

Country Portfolio Evaluation

Yemen: An Evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2006-2010)

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International and national NGOs and Governorate, district and local officials and community representatives in Sa'adah, Hajja, and Raimeh.

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Disclaimer

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Fact Sheet: WFP's Portfolio in Yemen

Timeline and funding level of Yemen portfolio operations


Operation	Title	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
DEV 10137	Country Programme - Yemen (2002-2007)		Req: \$45.4 Contrib: \$33.6								
DEV 10435	Country Programme - Yemen (2007-2011)							Req: \$80.5 Contrib: \$20.5		2011	
PRRO 10232	Food Assistance for Refugees		Req: \$3.8 Contrib: \$3.2								
PRRO 10232.1	Food Assistance to Somali Refugees in Yemen							Req: \$4.7 Contrib: \$4.8			
PRRO 200044	Food Assistance to Somali Refugees in Yemen								2011	Req: \$7.0 Contrib: \$3.1	
EMOP 10675	Assistance to IDPs in Sa'ada Governorate						\$0.5 \$0.4				
EMOP 10684	Humanitarian Assistance to IDPs in Sa'ada Governorate							Req: \$33.8 Contrib: \$24.7			
EMOP 10794	Immediate Response Emergency Operation Support to people affected by floods							Req: \$0.5 Contrib: \$0.4			
EMOP 10806	Food Assistance to Flood Affected Persons in Eastern Yemen								Req: \$3.9 Contrib: \$2.1		
EMOP 10767	Targeted Food Support to Vulnerable Groups Affected by High Food Prices								Req: \$ 61.2 Contrib: \$30.4		
EMOP 200039	Food Assistance to Conflict-Affected Persons in Northern Yemen								2011	Req: \$47.9 Contrib: \$0.4	
SO 200130	Air Passenger Service and Logistics Cluster Coordination in Support of the Humanitarian Response in Sa'ada								2011	Req: \$0.9 Contrib: \$0.4	
Food distributed (MT)		0	17660	25085	24689	19781	11410	14455	46419	126714**	
Direct Expenses* (USD millions)		n.a.	n.a.	7.6	7.6	7.9	6.5	12.8	26.6	n.a.	
% Direct Expenses: Yemen vs. World		0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.4%	0.7%	n.a.	
Beneficiaries (actual, thousands)		M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	
		0 0	339.4 338.4	514.2 512.6	599.2 596.8	591.1 592.6	336 340.4	359.62 356	791.32 785.2	3524	

Source: last SPR available, Resource Situation (11 January 2011), Annual Performance Report 2009.

Distribution of portfolio activities by beneficiary

	Education	Nutrition	GFD	Cash	FFW/FFA/FFT	HIV	Nutrition MCH
EMOP 108060			X				
EMOP 107940			X				
EMOP 107670		X	X				X
EMOP 106840		X	X				
EMOP 106750			X				
DEV 104350	X	X				X	X
PRRO 102321	X	X	X		X		X
PRRO 102320	X	X	X		X	X	X
DEV 101370	X	X			X	X	X
EMOP 200039		X	X				
PRRO 200044	X	X	X	X			X

Source: Dacota



Top 5 Donors: USA, Germany, U.K, UN CERF, Italy

Partners: Government of Yemen, 9 NGOs & 7 International Agencies

*Excludes PSA costs. 2008 & 2009 expenses presented are according to IPSAS and not comparable to 2007 & previous years values based on UNSAS

** Planning figures for 2010 (Source: ERD PoW 4 September 2010)

*** Cash and Voucher, HIV/AIDS are included as activities but figures are 0% due to a low absolute figure of beneficiaries not captured by the %.

Executive Summary

Introduction

Evaluation Features

1. This report presents the findings of the Yemen Country Portfolio Evaluation (CPE), implemented from 31 January to 13 March 2011. The CPE covers the 12 WFP operations active in Yemen between 2006 and 2010, four of which are still ongoing. This evaluation period was chosen to cover the portfolio's transition from a concentration on development – education and nutrition – to a focus on humanitarian responses to shocks and crises. The evaluation was timed to ensure that the report would inform both the preparation of a new CP and the WFP country strategy process in Yemen.

2. The evaluation focused on three main areas: i) the portfolio's strategic alignment with the needs of people in Yemen, the policies and priorities of the Government of Yemen, WFP's Strategic Objectives, and the objectives of other multilateral and bilateral agencies and donors; ii) the main factors behind the strategic choices made; and iii) the performance and results of the portfolio.

Context

3. With a human development index rank of 133 in 2010, Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East and one of the poorest in the world, in spite of petroleum reserves, which have provided the majority of government revenues for many years. These revenues are declining as oil supplies dwindle, and little has arisen in Yemen's economy to replace them. Although gross domestic product (GDP) has grown over the past decade, this growth slowed during the evaluation period, and a series of crises has created difficult conditions for the country's people and economy. Since 2006, a series of wars has affected the northern governorates of Sa'adah and Al Jawf, as Al-Houthi rebels combat government forces for control of what was once a relatively rich agricultural area. In 2007 and 2008, serious floods disrupted economic activity in the eastern governorates of Hadramaut and Al-Mahra, and in 2008, the global food, fuel and financial crisis led to a dramatic increase in food prices in Yemen, which imports up to 85 percent of its consumption needs. Refugees, mainly from Somalia, are arriving in greater numbers every month, and Al-Hirak separatists continue their insurrection in southern provinces.

4. Yemen has one of the highest child malnutrition rates in the world,¹ and the highest infant and child mortality in the region.² Poor access to safe water and improved sanitation are contributing factors to malnutrition, morbidity and mortality rates. In the particularly onerous context of rural Yemen – which is isolated, arid and poor, with few if any government services available – the impact of hunger is rapidly manifested as malnutrition among more vulnerable members of the community.

5. In 2006, total public expenditure on social services declined to 7 percent of GDP, excluding fuel subsidies, as evidenced in the poor progress against poverty indicators. Nationally, more than 40 percent of the population lives under the poverty line, with recent projected increases in poverty rates due to the food, fuel and financial crises of 2008/09.³ There are significant equity issues regarding poverty; rural areas – where more than 75 percent of the population lives – have the most severe poverty and the highest poverty gap index, and there has been far less progress against poverty in rural than in urban areas.

¹ Yemen CFSS. 2010.

² Data available from www.childinfo.org.


³ IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 00955. Impacts of the Triple Global Crisis on Growth and Poverty in Yemen. 2010. Washington D.C.

WFP's Portfolio in Yemen

6. During the period under evaluation (2006–2010), WFP's food assistance increased significantly and the overall focus of the portfolio shifted towards humanitarian relief and emergency response. During this period, WFP implemented 12 operations in Yemen, four of which are still ongoing, with total expenditures growing from US\$7.5 million in 2006 to US\$38.8 million in 2010. These operations include two CPs addressing education and nutrition outcomes; three PRRO for Somali refugees; three EMOP for IDP in the northern Sa'adah region; two EMOPs for flood-affected people in eastern Yemen; one EMOP to mitigate high food prices following the food, fuel and financial crises; and one special operation providing air passenger services and logistics for United Nations agencies in the Sa'adah region. Reflecting the portfolio's shift in focus, the planned budget went from approximately 95 percent development assistance in 2006 to approximately 85 percent humanitarian assistance in 2010.

7. Funding for operations was seen below that budgeted. Later in the evaluation period, funding for non-emergency operations was more limited, including for CP 10435 and the refugee operation, PRRO 200044. The response to high food prices was also considerably underfunded. As the scale of the portfolio increased, so did the average number of beneficiaries reached each year from 2007, with almost 2.5 million receiving food assistance in 2010.


Planned versus actual funding – WFP Yemen operations (2006–2010)



Sources: WFP project documents and SPRs.

PRRO 200044, EMOP 200039, CP 10435, and special operation 200130 (light shade of grey) are ongoing and will receive more funds in 2011.

Annual average number of beneficiaries (actual) by year



Sources: WFP project documents and SPRs.

Evaluation Findings

Alignment and Strategic Positioning

8. WFP operations in Yemen are generally well aligned with the Government's humanitarian objectives. WFP has responded quickly, efficiently and effectively to government requests to help deal with crises ranging from IDPs fleeing from war in the north to the impact of high food prices in world markets on Yemen's most food-insecure citizens. Most WFP work in Yemen reflects government policy statements and priority fields of intervention.

9. The WFP portfolio is in line with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), having shortened the first CP to align with the 2007–2011 UNDAF. WFP priorities are also in line with the 2011–2015 UNDAF, which will provide a framework for the new CP. The evaluation observed that WFP has provided significant leadership in the consolidated appeals process for humanitarian funding and planning in Yemen.

10. The evaluation team found two general areas of divergence from the priorities of the Government and other humanitarian/development agencies. First, the use of cash as a safety net and to support food security objectives is prioritized in strategy documents and was discussed by national-level stakeholders; WFP is of the opinion that cash interventions are not yet appropriate in Yemen and that they carry a high risk. Monetization of WFP food rations is also a challenge for beneficiaries in areas with weak food markets, and carries risks for beneficiaries. Some stakeholders felt that because many of the food security crises facing poor households in Yemen are chronic, they require development solutions rather than short-term relief solutions. However, the scale of WFP humanitarian relief operations shifts the overall focus of the response among all actors.

11. WFP works well with other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the context of IDP and refugee camps managed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. WFP's leadership of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee logistics cluster was commended by many stakeholders in humanitarian agencies, and its co-leadership of the food security cluster was also praised by those looking to see food security placed higher on the agenda than it has been in the past. However, coordination with some United Nations agencies varies. On the ground, implementation units working with WFP and other United Nations agencies may share office space, but do not coordinate or even necessarily talk to each other about working together and improving their impact on beneficiary groups. The UNCT is working to improve joint efforts and coordination among agencies, but there has been limited progress so far. WFP could provide more leadership in this area.

12. The portfolio is closely aligned with WFP's Strategic Objectives for the period 2008–2013. To varying degrees, each operation cuts across more than one Strategic Objective. Generally, most activities fall within Strategic Objectives 1, 3 and 4, as expected, but WFP's analytic work and policy advocacy have made cross-cutting contributions to all areas.

Strategic Choices

13. The evaluation analysed the strategic choices made over the period evaluated and the factors that were critical to this decision-making. Generally, the most important factors were the availability of funding, the urgency of emergency situations, and the use of data and other evidence.

14. The funding environment had a major effect on the portfolio and the choice of operations. Given major donors' prioritization of humanitarian emergency, WFP has pursued emergency funding, in line with its corporate mandate. However, government strategies are prioritizing development solutions for many of the chronic issues in Yemen – such as malnutrition and food insecurity – and for these areas WFP has had to work carefully within short-term programming modalities to address long-term or chronic challenges. This will likely continue to be a challenge, as the donor environment is increasingly becoming polarized. This presents a particular

challenge for development operations, and WFP must explore its available partnership options to plan and implement longer-term interventions.

15. Over the evaluation period, three major crises have been determining factors in WFP's strategic changes to its portfolio. The first is the outbreak and continuance of the Houthi wars in the north, which is now a major focus of WFP's operational resources, and the second is the arrival of a continually increasing number of Somali refugees. Appropriate strategic decisions were made for responding to the IDP crisis in the north and the continuing refugee needs in the south. The third determining factor has been high food price crises. The food price shocks of 2008/09 and late 2010/early 2011 required an immediate response to an acute situation. But the awareness they created of chronic food insecurity issues was also a significant driver of the decision to focus on chronic food insecurity throughout the country. WFP used the opportunity created by donors' increased awareness to design and fund a longer-term safety net operation. Such crises have thus been factors both in how WFP reacts and how it plans its future interventions.

16. Through its analytic work, WFP has been successful in placing food insecurity, hunger and nutrition issues on the national agenda. Primarily through the use of evidence generated by the CFSS, but also through management's participation and advocacy, the national food security strategy has focused on issues regarding access to food and the overall availability of food. It was noted that WFP was very effective in ensuring that these issues – as proximate causes of food insecurity – were included in the strategy, rather than basing it on a broader focus on livelihoods, income generation and rural development. There is opportunity to provide similar leadership in the area of nutrition, with implementation of the national nutrition strategy.

17. The evaluation team concluded that the one-off data collection analysis and the regular monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems were most useful for the planning and preparatory work of the overall portfolio. However, strategic decisions to adapt or change operational activities are based less on the generation and use of evidence about programme outputs and outcomes, and more on the general humanitarian situation, security considerations, funding and discussions with cooperating partners. Better use of outcome monitoring and the cross-checking of data are encouraged.

Portfolio Performance and Results

18. The evaluation focused primarily on the technical areas of food security, nutrition and education, with a fourth emphasis on the safety net modality, which is an increasingly important part of the portfolio. The evaluation team analysed the performance and results within these areas, using the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Cross-cutting factors that affected the results were also analysed.

Relevance

19. The evaluation concludes that the WFP portfolio was well aligned with the humanitarian needs of households in Yemen, including IDPs in the north and east, refugees in the south, and vulnerable households affected by high food prices. The scale of the portfolio increased dramatically during the evaluation period, to meet the increasing needs of emergency-affected areas and WFP's role as the lead response agency throughout most of Yemen. Chronic poverty and food insecurity levels throughout the country easily exceed emergency thresholds, and WFP is well positioned, logistically and strategically, to take advantage of donor funding and to implement activities where needed. The evaluation found no major issues concerning the portfolio's alignment to meet humanitarian objectives.

Efficiency

20. The evaluation examined the outputs across different operations, and considered their efficiency with respect to other humanitarian actors and, especially, the modality of their implementation. Given the scale of WFP operations, it is difficult to compare WFP's output delivery with that of other agencies. Internally, WFP has focused on the efficiency of its operations, through food procurement on local markets, competitive tendering of local transport companies, and other logistics arrangements. Long-standing contracts with reliable transport companies have incurred limited liability and losses under difficult circumstances. In general, the efficiency of the portfolio has improved with the increasing scale of operations and better collaboration with partners. An example of good practice is work with the Social Welfare Fund to deliver safety net rations, which provides efficiency gains to both agencies. Further efforts to develop partnerships will improve operational efficiency. The efficiency of some aspects of the portfolio was likely undermined by breaks in funding. The design of the safety nets and nutrition interventions requires predictable and consistent food rations; as well as mitigating the potential nutritional benefits, pipeline breaks in operations cause confusion among beneficiaries and challenges for the cooperating partners responding to unmet demand.

Effectiveness

21. The extent to which the portfolio objectives were achieved was analysed through the available data and through cross-checking with a range of key stakeholders. Generally, the outcome-level data reported on WFP operations were insufficient for this, and many operations are designed with aspirational objectives rather than those that can be measured within the given timeframes. In spite of this challenge, the evaluation concludes that the portfolio's effectiveness is most evident in the emergency response and refugee operations. The rapid response to IDP food insecurity in northern Yemen has mitigated internal migration and met life-saving needs of the people affected by conflict. The same is true of similar responses to floods in eastern Yemen. More than 14,000 refugees rely on rations from WFP as a crucial component of their coping strategies. The effectiveness of the development-oriented aspects of the portfolio has been limited, partly because of the limited scale of operations and partly because of funding limitations. The available outcome data for this aspect of the portfolio were inconsistent, and stakeholders, while appreciating the interventions, noted that they needed to be scaled up and/or revitalized. There may be opportunities for collaboration with other agencies working towards the same development outcomes, which would increase the effectiveness of WFP inputs.

Impact

22. The portfolio's positive contributions to broader humanitarian and development objectives in Yemen were also most evident in the humanitarian aspects of the portfolio. As a lead agency, in terms of resources, logistics, coordination and the timeliness of response, WFP contributed to meeting life-saving needs in conflict-affected northern regions and flood-affected areas in the east. In refugee operations, WFP certainly contributes to meeting the short-term food needs of the population in Kharaz refugee camp. However, the CPs' contribution to overall objectives in education and nutrition has been more limited. There is no evidence, beyond somewhat inconsistent data, that these interventions have made a lasting contribution to national objectives. Significant underfunding has mitigated their effectiveness.

Sustainability

23. The evaluation focused on the degree to which the portfolio's operations have developed hand-over options, capacity development strategies and policy advocacy. In general, efforts in these areas are limited, but they are also generally beyond the remit of WFP, given the circumstances and orientation of the portfolio. The Government has limited capacity, especially at decentralized levels, to manage and coordinate emergency response operations, and

institutional strengthening of this type is beyond the scope of WFP operations. Within the portfolio, training activities have taken place to enable WFP cooperating partners, including government actors, to manage operational implementation, but this is not institutional strengthening or capacity development in the wider sense. The evaluation team observed that communication and policy advocacy with national and sub-national stakeholders were underutilized in the education and nutrition areas, and would be welcomed by government and donor stakeholders. Capacity development, dialogue and policy advocacy would increase the sustainability of these aspects of the portfolio, even when funding of on-the-ground interventions is variable.

Cross-Cutting Factors

24. The WFP CO has established excellent relationships with its government counterparts, which is critical to its ability to respond and gain access to vulnerable communities throughout Yemen quickly. By leading UNCT delegations in negotiations with Houthi rebels in the north of Yemen to obtain access to IDPs in Sa'adah governorate, WFP has demonstrated its leadership in establishing safe corridors, and the impartiality of its operations.

25. In its analysis of portfolio performance, the evaluation team noted several issues stemming from the lack of monitoring data on the results/outcomes of WFP operations in Yemen. In general, very few data about the outcomes of operations are collected and data are not cross-checked with other data sources, including those of partners and the Government. This has implications for annual reporting and for strategic management of the portfolio. One-off exercises, such as the CFSS of 2009/10, are a very valuable contribution, and linkages between these data and those collected regularly would assist the monitoring of results at the outcome level.

26. The WFP Office in Yemen has 93 nationally recruited and 12 internationally recruited staff members based in Sana'a and four sub-offices. All staff demonstrated excellent commitment to WFP and knowledge of the operations. WFP should do its utmost to retain these valuable staff members, even if funding dips in the future. It was observed that good communication between senior management and all staff was a critical factor for success in the management of operational changes during the period under evaluation. In cases where it is necessary to redesign operations to take advantage of new funding or partnership opportunities, all staff must be encouraged to innovate and adapt interventions, rather than maintaining the current situation. Reinforcing the overall office capacity in nutrition and, perhaps, livelihoods/social protection programming would allow WFP to engage more effectively in national policy discussions of these issues.

Recommendations

27. **Recommendation 1:** WFP should consider balancing the focus of its operations to include both short- and long-term aspects of the emergency and chronic problems in Yemen.

28. The evaluation recommends that WFP explore the potential for forming partnerships and leveraging its resources – investments, M&E and policy advocacy – to address long-term solutions to chronic issues, such as general food insecurity and malnutrition. Although funding for shorter-term operations may be more accessible, WFP can position itself as a key partner in longer-term programming.

29. **Recommendation 2:** WFP should revitalize its fundraising for development-oriented operations in Yemen.

30. Owing to the funding context, WFP has had to fold its nutrition objectives into its EMOPs and PRROs, while food-for-education/take-home ration operations have shrunk to a fraction of

their original size and scope. Development programmes require longer-term and more stable and predictable funding, so WFP should design and implement a differentiated advocacy and fundraising strategy in response to the needs of its development mandate.

31. **Recommendation 3:** WFP should further develop and invest in joint programmes and other collaborative partnership arrangements with other United Nations agencies, large NGOs and donors.

32. WFP interventions are judged to be most effective when WFP works closely with other specialized entities to deliver them. However, in the CPs and the nutritional components of the high food prices EMOP and the follow-on safety net PRRO, it is operating in a far more stand-alone mode. This does not take advantage of opportunities to coordinate and collaborate with partners and provide integrated services to ensure maximal impact from its contributions.

33. **Recommendation 4:** WFP should further emphasize planning with, preparation with and training for its government and cooperating partners.

34. Some government counterparts and non-governmental cooperating partners wish to be full counterparts, through more training, better equipment and participatory approaches to planning and implementation. This also increases the potential for eventual hand-over of WFP operations, especially in the education and nutrition sectors.

35. **Recommendation 5:** M&E systems should be enhanced so that results can be compared over time and space and the outcomes of operations can be measured.

36. Efforts to collect historical and spatial – intervention versus non-intervention – data are insufficient to allow good assessments of the portfolio’s overall results and contributions. Improvement depends on both designing systems that measure impact and training government and community representatives to systematically and reliably collect the required information on results at the outcome level – not just WFP inputs/outputs. There are also many opportunities to collaborate with other implementing agencies and government departments in data collection, analysis and dissemination exercises.


37. **Recommendation 6:** Technical capacity should be increased in the areas of health, nutrition and, possibly, livelihoods or social protection.

38. To increase its participation in policy advocacy at the national level, WFP should augment its staff capacity in health and nutrition. This would allow it to balance field operations with higher-level planning, policy and advocacy. Additional expertise in livelihoods or social protection would also assist in establishing partnerships with agencies active in these areas and augmenting these aspects in future WFP operations.

39. **Recommendation 7:** The data and findings of the 2010 CFSS should be disseminated further, and a follow-up survey should be planned.

40. The CFSS of 2010 was very well received. It should be disseminated more widely among key stakeholders in Yemen and repeated regularly, to allow longitudinal analysis.

Map



1. Introduction

1. The repeated outbreaks of war in Northern Yemen, natural disasters such as flooding, and an influx of refugees from Somalia and other East African countries that began in the early 1990s, have exacerbated Food, Fuel, and Financial (FFF) crisis of 2007-2009 added to the country's challenges. The result has been a complex and serious humanitarian crisis that has continued to expand and deepen. This is the backdrop for the CPE of the 12 operations that the World Food Programme (WFP) implemented in Yemen between 2006 and 2010. The WFP Portfolio in Yemen has evolved since 2006, when it cantered on a development/country programme based on a series of nutrition and education interventions and support to Somali refugees. Since that date, dramatic events have significantly altered the humanitarian and development landscape in this poorest of Middle Eastern countries. Floods in Eastern Yemen in 2007 and 2008 led to internal displacements of people to which WFP responded with emergency assistance. A series of intermittent wars in the northern province of Sa'adah has displaced over 300,000 people. WFP has responded with a series of emergency operations and a special logistics operation for the provision of transport to the affected area.

2. In describing the context of the evaluation, the evaluation team cannot neglect to mention the on-going political upheaval which constrained the team's work during its time in country (20 February 2011 to 13 March 2011). The evaluation team had to cancel travel plans for Aden, Kharaz, and Taiz and a number of high government officials found themselves unable to meet with the team. With the exception of one day with travel restrictions within Sana'a, the CPE team was able to meet all planned stakeholders within the Government of Yemen, the UNCT, donors and NGO partners. That so many officials did make time is a tribute to the esteem in which WFP is held by all with whom they work.

3. This chapter of the evaluation report provides an introduction to the key features of the evaluation and aspects of the Yemen country context that have influenced strategic choices and directions of the WFP country portfolio during this period. Documents used in the preparation of this evaluation report are listed in Annex 2.

1.1. Evaluation Features

4. The scope of the Yemen CPE encompasses the 11 WFP food assistance operations and one Special Operation (SO) that were implemented (or on-going) between 2006 and 2010. The period includes six EMOPs⁴, three PRROs,⁵ and two Country Programmes (CP, [DEVs/CPs]).⁶ Given the strategic focus of this evaluation, the SO that provided air passenger services and logistics support is considered an activity supporting the objectives of other existing operations used by the Country Office (CO) to achieve its overall objectives and to foster partnerships. The SO is included and reviewed to this extent in the evaluation.

5. Given the strategic nature of the CPE, the report does not evaluate the 11 individual food assistance operations per se, but rather looks across the operations to assess the relevance and coherence of the WFP portfolio as a whole, its evolution over time, its performance, and the strategic role played by WFP in Yemen. With the constraints on travel in the field, the team observed some on-going operations, i.e. emergency assistance to IDPs in Sa'adah, the FFE operations, the nutritional components of the high food price response operation (many of which are carried over to a new nutrition/safety net operation), and relied more heavily on stakeholder interviews and secondary data for the operations that were already completed during the period under consideration. The evaluation team was unable to visit southern Yemen

⁴ EMOPs: 108060; 107940; 107670; 106840; 106750; 200039

⁵ PRRO: 102321; 102320; 200044

⁶ DEV 104350 and DEV 101370

because of the security situation and thus the analysis of the Somali refugee operations is limited⁷.

