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## EVALUATION REPORTS

Agenda item 6

*For consideration*

# E

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## SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT – UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA COUNTRY PORTFOLIO (2011–2014)

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## NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

### **This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This country portfolio evaluation covered all WFP operations in the United Republic of Tanzania between 2011 and 2014 and the country strategy 2011–2016. It assessed WFP's alignment and strategic positioning; the factors in and quality of its strategic decision-making; and the performance and results of the portfolio. The main thematic components of the portfolio were food assistance to refugees, food assistance for assets, school feeding, and blanket and targeted supplementary feeding to support mother-and-child health and nutrition. The United Republic of Tanzania was also a pilot country for United Nations Delivering as One.

During the evaluation period, food security improved, but gains did not match national economic growth. The development strategies of the past five decades – and the international community's contributions to them – have had limited success. At the same time, government policies, systems, capacity and resources have become significantly sounder and more comprehensive, and safety net systems have developed rapidly. As a consequence, the need for direct food assistance from WFP has decreased, other than for refugees.

While WFP's food assistance to refugees was reasonably well funded, the country programme – comprising mother-and-child health and nutrition, school feeding and food assistance for assets – suffered a shortfall, with funding slightly above WFP's average of 40 percent. A Purchase for Progress pilot launched in 2009 was adequately resourced through a trust fund. As a result of funding constraints, portfolio outputs and beneficiary numbers were significantly less than intended.

Portfolio performance was characterized by technical competence – strong work was carried out by dedicated staff – but strategic drift. Food assistance to refugees was generally efficient and effective, and the Purchase for Progress pilot made headway towards sustainable results. But the 2011–2016 country strategy's objective of “concentrated and integrated programmes and hunger solutions” was not achieved, nor was its ultimate objective of “hand-over to Government and partners”. Despite intensive WFP engagement, there was little evidence that Delivering as One enhanced WFP's efficiency, effectiveness or synergy with United Nations partners.

WFP did not engage adequately with developments in national social protection policy nor fully exploit its potential for providing related technical assistance in spite of country strategy commitments. Policy engagement with the Government on school feeding dwindled and was terminated in June 2015, apparently because the Government lacked interest in WFP's approaches.



The evaluation recommended a fundamental reappraisal and justification of WFP's comparative advantage and future role in the country, particularly in light of potential shifts in WFP's overall approach to programming. It urged for greater flexibility in the use of food assistance and the exclusion of direct food deliveries in the future, except in short-term emergencies; WFP should shift from operations to advice on food assistance. The evaluation also recommended framing non-emergency food assistance within the national social protection framework; new ways to optimize Delivering as One, supported by a corporate review of WFP's experience with the initiative; and more effective implementation of WFP's gender commitments through food assistance advisory services.

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## **DRAFT DECISION<sup>\*</sup>**

The Board takes note of "Summary Evaluation Report – United Republic of Tanzania Country Portfolio (2011–2014)" (WFP/EB.2/2015/6-D) and the management response in WFP/EB.2/2015/6-D/Add.1, and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

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\* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.



## INTRODUCTION

### Evaluation Features

1. This country portfolio evaluation (CPE) covered all WFP operations in the United Republic of Tanzania from 2011 to 2014, and the 2011–2015 country strategy, which was extended to 2016. It assessed WFP’s alignment and strategic positioning; the factors in and quality of its strategic decision-making; and the performance and results of the portfolio. The CPE was undertaken by an independent evaluation team, which conducted fieldwork in April 2015. The team complemented data analysis and document reviews with interviews of 300 stakeholders from diverse groups. An in-country workshop was held in July 2015 to present the evaluation findings to 50 stakeholders.

### Context

2. While the United Republic of Tanzania is a low-income country, its economy is growing quickly, with average gross domestic product growth of 6.9 percent between 2004 and 2012.<sup>1</sup> However, poverty and livelihood insecurity remain severe for many Tanzanians.<sup>2</sup> Approximately 33 percent of the rural population lives below the poverty line, as do 24.5 percent of households headed by women.<sup>3</sup>
3. During the evaluation period, the food security situation improved, but food security gains did not match the country’s economic growth. According to WFP’s 2012 comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis, 730,000 households – 8.3 percent – were food-insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity in 2010 and 2011. The development strategies of the past five decades, and the contributions of the international community to them, have had limited success.
4. However, the Government’s policy, systems, capacity and resources became significantly sounder and more comprehensive. Through the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), the Government rapidly developed safety net systems as part of a broader social protection strategy focused on moving from labour-intensive public works to targeted cash transfers. As a result, there was less need for direct food assistance from WFP. During the review period, in all emergency contexts that did not involve refugees, the Government was able to provide all required direct assistance independently.
5. Conflicts in neighbouring countries resulted in periodic influxes of refugees from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. By the end of 2014, 60,000 refugees, mostly from DRC, remained – down from 100,000 in 2011.
6. The United Republic of Tanzania is one of the United Nations’ pilot Delivering as One countries. A single United Nations Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP) is being implemented from 2011 to 2016, with a common country programme document that includes WFP’s work.

<sup>1</sup> International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2014. “IMF Regional Economic Outlook”. Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/afr/eng/sreo1012.pdf>; World Bank. 2014. World Bank Databank. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS>.

<sup>2</sup> According to the Government’s population and housing census, the country’s population was 45 million in 2012.

<sup>3</sup> National Bureau of Statistics. 2013. “Tanzania in Figures 2012”, page 22. Dar es Salaam.



## WFP STRATEGY AND PORTFOLIO

7. WFP's country strategy 2011–2015 identified three priorities: emergency humanitarian action; food security and nutrition support; and community investments in food security support. The country strategy was implicitly relevant to humanitarian and development needs, but it did not present an explicit theory of change explaining the assumptions made at the planning phase regarding the inputs and activities to lead to the intended results. Its references to the WFP Strategic Plan and Strategic Objectives were brief. The strategy's design assumptions included programme integration across activities and geographic focus to achieve concentrated and integrated programmes and hunger solutions. WFP activities were meant to make a significant difference in selected districts. The other assumption was for hand-over to Government and partners, as shown in the strategic framework.
8. Guided by the country strategy, the portfolio comprised three protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs) and one country programme (CP). Whereas much of the funding needed for PRRO support to refugees was received, the CP suffered a shortfall, with funding slightly above WFP's recent average of 40 percent.<sup>4</sup> The portfolio also included a Purchase for Progress (P4P) pilot, which was launched in 2009 and resourced through a trust fund. Funding shortfalls were a major cause of sub-office closures and a reduction in WFP staff from 150 in 2013 to 100 in 2014.

<b>TABLE 1: FUNDING OF COUNTRY PORTFOLIO 2011–2014 BY PROGRAMME CATEGORY</b>					
Type of operation	Number of operations	Requirements (USD)	% of requirements by project type	Actual received (USD)	% of requirements received
PRROs	3	130 504 969	44.50	99 918 997	76.56
CP	1	162 794 267	55.50	67 676 392	41.57
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>293 299 236</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>167 595 389</b>	<b>57.14</b>
<b>P4P EXTRA-BUDGETARY FUNDS (USD)</b>					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
	1 227 328	552 531	845 140	950 523	<b>3 575 522</b>

Sources: WFP's "The Factory" and WFP country office data.


9. Successive PRROs ran during the evaluation period, with reduced scope following the closure of a camp for Burundian refugees in 2012. The PRROs provided food assistance to refugees as part of a system of support involving several United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations. Between 60 and 80 percent of the logistics efforts of country office staff were devoted to receiving and forwarding food shipments for WFP operations in other countries, such as DRC, Somalia, South Sudan and Zambia.

<sup>4</sup> See the Office of Evaluation's "Operation Evaluation. Orientation Guide for Evaluation Companies: Key facts about WFP and its operations", available at <http://docustore.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/reports/wfp262593.pdf>



10. The CP focused on: i) food security and nutrition support for people living in environmentally fragile and chronically food-insecure areas, with district-wide interventions; and ii) linking smallholder farmers to markets through P4P, and strengthening food security and nutrition information systems.

**Figure 1: Portfolio beneficiaries and tonnage, by operation, planned and actual**




\* The number of beneficiaries by operation equals the average number of beneficiaries per year of the operation over the evaluation period 2011–2014.

Source: WFP standard project reports 2011–2014

11. The main components of the portfolio were food assistance for assets (FFA), school feeding, blanket supplementary feeding and targeted supplementary feeding to support mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN), emergency relief (with general food distribution) and support to HIV and AIDS clients. In addition, a 2012 pilot project in Mtwara Region used cash-based transfers to promote MCHN.<sup>5</sup> Figure 1 shows the planned and actual beneficiaries and tonnage; Figure 2 shows planned and actual beneficiaries by activity. These data indicate that: i) beneficiaries and tonnage were significantly less than intended; and ii) FFA and school feeding were the largest components.

<sup>5</sup> WFP. 2012. “Cash Transfer Pilot Project Safety Net to Promote Mother-and-Child Health and Nutrition in Mtwara Rural District of Tanzania”.

**Figure 2: Total planned and actual beneficiaries by activity, 2011–2014**

Source: WFP standard project reports 2011–2014

## EVALUATION FINDINGS

### Alignment and Strategic Positioning

12. WFP's food assistance to refugees was operationally relevant, directly addressing food insecurity. The school feeding, FFA and nutrition activities were also operationally relevant, targeting the country's most food-insecure areas. The operational relevance of the P4P activity was less direct, as participants were – as intended – not the poorest in the community and the activity was not restricted to the most food-insecure areas.
13. Strategically relevant activities in a WFP portfolio complement integrated national approaches to sustainable social and economic development – especially to ending hunger and food insecurity. Achievements in this area were only modest: the country strategy and the CP were aligned with national policies and strategies, but the portfolio did not achieve the integration required for full strategic relevance. As a result, the portfolio lacked a clear path to sustainability or hand-over – a crucial part of the implicit theory of change in the country strategy. P4P was an exception, although its direct contribution to enhanced food security was difficult to discern. Vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) activities were another exception, with significant capacity development among participating government agencies.

14. Despite earlier efforts with the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training to move towards a community-driven, home-grown school feeding model, WFP continued to focus on externally sourced food. This approach had to be scaled down and then terminated as funding ran out without an effective hand-over strategy. By the end of the review period, WFP and the Government had diverged on school feeding policy and WFP's policy influence waned thereafter; the reasons for this are not clear. There appear to have been weaknesses in WFP's engagement of the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, especially in 2014.
15. The United Republic of Tanzania made progress with an integrated social protection strategy and framework during the review period, with strong donor support. WFP was aware of these developments and engaged with the TASAF – notably in the 2012 Mtwara cash transfer pilot and the development of work norms. However, interviews and documents indicate that WFP did not engage in policy development or utilize its potential for technical assistance in this area as thoroughly as might have been expected, especially given the country strategy's commitment to supporting productive safety nets and the CP's focus on an integrated approach to district-level food assistance for safety nets.
16. Most informants reported that WFP engaged constructively in the nutrition agenda. The P4P experience demonstrated that, with adequate resources, WFP is capable of proactive and positive engagement in the national agenda. Delivering as One offered a major opportunity for – and challenge to – the alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's portfolio. Although stakeholders confirmed WFP's constructive engagement in this process, they also reported that “Delivering as One fatigue” set in as the country office concluded that the costs of the process outweighed the benefits. There is little evidence that the alignment achieved through Delivering as One resulted in greater operational synergy between WFP and other United Nations agencies, or improved strategic positioning with regard to government programmes or the contributions of the United Nations as a whole.<sup>6</sup>

### **Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision-Making**

17. The portfolio outlined in the 2011–2016 country strategy was based on sound analysis, but sectoral analysis during design and implementation was uneven. Funding and operational considerations took precedence over analytical inputs for operation and activity design. There is no evidence of substantive analysis of gender issues in the 2011-2016 country strategy or operation design – nor of any overarching gender strategy in the portfolio.
18. Monitoring of WFP's cash transfer pilot project demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of cash transfers.<sup>7</sup> The evaluators found strong support for the use of cash when assisting refugees. International evidence also suggests that cash transfers are more cost-effective than in-kind transfers. However, the country office did not carry out sufficient analysis to reach a conclusion, assuming instead that vouchers were more appropriate than a direct shift to cash transfers.
19. Portfolio implementation was steered by operational priorities, with little evidence of strategic adjustments. The operational strategy was generally sound, with decisions on logistics and humanitarian action to support refugees resulting in effective assistance. Regarding the country strategy's broader intention for an integrated and focused approach that supports the Government to end hunger in the country, strategic decision-making was

<sup>6</sup> This finding is consistent with “Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One” (United Nations, 2012).

<sup>7</sup> Standard Project Reports 2012 and 2013.





less evident. Because of WFP's perpetual resource constraints, many decisions taken from year to year were driven by funding considerations.

20. Despite weaknesses, including in reporting on its VAM work, WFP's activity monitoring was generally adequate during the review period. However, learning and adaptation from the data collected were less consistent. Monitoring at the Nyarugusu refugee camp led to some changes in strategy and method, such as the decision to register women as the recipients of food rations. The nutrition component of the portfolio also benefited from WFP's participation in, and learning from, monitoring activities. There is less evidence that school feeding and FFA activities benefited from analysis of monitoring data.

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## PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS

### Outputs

21. Outputs in the non-refugee portfolio were significantly affected by funding constraints, although the shortfall in assisted beneficiaries was proportionally less than the reduction in food assistance. The percentage of the planned number of children receiving school meals declined from 96 percent in 2011 to 65 percent in 2014, and school feeding days declined from 100 percent of the planned number in 2011 to 82 percent in 2013. The number of school feeding days was also less than planned in 2014, but reports do not state how much.
22. However, WFP achieved substantial FFA outputs of a satisfactory technical standard that put communities at centre stage, benefitting 27 percent of chronically food-insecure people in eight regions.<sup>8</sup> For nutrition activities, funding was one of several factors that drastically reduced the number of supplementary feeding beneficiaries below target. Other factors included late roll-out, changed admission criteria and the low number of malnourished pregnant and lactating women. After a slow start, P4P achieved impressive outputs. Outputs related to supporting refugees were generally close to target and of satisfactory technical quality. Monitoring reports showed that Sphere humanitarian standards were met in the Nyarugusu refugee camp.

### Efficiency

23. WFP made good progress in improving operational and logistics efficiency, largely avoiding pipeline breaks and cutting costs through attention to detail and enhancing its logistics strategy; direct support costs were cut by 18 percent in 2013 and 21 percent in 2014. Through its attachment to the distant regional bureau in Johannesburg, the country office continued to incur higher staff travel and related costs than would have been the case had it been attached to the regional bureau in Nairobi.
24. Efficiency was less evident in the design of the portfolio. Spatial efficiency/geographic concentration and – outside the refugee camp – institutional efficiency/collaboration with partners were inadequate. There was little evidence of Delivering as One activities outside Dar es Salaam, and even there, the CPE could not attribute any enhanced WFP efficiency to Delivering as One.

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<sup>8</sup> WFP Standard Project Reports.



25. WFP did not analyse the cost-effectiveness of all its activities. Nevertheless, at USD 23 per child,<sup>9</sup> the unit cost of school feeding in this portfolio was competitive with costs per child in other low-income countries, which range from USD 20 to USD 117.<sup>10</sup> Evidence of cost-effectiveness was less clear for the nutrition interventions, but arrangements for transporting nutrition commodities were efficient, and stock management was good.

### **Synergy and Multiplier Effects**

26. Activities to support refugees comprised integrated programmes that were linked to each other and to the complementary inputs of partner agencies. The rest of the portfolio was designed as an integrated package of activities that focused on selected food-insecure districts to achieve synergy among activities and to optimize WFP's impact on vulnerable people. As a result of funding shortages and the country office's view that broader coverage in fewer districts would lower WFP's profile and credibility, standard project reports show that this integrated, district-wide approach was not effective – undermining the main strategic thrust of the 2011–2016 country strategy. Complementarity with partners other than the Government was limited, and activities turned into the “silos” that their design had sought to avoid.
27. Despite the 2011–2016 UNDP and the significant commitment of senior country office staff to Delivering as One in Dar es Salaam, document review and interviews with WFP and partner staff yielded little evidence of synergies or multiplier effects; institutional silos persisted.

### **Gender**

28. Without making a significant impact at the national policy level, portfolio implementation contributed to a reduction in gender gaps and stronger awareness of women's rights and management capacity at the field level. For example, WFP and its partners at Nyarugusu refugee camp issued ration cards in women's names, and a woman chaired the camp leadership committee. However, interviews indicated that the WFP portfolio lacked adequate resources to achieve more meaningful implementation of the Gender Policy, in alignment with national priorities, including at the community and beneficiary levels.

### **Effectiveness and Sustainability**

29. Food assistance and related support to refugees were largely effective. The 2014 camp nutrition survey at Nyarugusu shows that global acute malnutrition dropped from 2.6 percent in 2010 to 1.4 percent in 2014, while stunting rates decreased from 48 to 40.7 percent. However with growing prospects for support to medium- and long-term refugees shifting to the use of vouchers or cash – as explored by WFP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 2014 – the comparative advantage of WFP's support to all but the early emergency needs of refugees is not certain.
30. Elsewhere, focus group discussions with teachers, parents and other local stakeholders indicated satisfaction with the outcomes of WFP school feeding, including perceived increases in enrolment, attendance, concentration and performance. However WFP data showed declining attendance and enrolment for girls and boys at WFP-supported schools.

<sup>9</sup> WFP country office data, March 2013.

<sup>10</sup> WFP. *State of school feeding worldwide*, 2013.



These data reflect national trends exacerbated by the declining number of feeding days and removal of the mid-morning meal in early 2013. By the end of the review period, the prospect for sustainable results from the portfolio's school feeding work had deteriorated as policy dialogue with the Government had virtually ceased.

31. WFP reported substantial achievements in capacity development, primarily at the technical and operational levels. While portfolio operations typically emphasized training in technical and management skills, outcomes varied. Those trained to carry out temporary activities such as FFA, or activities that were not sustainable, such as school feeding, reported uncertainty about how to retain and apply their new skills. When the relevant activities continued, the capacity development results were more positive.
32. FFA activities in the portfolio were partly effective: although the field assessment and interviews indicated that they were technically adequate and useful in addressing food insecurity, they had only a limited effect on beneficiaries' resilience to livelihood shocks and stresses. Levels of production and income remained low, alternative livelihood and coping strategies limited, and community support systems weak. Lack of baseline data precluded conclusive findings on the effectiveness of MCHN work, which was ultimately carried out on a small scale. Interviews and a review of health facility registers showed overall satisfaction with nutrition outcomes, with health-seeking behaviour of mothers and young children increasing in catchment areas.
33. Interviews and operational records show that P4P was effective in strengthening the participation of smallholder farmers – albeit not the poorest ones – in national agricultural markets. Efforts were made to build a sustainable institutional framework for enhanced involvement by farmers' organizations. In 2014, P4P worked with 28 farmers' organizations in ten districts, representing 18,000 farmers; however only one third were selling through P4P channels. While progress has been commendable, it is too early to celebrate P4P's achievements until some years after WFP's direct involvement has ceased.

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## CONCLUSIONS AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT

34. Overall, the United Republic of Tanzania country portfolio between 2011 and 2014 was characterized by technical competence – strong work was done by dedicated staff – but strategic drift. Although its design was well aligned with national and United Nations planning frameworks, there were evident shortcomings in the portfolio's strategic positioning. The country strategy emphasized programmatic integration in selected areas, but this was not achieved, other than in WFP's effective support to refugees. The analytical foundation for the portfolio laid out in the country strategy was sound, but sectoral analysis during the design and implementation stages was uneven. Funding contingencies and operational considerations often took precedence over analytical inputs for operation and activity design.
35. The portfolio achieved a degree of operational effectiveness. Work through the PRROs sustained the lives of thousands of refugees. Nutrition work was effective for individual beneficiaries, but not more broadly. School feeding appeared to be effective for the pupils it supported, enhancing attendance and easing the nutrition burden on poor families. FFA activities were partly effective. However, because WFP did not adequately engage in the development of national approaches to address food and livelihood insecurity, the sustainability of the portfolio's results was limited.



36. The shortage of funds that was a major cause of this limitation could have been used to stimulate new thinking about WFP's role and approaches. Instead, it simply led to dwindling outputs and a shrinking presence. The country strategy also emphasized hand-over and, implicitly, exit. While exit was forced on WFP in some circumstances, hand-over was not effectively achieved – except in the P4P pilot, in which interviews showed that new structures and systems could continue to develop without further WFP involvement.
37. Nothing should be taken for granted about WFP's next steps in the United Republic of Tanzania. Basic questions must be answered in charting the way forward. Those basic questions include the following:
  38. What is WFP's comparative advantage and future role in supporting refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania? Should this role be restricted to first-line emergency aid before voucher or cash systems, and their supporting market arrangements, are in place?
  39. What is WFP's comparative advantage in developmental support to food-insecure Tanzanian populations? If WFP continues to increase its focus on technical advice and associated capacity development, can it present a convincingly strong profile in the relevant technical areas to attract funding for its continued presence in the country?
  40. Most important, the evidence from this CPE implies that WFP's strategic positioning will have to adapt to the possibility that WFP no longer has a role in the United Republic of Tanzania beyond emergency response and associated logistics capacity for the country and its neighbours. In the next round of planning and resource mobilization for the country, WFP should consider a potential exit and offer a comprehensive justification for any continued presence.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

41. **Recommendation 1:** With support from the regional bureau and the Social Protection and Safety Nets Unit at Headquarters, the country office should redefine and restructure any future food assistance – outside humanitarian food assistance and the P4P agricultural marketing initiative – within the national social protection framework of the United Republic of Tanzania.
42. Food assistance should be conceptualized, structured, designed and delivered through the national social protection framework and system. Even with WFP's inadequate engagement during the review period, the Government and its partners have made progress with an increasingly comprehensive social protection system under the auspices of TASAF. The types of food assistance and related transfer modalities that WFP provides can fit into this system.
43. **Recommendation 2:** The country office, with support from the regional bureau and the Policy and Programme Division at Headquarters, should apply as much flexibility as possible in the design, resourcing and management of any further programme of food assistance so that it becomes a tool for creative, proactive support to the Government. Any further food assistance programmes should be based on a strategic analysis of WFP's comparative advantages and appropriate roles in the country. To enable this:
  - WFP should explore how to maximize the delegation of authority for Budget adjustments and the use of programme funds; and
  - 2016 should be a transitional year and be programmed accordingly, such as by extending the CP pending a new country strategy.



44. **Recommendation 3:** In the United Republic of Tanzania, WFP should shift from operations to advice in its food-assistance work. With support from the regional bureau and the Policy and Programme Division at Headquarters, the country office should focus on:
- operational services, including procurement and logistics to support humanitarian transfers in the country and the region;
  - technical assistance, notably on cash and voucher transfers, and social protection; and
  - transfers of food only in refugee emergencies and other crises that the Government cannot handle alone.
45. **Recommendation 4:** The country office, with support from the regional bureau and the Humanitarian Crises and Transitions Unit at Headquarters, should ensure that any future support to refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania is based on reappraisal and justification of WFP's role and comparative advantage in medium- and long-term food assistance.
46. A new proposal for support to refugees should explicitly address the possibility of WFP ceasing to engage in food assistance for medium- and long-term refugees. Plans should include a transitional period of hand-over to the Ministry of Home Affairs, and possibly other international organizations, and exit from all but frontline emergency assistance to refugees and supplementary feeding of vulnerable groups such as pregnant and lactating women and young children, in which it has a comparative advantage.
47. **Recommendation 5:** In consultation with the regional bureau and the Policy and Programme Division at Headquarters, the country office should work to optimize the value of Delivering as One in the United Republic of Tanzania:
- WFP should undertake a corporate review of its experience with Delivering as One to clarify its corporate position and responsibilities at different levels.
  - As the United Nations prepares for the second phase of Delivering as One and a second UNDAP, the country office should work with partner agencies to find new ways of achieving the recommendations of the 2012 global Delivering as One evaluation, focusing on better support from the United Nations system to programme countries and the simplification and harmonization of business practices.<sup>11</sup>
48. **Recommendation 6:** With support from the regional bureau and the Gender Office at Headquarters, the country office should ensure that in its future food assistance advisory services it specifies how WFP's Gender Policy (2015–2020) will be implemented in each activity. The country office should also prioritize the resourcing of Gender Policy implementation.

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<sup>11</sup> United Nations. 2012. "Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One".



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## ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CP	country programme
CPE	country portfolio evaluation
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FFA	food assistance for assets
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MCHN	mother-and-child health and nutrition
P4P	Purchase for Progress
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
TASAF	Tanzania Social Action Fund
UNDAP	United Nations Development Assistance Plan
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping