

Presentation to the WFP Executive Board

*2017 First quarterly operational briefing
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Rome, 12 January 2017



World Food Programme

Agenda

- 1. Major security factors affecting WFP operations since July 2016**
- 2. Proliferation of Terrorism**
- 3. Humanitarian Security Actions**
- 4. Questions**

1. Major security factors affecting WFP operations since July 2016

Major factors affecting WFP since July 2016

- **South Sudan:** Escalation of armed conflict in Juba (July).



Major factors affecting WFP since July 2016 (cont.)

➤ Syrian Arab Republic:



Major factors affecting WFP since July 2016 (cont.)

➤ Iraq:

- Mosul offensive; access limited;
- ISIL attacks in Baghdad to divert ISF from Mosul.

➤ Yemen:

- Airstrikes continued;
- Growing concerns over maritime attacks;
- Consistent terrorist and kidnapping threat;
- Visa issues;
- Access to beneficiaries.

Major factors affecting WFP since July 2016 (cont.)

➤ **Afghanistan:**

- Kunduz access;
- Contracted driver shot.

➤ **Mali:**


- Continued asymmetric attacks;
- Tensions significant impact on WFP;
- Elevated kidnapping threat against foreigners.

➤ **Nigeria/Lake Chad basin:**

- Asymmetric attacks resumed inside Maidiguri city;
- Access challenges.

Major factors affecting WFP since July 2016 (cont.)

Targeted attacks on WFP operations (armed conflict)



WFP SIMSAS: Armed incident – UN/Partner/Contractor targeted; WFP, Contractor, Partner

2. Proliferation of Terrorism

Terrorist attacks heat map: Sep 2014-Dec 2016



Iraq



Syrian Arab Republic



Afghanistan

Kabul, 26 Jul



Kabul, 11 Oct



Kabul, 1 Aug



Pakistan/India

Quetta/Pakistan (8 Aug 2016)



Uri/India (18 Sep 2016)



Somalia

MIA, Mogadishu, 26 Jul



Mogadishu, 31 Jul




Galkayo, 21 Aug



Mogadishu, 26 Nov



Mogadishu, 02 Jan



Mali



Yemen

Aden, 29 Aug



Turkey

Besiktas stadium, Istanbul, 10 Dec



Reina Club, Istanbul, 01 Jan



Central Europe

Nice/France (14 Jul 2016)



Würzburg/Germany (19 Jul 2016)



Ansbach/Germany (24 Jul 2016)



Rouen/France (26 Jul 2016)



Brussels/Belgium (05 Oct 2016)



Berlin/Germany (19 Dec 2016)



Terror trends

- **Attacks on soft civilian targets,**
- **Mass transportation systems;**
- **Low sophistication attacks;**
- **Active shooter scenarios;**
- **Barricade hostage tactics;**
- **IED in areas of armed conflict;**
- **Homegrown and returning extremists.**

3. Humanitarian Security Actions

Current Security Efforts

➤ Humanitarian Access Strategy

- Training, actor mapping and conflict analysis
- Cooperation with ICRC-MSF-UN AFP

➤ Close cooperation with other functional areas

- Internal joint reports and analysis
- Conflict Analysis Working Group
- Civil-Military coordination – NATO / EUNAVFOR / Italian Security Forces / SHADE (Bahrain)

➤ Continued successes in security analysis training



Current Security Efforts (cont.)

- **Security Assistance Missions**
- **Integration of HQ Security**
- **Blast vulnerability assessments**
- **Aviation Security**
- **Gender**
 - Consideration in reporting, assessment, planning, advice, training;
 - Procurement of PPE for women (in progress);
 - Ongoing focus on recruitment of women security officers.





The Field Security Division (RMQ) has a key role to play in helping WFP to achieve Zero Hunger.

As the concept of Field Security involves people and is also prevention-oriented, the Security Training & Learning Development Unit (STLDU) plays a key role within RMQ and within the organization.

STLDU GOAL

Develop security learning & expertise to optimize field staff safety & security

STLDU APPROACH

Improve skills and knowledge of WFP Security Personnel and increase security awareness of WFP Staff

What did STLDU achieve in 2016?

19 sessions organized and delivered

All STLDU courses have been tailored to WFP context and WFP policies and procedures.

LSA

4 sessions
78 participants
(including 8 from other UN agencies)

SSAFE

5 sessions
100 participants
(including 10 from other UN agencies)

WSAT

11 sessions in 8 countries
220 participants
(including 20 from other UN agencies)


ACTIVE SHOOTER (AS)

1 session
12 WFP participants & over 1300 online completions (e-learning)



We also provided a variety of support....

- Security Focal Point Training - including AS - to WFP European Offices
- Briefing to the Da Vinci Airport WFP colleagues on Active Shooter plan (managed by HQ Security)
- Facilitation of SSAFE courses in Niger (managed by the country office)
- Reduction of LSAs to be trained by TDS
- Facilitation of UN JPO Orientation programme - Field Security modules (organized and delivered by UN Staff College)
- Facilitation of FASTER and JERS trainings - SSAFE package (managed by OSE)
- Contribution to WFP's corporate approach to ACCESS and delivery of Negotiation Skills Workshop (managed by OSZ)




4. Questions

Thank you!

Annex: Focus areas Yemen, Nigeria and Turkey



Yemen



- **Conflict likely to continue at irregular intensity**
 - Peace process uncertain despite involvement of member states
 - Continued threat from airstrike, despite on-going de-confliction; impact on national staff and families
 - SLC prepares for ground offensives
 - Impasse at Taiz continues
 - Houthis intensify cross-border attacks
- **Heightened maritime threat**
 - Houthis fired missiles at UAE ship in Mukalla port (1 Oct) and against US warship near Bab al-Mandab Strait (9 Oct).
- **Extreme terrorist threat continues**
 - Military forces regained control of AQAP controlled cities.

North East Nigeria emergency

- **Boko Haram formally split in two in Jul 2016**
 - (long-time leader) Shekau faction,
 - Al Barnawi faction - supported by ISIL
 - Both extended presence on shores of Lake Chad
- **Since Nov, frequent attacks inside Maiduguri city.**
- **Boko Haram maintains capacity to carry out attacks despite heightened security.**
 - Attacks led to temporary suspension of operations and movements around Maiduguri
- **Dec: Government claims victory (again)**
 - Militants ousted from Sambisa forest stronghold
 - Militants now scattered, planning counter-attacks.
 - Likely to further affect humanitarian access



Turkey

- **Security deteriorated.**
 - **PKK affiliates:** Growing terrorism threat to government buildings nationwide;
 - **ISIL** expanded target range from Western and Kurdish interests to Turkish society and government interests;
 - Persistent terrorism threat to entertainment venues, commercial centres and places of worship frequented by foreigners, in particular in Ankara and Istanbul;
- **Increased collateral terrorism risk to WFP personnel;**
- **Attacks in border area pose threat to WFP operations.**

