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SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT – THE NIGER COUNTRY PORTFOLIO (2007–2011)

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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Should you have any questions regarding availability of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact the Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645/2558).

* Office of Evaluation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Food security is a major concern in the Niger, which is one of the poorest countries in the world and is regularly struck by natural disasters such as floods and drought.

This evaluation report covers the five-year period 2007–2011, during which a major food crisis occurred in 2010; food crises also took place immediately before and just after the evaluation period. This was also a time of extreme political instability, which had repercussions on WFP activities.


The evaluation provides a strategic analysis of WFP's portfolio in the Niger, covering the strategy pursued and how the country office adapted to changes in food security levels and the political context. It focuses on three main aspects: i) the strategic alignment of WFP's portfolio of activities; ii) the strategic choices made by WFP; and iii) the portfolio performance and results.

Overall, the evaluation is positive. WFP's intervention strategies were consistent and appropriate given the constraints and opportunities associated with the three phases of the evaluation period: from 2007 to 2010 the country office had to function without the support of the Government of the Niger; then the 2010 crisis put a halt to all long-term planning; lastly, during the final year of the evaluation period no major crisis occurred and the relationship with the Government was constructive. All WFP activities were adapted to the needs of the Niger's population, and efficiency was improved as a result of an increased use of cash assistance.

Effectiveness and impact varied according to the sector in which activities were carried out. Food distributions, supplementary food, assistance to tuberculosis patients and school feeding contributed to meeting targets. In contrast, food-for-work and cash-for-work initiatives failed to achieve the intended improvement in agricultural productivity. While blanket feeding helped to ease the crisis by saving lives, and had a beneficial effect on the nutritional status of targeted children, its overall impact on malnutrition in the Niger remains unclear. Regarding cereal banks and support for HIV-positive patients, the evaluation team was unable to assess performance because of the absence of data and the lack of specific objectives.

In the final section of the evaluation, ten recommendations are set forth, directed at four groups of stakeholders.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report – the Niger Country Portfolio (2007–2011)” (WFP/EB.A/2013/7-C/Rev.1) and the management response in WFP/EB.A/2013/7-C/Add.1, and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

INTRODUCTION

Evaluation Features

1. This evaluation report covers the five-year period 2007–2011, during which the country was struck by a major food crisis (2010); two other food crises occurred immediately before and just after the evaluation period, in 2005 and 2012. The evaluation provides a strategic analysis of WFP's portfolio of activities in the Niger, addressing the strategy pursued and how the country office adapted to changes in the level of food security and in the political context. The evaluation covers three major aspects: i) the strategic alignment of WFP's portfolio of activities; ii) the strategic choices made by WFP; and iii) the portfolio performance and results.

Context


2. Food security is a major concern in the Niger, which is one of the poorest countries in the world. With one of the world's highest rates of population growth, combined with high poverty rates and a weak agricultural sector subject to recurring climate shocks, the Niger receives international aid to meet the challenge of feeding its population. Assistance provided by WFP represents 46 percent of the total humanitarian aid received by the Niger during the evaluation period.¹ The country suffered six natural disasters during this period: floods in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, and – most seriously – the major drought of 2009, which led to the 2010 food crisis. Over the past 12 years, cereal production has been below the levels required to meet the population's food needs in one out of every three years, and three major food crises occurred between 2005 and 2012. Food insecurity in the Niger has followed a marked seasonal pattern: food availability begins to decline after the October harvest, then the lean season starts in May or June and gets steadily worse until the following harvest. The incidence of food insecurity is continually high. The absolute number of people experiencing food insecurity was 5.5 million in November 2011 – 34 percent of the total population – immediately after the harvest in a year of good production levels; during the 2010 crisis, at the beginning of the lean season, this figure was 7.7 million – 50 percent of the population.
3. The Niger experienced severe political instability during the evaluation period, causing a major direct impact on WFP's portfolio. During the first phase, until February 2010, the country was headed by President Mamadou Tandja, who encountered growing opposition after orchestrating a referendum in May 2009 to amend the Constitution and authorize the president to serve a third term. Mr Tandja was overthrown in a military coup in February 2010. A military transition government then took power pending legislative elections in January 2011, followed by a presidential election in May of the same year that brought the current president, Mahamadou Issoufou, to power. The Tandja administration had pursued a policy of food self-sufficiency, going so far as to minimize – and even deny the existence of – problems of food availability. This situation changed quickly after the coup d'état and with the advent of the *Conseil suprême pour la restauration de la démocratie* (CSR, Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy), which fully recognized the seriousness of the 2010 food crisis. The Issoufou administration, which regards food security as a matter of high importance, is pursuing a policy that reflects this concern.

¹ The ratio of WFP's total direct expenditures to total contributions and commitments of humanitarian aid, during the five years covered by the evaluation, according to the financial monitoring system of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

WFP's Portfolio in the Niger

4. During the evaluation period, WFP implemented three protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs) – 105090, 106110 and 200051; two emergency operations (EMOPs) – 200071 and 200170; and two country programmes (CPs) – 102850 and 106140. The choice of activities was determined largely by the disasters that occurred, particularly the food crisis of 2010. The initial part of the evaluation period – relating to PRRO 105090 and subsequently PRRO 106110, which began in September 2007 – was affected by the consequences of the 2005 food crisis: activities entailed “relief food distributions”,² and covered both nutrition and rural development, including support to cereal banks and food-for-work (FFW) programmes, aimed at enhancing households’ resilience. The two CPs supported rural development, school feeding and food assistance for patients undergoing HIV and tuberculosis (TB) treatments. Beginning with the 2010 crisis, in the framework of EMOP 200170, WFP established cash assistance through cash-for-work (CFW) activities and cash transfers to replace food distributions. Figure 1 outlines the main events between 2006 and 2011 and WFP’s operations during that time.

Figure 1: Chronology of Events



² The term used in the Niger.

FINDINGS

Alignment and Strategic Positioning

5. Two periods can be distinguished regarding the alignment of WFP's country portfolio with the policies and strategies of the Government of the Niger. During the first period, under the Tandja administration, there was formal alignment of goals, with WFP participating in and complying with the decisions made during the planning process led by the Government, which was in charge of food assistance to the Niger; however, there were differences in terms of strategic orientation. The Tandja administration's strong engagement in promoting food self-sufficiency during this period led it to obstruct food distributions and refuse to acknowledge the existence of high levels of food insecurity, even during lean periods, putting it at odds with WFP's intervention strategy. The situation improved dramatically after the coup of 2010 and the gradual establishment of a democratically elected government in 2011. Tensions subsided, and close strategic alignment was established between Government and WFP activities.
6. The country office gave priority to collaborating with government entities at both the national and regional levels. A highly effective working relationship was established with leading government stakeholders, especially the *Dispositif national de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires* (DNP-GCA, Food Crisis Prevention and Mitigation Mechanism), the main public agency responsible for planning and coordinating food assistance. The country office works closely with regional and subregional government committees in charge of planning and monitoring food assistance at the local level. The country office has been providing these committees with financial support since 2012 to enhance their field supervision role, provided they present field visit reports. This new procedure represents a major change from previous practices, in which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were given a budget for government officials to travel. The new procedure will facilitate hand-over of operations to local public stakeholders.
7. The activities in WFP's country portfolio were in line with the strategies and objectives of its main partners within the United Nations system. In particular, WFP's nutrition efforts were closely harmonized with those of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The two agencies collaborate in the blanket feeding working group and the nutrition cluster. Although – even recently – WFP's efforts were poorly aligned with those of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the situation has changed, and the two agencies are now coordinating their activities to ensure that communities benefit from WFP's food distributions and asset-creation activities, while also receiving seeds from FAO. There was also close collaboration with the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), until WFP had to suspend its assistance to people living with HIV because it lacked funds. Strategic and operational alignment was also established between WFP and the activities of a few NGOs and development projects headed by various branches of the Government in the health and rural development sectors, when the entities involved had sufficient funding to ensure a continuous presence in areas where WFP was operating – distribution of support rations for mothers of children admitted to *Centres de récupération nutritionnelle intensive* (CRENI, intensive nutritional rehabilitation centres), cereal banks and FFW/CFW activities.³ The country portfolio is also in line with WFP's Strategic Plan for 2008–2013.

³ Doctors Without Borders/Switzerland for the CRENI; the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) and Community Action and Support Programme for the cereal banks; and the Integrated Environmental Management Programme (IEMP) and the Dakoro Regional Development Project (PDRD) for FFW.


Strategic Choices

8. The country office developed appropriate analytical tools and promoted their use in increasing the effectiveness of food assistance. The Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) Unit provides ongoing support to the Government's early warning system (EWS). VAM staff maintain a close working relationship with their EWS counterparts, providing assistance in many critical analyses. The country office has also recently developed an innovative analytical framework, which it uses for the geographical targeting of cash assistance. WFP plays a key role in food security analysis in the Niger.
9. The relationship between WFP and the Government has had a strong influence on the country office's intervention strategies. Under the Tandja administration, the country office had limited programme options because it encountered resistance when planning relief food distributions and blanket feeding and had to discontinue its FFW activities when the Government prohibited them in April 2007. It then switched to activities that did not encounter government opposition, specifically school feeding, cereal banks and support for TB and HIV patients. With new governments in 2010 and 2011, the country office was free to programme major activities in the areas of concern: relief food distributions, blanket feeding and FFW/CFW programmes. These activities therefore accounted for a significantly larger proportion of the overall portfolio. Following the interruption during the Tandja administration, food assistance to vulnerable populations resumed its central role for WFP and the Government. The country office made the major strategic choice of expanding the role of cash assistance from 2010 onwards, which resulted in vastly increased efficiency as it entailed lower costs than food distribution – savings of approximately 39 percent.

Portfolio Performance and Results

⇒ *Overview of assistance provided to beneficiaries*

10. Health and nutrition activities made up the largest proportion of the portfolio in terms of amount of food assistance, as clearly indicated in Figure 2. If blanket feeding and the distribution of protection rations are included in the "health and nutrition" category, food assistance to this category constitutes 57 percent of the total for the evaluation period. After health and nutrition come food distributions (16 percent), followed by rural development (15 percent) and school feeding (11 percent). Increased work in response to the 2010 crisis under PRRO 106110 and EMOP 200170 overshadowed all other portfolio activities in the evaluation period, even though funding for EMOP 200170 was only 62 percent of the budgeted amount. This led to deficits in both food assistance and cash transfers, which were funded at 52 and 72 percent, respectively, of the planned amounts.

Figure 2: Breakdown of Food Assistance by Sector (2007–2011)

Source: Country office.

⇒ *Assessment of assistance provided by activity*

11. **Relief food distributions and protection rations.** Despite the large gap between planned distributions and those actually carried out during the 2010 crisis, the assistance provided was crucial in saving lives and helping the Niger to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe of massive proportions. WFP's capacity to launch an intervention that, at its peak, assisted 38 percent of the country's population is all the more impressive considering that planning suffered greatly from a lack of collaboration with the Tandja administration. However, the evaluation team questioned the decision to prioritize distributions of protection rations to families within the framework of the blanket feeding programme, while terminating relief food distributions to households experiencing food insecurity. This decision meant that some 70 percent of households that were experiencing moderate or serious food insecurity were deprived of assistance because they did not have children in the age group receiving blanket feeding. However, the effects of this decision were mitigated by the high levels of ration-sharing among households.
12. **Blanket feeding.** Blanket feeding during the lean season for children aged 6 to 23 months had two main objectives: i) to save lives by preventing child mortality; and ii) to improve nutritional outcomes. Although the evaluation team concludes that blanket feeding did indeed contribute to saving lives, it considers the impact on malnutrition to be less clear. Data collected in 2012 show a net improvement in the malnutrition rate, but this positive impact did not persist throughout the lean season, and targeting problems continue. Thus, while blanket feeding achieved the objective of saving lives, and doubtlessly contributed to improving the nutritional status of children, questions remain regarding its targeting and impact given the multiple causes of child malnutrition.
13. **Supplementary feeding for malnourished children, and pregnant and lactating women in Centres de récupération nutritionnelle ambulatoire en charge de la malnutrition modérée (CRENAM, mobile nutritional rehabilitation centres for moderate malnutrition).** The supplementary feeding programme for children

experiencing moderate malnutrition is accomplishing its main objective, which is to achieve a recovery rate of at least 75 percent.

14. **Distribution of rations to mothers accompanying their seriously malnourished children at CRENI.** The assistance provided to CRENI aims to reduce the drop-out rate. This objective is largely being achieved, as the drop-out rate recorded at the end of the evaluation period was under 3 percent – a very positive result. During its field visit, the evaluation team was able to confirm that the distribution of rations to mothers accompanying their children led to an improvement in the diversity and quantity of food available at the CRENI.
15. **Support for TB and HIV patients.** Providing food assistance to people living with TB and HIV was part of the portfolio until June 2011, when it was terminated because of lack of funding. No data have been collected that would make it possible to determine whether this assistance contributed to the objective of helping HIV-positive people gain at least 5 kg during the first six months of treatment. Support for TB patients appears to have contributed to the achievement of positive results in terms of treatment success, but all data on results were provided by implementing partners, raising doubts about their reliability.
16. **Food-for-work and cash-for-work activities.** The team determined that the FFW and CFW activities contributed considerably to reducing households' vulnerability to food insecurity. Overall, the assets created through FFW/CFW activities supported the recovery of agricultural land, the protection of ponds and the establishment of livestock corridors for the nomads' herds to increase productivity. The types of work were chosen in consultation with communities under the supervision of NGO partners. However, the country office did not define specific outputs or collect data for assessing the impact of the assets created. The evaluation team believes that serious deficiencies in the implementation of FFW/CFW projects limited their contribution to improved agricultural productivity. These failures relate, in particular, to the fact that the annual planning cycle of DNP/GCA – which determines the choice of geographical areas for FFW/CFW interventions – is not linked to the agricultural calendar, and to the lack of a longer-term assistance framework, rather than to flaws in the technical models adopted by the country office.
17. **Cereal banks.** The country office contributed to the development of a national strategy for cereal banks by providing financial support to the Government of the Niger in 2009-2010. The strategy was adopted in 2011. Despite this success, and as also happened for the FFW/CFW activities, the country office failed to set either impact goals for the cereal banks or indicators for measuring their performance once they were created. The evaluation team found signs of poor management practices at the cereal banks they examined, suggesting that there are deficiencies in training and/or monitoring by implementing partners.
18. **School feeding.**⁴ The number of beneficiaries of the school feeding programme steadily increased over the evaluation period without a corresponding increase in the volume of food assistance, which appears to have led to a reduction in individual rations. Nevertheless, overall progress in terms of rates of enrolment, attendance, retention and success in primary-school final examinations suggests that school feeding activities are meeting their planned objectives.

⁴ During the evaluation period, schools receiving WFP assistance represented between 6 and 8 percent of all the schools in rural areas.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall Assessment


19. Regarding the overall consistency of the country portfolio, it must be borne in mind that there have been three distinct phases, each with its own challenges and opportunities. From 2007 to 2010, the country office operated in an environment of severe constraints, without the benefit of government support for vital components of the strategy. Following this, the urgent need to respond quickly and effectively to the 2010 food crisis took precedence over all other activities and virtually excluded any sort of long-term planning. The last year of the evaluation period – 2011 – was also the first without constraints, with no major food crisis and a constructive relationship with the Government.
20. After analysing the various external and internal factors accounting for the portfolio's results, the evaluation team concludes that the management and staff of the country office dealt successfully with each of the three phases, adopting appropriate intervention strategies in each case. During the first phase, the country office managed to continue providing a minimal level of food assistance without provoking the Government's opposition, which could have jeopardized WFP's presence in the Niger. Thus, activities were implemented as effectively as was feasible, considering that the Government would have preferred that WFP ceased its operations altogether. During the 2010 crisis, the country office provided the bulk of the assistance needed to avoid a devastating humanitarian disaster. Finally, in 2011, the country office began analysing all portfolio activities and made a number of important changes to improve the effectiveness of its efforts. These included: i) stopping distributions of protection rations, which had been widely used in blanket feeding in 2010, and replacing them with relief food distributions combined with blanket feeding – this eliminated the exclusion errors that at the height of the 2010 crisis had denied WFP assistance to food-insecure households that did not have children in the age group receiving blanket feeding; ii) modifying guidelines on the registration of beneficiaries for blanket feeding, to ensure that all the children qualifying for assistance were taken into account; and iii) using a standard model – household economy analysis – to ensure that the targeting of most food assistance was determined at the household level. During each of the three critical phases, the country office teams managed to overcome difficulties, leading to a positive overall assessment of the country portfolio.

Conclusions

21. **Relevance.** Activities under the Niger portfolio (2007–2011) were adapted to the needs of the population. Food distributions and blanket feeding during the 2010 crisis contributed to saving lives. WFP helped put moderate malnutrition on the national agenda by assuring supplementary feeding to malnourished children. Food assistance for people living with TB and HIV not only encourages patients to seek treatment but also increases the success rate of anti-retroviral therapies and TB treatment, as shown by research. Rural development activities are helping to reduce community vulnerability to future crises and are enhancing their resilience. School feeding is contributing to improvements in the learning capabilities of girls and boys.
22. **Efficiency.** Efficiency improved during the evaluation period because of increased use of cash transfers from the 2010 crisis onwards, mainly in the form of unconditional transfers for relief and conditional transfers for CFW activities. Savings in the unit cost of delivery in comparison with food distributions were estimated to be 39 percent

(see Figure 3). Overall, the annual cost of food assistance per ton, except during times of crisis, was between 7 and 21 percent higher than WFP's usual averages. These figures are not out of line with the norm for a landlocked country with a highly dispersed population.

Figure 3: Cost of One Ton of Food Assistance in Kind and in Cash (2011)



Source: Data provided by the country office unit responsible for cash and asset transfers.

23. **Effectiveness and impact.** The country portfolio activities can be classified into three groups based on their effectiveness and impact. The top group comprises activities that clearly fulfil their objectives and that have had a positive impact: relief food distributions, supplementary feeding at CRENAM, distribution of protection rations at CRENI, assistance to TB patients and school feeding. All of these activities are consistently targeted and meet their objectives. In contrast, another group comprises FFW/CFW activities, which are not improving agricultural productivity as they should. A third group of mostly blanket feeding falls in between because it is more difficult to evaluate for effectiveness and impact: while blanket feeding clearly contributes to meeting the objective of mitigating the effects of crises by saving lives and seems to provide nutritional benefits to targeted children, its overall impact on malnutrition in the Niger is unclear owing to targeting problems and the complex causes of child malnutrition. Regarding cereal banks and support for HIV-positive people, the evaluation team has found it difficult to form an opinion in the absence of data and defined objectives.

Recommendations

⇒ *Recommendations for the country office*

24. **Recommendation 1: Launch a preventive supplementary feeding pilot programme using selected CRENAM sites.** The country office should choose a region in which to launch a preventive supplementary feeding pilot programme for all children 6–23 months of age with below-average weight/height ratios or whose mid-upper arm circumference is below a certain threshold. The pilot programme should be run by partners responsible for CRENAM in locations adjoining CRENAM premises. This will reduce time and costs by eliminating the need for a census and registration and by limiting inclusion and exclusion

errors. It could also provide a starting point for implementing a multi-sectoral approach to addressing the causes of childhood malnutrition other than lack of access to food.

25. **Recommendation 2: Find alternative solutions to the nutritional problems of people with TB and HIV.** After the failure of the eleventh round of negotiations of the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the suspension of WFP assistance because of the lack of funding, patients with TB and HIV no longer receive food assistance, although they continue to receive medication. The country office should undertake discussions with the nutrition cluster or within the framework of the REACH or Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) initiatives to find partners able to provide long-term food assistance.
26. **Recommendation 3: Establish a multi-year programme to support agropastoral activity.** The country office should conduct assessments in a number of high-potential areas where multi-year FFW and CFW activities could be launched, detaching its programming decisions from geographic targeting procedures directed by the DNP-GCA. It should also establish longer-term relationships with its own implementing partners and with other donors – FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), etc. – to develop an integrated technical and financial support programme. In 2012, the country office began to identify joint agricultural support projects conducted with other actors. This initiative should be continued and strengthened in the coming years.
27. **Recommendation 4: Streamline support to cereal banks by defining specific objectives.** The country office should specify its objectives for cereal banks. This could involve viewing them primarily as a tool for emergency relief, for example as a source of pre-positioned stocks managed by communities. The management model for that is relatively simple, with the cereal banks concentrating on good practices in supply management and collective management. Another approach would be to see the cereal banks as an economic activity that contributes to longer-term community resilience, which requires financial sustainability. This longer-term approach would require much more rigorous management. Both models are valid, and there are technical partners in the Niger with the necessary skills; the second model requires much more investment in training and assistance over a longer term, which the country office will need to take into account in field-level agreements with partners.
28. **Recommendation 5: Strengthen school feeding management training for school management committees.** This measure will promote greater ownership of school feeding activities by the communities involved. The country office should seek out partnerships with organizations so that the training takes place in the framework of a functional literacy programme for adults.

⇒ *Recommendations for the country office and Headquarters*

29. **Recommendation 6: Expand school feeding support in targeted areas to cover preschool and secondary schoolchildren (second basic cycle).** This measure would significantly increase the number of students targeted; currently, only primary schoolchildren are covered. It would improve the balance between planned and actual amounts of food distributed in assisted schools providing preschool education. It would also facilitate the transition from the first to the second basic cycle, particularly for girls who have passed their final primary-school examinations. To be effective, this measure would require a budget increase and additional efforts by the country office and Headquarters to secure adequate funding.
30. **Recommendation 7: Reduce the number of programme categories by consolidating interventions under the PRRO category and resorting to EMOPs in crisis situations.** The country office faces a real challenge in terms of planning because the current system is two-track: some interventions fall under both the well-funded PRRO/EMOP category and the less-funded CP category. Each category has its own planning cycle. This may occasionally cause mistakes, and also makes it difficult for the country office to streamline its overall portfolio to face fluctuating needs. The Niger is constantly having to adjust before or after a crisis; there were three major food crises between 2005 and 2013. So, even if it means departing from the provisions of the “Programme Category Review”⁵ document, the country office and Headquarters could consolidate the portfolio of activities for the Niger under the PRRO category and reinforce them occasionally if necessary through an EMOP. Among the country portfolio activities, the one that least fits the PRRO category is support for school meals, for which another funding source such as a development project could be used.
31. **Recommendation 8: Shift to longer-term field-level agreements with main implementing partners.** The short-term nature of these field-level agreements limits the effectiveness of activities, such as FFA and cereal banks, that would benefit from longer-term implementing partner presence. The lack of preliminary planning and monitoring of activities can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that the implementing partners cannot take a longer-term perspective because of the short-term nature of their contracts with WFP.

⇒ *Recommendation for Headquarters*

32. **Recommendation 9: Review WFP information technology (IT) systems to deal more effectively with cash transfers.** The current IT systems in the country office are inadequate for ensuring satisfactory monitoring of cash distributions. Efficiency ratios and calculations of portfolio shares are generally determined based on food volume without taking cash transfers into account. An increasing share of the portfolio is in the form of cash transfers, which creates problems for country office staff and for evaluators monitoring activity levels. It would be useful to have an IT system that could handle data on cash distributions in the same way that the Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System (COMPAS) tracks food distributions. It should be compatible with COMPAS, facilitate unified analysis of cash and food distributions, and use a common unit of measure for volume such as the value of a ton of food based on a set reference price. This will require a more comprehensive review at Headquarters.

⁵ WFP/EB.A/2010/11/Rev.1.

⇒ *Recommendation for the country office, the Government and other technical partners involved in vulnerability surveys*

33. **Recommendation 10: Study the feasibility of modifying the SMART surveys and the joint household vulnerability surveys to provide more precise detailed geographic analysis.** To overcome geographic targeting problems that occur mainly in relation to blanket feeding activities but also with other interventions, it would be useful to have analyses that provide more detail on malnutrition rates and food insecurity at lower geographic levels within the framework of the Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) surveys and the joint vulnerability surveys. For the SMART surveys, this would mean performing analyses at the sub-regional level, while for the joint vulnerability surveys it would involve analysis at the community level. These changes would require major additional financial and staffing resources from the various partners involved. This requires prior assessment of the options to determine technical and financial feasibility.

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CFW	cash for work
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System
CP	country programme
CRENAM	<i>Centres de récupération nutritionnelle ambulatoire en charge de la malnutrition modérée</i> (mobile nutritional rehabilitation centres for moderate malnutrition)
CRENI	<i>Centres de récupération nutritionnelle intensive</i> (intensive nutritional rehabilitation centres)
CSRD	<i>Conseil suprême pour la restauration de la démocratie</i> (Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy)
DNPGCA	<i>Dispositif national de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires</i> (Food Crisis Prevention and Mitigation Mechanism)
EMOP	emergency operation
EWS	early warning system
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFW	food for work
IT	information technology
NGO	non-governmental organization
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions
TB	tuberculosis