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**Executive Board  
Annual Session**

**Rome, 7–11 June 2010**

## **EVALUATION REPORTS**

*Agenda item 7*

*For consideration*



Distribution: GENERAL  
**WFP/EB.A/2010/7-E**  
26 April 2010  
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

## **SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT TIMOR-LESTE PRRO 103881**

**Assistance to Vulnerable Populations**

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## NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

**This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Food availability in Timor-Leste depends on imports of rice. In 2007, 50 percent of children under 5 were underweight, half the population lived in poverty and average per capita annual income was US\$358. Little human capital has been developed and there are few educated people to staff the Government or WFP.

The evaluation found that protracted relief and recovery operation 103881 (September 2008–August 2010) was largely relevant to Timor-Leste, a fragile post-conflict state moving towards development, where chronic undernutrition resulting from poor health, education, water, sanitation and dietary regimes affects half the population. Targeting was appropriate, focusing on vulnerable groups – victims of extreme weather, returning internally displaced persons, infants, pregnant and lactating women and primary school-age children – and vulnerable areas.

The objectives were in line with WFP policies, partners' interventions, government priorities and the need to develop government capacity while resources from oil are still available. WFP developed government awareness and capacity for planning and implementation of food-based programmes as part of a food security strategy.


During 2008, partly thanks to the availability of carry-over stocks, the operation was generally able to meet targets for supplying food and accessing beneficiaries, but for reasons beyond WFP's control the resettlement of internally displaced persons was delayed. The school feeding and mother-and-child health and nutrition programmes exceeded targets, but the food-for-assets programme delivered less food and reached fewer beneficiaries than planned; it was suspended for seven months in 2009. The WFP strategic reserve enabled rapid response to two emergencies in 2009, during which year the food shortfall became problematic.

Shortages of food, high logistics costs, limited human capacity, competition with other agencies for staff, the need to import services and equipment and the limited number of non-governmental partners restricted the efficiency of the operation and added to its cost. Causes outside WFP's control, such as the long supply chain, delays in closing camps for internally displaced persons and delayed food deliveries affected the timing of activities, but by mid-2009 WFP was able to prioritize development of government capacity to manage food security, in coordination with other agencies.

The evaluation found that impacts were mainly positive or neutral, though it is difficult to separate the impact of the operation from the recovery resulting from improved security and economic conditions. The operation supported the development of government capacity and raised its awareness of the significance of nutrition and food security; the food-for-assets component involved communities in planning and implementation.

The evaluation made ten recommendations covering operations, advocacy, capacity development, logistics, monitoring and evaluation, and hand-over strategy.

## DRAFT DECISION\*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report Timor-Leste PRRO 103881 – Assistance to Vulnerable Populations” (WFP/EB.A/2010/7-E) and the management response in WFP/EB.A/2010/7-E/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

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\* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

## BACKGROUND

### Context

1. Food availability in Timor-Leste still depends on large imports of rice<sup>1</sup> because production is below requirements. In 2007, 50 percent of children under 5 were underweight, half the population lived in poverty and average per capita annual income was US\$358. Food shortages in 2007 led to more insecurity. Little human capital has been developed, and there are few educated people to provide suitable staff for the Government or for agencies such as WFP. Transport is slow and expensive on largely unsurfaced roads.
2. There are, however, signs of recovery: most of the 150,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) – a sixth of the population – who fled unrest in 2006 have resettled, and all IDP camps have closed. Security has improved. Economic growth is increasing as government expenditure rises thanks to the Petroleum Fund, which is worth US\$5 billion in foreign exchange assets, though the International Monetary Fund (IMF) urges that withdrawals be consistent with preserving wealth for future generations.<sup>2</sup> The Government has used the Petroleum Fund to accelerate development, but the oil may last for only a decade so there is little time to develop an alternative source of sustainable economic development with food security as a component.
3. Economic recovery and improved security enable the transition to stability and development. The Government is developing capacity to manage change, but national priorities are presented annually with a limited planning framework. WFP is supporting the Government in creating emergency-response systems. In 2009 the Government identified food security as the first national priority. The Government and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2009–2013 prioritize health and education. Relevant WFP documents include its 2009 paper “Framework for Partnership, Capacity Development and Hand-Over”, the Strategic Plan (2008–2013) and the 2009 Nutrition Improvement Approach.

### Description of the Operation

4. WFP first operated in the territory that is now Timor-Leste in 1999 under emergency operations (EMOPs) 6175 and 6177 in response to the effects of conflict after the 1999 referendum. EMOP 103170 in 2003–2004 followed *la Niña* droughts. From 2005, when the country office opened, emphasis switched to developing a safety-net approach through protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 103880 (2005–2007). WFP support for the school meals programme (SMP) started in 2005.

### Main Features of the Operation

5. The PRRO planned to distribute 30,263 mt of food between 1 September 2008 and 31 August 2010 at a cost of US\$36.0 million; this was increased to US\$38.9 million in two budget revisions. By September 2009, PRRO 103881 was 38 percent funded. The planned activities were, in order of food supplied:

<sup>1</sup> In 2008 about half of the rice consumed was imported.

<sup>2</sup> IMF. 2009. Country Report No. 09/219 Timor-Leste. Washington DC.

- daily school meals: support for setting up a national free SMP, improved school kitchens and training for cooks. SMP would provide mid-morning food for 124,000 to 146,000 schoolchildren; in the event, 225,000 were fed;
  - mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN): nutritional support for children aged 6–23 months, malnourished children aged 24–59 months and malnourished pregnant and lactating women; between 51,600 and 64,000 beneficiaries were planned;
  - support for food for work/assets (FFW/A) to rehabilitate and create new rural assets and rehabilitate rural roads; half of the assets would be allocated to women;
  - a package to facilitate reintegration of 40,000 IDPs in 2008; the donor estimated 30,000 returnees and assistance was limited to that number;
  - development of contingency plans and provision of 550 mt of contingency stocks; and
  - development of the capacity of WFP and government staff to respond to food-related needs.
6. The specific objectives were to:
- increase community capacity to meet food needs through FFW/A;
  - improve the nutritional status and health care of vulnerable people;
  - improve primary school enrolment and attention spans;
  - improve government capacity in relation to food security;
  - support development of a national SMP;
  - maintain a contingency reserve; and
  - support IDP resettlement.

## Evaluation of the Features

7. The team of four had expertise in livelihoods and emergency response, nutrition, logistics and school feeding; standard evaluation techniques were used (see full Evaluation Report).<sup>3</sup> Pre-mission deskwork and briefings developed understanding of the context, planned responses in relation to other stakeholders and activities. Visits in September 2009 to Dili and the districts of Oecussi, Baucau and Bobonaro examined representative activities and interviewed beneficiaries and stakeholders; it was not possible to interview former IDPs or beneficiaries of relief assistance. Although schools were closed, it was possible to interview teachers and parents and inspect some schools; some government informants were not available for interview. Examination of field data led to modification of some desk study perceptions.

<sup>3</sup> Full evaluation reports are available at <http://www.wfp.org/about/evaluation/list>

## PERFORMANCE HIGHLIGHTS

### Operation Design: Relevance and Appropriateness

#### ⇒ *Objectives*

8. In the short term, PRRO 103881 aims to improve food security and nutrition through food-assisted activities; long-term food security and nutrition will be improved through help in establishing national systems.

#### ⇒ *Internal coherence of objectives*

9. The operation was based on experience in PRRO 103880 and the improving security and recovery contexts. It is in line with government and UNDAF aims. Information from the 2006 comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis and the 2007 crop and food supply assessment mission by WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) was used.
10. The design is in line with WFP's Strategic Objectives, but it did not take into consideration the following:<sup>4</sup>
- unit cost sharing with ministries to raise awareness of running costs;
  - clear hand-over arrangements;
  - geographical targeting and local focus in the design of SMP;
  - environmental considerations such as use of fuel-efficient stoves and not using beans, which need prolonged cooking; and
  - attention to community involvement.

#### ⇒ *External coherence of objectives*

11. WFP interventions support UNDAF country programme outcomes and the guidelines of the 2005 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). WFP is co-leader of the food security cluster (FSC), which works with the Government to improve food security in the long and short term. WFP moves beyond the clusters to deal with emergencies that the Government cannot address, but uses clusters to increase government competence to deal with emergencies on its own. Table 1 shows the relationship between government and PRRO objectives.

<sup>4</sup> Unlike countries with long-running country programmes, Timor-Leste has not had the benefit of fine-tuning of programming; the PRRO comes at an early stage in the capacity development of WFP and government staff.

<b>TABLE 1: COHERENCE OF GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES AND PRRO OBJECTIVES</b>	
<b>Government policies and objectives</b>	<b>Links to PRRO objectives</b>
The First Development Plan (2002) prioritized health and education; food security and nutrition were not discussed in detail at that time.	PRRO 103881 is aligned with the Government's emphasis on health and education, to which food security and nutrition are central.
The 2005 National Food Security Policy states: "... food insecurity in Timor-Leste has been one of the main concerns of the first Government"; it also notes the lack of a policy framework and emphasizes that pre-independence institutions no longer existed.	WFP advocacy aims to highlight the significance of the policy framework and institutional issues; its capacity-development supports the reform of state management, particularly in developing a policy framework and managing institutions for food security.
The 2005 Strategic Plan for Primary School Completion by 2015 stressed the importance of affordability in that food is the major household expense, so SMP is an incentive for completion.	The primary school meals programme is the largest food-based activity. In 2009 WFP accepted responsibility for providing food for all primary schools.
The 2005 Health Sector Strategic Plan (2008–2012) included MCHN, noting that 18 percent of children aged 12–23 months suffered from wasting; by SPHERE standards >10 percent is a nutritional emergency.	MCHN is a major food-based intervention supporting malnourished mothers and children under 5; it is also an incentive for attendance at health centres.
In the 2007 National Recovery Strategy, the Government prioritized resettlement of IDPs.	PRRO 103881 supported IDP resettlement and reintegration in 2008 and 2009.
A focus of the government development agenda is reform of state management, with emphasis on development of human resources. <sup>5</sup>	Objective 5 of PRRO 103881 is to enhance government structures and ability to deliver programmes, as stated in the March 2009 letter of understanding.
In 2009 the Government identified food security as its first national priority.	Food security is central to PRRO 103881; the objective is to develop government institutions and capacity.
Publication of the National Development Plan (2008–2012) will draw attention to reducing poverty and vulnerability. <sup>6</sup>	The title of PRRO 103881 is "Assistance to Vulnerable Populations". An emergency reserve will be created; Food for assets (FFA) aims to increase production.

Source: Government policy documents and PRRO documentation

### ⇒ *Project design*

12. The initial logical framework followed up recommendations in the Review of PRRO 103880<sup>7</sup> but was amended in February 2009 to fit WFP's new Strategic Objectives; a modified monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan was also produced. Performance indicators in the revised framework are more complete and precise, though the capacity of monitors and time needed for investigation may limit their value; it is understood that they had not been measured but were used in the 2009 standard project report.

<sup>5</sup> UNDAF (2008), p. 11

<sup>6</sup> UNDAF (2008)

<sup>7</sup> Country office evaluation of Timor-Leste protracted relief and recovery operation "Investing in People's Future". November 2007.



⇒ *Relevance/appropriateness*

13. The six PRRO activities were appropriate to needs in different ways and to different degrees.
- In view of recent food emergencies, contingency planning with the Government and creation of a contingency stock were justified in February and March 2009.
  - Return packs for IDPs facilitated resettlement and recovery of self-support.
  - FFW/A emphasized asset creation, and was targeted to nutritionally vulnerable people in food-insecure districts.
  - School feeding was intended to support school attendance and performance, necessary for developing human resources for the future.
  - Chronic undernutrition is widespread; supplementary feeding is appropriate for pregnant and lactating women and children aged 6 to 23 months, but is unlikely to affect the nutritional status of undernourished children aged 24 to 59 months.
  - The Government has little time to develop its capacity to manage food security, so WFP was well advised to help to develop systems, establish safety nets and improve logistics, planning and management capacity, and to develop local food processing.

⇒ *Outputs and implementation processes: elements of efficiency*

14. In 2008 WFP delivered 91 percent of planned food and reached 259,971 beneficiaries, slightly more than the target. But in 2009 difficulties of supply, pipeline breaks and additional requests from Government made it more difficult to satisfy demands: 24 percent of planned food had been supplied by mid 2009; 71 percent of planned beneficiaries had been reached.
15. There was no need for emergency relief assistance in 2008. But at the Government's request in February and March 2009 in response to food insecurity and floods, 21,565 beneficiaries in eight districts received rice and pulses from WFP's strategic reserve of 220 mt. Beneficiaries were involved in FFW to prevent dependence while repairing damage; the ration provided 40 percent of food needs for one month, compared with a target of 62 percent.
16. The plan was to provide resettlement rations for 40,000 IDP returnees in 2008, but the donor provided resources for 30,000 with the result that 73 percent of beneficiaries were reached; 30,665 beneficiaries were supplied in 2009. In 2008 the deliveries were 27 percent of the PRRO document target; in 2009 it was 28 percent. These figures reflect late and limited deliveries of food, reaching only 30,000 beneficiaries. To reduce some people's resentment over the perceived over-generosity of the Government resettlement package, some rations were given to vulnerable people who were not returnees.
17. Working through communities, FFA reached 94 percent of its targets and 55 percent of targeted beneficiaries in 2008. It was suspended for seven months in 2009, however, because resources were not available: as a result, by September 2009 only 16 percent of the 50,000 targeted beneficiaries had been reached, and only 103 of 333 planned activities had been implemented. Women's participation is limited, and there is a risk of nepotism in the locally controlled system.
18. Following government requests for MCHN, WFP serves 51 percent of health facilities and in 2009 covered 90 percent of planned beneficiaries, though not all deliveries were to MCHN centres. Coverage of eligible beneficiaries varies between districts; the percentage

of health facilities served by WFP in different districts varies from 0 to 100 percent. WFP serves centres in food-secure and food-insecure districts; food security is being enhanced in this way throughout the country, however, and it is politically essential that WFP is not seen to favour any part of the country. Because it would be more efficient to package the corn-soya blend (CSB), in 2008 WFP started to set up a facility to produce it.

19. The School Meals Programme was initially planned for six districts, but in April 2009 the Government requested WFP to cover the remaining seven districts; the programme now provides a mid-morning snack in 1,010 primary schools. There was no proportionate increase in food tonnage, however, so the ration was reduced from 30 percent of the recommended daily intake to 20 percent. Storage in some schools is inadequate, but WFP trained managers to reduce losses. There were some interruptions in supply and some absenteeism among government-paid cooks.
20. WFP has developed government partners' capacity in each component. WFP introduced a multi-agency food security monitoring system that evolved into a national FSC with inputs from other agencies. WFP also assumed co-leadership of the FSC in early 2009 to develop unified approaches in agencies and the Government.
21. Timor-Leste has many transport problems. The Dili warehouse is well run but over-full. Many roads are unsurfaced, transport in small trucks is expensive and in wet-weather final distribution points may be inaccessible, in which case porters – who are relatively expensive – are needed. There have been pipeline breaks.
22. The monitoring system was designed with appropriate indicators, but data must be collected from 1,500 sites; and in spite of WFP training, the educational limitations of some monitors limit their competence.
23. WFP has partnerships with four ministries and is developing their capacities. It works with United Nations partners, but non-governmental organization (NGO) partners have been difficult to find. Of the 76 WFP staff 14 are international, including 6 United Nations volunteers; dependence on international staff reflects the scarcity of suitable national candidates, and there is a need for continuous hands-on coaching for government and WFP staff.
24. The operation has a shortfall of 62.5 percent; by September 2009 84 percent of available resources had been spent. There have been further donations since the evaluation mission, but even with US\$600,000 from the Immediate Response Account, activities will be untenable after March or April 2010. Funding for capacity development and office presence is problematic because they are not food-based.

⇒ *Results*

25. The contingency stock was not used in 2008, but in February 2009 it was used to supply food urgently requested by the Ministry of Social Security for general food distributions in seven districts, and in March and April 2009 it supplied a request by the ministry to supply flood victims in Oecussi, which was carried out through FFW to avoid dependence. The strategic reserve of 220 mt was sufficient on these occasions, and would provide a useful initial distribution in a major emergency.

26. Support for the return and resettlement of IDPs was partially achieved: rice and beans were to have been distributed as a ration after IDPs had resettled, but they arrived late and were distributed separately. Not all IDPs returned to their home areas and it was not feasible to identify all of them, so the bean ration was also distributed to food-insecure host populations.
27. The food-for-assets activities increased the ability of targeted communities to meet food needs by creating productive assets and supplied food in food-insecure districts. But the predominance of feeder road construction in 2009 contrasted with the 2008 emphasis on irrigation and land reclamation, which directly supported food production. It would be desirable to diversify the types of activity, even though some, such as irrigation, require technical skills that need the participation of the few NGOs.
28. The Ministry of Health, other United Nations agencies and NGOs consider that WFP food was an important incentive to increase attendance by pregnant and lactating women at health centres; data for 2006 and 2008 corroborate this. Health professionals report that women showed increased mid-upper arm circumference, though there is no research data to confirm this. It is unlikely that children aged 23–59 months benefit significantly from the take-home CSB, which is shared in families. Focus groups reported that weevils often contaminated CSB, leading to rejection and wastage. The health education element of the programme, which would increase effectiveness, has not been delivered.
29. In the opinion of teachers, parents and Ministry of Education staff, SMP achieved the PRRO objective of improving enrolment, attendance, attention spans and retention, but there is no research data to confirm this. Many children dropped out when supplies were interrupted, so continuity of supply is needed. Other actions that are beyond WFP's remit and that require enhancement of Ministry of Education institutions are needed to improve learning outcomes.
30. WFP's work to develop government capacity to manage short-term and long-term food security involved a number of initiatives. Food security monitoring and the National Food Security Information System are located in ministries. Local production of a blend of corn/rice, soya, oil and sugar fortified with micronutrients in 3-kg packages for the MCHN programme were to begin early in 2010. The cash and vouchers initiative is at an early stage of development.
31. The sustainability of the food-based programmes depends on the willingness of the Government to accept responsibility and the strength of the systems it has created.

⇒ *Cross-cutting issues*

32. WFP sets norms for women's participation in FFA, food committees and reception of food and disaggregates data by sex, but the evaluation noted that women's participation was usually limited, though women had a significant role in MCHN. There is no evidence that girls suffer more undernutrition than boys, but in Timor-Leste adolescent girls may be pregnant after early marriage, which affects growth and development and prevents them from reaching their adult potential.
33. The operation contributed to the transition to recovery in emergency-related activities, MCHN, SMP and FFA; the latter aims to promote recovery in the three-month project timescales. Work to develop government capacity to manage food security is an increasingly important element that is linked to food-based programmes.
34. The lack of NGO partners, funding limitations and problems of working with the Government means that strong partnerships with other United Nations institutions are

needed. The food security cluster and other inter-agency systems are valuable in this context and also enhance partnership with the Government. WFP has a partnership with Timor Global for production of fortified blended food.

35. WFP is one of the agencies that can give warning of food emergencies. For SMP and MCHN, WFP is advocating with the Government to improve policy and systems at the central level and achieve better implementation.
36. Some FFA activities such as tree planting and erosion protection create, maintain or recover environments. But there was limited progress in introducing fuel-efficient solar-powered or fuel-burning stoves in school kitchens, even though the Government and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) installed solar panels at health centres; WFP intends to use Brazilian trust funds for fuel-efficient stoves, which would help to reduce deforestation.

