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Administrative and Managerial Matters

For information

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Security Report

Executive Summary

The global staff survey confirmed that WFP is doing all it can to ensure the safety and security of staff and their working environments despite significant security threats in 2015: three WFP staff members died in the line of duty, and casualty rates among partners and contractors remained higher than among WFP staff.

The role of the Field Security Division is to manage security and particularly to ensure that people in need can be reached. The reported case studies in Afghanistan and the Central African Republic show that WFP's mitigation and prevention measures ensured that operations could continue and prevented loss of lives and assets. Security arrangements are constantly reviewed to take advantage of opportunities for cost savings.

The Field Security Division is a member of several working groups of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network involved in policy development, strategic planning and resourcing. Its analysis and training functions support operational requirements by providing security information and developing the required training courses. The division's expertise in blast mitigation continues to be an asset in the United Nations Security Management System, while gender considerations are an integral part of WFP's security management.

To coordinate field security activities, it was planned to recover USD 18.8 million through standard staff costs and from projects, to fund the security emergency fund – estimated at USD 7.3 million – and payment of mandatory United Nations Department of Safety and Security costs estimated at USD 11.5 million. WFP's actual share of these costs paid in 2015 was USD 11.1 million.

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The Field Security Division in 2015

1. In 2015 the Field Security Division (RMQ) underwent changes in its senior management and organization, with a view to bringing together the security and access functions in line with its mission to ensure the safety and security of WFP personnel to enable them to gain access to and assist people in need.
2. The RMQ approach is to empower regional security officers and enhance links with senior management and other divisions to ensure that security personnel operate cohesively. The division also reviewed its analysis function to support WFP's operations and decision-making and its training function to extend its in-house expertise with a view to becoming a corporate centre of excellence; it is also developing specialist expertise in areas such as blast mitigation, civil-military coordination and communications.
3. RMQ continues to work with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) at Headquarters and in the field to increase efficiency and effectiveness. In the light of a move to integrate United Nations Secretariat security resources, however, WFP is keen to ensure that it maintains its own security resources to respond to the specific challenges it faces.

Security Incidents

4. The main security incidents involving WFP staff or assets and partner staff¹ were as follows:
 - Three WFP staff members died in the line of duty in 2015.
 - Casualty rates among partners and contractors remained higher than among WFP staff, indicating that the exposure of partners and contractors is higher and that WFP's security measures for its staff are more effective.
 - The number of reported incidents increased by 6 percent from 2014; this includes incidents involving WFP staff and assets and incidents involving partners and contractors.
 - South Sudan and the Sudan were again the countries reporting the highest number of incidents; this is consistent with the number of staff deployed.

WFP Personnel² Fatalities

5. A staff member was killed in June 2015 in a road accident in Pakistan. In April, two WFP staff members and a contracted driver disappeared in South Sudan while travelling in a convoy to a food distribution; fighting had broken out along the road that morning. They were presumed dead in August 2015.
6. A WFP staff member abducted at the airport in Malakal, South Sudan, on 16 October 2014 was also presumed dead in August 2015. This death was included in the 2014 figures on the assumption that the staff member was probably killed shortly after his abduction; this brings the number of staff killed in the line of duty in 2014 to two.
7. Two staff members lost their lives in non-work-related road accidents in the Sudan and Uganda. A staff member on annual leave drowned with his family in Turkey.
8. No WFP personnel were injured in the line of duty as a result of acts of violence, but four staff members were injured in violent non-work-related incidents: three sustained major injuries during armed robberies in Cambodia, Chad and Zimbabwe, and one was injured in the Syrian Arab Republic as a result of a mortar attack. Five staff members were injured in work-related road accidents in Pakistan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Uganda; two other staff were injured in non-work-related accidents in Malawi and Uganda.

¹ This report is based on incidents reported to the Security Information Management and Security Analysis System (SIMSAS).

