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SUMMARY TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT ON EMERGENCY OPERATION CHINA 6045.00¹

Emergency Food Aid to Flood-affected People in Anhui, Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi Provinces of China

Number of beneficiaries	5,786,900
Duration	Five months
Termination date	28 March 1999
Date Letter of Understanding signed	28 September 1998
Date approved	18 September 1998
Date of first distribution	29 October 1998
Dates of evaluation	15 September–7 October 1999
Cost (United States dollars)	
Total cost to WFP	93,351,254
Total food cost	72,928,074
Total cost to Government	58,092,772

¹ The full report is available on request, in English only. The mission consisted of a Senior Rural Sociologist/Team Leader (FAO IC); Senior Evaluation Officer (WFP); Emergency Expert (Consultant/AusAid); and two former EMOP Chinese Programme Associates. Government staff and WFP country office staff familiar with the EMOP participated throughout the field mission.

ABSTRACT

This participatory evaluation assessed the added value of WFP emergency assistance in the context of a strong government disaster response and drew lessons for future emergency operations (EMOPs). Findings highlight: use of vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) for EMOP targeting; grain-borrowing mechanisms; the positive involvement of beneficiaries and of women in particular; complementarity of government and WFP monitoring systems; issues related to timing; advantages/disadvantages of combining relief and rehabilitation objectives in an EMOP. A distinction is made between food for recovery and food for work. The former is appropriate in the rehabilitation phase, but not the latter. Main weaknesses as identified by the evaluation related to the timetable of activities, which was off schedule due to a delayed start of the project.

The evaluation team came to the conclusion that EMOP 6045.00 was a sound and successful project, assisting close to 5.8 million people to recover from a major flood in record time. Its success was largely attributable to the strong and concerted disaster response of the Government, to the proactive WFP effort to raise resources from international donors, to the very substantial government counterpart contribution, and to a food-borrowing mechanism which allowed distributions to begin four months earlier than would otherwise have been the case.

NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted for consideration to the Executive Board.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document, to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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Should you have any questions regarding matters of dispatch of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact the Documentation and Meetings Clerk (tel.: 066513-2645).



LIST OF ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

EMOP	Emergency operation
FFR	Food for recovery
FFW	Food for work
LOU	Letter of Understanding
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PMO	Project Management Office
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
VDC	Village Development Committee
VDP	Village Development Plan
ZOPP	Objective-oriented project planning



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose of the Mission

1. The purpose of this terminal evaluation mission was to assess project impact and draw lessons for the design of future emergency operations. EMOP 6045.00 is of particular interest because of its large scale and because it linked disaster relief to livelihood recovery. The evaluation assessed the added value of WFP assistance in the context of a strong government disaster response and drew lessons for future EMOPs.

Evaluation Methods

2. The evaluation adopted a participatory approach. Methods included stakeholder workshops, village Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs), focus group meetings, semi-structured household interviews and spot visits to project rehabilitation sites. Participatory tools included key informant interviews, use of objective-oriented project planning (ZOPP) cards, participatory mapping, calendar making, matrix ranking of project rehabilitation activities and positive/negative impact analysis. Gender issues were mainstreamed throughout the exercise.
3. The evaluation findings are based on visits to three of the four project provinces and eight of the 23 project counties. To compare the “with” and “without” project situation as well as beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, mini-PRAs were undertaken in eight severely affected villages, five moderately affected villages and four non-project villages.
4. In each county, three villages were selected for rapid field investigations as a basis for comparing the extent of damage and rate of recovery among project beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Three teams were formed to undertake village PRAs. The team composition included the EMOP evaluation mission members, staff from WFP Beijing and the Ministry of Agriculture, Beijing Provincial Project Management Office (PMO) staff and County PMO Staff. Each team spent an average of four to six hours in each village and undertook four main participatory evaluation exercises (calendar making, matrix ranking, focus groups, village mapping of disaster damage and rehabilitation works). The three teams came together at the end of the field work to present findings, compare and contrast conclusions and draw lessons.

Project Background

5. Continuous, heavy rains from March to August 1998 caused China's worst floods in the century. According to official estimates, 230 million people were affected, 4,150 people died, 13.8 million people were evacuated, and 5 million houses were totally destroyed. In order to reduce the impact of the disaster, the Chinese Government undertook a series of relief measures while concurrently seeking international assistance. WFP responded to the Government's request for the provision of emergency food aid to the targeted victims in four of the most seriously affected provinces—Hunan, Hubei, Anhui and Jiangxi.



6. Project objectives were to assist the Government to:
 - a) meet acute food needs of the targeted population living in temporary shelters; and
 - b) support post-disaster rehabilitation of essential assets for the target population.
7. The duration of the project was to be 120 days, divided in two phases: a one-month relief phase (free food with no work obligation) followed by a three-month rehabilitation phase to support recovery of community and household assets.
8. EMOP 6045.00 is WFP's largest project in China, covering 5,786,900 beneficiaries, 23 counties, 320 townships and 4,450 villages at a cost of US\$146 million. Total food contributions were to be 347,214 metric tons of rice (Government—100,000 tons; WFP—247,214 tons). The lead agency for project implementation was the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), working in close collaboration at the provincial level with the Disaster and Social Relief Department of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Provincial Grain Bureaux and the All China Women's Federation.

MAIN FINDINGS AND LESSONS

Overall Assessment

9. EMOP 6045 was a sound and successful project, which assisted close to 5.8 million people to recover from a major flood in record time. Its success was largely attributable to the strong and concerted disaster response of the Government, to the proactive WFP effort to raise resources from international donors, to the very substantial government counterpart contribution and to a food-borrowing mechanism which allowed distributions to begin four months earlier than would otherwise have been the case.
10. The project tested a model for combining relief with rehabilitation in an emergency operation and yielded valuable lessons about the practical difficulties of marrying relief with reconstruction because conventional food for work is inappropriate.
11. The project's main weaknesses relate to timing and to the scheduling of activities, which was off due to a delayed start of the project.
12. Although a number of innovative features such as commodity borrowing, cost sharing and beneficiary participation could be replicated in other emergency projects, it cannot be a model for other projects because of its dependence on unique circumstances—a century flood in China coinciding with a bumper harvest in the United States—in the absence of which WFP might not have been as successful in resourcing such a large operation.

SUCCESS STORIES AND INNOVATIVE FEATURES OF THE PROJECT

Use of Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) in Targeting

13. Because needs greatly exceeded available resources, accurate targeting was essential. Opportunities for targeting were excellent by international standards due to the existence of detailed data on flood damage at the county and township level as well as house-to-house inventories of damage at the village level. Using the VAM system to target those most severely affected, beneficiaries were reduced from an initial government request of more than 55 million people to nearly 5.8 million.



Commodity Borrowing

14. The system of commodity borrowing established was very positive and permitted food distributions to start four months sooner than otherwise. The Government's agreement to authorize borrowings from locally held stocks against a *pledge* from a donor (rather than requiring the food first to be shipped and discharged at port) was an innovative and important feature of this EMOP. It enabled WFP to follow the Government's first two EMOP distributions without interruption to the distribution schedule.

Cost Sharing

15. The Government's disaster response at all levels was impressive and exemplary, and prevented additional damages and loss of lives. WFP's ability to leverage counterpart funding from the Government contributed to the success of the operation. WFP's response was jump-started by government counterpart contributions; nevertheless, the first food distribution occurred when the relief phase had already turned into the rehabilitation phase.

Beneficiary Participation

16. Beneficiary participation was positive: public posting of beneficiary lists and entitlements at the village-level increased transparency and reduced the scope for misuse of food aid. Beneficiary representation on village-level registration and distribution committees created local ownership of the project and helped to ensure that rice distributions were fair. However, the EMOP's record on participatory planning of food for recovery (FFR) is somewhat disappointing. Although farmers were represented on the Village Development Committee (VDC), the village-level PRAs specified in the project document were not carried out and the Village Development Plans (VDPs) had already been finalized before the EMOP started.

Role of Women in Implementation

17. Over 10,000 village women were represented on VDCs, 7,000 served on registration committees and nearly 14,000 served on distribution committees. Women were 24 percent of the staff of PMOs, 37 percent of the membership of VDCs, 39 percent of the membership of registration committees and 45 percent of the members of distribution committees. However, since women's representation on project committees was a special requirement imposed only for the duration of the project, it did not last beyond the end of the project. Nonetheless, the presence of additional women on the committees improved transparency and village leaders' accountability to the flood victims. According to the Women's Federation, the project's initial requirement that 60 percent of food rations should be collected by women was unnecessary and culturally inappropriate because it forced women to carry 15–30 kg of grain for long distances. This requirement was dropped later on. The Women's Federation says that in China it is unnecessary to insist on women collecting the food instead of men because there is little risk of men misusing the food. Because Chinese women traditionally control family food stocks, the gender of the person collecting the food has little effect on women's control over food.



SUMMARY OF OTHER FINDINGS

United Nations Assessments and Appeals

18. While WFP took a risk and set an ambitious goal for resourcing the EMOP, almost 90 percent of the EMOP was resourced thanks to a strong and proactive resource mobilization effort in Beijing and Rome which started as early as July.
19. The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) joint assessment was conducted from 7 to 25 September, when flood victims had already been on the dykes for two months. This was very late, although the constraining factor was that the Government was slow to formally request assistance. Had WFP waited for the United Nations appeal, the EMOP would have come too late.

Lesson:

Early assessment of the food needs, combined with early and proactive resource mobilization efforts, is essential to provide timely assistance to disaster victims.

EMOP Needs Coverage

20. Coverage was largely dictated by WFP's estimate of the quantities of food aid that could be resourced from donors. Although food aid was needed for 10 to 11 months, the Government and WFP opted to limit the EMOP to four months in order to maximize the number of beneficiaries.

Counterpart Funding

21. The EMOP attracted incremental funds to flood-stricken areas through a matching mechanism. Funding was primarily used for material inputs into FFR activities and was adequate for all activities except house reconstruction, where the EMOP grant averaged only 8 percent of total cost for new houses in resettlement areas. Because subsidies for house construction in some resettlement areas were granted according to the number of rooms damaged, the bigger the house, the higher the subsidy. As a result, a disproportionate share of subsidies went to non-poor households in relation to poor households. Poor households who could not afford to move to new villages got less assistance.

Lesson:

For housing subsidies, a flat rate per household is preferable to a subsidy per room, as the latter is likely to favour the non-poor relative over the poor. WFP should be wary about including housing subsidies in counterpart funding when they represent less than 10 percent of total housing subsidies and less than 3 percent of housing cost.



Rice Distribution to Flood Victims

22. The Government efficiently managed a massive food distribution. The EMOP reached 90 percent of its target of providing 5,786,900 beneficiaries with a ration of 0.5 kg for 120 days. Due to resource constraints, only 107–109 days of food rations were provided against a target of 120 days. Consequently, villagers, who had been told they were entitled to 120 days, were dissatisfied because they did not get their full entitlement. Although it is desirable for farmers to know their entitlements as a means of improving transparency, it is important to avoid creating false expectations. It was not clear to most people that the 120 days was contingent on resource mobilization as stipulated in the Letter of Understanding signed between WFP and the Government. People thought the 120 days were a fact and not a goal subject to resources mobilized.
23. The delay of the second wheat shipment, which was contingent upon arrival and acceptance of the first shipment, caused two breaks for four and five weeks each in food distribution from 28 December to 5 February and from 21 February to 18 March. During this period people resorted to borrowing rice from the Government or other sources.
24. EMOP rice accounted for approximately 34 percent of the total rice distributed freely, on credit or purchased over the period of the food crisis. WFP's contribution alone was approximately 22 percent of the total rice distributed, borrowed or purchased over the period of the food crisis .

Lesson:

Project partners at all levels must be made aware that resourcing emergency food aid cannot be guaranteed by WFP. This will help avoid frustration and disappointment of the national partners.

Shipping

25. The first wheat shipment arrived in China on 21 February, only one week before project closing. Shipping of United States wheat has been unusually slow and costly to the Government, in particular since the final two shipments were sent on oil tankers, resulting in significant additional costs for unloading and demurrage.



REHABILITATION THROUGH FOOD FOR RECOVERY (FFR)¹

FFR Planning and Decision-making

26. WFP had limited influence on decisions about FFR: the project document was unrealistic about influencing the planning process, given that:
- there was very considerable planning capacity at the county and township level and villages were assisted to develop plans;
 - the plans had already been made before the sub-offices were opened; and
 - village plans did not stand alone and to a large degree reflected township and county rehabilitation plans.

Lesson:

Separate village development plans may not be required in cases where the local government has already developed comprehensive rehabilitation plans. Project planners should assess existing local recovery plans and work within them to the extent possible.

Appropriateness of FFR Activities and Phasing

27. The five FFR activities included in the EMOP (house reconstruction, well desilting, farmland desilting, canal desilting and village road rehabilitation) were appropriate. It was also appropriate to exclude dyke reconstruction as such works exceed the EMOP time frame and are a local government rather than a village responsibility. In principle it was appropriate to include shelter; however, in practice a considerable amount of EMOP funding went into resettlement villages and represented a small proportion of the cost of housing to flood victims .

FFR achievements

28. Over 79,000 houses were repaired/reconstructed, 55,100 hectares of farmland, 247,000 water wells/tanks and 7,600 km of irrigation canals desilted, and 2,000 km of village feeder roads repaired in the 90 days of the EMOP's FFR phase. In spite of the impressive numbers of achievements, targets were generally low in relation to beneficiary labour supply. Targets were generally achieved. However, 100 percent achievement of FFR targets did not necessarily imply completion of rehabilitation: only a fraction of total farmland, canals and roads needing rehabilitation could be covered by the EMOP.
29. In a few isolated cases—mainly in Jiangxi and Anhui—targets were excessive in relation to village labour supply and completion of EMOP activities lagged because local government gave preference to dyke work, leaving limited time for other FFR activities.

¹ While the project document has labelled this activity FFW, its intentions were rather to provide FFR. In order to avoid confusion between the standard FFW concept and this activity, the project's FFW component is identified throughout the report as FFR.



30. Housing targets were not 100 percent achieved because beneficiaries are expected to finance over 70 percent of the cost from their own resources. Since housing standards in resettlement villages are beyond the economic means of the poor, the majority of new houses are unfinished and the poor are lagging behind due to lack of financial resources.
31. Work on houses, wells, farmland, canals and roads generally started one to two months before the EMOP and continued up to three months after. People were fully engaged on reconstruction over the EMOP period but possibly worked as few as 30 days on EMOP activities.

Non-food Inputs

32. Agricultural recovery was slower than necessary because farmers had no seeds or cash for inputs: the EMOP design assumed that farm inputs would be resourced through the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) appeal. Although a FAO project provided seeds and fertilizers to 160,000 flood-affected farmers in six counties of Anhui, Jiangxi and Hunan (three EMOP and three non-EMOP counties), only an estimated 6 percent of the EMOP target population was able to benefit from FAO assistance. Hence it might have been advisable for WFP to include non-food inputs as part of the Government's counterpart contribution.

Management and Coordination

33. The management structure of the EMOP was fairly lean and cost-efficient, given the scale of the project. Support costs were much lower than for similar types of emergency operations (under US\$6 per beneficiary), because it was possible to rely on a well functioning national monitoring structure and staff. The PMO/Leading Group/Township Implementation Group structure was appropriate for China and worked well.
34. WFP Beijing staff provided valuable inputs into project start-up and early food distribution monitoring prior to the recruitment of project staff. The Government was well into the implementation of the EMOP by the time the sub-offices were established and performed well using established mechanisms and procedures. Sub-offices were a good idea and worked well. However, workload fell disproportionately on sub-offices in relation to the Beijing office. Sub-office staff, in particular food monitors, worked very hard putting in seven-day weeks and covering a huge area on their monitoring visits. The Jiangxi sub-office, feeling that the Chinese of the expatriate food monitors was limited, paired up expatriate monitors with the national food monitors. This effectively reduced project monitoring coverage for Jiangxi and Anhui from six teams to three.
35. An audit instigated by the People's National Congress found that there was misuse of government emergency funds at the township level. Had a proper monitoring systems review taken place beforehand, township monitoring, although undertaken to some extent, would have received more attention by EMOP monitoring.
36. There was limited formal capacity-building by the project, although food monitors received considerable on-the-job training. More counterpart training would have been required to ensure that PRA methods were applied and that early monitoring activities and reporting were in line with WFP's requirements.

Effectiveness of Monitoring

37. The effectiveness of the monitoring system hinged on the existence of two parallel monitoring systems. The combination of the two resulted in an efficient and effective



system and allowed for broad coverage. Nevertheless, effectiveness and capacity-building could have been improved by providing for regular exchange and analysis meetings involving the participation of monitors from both systems.

38. EMOP reporting forms were poorly designed and inadequately explained—thus resulting initially in inaccurate feedback. Commodity tracking was also inconsistent and resulted in final figures that were difficult to reconcile with actual WFP/Government contributions.
39. No evidence was found that the EMOP had monitored government counterpart funding. Since the final report of the Government has yet to be prepared, the mission was unable to satisfactorily review this issue.
40. Performance indicators as established in the project document were not useful as they did not relate to the key project objective and focused on output monitoring of the second objective. The EMOP impact study, the objective of which was to gauge the effect of the emergency food aid on people's livelihoods, was a worthwhile initiative but had methodological flaws.

Lessons:

- A strong national monitoring system and culture enable WFP to reduce its own monitoring role and staffing. Nevertheless, in order to combine the two systems into one effective one, both systems should have regular joint feedback and analysis sessions allowing for review of issues arising during monitoring visits, project assumptions and impact on beneficiaries.
- An effective monitoring system should be built on a thorough analysis of potential weak spots of an existing system or of the system the project intends to set up. Such analysis will allow project monitors to pay special attention to weak links in the chain and will result in a sounder system.
- An impact study accompanying an emergency project can be an important and valuable tool to inform monitoring and evaluation. However, care must be taken to provide the necessary technical support and staffing to establish valid survey methods and to include non-project villages in the survey to better assess impact.

PROJECT IMPACT³

Impact of Food Aid

41. The Government's disaster preparedness significantly reduced the loss of lives in comparison with previous floods. The EMOP contributed to the Government's commitment that nobody should die of hunger. However, it was never proposed that the EMOP would save lives, and correctly so, since flood-related deaths occurred in July and

³ In professional evaluation terms a distinction is made between the "outcome"—which is the short-term effect of the intervention—and the "impact" which is the higher level effect. The term "impact" as used in this summary report refers to the short-term effects achieved by the EMOP.



August as a consequence of dyke breaks, drowning and hurricanes. Careful attention was given by the Government to drinking water, sanitation and disease control to reduce disease-related deaths. In spite of frequent claims by local governments that the EMOP saved lives, the mission found no evidence to support this claim.

42. Food aid reduced indebtedness. Non-project villages and non-beneficiaries were forced to buy or borrow rice for the entire period from their return to the village in October until the first rice harvest in mid-June, whereas EMOP beneficiaries got four months of free rice from the project. However, the impact on debt was modest, considering that the value of EMOP rice per person was only RMB 850⁴ for a family of four, whereas the average household typically borrowed RMB 15,000 to build a new house. Beneficiaries confirmed that the assistance provided some food security and boosted their morale and self-confidence. To a certain extent, government counterpart funding also had an impact of keeping debts at bay.
43. Food aid did not create dependency or disincentives for self-help labour contributions. On the contrary, it reduced dependency insofar as it speeded up recovery. Although quantities were large, food aid had a minimal effect on local economies and markets. It was not a disincentive for production and did not distort local prices.

Impact of FFR

44. Reconstruction work would have been carried out anyway, with or without the project. However, in comparison with non-project villages, the EMOP sped up recovery. Better quality work was undertaken because the EMOP received more attention from the Government, which provided and more funding than would otherwise have been the case.
45. Although food aid reduced migration by providing additional security for families, it did not entirely stop people from going outside to work. Decisions on whether to go out for work often depended on balancing the need for cash with the need to contribute physically to reconstruction. Food rations did not markedly increase farmers' incentive to work because all villagers were obliged to participate in reconstruction and the value of the rice received was only a fraction of market wages. Food rations did not give people more time for reconstruction because they had no surplus labour and were fully engaged.
46. Crop production has fully recovered except in cases of severe land damage, hence households that only suffered crop loss will soon recover economically, whereas families that lost their house and all their assets will need many years to regain prior living standards. New floods in 1999 were a serious setback for the severely-affected areas.

Impact on Women

47. The EMOP enhanced the status, self-esteem and management capacity of the over 10,000 women who served on Village Development Committees. The effects on individual participants will last even though the committees were disbanded when the project ended. The impact on the status of ordinary farm women was more modest. Participation in FFR had little impact on women's status because Chinese women have a long tradition of participation in collective labour. Collection of food rations had little impact on women's control over food because Chinese women typically control the household food stocks and savings. Although the impact study and weekly progress reports state that food aid enabled women to start income-generating activities, this only occurred in a few isolated cases

⁴ Equivalent to approximately US\$102



where the local government gave women employment in township industries or loans to replace animals lost in the floods. On the whole, the project did not raise women's income because women have no spare time or resources to start new income-generating activities.

Lesson:

Women's participation in decision-making, particularly in China, is more important for improving their status than their participation in physical labour or in receiving the food allocation. Projects striving to increase women's participation should therefore pay more attention to effectively increasing women's role in decision-making processes.

Impact on Disaster Preparedness/Response Capacity

48. Although the Government has greatly improved its disaster preparedness and response capacity through dyke reinforcement coupled with relocation of entire villages away from flood-prone areas, the EMOP's contribution was relatively minor. Because the releasing of food stocks against a donor's pledge greatly facilitated the rapid distribution of food, institutionalization of a standing commodity borrowing agreement with WFP for future emergencies could enhance disaster preparedness and response capacity.

Added Value of EMOP

49. If donors had channelled food aid directly to the Government, rather than through WFP, it would probably have gone to the Department of Emergency and Social Relief of the Ministry of Civil Affairs—not to MOA. VAM provided for a new targeting method that may be used by WFP and the Government in the future. Government counterpart funding for rehabilitation would probably have been spread more thinly. Donor grain would probably have been released to beneficiaries on credit (against the promise to repay at the first harvest). Donors would not have had the opportunity of monitoring where their grain went and how it was used and villagers would have had no way to ensure that the distribution was fair. Nevertheless, channelling the food aid through the Ministry of Civil Affairs would have had the advantage of avoiding stressful breaks in distribution for beneficiaries and reducing the need for counties to borrow from grain stations.

50. In comparison with the alternative of channelling food aid through the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the EMOP had the following added value:

- It reduced the debt of beneficiary households by about RMB 850 (US\$103);
- It speeded up livelihood recovery through rehabilitation of household and village assets;
- It attracted nearly US\$12 million in counterpart funds to project counties;
- Through information-sharing with villagers, it increased transparency in project implementation and empowered beneficiaries to monitor food distribution;
- It co-opted 10,000 women onto Village Development Committees and empowered 20,000 women to take part in beneficiary registration and food distribution committees;



- It built up and strengthened local capacity in the design, implementation and monitoring of large-scale emergency operations;
- VAM improved targeting;
- The WFP monitoring system reassured donors that the food they donated was properly monitored and reached the intended beneficiaries;
- It ensured timely and effective reporting on progress, much appreciated by the donor community;
- The project gave WFP high visibility as an emergency organization and further enhanced WFP's image in China; and
- It gave WFP valuable experience for future emergencies and lessons applicable in China and elsewhere, especially about the appropriateness of combining relief with FFR.

WEAKNESSES AND RELATED PROJECT DESIGN ISSUES

Timing

51. The project's main weakness relates to the scheduling of activities and to the balance between relief and recovery in the overall project design (see the Annex).

