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WFP SECURITY REPORT



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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for information

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal point indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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* Field Security Division

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document provides an update on the threats to the security and safety of WFP staff and assets, and of partners and contractors. Various factors affected WFP's operations in 2011: the uprising in Tunisia spread to other countries in North Africa and the Middle East, where high levels of insecurity developed, there was civil war in Côte d'Ivoire, South Sudan became an independent State with its own internal problems, and conflicts in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Somalia continued. In many countries, the nature of security risks became more complex.

The number of security incidents nonetheless remained about the same as in 2010, with 54 incidents reported per 1,000 staff members. The incidents were of many kinds, but criminally motivated incidents remain the major threat to WFP staff and assets; terrorism-related incidents accounted for the lowest proportion.

These figures reflect the effectiveness of WFP's security risk management measures, such as the provision of specialist equipment and personnel, improvements to WFP premises and procedural changes. This document details the work of the Field Security Division in addressing the increasing security challenges that WFP faces. In 2012, mitigation measures will:


- institutionalize security – including planning, resource allocation and organizational processes – to reflect the significance of security in WFP;
- develop an innovative, flexible, proactive approach to security risk management to enable WFP to achieve its objectives;
- improve communication at all levels with a view to enhanced understanding, confidence and trust; and
- enhance WFP's security culture.

Risks are an inevitable part of WFP's operational model. In view of this, the Field Security Division aims to ensure that security management is integrated into WFP's risk management system and that security measures are practical and cost-effective.

The Management Plan (2012–2014) includes provision for a Security Special Account to cover the US\$9.6 million costs related to the United Nations Department of Safety and Security and US\$7.3 million for the Security Emergency Fund. A US\$16.9 million advance from the Working Capital Facility will be used to make payments. Up to US\$10 million from the General Fund will be used to cover amounts that cannot be charged to projects. The Field Security Division and the Budget and Programming Division are considering possible cost-recovery mechanisms. As of 2012, the cost of structural security upgrades will be authorized by the Premises Security Committee and budgeted as direct support costs in country offices, in consultation with the Field Security Division.

WFP's projected share of United Nations Department of Safety and Security field-related costs for 2010–2011 was US\$24.4 million. The figure for 2012 – US\$9.6 million – is based on the number of WFP staff in the field as calculated in the Chief Executives Board document “Cost-Sharing Arrangements for Jointly Financed Activities” (CEB/2009/HLCM/FB/8). The United Nations Department of Safety and Security budget review indicates that WFP's share of costs for 2012 is likely to increase to US\$11 million.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “WFP Security Report” (WFP/EB.A/2012/13-D).

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

BACKGROUND

1. This report provides: i) an update on the threats to the security and safety of WFP staff and assets, and of partners and contractors; ii) an account of the work of the Field Security Division (ODF) in addressing the increasing security challenges that WFP faces; and iii) a strategy for a security culture to ensure that WFP managers understand the risk environment and receive support in making decisions about risk management.
2. The report also provides information about WFP's share of United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) field-related costs for 2011–2012 and the Security Emergency Fund. At its 2011 First Regular Session, the Board took note of "Information Note on Funding of Security Management Arrangements" (WFP/EB.1/2011/12-B) and requested periodic information on progress and any changes in WFP's share of costs or the cost-sharing mechanism.

REVIEW OF WFP FIELD SECURITY

3. The United Nations Security Management System aims to enable United Nations organizations and implementing partners to achieve their goals in spite of security threats. WFP operates in volatile environments with a variety of security concerns: these are not limited to the deliberate targeting of United Nations and associated personnel, as evidenced most recently by the 2011 attack on the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, but extend to economically and politically motivated violence and environmental hazards, which constitute day-to-day operational constraints. Other developments have caused concern about security trends: these include the 2011 Arab Spring that destabilized some North African countries, intractable conflicts and the world economic crisis.
4. Given that risk is an inescapable part of operations, WFP's security measures are designed to enhance the security of personnel and to manage security risks with a view to facilitating operations rather than limiting activities. The aim is "the right security, at the right time, in the right place": ODF will continue to provide operational support, technical expertise, security leadership and risk management and analysis to enable WFP managers to understand the risk environment and make decisions accordingly.
5. The objectives of ODF for 2012–2016 are to:
 - institutionalize security – including planning, resource allocation and organizational processes – to reflect the significance of security in WFP;
 - develop an innovative, flexible, proactive approach to security risk management to enable WFP to achieve its objectives;
 - improve communication at all levels with a view to enhanced understanding, confidence and trust; and
 - enhance WFP's security culture.
6. Security risks are related to potential hostile actions in the field and also to WFP's identity and operations. To ensure that security management is integrated into WFP's management of risk, ODF aims to ensure that security risk mitigation does not generate alternative risks. Measures to enhance the security of premises, for example, may be perceived negatively by communities as distancing staff from beneficiaries. In view of this, ODF balances programme goals against risks to the safety and security of staff and applies risk mitigation options as part of an overall strategy.

7. Even so, residual risk frequently remains. Given that WFP accepts risk in the context of its moral imperatives rather than as a cost-benefit issue, even when appropriate financial allowances are available for security, ODF aims to ensure that security measures are practical and cost-effective.
8. The Field Security Division (ODF) will continue to work with UNDSS and other bodies to develop United Nations policies and standards that promote safety and security; by employing a decentralized decision-making system it promotes flexible responses to the changing security situation. The concept of risk appetite remains underdeveloped, but ODF will support the Board in engaging in risk management. In particular, it will develop WFP's security risk culture to ensure that managers understand mitigation procedures and that staff have guidance as to the levels of risk to which they are exposed or may be permitted to assume.
9. Given that the capacity of some host governments is limited in certain environments, WFP will be left with an inherent risk of insecurity. When these risks are beyond the control of humanitarian actors, ODF will support WFP's programme criticality process in deciding when the moral imperative to provide aid and assistance outweighs these risks.

SECURITY INCIDENTS INVOLVING WFP STAFF AND ASSETS AND PARTNER STAFF

Overview

10. In 2011, 895 security incidents involving the staff and assets of WFP and contractors and partners were reported,¹ 3 percent fewer than in 2010 but 12 percent more than in 2008 and 22 percent more than in 2009. These figures confirm the increasing trend since 2005 when WFP started to record and analyse security incidents (Figure 1).²
11. WFP staff or assets were involved in 786 of the incidents in 2011 compared with 785 in 2010. Of these, 646 involved only WFP staff and assets, and 140 involved WFP staff and assets and those of contractors or partners. Contractors' and partners' staff and assets were affected in 248 incidents, including those also involving WFP. Of the incidents involving WFP staff and assets, 491 occurred in the line of duty; this is a 12 percent reduction from the 553 work-related incidents in 2010.
12. Crime remains the main threat to WFP staff and assets: 67 percent of the incidents involving WFP staff and assets were criminal. Hazards accounted for 23 percent of these incidents, armed conflict for 5 percent, civil unrest 4 percent and terrorism 1 percent. This trend is consistent with the numbers of incidents observed in past years.

¹ This analysis is based on security incident reports received by ODF.

² All figures are found in the Annex. See also Figures 5 and 13.

SECURITY INCIDENTS BY TYPE

Critical Security Incidents³

⇒ *Staff fatalities*

13. There were no violence-related fatalities in 2010, but in 2011 four WFP staff members lost their lives in the line of duty as a result of violent acts. Senior Programme Assistant Santino Pigga Alex Wani was killed when a joint WFP/partner truck convoy was ambushed in South Sudan. Driver Farhan Hamsa was killed in the Somali region of Ethiopia in a similar ambush in which another WFP staff member was seriously injured and two were kidnapped. Staff members Muhyedin Yarrow and Mohamed Salad were shot and killed by an internally displaced person in south-central Somalia. Two WFP staff members lost their lives in accidents in the line of duty: logistics assistant Augustin Kasongo was killed when an aircraft crashed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and driver Swaibu Okecha was killed in a road accident in Uganda; another staff member was killed in a road accident while off duty in Malawi. Two staff members died from natural causes.

⇒ *Staff injuries*

14. For the second consecutive year there was a reduction in the number of staff seriously injured in the line of duty in acts of violence. Two staff members sustained serious injuries, one in Ethiopia and one in Guinea; five staff were injured in acts of violence while off duty.

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Killed	-	-	4	4	9	-	4
Injured	9	2	5	17	23	14	7

15. Five other staff members suffered injuries in two work-related accidents.

⇒ *Contractor/partner fatalities and injuries*

16. Three employees of WFP contractors and partners were killed in separate acts of violence in Afghanistan. Two partner staff members were killed in Somalia, and one in the Sudan. Two employees of companies contracted by WFP lost their lives in road accidents in Haiti while supporting operations.

	2008	2009	2010	2011
Killed	13	6	6	8
Injured	5	11	22	7

³ Incidents resulting in death, injury, abduction or kidnapping.

17. Seven employees of WFP contractors and partners were injured as a result of violence while at work in 2011, a significant reduction from 2010. Incidents of violence resulting in injuries to partner and contractor staff occurred in the Central African Republic, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan. Two employees of companies contracted by WFP were seriously injured in work-related road accidents.

⇒ *Abductions/kidnappings*

18. Two WFP staff members were abducted when a WFP convoy was ambushed in the Somali region of Ethiopia and released after 46 days; a staff member was killed and another seriously injured in the same incident. Two WFP staff members were subjected to “express kidnapping”⁴ in separate incidents in Guatemala and Honduras.
19. Seven partner staff members and seven employees of WFP contractors were abducted in six incidents in Afghanistan, the Philippines and the Sudan in 2011. Five of the incidents ended after a short time, but three United Nations Humanitarian Air Service staff abducted on 13 January 2011 in Darfur were held for 145 days. Kidnapping of foreign aid workers for ransom is a major threat in Darfur.
20. The 14 abductions of contractor or partner staff in 2011 constitutes a 180 percent rise from the abduction/kidnapping figure for 2010, reflecting an emerging trend in the targeting of aid workers.
21. Most of the critical security incidents resulted from violence. Armed attacks caused most of the fatalities and serious injuries among WFP and contractor and partner staff while on duty. The WFP staff fatalities were caused by firearms in two incidents, one on the road and one at a programme site; other weapons used in attacks where staff were killed or abducted included improvised explosive devices. Weapons were used or threatened to be used in cases of abduction. Non-violent deaths and injuries among WFP staff resulted mainly from traffic accidents; one fatality resulted from an aircraft accident.

Significant Security Incidents

⇒ *Evacuation and relocation of staff resulting from deteriorating security situations*

22. There were seven evacuations of staff in 2011 resulting from deteriorating security conditions – three in Libya, one in the Sudan and one each in Egypt, Côte d’Ivoire and Yemen. There had been no security-related evacuations in 2010.
23. Staff members had to be relocated to safer areas in the same country on 13 occasions – five times in the Sudan, four in Yemen, twice in South Sudan and once in Afghanistan and Côte d’Ivoire. The immediate causes were outbreaks of armed conflict; the cases in Afghanistan and Egypt were triggered by civil unrest.
24. The need to resort to such options confirms the challenges faced by WFP staff. Evacuations and relocations are not new in the United Nations Security Management System, but their frequency in 2011 reflects the need for contingency capabilities to respond to rapidly deteriorating security conditions.

⁴ A form of kidnapping in which the victim is held for a short time for a relatively small and easily paid ransom, sometimes using the victim’s bank card to withdraw money from automatic teller machines over a period of days.

⇒ *Detention and harassment*

25. During 2011 there were 30 incidents of arrest, detention and harassment of staff members in work-related circumstances, all involving nationally recruited staff. This constitutes a 16 percent reduction from the 36 incidents reported in 2010 and 19 percent from the 37 reported in 2009.
26. State police and military were responsible for 27 such incidents; three incidents were perpetrated by the non-state Ogaden National Liberation Front in the Somali region of Ethiopia. State-actor responsibility fell from 95 percent of arrest, detention and harassment incidents in 2010 to 90 percent in 2011. The largest numbers of incidents involving state actors were the ten in Ethiopia and the nine in South Sudan; four incidents were reported in the Central African Republic, two each in Haiti and the Sudan, and one each in Afghanistan, Kenya and Somalia.
27. Five incidents of arrest involving four staff members in work-related circumstances involved varying periods of incarceration in the Central African Republic, Guinea, South Sudan and the Sudan. All these staff have since been released.

⇒ *Criminality*

28. Crime remained the main security threat to WFP staff and assets in 2011. There were 526 crimes, 301 of which were work-related, accounting for 66 percent of the incidents involving WFP staff and assets; in 2010 criminality accounted for 37 percent of such incidents.
29. Of the 526 crimes against WFP and contractor staff reported in 2011, 25 percent involved the use or threat of weapons resulting in fatalities and injuries; this highlights the impact of armed criminality on WFP operations. A WFP staff member was killed in an ambush in the Sudan and two others were killed by an armed individual in Somalia. There were also criminal incidents in the Central African Republic and Somalia that resulted in injuries to contractor and partner staff.
30. Robbery accounted for the highest proportion of crime involving weapons: 80 cases involving WFP staff and assets were reported compared with the 131 incidents registered in 2010 (see Figure 8).
31. Two WFP vehicles were hijacked in 2011, one in the DRC and one in Egypt. No WFP vehicles were hijacked in Darfur, where such incidents are common. In a non-work related incident, a WFP staff member's private vehicle was hijacked in South Africa (Figure 8). There were no injuries in any of these cases, despite threats of violence. The vehicle hijacked in the DRC has since been recovered; efforts to recover the one taken in Egypt are ongoing. There has been a decreasing trend of hijacking incidents since 2008, resulting mainly from the installation of a special global positioning and tracking system on WFP vehicles.
32. Of the 387 crime-related incidents that did not involve the use of weapons, 211 affected WFP staff and assets in a work-related context. The most frequent type of criminality in this category was theft, with 95 incidents reported. Burglary or forced entry was involved in 85 incidents; 20 other burglary attempts were foiled.
33. There is a marked difference between crimes at Headquarters, which were largely limited to burglary and theft, and those in the field, where incidents were diverse but frequently included robbery and banditry.

Other Security Incidents

⇒ *Seizure of WFP property and access restrictions by state and non-state actors*

34. In 2011, there were 20 incidents of seizure or confiscation of WFP property: eight in South Sudan, seven in the DRC, two in Somalia and one each in Ethiopia, the Sudan and Yemen. This constitutes a 67 percent increase from the 2010 figures. In general, WFP food was most vulnerable to seizures, most of which were carried out by state actors. Vehicles contracted or owned by WFP remain vulnerable to seizure or confiscation. Half of the incidents in South Sudan involved the commandeering of contracted trucks by the Sudan People's Liberation Army.

35. In 2011, there were only six incidents of access restriction during WFP missions, two in South Sudan and one each in Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Kenya and the Sudan. In all cases, security reasons were cited by the authorities.

⇒ *Damage to and loss of WFP property*

36. There were 76 incidents in 2011 where WFP property or property shared with partners was damaged or lost. Malicious damage was reported in 29 of these incidents, 24 of which were criminally motivated. WFP property was damaged through collateral impact in nine cases, two of which were perpetrated in Afghanistan using explosives. Other damage resulting from natural hazards and road accidents was registered in 22 incidents; loss of property, mainly food, was recorded on 11 occasions.

Hazards and Other Safety-Related Incidents

⇒ *Road accidents*

37. There were 128 road accidents, accounting for 70 percent of hazard-related incidents involving WFP staff and assets in 2011, a marginal reduction from the 140 incidents in 2010. Of these, 93 occurred in the line of duty; 37 resulted in injuries and 8 resulted in fatalities including 5 local residents, a WFP staff member and two contracted employees. The high incidence of road accidents underscores the continuing need for training in driving and first aid.

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITY INCIDENTS⁵

38. The geographical distribution of security incidents in 2011 was consistent with the trends from 2007 to 2010. Sixty-four percent of incidents involving WFP staff and assets and partner and contractor staff – 569 – were registered in Africa, compared with 549 incidents in 2010. All WFP staff fatalities occurred in Africa. In Asia there were 199 incidents, an increase of 76 percent compared with 2010. A 48 percent increase in security incidents in Haiti compared with 2010 placed a country in the Americas in the top five for the first time.

Africa

39. Of the five countries with the highest number of incidents involving WFP staff and assets, three were in Africa. This is consistent with the patterns in 2010 (Figure 2).

⁵ Based on the United Nations classification of regions.

TABLE 3: TREND OF SECURITY INCIDENTS			
Country	2010	2011	% increase/decrease
South Sudan	103 [*]	106	+2
Sudan	75 ^{**}	56	-25
Afghanistan	41	47	+15
Haiti	33	46	+39
DRC	40	43	+7
Kenya	37	40	+8
Pakistan	41	36	-12
Ethiopia	44	34	-23

* Incidents reported from South Sudan region when it was part of the Sudan.

** A combination of incidents reported from Darfur and Centre, East and Three Areas (CETA) regions, the current constituents of the Republic of Sudan.

Note: The description of Haiti in the text refers to incidents involving WFP staff/assets and those of contractors and partners, while Table 3 includes only incidents involving WFP staff and assets; hence the numerical disparities.

⇒ *Republic of South Sudan*

40. Even though South Sudan seceded from the Sudan in July 2011, it had the largest number of security incidents involving WFP staff and assets and partner and contractor staff – 106 – compared with the 56 reported in the Sudan: this figure is consistent with trends over the past six years, when the South Sudan region had more security incidents than the Darfur and CETA regions. The figures underscore the challenging operational environments in which WFP programmes are implemented.
41. The highest number of incidents involving contractors and partners – 41 in 2011 – was reported from South Sudan, double the number registered in 2010 when it was still a region of the Sudan. Crime accounted for 63 percent of incidents in South Sudan, incidents related to hazards for 29 percent and armed conflict for 8 percent. Armed groups fighting to overthrow the Government increased their operations significantly before and after the declaration of independence in July 2011; border disputes between the north and south and increased ethnic violence in several states in South Sudan also increased insecurity. The net effect is an increase in the likelihood of threats to WFP operations.

⇒ *Republic of the Sudan*

42. Most incidents in the Sudan in 2011 were reported in Darfur – 56 percent – with 44 percent in CETA. In 2010, the ratio of incidents in CETA and Darfur was 1:3. The increase in incidents reported in CETA in 2011 was mainly the result of social and political changes, and reached a peak in the middle of the year before levelling off.
43. The main driver of insecurity in CETA was conflict, which accounted for 50 percent of incidents reported in CETA. During 2011, the Sudanese armed forces, backed by tribal militia, occupied Abyei. In conjunction with the independence of South Sudan, conflict broke out between the armed forces and the northern faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in southern Kordofan state before spreading to Blue Nile state. This resulted in the evacuation of WFP personnel from the area, and WFP operations in CETA remain severely constrained: there is minimal operational presence in Kadugli in southern Kordofan and in Damazine in Blue Nile state. The declaration of an alliance between Darfur rebel groups and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement shifted the conflict

towards CETA and reduced tensions in Darfur, where criminality and inter-communal tensions nonetheless persist. The killing of rebel Justice and Equality Movement leader Khalil Ibrahim in CETA in December 2011 could result in fragmentation of the movement.

44. Crime is the main threat in the Sudan, accounting for 60 percent of the incidents reported. Most criminal incidents were reported in Darfur, where conflict is less intense and combined with criminality.

⇒ *Democratic Republic of the Congo*

45. There were 43 incidents in the DRC, a 7 percent increase over the 2010 figure. Of these, 80 percent were criminally motivated, ranging from theft to ambushes, robberies and a vehicle hijacking. Most of the violent criminal acts were perpetrated against partners and contractors in eastern areas where rebel groups target the civil population and humanitarian agencies. Ethnic tensions are also a serious security concern: these did not directly affect WFP, but five staff of a non-governmental organization (NGO) were killed under circumstances that indicate ethnic violence.

Asia

46. As in previous years, the second largest number of security incidents involving WFP staff and assets and partner staff – 199 – was registered in Asia. Afghanistan and Pakistan accounted for 57 percent of these incidents.

⇒ *Afghanistan*

47. There were 66 security incidents in Afghanistan, of which 47 involved WFP staff and assets. The attack on the United Nations compound in Mazar-i-Sharif by 3,000 armed demonstrators protesting over the burning of a Koran in the United States resulted in the deaths of three United Nations international staff and four international security guards. The risk continues because the Taliban considers the United Nations to be a target.
48. Of these security incidents, 31 percent were acts of violence. Two involved the use of explosives on WFP food convoys: one of these resulted in the deaths of two contractors' employees and one partner staff member; the other caused minor damage to the escort of a convoy of trucks operated by WFP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Whether these attacks targeted the convoys or the Afghan Security Forces escorting them, they are examples of a real threat to WFP operations.
49. There is a clear pattern of militants targeting government workers and WFP partners. Two staff members of a government agency returning from a WFP project were murdered by militants in May 2011. Three abductions of WFP partner staff were reported in which the perpetrators tried to determine their affiliation with the Government; all were released unharmed. The targeting of government structures and personnel is aimed at disrupting service delivery and undermining the Government; and there is a possibility that humanitarian agencies will be targeted in the same way. The security situation remains precarious and is expected to deteriorate further.
50. Crime was a major operational challenge in 2011: 68 percent of security incidents were criminally motivated, half of which involved the use of weapons.

⇒ *Pakistan*

51. Of the 47 incidents reported in Pakistan, 36 involved WFP staff and assets. Armed criminality is a threat, especially to contractors and partners: 31 incidents were criminal in nature, 19 of which involved the use of weapons.
52. Information indicating the likelihood of suicide attacks at food distribution points resulted in the arrest of a suspected perpetrator. No such attack occurred, but the reports reflect the range of risks to which WFP operations are exposed.

The Americas

⇒ *Haiti*

53. The 49 security incidents involving WFP staff and assets and contractor and partner staff reported in Haiti in 2011 constitute a 48-percent increase over the 2010 figure and moved Haiti from eighth to fourth in the list of high-risk countries. Crime accounted for 65 percent of incidents; demonstrations over alleged delays in payment by WFP partners also caused security incidents.

Middle East and North Africa

54. The unrest in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 changed the pattern of security incidents affecting WFP. Following the uprising in Tunisia, there was regime change in Egypt and conflict in Libya; Yemen and the Syrian Arab Republic are suffering protracted crises that have resulted in high levels of insecurity. In Yemen, 33 incidents were reported of which 29 involved WFP staff and assets, a 61 percent increase over the 2010 figure. In the Syrian Arab Republic there were 13 incidents involving WFP staff and assets registered compared with zero in 2010.
55. There were three evacuations of staff in Libya and one each in Yemen and Egypt. Four relocations were carried out in Yemen.

Security Incidents by Regional Bureau

56. The Regional Bureau for East and Central Africa (ODN) reported 277 security incidents involving WFP staff and assets in 2011, of which 106 occurred in South Sudan. The Regional Bureau for Asia (ODB) reported 114 incidents compared with 113 in 2010. The Regional Bureau for West Africa (ODD) reported 100 incidents compared with 111 in 2010. The greatest increase was reported by the Regional Bureau for the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ODC) where 60 incidents were reported, a 122 percent increase from 27 in 2010. The greatest decrease in incidents was noted in the Regional Bureau for Southern Africa (ODJ) where there were 56 incidents compared with 258 in 2010; this is explained by the re-assignment of several countries to ODN. The Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (ODPC) reported 93 incidents, a 16 percent increase from the 2010 figure.

Security Incidents Affecting Contractors and Partners

57. There were 248 incidents involving staff and assets of contractors and partners in 2011, of which 134 involved a partner or a contractor as well as WFP staff or assets. Five incidents concurrently involved the staff and assets of WFP, contractors and partners, which underscores the need to streamline risk-management strategies with partners and contractors. There were 47 incidents that exclusively involved the staff and assets of partners, and 61 that involved those of contractors. One incident involved partner and contractor employees concurrently.

58. Of the incidents involving contractor and partner staff, 145 were reported in Africa, a 77 percent increase from the 82 in 2010. Contrary to the pattern for WFP, contractors and partners were more vulnerable in Asia, where five of eight fatalities occurred; the other three occurred in Africa.
59. As shown in Table 2, eight partner and contractor employees were killed in acts of violence while on duty in 2011, two more than in 2010. The most hazardous location for contractors and partners was Afghanistan, where two contractor employees and one partner staff member were killed in an improvised explosive device attack and two partner staff members were abducted and murdered. Two fatalities among partner staff were reported in Somalia and one in the Sudan.
60. Attacks on trucks were the commonest form of hostile incident affecting companies contracted by WFP, consistent with the pattern in the past two years. Attacks on contractors' trucks decreased from 42 in 2010 to 37 in 2011. The number of attacks fell in DRC, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kenya, Somalia and Yemen, but increased in Benin, the Central African Republic and Egypt.
61. The single incident of kidnapping for ransom in 2011 involved three United Nations Humanitarian Air Service crew members, who were eventually released after 145 days. This was the most protracted kidnapping incident involving contractors to date. The risk of kidnapping or abduction is particularly acute in Darfur.

Conclusions

62. The number of security incidents in 2011 was almost the same as in 2010, with 54 incidents reported per 1,000 staff members. In terms of critical security incidents, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan were the riskiest for WFP operations. The steady increase in the number of incidents reported since 2005 is partly attributable to improved reporting, but in view of the social and political uncertainties during 2011 the fact that the number of incidents has hardly changed can be considered a positive outcome. The nature of the security risks, however, tended to be more complex, a pattern that is expected to continue.

WFP FIELD SECURITY ACTIVITIES AND IMPROVEMENTS

WFP Field Security Capacity

63. To address security challenges and mitigate the risks to staff in the field, ODF operates a decentralized decision-making process that enables flexible responses to changing situations. As of 31 December 2011, there were 48 field security officers (FSOs), compared with 54 in 2010, and six regional security officers (RSOs). These officers are crucial in ensuring that WFP's mandate is implemented in hazardous environments. By evaluating local security situations and recommending improvements for physical safety and operational security, they ensure that robust measures are in place to protect staff and assets. The RSOs support Regional Directors in ensuring that security goals are met in line with the framework of accountability;⁶ they also advise Country Directors on security issues, provide contingency planning and train field office staff. Their skills are constantly developed through training and workshops in collaboration with UNDSS and other United Nations bodies with a view to developing a United Nations security policy and standards.

⁶ In the WFP Security Management Policy (Executive Director's Circular EDD2011/011).

64. In response to security challenges in 2011, FSOs and RSOs were deployed to support WFP operations in hazardous environments, often under difficult conditions, in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Chad, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.
65. The FSOs and RSOs are supported by local security assistants and WFP security focal points; the latter are not security professionals but they are crucial in reporting incidents, budgeting for security and implementing security measures for ODF.
66. Security field staff are supported by 14 professionals at Headquarters who advise and provide technical assistance. The Chief of Operations manages resources to assist field offices, advises senior management on security issues and coordinates security assessment missions and blast vulnerability assessments to ensure minimum operating security standards (MOSS) compliance in all premises. Headquarters staff also provide training to develop security awareness and analysis of security threats to assist stakeholders in formulating mitigation strategies.
67. A new Director of ODF was appointed in 2011, who began a review to improve internal risk-management processes and develop innovative approaches to security risk management. A number of new tools are being developed to streamline procedures and make better use of resources. Initial results are promising, and this work will continue in 2012–2014.
68. The ability of security staff to respond to increasingly challenging security needs is set in a funding context that calls for innovative approaches to deciding where and when to deploy scarce resources.

Security Assessment Missions

69. WFP continues its missions to country offices to assess whether security and safety measures are effective and to identify vulnerabilities that may have developed since previous missions or because of changes in the security environment.
70. During 2010–2011, consultants from WFP's standby roster carried out security assessments in 25 countries. Regional and Country Directors received copies of their reports and the 1,758 recommendations, which showed that the main deficiencies related to equipment, a trend in all WFP regions. These and other security deficiencies were addressed during 2011, and ODF will continue the process during 2012.

TABLE 4: BREAKDOWN OF MAIN SECURITY DEFICIENCIES	
Equipment and facility (57%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◇ Construction or enforcements of doors/walls ◇ Fencing ◇ Fire extinguishers ◇ First aid kits ◇ Communication equipment
Processes and procedures (33%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◇ Access control procedures ◇ Radio checks ◇ Vehicle tracking ◇ Parking procedures
Documentation (5%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◇ Evacuation plans ◇ Standard operating procedures ◇ WFP-specific security plans
Training (6%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◇ Trauma training ◇ Driver training ◇ First aid training ◇ Communications training

71. During 2010–2011, building protection measures, telecommunications equipment, blast-resistant film, body armour, access-control equipment and armoured vehicles were provided at 54 country offices and at Headquarters. Other equipment required for MOSS such as fire-fighting and alarm systems and medical equipment were provided at 40 country offices and at Headquarters; ODF also built up its stocks at United Nations Humanitarian Resource Depots for emergency deployment. An assessment in 2011 indicated that WFP premises are 60 percent MOSS-compliant – a reduction from 2010 – but changes in MOSS policy mean that the baseline standard has been replaced by measures to reduce risk levels as identified in the security risk assessment. In view of this, ODF is working with regional bureaux and country offices to ensure that security measures are in place and that implementation is monitored at Headquarters. Funds will be provided from the Security Special Account for offices that are not fully MOSS-compliant.

Premises Security and Blast Mitigation

72. Where enhancements are needed to ensure that premises are MOSS-compliant, the Premises Security Committee (PSC) monitors the status of projects and advises the Chief Operating Officer.

73. The Premises Security Task Force, which includes experts in security, blast assessment and engineering, supports the PSC by reviewing technical aspects of premises projects for existing buildings and those proposed or under construction. In 2011, support and advice was provided for 32 country operations in 57 project locations.

74. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) Blast Assessment Working Group determines policy in relation to the protection of United Nations premises relating to blast mitigation. It provides standards to which all premises must adhere in response to the threat of improvised explosive devices. Its guidelines, procedures and tools support security officers in their understanding of basic blast principles and measures to protect from and mitigate the effects of attacks using improvised explosive devices.

75. Blast vulnerability assessments are also carried out by ODF with a view to recommending enhancements to the physical security of WFP premises such as upgrading perimeter protection, access control and the location of offices.

Training

76. Security training is provided by ODF to supplement the online Basic Security in the Field course, which is compulsory for WFP staff.

⇒ *Security awareness training*

77. WFP's security awareness training for operating in insecure environments covers the responsibilities of individuals and WFP in terms of policies and procedures; it is prioritized on the basis of locations at the highest risk of sudden-onset disasters or changes in the security situation. During 2010–2011, security awareness training was provided for 855 WFP staff members.

⇒ *Driver training*

78. In view of the number of road accidents involving WFP staff and assets, ODF coordinates training for drivers in partnership with the Global Vehicle Leasing Pool and has rolled out a satellite-based tracking system. During 2010–2011, 277 drivers were trained in 22 countries, with 12 trained as trainers. By the end of 2010, 380 drivers had been trained and 93 trained as trainers.

⇒ *Country security focal point training*

79. In accordance with the Executive Director's circular on security and the framework of accountability, country Security Focal Points (SFPs) help to manage security in countries with no WFP security officer. During 2010–2011 ODF provided training for 56 country SFPs in ODPC, ODN, ODD and ODJ; training for ODB and ODC will be completed in the first quarter of 2012.

⇒ *Safe and secure awareness in field environments*

80. Safe and Secure Awareness in Field Environments and basic first aid training equips staff to operate in hostile environments. The course includes simulations of security threats in the field such as illegal checkpoints, hostage taking and improvised explosive device attacks. The aim is to teach participants to respond to incidents as safely as possible. The training will be conducted in 2012 to supplement UNDSS training.

⇒ *Hostage incident management training*

81. WFP security staff participate regularly in UNDSS hostage incident management training. During 2010–2011, 32 WFP staff were trained in organizational policy, planning and prevention, decision-making, disclosure of information, family support and actions on release of a hostage. Practical exercises help to assess individual strengths and weaknesses. This training has been very successful.

⇒ *Security analysis process and practice course*

82. The UNDSS security analysis process and practice course enables personnel to assess security threat information with regard to reliability, relevance, value, urgency and importance and advises on practical applications in relation to security risk management. In 2010–2011, 26 WFP staff attended the course.

⇒ *Workshops for WFP security officers*

83. The annual workshop for FSOs is a forum for discussing problems and best practice in security management, the application of policies, development of procedures and information management, reporting and analysis. In 2010–2011, FSO workshops were attended by 67 staff. Two additional workshops for regional and senior security officers were held in 2011, focusing on the strategic direction of ODF.

Security Information Management and Security Analysis Support System

84. The Security Information Management and Security Analysis Support System developed by ODF is based on WFP’s logistics portal. It enables security staff and focal points to manage information related to the security and safety of WFP staff, assets and operations. Analysis by ODF supports planning and decision-making with regard to strategies to protect staff and assets.

Audit

85. The audit of ODF by the Office of Internal Audit in 2011 assigned “partially satisfactory” rating. The report stated that internal controls and risk management are functioning, but need improvement. A survey of country offices highlighted their appreciation of ODF support, particularly when critical incidents occur. The audit identified nine medium-scale risks, but no high-risk areas; ODF is implementing the recommendations in agreed timeframes.

The Saving Lives Together Initiative

86. Saving Lives Together is a framework for collaboration on security among United Nations organizations and NGOs. The NGOs usually rely on acceptance strategies, which involves building relationships with local actors to emphasize impartiality; in view of the increasing volatility in operational environments, however, the effectiveness of such strategies on their own can be limited. The United Nations, on the other hand, relies more on measures such as protection and deterrence. The collaboration ensures that NGOs are supported in maintaining their duty of care for staff and that they consider deterrence and protection strategies.
87. A practical application of this initiative is WFP’s “safe distribution” model, which defines requirements for the safety and security of staff, cooperating partners and beneficiaries at distribution hubs and project sites, and ensures that all actors can contribute to creating and maintaining a secure operational environment.

REPORT ON THE WFP SECURITY EMERGENCY FUND

88. The Security Emergency Fund supplements the costs of security requirements not covered by country projects with a view to implementing improvements in physical safety and operational security.
89. With approval of the Management Plan (2010–2011) at its 2009 Second Regular Session, the Board approved the carry-over of US\$14.5 million of the US\$22.5 million approved in 2008 for allocation from the General Fund for field security upgrades.
90. The costs of security management and MOSS are separate from the costs of office relocation and blast mitigation, which require authorization from the PSC. In 2010–2011, the Security Emergency Fund provided for office relocation, blast mitigation, blast

assessments, security equipment, facility protection, training, security assessments and staffing.

TABLE 5: SECURITY EMERGENCY FUND 2010–2011 (US\$)		
	Allocations	Commitments
Security Management and MOSS		
Staffing	4 616 681	4 324 861
Consultants	603 110	578 812
Equipment	2 809 433	2 796 960
Facility protection measures	431 525	415 493
Training	850 385	849 300
Assessments	525 318	520 034
Substantial Infrastructure Works		
Office relocation and blast mitigation	4 663 548	4 031 976
TOTAL	14 500 000	13 517 436

91. With approval of the Fourth Update of the Management Plan 2010–2011 at its 2011 First Regular Session, the Board approved supplementary expenditures of up to US\$10.2 million for field security upgrades, to be funded from the Programme Support and Administrative Equalization Account.

TABLE 6: SECURITY EMERGENCY FUND 2011 (US\$)		
	Allocations	Commitments
Security Management and MOSS		
Staffing	390 000	334 014
Consultants	216 076	168 977
Equipment	1 351 667	1 249 036
Facility protection measures	432 766	374 400
Training	816 804	762 429
Assessments	343 687	307 236
Substantial Infrastructure Works		
Office relocation and blast mitigation	4 100 000	2 285 295
TOTAL	7 651 000	5 481 387

Source: WFP Information Network and Global System II, 1 February 2012.

92. With approval of the Management Plan (2010–2011) at its 2009 Second Regular Session, the Board approved the establishment of a Security Special Account that includes UNDSS costs of US\$9.6 million and the Security Emergency Fund of US\$7.3 million. A US\$16.9 million advance from the Working Capital Facility will be used to make payments, and up to US\$10 million from the General Fund will be used to cover amounts that cannot be charged to projects. The Budget and Programming Division and ODF are discussing possible recovery mechanisms. The plan also states that as of 2012 the cost of

significant physical security enhancements or structural upgrades, in particular blast mitigation measures, will be authorized through the PSC and budgeted under direct support costs in country offices, in consultation with ODF.

2010–2011 WFP SHARE OF UNITED NATIONS FIELD-RELATED SECURITY COSTS

93. At its 2005 First Regular Session, the Board agreed on financial support for the Secretary-General in implementing a unified security management system. This involves working with UNDSS and other United Nations bodies to develop security policies and standards.
94. The budget approved by the General Assembly (A/64/6/(Sect.34)/Add.1) for jointly financed UNDSS field-related security costs for 2010–2011 was US\$209.9 million, compared with US\$174.4 million for the preceding biennium. The budget for field-related security costs for the 2011–2012 biennium is US\$110.5 million (A/66/6 (Sect. 35); this excludes the United Nations Malicious Acts Insurance Policy, to which WFP does not subscribe.
95. Under the cost-sharing formula WFP's projected share for 2010–2011 was US\$24.4 million and for 2012 it was US\$9.6 million, budgeted in the new Special Account. This was based on the number of WFP staff in the field determined by the Chief Executives Board document "Cost-Sharing Arrangements for Jointly Financed Activities" (CEB/2009/HLCM/FB/8). The UNDSS budget review, however, indicates that the WFP share for 2012 is likely to increase to US\$11 million. As in the past, any unspent balance of the cost-shared portion of the UNDSS budget will be credited to the participating agencies.

TABLE 7: UNITED NATIONS FIELD-RELATED SECURITY COSTS (US\$ million)

	UNDSS total	WFP's share
2002–2003	42.9	6.5
2004–2005	113.1	13.2
2006–2007	172.3	20.2 [*]
2008–2009	174.4	17.3
2010–2011	209.9	24.4 ^{**}
2012	110.5 ^{***}	9.6

^{*} Credit of US\$3.2 million received in 2006.

^{**} Credit of US\$1.4 million received in 2010.

^{***} As per the proposed 2012 UNDSS budget.

96. As a member of the IASMN, WFP supports UNDSS in enhancing the transparency of the Jointly Funded Account budget, now a permanent item on the agenda. The UNDSS is working to improve the transparency of local cost-shared expenditures in terms of identifying over-spending and reflecting more accurately the actual costs of security for programmes.

97. WFP chairs a working group established by the Finance and Budget Network (FBN) to review cost-sharing mechanisms among United Nations organizations and to develop a model for the future that ensures transparent, predictable and equitable allocation of the Joint Financing Agreement budget. The working group is also exploring ways to attribute security costs to programmes. This work is anticipated to culminate in July 2011 with a final report to the FBN.

THE WAY FORWARD

98. The security strategy is designed to address new security challenges and the complex security environments in which WFP operates. It recognizes the need for flexibility and the need to enable rather than inhibit operations to ensure that WFP's goals are achieved. By engaging with stakeholders to develop understanding and competence ODF will mainstream security into WFP's organization and processes to enable managers to understand the risk environment and make decisions accordingly.
99. ODF will continue to work as a member of the United Nations Security Management System and with IASMN to develop risk-management policies, avoid duplication of effort and conserve resources. WFP acknowledges the maxims "no programme without security" and "no security without resources" and must continue to find the funding to manage security risks in the complex conditions in which it operates. WFP must adopt a "how-to-stay" security culture to enable it to address hunger needs worldwide.

TABLE 8: 2011 SIGNIFICANT SECURITY INCIDENTS INVOLVING WFP STAFF AND ASSETS: ALL TYPES

TYPES OF INCIDENTS	Total 2005	Total 2006	Total 2007	Total 2008	Total 2009	Total 2010	Total 2011	Total work related 2005	Total work related 2006	Total work related 2007	Total work related 2008	Total work related 2009	Total work related 2010	Total work related 2011
Deaths	16	13	17	11	17	15	9	3	0	4	3	5	1	6
Injuries	20	14	8	20	23	23	21	9	2	4	7	13	10	7
Detentions	30	25	26	45	48	56	52	17	18	12	20	29	30	23
Abduction	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Express kidnap	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Subtotal	66	52	51	76	88	94	86	29	20	20	30	47	41	40
Evacuation	4	1	2	4	0	0	8	4	1	2	4	0	0	8
Relocation	23	28	16	19	22	22	14	23	28	16	19	22	22	14
Medevacs	23	8	19	11	21	29	23	23	8	19	11	21	29	1
Subtotal	50	37	37	34	43	51	45	50	37	37	34	43	51	23
Thefts	85	91	89	104	74	101	163	63	64	80	75	62	77	103
Robberies	34	21	80	121	92	131	80	22	2	68	94	59	87	44
Assaults	14	9	29	30	8	17	29	11	5	21	14	3	8	13
Carjacking	14	4	5	17	8	7	3	13	4	5	15	5	4	2
Food re-bagging	10	1	0	0	0	0	4	10	1	0	0	0	0	4
Burglary	9	13	10	17	23	35	105	5	6	4	5	5	2	51
Damage to WFP property	2	8	15	19	21	30	50	2	8	15	19	21	30	41
Threats	25	12	22	29	24	34	30	20	9	18	18	18	23	19
Harassment	2	5	8	17	15	9	111	2	3	4	11	8	6	7
Road accidents	56	52	64	86	121	140	128	38	40	49	69	93	111	93
Aviation incidents	8	6	5	2	1	5	6	8	6	5	2	1	5	6
Others	38	59	69	105	102	131	55	37	47	52	87	78	108	45
Subtotal	297	281	396	547	489	640	764	231	195	321	409	355	461	428
TOTAL	413	370	484	657	620	785	895	310	252	378	473	445	553	491



Figure 1: Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets: 2005–2011




Figure 2: Countries with Highest Rates of Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2011




Figure 3: Countries with Highest Numbers of Significant Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets (2006–2011)







Figure 4: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2011, by Regional Bureau



**Figure 5: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets:
2008–2011, by Regional Bureau**




Figure 6: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in ODPC: 2005–2011





Figure 7: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2011: Property Crime



**Figure 8: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets:
2005–2011: Property Crime**




Figure 9: Countries with Highest Numbers of Attacks on Contracted Trucks in 2011






Figure 10: Countries with Highest Numbers of Attacks on Contracted Trucks in 2008–2011




**Figure 11: Road Traffic Accidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets:
2005–2011**






**Figure 12: Road Traffic Accidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets:
2008–2011, by Regional Bureau**



**Figure 13: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets:
2005–2011, by Type of Incidents**



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CETA	Centre, East and Three Areas (region of the Sudan)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FBN	Finance and Budget Network
FSO	field security officer
IASMN	Inter-Agency Security Management Network
MOSS	minimum operating security standards
NGO	non-governmental organization
ODB	Regional Bureau Bangkok (Asia)
ODC	Regional Bureau Cairo (Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia)
ODD	Regional Bureau Dakar (West Africa)
ODF	Field Security Division
ODJ	Regional Bureau Johannesburg (Southern Africa)
ODN	Regional Bureau Nairobi (East and Central Africa)
ODPC	Regional Bureau Panama City (Latin America and the Caribbean)
ODS	Regional Bureau Sudan
PSC	Premises Security Committee
RSO	regional security officer
SFP	Security Focal Point
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security