² In WFP's Framework of Accountability, the term "personnel" refers to individuals in the employ of WFP – except those who are locally recruited and paid at hourly rates – together with their spouses and recognized dependants regardless of their contractual status; this includes consultants, staff on temporary assistance contracts and interns.

Contractor/Partner Staff Fatalities

9. The number of fatalities in the line of duty among contractor and partner staff fatalities rose to twelve in 2015 from five in 2014. In the Sudan, three staff members of the Sudan Red Crescent Society were killed in an ambush while returning from a food distribution. In South Sudan a cooperating partner staff member was killed in an attack at a WFP food storage facility managed by an international non-governmental organization (NGO), and a contractor staff member was killed in an ambush while delivering food. In the Syrian Arab Republic, two partner staff members were killed in an airstrike while attending a coordination meeting. In the Central African Republic, three employees of WFP contractors lost their lives in two attacks on convoys while transporting WFP food to Bangui, and a truck driver also lost his life in a traffic accident.


Abduction/Kidnappings³

10. No WFP personnel were abducted in 2015. The only reported kidnapping involved cooperating partner staff. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 14 staff of the Rural Development Centre NGO were abducted while returning from monitoring a food distribution in Kisharu; they were released unharmed the following day. There were six armed robberies in which commercial truck drivers were held overnight: they occurred in Afghanistan, Haiti, Mali and South Sudan.

Global Trends

11. After the all-time high in 2013 related to the conflicts in South Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic and the decline in the following year, the number of reported security incidents increased in 2015. There were 728 reported incidents involving WFP staff and/or assets, 6 percent more than in 2014, and 764 reported incidents involving contractors and partners compared with 720 in 2014.
12. The upward trend of reported incidents affecting WFP over the past years is in line with the global trend of security incidents affecting aid workers⁴ and operations recorded by Humanitarian Outcomes in the Aid Worker Security Database (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Reported security incidents involving aid workers, 2008–2015




³ In contrast to a kidnapping, an abduction does not involve a ransom.

⁴ The Aid Worker Security Database compiles information only on major incidents of violence against aid workers.

13. The distribution of security incidents continued to correlate with WFP's staffing and field operations, and the average per capita rate of security incidents remained consistent. In 2014 an average of 4.7 security incidents were reported per 100 WFP personnel; the figure was 4.8 in 2015. South Sudan was the location of 94 incidents affecting WFP operations, the same as in 2014. There were 52 reported incidents in the Sudan, 50 percent fewer than in 2014. Thefts and traffic accidents increased significantly to 47 reported incidents during the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone; in Afghanistan there were 40 reported incidents, as in 2014, with 39 in Yemen and 38 in Kenya.
14. The countries with the highest per capita rates of security incidents involving WFP personnel were Sierra Leone, Burundi, Haiti, Yemen and Turkey (see Figure 2).⁵ In Burundi, WFP personnel were caught in cross-fire in several incidents. In Haiti, crimes and civil unrest were responsible for the high rate of security incidents per staff. In Yemen, crime rates increased and national staff were affected by airstrikes, particularly in Sana'a. There were increasing numbers of criminal acts and traffic accidents in Turkey.

Figure 2: Countries with highest per capita rates of reported security incidents involving WFP staff or assets, 2015 (number of incidents)




⁵ Countries with fewer than ten WFP staff were not considered.

Distribution by Threat and Incident Type

15. Criminally motivated incidents constituted 57 percent of security incidents in 2015, as in previous years. Hazards such as road accidents accounted for 26 percent, armed conflict for 11 percent, civil unrest for 4 percent and terrorism for 2 percent (see Figure 3).


Figure 3: Distribution by threat type of reported security incidents affecting WFP staff or assets, 2015 (%)



Note: Percentile figures are rounded to the nearest decimal place.