- The optimal timing of the relief phase was missed due to a one-month delay between the signing of the LOU and the first government food distribution. The Government was ready to distribute but WFP did not authorize the distribution since the first distribution could only be made upon confirmation of donor funding. As a result, the distinction between the one month of relief grain and the three months of FFR made little sense because flood victims had already returned to their villages and were engaged (*de facto*) in rehabilitation work.
- The overall duration of the EMOP was too short to enable it to fully accomplish its objectives of meeting acute food needs and recovering household and community assets.
- Food needs were not fully met: at the end of the project, beneficiaries needed to borrow rice for an additional two and a half months.
- In severely affected areas, three months of FFR were insufficient to allow households to rehabilitate their house, wells, farmland, canals and roads. The rehabilitation work started before the EMOP and in spite of 100 percent achievement of FFR targets it continued after the EMOP.
- Although project staff were fielded on schedule, this was too late to influence the participatory planning process because village development plans were finalized by the local government before the EMOP started.
- Although the EMOP sub-offices were opened and closed on time (as specified in the project document), the timing was not optimal because the first food distribution took place before the EMOP sub-offices opened and the last distribution was made after the sub-offices closed.



- FFR was only partly monitored because the WFP sub-office food monitors were not in place to monitor it before 12 December 1998.
- The delay in the arrival of the wheat shipments caused two breaks in rice distribution; these occurred because the donor made its second wheat shipment contingent upon the arrival and acceptance of the first one.

Project Objectives and Packaging

52. The project document gave primacy to a relief objective but it is clear from internal correspondence that WFP anticipated that the Government would meet the emergency needs and that WFP assistance would mainly focus on the recovery phase. Rehabilitation was given as a secondary objective in the project document but it is apparent that during implementation it became the principal objective.
53. At the time of the Government's request, there was a real emergency situation with need for relief and had the project started according to the original schedule, it would have hit the relief phase. It was appropriate to package the project as an EMOP because its primary focus was on meeting the acute, short-term food needs of flood victims. Its presentation as an EMOP facilitated rapid processing and increased its appeal to potential food donors. The PRRO process would have been far too slow and probably no more appropriate, given that the floods were not a 'protracted' emergency.

Linkage between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

54. Although theoretically it may seem attractive to link disaster relief, rehabilitation and development, in practice it is important to recognize that each phase presupposes a different set of target beneficiaries and a different way of utilizing food. The EMOP experienced difficulties when it attempted to combine relief and food for work in a single project. This experience has helped WFP and the Government to clarify some of the practical implications of supporting food-for-work-type activities in the recovery process.

Food for Work versus Food for Recovery

55. The so-called FFW arrangements put in place were unlike those applied in government or WFP development projects, and although country office staff were aware of the distinction, the use of the term "food for work" still led to considerable confusion at the local government level. There was little or no connection between the food distributed and the work done. Because it was essentially a relief distribution and nobody could be excluded, work norms could not be applied.

Lesson:

FFW requirements and modalities for recovery differ from those of development projects. Strict FFW in an emergency is not appropriate. WFP food should simply support households' efforts to recover their livelihoods and not stipulate work targets. Describing such activity as 'FFR' rather than FFW would eliminate unnecessary confusion and would still produce similar results and recovery efforts.




Need for Relief

56. Food aid was justified by the magnitude of the calamity and by the lack of purchasing power of those people affected, but not by an overall grain deficit. In severely affected areas, flood victims lost everything: house, crops, livestock and property. They had no stored food and no money to buy it. The Grain Bureau had sufficient reserves, but households could only gain access to grain for cash or on credit. They were falling deeply in debt to buy food. Rice surpluses were available for purchase from the Grain Bureau, but the counties and townships had no funds. Although the provinces and/or the central government arguably had the financial resources to purchase the grain, the Government could not simply decree that the Grain Bureaux release stocks to flood victims because it did not want to undermine their financial viability.



ANNEX

EMOP EVENTS AND ACTIVITIES¹

¹ This chart was elaborated by project stakeholders in every village and county visited by the Evaluation. The above represents a synthesis chart presenting overall findings.

