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SUMMARY REPORT OF THE EVALUATION OF UGANDA PRRO 6176.00

**Targeted Food Assistance for Refugees,
Internally Displaced Persons and Vulnerable
Groups**

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Note to the Executive Board



This document is submitted for consideration to the Executive Board.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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Executive Summary

In its first year of implementation, protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 6176.00 performed well in meeting its protracted relief objective, feeding unexpectedly large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in an unstable, unpredictable environment, but less well in meeting its recovery objectives, due largely to the continued encampment of IDPs. While relief activities have dominated PRRO 6176.00, attention has tended to focus on instituting recovery activities. However, more attention should be paid to strengthening core relief functions, such as verifying refugee and IDP numbers, and improving final distribution mechanisms and post-distribution monitoring.

The Emergency Food Needs Assessment (EFNA) methodology developed by the country office and regional vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) office in 2000 has contributed substantially to making food needs assessments for both IDPs and refugees more systematic, more responsive to programming needs and more collaborative. The mission encourages the country office to continue to build on this commendable initiative.


Although food-for-assets (FFA) activities have been generally beneficial, some were poorly conceived, a function of being supply and policy driven, with relatively little guidance provided to field offices. The country office has recognized these weaknesses and halted new activities pending the preparation of FFA guidelines for Uganda.

Two of the biggest future challenges for this operation concern the Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) for refugees and the resettlement of IDPs. Although WFP activities in refugee-hosting areas are explicitly linked to the SRS, this linkage needs to be strengthened. A related weakness of the SRS is the lack of clarity about the conditions for self-reliance. In relation to the resettlement of IDPs, WFP needs to be proactive at both the district and national levels, setting its sights on an agreed framework for resettlement. While it may be difficult to determine exactly what approach (and what risks) WFP should take, it is clear that the status quo is unsatisfactory. Strong leadership is required from within the United Nations system in Uganda, both to advocate for more urgent consideration of resettlement and to coordinate the funding and allocation of material inputs.

It was hoped that the introduction of the PRRO programme category would lead to longer-term funding commitments. This has not been the case with PRRO 6176.00, but one of the programming strengths of the PRRO category has been to allow the Uganda country office the flexibility to shift resources between the protracted relief and recovery components according to the situation on the ground. In this respect, the PRRO is a valuable programming tool for addressing relief needs while preparing for the resettlement of IDPs.



Draft Decision



The Board notes the recommendations contained in this evaluation report (WFP/EB.1/2002/5/2) and notes also the management action taken so far, as indicated in the associated information paper (WFP/EB.1/2002/INF/9). The Board encourages further action on these recommendations, with considerations raised during the discussion taken into account.



EVALUATION SCOPE AND METHOD

1. The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the relevance, timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of WFP assistance under the PRRO at the end of its first year and to assess the added value of including the operation in the PRRO programme category. The evaluation team was tasked to focus on the recovery strategy and on the conduct of planned relief and recovery activities, delivery of outputs and achievement of targets and stated objectives.
2. The mission consisted of five team members, including a UNHCR staff member, since a large portion of the PRRO caseload is comprised of refugees. The mission spent 25 days in Uganda in May–June 2001 and, in addition to consultations in Kampala, visited all WFP sub-offices involved in implementing the PRRO. The methods used included a participatory logical framework (logframe) exercise with WFP staff, site visits, key informant and focus group interviews with various stakeholders and a review of internal documents.

CONTEXT FOR PRRO 6176.00

3. As of 31 March 2001, WFP's protracted relief caseload included 147,323 southern Sudanese refugees and 520,522 IDPs. The Sudanese refugees began arriving in Uganda in 1988, fleeing war and famine, with the largest influx occurring in 1992. In 1994, the focus of assistance for refugees shifted from care and maintenance to local settlement. In 1998, the Government of Uganda and UNHCR launched the SRS, designed to further enable refugees to support themselves and to integrate services provided to refugees with those for nationals.
4. The insurgency causing internal displacement in Gulu and Kitgum districts commenced in 1986, but large-scale displacement and the creation of "protected villages" occurred in 1996/1997. Insecurity in Bundibugyo District in the southwest commenced with an insurgency in 1996, and WFP began focusing on the recovery of IDPs in late 1997, when insecurity subsided for a period. General levels of food insecurity and poverty in the districts concerned are now the highest in Uganda—demonstrating the direct correlation between war/civil disturbance and slow development.
5. The most significant contextual factor influencing the orientation of PRRO 6176.00 was that, while the operation was being planned, there had been some months of relative calm in Gulu and Kitgum districts, making the resettlement of the IDP caseload seem feasible.

PRRO STRATEGY AND DESIGN

6. In early 2000, EMOP 5816 (assistance to IDPs) and PRO 5623 (assistance to Sudanese refugees) were rolled into PRRO 6176.00. The PRRO's recovery strategy asserted that there would be a transition from relief to recovery, with a large expansion in the level of resources for FFA and food for training (FFT) as general distributions were phased out (up to 80 percent of resources were to be invested in recovery by the second year). However, the strategy was too optimistic and narrowly focused on the IDPs in the north, and did not provide adequate guidance on the circumstances under which the transition from relief to recovery could be made. Due to a resurgence of rebel activity in late December 1999, the



IDP caseload increased, and IDPs could not be resettled as had been planned. However, the PRRO—which was planned in mid-1999, approved by the Executive Board in February 2000 and launched in April 2000—was not amended to reflect this changed situation.

7. WFP's recovery activities in refugee-hosting areas take place in the context of the SRS, but in practice the linkage between the PRRO and the SRS needs to be strengthened. The problem is related to the lack of clarity about the conditions for self-reliance. Access to land is recognized as being key, but more guidance is required. Moreover, to facilitate programming, the definition of "refugee hosting area" in the SRS needs to be made more precise by referring directly to affected populations (i.e. where there is local competition for resources).
8. In terms of design, the PRRO planning document does not provide a road map for managers or a good basis for developing annual work plans or monitoring systems. While the country office has made considerable progress recently in developing work plans based on changed circumstances, satisfactory output statements have yet to be drafted to provide a solid foundation for monitoring and reporting.
9. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, WFP Uganda responded well to the increased relief requirements, affirming the flexibility in practice of the PRRO category. However, without clear guidance concerning the conditions under which recovery activities should be pursued or put on hold, field staff were unsure how to proceed with the planned recovery activities, resulting in some confusion, particularly in programming FFA.

Recommendations:

- ⇒ The Uganda country office should develop with UNHCR and the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) a definition of a "refugee hosting area", allowing WFP to focus its recovery interventions in areas populated by refugees. Once defined, both refugees and the host population could be embraced by FFA interventions.
- ⇒ All PRRO project documents should include a description of the operation based on a logical hierarchy (the results hierarchy of a logical framework).

ASSESSMENTS AND SURVEYS

10. The "architecture" for assessing food gaps, vulnerability and nutritional status is more developed for refugee than for IDP caseloads. UNHCR, the Government and WFP conduct biannual Joint Food Needs Assessment Missions (JFNAMs), and UNHCR contracts an international non-governmental organization (NGO) to conduct biannual nutrition surveys. There are no formal equivalents for IDPs, a deficiency that needs to be addressed by agencies and donors.
11. Assessment capacity for both IDP and refugee caseloads has been strengthened by the EFNA methodology, developed by the country office and the regional VAM office in collaboration with OPM, UNHCR, FAO and several NGOs. EFNA is a hybrid household food economy model with a focus on building national assessment capacity. As an aid to programming, it is a valuable tool for determining food gaps, and should not be expensive



to replicate. One of the outstanding challenges is to satisfactorily link EFNA studies and nutrition surveys.

12. The 2000 EFNA recommended targeting according to seasonal food availability in all IDP camps. However, this has been applied only to a limited extent.

Recommendations:

- ⇒ In collaboration with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Kampala, the Uganda country office should recommend to OPM that a six-month joint-assessment process be introduced for IDP operations, mirroring the assessment process in place for refugees.
- ⇒ The Uganda country office should hold discussions with WFP's implementing partners (IPs) and other NGOs concerning the establishment of more methodical nutritional monitoring for IDP camps, to inform decisions regarding rations. This should be considered a core function and allocated the necessary budgetary resources.
- ⇒ In order to guide programming, the regional VAM office and regional nutritionist should help the Uganda country office determine how to combine or link emergency food needs assessment studies and nutrition surveys, both in terms of the information collected and the interpretation of findings.
- ⇒ The Uganda country office should determine how many area-specific EFNA studies (mini-EFNAs) are required and can be managed in one year. The budget for the next phase should provide for these.
- ⇒ In consultation with IDP representatives, district officials and IPs, the Uganda country office should clarify its strategy in relation to the seasonal adjustment of rations. If seasonal adjustments are endorsed as an appropriate strategy, careful consideration should be given to determining when and by what amount rations should be increased/decreased during an annual cycle.

ACHIEVEMENT OF RELIEF OBJECTIVE

13. The objective of the relief component of the PRRO is to maintain minimum nutritional and dietary standards among the targeted populations. It is important to note that during the first year of the PRRO, WFP had to care for vastly more beneficiaries than anticipated, a situation that may persist into the next phase.



PROJECTED VERSUS ACTUAL BENEFICIARIES FOR FIRST YEAR OF PRRO

Beneficiaries	Original projection	Actual peak (June 2000)	Caseload at 31 June 2001
IDPs	190 000	573 440	520 522
Refugees	130 000	158 589	147 323
Total	320 000	732 029	667 845

Appropriateness of Relief Rations

14. Ration levels in the first year ranged from full rations (some refugees and a very small number of IDPs), to “quarter” rations, to “last phase” rations for refugees, which only include 10 g of oil. WFP bases these rations on the 100-percent reference of 1,818 kcal per person per day that has been in use in Uganda for several years, not on the 2,100 kcal reference introduced by WHO in 1997.
15. Ration levels are based on average per capita kilocalorie gaps for categories of camps/settlements. There is no targeting within camps/settlements, and indeed targeting would be problematic due to the practical difficulties in differentiating particular groups in a camp/settlement population from the rest. While the EFNA estimated that roughly 30 percent of the targeted population has greater food need (the “most food insecure”), the final calculation for planning purposes is the *average* food gap for each type of camp/settlement. Therefore, the most food insecure are receiving only a portion of what they need to bridge their greater food gap. It is not known how they cope under these circumstances.
16. Positive inferences can be drawn about the appropriateness of ration levels and the effectiveness of WFP’s assistance, given that nutrition outcomes have generally been satisfactory, although the mission stresses that data is relatively scanty for IDPs. The worst nutrition rates appear to be related to health and feeding practices, not to lack of food.

Recommendations:

- ⇒ The Uganda country office should establish the WHO-recommended reference ration of 2,100 kcal in the next phase of the PRRO.
- ⇒ The Uganda country office should determine how the most food insecure cope, given that general rations do not meet their assessed (greater-than-average) food gap. Recommendations should be made for future programming, both in terms of reducing negative redistribution and enhancing positive social redistribution.

Core Relief Responsibilities

17. Although relief activities have dominated PRRO 6176.00 to date, attention has focused on instituting recovery activities. This is understandable given the emphasis on effecting a transition; however, it has diluted attention to the fundamental tasks required to discharge WFP’s core responsibility to feed the hungry poor (i.e. meet assessed needs). It is recognized that WFP also has a responsibility to help refugees and IDPs to recover, and that relief should be geared to recovery. Nevertheless, the relief responsibility is primary and



irreducible. The mission noted shortcomings in relation to registration/verification, final distributions and post-distribution monitoring.

⇒ *Registration/verification*

18. Although efforts to conduct a census of refugees and verify IDP numbers are now under way, there was no census of Sudanese refugees or verification of IDPs in the period leading up to the PRRO, and no move to address the issue until six months into the PRRO. Refugee and IDP numbers are widely regarded to be inaccurate (generally inflated).

⇒ *Final Distribution*

19. Although most IP distributions are probably well organized, distributions in some camps are not, leading to a scramble for food—a situation that has proven hazardous for some beneficiaries. In addition, under-scooping and other forms of petty diversion are apparently quite common, impacting particularly on the more vulnerable.

⇒ *Post-distribution Monitoring*

20. The country office recognizes the importance of WFP field staff's returning to camps/settlements to randomly check how much food relief enters households and how it is utilized. Nevertheless, at the time of the evaluation, this form of post-distribution monitoring was not being conducted as a result of the pressure on field offices. This points to the need to better prioritize tasks, for training, and possibly for more staff. In addition, the monitoring responsibilities of UNHCR and WFP in the West Nile need to be more clearly defined.

Recommendations:

- ⇒ WFP should amend the PRRO guidelines to require a relief and recovery strategy to ensure planning for core mandate responsibilities related to meeting food relief needs, including the development of strategies for verifying beneficiary numbers, ensuring distributions are safe and equitable, monitoring final distributions and reaching the most food insecure.
- ⇒ The Uganda country office should include in the PRRO relief and recovery strategy an approach for ensuring that a reasonably accurate estimate of beneficiary numbers is attained and maintained.
- ⇒ The Uganda country office should continue to advocate for, and invest in, the registration of refugees and verification of all IDP numbers. Verification of IDPs should be conducted in close collaboration with district authorities through district disaster management committees.
- ⇒ The Uganda country office, in collaboration with district authorities, distribution committees and IPs (and with UNHCR in refugee-hosting areas), should continue to review distribution systems with a view to improving their effectiveness, particularly in relation to equity and the safety of beneficiaries.
- ⇒ As its first priority in relation to strengthening monitoring and evaluation, the Uganda country office should invest in the capacity of field staff to conduct post-distribution monitoring.



ACHIEVEMENT OF RECOVERY OBJECTIVES

21. The stated objective of the recovery component of the PRRO is essentially to support IDP resettlement and refugee self-reliance. The largest planned interventions are school feeding followed by FFA (for “rehabilitation”). Provision was also made for supplementary and therapeutic feeding and for support of institutions assisting vulnerable groups (such as formerly abducted children).
22. Projections for recovery activities were for assistance to a total 178,000 beneficiaries (11,259 tons) in the first year. By the end of the year, 209,714 beneficiaries had received assistance (118 percent compared with target), but only 3,123 tons had been utilized (28 percent compared with target). This reflects a slow start to school feeding: participating students rose to 73 percent of projections by the end of the first year, but only 27 percent of projected commodities were utilized. The planned expansion of the school feeding programme needs to take into account the capacity of the district and of WFP staff.
23. Similarly, although the number of FFA beneficiaries in the first year exceeded the initial projection (137 percent), the quantity of food utilized was well under target (28 percent). Field staff have found it difficult to generate FFA activities for encamped populations of IDPs or refugees, and so have mainly supported projects put forward for or by non-IDP and non-refugee populations—a concentration that is questionable, given the stated objectives of the PRRO. In refugee-hosting areas it is appropriate to integrate the host population in FFA activities, but not to concentrate on this population.
24. It is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of recovery interventions because no benchmarks are provided to measure recovery or the attainment of self-reliance, and reporting has not addressed outcomes. While some FFA activities have been of value to beneficiaries, others have been poorly conceived. FFA projects have tended to be supply and policy driven, and have frequently been undermined by a lack of matching inputs from IPs. The country office recognizes that there have been weaknesses in the approach and is not undertaking new activities until comprehensive FFA guidelines for Uganda (incorporating FFW and FFT) are finalized.
25. Local purchase is conducted by the country office on a significant scale, and the Agriculture and Marketing Support Initiative (part of the Country Programme) works to build the capacity of small farmer associations that participate in WFP tender processes. This project has proved very complementary to PRRO 6176.00, during the first year of which 33 percent of cereals and 37 percent of pulses were procured within Uganda. Market support through local purchases is clearly an important recovery activity, and the mission learned that there was widespread support for local purchase from district authorities in operational areas.
26. WFP staff appear to enjoy smooth and amicable working relationships with district authorities, although in some cases the authorities believe WFP could do more to support agricultural production and infrastructure development. There is a need to include WFP’s activities in district development plans, to which end the mission suggests that WFP staff consult closely with the district councils, and hold regular meetings with government counterparts and IPs.



Recommendations:

- ⇒ The relief and recovery strategy for the next phase of the PRRO should provide more guidance on how to build recovery into relief interventions, and how to determine when to make the transition from relief to recovery activities, given different scenarios.
- ⇒ The expansion of school feeding should be based on (a) an overall strategy in the district concerned; (b) the capacity of sub-office staff to monitor the intervention; and (c) the capacity of the local government to accommodate the expansion of schools. In addition, baseline data should be collected on the schools currently in the pilot, and on any that are added.
- ⇒ The principal beneficiaries of FFA should be IDPs and refugees, although it is acknowledged that in the case of refugees, the host population should be integrated in these activities and also benefit.
- ⇒ The Operations Department (OD) should give priority to developing and distributing corporate guidelines on FFA.
- ⇒ Any project expansion to PRRO 6176.00 should clearly outline the support expected through activity 6100.00 under the CP and include a local purchase strategy, setting realistic targets in terms of procurement from local farmers in the geographic areas covered by PRRO 6176.00.
- ⇒ Without neglecting to maintain its linkages with central authorities, the Uganda country office should explore opportunities created by government decentralization in Uganda and forge linkages with the districts on the basis of shared interests. It should also ensure that its activities are accounted for in district development plans.

MANAGEMENT

27. Security is a considerable constraint on the operation, particularly in Gulu, Kitgum and Bundibugyo districts. It imposes down time on deliveries to camps (sometimes for up to a week), inhibits assessment and monitoring and places staff in threatening circumstances. Security plans are in place, security-awareness training has been undertaken for all staff, and communication facilities and journey monitoring are excellent. However, the mission observed a contracted vehicle bearing large WFP stickers transporting soldiers in Gulu town, which compromises staff safety.
28. There are some deficiencies in the monitoring and reporting system, including the lack of benchmarks or indicators for monitoring outcomes. Although a lot of quantitative data is generated, there is very little qualitative reporting (including reporting on the effectiveness of recovery interventions). Even the quantitative reports do not compare performance to targets. Work is required to apply the EFNA methodology to monitoring, putting more emphasis on the incremental collection of data. Other constraints are the relatively poor quality of information received from IPs, and the lack of standardization.
29. It is noteworthy that a monitoring and evaluation focal point for the Uganda country office was appointed at the beginning of 2001, reflecting a recognition of the need to address monitoring weaknesses.



30. Country office and sub-office staff have identified as a weakness the general lack of experience and training in planning and managing recovery activities. While some staff have had opportunities for training over the past year, not enough has been undertaken for field staff expected to carry the burden of monitoring, or for IPs and district counterparts in support of some of the key operational aspects of the PRRO (core relief functions, planning and managing FFA and school feeding, etc.).

Recommendations:

- ⇒ The Uganda country office should ensure enforcement of its zero-tolerance approach to using United Nations–registered (or any vehicle bearing a United Nations insignia/sticker) for transporting soldiers.
- ⇒ The monitoring and reporting obligations outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding between WFP and its IPs in Uganda (including the Letters of Understanding with OPM) should be reviewed and revised in order to (a) standardize the relevant clauses; (b) clarify the specific monitoring roles of each party; and (c) provide standard report formats for each type of intervention (general food distributions, school feeding, FFA, etc.).
- ⇒ Training needs of sub-office staff and IPs should be reviewed for the implementation of the next phase of the PRRO, ensuring that staff have the skills necessary to discharge WFP’s core relief responsibilities, as well as more developmental functions under a PRRO.

COMMITMENTS TO WOMEN

31. The PRRO sets out to target women, but the analysis of disadvantage and vulnerability is not specific to the camp/settlement context, and no qualitative, gender-sensitive indicators are suggested for evaluating performance beyond numerical achievements.
32. The country office and IPs have encouraged a greater number of women to collect rations on behalf of their families, although outcomes are uncertain. Efforts have also been made to assist women to exercise more authority, stipulating participation in distribution committees (90 percent in Bundibugyo district). As of yet, no leadership training has been provided.
33. The PRRO set as a target the allocation to women of 65 to 70 percent of recovery resources and at least 30 percent of project outputs/assets created through FFA, but it is not clear if these targets have been met. Few FFA interventions have adequately considered gender issues in their selection and management. The country office is aware of this shortcoming and plans to provide training to IPs. Attempts have been made to use FFT to empower women.
34. Although the country office collects a considerable amount of disaggregated data and requires IPs to do so as well, qualitative monitoring of progress in relation to WFP’s Commitments to Women is missing.



Recommendations:

- ⇒ The project document for the next phase of PRRO 6176.00 should reflect a clear strategy for implementing WFP's Commitments to Women. This should also be reflected in work plans and in Memoranda of Understanding with IPs. Gender-sensitive performance-monitoring indicators should be developed to enable measurement of achievements against the Commitments to Women and WFP Uganda's Gender Action Plan.
- ⇒ The Uganda country office should undertake a follow-up survey to the 1999 WFP Uganda Gender Baseline Survey in order to measure progress against original baseline data in the geographical areas and sectors relevant to the PRRO

COORDINATION

35. Inter-agency mechanisms (including the United Nations Disaster Management Team, [UNDMT]) need to invest more in negotiating with the Government on a framework for the resettlement of IDPs. The situation of IDPs is complicated by internal and external security issues, but the current situation should be regarded by WFP and other United Nations agencies as intolerable—people are suffering, opportunities for recovery are being lost and there is a risk that WFP and others will be caught offguard by a request to support a resettlement (or “decongestion”) plan that is not in the interest of IDPs.
36. WFP cannot go it alone given that resettlement involves security issues, requires high-level central-government support, is easily politicized at the district level and will require strong support for non-food items (NFIs). Strong leadership is required from within the United Nations system. OCHA has a mandate for coordinating efforts to assist IDPs, and should be encouraged to play a leading advocacy role provided its capacity can be bolstered (leaving WFP to continue to lead operationally).
37. Cooperation between WFP and UNHCR is good but there is a need to build stronger linkages between the PRRO and the SRS, and to revisit the JFNAM recommendation to draft joint annual work plans. UNHCR is in the midst of an exercise that will pare it down to “core activities”. While the outcome is not yet clear, WFP should remain apprised of developments, as it could see UNHCR retreating from some activities.
38. In West Nile, WFP and UNHCR are often using the same IP and should give renewed consideration to tripartite agreements.
39. The Uganda country office generally views IPs in West Nile as competent and accountable, and working relationships are described as amicable and effective. In contrast, the main IP in Gulu and Kitgum districts appears to be weak, but the scale of the task and insecurity in the districts make it difficult for WFP to secure an alternative IP.
40. The refugee and IDP problems in northern Uganda are bound up with events in Southern Sudan. The country office has worked with Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) to establish an information-sharing system to ensure that WFP Uganda has access to food security information from southern Sudan.



Recommendations:

- ⇒ The Uganda country office should participate in government and donor fora where resettlement is discussed and promote the need to develop a framework for resettlement involving the government, United Nations agencies, donors and NGOs. In addition, the Uganda country office should advocate in the appropriate forum that an IDP coordinator be appointed (possibly an OCHA representative).
- ⇒ The formulation of a relief and recovery strategy for PRRO 6176.00 should include careful consideration of what type of IDP resettlement plan would be in the best interest of the people and what type of plan WFP should promote and support.
- ⇒ In line with recommendations in the UNHCR/WFP Memorandum of Understanding, joint plans of action consistent with the SRS should be developed at the field level to forge stronger links between UNHCR, WFP, the Government and IPs.
- ⇒ WFP and UNHCR should give renewed consideration to entering into tripartite agreements with IPs in Uganda. In relation to nutrition monitoring, the country office should consider pursuing a tripartite agreement between WFP, UNHCR and the health IPs to streamline information needs and establish mechanisms for addressing problems.
- ⇒ The Uganda country office should prepare simple criteria for selecting IPs for general food distribution, food-for-asset projects, supplementary/therapeutic feeding programmes and school feeding (including assessing their technical capacity) and consider assisting existing IPs in training their staff to improve the performance of the PRRO.
- ⇒ As recommended in the 2000 JFNAM, WFP should strengthen its relations with OLS in order to exploit windows of opportunity for common programming.

THE PRRO AS A PROGRAMME CATEGORY

41. The PRRO was under-resourced at its commencement, and no commodities arrived until the third month. By the end of 2000, pledges amounted only to 37 percent of what was requested and receipts to only 10 percent. Most of the resources used by the PRRO until the end of 2000 (over 33,000 tons) came from carryovers from the preceding emergency operation and protracted emergency operations for refugees and displaced persons. If these stocks had not been available, the PRRO would have been starved of commodities. As of June 2001, there was a large shortfall in commodities for the remaining year of the PRRO. When the PRRO programme category was introduced, it was hoped that it would lead to longer-term funding commitments. This has not been the case with PRRO 6176.00.
42. Resourcing of NFI requirements has not been an issue due to the continued encampment of IDPs and consequent under-expenditure on recovery, but the resources would have been inadequate had resettlement proceeded.
43. Combining the refugee and IDP caseloads into one operation resulted in some rationalization of management, greater continuity of staffing, some transport cost savings and greater budgetary flexibility. One of the strengths of this programme category has been its flexibility in allowing the Uganda country office to shift resources between the



protracted relief and recovery components according to the situation on the ground. In this respect, the PRRO is a valuable programming tool for addressing relief needs while preparing for the resettlement of IDPs.

44. WFP needs to match the potential flexibility and responsiveness of the PRRO category with flexible replanning procedures and documentation. It is also evident that there is a risk that a focus on recovery may lead to inadequate attention to relief responsibilities. This needs to be addressed.
45. There are some skeptics about the added value of WFP implementing FFA projects, and WFP will need to demonstrate its effectiveness. This will require a greater investment in design and staffing, adding to the cost of PRROs. The success of FFA projects is also dependent on securing matching NFIs. This puts a premium on coordination with other agencies and organizations.



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

EFNA	Emergency food needs assessment
FFA	Food for assets
FFT	Food for training
FFW	Food for work
IDP	Internally displaced person
NGO	Non-governmental organization
IP	Implementing partner (of WFP)
JFNAM	Joint Food Needs Assessment Mission
NFI	Non-food item
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PRRO	Protracted relief and recovery operation
SRS	Self-Reliance Strategy
UNDMT	United Nations Disaster Management Team
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VAM	Vulnerability analysis and mapping
WHO	World Health Organization