16. Of the security incidents reported in 2015, 521 – 68 percent – were work-related, and 243 – 32 percent – occurred outside the work context, as in previous years. Road accidents and property crimes were the dominant types of incidents affecting WFP (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Distribution by incident type of reported security incidents affecting WFP staff or assets, 2015




17. WFP's increased exposure to armed conflict in 2015 is evident in the increase from 29 incidents in 2014 to 55 in 2015. Of these, 12 occurred in the Syrian Arab Republic, 11 in Yemen, 5 in South Sudan and 3 in Afghanistan. The number of armed incidents targeting WFP operations increased by 73 percent, from 14 in 2014 to 19 in 2015 (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Armed incidents against WFP operations, 2014 and 2015



18. After an increase between 2006 and 2013, WFP was less affected by property crimes in 2014 and 2015, a period during which the number of reported incidents grew by only 7 percent (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Significant security incidents involving WFP personnel or assets, 2006–2015: property crime



19. The countries with the highest number of reported property crimes were, in order, South Sudan, the Sudan, Italy, Kenya and Sierra Leone. The rate of property crimes per staff member was highest in Sierra Leone, followed by Malawi, Haiti, South Sudan and Kenya. Lawlessness increased in Sierra Leone during the Ebola crisis: unemployment among young people in Malawi and an influx of firearms from South Africa and Mozambique were likely causes. Crime in Haiti has increased steadily since the 2010 earthquake, when thousands of prisoners escaped.
20. The number of work-related road accidents increased from 90 in 2014 to 108 in 2015.⁶ There were 91 accidents involving WFP vehicles: 86 involved non-armoured vehicles and 5 involved armoured vehicles. The incidents involving armoured vehicles tended to result in serious injury

⁶ Includes WFP vehicles and contracted trucks, but may not be all the incidents affecting trucks because they are not always reported.

or death, which reflects a need for training for drivers of such vehicles. The operations most affected by road accidents were: South Sudan with 14, Sierra Leone and Uganda 12, the Sudan 9, Liberia 7, Malawi 6 and Guinea 5. The number of accidents increased in countries in West Africa where WFP increased its road operations during the Ebola outbreak.

Conclusion and Outlook

21. The rising numbers of armed incidents during operations in the Syrian Arab Republic and in Yemen reflect the growing exposure of WFP and its partners and contractors to collateral and direct threats. With growing humanitarian needs in areas affected by Islamic State militancy in the Middle East, north Africa and the Sahel, this exposure is likely to increase.
22. Armed conflict and terrorism will continue to be the most significant threats to operations, so robust security measures based on security analysis adapted to WFP's needs will be required. Proficient security risk management and dependable funding will continue to be determining factors for the safety and security of WFP staff and operations.
23. It is one of RMQ's roles to establish and maintain safe access so that WFP can reach the most vulnerable people and communities. This requires developing security capacities in country offices and contributing to a corporate, institutional approach to management of humanitarian access.
24. WFP was not as much affected by kidnapping and hostage-taking in 2015 as in previous years, but the spread of Islamic State militancy to north Africa and central Asia is expected to lead to an increase in kidnappings for ransom and political purposes. With growing military pressure on militant groups in the Middle East, they are expected to revert to terrorist tactics and attacks of various kinds and acts of cyber warfare are expected to increase in frequency. WFP is a high-profile target, and is hence particularly exposed to these threats in that some groups oppose cooperation between WFP and host governments and view its programmes as contrary to their aims.
25. Crime will remain the most frequent threat affecting WFP, particularly property crimes against WFP staff. Road accidents will continue to be a significant cause of injuries and fatalities among staff, despite improvements to road safety and the implementation of risk-reducing measures.
26. In view of the foregoing, RMQ expects to face increasing challenges in the coming years as it continues to ensure the safety and security of WFP staff as they assist people in need and work to eradicate hunger.

Case Study 1: Afghanistan

27. The year 2015 witnessed the highest number of security incidents since 2001, even though there were no significant international military operations or elections.⁷ There was a significant rise in civilian casualties as a result of the Government's attempts to quell the insurgency, but there were no fatalities in the line of duty among United Nations staff as a result of the security measures adopted.
28. On 4 January 2016 the Taliban claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on Camelot, a protected residential compound for civilian contractors near Darya village, where WFP's country office is located. In what was assumed to be a "miss" on a neighbouring United States military base, at least 30 Afghan civilians were wounded. The explosive device was assessed to contain 700 kg of explosives, but it only caused six minor injuries among United Nations staff and minor damage to the country office. A blast vulnerability assessment in 2013 identified improvements for the Camelot compound, which clearly resulted in a significant reduction of casualties. Discussions with the owner of the compound and actions over the last 18 months have enabled WFP to improve the perimeter wall and gate at no cost to itself. The low level of initial capital investment by the country office made the decision to move the WFP office relatively easy. The incident highlights the need to maintain the successful blast-protection capacity in the United Nations.

⁷ Strictly speaking it is the second highest on record, but it is assumed that there was under-reporting in the last three months of 2015 following relocations from four cities.

29. In September and October 2015 Taliban forces attacked Kunduz and seized several outlying villages, stormed the regional hospital and clashed with security forces at the nearby university. These events had significant impacts on WFP and the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS); 290 United Nations personnel were relocated from Kunduz, Faizabad, Puli Kumhri and Maimana, one of the biggest relocation operations ever for UNHAS. Alternate work modalities were implemented, minimizing disruption to operations.
30. On 11 September 2015 five trucks were destroyed in an armed attack on a WFP convoy. The drivers were released the following day, but the incident highlights renewed access challenges resulting from the extreme volatility of the various power-brokers in areas of operation.
31. On 7 August 2015 a suicide bomber killed at least 20 police cadets and wounded another 25 outside the gates of a police academy in Kabul, the second attack in Kabul in less than 24 hours. A third attack made the day the deadliest 24 hours in Kabul since December 2011, and the deadliest week since 2001.

Security Mitigation: Procedures, Training and Enhancements to Premises

32. Given the security environment in 2015, security measures above the minimum required were implemented; these included additional blast vulnerability assessment missions to Kandahar and Kabul and USD 92,000 allocated for upgrades to minimum operating security standards (MOSS) in Kandahar. In Kabul, significant security upgrades to the compound such as installation of armoured doors in the residential area bunkers, refurbishment of doors and windows and application of blast-resistant film and guard services were paid for by the owners.
33. Training for staff continued: all of the 515 WFP personnel operating in Afghanistan passed the in-country Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE) training. Training for security staff included the UNDSS Security Analysis Practice and Processes course for two national staff. Guards continue to receive regular refresher training on access controls, hostile surveillance and reconnaissance detection, and drill weekly to practise responding to complex attacks, shooters on the premises and suicide bomb attacks.
34. Throughout the period, coordination with WFP cooperating partners was reviewed to ensure that enough security personnel were allocated to activities related to internally displaced people and returnees.


Facilitation of Access and Community Acceptance

35. WFP minimized risks to operations and staff by obtaining security guarantees through direct negotiations with belligerent forces. After securing a contribution of USD 250,000 from the United Kingdom Department for International Development, field security staff in the WFP Afghanistan access team ran several access communications workshops to establish strategies and provide training. Field security officers (FSOs) are also being trained in the concept of gaining acceptance to enable access. It was estimated in 2015 that Afghanistan's access strategy had enabled a 20 percent increase in access during one of the country's most violent years. WFP continues to engage with the access advisory group led by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to share information and optimize strategies.

Financial Considerations

36. Security expenditures in Afghanistan totalled USD 6.5 million in 2015.⁸ A review of security cost structures resulted in a change of the security guard structure that saved USD 700,000, and the freezing of one P3 FSO position that saved USD 300,000. This USD 1 million saving was achieved without compromising support for WFP's operations.

⁸ Includes direct support costs and landside transport, storage and handling costs, but excludes other direct operational costs.

Figure 7: Direct support costs, Afghanistan, 2015**Case Study 2: Central African Republic**

37. In the Central African Republic the year was marked by significant outbreaks of violence as groups vied for territorial influence as the mandate of the Transitional Government drew to a close. An increase in attacks against humanitarian and commercial convoys posed major security challenges, affecting WFP's ability to deliver assistance. Several civilians were killed in attacks along the road from Cameroon, one of whom was a contracted truck driver.
38. Through negotiations with militias on access and implementation of mitigation measures, WFP's security team ensured that operations could continue and prevented loss of lives and assets. The security team also helped to extract staff from parts of Bangui affected by fighting among the militias, thereby preventing fatalities in the line of duty.
39. On 7 February 2015, ex-Seleka elements and armed pastoralists attacked the Ngakobo site for internally displaced people at Bambari. In May there was an escalation of violent clashes involving Fulani groups and the *Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique* against Anti-balaka elements. This triggered population displacements and subsequently involved French military and Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission forces. WFP persuaded the militias not to attack WFP and United Nations sites in Bambari town during the fighting.
40. In late August and early September armed clashes resumed in Bria, Bambari and Bantagafo, causing medium-scale population displacements. WFP's field security team negotiated safe access to the air strip for aid workers in Bambari during the fighting. On 21 September there was an escalation of violence led by Anti-balaka militias in Bangui following the death of a Christian taxi driver, and rumours of military coup against the Transitional Government circulated. WFP helped to extract staff of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations from their residences to a hotel and the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission compound in Bangui.
41. On 25 September 2015 a theft of 7.6 mt of food was reported at the WFP warehouse in Bossangoa in which 45 armed young men broke into the compound late at night, and on 27 September suspected Anti-balaka militants entered the WFP logistics base in Bangui and attempted to steal vehicles. Between 3 and 5 October the UNHAS relocated 200 NGO staff members out of the country, and on 6 October a private truck carrying WFP food in an escorted convoy from Cameroon was looted near Yaloke; armed men killed one truck driver and wounded another, who later died from his injuries.

42. On 24 November five unescorted WFP trucks were attacked near Bouca by armed men intending to steal rice and oil, and on 9 December 30 NGO staff members were briefly detained by Anti-balaka elements on the Bossangoa-Kamba Kota road; they were not partner staff, but the large number of staff taken in one incident was unusual. And on 25 December 1,350 mt of rice was looted from WFP trucks that were stopped by suspected Anti-balaka elements 45 km from Bossemptele.

Capacity Development

43. As insecurity increased in late September and early October several WFP staff attended SSAFE training run by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security. The FSO, the local security assistant and the Head of Logistics attended training in humanitarian access and negotiations, and WFP recruited two United Nations volunteer security specialists in Paoua and Kaga Bandoro.

Coordination, Cooperation and Response Capability

44. In response to the violence in September, the field security team relocated to a hotel to enable continued operations, and living arrangements for staff were reviewed, training in security risks was given and measures were put in place to prevent looting.
45. The WFP security team increased its cooperation with United Nations security organizations, implementing partners and NGO security teams. When tensions were high, this cooperation enabled the security team in Bangui to support the relocation of NGO staff from Bambari to Bangui and of WFP staff from their residences to hotels.

Security Risk Management

46. In the global staff survey, 83 percent of respondents were satisfied that WFP does all it can to ensure staff safety and security, and 85 percent that safety and physical working conditions are adequate; 86 percent of respondents stated that they fully understood MOSS and 85 percent had had adequate security training.
47. Membership of the Security Risk Management Working Group assisted a revision of the security risk management process to include a new manual, a training programme and an e-tool. WFP continues to support the High-Level Committee on Management in implementing duty of care for personnel operating in high-risk environments.

Gender Considerations in Security Risk Management

48. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network working group on gender considerations in security management, co-chaired by RMQ, drafted a policy on gender and developed a tool for the management of gender-related incidents by security professionals. Guidelines to assist United Nations personnel in handling gender-based violence were also drafted. The RMQ gender focal point, who is part of the WFP gender results network and liaises with other agencies, participated in a conference on support for WFP employees affected by gender-based violence. Gender perspectives are considered in security reporting and analysis. Recommendations to improve the inclusion of gender in RMQ's joint products with the Operations Centre are also being implemented. Seven of the last ten personnel hired by the RMQ are women.

Field Security Capacity and Operations

49. WFP employs 70 professional staff, 102 local security assistants, 20 consultants, 50 security focal points and 17 staff at Headquarters in Rome. The roster of consultants was augmented in 2015 in view of evolving crises such as that related to Boko Haram, which involved increased raids on villages in north-eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region and an increase in suicide attacks in towns and refugee camps. The roster enabled WFP to provide security analysis and support in the region. WFP security teams advised partners on site selection in the Diffa region of Niger after a Boko Haram attack that injured a beneficiary near a partner's distribution site.

50. The division has provided regular inputs into planning for very-high-risk missions, particularly in Yemen where evacuation planning is critical. In March all United Nations international staff were evacuated from Yemen. A mission was sent to Tunisia to support contingency planning for a possible operation in Libya and following the attacks in Paris in November 2015, RMQ devised plans for responding to armed attacks, enhanced its contacts with European security counterparts and conducted training with Italian security forces at Headquarters.

Security Assessment Missions

51. There were 17 security assessment missions under the RMQ accountability and support mechanism, most of which were concerned with equipment deficiencies in the Nairobi Regional Bureau and the Bangkok Regional Bureau.

| | |
|--------------------------------|--------------|
| Contingency/emergency planning | 173 |
| Documentation | 277 |
| Equipment | 725 |
| Framework of accountability | 123 |
| Processes and practices | 397 |
| Roles and responsibilities | 50 |
| TOTAL | 1 745 |

52. The security assessment mission concept is being reviewed in line with changes in security risk management processes and the MOSS approach on which reporting has been based. RMQ is increasing its security assessment missions, employing more consultants and adopting a two-year cycle. This will be supported by enhanced information technology and emergency funding to maximize effectiveness and accountability. Follow-up reporting will monitor compliance.

Access Facilitation

53. The division is working with security actors in fragile contexts to develop training in and strategies for humanitarian access, for example in Afghanistan and Ukraine. This approach enables WFP to minimize risks to staff by obtaining security guarantees through communication with belligerent forces.
54. Contributions of USD 250,000 from the United Kingdom Department for International Development enabled RMQ to enhance communications with communities in Afghanistan and increase the freedom of movement for WFP operations by an estimated 20 percent. Access training in Ukraine led by field security teams enabled WFP to deliver 400,000 food parcels in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, where WFP is one of the few organizations allowed to deliver humanitarian assistance. FSOs are being trained with a view to institutionalizing the approach in WFP.

Premises Security and Blast Mitigation

55. In 2015 WFP carried out ten blast vulnerability assessments in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic – many for other agencies – recommending blast-mitigation measures to protect personnel and facilities. RMQ also funded seismic assessments in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. A blast assessment questionnaire designed by WFP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was field tested with a view to implementation in 2016 following feedback. In view of current threats, RMQ will continue to support the United Nations Security Management System with its expertise in this area.

Analysis

56. New security analyst posts have been established in the Bangkok and Dakar regional bureaux to assess regional security risks. The RMQ analysis team continued to coordinate with the Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division with a view to developing a common operational picture; it also provides inputs for the Executive Director's daily operational briefing and works with other United Nations organizations to optimize information sharing.

Training

57. In 2015 the RMQ training team developed a WFP-specific certification course for local security assistants to replace the course delivered by UNDSS; four courses are planned for 2016. A women's security awareness training course was also developed to enable staff to address gender-related security issues. Five SSAFE courses were delivered in Rome, attended by 92 staff. Security-awareness training was delivered in Nairobi for 630 people to address specific security challenges; staff from other agencies also attended.
58. An e-learning package for WFP's Security Information Management and Security Analysis System (SIMSAS) was published, and the training team developed online modules on basic and advanced security in the field to augment the UNDSS modules, which were in English only.
59. Four FSOs completed the UNDSS Security Certification Programme, three staff completed the UNDSS Intermediate Training Programme, seven completed the Security Analysis Practice and Processes course, one staff member completed the Security Training Officer Certification Course, 13 completed SSAFE training of trainers, 12 completed Women Security Awareness Training of Trainers and one completed the Hostage Incident Management course.

UNDSS Costs and the WFP Security Emergency Fund

60. To coordinate field security activities, it was planned to recover USD 18.8 million through standard staff costs and from projects to fund the Security Emergency Fund – estimated at USD 7.3 million – and to pay mandatory UNDSS costs estimated at USD 11.5 million. WFP's actual share of UNDSS costs in 2015 was USD 11.1 million.
61. Funds from the Security Emergency Fund supported MOSS compliance in 20 country offices. Cameroon, Chad and Niger benefited for the first time from RMQ funding to finance physical protection, enhancement of sub-offices exposed to Boko Haram threats and acquisition of personal-protection vests and helmets and armoured vehicles. Workshops supported by the funds benefited 58 countries.

| | Original 2015 budget request | Allocation 2015 | Commitment and actual 2015 | % of total |
|------------------------------|---|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Staffing | 3 500 000 | 3 882 617 | 4 059 227 | 22 |
| MOSS | 2 400 000 | 2 464 258 | 2 834 204 | 15 |
| Training | 1 000 000 | 708 325 | 460 576 | 2 |
| Security Assessment Missions | 400 000 | 244 800 | 221 594 | 2 |
| UNDSS | 11 500 000 | 11 111 998 | 11 111 998 | 59 |
| TOTAL | 18 800 000 | 18 441 998 | 18 687 598 | 100 |

UNDSS Jointly Financed Activities

62. The 2014/15 cost-sharing budget for UNDSS was finalized at USD 225.2 million. WFP's actual share of UNDSS costs paid in 2015 was USD 11.1 million, in line with the number of WFP staff in the field (see CEB/2010/HLCM/FB/8/Rev.2).

| | UNDSS | WFP share |
|-----------|-------|-----------|
| 2002–2003 | 42.9 | 6.5 |
| 2004–2005 | 113.1 | 13.2 |
| 2006–2007 | 172.3 | 20.2* |
| 2008–2009 | 174.4 | 17.3 |
| 2010–2011 | 209.9 | 24.4** |
| 2012–2013 | 218.6 | 23.5 |
| 2014–2015 | 225.2 | 22.4 |

* Credit of USD 3.2 million received in 2006.

**Credit of USD 1.4 million received in 2010.

63. The Organizational Budgeting Service and the regional bureaux applied a new cost-recovery process to share the cost recovery of USD 8.8 million among all country offices except small and very small offices (Table 4).

| Regional bureau | 2015 | Number of country offices | % of overall costs |
|-----------------|-----------|---------------------------|--------------------|
| RBB | 1 839 755 | 11 | 21 |
| RBC | 2 201 937 | 10 | 25 |
| RBD | 1 453 295 | 12 | 17 |
| RBJ | 860 092 | 6 | 10 |
| RBN | 1 845 239 | 7 | 21 |
| RBP | 599 683 | 4 | 7 |

Looking Forward

64. As part of the Resource Management Department, RMQ will aim to be as cost-effective and efficient as possible and will implement the cost controls envisaged in the Financial Framework Review. It will work with UNDSS to achieve cost excellence with the resources available, and will continue to work with the Staff Wellness Division and Headquarters security on matters of duty of care and threats affecting Europe. The division will continue to work with the Policy and Programme Division to develop acceptance strategies through engagement with communities, and will continue to optimize relations with implementing partners and implement the Saving Lives Together initiative.

Acronyms Used in the Document

| | |
|-------|--|
| FSO | field security officer |
| MOSS | minimum operating security standards |
| NGO | non-governmental organization |
| RMQ | Field Security Division |
| SSAFE | Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments |
| UNDSS | United Nations Department of Safety and Security |