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For consideration

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ANGOLA PORTFOLIO EVALUATION



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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted for consideration to the Executive Board.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The portfolio evaluation covered the protracted relief and recovery operations and special operations in Angola from January 2002 to December 2004, focusing on relief and recovery strategies, coordination and partnerships, targeting and monitoring and evaluation. The four criteria examined were: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and connectedness. Two crosscutting issues – protection and gender – were also examined.

Emergency food distributions, medical and social feeding programmes and other relief activities contributed to WFP's overall objectives of saving lives, improving nutritional status and preventing malnutrition.

Recovery activities consisted of general distributions to internally displaced people and returning refugees, food for work, food for assets and food for education and training. Instead of addressing the need for food-insecure households to improve livelihoods in a sustainable manner, most food-for-work activities focused on providing food in exchange for labour; few reflected priority areas for women such as literacy, skills-training and income generation. School feeding constituted a means to improve school attendance, address nutritional needs and promote community participation in development and reconciliation, but its scope was limited by weak government services, limited government funding and commitment, a shortage of skilled implementing partners and competing educational priorities.

New HIV/AIDS activities consisted of community awareness-raising for prevention, which should expand to include food and nutritional support.

WFP coordinated implementing partners at the sub-national level and partnered with United Nations agencies through coordinating bodies at the national level. Further coordination was needed, however, especially with government authorities; more skilled implementing partners should be involved in recovery activities. It was recommended that WFP build government capacity for better coordination and advocate with officials for increased financial and technical engagement in recovery.

Overall, targeting methods improved and vulnerability analysis and mapping data were used for geographical targeting; this data required further refinement to identify the most vulnerable populations in each targeted zone. In the light of declining donor funds, WFP needed to establish selection criteria to identify those most in need of food assistance.

The monitoring and evaluation system improved, forming a sound basis for efficient data collection and storage. Monitoring and evaluation continued to operate separately from vulnerability analysis and mapping, however, reporting primarily on outputs, with insufficient analysis of outcomes in relation to objectives. The monitoring and evaluation system required further improvement to provide useful information on logistics and management.

Relief and recovery strategies were relevant in the context of local conditions. Some protracted relief and recovery activities, however, and supporting special operations, were limited by insufficient government technical services and financial inputs. Other constraints



included an inadequate number of skilled implementing partners, especially in remote areas and difficulties in reaching affected populations because of insecurity and United Nations security regulations. The evaluation concluded that vulnerable populations depended almost exclusively on WFP for food support and that portfolio activities were effective. Insufficient data on mortality, morbidity and nutritional status prevented an assessment of the extent to which WFP's main objectives were achieved.


WFP was generally efficient, reaching large numbers of beneficiaries despite some pipeline breaks, delivery delays and gaps between planned and actual figures. WFP's partners and activities were too numerous, especially in view of budget and staff cuts.

WFP made little progress in linking short-term emergency relief measures with longer-term recovery efforts. In the absence of a medium-term exit strategy for transferring responsibility to Angolan authorities, the Government was only marginally involved in WFP programmes. Its weak financial and technical engagement severely limited the potential of WFP's activities to contribute to sustainable recovery.

WFP sought to ensure beneficiary protection, but the task became increasingly complex, involving prevention of discrimination in aid programmes, ensuring access to basic services and protecting land tenure and property rights.

Few of WFP's implementing partners were familiar with the Enhanced Commitments to Women. Widespread gender imbalances in decision-making and participation and lack of attention to the needs of households headed by women required further analysis and action.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of the recommendations in "Angola Portfolio Evaluation" (WFP/EB.2/2005/6-B) and of the management action taken, as indicated in the matrix, and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by Board members during discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.



INTRODUCTION

1. WFP has served people affected by civil war in Angola since the mid-1970s, alternating between relief and recovery food assistance through emergency operations (EMOPs) and protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs). Each year, 1.6 million mt of food reached an average of 1.1 million people, peaking at 2 million between 1993 and 1995.
2. An evaluation of WFP's activities by the Office of Evaluation in September 2001 challenged WFP's country office in Angola to: (i) determine overall goals and articulate programme guidelines; (ii) establish a field-based and flexible recovery strategy for food-for-work (FFW) activities; and (iii) develop a flexible programming approach that would permit either a rapid expansion of recovery activities or a return to activities aimed at saving lives.
3. The current portfolio evaluation covered overlapping operations from January 2002 to December 2004, including three PRROs and five special operations (SOs). Large-scale population movements, insecurity and critical levels of food insecurity throughout Angola characterized the years following the return of peace in 2002 as 4 million internally-displaced people (IDPs) and refugees from neighbouring countries returned home. Inadequate recovery in the agricultural sector produced episodes of acute famine throughout the remainder of 2002 and early 2003.
4. Operational expenditures ranged from US\$109 million in 2002 to US\$145 million in 2003 and US\$79 million in 2004. Food distributions followed a similar pattern with 141,000 mt reported in 2002¹ rising to 194,000 mt in 2003² and falling to 119,000 mt in 2005.³
5. The number of beneficiaries varied according to identified needs and accessibility. In 2003, the actual monthly average of assisted beneficiaries was 2 million.⁴ Recipients of general distributions for resettlement constituted the largest number of beneficiaries, representing a monthly average of 79 percent – 25 percent for relief distribution and 54 percent for IDPs and refugees. Beneficiaries of emergency nutrition and social programmes made up 6 percent of the total monthly average; recovery FFW and food-for-training (FFT) beneficiaries constituted the remaining 15 percent. In 2004, the actual monthly average of assisted beneficiaries was 1.2 million.⁵ General food distribution recipients accounted for 71 percent of the total, while vulnerable groups receiving targeted feeding made up less than 4 percent. FFW and FFT beneficiaries increased slightly to 16 percent of all beneficiaries.
6. The main objectives of the evaluation were to assess the portfolio, provide evidence-based findings of results and propose operational improvements. The evaluation focused on:
 - a) **relief and recovery strategies, coordination and partnerships**, as derived from a problem analysis and the evolution of the situation;
 - b) **targeting** issues, as derived from needs and vulnerability analyses and in line with the forthcoming thematic evaluation on targeting; and

¹ Standardized Project Report (SPR) figure includes 61,000 mt from PRRO 10054.00 and 80,000 mt from PRRO 10054.01.

² SPR figure, 194,000 mt from PRRO 10054.01 exclusively.

³ SPR figure, 50,000 mt under PRRO 10054.01, 69,000 mt under PRRO 10054.02.

⁴ Dakota 2003 Report – PRRO 10054.00.

⁵ Dakota 2004 Report – PRRO 10054.01.



- c) the **monitoring system**, in relation to vulnerability and needs assessments, implementation processes and the need for informed decision-making.
7. The four criteria examined were relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and connectedness; the two cross-cutting issues were protection in relation to food assistance and gender in terms of WFP's Enhanced Commitments to Women (ECW).⁶ Basic education and HIV/AIDS-prevention and mitigation received specific attention. The evaluation addressed operational and management issues only when they affected WFP's ability to achieve its objectives.

RELIEF AND RECOVERY STRATEGIES, COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIPS

Relief

8. The efforts made by WFP to reach large numbers of hungry people in a very short time cannot be understated. WFP displayed operational flexibility as access to formerly remote areas increased and a growing caseload required WFP to expand relief food distributions rapidly to a large number of locations. The PRRO strategy permitted sufficient flexibility to provide for massive relief needs, but only with existing resources.
9. The evaluation found that WFP largely met its objective of saving lives through the regular distribution of food aid to war-affected and vulnerable populations including IDPs, returning refugees and host populations who had no other sources of food. During the evaluation period, relief agencies gathered few data on population figures, mortality and morbidity. Scant evidence exists that WFP achieved its objective of saving lives, although findings generally support this conclusion. Constraints to meeting the food needs of target populations included pipeline breaks, resource shortfalls and inadequate targeting. Some isolated communities did not receive the assistance they required. WFP staff and implementing partners were unable to reach large parts of the country because roads and bridges had been destroyed and because of insecurity and United Nations security regulations prohibiting access by aid workers.

Recovery

10. By 2004, the number of food-insecure and highly vulnerable people had significantly declined, leaving fewer people at risk. Humanitarian aid workers reached some areas for the first time in decades and more people received assistance to rebuild their lives. Destroyed infrastructure, prohibitive mine-clearance requirements and diminished human capital were some of the obstacles hindering progress from emergency relief to recovery. For the first time, however, it was possible to improve livelihoods, develop skills and implement sustainable solutions.
11. WFP expanded its capacity to assess vulnerability using vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM), which enables it to identify areas of concern and offer evidence-based advice for recovery efforts. As access to remote areas and security conditions improved in 2004, the number of resettled people rose sharply in the central highlands. In that year, WFP began to focus its efforts on this highly food-insecure region: intervention strategies included a variety of safety nets ranging from health and nutrition to school feeding

⁶ WFP's Enhanced Commitments to Women are outlined in the WFP Gender Policy (WFP/EB.3/2002/4-A).



programmes in order to create suitable learning environments for children; FFW and food-for-assets (FFA) activities were developed in line with United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) strategic priorities.

12. The economic situation began to stabilize across the country, as evidenced by a steadier currency, slowed inflation,⁷ and a 10 percent rise in gross domestic product in 2004. Social indicators, however, continued to stagnate because the country suffered from inadequate infrastructure and social services.⁸ Despite its considerable natural resources and potential for revenue, the Government failed to allocate sufficient financial resources for social concerns. Even with adequate financial resources, however, human resources would have been unavailable for social services.
13. At the time of evaluation, donors were reluctant to finance large infrastructure and long-term development projects while the Government earned massive revenues from natural resources. A number of donors had decreased or discontinued funding for food aid, which they perceived to be unsustainable.⁹ Donors reported frustration with the Government's inability to use its abundant oil revenues to provide food for its people.¹⁰ Donor funding to WFP, including food and cash donations, fell sharply.¹¹ Without government funds for recovery, Angola's most vulnerable people faced a precarious situation as the flow of international humanitarian assistance slowed to a trickle.
14. The current PRRO foresaw distribution of 228,000 mt of food in 2004 and 171,000 mt in 2005, but only half the expected amount was available in 2004. The present PRRO has reduced the coverage of most programmes and concentrated on refining vulnerability analyses and implementing recovery activities rather than relief activities.¹² With constraints including poor soil and limited access to productive inputs such as animal traction, seeds and fertilizers, farmers were slow to improve agricultural production. Inadequate extension services were also a significant limitation.

Coordination and Partnership

15. WFP contributions to humanitarian relief and recovery were intended to complement Government inputs, other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in food-deficient areas. In many remote areas, the number and technical capacity of other relief organizations was limited; this impacted the overall effectiveness of WFP assistance. As donor contributions declined, it became increasingly imperative for WFP to develop a meaningful partnership with the Government and to advocate for its increased financial engagement in recovery activities.

Health and Nutrition

16. Malnutrition resulted from: (i) a lack of nutritious food and safe drinking water; (ii) inadequate hygiene and sanitation facilities; (iii) a scarcity of de-worming services; (iv) insufficient care of young children, older adults and sick people; and (v) high rates of infectious disease and parasitic infestation. Partnerships to address these conditions were

⁷ The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, December 2004.

⁸ Human Rights Watch. 2004. Some Transparency, *No Accountability: The Use of Oil Revenue in Angola and Its Impact on Human Rights*. New York.

⁹ Human Rights Watch. 2005. *Coming Home: Return and Reintegration in Angola*. New York.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² The preparation of a recovery strategy, as the foundation for PRRO activities is recommended in "From Crisis to Recovery" (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A), and in: WFP. 1999. *Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO*. Rome.



necessary, but not always possible. In most cases, very few health-related activities were carried out because of low technical capacity, a limited number of Government health workers and insufficient funds.

17. The Government's decentralization of responsibilities and resources hampered coordination in many parts of the country. The Government had not yet formulated a national nutrition policy, plan of action or food-aid policy. Nutrition and health information systems were not yet established and the limited data available were either unreliable or representative of small geographic areas. WFP did not assess the role that therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes played in improving nutritional status. WFP's interventions contributed to nutrition objectives primarily by reducing acute¹³ rather than chronic¹⁴ malnutrition, but these contributions were not quantified.
18. Iodized salt was included in general rations but it was absent for at least two months in early 2005 because of procurement problems. Lack of iodized salt in rural and urban markets and the limited purchasing power of most people had serious consequences, particularly in view of the high prevalence of iodine deficiency disorders in Angola. Attempts by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to promote local iodization of salt were not successful and WFP needed to ensure that it was procured and distributed.
19. Pellagra, the result of a micronutrient deficiency¹⁵ related to a maize-based diet, was of critical concern in Bié Province. With better planning and more accurate monitoring of food rations and nutritional status, it is likely that this outbreak could have been prevented. The experience provided a number of lessons for treating large-scale outbreaks of pellagra and for preventing similar occurrences.
20. In 2004, WFP's HIV/AIDS programme implemented 60 FFT projects¹⁶ aimed at expanding community members' knowledge and awareness of the disease. By the end of the year, 8,000 beneficiaries had received 65 mt of food aid. HIV/AIDS programmes were constrained by a number of factors however, including lack of clarity regarding whether to provide cash payments or food rations to *activistas*,¹⁷ or to request voluntary contributions for orientation sessions once training had taken place. In some cases, implementing partners and beneficiaries found HIV/AIDS messages to be controversial and some cultural and religious issues arose with the promotion of condom use.
21. In early 2005, only one clinic in Luanda provided free HIV testing and treatment; a nationwide plan for the provision of anti-retroviral therapy (ART) was being formulated. WFP had not yet established support for people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), but plans were under way to provide food for four to six months, followed by FFT or FFW. Programmes to reduce mother-to-child transmission of HIV during pregnancy and birth were not well developed and no activities took place during the evaluation period. WFP was planning to include PLWHA in an ongoing school feeding programme and other feeding activities.

¹³ Acute malnutrition (wasting), or weight-for-height, reflects recent weight loss or gain (*Food and Nutrition Handbook*, 2003 edition).

¹⁴ Chronic malnutrition (stunting), or height-for-age (*Food and Nutrition Handbook*, 2003 edition).

¹⁵ Pellagra: Niacin deficiency resulting from a diet based on maize (*Food and Nutrition Handbook*, 2003 edition).

¹⁶ "HIV/AIDS Plan Interventions Monitoring Report", WFP Angola: November 2004.

¹⁷ HIV-AIDS awareness promoters are referred to as "*activistas*."



Food for Work and Food for Assets

22. Most FFW activities were limited to food distributions in exchange for labour instead of sustainable activities to improve livelihoods.
23. The evaluation observed that many FFW and FFA activities such as building roads, schools and health posts, maintaining airstrips and capacity-building only partially met identified needs: for example, classrooms and health centres visited by the evaluation team in Ganda, Cachinbango and Kunge were of poor quality or inadequately completed. The weak role and limited presence of the Government,¹⁸ inadequate government funding for basic services and the lack of technical capacity and physical presence of WFP and its partners limited the outcomes of FFW and FFA activities. WFP's recovery activities required a medium-term exit strategy, including plans to enhance self-sufficiency and resilience to shocks through FFW and FFA.

Food for Training and School Feeding

24. School feeding and support to primary education offered an opportunity for broader community participation in development, reconciliation, improving attendance and addressing nutritional concerns. As just one of many educational initiatives, the school feeding programme was hampered by weak government support, insufficient funding and commitment and inadequate implementing partners. The absence of formal agreements between WFP, the Government and other agencies involved in basic education limited sustainability. Tripartite agreements were needed to establish wider inter-sectoral collaboration, especially in areas of water and sanitation, health, nutrition and community development. A review of previous experiences with school feeding was also recommended before expanding school feeding activities.
25. Despite the dedication of WFP staff, technical inputs for school feeding were insufficient. Additional technical support was required to strengthen the skills and knowledge of existing staff and hire external consultants.

Special Operations

26. Limited access to large areas of the country impeded recovery activities. Road and bridge repair and construction and widespread de-mining significantly improved road accessibility, however, and reduced transport costs. Despite unreliable and even hazardous roads and bridges, food transported by air decreased from 15 percent to 10 percent in 2004 as road and bridge improvements through SOs permitted increased access to remote locations. Between 2002 and 2004, food tonnage transported by road increased from 70 percent to 90 percent of total tonnage; tonnage transported by air decreased from 30 percent to 10 percent.
27. WFP responded to the emerging need to improve access in a timely and efficient fashion, enhancing its capacity and that of its partners to assess vulnerability, increase food and non-food assistance and monitor activities. By providing access to areas that had not been visited during the conflict, the United Nations common passenger air services facilitated the return of refugees, IDPs, former rebel soldiers and their families. The creation of air access routes permitted vulnerability analyses in newly accessible areas and allowed WFP to identify additional food-assistance needs, improving the effectiveness of operations.

¹⁸ Agronomists on WFP's staff have been instrumental in ensuring the viability of a community agricultural project in Mexico, however.



28. WFP and its partners agreed that the routes selected for passenger air services were appropriate, but no documented evidence was found demonstrating a link between these services and improved targeting or humanitarian assistance. Standardized project reports (SPRs) primarily described products and outputs, including number of entities, users, destinations and medical evacuations.¹⁹ WFP correspondence provided an ad hoc analysis of the current phase of passenger air services, demonstrating to some extent the efficiency of passenger air services in accessing remote areas.
29. According to many implementing partners and users, passenger air services had improved access, raised the quality of information and established a basis for informed management decisions; evidence for this was not documented by WFP, however. WFP had not carried out cost-benefit analyses to assess the expense of providing the service. WFP missed an opportunity to determine whether certain routes were more favourable than others because no comparisons were made between the situations in newly accessible areas and those accessible previously.

Targeting

30. The categorization of beneficiaries used to describe regional vulnerability levels became less useful as populations became more integrated. The definition of vulnerability needed to take into account household composition, household economy and nutritional and health status in addition to vulnerability based on access to food. VAM selection criteria and indicators were used for geographical targeting, but were not used systematically for beneficiary selection in particular areas. With declining contributions from donors, WFP was increasingly obliged to involve communities in the development of selection criteria for targeting.
31. IDPs were resettled in conditions that did not conform to standards established by the international community and the Government. Refugees returned at a slower rate than expected; 50,000 people did not reach their areas of origin, and as a result of the phasing out of resettlement schemes these people did not receive food assistance. Other needy communities were not assisted because of inconsistencies in policy and action, inadequate targeting methods and lack of access to some areas.
32. With significant rural-to-urban migration occurring during the evaluation period, WFP needed to address urban vulnerability to food insecurity, a complex matter requiring considerable reflection and action.

Monitoring and Evaluation

33. The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system had steadily improved and formed a sound basis for data collection and storage. The system was isolated from VAM exercises, programming and management, however; information generated by the M&E system was used almost exclusively for reporting purposes. It did not provide information on outcomes such as analysis of achievements, although the country office benefited from regular vulnerability analyses.
34. Linking VAM more closely with the M&E system would improve the scope of reporting and analysis of results; vulnerability analyses should provide information on outcome indicators as described in the *Corporate Indicator Compendium*. Internal evaluations could also have measured achievement of targets during the past work plan and provided recommendations for the next plan. In order to improve planning and programming, WFP

¹⁹ SPRs noted that 20,000 passengers flew in 2002, a figure which doubled in 2003 and returned to 2002 levels in 2004.



should enhance its capacity to measure outcome-level achievements and carry out regular internal evaluations.

35. The in-country dual Excel and Access data system, which stored information in an easily accessible manner and produced reports according to changing requirements, made information available when it was needed. Benefits would be enhanced if the system included more information on outcomes and if more staff were trained in its use.
36. PRRO monitoring was based on a logical framework that did not include corporate indicators; this limited country-office reporting on Strategic Priority outcomes. Large variations existed among implementing partners in terms of monitoring and reporting capacities. Analysis of progress towards outcomes by the monitoring system was impeded by (i) lack of information from implementing partners, (ii) limited baseline data and (iii) limited internal demand for such analysis.
37. In agreements between WFP and implementing partners, monitoring and reporting obligations were presented as additional requirements and were inadequately budgeted. As a result, some reporting tasks exceeded partners' capacities and resources. In view of the multitude of interventions and partnerships, it appeared unlikely that implementing partners would provide more accurate or timelier reports in the future. Food-aid monitors spent relatively little time on monitoring compared with tasks such as distributing food, identifying activities and formulating projects. Working under extremely difficult conditions, they had limited capacity to ensure the adequacy of implementing partners' work.
38. The results-based management (RBM) approach stimulated positive changes in the current monitoring system. In addition to facilitating reporting, RBM inspired staff and partners to focus on the effects of food aid and use outcome analysis for more strategic decision-making.

Protection

39. WFP ensured the protection of food-aid beneficiaries; staff and management were aware of protection needs related to threats of violence, but food-aid-related protection needs were addressed in an irregular manner. Protection issues in Angola are complex and include non-discrimination in aid programmes, access to basic services and protection of land and property rights. Most WFP staff members were unaware of their potential to affect the protection needs of beneficiaries. Many were also unaware of how protection issues could influence strategic decisions.

Gender

40. Women in Angola are increasingly contributing to recovery through formal and informal economic activities, but there was a notable absence of women in high-level decision-making roles. The evaluation team observed that women were often subordinate to men, possibly reflecting deep-rooted cultural attitudes and values dictating that women should either take care of children and the family or work in the fields. The low status of women and their virtual absence from formal government positions or managerial posts in humanitarian agencies may result from their low educational attainment and a literacy rate that is half that of men.²⁰ High levels of insecurity in the field were also responsible for the

²⁰ Literacy rates in Angola are 56 percent for men and 28 percent for women (*US Government/CIA World Factbook*, January 2005.)



relatively limited number of women working in field-based government, WFP or NGO posts.

41. Gender-related activities included a consultation on ECW guidelines and an ECW baseline survey training workshop in 2003. Recovery activities involved women as beneficiaries, but did not adequately reflect areas of interest to women such as literacy, skills training and income-generation. Neither WFP nor its partners addressed gender imbalances in decision-making or the special needs of female-headed households. Government authorities and implementing partners were insufficiently aware of the ECW and would have benefited from additional information and guidance. Additional gender training for WFP staff, partners and Government counterparts would have assisted WFP in mainstreaming the ECW.

OVERVIEW OF RELEVANCE, EFFECTIVENESS, EFFICIENCY AND CONNECTEDNESS

Relevance

42. WFP's support to Angola in the last three years has evolved in response to the changing needs of vulnerable populations and improved access to those most in need. A number of constraints prohibited WFP from responding with the necessary intensity or specificity required, but the evaluators found its programmes to be highly relevant. With a transition to sustainable recovery strategies, the current focus on development and the recent improvement of social indicators, Strategic Priority (SP) 1, which focuses on saving lives, became less relevant in Angola. The focus should have shifted to SP 5, which emphasizes developing government capacity and addresses the need to formulate an exit strategy.

Effectiveness

43. The evaluation found that WFP's main objectives of saving lives and maintaining or improving nutritional status were achieved to some extent. No evidence was provided in reports, but it was clear that vulnerable populations depended almost exclusively on WFP for food throughout most of the evaluation period. In the light of some populations' dependence on external food aid, it was possible that beneficiaries may have suffered during periods when food resources were inadequate or when pipeline breakdowns occurred.
44. Programme design improved during the evaluation period, in line with a shift from emergency relief distribution to targeted recovery to address the specific needs of the most vulnerable people. PRRO interventions were based on assumptions about the availability of competent implementing partners, adequate supplies of non-food items and the existence of complementary activities to address the root causes of food insecurity and malnutrition.
45. In many cases, these assumptions were not accurate. For example, WFP did not systematically assess implementing partners' performance. Establishing fewer partnerships with larger, more capable implementing partners would have increased WFP's effectiveness; such partners were unavailable, however. The positive effects of activities such as school feeding and therapeutic feeding were limited by the absence of support and inputs. For example, beneficiaries confined to centres for long periods would have benefited from developmental stimulation through training in health, hygiene, literacy, income generation or vocational skills. School feeding would have been significantly



enhanced by the promotion of health and hygiene, including information about hand-washing and distribution of de-worming tablets.

46. Expected outcomes were sometimes unclear, particularly for new initiatives such as HIV/AIDS-prevention activities. WFP also needed to identify practical and cost-effective means of measuring progress towards achievement of qualitative goals.
47. WFP contributed considerably to enriching humanitarian coordination in collaboration with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations country team (UNCT), governmental agencies, NGOs and donors. Provincial education departments coordinated school feeding, providing a model for other levels of administration.

Efficiency

48. Actual distribution figures and numbers of beneficiaries reached were nearly always less than planned. There were several critical periods in which 60 percent to 75 percent of requirements were met and fewer than 15 percent of intended beneficiaries were reached. Distributions reached intended tonnages on a few occasions in 2002, once in 2003 and over a period of several months in 2004; WFP reached its intended number of beneficiary on only one occasion, in early 2002. The number of actual beneficiaries reached a reported high of 1.6 million in September 2003, compared to a low of 190,000 in May 2003.
49. WFP's agreements with partners and the variety of relief and recovery activities implemented increased WFP's management and financial burden in terms of administration, supervision, monitoring and logistics. Ensuring high-quality, low-cost project implementation was almost impossible for in Angola because of WFP's high number of partners and the broad scope of activities in geographically diverse areas. WFP staff was also reduced by one-third because of budgetary constraints, resulting in fewer human resources to carry out more complex recovery activities.
50. The strategy of concentrating efforts in the central highlands was appropriate, but WFP required additional human and financial resources to assess vulnerability in areas where it no longer maintained a field presence and to respond quickly if the need arose. There was also concern about areas where WFP had never established a presence and for which no information was available.

Connectedness

51. During the peak of the crisis, when immediate food needs were high, WFP's main task was to bring relief food to vulnerable populations. As inaccessible areas opened up, WFP reached a larger number of beneficiaries and its programmes expanded. Eventually, vulnerability to food insecurity and beneficiary numbers declined and WFP's focus changed from relief to recovery. It is unlikely that WFP will have the prominent role it did in the past, but food assistance may still be required to complement the recovery activities of other actors. The harmonized United Nations Development Group (UNDG) four-year programming cycle (2005–2008) exceeded the maximum three-year duration of a PRRO. The next PRRO was scheduled to begin in 2006 and end in 2008, however, covering the remainder of the UNDG cycle.



ANNEX: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY—ANGOLA PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

WFP recommendations (February/March 2005)	For action by	Executive reply and measures taken (August 2005)
Relief and recovery strategies; coordination and partnerships		
1. Involve national authorities in programme design while further investing in capacity-building and encouraging national contributions to facilitate hand over.	Country office	Agree. Involved all stakeholders at every stage of the design of the new PRRO.
2. Harmonize the next programme cycle (2006–2008) with UNDG and focus on SPs 2, 3, 4 and 5 to improve coordination and prevent duplication.	Country office	Agree. Harmonization will take effect in 2009.
3. Create – jointly with partners – integrated provincial and municipal relief, recovery and development strategies, while clearly agreeing on proposed results, performance indicators, monitoring and reporting.	Country office	Agree. UNICEF and WFP are developing a coordinated provincial approach for support to primary education, mainly for rehabilitation of primary schools, including water/sanitation and teacher training.
Health and nutrition		
4. Adhere to WFP policy regarding micronutrient fortification and the provision of fortified commodities.	Country office	Agree and completed.
5. Contribute to efforts to prevent and mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS within an integrated package of inputs, namely: awareness-raising; improving food security and providing, on a pilot basis, food and nutritional support to people suffering from AIDS and receiving ART.	Country office	Agree, partially accomplished. Increased awareness, by partnering with NGO activists; improved the food security of PLWHA by providing food rations to HIV patients; provided nutritional support to ill people by developing nutrition-care guidelines about nutrition and HIV for caregivers in hospitals and in homes.
Food for work/Food for assets		
6. Develop guidelines to standardize FFW/FFA, ensuring that such activities are effective in addressing vulnerability to food insecurity and enhance resilience to future shocks. Continue to provide relief assistance as required during the transition process from relief to recovery and avoid providing FFW/FFA assistance as a relief strategy.	Country office	Agree. Since the evaluation, WFP commissioned a review of FFW/FFA; based on this review, we are now drawing up guidelines.
Food for training/school feeding		
7. Ensure that school feeding is implemented within the framework of an integrated package of inputs to basic education, building upon cooperation and expanding to include nutrition, health, sanitation and environmental concerns.	Country office, in collaboration with School Feeding Unit at Headquarters	Agree. Country office already established a school feeding programme package that includes elements on nutrition, health, sanitation and environmental concerns.
8. Specify and closely supervise the minimum standards for school meals, school construction, classrooms, feeding facilities and water/sanitation in all implementing partner agreements.	Country office, in collaboration with School Feeding at Headquarters	Agree. Developed minimum operating standards (MINOPS) in 2004. The school feeding programme provides pupils with a well-balanced and nutritious food basket, has standard criteria for rehabilitation and construction and a standard NFI package, including monitoring needs. The MINOPS are integrated in all implementing partner agreements.



ANNEX: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY—ANGOLA PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

WFP recommendations (February/March 2005)	For action by	Executive reply and measures taken (August 2005)
SOs		
9. Maintain passenger air services to ensure a sufficient level of access, at a time when data from assessments of newly accessible areas and the monitoring of current interventions is crucial for decision-making, in light of the current operation's planned phase-down.	Country office	Agree. While we expect to downsize passenger air service operations further by the end of 2005, we also recognize the need to extend its reach to many inaccessible areas.
10. Ensure that the identification of bridge-building locations and the need for WFP to improve timely, efficient food delivery and improved access for needs assessment are clearly linked.	Country office	Agree. WFP country office has prioritized bridge sites with the main criteria of improved access and efficient, timely food delivery.
Targeting		
11. Involve and enhance women's, communities' and implementing partners' participation in better defining and applying beneficiary selection and targeting criteria, particularly for recovery activities.	Country office	Agree. In Angola, the long relief operation has already established certain WFP norms among beneficiaries. For example, the practice of distribution to women is well established and accepted.
12. Extend food assistance to reach vulnerable populations currently inaccessible to WFP staff because of United Nations security restrictions, through working arrangements with other implementing partners.	Country office	Agree. WFP assistance targets the most vulnerable areas. In the next PRRO, targeting strictly follows VAM baseline survey recommendations.
13. Enhance ongoing VAM in partnerships, for greater information availability and additional capacity-building of partners in beneficiary targeting, also retaining assessment capability in geographical areas, including urban locations, whether or not WFP is itself operational in those areas.	Country office, in collaboration with the VAM Unit at Headquarters	Agree, although this has funding implications. The direct support cost rate for the next PRRO is already among the highest in the world.
M&E		
14. Expand the scope of vulnerability assessments to feed outcome level information into the M&E system, ensuring greater use of the Corporate Compendium Indicators and seeking partnerships with other actors.	Country office	Agree.
15. Enhance the M&E system to serve the needs of programme, logistics, VAM and management.	Country office	Agree. Already ongoing.
16. Gather jointly quantitative and qualitative information on the causality of acute and chronic malnutrition to guide decision-making, measure programme effectiveness and raise awareness.	Country office	Agree. Country office already does this using rapid food and nutrition assessments, VAM baseline surveys and other tools.
17. Report on outcomes to assess access improvement, effectiveness in supporting the PRRO and savings following bridge construction, as intended by SOs.	Country office and ODJ at Headquarters	Agree. Angola country office does not have the capacity or resources to carry out cost-benefit analyses. We will need additional resources to implement this recommendation.
18. Continue efforts to support the Government's collection and analysis of accurate, reliable, gender-disaggregated data, especially on enrolment, attendance and performance.	Country office	Agree. Efforts are ongoing.



ANNEX: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY—ANGOLA PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

WFP recommendations (February/March 2005)	For action by	Executive reply and measures taken (August 2005)
Protection		
19. Analyse protection issues, risks and threats such as discrimination of certain categories of beneficiaries, discrimination, exploitation, abuse, land tenure, as they relate directly to food assistance programmes, using necessary expertise.	Country office	To date, WFP staff members are not trained in this area. More training would be needed if WFP were to assume a greater role in food aid-related protection issues.
20. Ensure that messages given in the course of HIV/AIDS-awareness sessions are sensitive to the potential for tension between communities, for example portraying returning refugees as potential risk factors.	Country office, in collaboration with HIV/AIDS unit at Headquarters	Agree. UNAIDS provides messages used in HIV-awareness sessions. The country office will ensure that NGO partners also address any potential community tensions in awareness sessions.
21. Review the land-tenure situation of existing and planned FFW projects and ensure that some form of guaranteed land use exists before approving agricultural projects.	Country office	Agree. The country office will reformulate and specifically include the land tenure situation regarding agricultural projects in the WFP standard project proposals.
Gender		
22. Ensure that women are actively involved and have a strong voice in food-related decision making, including food-distribution committees and parent-teacher associations to guarantee women's equal participation and share in asset creation and food management by conducting post-distribution monitoring and household food consumption surveys. Organize training in literacy, skills development and leadership for women.	Country office	Agree. We have used a significant number of participatory approaches with women and men; participatory consultations regarding FFW activities are taking place between partners and women and men beneficiaries, especially for activity identification and formulation. WFP will introduce post-distribution monitoring in 2006 within the limits of our reduced staff capacity. The country office needs to backstop sub-offices in the implementation of ECW3, 4 and 5 at the field level.
23. Train staff and implementing partners in gender analysis and gender-sensitive programming, including M&E. Conduct a gender-sensitive needs analysis with other United Nations agencies, NGOs, the Government and community-based groups.	Country office	Agree. The country office has trained gender focal points. Next steps include: creating a gender focal team; providing training to field staff and partners; incorporating gender analysis; conducting gender-sensitive programming; and needs analysis in VAM baseline surveys, as far as resources allow.



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

ART	anti-retroviral therapy
ECW	Enhanced Commitments to Women
EMOP	emergency operation
FFA	food for assets
FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome
IDP	internally displaced person
MINOPS	minimum operating standards
PLWHA	people living with HIV/AIDS
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OEDE	Office of Evaluation
RBM	results-based management
SPR	standardized project report
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping

