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INFORMATION NOTE ON THE REVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS JOINT LOGISTICS CENTRE (UNJLC) IN LIBERIA

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted for information to the Executive Board.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.


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DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of the information contained in “Information Note on the Review of the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) in Liberia” (WFP/EB.2/2004/2-C).

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.



INTRODUCTION

1. This review is part of a trilogy that started with a review of the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) Afghanistan operation in June 2003, followed by a review of UNJLC Iraq operations in September 2003. The objective of all three reviews was to identify lessons and best practices for improving application of the UNJLC concept in future deployments.
2. The review was undertaken in February 2004 by external consultants through the Netherlands firm Royal Haskoning. WFP provided oversight through its Office of Evaluation (OEDE), in cooperation with the Surface Transport Service (OTL) and UNJLC.

THE PROCESS

3. The review is based on a participatory and collaborative approach. It was carried out in three phases: in Phase I—Preparatory/Documentary: Headquarters—the team reviewed documents and interviewed United Nations agency staff at the headquarters level; Phase II—Learning from Action: the Field—was carried out in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal and used techniques such as the after-action review to capture knowledge and lessons; and Phase III—Identifying Lessons: the Report—produced a full technical report and a summary report containing lessons from the UNJLC experience in Liberia and recommendations for improving UNJLC activities in future deployments. Both reports are available from OEDE.

UNJLC ACTIVATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING

4. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG) activated the UNJLC Liberia in accordance with the Activation Protocol on August 13 2003 for an initial period of three months. Preparation work was undertaken by the Rome-based core unit, which also prepared the WFP special operations (SOs) for funding UNJLC operations.
5. The mission for UNJLC Liberia was to complement and coordinate the logistics capabilities of humanitarian agencies during the crisis. In principle, each participating agency would continue to operate its own transport assets, but the agencies would jointly plan the use of the limited transport infrastructure.
6. A new challenge for the UNJLC Liberia operation was the coordination of humanitarian inter-agency logistics with those of the peacekeeping force. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) had to mobilize 15,000 troops in six months, and the impact of this on Liberian infrastructure was considerable; hence the clear need for coordination from UNJLC. The creation of the Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC) was instrumental in this respect.
7. UNJLC activities were related to the four SO components: (i) the central coordination platform to identify and resolve logistics bottlenecks for humanitarian logistics operations in the region; (ii) the logistics information platform; (iii) the air movement and coordination platform; and (iv) the civil–military coordination platform.
8. Twelve international and six national staff were employed throughout the UNJLC Liberia operation, with a peak of eight international staff in November 2003. Staff were recruited by UNJLC or seconded by WFP and the United Kingdom’s Department for



International Development (DFID). The management structure for this operation was simple and straightforward, with the Chief UNJLC reporting directly to the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). An important achievement for the institutionalization of the UNJLC concept was the fact that the operation was managed without the direct involvement of OTL, its originator.

MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS

9. Throughout the whole Liberia operation, UNJLC consulted with United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local authorities and the military on their needs for logistics coordination and information. It chaired the well-attended weekly joint logistics meetings and subsequently compiled the weekly bulletins. The logistics maps prepared by UNJLC were much appreciated by all stakeholders, as were the various technical logistics reports.
10. UNJLC conducted a number of technical and logistics assessments of aspects of the transport infrastructure and system in Liberia, such as Richard International Airport, Freeport Monrovia, roads and bridges, warehouses, trucking companies and heavy construction equipment, often in association with other United Nations agencies and NGOs.
11. The distribution of diesel fuel to United Nations agencies in the first weeks of August was extremely successful in getting the humanitarian operations moving in Liberia. Subsequently, UNJLC mapped the fuel stations in Monrovia, produced an assessment of the fuel facilities up-country and published fuel prices in its weekly bulletins. In November 2003, the fuel expert made a detailed analysis of UNMIL's impact on the fuel situation in Liberia, and prepared recommendations for future improvements. This study was very useful for UNMIL when drafting a long-term fuel supply contract, and for the humanitarian community when assessing its fuel needs and determining its fuel strategy.
12. UNJLC compiled the Customs and Immigration Study indicating areas for international assistance with short-term and medium-term capacity-building. UNJLC secured the reactivation of United Nations privileges and immunities related to immigration, and negotiated reduced fees and charges for humanitarian transports at sea ports, airports and border crossing points. A vital operational link via the civil-military coordination (CMCoord) humanitarian environment was established with the UNMIL peacekeeping forces in Liberia, and this de-conflicted humanitarian and military logistics operations.

MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Activation Process

13. The activation of UNJLC Liberia was in full compliance with its protocol. However, internal WFP consultation at the headquarters, regional bureau and country office levels on the establishment of air operations and UNJLC was reported to be insufficient, resulting in slow acceptance of UNJLC during the first phases of its implementation.
14. As common services are increasingly becoming a standard feature in complex emergencies, WFP should make clear its position on the activation and decision-making processes of the services under its custodianship, including holding timely consultations with the field prior to inter-agency discussions in order to define the need and scope for an



UNJLC operation. This will increase the acceptance and effectiveness of UNJLC once activated.

15. As was the case in Iraq, UNJLC should, to the extent possible, remain a non-operational centre focusing on the coordination of inter-agency logistics. Only if there is a clear request from the major United Nations agencies and users should UNJLC be involved in predefined operational tasks.

Value-Added

16. UNJLC Liberia has proven to be value-added in special sectors such as (i) providing fuel to United Nations agencies and NGOs in the first weeks after re-entry, (ii) providing logistics maps, (iii) assessing infrastructure for airports, sea ports and roads, (iv) arranging customs and priority procedures for the entry of humanitarian goods, (v) negotiating reduced charges and fees for cargo handling and storage, and (vi) providing reports on fuel and immigration and customs.
17. For WFP there was less value-added from UNJLC related to the West Africa Regional PRRO project. However, WFP recognized that UNJLC activities produced indirect benefits, because it coordinated the logistics requirements related to non-food items (NFIs) for UNMIL and other United Nations agencies and NGOs.
18. UNJLC operations should be short in duration and should focus on the onset and first phases of emergency situations, as this provides the greatest value-added impact to humanitarian response operations.
19. UNJLC should develop a catalogue of its services and products that underlines their value-added benefit to United Nations agencies and NGOs. Highlighting the top five services/products would further assist stakeholders in better positioning the UNJLC. In any case, UNJLC should avoid duplicating work done by others.

Capacity-Building and Exit Strategy

20. In the first months of operations, the capacity building of local government authorities in Liberia was hampered by the new transitional government's frequent staff replacements. In addition, for political reasons, government staff could not always participate in up-country logistics assessments. Nevertheless, Freeport staff were trained in port management and operation capabilities, and Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) staff in assessing airfield strips.
21. UNJLC should continue to report regularly to the United Nations country team (UNCT) in order to ensure the team's full engagement in UNJLC operations. Extensions of UNJLC operations can be decided by the UNCT and/or HC based on present needs for the coordination of inter-agency logistics.
22. UNJLC should scale down its operations and exit as soon as other United Nations agencies have established themselves in the crisis area and are ready to take over inter-agency logistics coordination from UNJLC. UNJLC exit operations should be carried out in close consultation with, and with the approval of, the UNCT or HC.

UNJLC Core Unit

23. For the UNJLC Liberia operation, the core unit in Rome functioned as originally envisaged, whereas in the Afghanistan operation there was no core unit; in the Iraq operation it was just taking shape when the crisis hit. The core unit coordinated the design and start-up for the UNJLC Liberia operations, formulated the SO project document, and was later involved in general strategy support and information management.



24. The core unit is well suited to covering strategic issues and providing support functions such as information management and mapping.
25. Some stakeholders indicated that UNJLC should be proactive in publicizing its guiding concept, services and products at Headquarters and the field level so as to increase its impact. It was also reported that as a continuing feature of UNJLC in periods between emergency crises the UNJLC core unit should develop brief standard operating procedures (SOPs) for new UNJLC operations and staff so that they can benefit more from recent UNJLC experiences. UNJLC staff should be properly debriefed for this purpose.

Management and Staffing

26. WFP has established the Human Resource Consultancy Unit as a centralized system for contracting and administering international consultants, including international UNJLC staff. This will ensure that UNJLC staff are properly contracted and covered while moving from one operation to another. A focal point for international UNJLC staff within the core unit will ensure smooth liaison with WFP Headquarters-based administration and finance units.
27. Where appropriate, UNJLC should continue to make use of the WFP stand-by agreements (SBAs), which are an efficient resource for the rapid mobilization of staff for UNJLC operations. UNJLC should trim its staffing to the actual requirements for coordinating inter-agency logistics, and should ensure that sufficient senior staff with logistics experience are recruited from the outset of its operations.
28. UNJLC Liberia received administrative and financial support from the WFP country office. However, the capacity of the country office staff was reported to be of low efficiency, resulting in delays in paying local staff's salaries and procuring the items necessary for UNJLC operations. The recruitment of local UNJLC logistics assistants to liaise with the country office staff improved procedures to a certain extent. This option should be applied whenever appropriate.
29. UNJLC should ensure that local vendors and suppliers meet WFP vetting requirements.

Central Coordination

30. Various assessments of the transport infrastructure in Liberia were undertaken with the aim of identifying and eliminating logistics bottlenecks. Logistics information has been compiled in maps, reports and weekly bulletins. Agency feedback was encouraged in order to make the information products more responsive to user requirements. The UNJLC website was also used to collect information at the field level; agency and NGO staff frequently visited the UNJLC office for personal updates. Stakeholders reported that the information provided by UNJLC strongly assisted them in their own logistics planning.
31. The custom interventions made by UNJLC were valuable to United Nations agencies and NGOs, given the transitional environment in Liberia at the time, during which there was no formal government in place for a while and then a transitional government with frequent changes of officials and procedures.
32. In August 2003, with the approval of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), UNJLC distributed diesel from the WFP-chartered vessel to the humanitarian community and to an electricity and water company in Monrovia to bridge the gap in the commercial fuel supply. It also surveyed the capacity of fuel storage and road tankers in the country, and mapped fuel stations in Monrovia. The weekly bulletins reported on actual fuel prices.



33. UNJLC coordinated the fuel requirements of United Nations agencies and NGOs with UNMIL in an attempt to include humanitarian fuel needs in UNMIL's new long-term fuel contract, which benefits from reduced fuel prices.
34. In association with the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), UNJLC carried out a survey of commercial transport companies in Monrovia, including contact details, a breakdown of fleet composition and transport prices. Later, it completed a bus survey at the request of the International Organization on Migration.
35. At the request of the HC, UNJLC and the Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) completed an extensive road survey project of the main supply routes for the humanitarian community in Liberia. For security reasons, United Nations staff could not be employed for site surveys up-country. As NGO staff and UNMIL officers were not available, the surveys were successfully made by local logging companies using standard assessment forms, which are an important tool for future UNJLC operations. The survey indicated urgent repair works and provided cost estimates.
36. The survey facilitated the planning of road repair activities by the UNMIL engineering brigades, as the UNJLC-led Road Task Force (RTF) was able to prioritize road repair requirements from a humanitarian perspective.
37. Stakeholders reported that UNJLC was well integrated into the United Nations structure in Liberia, including the UNMIL peacekeeping operation. UNJLC attended coordination meetings, was represented on the HOC and frequently visited the agencies, NGOs and local authorities in order to identify their needs in terms of coordinating inter-agency logistics. The "walk-with-the-people" attitude was very productive in UNJLC's networking. Although UNJLC was located in the WFP office, stakeholders did not express concern about its independent position.
38. UNJLC should arrange for a fuel survey as early as possible in emergency crises in order to determine what best benefits the whole humanitarian community. Fuel studies should be undertaken by an expert with on-the-ground expertise.
39. UNJLC is well positioned to coordinate the integrated fuel requirements of the humanitarian community with those of peacekeeping operations so as to facilitate the creation of greater purchasing power for fuel contracts, thereby saving considerably on donor money.
40. UNJLC is well positioned to coordinate road transport and assessment survey projects. In this respect it should explore ways of matching necessary repair projects to the donor community in order to accelerate timely implementation.
41. UNJLC should continue working closely with the HC and the humanitarian and peacekeeping community to ensure its integration into the overall United Nations structure and mission in emergency crises.

Logistics Information

42. Logistics information for the humanitarian community was collected and analysed by the Rome-based core unit until UNJLC field staff had been employed. The core unit disseminated information via the Web site, mailing lists and the sending of hard copies of logistic maps to the field for onward distribution.
43. The design for the UNJLC Liberia Web site was based on that for the UNJLC Iraq site. The contents-based management system was enhanced to facilitate quick and easy access and the uploading of information. Further attention is needed to link the UNJLC website to those of other partners. The UNJLC website is now a mainstay of UNJLC deployments.



44. UNJLC should continue to assess the logistics information needs of United Nations agencies and NGOs right from the outset of its mobilization in order to ensure that its services and logistics information remain demand-driven from the field. In turn, the UNJLC core unit should continue consulting field staff to refine information needs for the Web site and reports. Other contributing parties should be duly recognized by, for instance, showing their logos on the UNJLC website and reports.
45. A continuing effort on delineation between UNJLC and HIC services is needed in order to prevent the duplication of efforts and to expand on recent UNJLC experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. Co-locating both units, wherever possible, will strongly contribute to effective cooperation.

Civil–Military Coordination

46. The UNJLC CMCoord officer had frequent contacts with UNMIL in order to avoid humanitarian and military transports congesting Liberian infrastructure and transport corridors. This interface became easier after the HOC had been established as both parties were represented.
47. Based on experiences gained in Iraq, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) CMCoord officers in Liberia addressed the policy-related issues of civil-military relations, while the UNJLC CMCoord officers focused on operational-level issues.
48. It is recommended that civil–military relations be formalized, whereby OCHA should focus its attention on policy-related issues, while UNJLC should deal with operational level issues.
49. When peacekeeping forces are present in an emergency crisis, UNJLC should continue to communicate civil–military logistics issues with them in order to prevent congestion and to optimize the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA), in adherence with most recent United Nations guidelines.

Air Movement Coordination

50. UNJLC assisted in reaching agreements on the use of air space and airfields in Liberia by humanitarian air transport, including the WFP Humanitarian Air Service. UNJLC eased the passage of cargoes and passengers at the airports, and negotiated reduced fees and handling charges.
51. UNJLC identified the needs and requirements for long-term air space management and air traffic control in close collaboration with CAA staff. After its mobilization, UNMIL took over the air management and control tasks, which will be transferred to the local authorities at a later stage.
52. Although the revised Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for Liberia includes a proposal for United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS), it was later decided that common air services would be provided by WFP Humanitarian Air Services and included in its regional air operations, as the Programme already had a plane operating in West Africa. UNJLC liaised with UNMIL and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to optimize humanitarian air operations.
53. In the initial stage, UNJLC took bookings for passengers, prepared manifests and assisted requests for cargo bookings from United Nations agencies and NGOs, working in consultation with WFP air operations staff. Later the air planning officer was transferred to WFP to improve the coordination of air operations. The UNJLC terms of reference



included the scheduling of air operations, which is the sole responsibility of WFP as the ultimate responsible party.

54. For future operations, UNJLC should discuss its coordinating role for passenger and cargo air operations in detail with WFP, which has become responsible for all non-peacekeeping United Nations flight operations for passengers. This discussion is now scheduled for May 2004.

Logistics Coordination and Movement Control Centre

55. In September 2003, the acting HC introduced the HOC as an umbrella location where NGOs, agencies and other parties could meet to exchange information. Later, the HOC was formalized as a coordination centre to form a “one-stop shop” for logistics information for the humanitarian community. HOC represented the following parties: OCHA/CMCoord, UNMIL/Civil–Military Coordination (military environment) (CIMIC), UNJLC/Logistics Coordination and Movement Control Centre (LOCOMOCC), the Government of Liberia/Liberian Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRCC), national NGO liaison, Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) and HIC, the last two of which are located in other offices.
56. UNJLC provided the LOCOMOCC and recruited the national NGO liaison staff members for the HOC. The use of an NGO coordinator was a successful continuation from UNJLC Iraq. Then, in collaboration with these HOC members, United Nations agencies, NGOs and local authorities, UNJLC complemented and coordinated logistics capabilities, provided rapid response assistance to the humanitarian community as requested, and facilitated the exchange of logistics information as needed through LOCOMOCC.
57. The review noted confusion in the field among the respective roles of UNJLC, LOCOMOCC and HOC. Some stakeholders reported duplication of activities, while others went to either party to address questions or collect information.
58. In future operational environments in which UNJLC is deployed alongside a peacekeeping operation, UNJLC is well placed to provide an operational interface with the Joint Logistics Operations Centre of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), which is the standard logistics facility used with DPKO missions.
59. In cases where HOCs are used to facilitate humanitarian logistics operations and UNJLC is deployed, the respective roles of the HOC and UNJLC must be clearly publicized. In addition, when peacekeeping operations are deployed, the Joint Logistics Information Centre (J-LOC) should be represented in any HOC that is formed in order to create a real “one-stop shop” for logistics information for the humanitarian community.

UNJLC Support to WFP Operations

60. WFP did not experience direct benefits from UNJLC during implementation of the West Africa regional PRRO operation, as it was well equipped to complete this operation on its own.
61. In Liberia, there was strong collaboration between WFP logistics and UNJLC staff, and a common understanding of the need to coordinate inter-agency logistics issues after the crisis. However, cooperation on administration and finance aspects was less effective.





UNJLC AFGHANISTAN	UNJLC IRAQ	UNJLC LIBERIA
In order to increase its efficiency, UNJLC should be involved in the planning and assessment phase of upcoming emergencies right from the beginning.	UNJLC Iraq was involved in the preparation phase before the crisis and was therefore well established at the start of the actual operations in March 2003.	Preparation time for UNJLC Liberia was very short, and there was insufficient time for the necessary consultation with WFP in the region.
UNJLC should have a short pre-set duration during the first phases of emergency crises. It should focus on de-conflicting and de-bottlenecking logistics. Continuation into a next phase needs careful consideration.	UNJLC Iraq was active from March to September 2003, with some activities extended up to December 2003 with clear approval of the Humanitarian Coordinator, Iraq (HCI).	UNJLC Liberia was of short and pre-set duration, with timely extensions discussed and agreed with the UNCT.
In defining the functions for UNJLC, replication of tasks and services provided by other United Nations agencies, especially WFP, operating in the same emergency area should be prevented.	Compared with UNJLC Afghanistan, this was improved, although some work done by UNJLC was perceived by other agencies as duplication.	UNJLC had frequent consultations with other agencies and UNCT in order to determine required inter-agency services and actions for UNJLC Liberia.
For each operation, it should be decided whether UNJLC is to play a coordinating role only or also carry out operational tasks.	Although UNJLC Iraq was non-operational, some operational tasks were executed (e.g. tactical fuel supply for United Nations cars). Nevertheless, UNJLC seems to be best accepted when it remains non-operational.	UNJLC is best accepted when it remains non-operational. It should undertake specific short-term operations only at the request of the HC or UNCT (e.g. for fuel distribution).
UNJLC should only make priority listings for air cargo transport and should not do tasking and scheduling of aircraft. In addition, the relationship between UNJLC and UNHAS should be defined in detail.	This aspect still needs improvement, as in its early stages UNJLC Iraq conducted scheduling of aircraft. The UNJLC–UNHAS link will be better established in view of a new WFP mandate to coordinate non-peacekeeping air operations for the United Nations.	UNJLC should discuss its coordinating role for passenger and cargo air operations for future operations in detail with WFP, which is responsible for all non-peacekeeping United Nations flight operations for passengers (since January 2004).
UNJLC should consult with United Nations agencies and NGOs in the field on their specific requirements for information. This consultation should address needs for sectoral studies (e.g. transport surveys).	Initial initiatives were undertaken to carry out a market assessment of the logistic information needs of the United Nations agencies. However, this activity was abandoned and requires completion.	UNJLC staff in the field frequently updated the needs for inter-agency logistics information. Needs for infrastructure assessments were approved by United Nations agencies (HC or UNCT). Provision was strongly demand-driven.
	UNJLC should fully recognize the sources used in its Web-site, bulletins and reports (e.g. by showing the logos of United Nations agencies/NGOs).	Still needs better implementation.



UNJLC AFGHANISTAN	UNJLC IRAQ	UNJLC LIBERIA
<p>UNJLC should continue to coordinate with the military on the de-conflicting requirements for air space on behalf of the humanitarian community, and should remain involved in the consultation of CMCoord operational level activities.</p>	<p>UNJLC should conduct a study to find out how it can best liaise with military HQs such as the Regional Air Movement Coordination Centre (RAMCC) for operational de-conflicting, as military forces tend to tighten security considerably. Cooperation and consultation with the military are essential for humanitarian aid supply.</p>	<p>UNJLC coordinated inter-agency logistics transport needs for the humanitarian community with the peacekeeping force UNMIL.</p>
<p>UNJLC should endeavour to maintain its independent position vis-à-vis WFP in order to strengthen its neutrality in inter-agency logistics with the donor, United Nations and NGO communities.</p>	<p>UNJLC is now recognized as an independent and neutral coordinating body. Therefore, it should focus its attention on better communication with its custodian WFP.</p>	<p>UNJLC is now well accepted in the United Nations and NGO humanitarian community. Communication with WFP logistics field staff was very good.</p>
<p>UNJLC should market its position as the key call centre for coordinating inter-agency logistics at the headquarters and field levels in order to increase understanding and acceptance of the UNJLC concept.</p>	<p>Marketing of the UNJLC concept is still needed despite a number of training courses held since UNJLC Afghanistan. In addition, United Nations agencies should be encouraged to market UNJLC internally.</p>	<p>Promoting UNJLC could be enhanced by presenting a catalogue of potential services and products. The HOC caused a lot of confusion in the field and better delineation with UNJLC is needed.</p>
<p>In order to increase transparency in its functions, available budgets, expenditures and tracking of donations, UNJLC should be included in one separate WFP SO project rather than in a multipurpose SO, as used for Afghanistan.</p>	<p>The separate SO concept was implemented with success and contributed considerably to transparency.</p>	<p>UNJLC Liberia showed continued success with the separate dedicated SO.</p>
<p>Strong leadership and communicative skills are needed to represent UNJLC at the highest United Nations and government levels, and this must be assured for the future.</p>	<p>UNJLC should appoint one full-time person as Chief UNJLC because alternating this position among more than one individual undermines single-line command. When a Chief and Operational Coordinator are deployed, their relative roles should be properly explained to the participating agencies.</p>	<p>UNJLC Liberia leadership (and staff) were highly appreciated in the field for their initiatives in identifying and solving logistics bottlenecks. Operation was undertaken without direct involvement of the initiator of its concept.</p>
	<p>The specific relationship between UNJLC and WFP on support services (administration, finance, and human resources) should be described in a separate Note for the Record (NFR) or Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for each UNJLC project.</p>	<p>Relationship was included in NFR for UNJLC Liberia. The liaison officer in the Core Unit for international staff proved its value. Communications with country office staff needs to be streamlined.</p>

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CAA	Civil Aviation Authority
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CIMIC	Civil–Military Coordination (military environment)
CMCoord	Civil–Military Coordination (humanitarian environment)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPKO	Department of Peace Keeping Operations
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation)
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCI	Humanitarian Coordinator, Iraq
HIC	humanitarian information centre
HOC	humanitarian operations centre
IASC–WG	Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group
J-LOC	Joint Logistics Information Centre (DPKO)
LOCOMOCC	Logistics Coordination and Movement Control Centre
LRRCC	Liberian Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission
MCDA	military and civil defence assets
MoU	memorandum of understanding
NFI	non-food item
NFR	note for the record
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OEDE	Office of Evaluation
OTL	Transport, Preparedness and Response Division – Logistics Service
RAMCC	Regional Air Movement Coordination Centre
RTF	Road Task Force
SBA	stand-by agreement
SO	special operation
SOP	standard operating procedure
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNCT	United Nations country team
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Services
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
UNMIL	United Nations Mission In Liberia
UNSECOORD	Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator