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## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Overall Assessment

37. The evaluation found that PRRO 103881 was largely relevant to Timor-Leste, which is recovering from conflict and moving towards development. Timor-Leste is a fragile state where food security interventions must respond to acute emergencies, but chronic undernutrition resulting from poor health, education, water and sanitation conditions and diet affects half the population. Targeting was appropriate, focusing on vulnerable groups – victims of natural disasters, returning IDPs, infants, pregnant and lactating women in MCHN, children of primary school age in SMP – and vulnerable villages.
38. The objectives were in line with WFP policies, partners' interventions, government priorities and the need to develop government capacity rapidly while resources from oil are still available. WFP supported the Government food security strategy and developed Government awareness and capacity for planning and implementation of food-based programmes.
39. Resettlement of IDPs was delayed during 2008 for reasons beyond WFP's control, but in general PRRO 103881 met its targets for supplying food and reaching beneficiaries, partly because carry-over stocks were available. The SMP and MCHN programmes exceeded targets; the FFA programme almost achieved its target of activities, but it delivered less food and reached fewer beneficiaries than planned.
40. The delayed resettlement of IDPs was completed by mid 2009. The WFP strategic reserve made possible a rapid response to two minor emergencies in 2009, during which the food shortfall became increasingly problematic. By mid-2009 food deliveries were considerably below target, though the targets for beneficiary numbers were being reached in all programmes except FFA, in which shortage of food led to a seven-month suspension until July 2009.
41. Shortages of food, the logistics costs, limited human capacity, competition with other agencies for staff, the need to import services and equipment and the limited number of NGO partners restricted the efficiency of the operation and increased its cost. Causes outside WFP's control, such as the long food supply chain, delays in food deliveries and in closing IDP camps affected the timing of activities. Annex 5E of the full evaluation report gives proposals for increasing the efficiency of logistics. Despite resource limitations that threaten the completion of the PRRO, by mid-2009 WFP was able to prioritize

development of government capacity to manage food security, in coordination with other United Nations agencies.

42. The evaluation found that impacts were positive or neutral in all the programme areas, though it is difficult to separate the impact of PRRO activities from the recovery resulting from improved security and economic conditions. The operation supported the development of government capacity and raised its awareness of the significance of nutrition and food security. FFA, while significantly reduced, involved communities directly in planning and implementation.
43. The sustainability of the results of PRRO 103881 depends on WFP's implementation of the activities, which is sound, and their incorporation into governmental and local systems. There is concern in MCHN and SMP that institutional capacity is insufficiently developed to fulfil the Government's plans. But the maintenance of positive national security and socio-economic environments will influence the long-term achievements of PRRO 103881.

### Issues for the Future

44. The Timor-Leste country office faces a crisis of resources that the evaluation team predicted in October 2009 would be critical by the end of the year and would threaten WFP's ability to continue programmes. SMP is particularly threatened, and its failure could be a political threat to Government. A sound hand-over strategy depends on the Government accepting full responsibility for food security; its capacity is currently insufficient. Donors need to be fully aware of the risks to Timor-Leste if food security worsens significantly.
45. The required capacity cannot be fully developed in PRRO 103881. WFP might consider a further PRRO with a focus on creating government structures and skills for food security management. Dedicated funding is needed for capacity development; as capacities increase WFP could hand over more responsibility while assisting as problems arise, possibly beyond the next PRRO. Food-based interventions need to continue while programmes are established in the Government, particularly SMP.
46. The case for a further PRRO rather than a country programme or development project is that Timor-Leste remains a fragile state afflicted by regular large and small emergencies that need responses. A new extended recovery component of the PRRO would be appropriate, in which capacity development could be the central activity; SMP and MCHN could support food security, though with decreasing food requirements. It would probably be advisable to move to a development project after two years.
47. Support for government capacity will become dominant as hand-over to the Government of WFP's food-based activities nears. There is still a need for capacity-development in WFP to support this. Capacity-development plans for MCHN and SMP should also be supported.
48. Logistics remains a problem area. At the time of the mission, the Dili warehouse was over-full:<sup>8</sup> stacks were dangerously high and there was a risk of cross-infestation, for which costly pest control is needed. Transport is expensive. The system of alternative distribution points reduces control of delivery information, and transport by porters is unacceptably costly. WFP needs to find out the state of the whole logistics system for its

<sup>8</sup> This was partly a result of the long break in the school year. WFP did not wish to pre-position stocks in schools because there would be an increased risk of deterioration.



own purposes and so that it can advise the Government. It would be advisable to develop a logistics team in the Government before hand-over.<sup>9</sup>

49. The M&E system is appropriately designed, but there was a weakness in the ability of monitors to carry out the work on such a vast scale – there are over 1,500 monitoring sites.
50. WFP experienced difficulty in expanding SMP, and the Ministry of Education overestimates its own capacity to manage the programme. WFP needs to develop hand-over strategies as quickly as possible, with technical support for SMP and training for ministry staff. SMP is currently over-centralized, and the ministry's plan for local procurement and development of school clusters is still to be tested.
51. The fortified blended food project with Timor Global should help to enhance nutrition in the MCHN programme, which could be improved by taking into account the proposals in Annex 5G of the full evaluation report.
52. Food-for-assets activities had some successes, but WFP needs to work with communities and local authorities to identify worthwhile projects. Technical skills will be needed for this. Communities value assets that are sustainable.

## Recommendations

53. The evaluation team made ten recommendations; the first three are priorities. With support from the regional bureau and Headquarters as required, the country office should:
54. **Recommendation 1:** continue to advocate with donors and the Government for funding for PRRO 103881: current resources are insufficient for completion and the Government is not yet able to take responsibility for food security;
55. **Recommendation 2:** continue WFP's presence with a further PRRO that focuses on enhancing government capacity development to manage food security and nutrition, and consider ways of supporting the Government in food security issues in the long term; some form of funding to support capacity development should be provided; pending improved capacity, food-based programmes should continue;
56. **Recommendation 3:** improve the supply chain by: i) developing warehouses at extended delivery point sub-offices; ii) pre-arranged deliveries to final delivery points; iii) better storage at schools and MCHN centres; iv) abandonment of alternative distribution points; and v) direct contracting of Oecussi transporters;<sup>10</sup>
57. **Recommendation 4:** make an inventory of the current logistics structure and propose improvements;
58. **Recommendation 5:** support the development of a government logistics team that could be inter-ministerial or based in the Ministry of Social Security;
59. **Recommendation 6:** develop the capacities of monitors in all food-based programmes through further training;
60. **Recommendation 7:** develop SMP hand-over strategies and increase technical capacity in the country office to further develop the capacity of the Ministry of Education, including providing support with up-to-date knowledge of SMP;

<sup>9</sup> WFP focused on building the logistics capacity of several ministries, which did not want to give overall coordination powers for logistics to a sole ministry.

<sup>10</sup> Annex 5E of the full report provides details of these recommendations.

61. **Recommendation 8:** Support the piloting of the Ministry of Education’s planned local food procurement for SMP, and support scaling-up of local procurement if it is feasible as a national strategy;
62. **Recommendation 9:** align MCHN with the actions proposed in Annex 5G of the full evaluation report, and discontinue SMP for children aged 24–59 months;<sup>11</sup> and
63. **Recommendation 10:** advocate with communities and local authorities to increase the number of projects that directly improve production of valued assets to ensure maintenance, and seek technical assistance for implementation.

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<sup>11</sup> Seven recommendations are contextualized for Timor-Leste in Annex 5G of the full report.

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## ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CSB	corn-soya blend
EMOP	emergency operation
FFW/A	food for work/assets
FSC	food security cluster
IDP	internally displaced person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MCHN	mother-and-child health and nutrition
NGO	non-governmental organization
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SMP	school meals programme
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework