two staff members were killed as a result of traffic accidents while off duty – one in Pakistan and the other in the Central African Republic.
3. In addition, no WFP personnel were injured in the line of duty. One staff member was injured in an act of violence during a non-work-related incident in Juba, South Sudan, and six staff members were injured in non-work-related accidents – four of them traffic accidents in Cambodia, Pakistan, the Sudan and Uganda.
4. Three eligible dependants sustained serious injuries as a result of acts of violence – two in Burundi and one in Lesotho.

### **Contractor and Partner Staff Fatalities and Injuries**

5. The number of fatalities in the line of duty among partner and contractor staff rose significantly from 9 in 2015 to 26 in 2016. A major cause of this increase was the high death toll from the 19 September attack in the Syrian Arab Republic in which a 31-vehicle United Nations convoy carrying wheat flour, health supplies and emergency aid, and a partner warehouse were attacked. According to the United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry, these attacks were carried out from the air. At least 12 WFP partner staff members and five contracted drivers were killed in these attacks, and 25 partner and contractor staff members were injured.
6. Three other partner staff members lost their lives on behalf of WFP in the Syrian Arab Republic – two during a shelling attack on a partner's warehouse and one as a result of an improvised explosive device.
7. Two contracted drivers were shot in South Sudan while transporting WFP food in two separate incidents.
8. One United Nations peacekeeper was killed and another injured while providing armed escort to a WFP convoy in the Sudan.
9. Three contracted drivers lost their lives in work-related traffic accidents in Malawi, Mozambique and the Syrian Arab Republic. One partner staff member died in a workplace safety incident in Uganda.
10. Two WFP partner staff members were seriously injured during an attack in the Syrian Arab Republic, and two were attacked by refugees during a general food distribution in South Sudan.
11. Among contractor staff: two staff members were seriously injured in the line of duty as a result of violence in the Syrian Arab Republic; one was injured during an armed robbery in South Sudan; one was injured during an armed incident in Afghanistan; one was injured in a traffic accident in Kenya; and one was injured in a workplace safety incident in Sierra Leone.


## Abduction and Kidnapping

12. The number of kidnapping incidents dropped from seven in 2015 to four in 2016.
13. Only one kidnapping incident involving WFP personnel was reported: in Burundi, the spouse of a WFP staff member was abducted and released the same day.
14. In the other three incidents, employees of WFP contractors – commercial vehicle drivers – were held overnight along with their vehicles during armed robberies in Afghanistan, Somalia and the Sudan.

## Global Trends


15. In 2016, 761 security incidents involving WFP staff or assets and contractors supporting WFP operations were reported. This was similar to 2015 when 764 incidents were reported. Of those in 2016, 518 (68 percent) were work related while 243 (32 percent) occurred outside work (Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Security incidents involving WFP staff/assets, contractors and partners in 2010–2016**




16. There were 697 incidents involving WFP personnel or assets were reported (Figure 2) – a 4 percent decrease from 2015, when 728 incidents were reported. Of these incidents, 467 (67 percent) were work related while 229 (33 percent) occurred outside work.

**Figure 2: Security incidents involving WFP staff/assets in 2005–2016**




17. As shown in Figure 3, the countries with the highest ratios of security incidents involving WFP personnel were Guatemala, with 16 incidents among 68 staff members (22.4 percent), Haiti, with 38 incidents among 176 staff members (21.6 percent), Yemen, with 41 incidents among 268 staff members (15.2 percent), the Syrian Arab Republic, with 40 incidents among 276 staff members (14.5 percent) and Somalia, with 34 incidents among 243 staff members (14 percent).<sup>2</sup>

**Figure 3: Countries with highest ratios of reported security incidents to number of personnel in 2016 (per 100 staff members)**



18. As shown in Figure 4, the ratio of reported incidents to WFP personnel doubled in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guatemala and Somalia.

**Figure 4: Growth/decrease rates in number of reported incidents relative to number of staff members**




19. The increase in Somalia resulted from an increase in the activities of Al Shabaab and Daesh in the country, and an unstable political situation. In Ethiopia, the number of reported incidents grew with increased civil unrest and improved security reporting. In Cameroon, road conditions worsened and crime increased with the presence of armed groups throughout the country. In Guatemala, the ratio of incidents to personnel increased as a result of gang-related criminality attributed to social violence, which has overwhelmed the law enforcement and judicial systems.
20. In Sierra Leone and Malawi, the ratio of reported incidents to personnel was nearly halved. In Sierra Leone, operations were scaled down in 2016 after the end of the Ebola crisis. In Malawi, the decrease was related to a drop in property crime.

<sup>2</sup> Only country offices with more than ten personnel and ten or more reported incidents were considered. In Papua New Guinea, five incidents were reported among 12 personnel (41.7 percent), which would have put this country office at the top of the list.


21. Consistent with previous years, the highest numbers of security incidents were reported in Africa and Asia. South Sudan (with 117) accounted for the most incidents affecting WFP operations, followed by the Sudan (with 54), Afghanistan (44), Yemen (41) and the Syrian Arab Republic (40). See Figure 5 for a breakdown by country.

**Figure 5: Countries with highest numbers of security incidents involving WFP staff/assets in 2016**




22. Property crime remained the most common type of incident, accounting for half of all incidents in 2016, followed by hazards (including traffic accidents) at 34 percent, armed conflicts (10 percent), civil unrest (4 percent) and terrorism (2 percent). This is consistent with data from previous years.


**Figure 6: Reported security incidents affecting WFP staff/assets in 2016, by threat type**




23. As in previous years, traffic accidents remained the most reported security incident, followed by thefts, robberies, burglaries and armed attacks in which WFP was not the target (Figure 7).

**Figure 7: Reported security incidents affecting WFP staff/assets in 2016, by incident type**

24. WFP continued to face the direct and the intentional targeting of humanitarian personnel and facilities. The number of armed incidents directly affecting WFP's operations has increased in recent years. As shown in Figure 8, the number of incidents in which WFP operations were directly targeted nearly doubled between 2014 and 2016.

**Figure 8: Armed incidents involving WFP staff/assets, 2014–2016**

25. No WFP personnel were severely injured in work-related traffic accidents, although the number of traffic accidents reached an all-time high in 2016 (Figure 9). However, two staff members were killed while off duty as a result of traffic accidents in Pakistan and the Central African Republic. The operations most affected by traffic accidents were: South Sudan with 16 work-related and 1 non-work-related, the Sudan, also with 16 work-related and 1 non-work-related, Kenya, with 11 work-related and 2 non-work-related, Cameroon, with 10 work-related, and Ethiopia, with 7 work-related and 1 non-work-related. Determinants of accident prevalence included the size of operations and distances travelled; poor road conditions were a major cause.

**Figure 9: Traffic accidents involving WFP staff/assets, 2005–2016**

### Conclusion and Outlook

26. The rising number of targeted armed incidents in conflict areas reflects the growing exposure of WFP, its partners and contractors to risk. In areas where hunger is being used as a weapon, risk is rising drastically. As the growing number of armed conflicts is a major driver of global food insecurity, WFP's operations will increasingly be exposed to the threat of violence. As a result, secure access to affected populations will remain one of the biggest challenges for WFP.
27. The expected defeat of Daesh on the battlefields of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic will not end the threat from that group, which has an established operational network throughout Northern Africa and the Middle East. Attacks in Europe have also become more frequent – and will likely continue. With the disappearance of frontlines on the battlefield in Iraq, the threat of insecurity has become much harder to predict and manage. Unless a political solution is found, the risk of future insecurity in Iraq will remain high.

### Security Risk Management

28. As an identified risk for WFP, insecurity is reflected in one of ten key performance indicators, which safeguard security by ensuring that the Framework of Accountability is applied. This is now mandatory for all country directors.
29. A revised Security Policy and Framework of Accountability was developed in 2016 for publication in early 2017, incorporating changes in relation to new United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) policies and including reporting lines and responsibilities for regional security officers. The framework also clarifies security structures for WFP offices outside Headquarters that are not administered by regional bureaux.
30. WFP participated in the High-Level Committee on Management working group on the duty of care for United Nations personnel, which recognized the importance of safety and security – along with staff wellness and human resources – as a critical issue in high-risk duty stations. Following a revision of the UNSMS security risk management process in 2015, this group's recommendations and changes in the security risk management process are being implemented. RMQ continues to participate in several Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) working groups.

## Gender Considerations in Security Risk Management

31. Gender continues to be a focus in security risk management. Following RMQ's active participation in the 16 Days of Activism Against Gender-based Violence campaign, the division developed and delivered Women Security Awareness Training (WSAT).

### *Women Security Awareness Training*

In 2016, WSAT was launched to raise awareness of the security risks that affect women and to provide practical tools for mitigating them. The training also provides a safe forum for women to share their experiences and address any security issues they experience. The development of WSAT involved inputs from WFP's human resources, wellness, investigation and gender teams.

Comments on WSAT held in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) included the following:

"I loved that the WSAT trainers created a 'safe space' where all female staff were invited (from heads of units to the office cleaners) to discuss the real issues they face in their daily lives vis-à-vis security and protection. In a country like DRC where violence against women and abuse is common, establishing a safe space and reassuring our staff that they are not alone and can stand up for themselves was fantastic. For days following the training, our female staff continued to discuss what they learned during the training. So many, myself included, felt empowered by the experiences of others and the sense of strength established. I felt like many women gained self-confidence and felt closer to one another. Further, the skills learned – self-protection, general surveillance of an area, etc. – were priceless and have become part of my daily routine."

Maribeth Black, Emergency Response Officer, DRC

## Field Security Capacity and Operations

32. WFP employed 94 international professional security personnel (comprising 48 staff members, 30 short-term staff members and 16 consultants), 128 local security assistants and 168 security focal points. Of these 390 personnel, 355 were deployed in the field and 19 at Headquarters. The roster of consultants was significantly augmented in 2016 from 6 to 16, significantly improving RMQ's ability to support WFP's operations.
33. Four emergency surge support missions were also conducted in response to sudden-onset security needs in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Haiti and Zimbabwe. Ongoing crises in complex security environments have demanded innovative operating practices. In Yemen, a dedicated security officer has facilitated chartered boat missions to access affected populations, and strategic civil military coordination on security issues has helped to gain security assurances. In Nigeria, RMQ has instigated the use of helicopters for deep field access.
34. Terrorist attacks in Europe prompted WFP to consider plans to unify security at Headquarters and in the field; a merger is planned for 2017. Training was developed for European security focal points and active-shooter training was delivered. The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) reorganized the scope of work for chief security advisers in Europe, assigning additional responsibilities to some UNSMS-affiliated organizations to allow for more effective regional security coverage. RMQ supported the Headquarters security team in an exercise conducted by Italy's Special Forces Police as part of regular preparedness activities by the Ministry of Interior to simulate the rescue of Headquarters staff.

## Security Assistance Missions

35. In its review of the oversight functions of regional bureaux, the Office of Internal Audit identified established security frameworks and governance structures. Extensive security risk monitoring activities were observed in all regional bureaux, including security assistance missions.
36. In 2016, the security assessment mission concept was reviewed, allowing assessments to become assistance missions; 35 missions were conducted during the year. The expanded pool of experienced security assistance mission consultants receives regular updates on developments in WFP and broader United Nations security trends; consultants also attend an annual training workshop.

## Access Facilitation

37. RMQ continues to establish best practices for facilitating access in the field, working with colleagues across WFP. Access guidelines have been drafted and trainers trained. Support has been provided in Iraq, Mali, Myanmar and Nigeria through contextual analysis desk reviews and site visits. Training in negotiation has also been delivered jointly with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

## Premises Security and Blast Mitigation

38. Six blast assessment missions were conducted at offices and accommodation in Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey and Yemen. These missions assisted several United Nations agencies in providing safe and secure premises for their staff.
39. Missions to develop a blast assessment questionnaire will allow WFP to assess the vulnerability of its premises more quickly. The questionnaire has been field tested for implementation in 2017.
40. Technical specifications for ballistic-resistant office and accommodation units, next-generation personal protective equipment, defence gabion systems and magnetic walk-through and baggage scanners were also developed.

## Analysis

41. An analysis skills workshop was held to discuss best practices and optimize information-sharing. The analysis team also increased its collaboration with the United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre, the UNDSS Threat and Risk Assessment Service and other partners to enhance its capabilities.
42. In an effort to raise awareness of security and extend access to analysis, RMQ held a security conference at Headquarters on the impact of geopolitical instability in the Middle East, North Africa and beyond, and published a number of articles within WFP.
43. In addition, the analysis team focused on developing conflict and context analysis to identify the root causes of problems experienced by beneficiaries and develop interventions to minimize the risk of activities that exacerbate existing conflicts. RMQ contributed to launching the Centre of Competence on Humanitarian Negotiations, in Geneva with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Médecins sans frontières* and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. The division also participated with ICRC and Chatham House in a working group on negotiation with non-state armed groups.
44. Through a joint effort with the Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division's Operations Centre and in collaboration with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the analysis team continued establishing a community of practice with other operations and crisis centres.

## Training

45. During 2016, 19 training sessions tailored to WFP's operating context were developed and delivered by RMQ. Two courses for local security assistants in Jordan and two in Kenya were attended by 79 local security assistants from WFP and other United Nations agencies. Eleven WSAT sessions were attended by 208 women from WFP and other United Nations agencies in eight countries (see paragraph 29 for more information about WSAT). Active-shooter awareness training was delivered in Rome and attended by 12 WFP staff members. An online active-shooter training module was developed in English and French, and made accessible on WFP's Learning Management System, with 1,400 online completions. Ten WFP staff attended the security focal point training for WFP offices in Europe. Five Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE) certification courses were delivered in Rome and attended by 96 staff members from WFP and other United Nations agencies.

46. Training support and facilitation were provided to other WFP divisions, the Niger country office and the United Nations System Staff College. Extensive support was also provided to the Joint Emergency Response Simulation (JERS) exercise, including Functional and Support Training for Emergency Response (FASTER) organized by WFP and UNICEF.
47. Security personnel received training to enhance their skills: three staff members completed SSAFE training of trainers, one completed WSAT training of trainers, two completed a security analysis practice and processes course, four completed the UNDSS Security Certification Programme, and four completed local security assistant training.

### UNDSS Costs and the WFP Security Emergency Fund

48. To coordinate field security activities, WFP planned to recover USD 18.8 million through standard staff costs and projects to fund the Security Emergency Fund – estimated at USD 7.3 million – and to pay mandatory UNDSS costs estimated at USD 11.5 million. WFP's actual share of UNDSS costs in 2016 was USD 10.1 million.

	<b>2016 allocation</b>	<b>2016 commitment and actual</b>	<b>% of total</b>
Staffing	4 585 058	4 584 572	26
Minimum operating security standards (MOSS)	2 163 062	2 164 120	12
Training	549 971	643 673	4
Security assistance missions	375 819	346 689	2
UNDSS	10 151 307	10 151 307	57
<b>Total</b>	<b>17 825 216</b>	<b>17 890 360</b>	100

49. Emergency funds supported MOSS compliance, facility enhancements and purchases of telecommunications equipment in 15 countries. Most funding requests were based on changes in the security situation or expansion of operations into insecure areas in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Indonesia, the Niger, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.

### UNDSS Jointly Financed Activities

50. The 2016–2017 cost-sharing budget for UNDSS was finalized at USD 227.2 million. WFP's actual share of UNDSS costs in 2016 was USD 10.1 million in line with the number of WFP staff members in the field (see CEB/2010/HLCM/FB/8/Rev.2).

	<b>UNDSS</b>	<b>WFP share</b>
2002–2003	42.9	6.5
2004–2005	113.1	13.2
2006–2007	172.3	20.2*
2008–2009	174.4	17.3
2010–2011	209.9	24.4**
2012–2013	218.6	23.5
2014–2015	225.2	22.4
2016–2017	226.4	20.3

\* Credit of USD 3.2 million received in 2006.

\*\* Credit of USD 1.4 million received in 2010.

51. The Budget Service and the regional bureaux applied a new cost-recovery process to share the USD 8.8 million cost recovery among all country offices (Table 3).

<b>TABLE 3: SECURITY COST SHARING IN 2016</b>			
<b>Regional bureau</b>	<b>Number of country offices</b>	<b>USD</b>	<b>% of overall costs</b>
Bangkok	14	1 778 660	20
Cairo	16	2 251 533	26
Dakar	18	1 586 698	18
Johannesburg	11	946 322	11
Nairobi	9	1 756 228	20
Panama	12	480 559	5

52. UNDSS proposed a USD 9 million increase in the budget for 2018–2019, with 35 new professional posts – 40 percent of them based in New York. WFP continues to support rationalizing the budget for jointly funded activities and strengthening field-level security, but questions the need for such a significant increase. In coordination with other IASMN member agencies, WFP was able to maintain the proposed budget capped at USD 237 million (including the re-costing). This “real zero growth” budget represented a 4.5 percent increase from the previous two years. The budget was deemed sufficient for UNDSS to operate adequately if it abides by the IASMN recommendation to streamline its support further at a time when local security budgets have increased.

### **Looking Forward**

53. Recruiting and retaining women in the division continues to be a concern. RMQ will focus on achieving a gender balance in security so that gender perspectives are considered.
54. By unifying security at Headquarters and in the field, RMQ will ensure that security concerns in Europe gain the necessary attention and that European offices conform to policy changes within UNSMS.
55. The training team will deliver two new initiatives in 2017: an advanced local security assistant field-based simulation exercise and a WSAT training of trainers with UNHCR. These courses will develop the competencies of local staff and greatly expand WFP’s training capacities.
56. Financing for security is also a concern: WFP will advocate with IASMN to ensure transparent budgeting for security.
57. Security analysis will continue by expanding joint efforts with WFP units and focusing on the integration of information technology-supported tools to improve efficiency and support a common United Nations operating framework.

## **Acronyms Used in the Document**

DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FASTER	Functional and Support Training for Emergency Response
IASMN	Inter-Agency Security Management Network
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
MOSS	minimum operating security standards
RMQ	Field Security Division
SSAFE	Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSMS	United Nations Security Management System
WSAT	Women Security Awareness Training