6. **Rationale.** The rationale for this CPE is to contribute and assist the Yemen CO in reviewing past performance and comparative advantages and to support its efforts to define the strategy for future WFP activities in the country. The evaluation was undertaken at this point in time to provide input and insights into the preparation of a new CP operation expected to take place in 2011. Furthermore, this CPE precedes the finalization of a new UNDAF that should contribute to the development and roll out of the fourth National Development Plan (2011 – 2015).

7. **Objectives.** Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, this evaluation 1) assesses and reports whether or not the performance and results of the CO portfolio are in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Yemen (accountability) and 2) determines the reasons for observed success/failure and draws lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about strategic partnerships, operational design, and implementation (learning). The relative emphasis is placed on learning, in line with the rationale for this evaluation and with the interest of the key stakeholder groups.

8. **Key Questions for the Evaluation.** The evaluation focused on three key questions:

- **Strategic alignment of the WFP portfolio.** The sub-questions were: Is WFP Yemen's portfolio aligned with country's humanitarian and developmental agenda, the needs and priorities, of the Government and its partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs? Have there been any trade-offs between aligning with national strategies and WFP strategic plans and corporate policies?
- **Making strategic choices.** The sub-questions were: Did WFP Yemen analyze the national hunger, food security, and nutrition issues or use existing analyses to understand the key hunger challenges in the country in making programming decision? Did WFP contribute to putting hunger, food security, and nutrition issues on the national agenda, advocate for inclusion to national and partner strategies, and build national capacity? In what ways did WFP position itself as a strategic partner with government, multilateral, bilateral, and NGO partners? What were the underlying factors that were the drivers of WFP's strategy?
- **Performance and results of the WFP portfolio.** The sub-questions were: How did the operations perform and what did they achieve in terms of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability⁸? Were there synergistic and multiplying effects across similar activities in different operations? Were there operational synergistic and multiplying effects between WFP activities and those of partners (multilateral, bilateral, and NGOs)?

9. **Methodology:** The evaluation team accepted the very ambitious terms of reference and worked through the equally challenging country context with the support of the CO team. The onset of demonstrations for and against the government made the task more difficult and restricted travel. To assess the performance of the portfolio, the CPE team relied on qualitative data from interviews with a wide range of respondents and the team used available data from

⁷ Another planned impact evaluation covering food assistance to Somali refugees in protracted situations mitigated the extent to which the evaluation needed to focus on these operations.

⁸ The analysis of question 3 is organized according to i. beneficiaries and assistance provided, ii. attaining objectives, and iii. contribution to national humanitarian objectives, with a cross-cutting focus on the factors affecting the results and this analysis is summarized by the DAC criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability) in the conclusion section.

secondary sources, especially the 2010 CFSS and WFP monitoring data. The team carried out a literature review and attended a briefing session in WFP headquarters interviews in Rome and followed the evaluation matrix developed and presented in Annex 4 of this report.

10. Data collection was based on interviews and focus group discussions, literature review and secondary data analysis, as well as on observations of institutions and beneficiaries in Sa'adah, Sana'a, Raimah and Hodeida. Our fieldwork included open-ended but structured interviews with key informants and a few focus group discussions with specific target groups. The team structured its data collection around the issues of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. One major obstacle was the lack of outcome monitoring data from WFP operations. Lists of primary and secondary data sources are presented in Annexes 2 and 3.

11. **Quality Assurance:** The evaluation started with the recruitment of an experienced and competent CPE team. The WFP provided excellent orientation to the team both in Rome and in Yemen. In most areas of investigation, information was limited but triangulating through daily exchange of up to the minute meeting reports, twice daily team meetings, and regular interactions with WFP CO staff enabled the team to form what we considered a fair picture of the portfolio.

12. **Intended Users.** The intended users of the evaluation are the Yemen CO and its partners in the Government of Yemen, as well as the United Nations Country and Humanitarian Team multilateral and bilateral donors, and NGOs. The evaluation informs:

- WFP about decisions regarding the strategic positioning of its operations in the future and adjusting programmes to the extent necessary, and the development of new CP in 2011;
- The government to support its policy agenda in the country and work toward improved ownership and coordinated policies and activities;
- The UNCT as it finalizes its new UNDAF in 2011;
- Relevant multi- and bi-lateral donors about the performance and results of activities that it funds, including health/nutrition, food or cash/vouchers for education, and food or cash/vouchers--for-work/-training, which can help determine whether and how these programmes can complement health, education, and food security and rural development strategies.

1.2. Country Context

13. This section presents critical aspects of the social and economic context and events in Yemen from 2006 to 2010 that have shaped WFP's mission and country portfolio.

14. **Overview.** Despite its potentially strategic location and significant mineral resources, Yemen continues to struggle with high levels of poverty and unemployment. Population density is high and the rate of population increase sufficient to overwhelm efforts to generate jobs for the large number of educated and uneducated youth in the country. The economy, aside from petroleum extraction is in great part agricultural and pastoral. Nearly 70 percent of Yemen's population of approximately 24 million live in rural areas and mainly make their living by subsistence cultivation, herding, and/or fishing⁹. Locally produced cereals are generally eaten or sold for consumption within Yemen. Qat production provides the principal cash crop as well as significant rural employment. Apart from the petroleum sector, industries are very limited.

⁹ 2010 Yemen MDG Report

15. **Poverty and Level of Development.** Yemen's economy has been based on oil for several decades, with a corresponding redistribution through extensive subsidy schemes and civil service salaries¹⁰. However, oil reserves are dwindling and are expected to be exhausted in 10-12 years. Yemen's need to diversify its national income is challenged by dwindling resources, especially water, high unemployment rates, low literacy levels, and several governance issues. In its third five year Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (2005-2010), the government adopted several austerity measures to control the budget deficit in the face of declining oil revenue. Of particular concern are partial cutbacks in fuel subsidies that came at a time of food price increases; the combined effect leading to greater food insecurity throughout the country.

16. Food price increases in 2008 led to food shortages throughout many regions of the country and a corresponding WFP response in general food distribution. While prices have decreased since, food security remains a major challenge because of the high dependency of imported food commodities (90 percent of rice and 100 percent of wheat is imported¹¹). Indeed many poor households are partially reliant on government transfers, including through the government's Social Welfare Fund¹², to meet their daily food basket needs. There remain many potential efficiency gains in the government safety net programmes¹³; these issues combined with reduced government revenue have limited the effectiveness of these programmes in reducing poverty.

17. Total public expenditure on social services has declined to 7 percent of GDP as of 2006, excluding fuel subsidies, and this is evident in the poor progress against key poverty-relevant indicators. Nationally, over 40 percent of Yemenis live under the poverty line with recent projected increases in poverty rates due to the food/fuel/finance crisis of 2008/9¹⁴. There are significant equity issues with respect to poverty; rural areas, where over 75 percent of the population lives, have the greatest severity of poverty and highest poverty gap index and progress against poverty in rural areas have been far less than urban areas¹⁵. The World Bank statistics indicate that poverty in Yemen at the level of US\$1.25/day has risen from 4.53 percent in 1992 to 17.53 percent in 2005 and at the US\$2/day level (closest to government standard) from 15.42 percent to 46.6 percent (see Table 1).

TABLE 1: POVERTY STATISTICS: POVERTY LINES, GAP, AND HEADCOUNT RATIOS

	1992	1998	2005
Poverty gap at US\$1.25 a day (PPP) (percent)	1.36	3	4.18
Poverty gap at US\$2 a day (PPP) (percent)	4.42	11.09	14.76
Poverty gap at national poverty line (percent)		13.2	
Poverty gap at rural poverty line (percent)		14.7	
Poverty gap at urban poverty line (percent)		8.2	
Poverty headcount ratio at US\$1.25 a day (PPP) (percent of population)	4.53	12.88	17.53
Poverty headcount ratio at US\$2 a day (PPP) (percent of population)	15.42	36.35	46.6
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (percent of population)		41.8	
Poverty headcount ratio at rural poverty line (percent of rural population)		45	
Poverty headcount ratio at urban poverty line (percent of urban population)		30.8	

Source: World Databank, Millennium Development Goals Database

¹⁰ 2009 World Bank/IFC Country Assistance Strategy.

¹¹ 2010 Yemen MDG Report.

¹² Support by donor (World Bank, EC) funds.

¹³ Yemen Poverty Assessment. 2007.

¹⁴ IFPRI Discussion Paper 00955: Impacts of the triple global crisis on growth and poverty in Yemen.

¹⁵ 2010 Yemen MDG Report

18. **Natural Disasters.** Over the past 20 years the main and most frequent natural disaster has been floods. Since 1991 there have been 9 significant floods, with five flood events affecting at almost 250,000 people (see Table 2). Although a less frequent occurrence, seismic activity was recorded in 1991 that affected 40,000 people.

TABLE 2: RECENT NATURAL DISASTERS IN YEMEN AND ESTIMATION OF PEOPLE AFFECTED

Year	Natural Disasters	People Affected
1996	Flood	138,110
1991	Earthquake (seismic Activity)	40,039
1991	Flood	30,000
2008	Flood	25,064
1993	Flood	21,500
1999	Flood	19,750
1996	Flood	5,000
1998	Flood	3,000
2006	Flood	2,000
2007	Flood	2,000

Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED international disaster database

19. **Civil Insecurity.** There are several tensions that have led to a high level of sustained civil insecurity in Yemen, namely issues related to the reunification of the northern and southern parts of the country and rural-urban tension that is grounded in traditional versus modern values and traditional versus democratic governance systems. The conflict in the Sa'adah region of the north, for example, has created a significant humanitarian emergency with more than 300,000 people displaced from their homes over the past five years. In addition, Yemen has granted prima facie status to Somali refugees and so the refugee population in the south western Aden region and urban areas of Yemen has continued to increase, with many secondary impacts on host communities throughout Yemen. Civil insecurity, as part of the current wave of protests across the Middle East, has also reached Yemen.

20. **Food Insecurity.** Food insecurity is unevenly distributed amongst the population of Yemen, with those in rural regions and especially the upper highlands in the north and near the Red Sea coast the most food insecure¹⁶. Overall 31.5 percent of the population is considered food insecure, with limited access to sufficient and nutritious food and who are eating a poor or borderline diet by international standards. 11.8 percent overall are considered severely food insecure. This is a conservative estimate given the lack of access to some governorates in the northern region, which are known to have high levels of poverty and poor markets. The average rural diet is poorly balanced, and micronutrient deficiencies are especially high in rural areas. Food insecurity is highest among rural, non-farm households, livestock farmers and especially among wage labourers in both urban and rural areas¹⁷.

21. **Government Strategy and Capacity.** The Government adopted a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for the period of 2003 – 2005, which was followed by a Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction that covered the period of 2006 – 2010. These plans focused on 1) promoting good governance; 2) ensuring strong and sustainable growth; 3) developing human capital; 4) improving living conditions of vulnerable groups; and 5) restoring and safeguarding ecosystems.

¹⁶ CFSS 2010.

¹⁷ See the CFSS 2010 for more details on all food security indicators.

22. The Government has developed, or worked with partners to develop, policies and programmes in key sectors such as health, nutrition, and food security. For health, a health reform strategy adopted in 2000 aims to improve the performance of the health sector through decentralization (including the development of District Health Systems and community co-management). It also seeks to clarify the role of the public sector, develop an essential drugs policy and realign the logistics system. Finally it calls for the adoption of an outcome-based management system with an integrated focus on gender, inter-sectoral cooperation and increased participation by the private sector and NGOs. For nutrition, in 2010 the Ministry of Public Health developed a national nutrition strategy, which identifies appropriate nutritional interventions, adopts practical approaches, and defines actions to guide nutrition interventions while clarifying the roles and responsibilities of government and partners. In early 2010 a National Food Security Strategy (NFSS) was developed with the assistance of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). This strategy suggests setting clear goals to be achieved by 2015 and 2020, such as to double macro food security and to cut household level food insecurity and child malnutrition by half. The next phase of the strategy development will assess the options on how to achieve these goals by prioritizing policies and investments in the fields of growth, trade and transport agriculture, water and fisheries and public health and education. WFP participated in the development of the new NFSS that has been formally adopted by the government cabinet. The European Commission (EC) has agreed to fund the work by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and IFPRI to develop the implementation and investment strategies required to make the NFSS into a set of successful actions.

23. Constraining the implementation of government strategies in Yemen is the generally weak capacity of the government to plan, coordinate, manage, and implement initiatives in key sectors such as health, education, and food security (especially agriculture and rural development). Interviews during the inception and final phases of the evaluation repeatedly highlighted the weak capacity within government and that resources were insufficient for government agencies to carry out their mandates.

24. **Agriculture and Rural Development.** Agricultural land area in Yemen is estimated at about 1.3 million hectares, which is 2.0 percent of the country's territory. Total cultivated areas have not increased significantly since 1970, ranging from 1.1 to 1.3 million hectares depending on rainfall. Moreover, traditional forms of agriculture seem to experience declining productivity, including the abandonment of water-harvesting techniques and poor maintenance of traditional agricultural terraces. At the same time, land productivity is also falling because of salinization and soil erosion. Large yield gaps compared with neighbouring countries suggest that there is potential for productivity-led agricultural growth.

25. Agricultural growth in Yemen has been idiosyncratic and food production on a per capita basis has not increased over the evaluation period. While total growth in agriculture averaged 3.0 percent in 2000–06¹⁸ continued rapid population growth has meant no agricultural growth on a per capita basis. Moreover, agricultural growth fell to below one percent in the years since 2004, which further underlines the big challenges facing agriculture in Yemen. Major challenges include the sector's high dependence on rainfall and the generally harsh natural conditions, especially increasing water scarcity.

26. **Health and Nutrition.** Yemen has one of the highest child malnutrition rates in the world with <5 wasting and stunting at 13.2 percent and 55.7 percent respectively¹⁹. Infant and <5 child mortality are among the highest in the region at 53/1000 and 69/1000 respectively²⁰.

¹⁸ MOAI 2009.

¹⁹ Yemen Comprehensive Food Security Survey. 2010.

²⁰ 2008. Data available from www.childinfo.org

The maternal mortality rate, at 370²¹ is also the highest in the region and partially due to high rates of early marriage and inadequate maternal and child health awareness and facility access. Poor access to safe water, at 66 percent nationally, and improved sanitation, at 46 percent nationally, are contributing factors to malnutrition, morbidity, and mortality rates. The total fertility rate in Yemen, at 6.2 children per woman²², is among the highest in the world. In the particularly onerous context of rural Yemen – isolated, arid, poor, with few if any government services available – the impact of hunger is manifested rapidly as malnutrition among the more vulnerable members of the community.

27. **Education.** The Yemeni constitution stipulates that educational opportunities should be equitably available for all citizens. A number of complex issues – high population growth, a dispersed population in small rural communities, difficult terrain, and prolonged conflict in the north – has mitigated progress against this goal. Illiteracy rates remain high at 47.2 percent nationally (25.7 percent in urban areas and 54 percent in rural areas) and the primary net enrolment rate was projected to be 69.8 percent in 2008 (projected from 2004 survey data)²³. These rates are only slightly improved from earlier measurements. The net primary school enrolment ratio for males is approximately 79 percent, while for females it was 66 percent²⁴. Primary attendance rates during the same period were 75 percent for males and 64 percent for females. It is important to note that among many WFP target communities, especially Sa’adah IDPs and Somali refugees, these rates are significantly lower.

28. **Humanitarian Situation and International Assistance.** Yemen’s political and administrative systems have in the past hampered its access to development financing from mainly western donors. Its support of Iraq during the first Gulf War and its prior acrimonious relationship with Saudi Arabia caused an overall decline in foreign assistance, from US\$700 million in the 1990s to US\$350 million in 2006. Only recently, with national efforts for governance reform and anti-terrorism initiatives, have donor pledges increased. Yet, overall international assistance remains on average one-third that of other Least Developed Countries²⁵.

TABLE 3: TOP 10 DONORS TO YEMEN (2008-09 AVERAGE)

	US\$ million
IDA	128
Germany	75
Arab countries	65
Japan	36
United Kingdom	35
Netherlands	34
United States	26
EU institutions	21
Arab institutions	16
Italy	12

Source: OECD, World Bank

²¹ 2003-2008 unadjusted. www.childinfo.org

²² 2003 Yemen Family Health Survey

²³ Yemen MDG Report 2010.

²⁴ UNICEF Yemen Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey data. www.childinfo.org

²⁵ DFID Evaluation Report EV706. Evaluation of DFID country programmes: Yemen. 2010.

29. Net ODA was US\$500 million in 2009, with the majority going to the economic infrastructure, the education sector and humanitarian assistance. International development assistance (UN agencies, World Bank, etc.) is the greatest contributor, while bilaterals such as Germany, the Arab countries, Japan and the UK also contribute significant funds each year (see Table 3). Major donors include the USA, UN Agencies, the EU, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia, and individual European countries (e.g., Italy, France, Germany, etc.).

1.3. WFP's Portfolio in Yemen

30. **Overview of WFP in Yemen.** WFP has been present in Yemen since 1967, providing over US\$500 million in food aid and assistance. Generally the interventions have addressed food insecurity and acute malnutrition and more recently its focus has expanded to include chronic hunger and malnutrition issues. Figure 1 summarizes the timeline and budget for the operations since 2002 – 2010.

31. **Portfolio:** The evaluation covers the WFP portfolio from 2006 – 2010. Since 2006, WFP Yemen has implemented 12 operations, 4 of which are ongoing. Operations include EMOPs, PRROs, DEV/CPs, and one SO building logistics capacity. The actual budget of WFP operations over this five-year period is approximately US\$150 million, with ongoing projects receiving additional money in the 2011 and 2012 budgets.

32. Table 4 provides an overview of the budget for each type of operation covered by the evaluation. In 2006 and 2007 the total budget was between US\$6 million and US\$8 million, expanding rapidly in 2008 and 2009 to US\$17.6 million and US\$30.8 million respectively. Notably, the rapid increase is due in large part to increased scale and funding of EMOPs in response to the FFF crisis and Sa'adah conflict. Between 2006 and 2009, the amount of funding allocated to EMOPs grew from US\$0 to US\$25 million.

33. Table 5 provides an overview of food distribution by project type. The country programmes received the largest share between 2006 and 2008, with emergency operations surpassing it at this point. Total food distribution expanded greatly in 2009 and 2010. The vast majority of additional food distribution went to support the FFF crisis and Sa'adah EMOPs, consistent with increased scale of need and funding.

FIGURE 1: TIMELINE AND FUNDING LEVEL OF YEMEN PORTFOLIO 2006-2010

Operation	Country Programme - Yemen (2002-2007)	Time Frame	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
DEV 10137	Country Programme - Yemen (2002-2007)	Jun 02 Dec 06	Req: \$45.4 Contrib: \$33.6									
DEV 10435	Country Programme - Yemen (2007-2011)	Jan 07 Dec 11						Req: \$80.5 Contrib: \$20.5			2011	
PRRO 10232	Food Assistance for Refugees	May 03 Jan 08		Req: \$3.8 Contrib: \$3.2								
PRRO 10232.1	Food Assistance to Somali Refugees in Yemen	Feb 08 Jan 10						Req: \$4.7 Contrib: \$4.8				
PRRO 200044	Food Assistance to Somali Refugees in Yemen	Feb 10 Dec 11								2011	Req: \$7.0 Contrib: \$3.1	
EMOP 10675	Assistance to IDPs in Sa'ada Governorate	Jun 07 Sep 07						\$0.5	\$0.4			
EMOP 10684	Humanitarian Assistance to IDPs in Sa'ada Governorate	Sep 07 Jun 10						Req: \$33.8 Contrib: \$24.7				
EMOP 10794	Immediate Response Emergency Operation Support to people affected by floods	Oct 08 Jan 09							Req: \$0.5 Contrib: \$0.4			
EMOP 10806	Food Assistance to Flood Affected Persons in Eastern Yemen	Mar 09 Jan 10								Req: \$3.9 Contrib: \$2.1		
EMOP 10767	Targeted Food Support to Vulnerable Groups Affected by High Food Prices	May 09 Dec 10								Req: \$ 61.2 Contrib: \$30.4		
EMOP 200039	Food Assistance to Conflict-Affected Persons in Northern Yemen	Jul 10 Jul 11								2011	Req: \$47.9 Contrib: \$0.4	
SO 200130	Air Passenger Service and Logistics Cluster Coordination in Support of the Humanitarian Response in Sa'ada	May 10 May 2011								2011	Req: \$0.9 contrib: \$0.4	
	Food Distributed* (MT)		0	17660	25085	24689	19781	11410	14455	46419	126714.77***	
	Direct Expenses** (USD, millions)		n.a.	n.a.	7.6	7.6	7.9	6.5	12.8	26.6	n.a.	
	% Direct Expenses: Yemen vs. World		0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.4%	0.7%	n.a.	
	Beneficiaries* (actual, thousands)		M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	
			0 0	339.4 338.4	514.2 512.6	599.2 596.8	591.1 592.6	336 340.388	359.62 355.977	791.3 785.19	3524	

TABLE 4: WFP FUNDING (US\$) BY PROJECT TYPE AND YEAR

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total CP	6,885,547	4,385,975	8,605,478	4,028,311	3,556,072
Total PRRO	653,437	1,118,334	2,534,025	1,659,897	2,969,805
Total EMOP	0	989,682	6,469,369	25,067,325	32,311,198
Total Funding	7,538,984	6,493,991	17,608,872	30,755,533	38,837,075

Source: WFP CO and Project Documents


TABLE 5: FOOD AID DELIVERED IN YEMEN 2006–2010 IN METRIC TON (MT) PER FOOD AID TYPE

Programme Type	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total
CP	18,436	7,806	6,288	12,613	5,868	51,011
PRRO	1,344	1,738	1,946	2,719	3,417	11,164
EMOP	0	1,860	6,219	31,088	50,691	89,858
Total	19,780	11,404	14,453	46,420	59,976	152,033

Source: WFP CO and project documents

34. **Resource Flows.** The relative share of donor contribution to the WFP operations during the 2006 – 2010 period is illustrated in Figure 2, there were relatively fewer donors in the early part of the period under evaluation and the size of the Yemen portfolio was US\$ 7,538,984. In contrast, in 2010 there was a dramatic increase in the number of donors and a significance increase in funding (US\$38,649,169).

FIGURE 2: 2006 AND 2010 DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS



35. **Special Operations.** During the period of the evaluation there was one SO that provided air passenger services and the logistics cluster contribution in support of the humanitarian response in Sa'adah. The objective of this SO (SO 200130) is to provide WFP, as the Logistics Cluster lead and custodian of the United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS), the ability to implement its food assistance operations and support the efforts of the humanitarian community to respond to the crisis in Yemen. This SO provides the assets, staff, and systems necessary to: 1) enhance the predictability, timeliness and efficiency of the emergency response under the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) cluster approach and 2) facilitate the access of humanitarian personnel and light cargo to the affected areas and ensure operational continuity. This SO was initially designed for six months, from 24 May to 23 November 2010, at a total cost of US\$ 530,634, and has been extended over time.

36. **Key External Events.** The key external events from 2005 through 2010 that led to significant changes in WFP operations can be divided into two types: civil insecurity in Somalia and Yemen and the global FFF crisis. Civil insecurity pertains to the continued influx of Somali (and other) refugees as well as the ongoing Sa'adah conflict which has generated over 350,000 internally displaced people (IDPs). To address the needs of Somali refugees, WFP has continued the series of PRROs that began in 1992 to provide rations and nutritional supplements to those in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) camps and reception centres. To address IDPs from Sa'adah, WFP has supported IDP camps with food rations through two EMOPs. Second, the global FFF crisis of 2007 – 2008 led to a dramatic increase in food prices in Yemen. While this crisis affected the entire Yemeni population, poor and rural poor households were disproportionately affected. The cash payments by the Government SWF were inadequate in distribution and scope to cover the emergency caloric and nutritional needs of the population, including targeted malnourished groups and thus the WFP responded with an emergency food security operation (EMOP 10767).

37. **Overview of the CO's Analytical Work.** The Yemen CO has a solid assessment and analytical capacity located in the CO, composed of technical experts in the M&E and the vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) unit. Some of the analytical work is done internally within the WFP CO, and some is done with partners. The analytical work includes:

- **Standard Project Reports:** These internal reports are completed annually for each operation to describe the operation's objectives, results (beneficiaries reached, outputs, outcomes, and progress toward sustainability and capacity development), inputs (resources from donors, government, and partners, food purchases, transport, and post-delivery losses), management (partnerships and lessons learned), statistics (resources from donors and commodity transactions), and financial details. These reports can help to evaluate progress of operations over time.
- **Joint assessment mission (JAM):** JAMs are jointly organized by UNHCR and WFP to understand the situation, profiles, and needs of refugees, IDPs, and host populations, with particular regard to food security and nutrition. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between UNHCR and WFP signed in July 2002, and updated since, forms the basis of UNHCR-WFP collaboration. The most recent JAM was in 2009.
- **CFSS:** A CFSS was carried out in 2009 and published in 2010 that provides an in-depth picture of the food security situation and the vulnerability of households in Yemen. The objective of the CFSS was to guide WFP's interventions in 2010 – 2011, informing Yemen's Humanitarian Response Plan 2010 and providing a potential basis for improved geographic and socio-economic targeting of the most food-insecure people. Data from the CFSS formed the basis for WFP activities included in the UN's Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) plan for 2010 and 2011.
- **M&E:** The M&E Unit is expanding the amount and quality of data and information that is captured and made available for routine and ad hoc analysis. One-off assessment reports are led by this unit.

2. Evaluation Findings

38. The evaluation findings are organized according to the three areas of focus for the key evaluation questions²⁶, as follows:

- **Alignment and strategic positioning of the WFP portfolio**
- **Making strategic choices**
- **Performance and results of the WFP portfolio**

2.1 Alignment and Strategic Positioning

Alignment with Government Policies

39. All WFP programmes are authorized by two MOU with the government. The first is with the WFP's official counterpart agency, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (Planning and international Cooperation), led by the Deputy Prime Minister. The second is with the technical ministry which oversees the direct implementation of the programme: the Ministry of Education for the WFP Food for Education operations; the Ministry of Health for the WFP nutrition activities, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour for the WFP safety net activities, and the Executive Unit of the Ministry of the House of Representatives and the Shura for the WFP operations addressing food security for IDPs in the north.

40. The WFP's planning and implementation modalities are highly integrated with the GoY. The WFP response to the emergencies for the IDPs in Sa'adah and to the victims of the floods in Eastern Yemen (Hadramaut and Al Mahrah) came immediately when the government asked for the agency's help. The other programmes (education, nutrition, safety net, etc.) were planned jointly with the relevant government ministries. The evaluation team met key stakeholders in these ministries who confirmed the joint planning and implementation of these programmes.

41. The WFP has participated in the preparation of the official government positions, policies and priorities for the areas of key WFP interventions which are embodied in a series of key planning and strategy documents. These documents include:

- National Food Security Strategy 2010 (NFSS)
- National Nutrition Strategy 2010
- Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (DPPR) 2006-2010, and 2011-2015
- Public Investment Plan (PIP) – 2011-2015
- Women's Development Strategy 2006-2015
- National General Education Development Strategy (review May 2010)

42. Generally, the evaluation team found that there is a high degree of integration and government ownership of WFP operations at the national level, which dissipates somewhat in the lower and more remote levels of government. The integration of WFP strategy into government structures at the national and sub-national levels is a complex issue. Ownership requires a willingness to actively engage and coordinate, by both the WFP and the Government of Yemen. While other agencies (World Bank, European Commission, IFPRI, etc.) have played a more direct capacity building role in supporting the government to develop key sector strategies and to discuss key policy and priority-setting issues in the food security and nutrition sectors, WFP staff have participated in discussions and have offered critical comments on draft policy

²⁶ See page 3 or Annex 1 (TOR) for the evaluation sub-questions.

papers and planning documents. This was the case most recently for the development of the NFSS and the National Nutrition Strategy, both in 2010. These documents reflect rational policy options for Yemen and WFP operations support the achievement of their objectives.

43. WFP/Yemen operations are in line with and support the main policy directions of these documents. There are a few small points of potential divergence:

- The NFSS and the DPPRs call for the use of cash in poverty alleviation and disaster mitigation programmes. They do not mention food distributions. Other donors such as the World Bank and the European Union (EU) maintain that food is available in Yemen. Most food is imported, but the commercial sector is efficient at ensuring supplies. According to the evaluation team discussions, these donors thus feel that general distribution can have a market distortion effect, counteracting other rural development initiatives. These stakeholders would prefer to see cash-based interventions that would support the development of the currently thin markets rather than their distortion. WFP maintains that in many remote and/or insecure parts of the country, food supplies do not arrive reliably and infusions of cash into local markets would cause inflation in food prices. There is also some concern about the use of cash for non-food purchases, such as qat.
- The evaluation team observed that several government agencies (e.g. Sa'adah governorate, Executive Unit, Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, Ministry of Public Health) prefer general food distributions as opposed to targeted ones, e.g. all the needy in Sa'adah province as opposed to registered IDPs only, or all pregnant and lactating mothers and children as opposed to only moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) sufferers. This approach seems based on the difficulty of identifying the truly needy in a country where most are poor and on the political problems implied in including certain classes of potential beneficiaries (e.g. government officials or members of the army).

44. Overall, WFP operations and government priorities are well-aligned in the areas of rapid emergency response. The government as requested the WFP to support efforts to relieve suffering from dramatic shocks including from the Houthi wars in the North and the seasonal floods in Hadramaut and Al-Mahra Governorates. The government and the WFP CO discussed the impact of the sudden rise in international food prices in 2008 and 2009 and agreed on key hunger areas for which food assistance would provide vital support for the neediest and most vulnerable population groups. The WFP targeted operations in this response utilize the Social Welfare Fund (SWF) beneficiary lists (lists of those low income households who currently received social cash transfers from the Government and the evaluation team heard from Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour stakeholders who indeed valued the WFP's validation of its current SWF beneficiary lists.

45. The WFP has also aligned with and supported the government policy work through its data/analytic contributions. The government is finalizing the national food security and nutrition strategies and the WFP CFSS of 2010 has contributed to these strategies through identification of food insecure demographics and geographic locations and through an updated situational analysis against key indicators. Key stakeholders confirmed the value of this contribution in an environment where it is extremely difficult to gather survey data throughout much of the country; the CFSS data collection effectively validated the simulation models used by IFPRI, and other key stakeholders, in developing the national food security and nutrition strategies.

WFP's Participation in and Contribution to Aid Coordination

46. The UNCT in Yemen follows two key programme documents:

- UNDAF 2007-2011
- The Consolidated Appeals (CAPs) of 2010 and 2011

47. WFP Yemen has adjusted the timing of its development operations to coincide with the UNDAF, with Develop Projects (DEV) 10137 ending a year early in order to align its development activities under DEV 10435 starting in 2007. During stakeholder interviews with the UNCT, the evaluation team found that the WFP humanitarian operations are perceived as well founded, justified by solid research and data (mostly from the CFSS), and thus the WFP is able to leverage the CAP to secure humanitarian funding through both analytic work and strategic positioning on humanitarian issues. All the operations proposed by the WFP under emergency priority for both 2010 and 2011 were included in the CAPs for those two years. WFP has consistently received more funding under the CAP than have other UN agencies, partially reflecting the scale of humanitarian need and food insecurity and partially reflecting the WFP's ability to justify the need for humanitarian operations.

48. There are two issues that were observed by the evaluation team:

- **Definitions of humanitarian versus development interventions:** Initially, WFP put its FFE programmes in the CAP, as emergency requirements to help solve the gender education gap in Yemen. At the mid-year review of the 2010 CAP, the FFE programme was removed and placed more appropriately under the UNDAF rubric, along with other development operations.
- **Balancing humanitarian and development operations:** The WFP has a corporate mandate to carry out both emergency humanitarian and transitional/early recovery/development work. The WFP Yemen operations have weighted far more heavily on the former mandate than on the latter. Given the scale and number of emergencies in Yemen – the Houthi Wars, the refugee crisis from Somalia, the FFF crisis, etc. – this is expected. Several of the emergency operations in Yemen have early recovery/transitional activities written into their design, but conditions have not permitted their implementation. However, according to some key stakeholders it is debatable whether many chronic issues, e.g. food insecurity, are best mitigated through emergency programming or whether longer-term development solutions are needed.

49. The evaluation team found a mixed-picture of the WFP coordination amongst some donors and individual UN agencies. UNHCR and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) consider the WFP an excellent partner which coordinates well with them in the field and in Sana'a. The WFP leads or co-leads two of the IASC clusters (Food Security and Agriculture (with FAO) and Logistics). The World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), however, felt that the WFP needed to work more closely, both technically and geographically, with their programmes in the nutrition and education sectors. The working relationship with these agencies was however better with respect to the IDP and refugee camp operations.

Several donors felt that the WFP stand-alone development programmes, especially the FFE THR activities, were less effective as WFP limits itself to food distribution when the pipeline is intact and does not concern itself with designing a more inclusive programme with other organizations, such as UNICEF or WHO. Given the number of pipeline breaks and poor funding for these FFE and nutrition activities, the evaluation team observed that this was likely a missed opportunity to maintain continuity with beneficiary communities and take advantage of the synergies from partner activities. USAID, a major donor to WFP in Yemen, suggested that it

would consider funding the WFP for shock-generated EMOPs, such as that for IDPs in the Sa'adah region but that the WFP does not provide the reporting that the US government requires to justify longer-term investments. Department for International Development (DfID) expressed a similar viewpoint.

Geographic Targeting

50. Key stakeholders, such as The Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, and the Planning and international Cooperation, have consulted with the WFP CO about the regions of the country where nutritional assistance is most required and where girls' school enrolment and attendance lags the most. The WFP selection of governorates and districts reflects Government perceptions and data about regional poverty. The WFP's choice of priority geographic areas, since 2009/10, has been based on the CFSS 2010 analysis of food insecurity and vulnerability. The evaluation team found that the government geographical preferences have generally been aligned with the CFSS analysis.

WFP Portfolio Activities in Relation to Government of Yemen Sectoral Strategies

51. **Education:** The WFP education portfolio is limited to the FFE activities of the DEV/CP and school feeding with the refugee operations. In 2006-7, this was the most important element in WFP/Yemen's portfolio but its importance has since diminished, in light of the emergencies, e.g. IDPs in the north, floods and high food prices, which have taken the attention of both WFP and donors.

52. Nonetheless, the evaluation team found that the Ministry of Education local government officials as well as parents at the WFP beneficiary schools feel that these education activities are of key importance to help Yemen overcome its quite dramatic gender gap in education. Key Ministry of Education stakeholders stated categorically in interviews that they want to maintain the FFE programme's exclusive attention to girls' education, even though several donors suggested broadening the programme to include boys. In this sense, the WFP FFE programming is more closely aligned with the priorities of the government than necessarily those of donors.

53. **Nutrition:** The WFP nutrition programme responds directly to government guidance. The government is very conscious of the danger that under-nutrition poses for its most vulnerable citizens: the rural poor, pregnant and lactating women and very high proportion of the nation's young children. Studies such as the CFSS have underlined the concentration of the under-nourished in rural areas and in certain districts of specific governorates. The WFP has responded by concentrating its food deliveries in the more remote and difficult to access areas of the country (as long as security permits). This choice reflects the guidance offered by the Government Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour /SWF and by the Ministry of Public Health and its sectoral offices for nutrition.

54. **Food Security:** The WFP CO participated actively in discussions which led to the NFSS of 2010. Food security is perhaps the major priority of the government, after territorial integrity and a significant factor in many other socio-cultural conflicts within Yemen. The NFSS emphasizes agricultural development, improvement in the use of water resources, and reduction in plantings of qat to improve food security and reduce the need for imported food commodities. The WFP in Yemen does not work in these areas of direct support to food production through agriculture; they are not carrying out standard WFP development programmes such as food/cash for work or food/cash for training. However, they make a direct contribution to temporary food security through their emergency programmes: EMOPs for Sa'adah and High Food Prices, PRROs for Somali refugees, nutritional programmes embedded in EMOPs and PRROs. Increased food security is an incidental effect of the FFE THRs, which amount to a conditional food transfer to families which send their daughters to school and keep them there.

55. The WFP includes food/cash for work and food/cash for training in some of its operational documents e.g. Sa'adah EMOP, new Safety Net PRRO, but during the period under evaluation, they have not carried out any of the planned activities. The WFP has obtained funding to undertake a small pilot project replacing food distributions with cash distributions under the new Safety Net PRRO and this will contribute to better aligning WFP's work with government sector priorities.

56. **Gender:** In general, the two WFP Gender policies are in conformity with the government Women's Development Strategy, which focuses on adopting development and economic policies that are gender sensitive and reducing poverty for rural/women-headed households. The government policies aim is to double the current percentage of paid working women and of working women in the agricultural sector; and reduce by half the unemployment percentage among women. In addition, the objective is to enhance women's economic independence by facilitating their access to resources, markets, trade, services, information and technology, while increasing women's participation in economic and developmental decision making positions.

57. The WFP's portfolio reflects both special attention to women (the former WFP policy) and equal attention to both genders (the current WFP policy). The FFE activities are targeted to primary and secondary girls and the targeted nutrition programmes focus upon pregnant and lactating mothers. Emergency food distributions make special arrangements for women-headed households; separate ration collection stations or separate collection lines are the preferred approaches to minimize risks of theft or harassment.

58. In a UN-led review of gender programming in Yemen, the WFP had the highest score among all UN agencies for paying constructive attention to gender issues in its operations and for targeting women as beneficiaries. This review measured the proportion of female beneficiaries in the various UN agency programmes and the proportion of resources devoted to women, also noting special measures, such as the separate ration distribution facilities for women which the WFP implements.

Government Ownership

59. The level of ownership achieved for WFP operation varies depending on the type of activity and corresponding government interlocutor. Through key stakeholder interviews, the evaluation team found a mix of perspectives on the WFP engagement, ownership issues, and capacity building approaches. The data collected was verified amongst different stakeholders relevant to the technical area and with WFP staff. Generally much depends upon the key leadership positions in government agencies and with the level of decentralization, e.g. administrative structures at lower levels are often more dependent on others for planning and reporting and have a different relationship with aid agencies than do those at national level. The WFP has had to balance issues of political process with political expediency to implement humanitarian programmes in a timely manner.

60. At every level, the Ministry of Education technical offices, governorate, district and school administration, the government strongly supports the FFE components of the CP. However, other key stakeholders in the Ministry of Education, while supportive of the activities, feel that they lack ownership of the programme. WFP has failed to include the Ministry of Education Girl's Education Department (GED) in its planning or implementation of the FFE operation. The designated Ministry of Education counterpart to the WFP for FFE, the School Feeding Department, officially control the operation but suggested that they were viewed as an aid recipient and only minimally included in the real decisions about activity planning, strategies, or evaluations. Their desire to participate more fully in all aspects of the planning, implementation and evaluation of the programme indicates their basic commitment to and feeling of ownership of the work. The ownership of the FFE operation in the governorates and districts is varied:

some stakeholders had similar views as the School Feeding Department, while others felt more integrated into the activities and their implementation.

61. While the Ministry of Public Health at its highest levels was observed by the evaluation team to have close involvement in the WFP operations that include nutrition interventions, other officials in the Nutrition Department and Governorate Health Offices, for example, suggested that they were more marginalized in the collaborative process. Some stakeholders suggested that the WFP distribution modalities did not allow for their suggestion modifications, e.g. providing sanitary containers for sub-divided ration allotments, or pre-prepared individualized packages. Some stakeholders noted that they felt unprepared to distinguish between the WFP activities, their nutrition objectives and implementation modalities; for example the difference between FFE take home rations and blanket general food distribution(GFD) rations given at the same distribution points to often the same community members.

62. The safety net activities, under the HFP EMOP (and in the new Safety Net PRRO) seem to have achieved total involvement and ownership by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour and the SWF. WFP/Yemen consulted with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour and the SWF on the choice of governorates and districts – this choice was informed by the CFSS of 2010 and the IFPRI study which preceded it – and chose beneficiaries from the SWF lists of those receiving an unconditional cash transfer as a government sponsored measure for poverty alleviation. During stakeholder interviews with Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour and SWF, the evaluation team confirmed the government personnel’s knowledge of and commitment to the WFP safety net interventions.

63. In general, government processes and structures are quite open for the WFP’s engagement. The government, led by Planning and international Cooperation has established a number of forums for the discussion of key policies and strategies. One of these was the development of the NFSS, in which WFP participated actively. Another forum, in which the WFP participated and which is hosted by the Ministry of Education, works on education policy and girls’ education strategies. WFP seems not to have participated in the working group established to develop the national nutrition policy, although its analytic work was used, and the WFP has been active in an external Chatham House discussion on nutrition policy in Yemen.

Coordination Mechanisms and Partnerships

64. The WFP is an active member of the UNCT and participates in the IASC cluster coordination. As discussed, the WFP, with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), chairs the Food Security and Agriculture cluster and leads the Logistics cluster, under which the WFP’s main responsibility is the planning and execution of UNHAS flights to Sa’adah. WFP also participates in other cluster discussions, including nutrition and education.

65. However, based on discussion with key stakeholders, WFP has mixed reputation for coordination and cooperation. WFP has participated in joint missions with OCHA and UNICEF to negotiate with the Houthi rebels for access to Sa’adah province for distribution of rations to IDPs. In the sub-offices, WFP participates in most cluster meetings, shares office space with UNHCR and UNICEF, and works closely with others in the refugee camps. While the WFP participates in cluster meetings in Sana’a and in discussions of policies and priorities for the UNCT and its relations with the Government, some stakeholders suggested that WFP acts wilfully and independently in the field, communicating little with other agencies and failing to take advantage of possible synergies. The WFP team in Yemen, however disputes this allegation, saying that the other agencies do not cooperate when the WFP seeks them out. In general, coordination was observed to be very good in the field (e.g. Haradh and Sa’adah city which the evaluation team made field visits).

66. WFP's cooperation with UN and bilateral partners is varied. While some UN stakeholders praised the WFP for its efforts to work cooperatively with other UN agencies, coordination seems to function well only under UNHCR leadership in the IDP camps in the North (e.g. Haradh) and in the camp for Somali refugees in Kharaz. Even where WFP and other UN agencies such as UNICEF or WHO work on related programmes in the same geographic area, there is little or no coordination or sharing of resources and ideas in the field. All donors appreciate WFP's logistics capacity and their ability to deliver food to the Sa'adah IDPs in spite of significant obstacles – bandits, tribes, predatory military units, and Houthi control of access roads. However, bilateral donors such as USAID, the EC, and DfID have shown reluctance to fund WFP development operations, partially due to WFP's reluctance to broaden the scope or partnership arrangements of the interventions.

67. The evaluation team did find evidence where the WFP partnership efforts have increased the efficiency and effectiveness of its counterparts. For example, the Safety Net (HFP) EMOP complemented the SWF cash distributions to ensure a satisfactory minimum ration for the poorest families in the areas where both Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour /SWF and the WFP work. Key Ministry of Public Health stakeholders stated that feeding for leprosy and TB patients increased the rate of attendance of patients and the cure-rate. Food distributions also increased attendance at health centres, according to local officials and district records, by pregnant and lactating women and contributed to improved antenatal care. In the north and for the Somali refugees in Kharaz, WFP food supplies complement services from other UN agencies and from NGOs which provide a wider range of essential services than a ration distribution. In these cases, work with partners generates additional benefits that would not be available from one programme alone. In the two Haradh IDP camps managed by UNHCR and entrusted to the daily supervision of Islamic Relief (an international non-governmental organization), UNICEF provides a women's centre, OXFAM and UNICEF provide water supplies, and *Medecins Sans Frontieres* has established a hospital for both IDPs and residents of the nearest town. In this context, WFP rations contribute very directly to an integrated improvement in the welfare of those who have fled the conflict in Sa'adah.

68. As discussed, in the education sector, the WFP has not established close coordination for the FFE THR programme with other UN agencies which work in the same technical or geographic area, such as UNICEF and its implementing partners, nor do their programmes work closely on the ground with other donor programmes, such as the nascent World Bank funded conditional cash transfer programme for keeping boys and girls in school. The FFE THR programme would benefit greatly in terms of its potential for impact and increased funding if these relationships were developed.

69. In the nutrition sector as in the education sector, WFP works closely with certain Government Ministry of Public Health agencies such as the Nutrition Department, but not with others, such as the Reproductive Health Department. The WFP nutrition work acts quite independently in the field, without establishing effective working relationships with other UNCT members like WHO or UNICEF. The evaluation team observed this in field visits, where, for example, WFP teams feeding MAM cases often worked in the same health facility as UNICEF teams feeding severe acute malnutrition cases but with little coordination or collaboration.

2.2. Making Strategic Choices

70. Based on stakeholder interviews and the evaluation team's observations, the WFP's strategic decisions, e.g. on planning new operations, modifying current operations, selection of partners, etc. are based first on responding to humanitarian shocks and, second, on addressing chronic problems as evidenced by both the WFP and partner generated data. A cross-cutting factor is the funding environment and related donor priorities. These effectively influence the

way in which operations are pitched and designed and to a certain extent drive the overall focus of the portfolio.

71. The evaluation team notes that the decision to purchase the majority of food commodities on the local market has enabled the WFP to respond quickly to the needs of the people and this, partially, has cemented their reputation as a rapid responder amongst the humanitarian agencies. The office has also established excellent working relationships with high-level government entities and individuals, allowing the operations to have excellent access throughout the country, including in the tightly controlled northern areas. This is perhaps an overlooked factor both driving and enabling strategic decisions on the WFP portfolio. Without this reputation and this staff/operational access, it's certain that the scale-up of the portfolio over the 2006-2010 period would not have been what it was.

72. The evaluation analyzed key three factors that underlie WFP's decision-making in terms of their effects on strategic choices as follows: funding, humanitarian emergencies, and the generation and use of data and evidence²⁷.

Funding

73. The evolving funding environment over the evaluation period was observed to have a major driving effect on the design of the operations and overall focus of the portfolio. There are both internal and external factors at work with respect to the changing nature of funding and the ability to secure funding for the WFP operations. In some respects, the evaluation team observed that internal strategic decisions have been made to increase the emergency focus of the portfolio in order to meet the scale of the humanitarian situation, rather than the external donor community pushing the WFP away from a development focus and into more humanitarian operations.

74. On the other hand, the WFP has made strategic decisions to address key issues through its emergency operations rather than through development operations because of the overall increase in ODA oriented to humanitarian needs. For example, the WFP reduced and eventually dropped its nutrition support activities from the development operation because of a lack of funding. The reduction in total rations (and in the periodicity of rations), an initial result of pipeline breaks, reduced the overall effectiveness (and perception thereof) of its nutrition activities. This in turn led to less enthusiasm on the part of donors. However, all data about malnutrition in Yemen points to the urgency of this work and the government supports food security and nutrition as major policy priorities. The WFP has now put its nutrition activities into its emergency operations, first in the HFP EMOP (10767) and now in the Safety Net PRRO (200038).

75. The political process of obtaining donor funds for operations is linked, in Yemen, to the specific perceptions about the nature of the humanitarian and development challenges in the country. The evaluation team heard from some stakeholders that believe many of the chronic issues such as food security, under-nutrition, inter-tribal conflict, etc. are best addressed through longer-term development operations. Other stakeholders address these challenges through a shorter-term humanitarian focus. The evaluation team concluded that the WFP's approach, that of framing such issues as humanitarian emergencies and with operations designed as such, has enabled the portfolio to obtain more funding, deliver more food, and reach more beneficiaries each year. There are, however, detractors, who stated that the sustainable solution to chronic problems lies in a different approach to working with beneficiaries and focusing on the broader livelihood, social infrastructure, etc. challenges.

²⁷ The evaluation assumes that analytical information can be used to make more informed decisions, develop response strategies, and improve the performance and results of the programmes.

76. WFP is now faced with a strategic choice about its FFE activities within the design of the next DEV/CP. Historically one of the centrepieces of WFP's development operations in Yemen, there is now inadequate funding, and perhaps interest, to support a meaningful scale of this operation in the field. Without a renewed and successful effort to identify sources of funds for FFE, the WFP has to consider whether or not to drop this long-standing and ostensibly successful programme. Yemen's on-going series of natural and political crises has distracted donor attention from FFE, while WFP's inability, to date, to join with other agencies to design a more integrated approach to improving (girls') access to education has further discouraged potential funders.

Humanitarian emergencies

77. The WFP has, according to key government and donor stakeholders, positioned itself as a leading agency for humanitarian response in Yemen. Partially this is a result of the funding environment and partially a result of deliberate strategic positioning of the portfolio in order to meet the scale of humanitarian needs throughout the country. Thus, the nature of the humanitarian emergencies and the evolving humanitarian situation on the ground have become key drivers of the WFP's strategic decision-making within the portfolio.

78. The continuing emergency situations, e.g. the conflict in the north, floods, high seasonal malnutrition rates and hunger caused by high food prices, are factors that have resulted in the scale up of the emergency aspect of the WFP portfolio. The evaluation team concluded that this is part of the general trend, within the development/humanitarian community, of increased focus on the situation in Yemen and not directly a result of a deterioration of the situation on the ground. For example, there were significantly more natural disasters prior to 2006 than since, and it is unlikely that the food security situation has gotten significantly worse since a decade ago. Indeed, many relevant indicators (per capita GDP, access to social services, gender equality, etc.) are generally the same or improving.

79. However three major humanitarian emergencies over the portfolio period have been the determining factors in the WFP's strategic changes in its portfolio. The first has been the start and continuance of the Houthi wars in the north, which is now a major focus of the WFP's operational resources. The second is the continually increasing number of Somali refugees arriving on the shores of Yemen. Since the Ethiopian invasion in 2007/8, there have been significantly more refugees arriving each month, over and above the long term trend. And third is the high food price crisis of 2008/9. Both national and international attention to the effects of this crisis in developing countries was a significant driver of the decision to focus on chronic food insecurity throughout the country. The initial emergency operation in response to the crisis has now led to a longer term PRRO addressing the more chronic issues.

80. Humanitarian emergencies thus have been a factor in both a reactive and opportunistic manner. The appropriate strategic decisions were made to respond to the IDP crisis in the north and the continuing refugee needs in the south. The food price shock of 2008 (and recently in late 2010/early 2011) were factors in an immediate response, but the WFP also used the opportunity created by increased awareness of chronic food insecurity issues on the part of donor to design and fund a longer term safety net operation.

Generation and use of data and evidence

81. The WFP does an excellent job of analyzing the issues facing Yemen in trying to deal with hunger, food security and nutrition. In addition, the evaluation team observed that the WFP's government interlocutors universally thanked the WFP for responding quickly and thoroughly to requests for information about their programmes and their beneficiaries. Placing issues of food insecurity, hunger and nutrition on the national agenda has been a significant contribution by the WFP, and was commended by key stakeholders during the evaluation. Primarily through

the use of evidence generated by the CFSS (see below), but also through participation and advocacy by senior management, the national food security strategy (NFSS) has focused on issues regarding access to food and overall availability of food commodities. It was noted through some stakeholder interviews that the WFP was very effective at ensuring these issues (proximate causes of food insecurity) were included in the strategy, rather than only a broader focus on livelihoods and income generation and rural development.

82. The WFP VAM unit in Rome, with support from the Yemen CO, carried out a seminal study to assess the food security status of the country: the CFSS. Based on primary data collected in 2009 and published early in 2010, the CFSS established firmly the critical nature of malnutrition and food insecurity in many parts of the country. The CO quickly planned and implemented an EMOP (10767) to provide rations and nutritional supplements to vulnerable groups. As the CFSS revealed that the food security status of many Yemenis affected by high food prices was acute, the CO planned and sought funding for a follow-on operation (PRRO 200038, which is currently running) to try to limit the impact of moderate acute malnutrition on families during the 'hunger season' and on infants and on pregnant and lactating mothers. In this key example, the WFP's own generation of valuable evidence on food insecurity throughout the country was a key factor driving its own operational planning, and indeed contributing to the wider evidence base on this issue in Yemen. The 2010 CFSS is recognized by the GoY, the UNCT and the donor community as a key basis for understanding Yemen's needs and problems in this regard.

83. The WFP's monitoring and evaluation system is generally focused on output level data, e.g. the office has good records of food distribution (tonnage and costs) and beneficiaries²⁸. However, the monitoring of outcomes was noted by the evaluation team to be quite limited. For example, data on girls' enrolment in and attendance at school, as well as graduation rates was available for limited geographic areas and for what seemed almost random time periods. The same was generally true for the outcome of targeted nutrition programmes. In some cases, WFP was able to track 'graduation' rates for children or pregnant/lactating mothers, but there was not enough data available to establish a reliable trend, nor was it clear how the WFP data was cross-checked with government administrative data and that of other agencies. In general, this limits the ability of the WFP to report specifically on its short and long-term outcomes and contribution to broader humanitarian or development goals except in a very generic way.

84. In general, the evaluation team concluded that the one-off data collection and analysis, e.g. the CFSS, and the regular monitoring and evaluation system were most useful for the planning and the preparatory work of the overall portfolio. In other words, the use of situational and operational data is a key factor in the strategic planning of operations, including the targeting components, budgeting and estimating the number of beneficiaries. Following up of results, including strategic decisions to adapt/change operational activities are, however, based less upon the generation and use of evidence about the programme outputs and outcomes, but more upon the general humanitarian situation, security considerations, funding and discussions with implementing partners.

2.3. Portfolio Performance and Results

85. This section focuses on beneficiaries and assistance, the degree to which they obtained their objectives and their contributions of the portfolio to national humanitarian and development objectives. The evaluation team analyzed the portfolio according to the themes of food security, nutrition, education and safety nets, based upon the terms of reference and

²⁸ The counting of beneficiaries was observed to be problematic in some cases, e.g. counting the same beneficiary each time they receive a ration, which leads to double or even triple counting. The evaluation team understands, however, that this is an issue not unique to the WFP in Yemen, but also found elsewhere.

discussions with WFP stakeholders on the best positioning of the evaluation against the portfolio. In the conclusion to this section, the factors that affected the results and are generally cross-cutting are provided.

Overview

86. For the portfolio period of 2006–2010, the overall budget (planned versus actual expenditures), the overall commodity tonnage (planned versus actual distribution) and overall number of beneficiaries (planned versus actual) are presented in Table 6.

87. Determining a relatively precise tally of beneficiaries was a challenge because of the way the WFP records and report beneficiary numbers and the definitions of a beneficiary. Within a given year, as reported by the WFP Standard Project Reports for each operation, the same beneficiary is counted once even though they may receive food assistance more than once. Over a multi-year operation, however, these beneficiary numbers are typically summed although it is likely that the same beneficiary is receiving food assistance each year; thus there is a typical ‘double-counting’ of beneficiaries in a multi-year summary of an operation. To account for this, the evaluation team calculated annual averages of actual beneficiaries for each operation (presented in Table 7); this method attempts to factor for some of the double counting of beneficiaries and produce an approximation of the number of individuals that receive assistance under each operation.

88. The definition of a beneficiary was also a factor in the evaluation team’s ability to analyze the performance of an operation or indeed of a particular theme, e.g. food security, across operations. A refugee arriving at a reception centre and receiving a one-time prepared food ration is counted as a beneficiary in the same manner as an IDP in the north or a refugee in the Kharaz camp that may receive multiple complete rations over an entire year. Thus the counting of beneficiaries does not give a complete picture about the scale of assistance provided nor of the overall contribution to food security, etc. The summary of commodity distribution, combined with beneficiary numbers, provides a more complete picture and those data have been included where relevant.

TABLE 6: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF WFP OPERATIONS BETWEEN 2005 AND 2010

Operation	Beneficiaries**		Tonnage		Total Cost (US\$)	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
CP 10137	244,128	208,298	21,460	18,436	45,380,605	33,585,948
CP 10435	3,219,240	2,648,208	69,141	32,575	80,471,141	23,395,130
EMOP 10675	20,000	19,873	692	692	459,597	388,276
EMOP 10684	548,000	564,213	65,538	39,495	41,765,748	31,370,180
EMOP 10767	2,440,144	1,474,359	68,725	29,935	61,219,551	30,075,289
EMOP 10794	20,000	47,984	1,041	511	477,370	433,363
EMOP 10806	85,810	85,441	3,590	3,123	3,888,703	1,840,729
EMOP 200039	300,000	257,711	33,529	16,102	47,927,438	34,659,404
PRRO 10232	210,772	257,782	9,835	8,025	3,812,183	3,161,732
PRRO 102321	110,488	166,981	5,051	4,789	4,732,882	3,862,800
PRRO 200044	95,000	121,716	4,351	3,139	7,009,882	2,969,805
SO 200130	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	942,675	450,480

Source: WFP project documents and standard project reports

** direct and indirect beneficiaries

89. In addition there is a distinction between direct and indirect beneficiaries. Throughout the operational reporting, the evaluation team found that a standard procedure was to calculate indirect beneficiaries of certain type of food distribution using a multiplier for family size. This is useful as it acknowledges the reality that food is shared at the household level and even targeted food distribution, e.g. for supplementary feeding of pregnant and lactating women, benefits other members of the household. It is impossible to know to what degree these indirect beneficiaries are benefiting from this food at household level, i.e. it depends on a mix of gender, livelihood, etc. factors, but it is fair to say that additional food commodities will contribute to the overall food security of a household. Only direct beneficiary data are presented in this section unless indicated otherwise.

TABLE 7: ANNUAL AVERAGE OF BENEFICIARIES BY OPERATION**

Operation	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Annual Average
CP 10137	1,156,280					231,256
CP 10435		608,720	546,694	801,710	691,084	662,052
EMOP 10675		19,873				19,873
EMOP 10684		36,000	76,751	156,854	294,608	141,053
EMOP 10767				487,554	986,805	737,180
EMOP 10794			22,981	25,003		23,992
EMOP 10806				42,902	42,539	42,721
EMOP 200039					257,711	257,711
PRRO 10232	27,401	31,700	31,700			30,267
PRRO 10232.1			51,495	87,489	27,997	55,660
PRRO 200044					121,716	121,716
Total	1,183,681	696,293	729,621	1,601,512	2,422,460	

Source: WFP project documents and standard project reports

** direct and indirect beneficiaries

90. According the project documents and standard project reports, the country portfolio in Yemen covers all five strategic objectives outlined in the WFP Strategic Plan (2008 – 2013). Table 8 below presents the strategic objectives and major activities in the Yemen country portfolio, aligned with the sectors of focus under the evaluation.

91. The operations do not pursue a collective logical framework or common goal at the country level. As indicated in the terms of reference, the evaluation does not focus on individual operations but across the portfolio as a whole. The objectives from individual operations can generally be grouped as follows:

- **Food security:** The majority of the WFP assistance within the portfolio, measured by commodity distribution or beneficiary numbers, was focused on providing food security to vulnerable populations. This is generally in the form of GFD to provide immediate assistance to those facing severe food shortages to secure sufficient food (a full food ration) for consumption and prevent people from adopting negative coping strategies such as depleting productive assets. With the exception of the two DEVs (104350 and 101370), GFD is an activity in all food assistance operations in the portfolio.
- **Education:** Educational support, through school feeding and take home rations serves to contribute to the improvement of school enrolment for girls and girls' attendance rates in primary and secondary schools. Support to girls' education is a core activity of both

CPs (DEV 104350 and 101370) as well as the three operations focused on refugee assistance (PRRO 102321, 102320, and 200044) under the portfolio.

- **Health and nutrition:** Operations with food assistance activities specifically focused on health and nutrition objectives target vulnerable groups that require immediate assistance (treatment) or to reduce chronic malnutrition (prevention). Food assistance is generally in the form of supplemental feeding for children with poor anthropometric scores and pregnant and lactating women. Health objectives are usually secondary objectives to the primary outcome of improved nutritional status. Health and nutrition interventions feature in both CPs (DEV 101370 and 104350), the operations in northern Yemen (EMOP 10675 and 10685 and 200039) and the refugee assistance operations (PRRO 102320 and 102321 and 200044).
- **Safety nets:** Safety net objectives are distinguished from food security objectives by the nature of the food assistance provided and its achievable aims. Providing safety nets means the WFP is providing partial rations to beneficiaries in order to supplement their existing food basket. The objective of this assistance is to prevent negative coping strategies and preserve the existing livelihoods of beneficiaries²⁹. The operation addressing high food prices (EMOP 10767) is the only operation with a particular safety net focus under the portfolio.

TABLE 8: ALIGNMENT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, MAJOR ACTIVITIES AND RELEVANT SECTORS OF THE CPE

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (2008-2013)	MAJOR ACTIVITIES	SECTORS OF FOCUS - CPE
1. Saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⊙ General food distribution ⊙ Targeted food distribution ⊙ Supplementary feeding ⊙ Emergency needs assessments/analytic work ⊙ Emergency logistics/cluster-lead 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nutrition/Health • Safety net • Food security
2. Preventing acute hunger and investing in disaster preparedness and mitigation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⊙ VAM ⊙ Targeted food, cash and voucher assistance as safety nets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nutrition/health • Food security
3. Restore and rebuild livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⊙ Targeted food, cash and voucher assistance as safety nets ⊙ Target food distribution ⊙ Rebuilding essential delivery infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nutrition/Health • Food security
4. Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⊙ MCHN ⊙ School feeding (THR-FFE programmes) ⊙ Food/nutrition in HIV/AIDS/TB programmes ⊙ Relevant policy and programmatic advisement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food security • Nutrition/Health • Education • Safety net
5. Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger through hand-over strategies and local purchase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⊙ Procurement of food/non-food item for producers/service providers ⊙ Capacity building of local partners ⊙ Policy and programme advisement ⊙ Advocacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education

²⁹ The distinction between operations with a food security objective and those with a safety net objective is, in practice, less clear. Food security is a technical area that includes safety nets, which potentially contribute to a number of objectives and are a modality for meeting those objectives. Using general food distribution as a form of safety net, as opposed to cash transfers, for example, makes these operations virtually indistinguishable on the ground from GDFs solely with food security objectives (aside from the amount of calculated food ration). Factors important to safety nets such as timeliness, predictability, etc. are equally important for all food distributions. Further, from the perspective of beneficiary households, there is almost always a need to complement a given food ration and in this sense all GDF, except for households in the most dire circumstances, are in some sense 'partial'. Based on discussions with the evaluation manager and the WFP CO, the evaluation team has focused on safety net objectives (one operation - EMOP 10767) to emphasize this area of work, including the important partnership aspects and lessons learned therein, for future programming.

Food Security

92. Improving food security for vulnerable populations is a central objective of the portfolio. As stated, evaluation team found that general food distribution was the main activity to reach these objectives.

Beneficiaries and Assistance Provided

93. Tables 9-11 show the breakdown of outputs (beneficiaries and food commodities distributed) by operation and by year. Funding and secure access to vulnerable populations are the two most important factors determining the meeting of targets and general food distribution to IDPs in the north, refugees in the south, and IDPs (resulting from flooding) in the east has been funded within expectation.

94. Beneficiaries for general food distribution are selected in different ways depending on the operation. For the EMOPs targeting IDPs in northern Yemen, beneficiaries are determined by IDP status, including their registration by UNHCR and proximity to a distribution centre. Eligible IDPs are those who reside in established camps, live outside camps and are hosted by relatives or communities, and those returning to their places of origin. This entitles them to general food distribution, blanket supplementary feeding for IDP children aged 6-59 months (6-24 months in selected governorates) where targeted treatment for moderate acute malnourished is available (see section on Health/Nutrition). For the operations addressing the needs of Somali refugees, beneficiaries are registered refugees, with ration cards, living in camps. Some distribution occurs outside the camp, but the ration cards are used for identification. New arrivals are identified by UNHCR's implementing partners, which monitor main entry points and staff the reception centres. For the EMOPs addressing the needs of victims of flooding in Eastern Yemen, beneficiaries were IDPs registered by UNHCR.

95. In general, the evaluation team observed that the establishment of general food distribution lists was a very critical process in the operational delivery and required a high degree of cooperation and verification with partners. UNHCR is a key partner in this respect, as are the cooperating partners in each region. The WFP has put significant effort into this aspect and there were no major issues observed.


96. The repeated wars in northern Yemen have affected a large number of people, mainly from the Sa'adah province. The WFP has been providing general food distribution since 2007 and, as shown in Table 9, the scale of the response is increasing each year. Figure 3 demonstrates that the increase in beneficiaries reached each year has been met by a similar increase in commodity distribution, as was expected.

TABLE 9: BENEFICIARIES AND COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION TO IDPS AFFECTED BY WAR IN NORTHERN YEMEN

	EMOP 106750		EMOP 106840								EMOP 200039	
Direct beneficiaries	2007		2007		2008		2009		2010		2010	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
IDPs receiving GFD*	20,000	19,873	36,000	36,000	77,000	76,751	150,000	156,854	285,000	294,000	285,000	236,118
Total commodities	2,007		2,007		2,008		2,009		2,010		2,010	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Metric tonnes	692	692	5,375	1,177	17,415	5,779	13,072	13,211	29,723	19,338	33,529	16,102

*includes all members of recipient households

FIGURE3: BENEFICIARY AND COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION TRENDS (ACTUAL) - IDPS NORTHERN YEMEN




97. The operations targeting refugee households in southern Yemen have been on-going since the early 1990s. Over the portfolio evaluation period, there was a dramatic increase in the number of beneficiaries for general food distribution; this was concomitant with the increase in refugee movement out of Somalia over the same period. Table 10 shows this increase, and notably that the actual numbers of beneficiaries reached has, since 2008, been slightly higher than planned. Figure 4 shows the approximately parallel increase in commodity distribution as beneficiary numbers have increased. The increase in newly arriving refugees that receive a prepared food ration at distribution centres (and thus are counted as beneficiaries) but who do not continue thereafter to receive food at the Kharaz camp can account for the relatively smaller increase in commodity distribution compared to the increase in beneficiary numbers.

TABLE 10: BENEFICIARIES AND COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION TO REFUGEES

Beneficiaries	PRRO 102320						PRRO 102321						PRRO 200044	
	2006		2007		2008		2008		2009		2010		2010	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Refugees receiving GFD*	8,525	8,200	27,051	26,200	27,051	26,200	33,976	39,228	43,501	81,468	13,173	20,116	95,000	121,716
Total commodities	2006		2007		2008		2008		2009		2010		2010	
Metric tonnes	2,306	1,345	2,306	1,737	172	153	2,248	1,794	2,605	2,717	198	278	4,429	3,140

*includes all members of recipient households

FIGURE 4: BENEFICIARY AND COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION TRENDS (ACTUAL) - REFUGEES




98. During the flooding in Hadramaut province, which peaked in 2009, the WFP responded with general food distribution. These operations were smaller than the more protracted situation in northern Yemen and the refugee crisis in southern Yemen, yet over 65,000 people were beneficiaries of WFP assistance during this time (see Table 11). Funding and security access for these operations were not an issues and all output targets were generally met. The trend of ration distribution approximately matched the trend of beneficiary numbers, peaking in 2009 (Figure 9).

TABLE 11: BENEFICIARY AND COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION TO IDPS AFFECTED BY FLOODING

Beneficiaries	EMOP 107940				EMOP 108060			
	2008		2009		2009		2010	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
IDPs receiving GFD*	20,000	22,981	0	25,003	42,905	42,902	42,905	42,539
Total commodities	EMOP 107940				EMOP 108060			
	2008		2009		2009		2010	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Metric tonnes	602	440	439	70	2,924	2,455	666	667

*includes all members of recipient households

FIGURE 5: BENEFICIARY AND COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION TRENDS (ACTUAL) - IDPS AFFECTED BY FLOODING



Attaining Objectives

99. The overall objective of food security programmes is to ensure a minimum adequate caloric intake to beneficiaries in order to maintain or improve their food security situation. WFP ration distributions are carefully calculated to achieve this end. Funding has proven adequate to provide regular distributions of monthly rations to all eligible recipients. According to the evaluation’s review of several of the relevant project documents, food security outcomes are stipulated in a relatively non-specific manner. For example, the food security outcome of the first (of the portfolio period) refugee operation was to, “contribute to the food security requirement of the refugees living in the camp” and the planned outcome of the emergency operation 106840 in northern Yemen was to “maintain and improve the current nutritional status and prevent acute malnutrition” and the indicators were actually output level indicators such as “number of actual beneficiaries against number planned”. From a results-based management perspective these types of outcomes and indicators are not sufficient to actually

determine whether the objectives were achieved; in other words, they are more aspirational and not necessarily measurable nor evaluable.

100. However, the evaluation notes that the outcomes planned and reported in the operations from the latter part of the portfolio period, e.g. 2009-2010, are much better. For example, the most recent emergency operation in northern Yemen, aims to *i. reduce acute malnutrition in children under-5 in the targeted populations, and ii. improve food consumption over the operational period for the targeted population. The targets for these outcomes are, i. less than 10 percent children with mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) scores under 2z-scores, and ii. 80 percent of population above borderline food consumption scores.* Similar measurable outcomes are stipulated for the most recent refugee operations. This improvement will allow the WFP to determine its achievements against objectives with appropriate monitoring systems and data collection in place.

101. Annual SPRs for the respective food security operations tend to report in a very generic way against these outcomes. This is generally because of a lack of outcome-level data monitoring and a lack of baseline data. One exception has been for the refugee operations in the south, where UNHCR nutrition surveys provide good data every two years and allow the WFP to report on nutrition outcomes. For the operations in northern Yemen, several rapid assessments have provided valuable situational data. Post-distribution monitoring and other one-off assessments tend to show the reliance of IDPs on the WFP food assistance. These assessments are valuable and clearly demonstrate that the WFP food assistance contributes to alleviating hunger but is not sufficient to ensure food security of the IDP populations³⁰.

102. With limited baseline data and limited outcome monitoring it is difficult to determine the specific achievement against objectives. There are also limited data collected on relevant indicators over time amongst all agencies (government and non-government) in Yemen, and thus cross-checking data against overall progress within a particular region or a particular sector is difficult. The CFSS of 2010, combined with IFRPI modelling of the same indicators, are probably the best sources of situational data by geographic area. However, it is impossible at this time to compare this situational data with the geographic scope of the WFP operations and see any effect.

103. Where assessments have been done, as in the case of the operations in northern Yemen, the results are often surprising, e.g. declines in food security in 2010 despite large scale food distribution. This is indicative of a conceptual challenge in the measurement of the WFP food security objectives; namely that that objectives require a complement of interventions, including from outside the WFP mandate, in order to be achieved³¹. It is thus difficult to conclude that overall the WFP could fully achieve its food security objectives unless complementary interventions are planned and implemented with relevant partners.

Contribution of Portfolio To National Humanitarian/Development Objectives

104. The WFP food security focused operations, however, do contribute substantially to Yemen's national humanitarian objectives, as anticipated. The government has responded to a series of humanitarian emergencies by requesting WFP assistance, often as a lead agency in term of coordination, logistics and delivery of aid. WFP food security operations have not suffered delays in start-up or implementation and the working relationship with the government

³⁰ An assessment in May 2010 showed a deterioration of the food security situation because IDPs lacked sufficient access to basic health and education services, and adequate shelter, etc. Food rations were being monetized in order to generate cash.

³¹ An example of this integration is the Kharaz refugee camp, where a complement of agencies and livelihood interventions (health, education, food security, income generation, etc.) are operating in one area and more robust situational monitoring reveals positive trends against objectives.

was observed to be effective. In the case of the emergency operations in northern Yemen, the government established a new Executive Unit to ensure quick responses and close cooperation in registering and feeding those in need. Key stakeholders in the Executive Unit also stated that the WFP has made a very important contribution to meeting Yemen's humanitarian objectives in this region. Overall, the WFP has contributed to short-term food security objectives through this humanitarian response and through general food distribution.

105. Yemen's development objectives also centre on food security. The NFSS, to which the WFP made an important intellectual contribution by participating in discussions and reviewing drafts, puts food security at the centre of the nation's plans for future prosperity and peace. To date, WFP food security operations in Yemen have made some minimal contributions to these longer term national development goals. The EMOP responses to the floods in Hadramaut (10794, 10806) have allowed approximately 130,000 beneficiaries to remain near their homes and to take up their livelihoods after the flood-waters receded. Many of these people might otherwise have gone to Sana'a or other cities to swell the ranks of the unemployed and turbulent urban population. The same is true for the IDPs who remain near the ration distribution centres in Haradh, Sa'adah City and Amran. However, preserving existing livelihoods and preventing migration to the cities is really only a short-term contribution to the much broader national food security objectives.

106. While the WFP is currently testing a cash-based safety net programme in several pilot districts, the agency remains very dubious about the possibility of using cash or vouchers to supplement or supplant food distributions. Other donors in Yemen, e.g. the World Bank, European Commission, and DfID, feel strongly that cash makes more sense in a country where food is available but people often do not have the money to buy it. This orientation is reinforced by regular reports of beneficiaries selling parts of their food ration to raise cash for other needs. This area needs to be re-examined by the WFP.

Health and Nutrition

107. Health and nutrition-specific interventions are found in the CO (DEV 101370 and 104350), the operations addressing high food prices (EMOP 107670), the IDP focused operations in northern Yemen (EMOP 106840 and 200039) and the refugee operations (PRRO 102320, 102321 and 200044). These interventions are nutrition focused and the health objectives are secondary, i.e. a result of improved nutritional status. The major activity is targeted supplementary feeding for treatment of malnourishment and blanket supplementary feeding as prevention for deterioration of nutritional status.

Beneficiaries and Assistance Provided

108. WFP offers nutritional supplements to two groups of vulnerable Yemenis: a targeted group of those presenting symptoms of MAM, as measured by MUAC and by height/weight ratios; and a blanket group of pregnant and lactating women and children between 6 and 59 months of age. For each take home ration targeted directly to a specific group, there is a larger group of indirect beneficiaries at household level³².

109. For all nutrition assistance interventions, the government assisted in the establishment of distribution lists and approved the final list of beneficiaries. In the refugee operations, UNHCR coordinated the selection of beneficiaries and in the case of the IDPs, the Government Executive Unit took the lead in beneficiary selection with technical support from UNHCR and WFP.

³² Only summaries of direct beneficiaries of nutrition interventions are presented here; indirect beneficiary calculations are presented only for DEV 101370 and 104350 because of the large numbers of pregnant and lactating mothers receiving take home rations under the country programmes.

110. In both CO (DEV 101370 and 104350), WFP provided take home rations to TB and leprosy patients, supplementary feeding for moderately malnourished children, and take home rations to significant numbers of pregnant and lactating women (Table 12), which had a spin-off effect to indirect beneficiaries at household level. The districts selected for the CP programmes³³ come from government and WFP analysis of statistics on the most impoverished areas of the country and areas where girls' enrolment in school is lowest.

111. The commodity distributed (see Table 12) showed a general decline (with the exception of 2009) since 2005. Due to limited funding, really since the initial design of the operations, food distributions were reduced each year, either through reduced rations or a reduction in the number of distributions each year. Figure 7 shows the declining trend in commodity distribution, which contrasts with the increasing number of beneficiaries each year.

112. According to key stakeholders at district health facilities, supplementary feeding of TB and leprosy patients and pregnant women improved their attendance at health facilities and their following treatment regimes and antenatal care schedules, respectively. Unfortunately, these components were not included in the operational activities after 2010, due to limited funding, despite their apparent success³⁴.


TABLE 12: CP 101370 AND CP 104350, NUTRITION BENEFICIARIES AND COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION, 2005-2010

	CP101370				CP 104350							
	2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual
Direct beneficiaries												
Pregnant and Lactating Women	17,970	16,662	20,421	14,044	12,600	10,987	12,600	7,547	12,600	11,320	12,600	13,401
Children with MAM (treatment)					9,800	7,050	9,800	6,299	9,800	9,652	9,800	5,090
TB/Leprosy Patients	1,320	1,183	4,200	4,094	1,730	1,413	2,000	1,115	2,000	1,401	1,730	1730
Total	19,290	17,845	24,621	18,138	24,130	19,450	24,400	14,961	24,400	22,373	24,130	20,221
	CP101370				CP 104350							
	2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual
Indirect beneficiaries*												
Children 0-59mo, 5-18 years, adults	220,080	221,935	244,128	208,298	168,910	136,157	168,910	104,728	168,910	156,608	168,910	129,438
* Indirect beneficiaries are calculated using a multiplier from the direct beneficiaries, normally assuming a household size of 7.												
	CP101370				CP 104350							
	2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual
Total commodities												
Metric tonnes	6,420	4,290	6,520	3,701	4,128	2,316	4,025	2,839	2,604	2,737	4,222	1,579

³³ The overall objective of both country programmes was to encourage families to send their children to school (only 20 percent of the total food commodity delivered under the two operations in these was for nutrition activities).

³⁴ Key stakeholders in the MoPHP requested the reinstatement of these programmes in conversations with the evaluation team.

FIGURE 6: NUTRITION BENEFICIARY AND COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION TRENDS (ACTUAL) – CPS



113. Beneficiaries under the HFP EMOP programmes include both blanket and targeted feeding interventions for the same groups. Beneficiary numbers increased over the two year period (see Table 13), largely due to the inclusion of nutritional treatment of moderately malnourished children in 2010. While there is an insufficient time period to show trends, a new operation focused on nutrition and safety nets to mitigate the effects of high food prices will increase the WFP’s outputs under this area.

TABLE 13: HIGH FOOD PRICES EMOP – NUTRITION BENEFICIARIES AND COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION 2009-2010

	EMOP 107670			
	2009		2010	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Direct beneficiaries				
Pregnant and Lactating Women	132,270	97,699	132,270	101,424
Children (6-59mo) supplementary feeding (treatment for moderate acute malnutrition)			25,284	15,575
Children (6-23mo) supplementary feeding (prevention)	109,648	38,685	84,364	82,704
Total	241,918	136,384	241,918	199,703
Total commodities				
Metric tonnes	15,177	15,351	53,548	14,584

114. The assistance to IDPs in northern Yemen included a supplementary feeding programme for children. This began in 2009 and the numbers of beneficiaries are increasing dramatically (see Table 14). Food security assessments in 2010 (see previous section) showed sharp deteriorations in situational indicators and as a result, supplementary feeding targeting children for prevention was included in EMOP 106840 and subsequently in EMOP 200039. The commodity distribution for the supplementary feeding programme is not possible to disaggregate from the total.

TABLE 14: SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING IN SA'ADAH GOVERNORATE - 2009-2010

Direct beneficiaries	EMOP 106840				EMOP 200039	
	2009		2010		2010	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Children (0-50mo) under supplementary feeding (prevention)	30,000	6,299	57,000	58,422	40,000	51,542
<i>Commodity distribution data not available with sufficient disaggregation to these activities.</i>						


115. Finally, the PRROs for Somali refugees have included both targeted and blanket nutritional supplementation. As shown in Table 15 and Figure 7, the number of beneficiaries has been increasing, most notably in the last two years. Indeed in the early part of the evaluation period, supplementary feeding toward nutritional outcomes was a minor activity.

TABLE 15: SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING WITHIN REFUGEE OPERATIONS 2006–2010

Direct beneficiaries	PRRO 102320						PRRO 102321						PRRO 200044	
	2006		2007		2008		2008		2009		2010		2010	
	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual
Pregnant and Lactating women	788	619	119	716	288	716	125	129	131	2,940	129	3,635	580	1,044
TB/Leprosy Patients	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	90	150	109	360	179
Children (6-59mo) treatment of MAM	198	76	198	414	198	414	208	1,671	1,671	1,050	1,670	2,014	2,580	1,696
Total	986	695	317	1,130	486	1,130	333	1,800	1,802	4,080	1,949	5,758	3,520	2,919

Commodity distribution data not available with sufficient disaggregation to these activities.

FIGURE 7: TRENDS IN SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING - REFUGEE OPERATIONS 2006–2010



116. In all relevant operations, the actual number of beneficiaries increased over the portfolio period. This general trend is complicated in some instances by the number of pipeline breaks and irregular food distributions, especially in the CPs. Ration reductions are one means to mitigate a complete stoppage of food delivery but this also reduces the effectiveness of the original operational design.

117. The evaluation team noted that the planned number of beneficiaries in the two CPs did not appear to change or adapt to the change in funding circumstances. It is recognized that a high number of planned beneficiaries is used to leverage funds but the discordance between planned and actual beneficiaries and the declining commodity distribution is a sign that some adaptation is necessary. The increasing trend in number of beneficiaries reached under the CP is questionable if those beneficiaries have only received food assistance on a limited basis.

Attaining Objectives

118. Health indicators, which are recorded only for CP 104350, reveal mixed outcomes. Incidence of low birth rate, as recorded by the WFP, rose from 19 percent to 25 percent between 2006 and 2008, and then fell drastically to 8 percent in 2009. This dramatic decrease merits investigation, as it not only reverses a three year upward trend in incidence of low birth weight, it also aligns the programme with its goal of at least a 10 percent reduction in incidence of low birth weight just in time for the project's completion; these reports gave the evaluation team

reason to view some data with caution³⁵. In addition, although the percentage of leprosy patients cured rose from 32 percent to 35 percent between the “previous” and “latest” measurements in 2006, the percent of TB cases registered that completed treatment fell from 88 percent to 80 percent within the same time period. No outcome measurements for either indicator were recorded at later points in the programme. Although there are inherent differences in the treatment of TB and leprosy, mixed performance in 2006 and failure to measure outcomes in more recent years makes analysis of health outcomes very difficult.

119. The result of this failure on the part of WFP and its cooperating partners in the Ministry of Public Health to measure outcomes of the health and nutrition interventions makes it very hard to judge whether the programmes attain their objectives. Collecting facility based data is insufficient to determine neither general trends nor causal effects from many health and nutrition interventions, especially in areas where current access to and use of health facilities is limited. Where food based interventions are used, there is a potential strong positive bias to attendance at facilities, resulting both false positive and negative trends in key indicators (see footnote 35). Household data collection, perhaps in partnership with other agencies, is necessary to properly triangulate data.

120. The evaluation team heard key stakeholders testify to the positive impact of the health and nutrition actions of the WFP. Health practitioners at health facility level claimed that tuberculosis and leprosy patients came far more regularly for their medicines when promised rations. Medical staff in districts and sub-districts said that birth weights rose and children graduated from MAM status when rations arrived regularly. The evaluation team was unable to verify these findings with data however. Given the funding limitations in the CPs and the relatively recent (2009 – 2010) scale up of supplementary feeding, it is unlikely that the health and nutrition objectives, as stated in the project documents, have been fully met.

Contribution of the Portfolio To National Humanitarian/Development Objectives

121. The scale of supplementary feeding with the 2005-2010 period was relatively small compared to the overall chronic nutrition problems. Indeed the bulk WFP nutrition activities are focused on humanitarian response situations with IDPs northern Yemen and under the high food price operation. In both cases, blanket supplementary feeding as a preventative measure against deterioration of nutritional status is the bulk of the case load and this is not readily revealed in performance indicators. The evaluation team observed both the demand and the need for nutritional supplementation in northern Yemen with many people displaced and reliant on food rations and in this sense the WFP nutrition activities to contribute to humanitarian objectives within the country.

122. While the evaluation team did not focus on the refugee operations per se, the evidence from UNHCR nutrition surveys is more mixed with consistently moderate levels of malnourishment among children and anaemia among pregnant women. This is the case within the treatment area (the Kharaz refugee camp primarily) but is against a background of similar malnutrition levels in the host communities and indeed in much of Yemen.

123. Good practices in nutrition intervention require a mixture of complementary interventions in order to address chronic levels of malnutrition. High levels of disease burden, poor water and

³⁵ The evaluation team had some difficulty reconciling some of the indicator data reported with possible causal effects on the indicators. For example, low birth rates reported at a health facility could increase, all other factors constant, if more women are using the health facility, motivated to come to the facility by food rations or otherwise. One would expect thus to see an increase in the reporting of low birth weights even though this is not a result of the feeding per se, but a result of better attendance to health facilities and further exposing the real nutritional situation. In this case an increase in reported incidence of low birth weights deserves further analysis by the M&E unit. Simply reporting intake data from a health facility within a treatment programme does not give a clear picture of trends against outcome indicators.

sanitation access, poor levels of education and awareness, especially amongst care-givers, a poorly balanced diet, poor care practices, unequal intra-household food distribution, and migration are significant factors affecting the nutritional situation amongst the WFP targeted beneficiaries. Providing supplementary food is one factor to address the issue, but this must be done in partnership with other complementary interventions in order to see progress against development or humanitarian nutrition objectives. Within the development operations, this is an area requiring more effort on the part of the WFP in order to see contribution to national development objectives. Within the emergency operations, these complementary interventions should be part of a transition strategy for the WFP and partners, i.e. as the emergency situation stabilizes, a transition phase where complementary interventions are delivered in closer coordination would improve the WFP contribution to short-term nutrition objectives.

Education

124. The two CPs³⁶ (DEC 10137 and 10435) are focused primarily on education objectives, with 80 percent of the overall resources in these two operations directed at the education interventions alone.

Beneficiaries and Assistance Provided

125. FFE programmes are designed to reduce the education gender gap in Yemen. Beneficiary households include those with girls enrolled in basic and secondary-level education. The current CP provides each female student beyond grade one with a ration of 416 g of wheat and 22.5 g of oil per day. There should be three distributions per school year. Resource constraints have recently reduced this to one partial distribution per school year. Eligible students must attend 80 percent of school days annually, or obtain excused absences for days exceeding 20 percent.

126. Table 16: gives an overview of the 10 distributions of take home ration (THR) which were organized under the FFE programme from 2006 until 2010 showing the inconsistencies as a result of funding shortfalls. The number of beneficiaries does not change but the amount distributed to each beneficiary changes.

TABLE 16: WFP YEMEN FFE -TAKE HOME RATION DISTRIBUTIONS

Year	Nr.	WFP Yemen: FFE THR Distributions											
		Month											
		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
2005	3			X		X							X
2006	2						X				X		
2007	1										X		
2008	2					X						X	
2009	1					X							
2010	1	X											
Total	10	1		1		3	1				2	1	1

127. WFP made a strategic decision to maintain the number of beneficiaries in the programme, even though each recipient received less than one third of the basic intended ration. In 2007, 2009 and 2010, school-girls and their families received only one distribution instead of three. In the other years covered, WFP was able to give two distributions (2005, 2006, 2008). The CPE team was told that the amount of food in each ration was reduced in 2010.

³⁶ The evaluation did not focus on the SF interventions within the refugee operations, partially because of a lack of access and partially by management decision to place less emphasis on the refugee operations.

128. Table 17 provides an overview of key outputs of the FFE interventions under DEV 10137 and DEV 10435 from 2005 until 2010. Under DEV 10137, the differences between planned and actual numbers of beneficiaries (between +14 percent and -2 percent) and the amount of commodities (between -1 percent and -7 percent) are small. Under DEV 10435 however, there are considerable differences between planned and actual number of beneficiaries (between -8 percent and -23 percent), and very large differences between planned and actual amount of commodities (between -59 percent and -73 percent), resulting in wide gaps between planned and actual ratios of total commodities per beneficiary (between -40 percent and -64 percent).


129. Even with the reduction in beneficiaries reached each year, the commodity/beneficiary ratio (see Figure 8) continued to decline with the exception of 2009. Generally, fewer beneficiaries were receiving fewer rations year upon year. Much of this was anticipated by the WFP due to dramatic funding shortfalls. In response to these resource shortfalls WFP Yemen thus reduced, suspended and/or limited the THR to the most deprived families. Security reasons were also taken into account and sometimes WFP could not deliver rations to the project areas because of threats of hijacking or kidnapping.

130. The SF Department of the Ministry of Education has been a full partner in the implementation of the FFE-THR programme. They have ensured coordination and support in selecting (a diminishing number of) school districts and preparing local staff – principals, teachers, PTAs to support and benefit from the operation.

TABLE 17: WFP YEMEN FOOD FOR EDUCATION – BENEFICIARIES AND COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION 2005-2010

	DEV 10137				DEV 10435							
	2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Beneficiaries												
Schools	1388	1333	1388	1352	1350	1306	1350	1300	1300	1300	1300	1006
Girls	120000	136300	138000	135430	78300	67509	86130	63138	94734	87422	104207	75720
Commodities (MT)												
Wheat	19381	18399	13800	13676	11745	5269	6868	2497	14212	8954	14718	3911
Vegetable oil	1016	576	1140	1059	475	76	492	303	2302	259	784	0
Dried fruit	0	0	0	0	160	144	990	650	1137	664	279	279
Total commodities	20397	18975	14940	14735	12380	5489	8350	3450	17651	9877	15781	4190
Commodity beneficiary ratio	0.170	0.139	0.108	0.109	0.158	0.081	0.097	0.055	0.186	0.113	0.151	0.055

FIGURE 8: BENEFICIARY/COMMODITY RATIO 2005 – 2010 WFP FFE INTERVENTIONS



Attaining objectives

131. The objective of the FFE -THR programme³⁷ was to increase girls' educational achievement through motivating families to enrol their daughters in school and to keep them there through at least primary school. For the second CP, ration eligibility was extended to girls attending secondary school. The objective in this case was to help reduce Yemen's overall gender gap in education and provide continued incentive for beneficiaries that may have received the take home rations through primary school.

132. The CPE team found consistent qualitative evidence that the FFE-THR programme has effectively increased girl's enrolment and attendance at participating schools. School principals, teachers, PTA members, parents of girls all testified to the impact of the rations on their daughters' school attendance. A number of interlocutors also noted the negative effect of discontinuing the ration – girls dropped out and enrolment rates seemed to decline.

133. The positive effect of the FFE programme is difficult to quantify because of continuously fluctuating levels of resources available to the FFE programme, resulting in a changing number of beneficiaries and changing rations over time. There are no readily available datasets of chronologic and spatial control groups to compare the effect and impact of the FFE programme with. The only "complete" impact indicator dataset for the time span from 2005 to 2010 is the girls to boys rate of schoolchildren enrolled in FFE supported primary education schools, which seems to support a positive impact of the FFE) on the ratio of girls enrolled compared to boys.

134. The data collected by the FFE programme (summary in Table 18) is difficult to analyze over time and its internal validity appeared questionable to the evaluation team. The large changes from one year to the next would seem to indicate that the timing of data collection was important, i.e. on average major changes from one year to the next would be more gradual, and the correlation or cross-checking between these data and other data sources, e.g. government administrative datasets, was not done. If done this would allow for greater reconciliation of data from year to the next. The WFP FFE programme must recognize, and control for, the bias that exists through school attendance records, especially when take home rations benefit the entire household and, with sufficient scale, the community at large (including the teachers).

TABLE 18: WFP FOOD-FOR-EDUCATION IMPACT INDICATORS

Year	Food For Education assisted primary schools							
	GGER %	BGER %	GBR	FMTR	GPR %	GBAR %	GE %	(BV)Base Value: at start of project, benchmark
BV	38.7		0.36	0.06				(GGER) Girls Gross Enrolment Rate: % of girls (regardless of age) enrolled in WFP assisted primary schools
2005	49.7		0.99	0.06				(BGER) Boys Gross Enrolment Rate: % of boys (regardless of age) enrolled in WFP assisted primary schools
2006	50.0		1.00	0.06				(GBR) Girls to Boys Rate: rate of girls to boys enrolled in WFP schools
2007	40.0	60.0	0.67	0.08				(FMTR) Female to Male Teachers Rate: Rate of female teachers to male teachers in WFP assisted schools
2008	44.0	56.0	0.78	0.04				(GPR) Girls Promotion Rate: % of girls that pass
2009			0.85		80.0	85.0	20.1	(GBAR) Girls and Boys Attendance Rate: % of schooldays in which girls and boys attend classes
2010			0.88		80.0	80.0		(GE) Girls Enrolment: % of average annual change in number of girls enrolled

Source: standard project reports 2006 - 2010

³⁷ Given that these interventions were focused on take home rations, educational attainment objectives are not included.

135. The evaluation team examined in depth two schools that were typical examples of the FFE beneficiary schools. School records provide further support to the positive impact the FFE programme has had on girls' enrolment. In addition, a negative impact on girls' enrolment could be observed where the FFE programme support was discontinued or reduced. In the case of the Abdel Rahman Al-Rafgai school in Taur Beni Qais district (Table 19), the percentage of girl students dropped from 61 percent in 2007 to 45 percent in 2010 after ration reductions in 2009/10. The key stakeholders at the school (head teacher, teachers, parents) attributed this to the reduction in school ration that was used as an addition to the food basket at home.

TABLE 19: SCHOOL RECORDS AT ABEL RAHMAN AL-RAFgai SCHOOL

Abdel Rahman Al-Rafgai school, Taur Beni Qais District, Hajjah governorate.												
Class 1-9	2007 – 2008				2009 – 2010				2010 – 2011			
	Boys	Girls	Tot.	% G	Boys	Girls	Tot.	% G	Boys	Girls	Tot.	% G
Annual average	78	124	202	61%	101	80	181	44%	104	86	190	45%

136. Table 20 shows that the Al-Mitaq school at a distance of only 15 km from the Abel Rahman Al-Rafgai school but no longer benefitting from FFE since 2007, counts presently only 38 girl students (22 percent) out of a total of 175 students (while reportedly it still had 140 girl students in 2006). Again, key stakeholders at the school attributed this decline to the cessation of the take home rations and the removal of girl children from school for employment or housework. The proximity of these two schools suggested that the livelihoods and other factors affecting the decision to enrol girls in school were relatively similar.

TABLE 20: SCHOOL RECORDS AT AL-MITAQ SCHOOL

Al-Mitaq school, Taur Beni Qais District, Hajjah governorate								
Class 1-9	Participating in FFE (DEV 10435)				No longer participating in FFE (DEV 10435)			
	2006 -2007				2010 - 2011			
	Boys	Girls	Tot.	% Girls	Boys	Girls	Tot.	% Girls
Annual average	145	140	285	49%	137	38	175	22%

137. These partial results, while indicative only, do seem to indicate some positive benefit obtained from the FFE-THR programme. The transitory nature of school enrolment, however, suggests that lasting achievement of progress toward the education objectives will require complementary interventions to address other educational factors, e.g. school quality, availability of women teachers, protection in addition to broader food security interventions.

Contribution of Portfolio to National Humanitarian/Development Goals

138. The FFE-THR operations work towards narrowing the gender gap in girls' education, which is one of the main elements in the government education development plan and in its gender strategy. In the very limited areas where the programme functions, it seems, based on partial evidence, to have had a positive contribution in enrolling more girls in school and in keeping them in school longer than in areas not covered by the programme.

139. However, the very limited geographic scope of the operations and shrinking beneficiary numbers since 2006 means that while its contribution is positive, it is very limited. The WFP offices said in several interviews that they liked to think of large scale interventions; that there was no time for smaller pilot projects for non-controversial activities in Yemen. But the lack of funding, explained elsewhere in this report, has limited the FFE-THR to a narrow group of districts and schools.

140. Undocumented secondary effects of the operations (may) include:

- a. Postponing the age of marriage for girls who remain in school, as families tend to marry off their daughters very young to save themselves the burden of feeding extra mouths and to cement alliances which may benefit the family in their context.
- b. Improved caloric intake and nutrition for the whole family from bringing the ration home and sharing it.
- c. Motivating the Ministry of Education and local school districts to hire more women teachers for the greater numbers of girls attending school.
- d. Improved school administration and management as teachers and principals have to document school attendance to justify the distribution of second and third packages of rations in a given year.

Safety Nets

141. The HFP EMOP (10767) was the single operation that was designed to complement (with partial food rations) the government Social Welfare Fund cash transfers in a top-up manner to provide a safety net to poor households faced with high food price increases. A follow-on PRRO to continue this safety net operation was launched before the CPE team arrived in Yemen, but falls outside the scope of this evaluation.

142. At the onset of high food prices in 2008, the WFP and the government estimated that a third of the Yemeni rural population suffered drastically from this crisis, especially during the hunger season (May – October). In 2008, a WFP rapid assessment report concluded that food security has deteriorated dramatically as a consequence of the increased food prices; and found 18 percent of the surveyed households to be severely food-insecure, while a further 25 percent were moderately food insecure.

143. This rapid assessment confirmed findings by an earlier household budget survey conducted as part of the design for an expanded social safety net supported by the World Bank and the European Commission. This survey concluded that the proportion of people suffering from food poverty (those unable to even meet their basic food needs), had risen from 12.5 percent in 2005-6 to 27 percent in December 2007, in large measure due to rising food prices. In addition, the WFP led CFSS, implemented in 2009, confirmed that over 32 percent of households (7.2 million people) were food insecure, with 2.7 million people severely food-insecure as of October/November 2009.

Beneficiaries and Assistance Provided

144. WFP planned and carried out this operation in close coordination with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour and its Social Welfare Fund (SWF). The SWF provides a cash subsidy to families falling below an income threshold. They have complete lists of these families, which WFP teams verified and found highly accurate. The WFP and the SWF/Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour together chose the poorest districts and then adopted the SWF list of poor and food insecure families to receive a ration to complement the food that could be purchased with the SWF contribution. The operation reached almost 800,000 beneficiaries in 2010 (see Table 21) and thus the scale of the safety net intervention is significant in the overall context of similar work in Yemen.

TABLE 21: SAFTEY NET OBJECTIVES: BENEFICIARIES AND COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION

Direct beneficiaries	EMOP 107670			
	2009		2010	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Partial rations (safety net)	377,482	374,982	1,717,000	789,103
Total commodities*	2009		2010	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
	Metric tonnes	15,177	15,351	53,548
<i>These tonnages are combined with those addressing nutrition objectives.</i>				

Attaining Objectives

145. Though well designed and coordinated with the SWF and with schools and health centres in the districts as distribution centres, the EMOP only was able to generate about half of the funds required for the programme. WFP distributed the rations obtained with the reduced funding and worked closely with the SWF/Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour to the chosen districts and families.

146. There have not been reports of increased food insecurity in areas where the WFP/SWF programme operated nor reports of increased morbidity or mortality, compared to regions where the programme did not reach. Data collection on food security, e.g. food consumption scores and nutrition e.g. MUAC of children, was not evident at the time of the evaluation field work, so the evaluation team could not verify any significant differences between target and non-target areas. However key stakeholders within the regions attested to the positive contributions of the food distributions.

147. There is most certainly a need for the WFP to implement surveys within the coverage and adjacent areas to continue to monitor the situation given increased variability in food prices. In addition, this will help monitor the outcomes of safety net interventions. Given the scale of beneficiaries reached and the tonnage delivered, it is feasible that follow-ups to the CFSS of 2010 could provide meaningful data at the governorate level to track progress against key performance indicators.

Contribution of the Portfolio to National Humanitarian/Development Objectives

148. The safety net interventions were designed specifically to contribute to the humanitarian objectives of Yemen's government and donor community. As WFP and the government Social Welfare Fund concentrated available resources on targeted and highly vulnerable groups of women and children (over 30,000 metric tonnes of food and complementary cash transfer), it is expected that short-term alleviation of hunger was achieved within the coverage area.

149. The operation did not include a plan for moving toward a more sustainable approach to contributing to food security for these poorer and remote areas of Yemen. The evaluation team recommends that this is a critical aspect in designing a safety net operation in the future, given the limited livelihood options in rural areas. The balance between cash and in-kind (food) transfers, as part of a safety net approach, also need further exploration given the challenges of thin markets for food commodities in much of Yemen.

Factors affecting the results: operational issues

150. A number of factors have affected the relative contribution of the WFP portfolio. The evaluation focused on those cross-cutting factors that affected the performance of the portfolio as a whole, but acknowledges that there are many specific issues for each operation and within each technical area.

151. First, the WFP CO has established excellent relationships with its government counterparts. This effort to establish a solid footing for trust and cooperation has paid off in quick establishments of MOUs and significant support in providing help and protection for convoys of food to difficult or insecure areas. In addition, the government has trusted WFP to lead delegations of the UNCT to try to negotiate access to Sa'adah Governorate IDPs with the Houthi rebels without official presence. These negotiations have not yet led to food distributions outside of Sa'adah City but at least a dialogue had begun while the evaluation team was in country.

152. WFP logistics arrangements were observed to be efficient and are a key factor in quick response during humanitarian operations. The experienced and dedicated logistics staff have identified secured commodity contracts within Yemen and provide quality control on all commodity shipments. Their system of competitive bidding has ensured the procurement of key commodities at prices generally at or below that of commodities purchased on the international market and shipped to Yemen. Commodities purchased from local suppliers are available more quickly and with less administrative cost than imported food. The logistics staff have also procured transport by competitive bidding and ensured that truckers agree to cover all losses except those from *force majeure*. They have investigated and analyzed the road conditions and security issues on alternate routes and consult with government and UN security agencies to decide which route to follow prior to each convoy. Losses have been minimal.

153. WFP works closely with the government and the UNHCR to identify eligible IDP recipients of food security assistance. While controversial³⁸, this carefully targeted approach has ensured that those who really need assistance because of their IDP status receive regular rations. In the South, WFP works closely with the UNHCR to target officially recognized refugees as beneficiaries. This targeting keeps costs at levels appropriate to the food security programmes and helps avoid distributions to families 'connected' to officials or members of the armed forces.

154. For the CPs, funding shortfalls have mitigated any potential impacts, especially at the national level. Ration distributions have been reduced, especially within the CPs, though quality has been maintained. When only one or two of three or four intended rations are available, the impact of any nutrition or education intervention is necessarily compromised. For nutrition, the consistency and predictability of supplementary feeding is a major factor in reducing the physiological effects of malnourishment, whether it be from low food availability or micronutrient deficiency. Major interruptions in a supplementary feeding regime can negate the positive benefits of those rations given, i.e. food rations are not simply additive from a nutritional standpoint.

Factors affecting the results: Monitoring and cross-checking of outcome data

155. In the preceding analysis of the portfolio performance, the evaluation team has noted several issues stemming from the lack of monitoring data on the results/outcomes of the WFP

³⁸ This targeting is also a factor causing some controversy with the Government, UNCT and other donor agencies. Many Government agencies would prefer a more liberal eligibility policy which would allow, for example, families of officials or serving soldiers or police who lost their homes in Sa'adah to obtain rations. In addition, the local governors in Sa'adah City and Haradh (Hodeida Governorate) would like to allow the very poor residents of their cities to obtain rations, even if they are not IDPs. This, they say, will minimize conflicts and jealousies within their areas of governance. The CPE team could not verify any similar issues in the Aden area.

operations in Yemen. In general, very little data is collected about the outcomes of the operations. This has implications for annual reporting, e.g. the standard project reports generally provide only generic reporting on outcomes, and for strategic management of the portfolio.

156. WFP Yemen collects outcome data for programmes in Yemen based on its five corporate strategic objectives (SOs). Each SO is broken into more specific sub-categories and measurable indicators for each sub-category that can be observed and recorded. Although this organization provides a pragmatic framework for quantifying outcomes, the majority of outcomes were not recorded in a consistent or useful way.

157. First, it is unclear how Strategic Objectives, sub-categories, and measurable indicators are selected for each operation within the Yemen portfolio³⁹. Table 22 displays outcomes recorded based on sub-category. Notably, between 2006 and 2010, Strategic Objective 2 and 3 were not measured by any operation, and only one subcategory within Strategic Objective 5 was measured by one operation. EMOPs regularly record outcomes for Strategic Objective 1.1 and 1.3, prevention and reduction of acute malnutrition in children under-5 in targeted populations and improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted households, respectively. However indicators within those sub-categories were not recorded consistently over time. Although the CP reports on all of the Strategic Objective 4 sub-categories, within these categories over half of the measurable indicators have only one data entry between 2006 and 2010, or no recording at all.

TABLE 22: MONITORING OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES BY OPERATION

Strategic Objective	1			2			3			4					5		
	1	1.2	1.3	2.1	2.2	2.3	3.1	3.2	3.3	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5	5.1	5.2	5.3
DEV 101370	<i>under prior strategic plan</i>																
DEV 104350											▲	▲	▲	▲	▲		
PRRO 102320	<i>under prior strategic plan</i>																
PRRO 102321	▲		▲								▲						
EMOP 106840	▲		▲														
EMOP 200039	▲		▲														
EMOP 108060			▲														
EMOP 107670	▲		▲														
EMOP 200044	▲		▲								▲						
EMOP 106750	No outcome collected																
EMOP 107940	No outcome collected																
SO 200130	No outcome collected																


158. Second, each year has three data points for each variable, “baseline,” “previous,” and “latest.” Use of “baseline” and “previous” categories is used inconsistently within operational reporting. In some cases, the “baseline” data point is provided once at the beginning of the programme and is constant throughout, in others it changes year to year, and in others it is not recorded at any time. Finally, there are errors within measurement for some indicators such as an apparent change in the unit of measurement. Specifically, percentages and ratios are sometimes displayed as decimals, and sometimes whole numbers out of 100 which causes confusion and casts doubt upon the accuracy of data. For example, under CP 104350, the ratio of female to male teachers jumps from .06 in 2006 to 4 in 2008. While many of these may be

³⁹ The evaluation team found some inconsistency in the application of sub-objectives with the programme categorization guidance, e.g. safety nets are linked to SO2 outcomes but fall within SO4 under the WFP programme categorization guide.

small errors, taken across the portfolio as a whole the results-based management focus needs sharpening.

159. Where it is possible to extract trend lines or cross-sectional comparison with other data, WFP programmes show some positive outcomes. As shown in Figure 9, gender ratios of school enrolment in WFP targeted schools in both CP 104350 and PRRO 102321 have improved dramatically since baseline data in 2006. Compared to national data (WDI 2010), the ratio of female to male enrolment in primary school was 74 percent in 2005 and 80.4 percent in 2008, and in secondary school was 47.5 percent in 2005 and 49.4 percent in 2008. This may suggest that the CP achieved high rates of increase across both operations, and indeed a greater ratio than the national average ratio in the CP. While the ratio for refugee operation (PRRO 102321) has improved, it is still below the national average for the primary school enrolment gender ratio. The evaluation team makes no conclusion on these comparisons but it is worth further exploration and analysis.

FIGURE 9: CROSS-CHECKING OF GENDER RATIO OUTCOME DATA



Source: WFP CO and Project Documents

160. Health indicators, which are recorded only for CP 104350, reveal mixed outcomes. Incidence of low birth weight as recorded by the programme rose from 19 percent to 25 percent between 2006 and 2008, and then fell drastically to 8 percent in 2009. This merits further investigation, as discussed in the *Health and Nutrition* section. In addition, the reporting of data for leprosy cure rates and TB treatment completion lack consistency and require further analysis. Generally, cross-checking of these data should be done by the programme staff throughout the implementation period to help improve the data collections systems.

Factors Affecting the results: human resources

161. WFP Yemen now has 93 national staff members and 12 expatriate staff members. Most are based in Sana'a, but WFP also manages four sub-offices: Aden, Haradh, Amran, and Sa'adah City. The latter three deal with the EMOP for the IDPs from the Houthi Wars; while the first deals with the PRRO for the refugees from Somalia. The evaluation team was very impressed with the quality and dedication of both the international and national staff of the CO. Four of the international staff members, including the Deputy Country Director, speak Arabic, which permits the CO to make high-level contacts with non-English speaking Yemeni government and Al-Houthi officials.

162. A good number of the Yemeni staff members have worked for WFP for many years, and have internalized the ethos of the organization. They believe in the importance of the WFP mission and of its dual mandate and strategic objectives. The WFP should do its utmost to retain these valuable staff members even if funding dips in the future. As the international staff members come and go with relative rapidity, the presence and commitment of the Yemeni professionals and support staff members are keys to continuing efficiency and effectiveness. It was observed that good communication between senior management and all staff was a key success factor in the management of the operational changes over the portfolio period. In cases where operational re-designs are necessary, to take advantage of new funding or partnership opportunities, all staff must be encouraged to innovate and adapt the interventions rather than maintaining the status quo.

163. Given the increasing emphasis on chronic and large-scale malnutrition and food insecurity, the WFP lacks certain technical specialties among its cadre. With the commitment of the organization to nutrition objectives and Yemen's chronically under-nourished population, the WFP CO should reinforce its professional nutritionist staff numbers. To date, WFP has not participated actively in policy dialogue with the government and other donors for the development of the national nutrition policy. With a senior professional nutrition specialist, this could easily be corrected, as a number of government and donor staff mentioned how welcome WFP would be at the discussion of nutrition policy issues.

164. The government has emphasized in its policy documents such as the NFSS and CPPR the importance of economic development and employment generation. The WFP CO in Yemen currently does not have staff experienced in planning and carrying out food-based work programmes aimed at generating jobs for the large number of unemployed youth in the country. A senior staff member focused on livelihoods or social protection or economic development/income generation would help push all of the WFP operations in Yemen toward greater focus in these areas.

165. At this time, the CO has named two staff members (one international and one Yemeni) as focal points for ensuring that gender is considered in operational design and implementation. WFP has received praise from the Gender Capacity Advisor in the UNCT for including gender considerations in design and implementation of its operations. For example, for ration distribution to IDPs from the Sa'adah wars, WFP offers distribution points for women only and provides protection for women who collect rations for their families. The FFE-THR programme is specifically for girls' education; and the targeted nutrition programmes are focused on maternal and child health. Nonetheless, the WFP recommendation in its new corporate gender policy is to have a gender specialist on staff to ensure that all planning and implementation of operations in the country take gender balance into consideration. The evaluation team would caution that the focus be put on the functional roles of the gender focal points so that their roles do not become merely symbolic.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1. Overall Assessment

166. The evaluation team found that the WFP Yemen portfolio of operations, the overall performance, strategic decision making and alignment with the government of Yemen, are well placed to address the humanitarian needs in Yemen. In an increasingly volatile and political context, the WFP has scaled up its operations, found funding to address emergency needs, and played a key role in moving forward the national food security agenda.

167. The preceding analysis has focused on a wide range of issues and a relatively complex portfolio addressing both humanitarian and development challenges throughout the country. A

key factor in its successes thus far has been partially the experienced and dedicated staff who understand well the country context and the political context of operations in Yemen. In addition, logistical support for all funded operations is effective and efficient. Procurement of food on local markets, and long-standing relationships with in-country transport operators has meant that food distributions go where they are needed with remarkably few logistics interruptions.

168. Funding of its operations has been a mitigating factor in the attainment of expected results and indeed, in some cases, has limited the relevance and contribution of the under-funded interventions. This is the case for the non-emergency operations. In order to continue working toward key development objectives in the country, alternative funding options must be explored; the evaluation team observed that opportunities exist if the WFP operations are more integrated and coordinated with other development actors in the same sector and geographic locations.

169. The evaluation has made conclusions on the overall alignment of the portfolio, the factors that have driven the strategic direction and decision-making within the portfolio, and its overall performance in the food security, nutrition, and education sectors. The evaluation also analyzed the safety nets focus of the portfolio, given its emphasis in the latter part of the portfolio period.

3.2. Evaluation Findings

Alignment and Strategic Positioning

170. WFP operations in Yemen are generally well aligned with government humanitarian objectives. WFP has responded quickly and efficiently/effectively to government requests to help deal with crisis ranging from IDPs from the war in the north to the impact of high food prices in world markets on their most food insecure citizens. Most of WFP work in Yemen reflects government policy statements and priority fields of intervention.

171. The evaluation team found two general areas of divergence from the priorities of government and other humanitarian/development agencies. First, the use of cash as a safety need and in support of food security objectives is prioritized within key strategy documents and was discussed by key national-level stakeholders; the WFP does not feel that cash interventions are yet appropriate in Yemen and that they carry a high risk. However, monetization of the WFP food rations is also a challenge for beneficiaries in areas with thin or weak food markets and carries risks for beneficiaries. Second, some key stakeholders felt that many of the food security crises facing poor households in Yemen are chronic in nature and require development solutions rather than short-term relief solutions. This may be more of a strategic/fund-raising decision, rather than a technical, one, but the scale of WFP humanitarian relief operations does shift the overall focus of the response amongst all actors. There was, however, no consensus on this issue.

172. WFP works well with other UN agencies and NGOs in the context of UNHCR-managed IDP and refugee camps. The WFP lead on the IASC logistics cluster was commended by many stakeholders in humanitarian agencies and its co-leading of the food security cluster was also praised by those looking to see food security put higher on the agenda than it has been in the past. However, coordination with some UN agencies is varied. On the ground, implementation units working with the WFP and other UN agencies may share the same space, but do not coordinate or even necessarily talk to each other about working together and improving their impact on beneficiary groups. The UNCT is making efforts to have improved joint efforts and better coordination amongst the agencies but there has been limited progress thus far. This is an area where WFP could provide more leadership.

173. The evaluation team analyzed the extent to which the WFP Yemen portfolio matches the priorities of the WFP corporate strategic plan. The WFP country portfolio is closely aligned with

the organization's Strategic Objectives for the period 2008-2013. To varying degrees, each of the operations cut across more than one of the WFP corporate Strategic Objectives.

WFP Strategic Objective (SO) 1: Saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies

174. The WFP has concentrated on saving lives and is the lead agency in humanitarian response efforts in Yemen. The two EMOPs which provide rations for the IDPs from the Houthis Wars in the north of the country have ensured the survival of hundreds of thousands of people who have had to flee their homes and businesses/farms to escape the recurrent violence in and around Sa'adah province. The two EMOPs in response to floods in eastern Yemen (EMOPs 10794 and 10806) provided immediate relief to over fifty thousand people in danger of starvation from the loss of fields, crops, and businesses. The EMOP plans included such interventions as cash-for-work to restore livelihoods but the continued stalemate in Sa'adah has prevented agency access to zones where most IDPs make their living.

WFP SO 2: preventing acute hunger and investing in disaster preparedness and mitigation

175. The 2010 CFSS showed that acute hunger is chronic in many parts of Yemen, particularly when events such as the FFF crisis hit the country. This analytic work was a key contribution from the WFP to the broader humanitarian/development work in Yemen and identified the governorates and districts throughout the country that were the most food insecure, also validating the modelling work of the same from the government and IFPRI. This has permitted WFP and the Government's Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour to plan their HFP EMOP (10767) and its follow on PRRO (20038) to effectively target the poorest and most vulnerable regions of the country. The WFP implements its EMOP 10767 in conjunction with the Social Welfare Fund and in parallel to the SWF cash transfer. This has a safety net effect and is designed to mitigate the 'hunger periods' in Yemen.

WFP SO3: Restore or Rebuild Livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations

176. The WFP has focused for over a decade on providing food security for Somali refugees in southern Yemen. These consecutive operations work toward the objective of rebuilding their livelihoods and finding durable solutions although the protracted nature of the refugee crisis will require political solutions. In addition, the WFP found that rebuilding livelihoods after the floods in eastern Yemen was not an urgent need and they wisely refrained from entering that domain. The emergency in the North is not yet in a post-conflict situation, even though active military engagements have declined. WFP has made a good-faith engagement to enter the Houthi-controlled parts of Sa'adah province but have not been able to agree on conditions for emergency or transitional support to current and/or former IDPs there.

WFP SO4: Reduce Chronic Hunger and Under-Nutrition

177. The 2010 CFSS showed that a very high percentage of Yemenis, especially in rural areas, suffer from hunger and chronic, acute malnutrition. This is particularly true of vulnerable groups, including infants, children and lactating/pregnant women. The WFP high food price (EMOP 10767) addresses two main issues: chronic hunger during a defined period of the year (May-December) and MAM among vulnerable groups. By including nutritional support for vulnerable groups under an EMOP (10767) and now under an emergency PRRO (200038), the WFP has been able to strategically find funding to address chronic hunger and under-nutrition in spite of donor reluctance to fund these activities under the development operation. However,

the WFP does not have a clear exit/transition strategy under the short-term (EMOP and PRRO) approach, which is necessary given that these are chronic issues.

WFP SO5: Strengthen the capacity of countries to reduce hunger through hand-over-strategies and local purchase

178. In Yemen, where government revenues are declining as oil-reserves decline, and where the government faces both a recurrent war in the North and a secessionist movement in the South, the idea of handing WFP activities over to government or local non-state agencies has not proven viable. Training to complement the WFP operational implementation does occur, but this is not focused, at this point, on eventual hand-over of these specific activities. Indeed as the portfolio has moved from a development focus, where capacity building and handover options are expected, to an emergency response profile, there has been a reduction in the emphasis on capacity building outside of operational delivery.

179. Advocacy on long-term solutions and development priorities is an area where WFP/Yemen needs to improve. The government and the donor community, including the UNCT, are very favourable toward WFP work delivering food assistance in emergency contexts. However, WFP's excellent work on FFE-THR operations and on nutritional supplements for vulnerable groups has gone under-noticed and under-appreciated. This is due to WFP's failure to monitor and report on the impact of these development programmes and in part to their inattention to advocating for funding and cooperation from donors and other agencies. The CPE team, for example, was unable to find any publicity beyond internal WFP reports about the success of the FFE-THR programme, or about the positive impact of the nutritional programmes for the vulnerable.

Making Strategic Choices

180. The evaluation analyzed the strategic choices made over the portfolio period and factors that were critical to this decision-making. Generally, the influence of funding, the emergency situations/crises, and data/evidence was the most pronounced.

181. The funding environment has had a major effect on the portfolio and the choice of operations over the portfolio period. Given the prioritization of humanitarian emergency among the major donors, the WFP has pursued this funding and indeed this is aligned with its corporate mandate. However, there are many chronic issues in Yemen, e.g. malnutrition, food insecurity, etc. that are being prioritized with development solutions under government strategies and, for these areas, the WFP has had to carefully work within short-term programming modalities to address long-term/chronic challenges. This will likely continue to be a challenge as the donor environment is increasingly becoming polarized. For development operations, this particularly presents a challenge and the WFP must look at its available partnership options to plan and implement longer-term interventions.

182. Three major humanitarian emergencies, over the portfolio period, have been the determining factors in the WFP's strategic changes in its portfolio. The first has been the start and continuance of the Houthi wars in the north, which is now a major focus of the WFP's operational resources. The second is the continually increasing number of Somali refugees arriving on the shores of Yemen. And third is the high food price crisis of 2008/9. Both national and international attention to the effects of this crisis in developing countries was a significant driver of the decision to focus on chronic food insecurity throughout the country. The appropriate strategic decisions were made to respond to the IDP crisis in the north and the continuing refugee needs in the south. The food price shock of 2008 (and recently in late 2010/early 2011) were factors in an immediate response, but the WFP also used the opportunity created by increased awareness of chronic food insecurity issues on the part of donor to design

and fund a longer term safety net operation. Humanitarian emergencies thus have been a factor in both a reactive and opportunistic manner.

183. Through its analytic work, the WFP has been successful at placing issue of food insecurity, hunger and nutrition on the national agenda. Primarily through the use of evidence generated by the CFSS, but also through participation and advocacy by senior management, NFSS has focused on issues regarding access to food and overall availability of food commodities. It was noted that the WFP was very effective at ensuring these issues (proximate causes of food insecurity) were included in the strategy, rather than only a broader focus on livelihoods and income generation and rural development. The evaluation team concluded that the one-off data collection analysis and the regular monitoring and evaluation systems were most useful for the planning and the preparatory work of the overall portfolio. Strategic decisions to adapt/change operational activities are, however, based less upon the generation and use of evidence about the programme outputs and outcomes, but more upon the general humanitarian situation, security considerations, funding and discussions with implementing partners. Better outcome monitoring and cross-checking of data is encouraged.

Portfolio Performance and Results

184. The evaluation focused on the results of portfolio, analyzing the outputs, outcomes and their contribution to national objectives, and the factors that affected the results. The evaluation analyzed results across all operations, concentrating on food security, nutrition, education and safety nets as key technical areas. In addition, the evaluation was guided by the following DAC⁴⁰ evaluation criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The findings are summarized by these criteria.

Relevance

185. The evaluation concludes that the WFP portfolio was aligned well with the humanitarian needs of households in Yemen, including IDPs in northern and eastern Yemen, refugees in the south, and to vulnerable households affected by high food prices. The scale of the portfolio increased dramatically over since 2005/6 in order to meet the increasing needs of emergency-affected areas and the WFP is the lead response agency throughout most of Yemen. Chronic poverty and food insecurity throughout the country easily crosses emergency thresholds and the WFP is well positioned, logistically and strategically to take advantage of donor funding and to implement activities where needed. The use of the CFSS analysis to target vulnerable regions also ensured the most effective matching of resources to needs. The evaluation found no major issues concerning the alignment of the portfolio to meet humanitarian objectives.

186. Some considerations were raised throughout the evaluation about the appropriateness of humanitarian responses to generally chronic problems in Yemen, such as food insecurity, that require development solutions. The evaluation team does not consider the WFP portfolio to be off-base in this regard, but further discussion about meeting development objectives and further integrating operations with development partners, given the resources to do so, is warranted.

Efficiency

187. The evaluation examined the outputs across the different operations and considered their efficiency with respect to other humanitarian actors and especially in the modality of their implementation. Given the scale of the WFP operations the comparability of output-delivery to other agencies is limited. The WFP has, internally, focused on efficiency of its operations through procurement of food on local markets and competitively tendering local transport

⁴⁰ OECD DAC. 2010. NETWORK ON DEVELOPMENT EVALUATION; Summary of key norms and standards. 2nd Edition.

companies and other logistics arrangements. The long-standing contracts with reliable transport companies have limited liability and loss under difficult circumstances. In general, the efficiency of the portfolio has improved with the increasing scale of operations and better integration with partners. A good practice example is the close collaboration with the Social Welfare Fund to deliver safety net rations; verifying SWF distribution lists and complementing SWF cash transfers with a food rations provides efficient benefits both the WFP and SWF and far more beneficiaries are reached than a stand-alone operation could achieve. Further efforts at developing partnerships will improve operational efficiency.

188. The efficiency of some aspects of the portfolio was likely undermined by breaks in funding. The design of the safety nets and nutrition interventions require predictability and consistency of food rations; pipeline breaks operations cause confusion amongst beneficiaries and challenge implementing partners to respond to unmet demand. Further, inconsistent supplementary feeding, e.g. for TB/leprosy patients or malnourished children, may physiologically negate the positive potential benefits from the intervention. Thus the pipeline breaks experienced in the development operations, especially, have mitigated the efficiency of these interventions and may indeed have impacted upon their overall effectiveness.

Effectiveness

189. The extent to which the objectives of the portfolio were obtained was analyzed through available data and cross-checking with a range of key stakeholders. Generally, the outcome level data reported on WFP operations was insufficient to make this determination and indeed many operations are designed with aspirational objectives rather than those that can be realistically measured within the given timeframes. Notwithstanding this challenge, the evaluation concludes that the effectiveness of the portfolio is most evident in the emergency response and refugee operations. The rapid response to IDP food insecurity in northern Yemen has mitigated internal migration and met life-saving needs of the people affected by conflict. The same is true for the similar responses to floods in eastern Yemen. Over 14,000 refugees are reliant on rations from the WFP and they utilize these rations as a key component to their coping strategies. While improvements in operational design for the protracted refugee situation are possible, the evaluation notes the overall life-saving contribution to the refugee situation.

190. The effectiveness of the development-oriented aspects of the portfolio are limited, partially because of the limited scale of the operations and partially because of limited funding. The available outcome data for this aspect of the portfolio was inconsistent and key stakeholders, while appreciating the interventions, noted that they needed to be scaled-up and or revitalized. Other agencies in Yemen, working on similar issues, have developed robust programmes to address educational attainment objectives and chronic malnutrition; there may be opportunities for collaboration therein that would increase the effectiveness of the WFP inputs.

Impact

191. The positive contributions of the WFP portfolio to broader humanitarian and development objectives in Yemen were also most evident in the humanitarian aspects of the portfolio. As a lead agency, in terms of resources, logistics, coordination, and timeliness of response, the WFP contributed to the life-saving needs in the conflict northern regions and to the flood-affected areas in the east. In the refugee operations, WFP's contribution to the broader objectives, under the leadership of UNHCR, was overall positive and certainly contributes to the short-term food needs of the population in the Kharaz refugee camp.

192. There remain areas for improvement in both the refugee operations and in the development-oriented aspects of the portfolio. The long-term impact of general food distribution in protracted refugee situations is an open question and this component of the portfolio may benefit from further discussion on flexible solutions, including those currently

being proposed by partners. The contribution of the CPs to the overall objectives in the education and health/nutrition sectors is more limited. There is no evidence, beyond somewhat inconsistent data, that these interventions have made a lasting contribution to the national objectives. Significant under-funding has mitigated their effectiveness.

Sustainability

193. The evaluation focused on the degree to which the portfolio, and operations with the key sectors therein, has developed transition/hand-over options, capacity building strategies, and policy advocacy. In general, efforts in these areas are limited but also generally beyond the remit of the WFP given the circumstances and overall orientation of the portfolio. The government of Yemen has a limited capacity, especially at decentralized levels to manage and coordinate emergency response operations and institutional strengthening of this type is beyond the reasonable scope of WFP operations. Indeed, within the portfolio, training activities have taken place to enable WFP implementing partners, including government stakeholders, to manage operational implementation, but this is not institutional strengthening or capacity building in the larger sense.

194. The lack of funding for the development components of the portfolio was a major mitigating factor limiting its sustainability. However, there remains more opportunity through the CPs to work on capacity building, institutional strengthening and policy advocacy. The evaluation team observed that communication and policy advocacy with key national and sub-national stakeholders was under-utilized in the education and nutrition areas and that it would be welcomed by key stakeholders in the government and donor community. Even with variable funding of on-the-ground interventions, further efforts and upstream capacity building, dialogue and policy advocacy would increase the sustainability of these aspects of the portfolio.

3.3. Recommendations

Recommendation 1: WFP should consider balancing the focus of its operations to include both short and long-term aspects of the emergency and chronic problems in Yemen.

195. The humanitarian crises in Yemen are a mixture of shock events, e.g. flooding, and chronic problems that are tipped into the realm of emergency scenarios by conflict, high food prices, etc. WFP's mandate includes both the emergency response but also the transition and development objectives in these scenarios. Some of these crises are intractable, e.g. refugees from Somalia, high food prices, and will not be solved by food assistance alone. The evaluation recommends that the WFP begin to look at forming partnerships and leveraging its resources (investments, M&E, and policy advocacy) to address the long-term solutions to some of these crises. The broader debates on social protection for the poor households, food/cash for work, etc. are relevant here. While funding may be most accessible for shorter-term operations, the WFP can position itself as a key partner in longer-term programming.

196. Indeed there are some areas where opportunities currently exist to link WFP's operational activities to new solutions on the ground. For example, providing a transition ration for a specified period for refugee families who leave the Kharaz refugee camp to try to find work in other cities may be a viable option. Where IDPs in the north have begun establishing new homes and livelihoods in the areas of displacement, WFP should explore a transition from general food distribution to livelihood activities. In nutrition programmes, these longer term investments can include nutrition education, proper feeding and cooking practices, and innovative use of nutritious local products, including the products of home gardens. In education, it includes moving to a multi-sector approach that includes advocacy, teacher training, community mobilization, communication for behaviour change, water and sanitation infrastructure, etc.

Recommendation 2: WFP should revitalize its fund-raising for development-oriented operations in Yemen.

197. Due to a favourable environment for humanitarian funding, the funding for the WFP CPs has suffered. As a result, WFP has folded its nutrition objectives into its EMOPs and PRROs, while the FFE-THR operations have shrunk to a fraction of their original size and scope. Whereas ad hoc funding may be appropriate for emergencies, development programmes require longer-term and more stable and predictable funding. Therefore, WFP should design and implement a differentiated advocacy and fund-raising strategy responding to the needs of its development mandate.

198. An opportunity would be to assign (or hire) specialized staff to raise funds for these development objectives from the CO, the Regional Bureau, and from WFP headquarters. Increased staff capacity could also serve to further communicate and promote the development objectives within Yemen, through researching, documenting and communicating successes of the FFE programme, among others. Without this re-organization of fund-raising, the future of the CP looks very bleak.

Recommendation 3: WFP should further develop and invest in joint programmes and other collaborative partnership arrangements with other UN agencies, large NGOs, and donors.

199. WFP interventions are judged to be most effective when the agency works closely with other specialized entities to deliver interventions. However, in the CPs and in the nutritional components of the HFP EMOP and the follow on Safety Net PRRO, it is operating in much more of a stand-alone mode. This does not take advantage of opportunities to coordinate and collaborate with partners and provide a set of integrated services ensuring maximal impact from its contributions.

200. Working with WHO to provide de-worming with both THR and nutritional programmes and IMCI to beneficiary populations would be an opportunity. In girls' education interventions, activities to train and assign female teachers and carry out information, education, and communication campaigns for the PTAs and local communities to address not only economic but also socio-cultural inhibitions to girls' education are required. In addition, the construction and equipment of girls-only schools is another immediate opportunity. These complementary activities, implementable through partnership arrangements, would improve the effectiveness of operations and increase their sustainability. Joint M&E arrangements are also more likely to be more robust.

Recommendation 4: WFP should further emphasize planning, preparation with, and training for its Government and cooperating partners.

201. The evaluation noted that several (although not all) government counterparts and non-governmental cooperating partners wished to be "full counterparts" with more training, better equipment and a more participatory approaches to planning and implementation. This may make some interventions run more smoothly and avoid confusions and misunderstandings and would also significantly increase the counterparts' commitment to the WFP's programmes. The operations clearly seem to function better with more and more trained and equipped government counterparts. This also increases the potential for eventual handover of the WFP operations, especially in the education and nutrition sectors. The WFP should further emphasize its current efforts in this regard.

Recommendation 5: Strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems to compare results over time and space and to measure outcomes across operations.

202. The M&E unit effectively measures inputs to its programmes including distribution tonnage, funding, and beneficiaries. However, efforts to measure historical and spatial (intervention vs. non-intervention) comparisons of the results of these investments and intense staff effort have proven inadequate. This improvement depends both upon designing systems which measure impact and in training government and community representatives to collect required information a systematic and reliable way. This is particularly critical to enable WFP to raise funds for development programmes, where donors have a wide range of candidates for their money. If WFP can show clearly that their FFE-THR programme is not only enrolling girls in school, but keeping them in school, helping them learn more and graduating and finding employment this would no doubt help encourage donor contributions to fund the work. Similarly if WFP can show that distribution of food for pregnant women and children improves health services utilization and helps the country to reach Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 4, 5, 6 through decreasing maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality, this would no doubt help encourage donor contributions to fund the work. WFP should stress the importance of supportive supervision and on-the-job training to ensure the quality of data collection and reporting. In addition, there exists many opportunities to collaborate with other implementing agencies and government departments in data collection, analysis and dissemination exercises.

Recommendation 6: Increase technical capacity in the areas of health/nutrition and potentially in livelihoods/social protection.

203. In order to increase its participation in policy advocacy at the national level, the WFP should augment its staff capacity in health and nutrition. Greater overall staff capacity in this area would allow the WFP to balance field operations with higher level planning, policy and advocacy. Further expertise in livelihoods or social protection would also assist in establishing partnerships with agencies active in these areas and augmenting these aspects in future WFP operations.

Recommendation 7: Further disseminate the data and findings of the 2010 CFSS and plan for a follow-up survey.

204. The CFSS of 2010 was very well received and has become a key contribution in the analysis of food security and under-nutrition in Yemen. It should be further disseminated amongst all key stakeholders in Yemen and should be repeated regularly. The CFSS is a snapshot in time and thus less reliable for targeting of interventions where micro-climatic variations on an annual or even seasonal basis can have a major impact on food security, hunger, and under-nutrition. However, regular monitoring will build upon this baseline and carrying out follow-up surveys (perhaps every two years) will allow for longitudinal analysis.

Annexes

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

1. Background

1.A. Introduction

CPEs encompass the entirety of WFP's programme-related activities during a specific period. They evaluate the portfolio's alignment with and support to national priorities, the strategic choices and prioritization made in the design of the portfolio, and the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole. The evaluation exercise provides insights to assist in making evidence-based and strategic decisions about positioning WFP in a country, forming strategic partnerships, and in operations design and implementation.

The purpose of these TORs is to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation, to guide the evaluation team and specify expectations during the various phases of the evaluation. The TOR are structured as follows: Section 1 provides information on the context; Section 2 presents the rationale, objectives, stakeholders and main users of the evaluation; Section 3 presents the WFP portfolio and defines the scope of the evaluation; Section 4 identifies the key evaluation questions; Section 5 spells out the evaluation approach; and Section 6 indicates how the evaluation will be organized. The annexes provide additional information on the humanitarian situation in Yemen, WFP's corporate objectives, and more specific detail on the WFP portfolio in Yemen.

1.B. Country Context

Yemen is classified as a Least Developed Country, ranking 140 out of 182 countries on the 2009/10 Human Development Index, and is the poorest country in the MENA region. Yemen remains off-track in meeting most of the MDG goals⁴¹ and, although progress has been made in several areas, there are constraining socio-economic factors that increasingly challenge policy makers. Indeed, the demographic bulge (almost 50 percent of the population is under 15), urbanization, unemployment, high fertility rates, and resource scarcity are causes of increasing poverty and socio-political tensions. Significant gender disparities contribute to each of these as well.

Despite the 1990 re-unification of north and south Yemen, much of the country remains isolated from urban centres in mountainous terrain with poor infrastructure and access. The socio-cultural environment is often traditional and there is tension between the existing multi-party democratic system that officially governs the country and the traditional tribal customs that prevail in the rural areas. Partially due to these tensions, the conflict in the Sa'adah region of the north has created a significant humanitarian emergency over the past five years. With Yemen's proximity to Somalia, the refugee influx into the south-western Aden region has continued to increase for the past five years, with many secondary impacts on host communities throughout Yemen. Yemen has also experienced periodic natural disasters, primarily flooding in the eastern part of the country, most recently in 2008 (see annex 1). These natural disasters are exacerbated by climate change and associated effects. Significantly, it is estimated that major urban areas of Yemen will face water shortages within a decade with few alternatives currently in place.

Yemen's economy has been based on oil for several decades, with a corresponding redistribution through extensive subsidy schemes and civil service salaries⁴². However, oil reserves are

⁴¹ 2010 Yemen MDG Report.

⁴² 2009 World Bank/IFC Country Assistance Strategy.

dwindling and are expected to be exhausted in 10-12 years. Yemen's need to diversify its national income is challenged by dwindling resources, especially water, high unemployment rates, low literacy levels, and several governance issues. In its third five year Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (2005-2010), the government adopted several austerity measures to control the budget deficit in the face of declining oil revenue. Of particular concern are partial cutbacks in fuel subsidies that came at a time of food price increases; the combined effect leading to greater food insecurity throughout the country.

Food price increases in 2008 led to food shortages throughout many regions of the country and a corresponding WFP response in general food distribution. While prices have decreased since, food security remains a major challenge because of the high dependency of imported food commodities (90 percent of rice and 100 percent of wheat is imported⁴³). Indeed many poor households are partially reliant on government transfers, including through the government's Social Welfare Fund⁴⁴, to meet their daily food basket needs. There remain many potential efficiency gains in the government safety net programmes⁴⁵; these issues combined with reduced government revenue have limited the effectiveness of these programmes in reducing poverty.

Total public expenditure on social services has declined to 7 percent of GDP as of 2006, excluding fuel subsidies, and this is evident in the poor progress against key poverty-relevant indicators. Nationally, over 40 percent of Yemenis live under the poverty line with recent projected increases in poverty rates due to the food/fuel/finance crisis of 2008/9⁴⁶. There are significant equity issues with respect to poverty; rural areas, where over 75 percent of the population lives, have the greatest severity of poverty and highest poverty gap index and progress against poverty in rural areas have been far less than urban areas⁴⁷. Primary enrolment rates have increased modestly over the past decade but again show significant urban-rural and geographic disparities due to poverty and access issues. Yemen has one of the highest child malnutrition rates in the world with <5 wasting and stunting at 13.2 percent and 55.7 percent respectively⁴⁸. Infant and <5 child mortality are among the highest in the region at 53/1000 and 69/1000 respectively⁴⁹. The maternal mortality rate, at 370⁵⁰ is also the highest in the region and partially due to high rates of early marriage and inadequate maternal and child health awareness and facility access. Poor access to safe water, at 66 percent nationally, and improved sanitation, at 46 percent nationally, are contributing factors to malnutrition, morbidity, and mortality rates. In general, progress against key social indicators (see annex 2 for a summary) is hampered by high illiteracy rates among the adult population, high fertility rates and a consequent high population growth rate, poor access to social services, especially in rural areas with the rural population dispersed over at least 133,000 small settlements, and a widening food security gap. The production and consumption of qat is also a major issue, from its significant agricultural water consumption to its social impacts within communities.

The current government Development DPPR is built upon eight pillars that together lay out a plan for economic and social development. This is complemented by the National Reform Agenda and Public Investment Programme⁵¹, which are broad fiscal and governance public sector reform projects. The DPPR contains a number of objectives directly relevant to WFP's country portfolio, including agricultural modernization, increased primary enrolment through

⁴³ 2010 Yemen MDG Report.

⁴⁴ Support by donor (World Bank, EC) funds.

⁴⁵ Yemen Poverty Assessment. 2007.

⁴⁶ IFPRI Discussion Paper 00955: Impacts of the triple global crisis on growth and poverty in Yemen.

⁴⁷ 2010 Yemen MDG Report

⁴⁸ Yemen Comprehensive Food Security Survey. 2010.

⁴⁹ 2008. Data available from www.childinfo.org

⁵⁰ 2003-2008 unadjusted. www.childinfo.org

⁵¹ 2009 World Bank/IFC Country Assistance Strategy.

quality management and teacher training, improved primary health services, community-driven social safety nets through a broad-based cash transfer programme, and women's empowerment through enhanced employment opportunities. In addition, a new food security policy is being developed by the government of Yemen with support from IFPRI, World Bank, EC, GTZ, and WFP. A draft national nutrition strategy, yet to begin implementation, will complement the food security policy.

The current UN Development Assistance Framework (2007 – 2011) includes four overall outcomes related to i. Governance, ii. Gender equality and women's empowerment, iii. Population and basic social services, and iv. Pro-poor growth. The associated outcomes and outputs include results directly relevant to WFP's country portfolio including refugee rights, nutrition policies, early childhood development, health, and education, enrolment in basic education, community nutrition, food security, and targeted livelihood improvement programmes. Thus the WFP portfolio of operations fits within the rubric of the UN Country Team's plan of cooperation in Yemen. The next UNDAF (2012 – 2015) is currently in draft form and will be relevant to the development of the WFP Country Strategy.

2. Reason for the evaluation

2.A. Rationale

WFP's latest Strategic Plan (2008-2013) outlines five strategic corporate objectives and marks a shift away from WFP as a strictly food aid agency and toward broader development assistance objectives. This partly reflects the changing nature of food security globally, but also the changed nature of the aid effectiveness debate post-Paris and Accra agreements. Thus WFP country operations reflect a wider spectrum of humanitarian and development assistance objectives and each CO is required to develop a Country Strategy (CS) document reflecting corporate strategy and national priorities.

The rationale for this CPE is to review the comparative advantage and positioning of the overall suite of WFP Yemen operations vis-à-vis corporate strategic objectives, national priorities and the situation on the ground. In addition, the CPE will review the relative performance of the operations against expectations to determine lessons learned.

This CPE is timed to provide preliminary results and observations for the WFP Yemen design of its new CP and overall findings and recommendations in the design of the Country Strategy document. The CPE also precedes the finalization of a new UNDAF, for which the results will be relevant, and coincides with the roll-out of the fourth National Development Plan (2011-2015). Finally, the new 2011 CAP – Humanitarian Response Plan has just been finalized and will have implications for future humanitarian programming.

2.B. Objectives

CPEs serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the evaluation will:

- Determine the reasons for observed success/failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings that allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in the Yemen development context, improve strategic partnerships, and improve operations design and implementation whenever possible (learning).
- Assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Yemen (accountability).

The major emphasis of this CPE rests upon Objective 1 in order to assist the WFP CO in their further collaboration with national development partners. In addition, the emphasis on Objective 1 will assist in building linkages and synergies between projects and partners in a new Country Strategy context.

2.C. Stakeholders and users

The evaluation has a broad range of stakeholders and, corresponding to the emphasis on learning in Objective 1, country-level development partners and intended/un-intended beneficiaries are priority stakeholders. As such, the evaluation process will be implemented in a manner that facilitates positive discussion and dialogue among primary stakeholders. Table 1 below, and Annex 8 attached, provide more detail on the evaluation stakeholders, but a full stakeholder analysis will be done by the evaluation team during the inception mission.

TABLE 1: EVALUATION STAKEHOLDERS AND USERS

Stakeholders	Interest in the Evaluation
Internal stakeholders	
CO	Primary stakeholder of this evaluation. Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, it has a direct stake in the evaluation and will be a primary user of its results.
Regional Bureau and Headquarters Management	Both have an interest in learning from the evaluation results.
WFP Executive Board (EB)	Presentation of the evaluation results will inform Board members about the performance and outcome of WFP activities in Yemen.
External stakeholders	
Beneficiaries. Refugees in camps, IDPs, host communities, people with poor food consumption score, malnourished children and pregnant/lactating women, primary school children in food insecure areas.	As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective.
Government. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (the main overall counterpart for WFP). The main implementing Government partners are the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Public Health & Population, the Social Welfare Fund and the Social Fund for Development.	The Government of Yemen is in process of finalizing and implementing a new national development plan and a new food security strategy and has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP activities in the country are aligned with their priorities.
NGOs. Islamic Relief, Care, <i>Medecins Sans Frontieres</i> , StC, CSSW, ADRA, Red Cross/Red Crescent, etc.	NGOs are WFP partners for most of its operations in the country while at the same time having their own activities. The results of the evaluation might affect the WFP activities and therefore the partnerships.
Donors Germany, Italy, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Finland, Japan, Denmark, Ireland, USA, New Zealand, Greece, Switzerland, Netherlands, DFID, EU/ECHO (teleconference with regional office in Jordan), UN CERF, private donors	WFP activities are supported by a large group of donors. They all have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP's work is effective in alleviating food insecurity of the most vulnerable.
UN Country team UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, FAO, OCHA	The results of the evaluation will be used as inputs in the preparation of the next UNDAF as well as for development of yearly consolidated annual plans.
Others World Bank	

3. Subject of the evaluation

3.A. WFP's Portfolio in Yemen

WFP has been present in Yemen since 1967 and has provided over \$500 million US\$ in food aid and assistance since then. Generally the interventions have addressed food insecurity and acute malnutrition and more recently more chronic hunger and malnutrition issues. Annex 3 provides a summary of all operations that have been implemented to date.

Since 2005, WFP Yemen has implemented 12 operations with 4 of those operations still ongoing in January 2011. These include EMOPS, relief and recovery operations (PRROs), development programmes (DEV/CP), and one special operation (SO) building logistics capacity. The actual budget of WFP operations over this five year period is approximately US\$150 million with some operations continuing into 2011 and 2012. Additional operations have been recently approved for 2011 and, while outside the scope of this evaluation, continue to build upon the past work. Table 2 below provides an overview of the timeframe and budget (including time and budget extensions) of the operations covered by this evaluation. Table 3 summarizes the operations by focus and overall budget share. Table 4 summarizes the additional activities funded by separate grants.

TABLE 2: TIMELINE AND FUNDING LEVEL OF YEMEN PORTFOLIO 2005-2010

Operation	Country Programme - Yemen (2002-2007)	Time Frame	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
DEV 10137	Country Programme - Yemen (2002-2007)	Jun 02 Dec 06	Req: \$45.4 Contrib: \$33.6									
DEV 10435	Country Programme - Yemen (2007-2011)	Jan 07 Dec 11							Req: \$80.5 Contrib: \$20.5			2011
PRRO 10232	Food Assistance for Refugees	May 03 Jan 08		Req: \$3.8 Contrib: \$3.2								
PRRO 10232.1	Food Assistance to Somali Refugees in Yemen	Feb 08 Jan 10							Req: \$4.7 Contrib: \$4.8			
PRRO 200044	Food Assistance to Somali Refugees in Yemen	Feb 10 Dec 11								2011	Req: \$7.0 Contrib: \$3.2	
EMOP 10675	Assistance to IDPs in Sa'ada Governorate	Jun 07 Sep 07						\$0.5				
EMOP 10684	Humanitarian Assistance to IDPs in Sa'ada Governorate	Sep 07 Jun 10							Req: \$33.8 Contrib: \$24.7			
EMOP 10794	Immediate Response Emergency Operation Support to people affected by floods	Oct 08 Jan 09							Req: \$0.5 Contrib: \$0.4			
EMOP 10806	Food Assistance to Flood Affected Persons in Eastern Yemen	Mar 09 Jan 10								Req: \$3.9 Contrib: \$2.1		
EMOP 10767	Targeted Food Support to Vulnerable Groups Affected by High Food Prices	May 09 Dec 10								Req: \$ 61.2 Contrib: \$30.4		
EMOP 200039	Food Assistance to Conflict-Affected Persons in Northern Yemen	Jul 10 Jul 11								2011	Req: \$47.9 Contrib: \$30.4	
SO 200130	Air Passenger Service and Logistics Cluster Coordination in Support of the Humanitarian Response in Sa'ada	May 10 May 2011								2011	Req: \$0.9 Contrib: \$0.4	
	Food Distributed* (MT)		0	17660	25085	24689	19781	11410	14455	46419	126714.77***	
	Direct Expenses** (USD, millions)		n.a.	n.a.	7.6	7.6	7.9	6.5	12.8	26.6	n.a.	
	% Direct Expenses: Yemen vs. World		0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.4%	0.7%	n.a.	
	Beneficiaries* (actual, thousands)		M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	
			0 0	339.4 338.4	514.2 512.56	599.2 596.8	591.1 592.6	336 340.388	359.62 355.977	791.3 785.19	3524	

TABLE 3: YEMEN PORTFOLIO OPERATIONS AND BUDGET SHARE

WFP portfolio 2005 - 2010 by Programme Category													
	No. of operations	Total Budget	Weight (%)	Food Distributed (MT)									
				2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010*	
DEV/CP	Development	2	125.85	45%	0	15,754	23,691	23,265	18,436	7,806	6,288	12,613	19,251
EMOP	Emergency operations	6	139.29	50%	0	0	0	0	0	1,870	6,219	31,088	103,045
PRRO	Relief and Recovery	3	15.55	6%	0	1,049	1,276	1,424	1,344	1,738	1,946	2,719	4,419
SO	Special operations	1	0.53	0%									
Total		12	281		0	16,803	24,967	24,689	19,780	11,414	14,453	46,420	126,715

Source: SPR and Budget Revisions, WFP ODXR Programme of Work 4/10/2010, planned needs (*).
 1 As per latest SPR

TABLE 4: ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES FUNDED BY GRANTS

Main additional Activities Supported by Grants			
Donor	Contribution Year	Current allocated budget (US\$)	Activities funded
DFID UK	2005	71,010	Update of Community Food Security Profile (CFSP)
DFID UK	2005	101,137	Harmonizing and Strengthening of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems in Yemen CO

Source: WFP

The CPE covers the range of WFP activities within the 2005 – 2010 period. This includes analytic work and other non-operationally funded activities that were done as part of WFP's programme of cooperation in Yemen. The portfolio covers two strategic plan periods in WFP;

thus several operations were designed and began implementation before the current (2008-2011) strategic plan, and associated strategic objectives, was in place. This evaluation however uses the framework of the current strategic objectives to assess issues of alignment of the portfolio with corporate strategy. Table 5 summarizes the current corporate strategic objectives (SOs 1-5) and associated activities.

TABLE 5: SOS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES

Strategic Objective (2008-2011) ⁵²	Major activities
1. Saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ General food distribution ▪ Targeted food distribution ▪ Supplementary feeding ▪ Cash and voucher transfers ▪ Emergency needs assessments/analytic work ▪ Emergency logistics/cluster-lead
2. Preventing acute hunger and investing in disaster preparedness and mitigation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ VAM ▪ Disaster risk reduction (DRR) capacity building ▪ Targeted food, cash and voucher assistance as safety nets
3. Restore and rebuild livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Targeted food, cash and voucher assistance as safety nets ▪ Target food distribution ▪ Rebuilding essential delivery infrastructure ▪ Reestablishing community-level food infrastructure
4. Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MCHN ▪ School feeding ▪ Food/nutrition in HIV/AIDS/TB programmes ▪ Relevant policy and programmatic advisement
5. Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger through hand-over strategies and local purchase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Procurement of food/non-food item for producers/service providers ▪ Capacity building of local partners ▪ Policy and programme advisement ▪ Advocacy

The main activities of the Yemen portfolio cover the range of SOs 1-5 with specific operational activities often relevant to more than one SO. Table 6 provides a detailed breakdown of the operation by major activities and associated beneficiary shares. Further details are available in Annex 5.

⁵² See Annex 4 for further details on the specific goals and main tools under each strategic objective.

TABLE 6: ACTIVITIES BY OPERATION AND BENEFICIARY SHARE

	Education	Nutrition	GFD	Cash	FFW/FFA/FFT	HIV	Nutrition MCH
EMOP 108060			X				
EMOP 107940			X				
EMOP 107670		X	X				X
EMOP 106840		X	X				
EMOP 106750			X				
DEV 104350	X	X				X	X
PRRO 102321	X	X	X		X		X
PRRO 102320	X	X	X		X	X	X
DEV 101370	X	X			X	X	X
EMOP 200039		X	X				
PRRO 200044	X	X	X	X			X
SO 200130							

3.B. Scope

The evaluation covers the 2005-2010 time period and all operational and analytic work within this period. In light of the strategic nature of the evaluation, the aim is not to focus on individual operations but to evaluate the portfolio as a whole, assessing its alignment with international and national priorities, strategic choices given the food and hunger context in Yemen, and overall performance. As part of this scope, the evaluation will examine the analytic work conducted by WFP and the country office’s participation in key policy and programme processes in Yemen, not to assess methodological elements but to determine their overall contribution to the strategic positioning of the portfolio.

Given the distribution of funds and beneficiaries (see Tables 3 and 6) the major emphasis of the evaluation is upon the development and emergency operations. The EMOPS have focused primarily upon food assistance to people affected by high food prices and upon food assistance to people affected by the conflict in the Sa ‘adah region. The two development programmes (DEV or CP), running consecutively, have focused primarily on education and nutrition interventions. Significant funding has also been used in relief and recovery operations (PRROs) to provide food assistance to Somali refugees; while this is an important component of the portfolio, this assistance is also the subject of an upcoming joint WFP/UNHCR evaluation and will be less emphasized in this portfolio evaluation.

The geographic scope includes all areas covered by the portfolio. The map in Annex 6 shows the location of major operations and WFP sub-offices. The refugee camps near Aden (south-west Yemen) may not be covered during the field work, depending on the overlap with the other WFP/UNHCR joint evaluation field visits and stakeholder interviews.

4. Evaluation questions

The CPE addresses the following three key questions, which will be further detailed in a matrix of evaluation questions to be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. Collectively, the questions aim at highlighting the key lessons from the WFP country presence and performance, which could inform future strategic and operational decisions.

Question one - Strategic alignment of the WFP portfolio including the extent to which:

- i. its main objectives and related activities have been in line with the country's humanitarian and developmental needs, priorities and capacities;
- ii. its objectives and related activities have been aligned with the relevant national agenda and policies, including sector-specific policies;
- iii. its objectives and related activities have been harmonized and coordinated with those of partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs), reflecting also the extent to which harmonization and coordination was possible given the implementation environment.
- iv. there have been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies on the other hand.

Question two - Making strategic choices including the extent to which WFP:

- i. has analyzed the national hunger, food security and nutrition issues, or used existing analyses to understand the key hunger challenges in the country;
- ii. contributed to placing food security issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues;
- iii. positioned itself as a strategic partner for the government, multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners and in which specific areas; and
- iv. identify the factors that determined existing choices (perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organizational structure, monitoring information etc.) to understand these drivers of strategy and how they need to be considered and managed when developing a country strategy.

Question three - Performance and Results⁵³ of the WFP portfolio including:

- i. the relevance to the needs of the people;
- ii. the level of efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities and explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control);
- iii. the level of synergy and multiplying effect between similar activities in different operations and between the various main activities regardless of the operations; and
- iv. the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs) at operational level.

5. Evaluation approach

5.A. Evaluability assessment

The CPE will build upon past analytic work relevant to the WFP portfolio, including a previous evaluation of the CP⁵⁴ (but not the entire portfolio) in 2007. In addition, several recent assessment reports relevant to the situation of food security in Yemen have been published with collaboration by the WFP CO; these assessment reports provide a wealth of contextual information for the evaluation. A recent Real Time Evaluation (RTE) of UNICEF's response to the emergency in northern Yemen provides good background information on major issues in the inter-agency response in the Sa 'adah region. A WFP/IFPRI randomized trial of cash or food to severely food insecure households is currently underway and may provide relevant background information. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has done significant work with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation on poverty assessments, MDG reports, and national development planning in Yemen and the relevant reports are available.

⁵³ The performance and results of the portfolio should generally be assessed as a whole, including across operational divides, rather than assessing performance of each individual operation.

⁵⁴ Evaluation of the WFP Yemen CP 2002 – 2007,

NGO evaluations from Oxfam, Care International, and Save the Children also provide good background information on development partner activities in the Yemeni regions.

The 2005/6 Household Budget Survey, the 2003 Family Health Survey, and the 2003 Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information Mapping Systems Survey are the three prominent national surveys upon which most development partner programming baseline data is based. The last Demographic Health Survey was conducted in 1998 and is thus outdated, and UNICEF has implemented its 4th round Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey in 2008. The 2010 CFSS was a national survey covering a range of food security/nutrition issues and provides follow-up data although with different survey methodologies that limit time-series comparability.

Each WFP operation has its own logical framework and a project document with outcomes, outputs and associated rationale. These operations are under-pinned by and refer to corporate strategic plan objectives are also informed by relevant WFP operational guidance and strategy, e.g. school feeding, mother-and-child nutrition maternal and child health and nutrition (MCHN), cash and vouchers, gender policy, etc. Annual SPRS are prepared for each operation, and, in several cases, budget revision documentation is available that details revisions in timeline and budget for each operation.

Output monitoring is regularly conducted for all activities and this information is readily available. Outcome monitoring is generally beyond the scope of WFP in-country monitoring and evaluation work, but key indicators are available from government administrative and survey data, and from other partners' monitoring systems, e.g. UNICEF, WHO, etc. The 2010 MDG report, prepared by UNDP and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, provides a good overview of available demographic data and trends. The Office of Evaluation (OE) will share with the evaluation team an extensive library of relevant documents upon the contract signing (see Annex 9).

The main challenges in evaluating the WFP Yemen CP are the following:

- The concept of a 'portfolio' is not normally used by the CO; thus, no logical framework or overall plan for the entire portfolio exists. Rather, each operation normally builds upon a prior operation or a relevant new humanitarian situation on the ground without an overall perspective of a country strategy⁵⁵.
- WFP operational logical frameworks often list high-level outcomes and outcome indicators that do not necessarily correlate with the timeframe nor the scope of the operation; thus, evaluating portfolio performance must emphasize the contribution to high level outcomes in a long term multi-partner context largely through qualitative methods and triangulation of data.
- There is limited available data beyond output monitoring data and thus assessing outcomes and impacts in a systematic and quantitative manner will be difficult (related to point above)
- WFP in-country partners do not normally think of WFP's work as a 'portfolio' and thus various stakeholders may only be familiar with a small number of related operations, and relevant issues therein, rather than the full portfolio.
- Overall, the operations implemented over the 5-year period have only been funded to approximately 50 percent of requested funding (see Table 7). This will be a major factor limiting the full implementation of planned projects and reaching intended beneficiaries;

⁵⁵ Country Strategy documents are a new development in WFP and Yemen will be developing a Country Strategy document after this evaluation.

however, this is a systemic issue that all operations face and contingency planning should be a routine factor.

- Security concerns and limited access to many field sites; the evaluation team will have to work closely with WFP’s security and logistics teams to develop a selected list of accessible field locations.

TABLE 7: REQUIRED VERSUS EXPENDED BUDGETS

Requirements vs. Direct Expenses - Yemen (USD, millions)						
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Gross Requirements	14.3	16.1	12.2	29.6	63.1	99.0
Direct Expenses*	7.6	7.9	6.5	12.8	26.6	n.a.
Gap	6.7	8.2	5.7	16.8	36.5	n.a.
D. Exp. Vs. Requirements (%)	53%	49%	53%	43%	42%	

Source: WFP ODXR Unit (2010 figures from ODXR PoW 4 October 2010); APR 2009 and 2007 (*).
Gross Requirements: Needs (USD, millions); Direct Expenses (USD, millions): Excludes PSA costs.
*2008 & 2009 expenses are according to IPSAS and not comparable to 2007 & previous years' values based on UNSAS.

5.B. Methodology

The evaluation will follow the internationally agreed standards for evaluation in humanitarian situations, including the standard DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability) and the additional criteria for humanitarian evaluations of connectedness (as a factor in sustainability), coherence and coverage. Given the nature of the emergencies and general food insecurity in Yemen, the last three evaluation criteria will be important to consider in evaluations questions 1 and 2.

During the inception phase the evaluation team will design the evaluation methodology to be presented in the inception report. The methodology should do the following:


- Address the main evaluation questions 1-3 and related sub-questions
- Build upon an evaluation model (see Figure 1 below) that structures the operational portfolio as groups of activities and in terms of their contribution to overall strategic objectives
- To the extent possible, construct a logic model that integrates the main WFP Yemen activities to their overall objectives, with key assumptions including the contribution from partners, policy alignment, funding, etc.
- Utilize mixed methods and triangulate data from different sources, especially from a range of stakeholders at national, district and community level
- Clearly articulate the sampling strategy to be used including the rationale for purposive sampling of stakeholders and field sites⁵⁶
- Emphasize the learning aspects of this evaluation through a well structured process of participatory feedback and verification of findings

An evaluation design matrix⁵⁷ will be developed for the inception report in order to clearly link the evaluation questions with the methodology and associated methods.

⁵⁶ The field visit sample will be determined in consultation with the WFP CO and security personnel – it is possible that certain areas will be too insecure for safe travel of an evaluation team.

⁵⁷ Examples of evaluation design matrices, logic models, etc. are available from the Office of Evaluation.

FIGURE 1: EVALUATION MODEL FOR WFP COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATIONS



SO: Strategic Objective; SF: School Feeding; GFD: General Food Distribution; FFA/W/T: Food for Assets/Work/Training; ART, TB & PMTCT: Anti-Retroviral Therapy, Tuberculosis and Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission; OVC: Orphans & Vulnerable Children; MCHN: Mother and Child Health and Nutrition; P4P: Purchase for Progress.

5.C. Quality Assurance

WFP’s evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community. It sets out processes within-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It aims for quality assurance of evaluation reports (inception, full and summary reports) based on standardised checklists and templates. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. The evaluation manager will conduct the first level quality assurance, while the OE Director will conduct the second level review. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis. All EQAS templates and relevant documents will be made available to the evaluation team to assist in the process of formatting their deliverables and ensuring all quality elements are included.

The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases. The evaluation team should also emphasize the communication components of the quality assurance process through the

production of short summary reports that can be used to inform lay audiences and stakeholders about the evaluation at major stages⁵⁸.

6. Organisation of the evaluation

6.A. Phases and deliverables

The evaluation is structured into four separate phases of relevance to the evaluation team. Figure 2 summarizes these phases and more details are below. Annex 7 provides a detailed breakdown of the proposed timeline for each phase over the full 8 month timeframe, including the preparation and management response activities that are the responsibility of the evaluation manager.

FIGURE 2: SUMMARY OF EVALUATION

ID	Task Name	Duration	Start	Finish	Dec '10	Jan '11	Feb '11	Mar '11	Apr '11	May '11	Jun '11	Jul '11
1	Phase 1 - Preparation	35 days	Wed 08/12/10	Tue 25/01/11	[Timeline bar from Dec 22 to Jan 24]							
9	Phase 2 - Inception	15 days?	Wed 26/01/11	Tue 15/02/11	[Timeline bar from Jan 26 to Feb 10]							
21	Phase 3 - Evaluation Mission	21 days	Wed 16/02/11	Wed 16/03/11	[Timeline bar from Feb 16 to Mar 16]							
26	Phase 4 - Reporting	42 days?	Thu 17/03/11	Fri 13/05/11	[Timeline bar from Mar 17 to May 18]							
40	Phase 5 Executive Board and follow-up	20 days?	Mon 16/05/11	Fri 10/06/11	[Timeline bar from May 16 to Jun 05]							

Phase 1: Preparation

The key components of the preparation phase for the evaluation team are the contract signing, preparatory mission to Yemen with the evaluation manager⁵⁹ and the evaluation team leader, and finalization of the TOR.

Phase 2: Inception phase

The inception phase follows WFP's EQAS quality assurance system and consists of an evaluation team briefing in WFP Rome, followed by a document review and writing of the inception report. The practice in WFP is to have a detailed inception report with a comprehensive bibliography, detailed evaluation design matrix and finalized research tools. The inception report is then formally approved by the OE before field work begins.

Phase 3: Fieldwork and data collection phase

The fieldwork will take place over a three week period and follow the methodology and detailed timeline developed by the evaluation team. An internal (WFP) informal debriefing session will be held at the end of the fieldwork and supported by an aide-memoire providing initial findings and highlighting key issues. The aide-memoire will be used by the WFP Yemen CO to support the design of the next CP/development project and must be handed over to the country team prior to departure from Yemen. A second debriefing workshop with external partners will also be held at the end of the fieldwork, using the same aide-memoire and a presentation. Both debriefing sessions should be used by the evaluation team to gather further input and feedback for the final reporting.

Phase 4: Reporting

The reporting will take place over a two month period. The evaluation team leader is responsible for drafting the evaluation report and for ensuring quality control of the data, analysis, and presentation. The evaluation team is responsible for handing over copies of relevant data sets collected during the fieldwork. OE will gather feedback on the draft report from internal and external stakeholders and provide final approval. In addition, OE will ensure a management response is provided to key recommendations.

⁵⁸ The Office of Evaluation will assist the evaluation team, if needed, in translation of short documents into Arabic.

⁵⁹ Alternatively, the preparatory mission to Yemen can happen during the inception phase after the team briefing in Rome.

Deliverables:

The evaluation team are responsible for the following deliverables. The detail of each expected deliverable is available in the EQAS system and will be specified in the signed contract.

TABLE 8: TIMETABLE OF KEY EVALUATION TEAM DELIVERABLES

Deliverables	Date ⁶⁰ (tentative)
Draft inception report	11th February 2011
Final inception report	18th February 2011
Aide memoire and presentation	12th March 2011
Draft evaluation report	22nd April 2011
Copies of data sets	22nd April 2011
Final evaluation report	20th May 2011

6.B. Evaluation team/Expertise required

The evaluation will be conducted by a team of independent consultants with relevant expertise for the WFP Yemen country portfolio. The evaluation team will consist of a team leader and 2-3 subject specialists. It is critical that the evaluation team consist of at least one local consultant who is resident in Yemen and familiar with the development partner and government context.

The team leader is responsible for leading the evaluation team and for quality control of all relevant deliverables. As manager of the evaluation team, the team leader will have responsibility for the selection, in collaboration with the evaluation manager, relevant subject matter specialists for the evaluation team. The team leader is also responsible for communication and liaison with all relevant stakeholders, in collaboration with the WFP evaluation manager where required.

The subject matter specialists must be familiar with current issues relevant to food security, social protection, nutrition, education and gender mainstreaming. It is highly preferable that the subject matter specialists are familiar with the UN and WFP work modalities and ideally familiar with WFP programming.

The following specific skill sets are required:

Team leader

- Familiarity with the Yemen context
- Post-graduate degree with specialty knowledge relevant to food security and international development
- At least 10 years experience managing research and evaluations, either as an independent consultant or within an organization, focused on food security and related issues (e.g. Nutrition, rural sociology, agricultural economics, gender, etc.)
- At least 10 years (consecutive with above) leading teams of people in a multi-stakeholder, multi-cultural environment and a track record of producing results therein
- Demonstrable skills (through prior work and professional education or accreditation) in evaluation methodology and design relevant to food security and development country contexts
- A track record of publication and excellent English language writing and presentation skills
- Ability to work in difficult and insecure conditions

⁶⁰ Deliverables have been planned with respect to the Yemeni working week – Saturday to Wednesday.

Subject specialists

- Significant demonstrable expertise (through work experience and education) in social protection, nutrition, education, and gender
- Development and humanitarian experience relevant to the particular subject specialty
- 8-10 years post-graduate experience in research and evaluation
- A track record of written work on similar assignments
- Ability to work in difficult and insecure conditions

Yemeni evaluation specialist

- 8-10 years work experience within research, evaluation and public sector issues in Yemen
- Strong understanding of the socio-economic issues facing different regions of Yemen
- Strong understanding of the socio-political context and familiarity with different development partners and government ministries, departments and agencies
- University degree in a field relevant to food security, poverty, and rural communities
- Excellent Arabic language writing and speaking skills; working English language ability

6.C. Roles and responsibilities

This evaluation is managed by WFP's OE. Ross Smith is the Evaluation Manager and is responsible for drafting the TOR; selecting and contracting the evaluation team; preparing and managing the budget; setting up the review and feedback for the major deliverables; organizing the evaluation team briefing in Headquarters; assisting in the preparation of the field missions; conducting the first level quality assurance of the evaluation products and consolidating comments from stakeholders on the various evaluation products. The Evaluation Manager is also be the main interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.

The CO is expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation; be available to the evaluation team to discuss the programme, its performance and results; facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders in Yemen; set up meetings and field visits, organise for interpretation if required and provide logistic support during the fieldwork.

Relevant WFP stakeholders at the Regional Bureau in Cairo and in Rome headquarters will be available for interviews/meetings with the evaluation team and to comment on the various reports throughout the evaluation process.

To ensure the independence of the evaluation, the CO and Regional Bureau staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias the responses of the stakeholders.

6.D. Communication

In order for this evaluation process to be an effective learning process, the evaluation team will emphasize transparent and open communication with evaluation stakeholders. The evaluation terms of reference and relevant research tools will be summarized to better inform stakeholders about the process of the evaluation and the expectations of them. OE will assist in translation of summary documents into Arabic as needed, including the terms of reference, aide-memoire, etc. in order to facilitate dissemination to stakeholders. The final evaluation report will be translated into Arabic.

It is essential for the WFP Yemen office to have interim results and feedback during the process of the evaluation to better inform their preparation of a new programme. Therefore, informal briefing sessions on specific topics, e.g. education, nutrition, etc. can be scheduled during the process of fieldwork. Thereafter, two final debriefing sessions will be held, internal and external, and supported by a written aide-memoire and a presentation.

OE will make use of data sharing software to assist in communication and file transfer with the evaluation team and the WFP CO. In addition, regular teleconference and one-on-one telephone communication between the evaluation team, the evaluation manager, and the WFP CO focal point will assist in discussing any issues.

The evaluation inception report and final reports shall be written in English. It is expected that the evaluation team, with the team leader providing quality control, produce written work that is of very high standard, easily readable, and free of errors.

The final evaluation will be presented to WFP's Executive Board, along with the official management response to key recommendations. Thereafter it will be posted on WFP's internet, both internally and externally, and incorporated into OE's annual report. In addition the Evaluation Manager and the WFP CO will produce appropriate dissemination products, such as summarized presentations, lessons learned briefs, and other products that can be extracted from the collected data, e.g. case studies.

6.E. Resources/budget

The evaluation will be financed by OE. The evaluation team will either be hired through an institutional contract or through individual contracts. It is expected that the total budget for the evaluation will be approximately \$200,000 depending on consultant rates, international travels, logistics and security-related expenses, etc.

Annex 2: Bibliography

Document Title	Institution/Author
Social Exclusion Analysis- Yemen, Prepared for DFID and World Bank, January 2006	Adra, Najwa
Food Insecurity Yemen	FAO
The State of Food Insecurity in the World	FAO
Support to Information Systems for Food Security	FAO, WFP OE
Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission	FAO/WFP
FAO and WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission Yemen	FAO/WFP
Food assistance outlook brief	FEWSNET
Livelihoods zoning plus activity in Yemen	FEWSNET
Turmoil in Cereal Markets: Another Food Price Crisis?	FEWSNET
Health Sector Reform	Government
Millennium Development Goals needs assessment	Government
National Health Accounts 2007	Government
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2003-2005	Government
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2003-2005	Government
Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction 2006-2010	Government
Summary of the Second Five - Year Plan for Economic & Social Development 2001-2005	Government
Yemen's Strategic Vision 2025	Government
CP Action Plan CPAP 2007-2011	Government/UNDP
Assessment Study of Health Development Councils Yemen, Feb, 2011	IBF, EC
Yemen National Food Security Strategy, November 2010	IFPRI, Planning and international Cooperation
Rapid Assessment Study for the Governorate of Amran	IOM
Rapid Assessment Study for the Governorate of Hajjah	IOM
Humanitarian response plan	OCHA
Impacts of the Triple Global Crisis on Growth and Poverty: The Case of Yemen, Development Policy Review, 2011	ODI
Response analysis Consultation Mission August 2009	OMC, OMXD, OMXF
Common Country Assessment	UN
Development Assistance Framework 2007-2011	UN
Yemen Mid-Year Review, Humanitarian Response Plan	UN
Aids Epidemic Update 2009	UNAIDS
UNAIDS Epidemiological Fact Sheet 2008	UNAIDS
UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic/2010	UNAIDS
Development Assistance Framework 2007-2011	UNDAF
Arab Human Development Report 2009	UNDP

Document Title	Institution/Author
CP Document 2007-2011	UNDP
Strengthening the Global Partnership for Development in a time of Crisis MDG8	UNDP
Yemen 2008 Resident Coordinator Annual Report	UNDP
Yemen Poverty Assessment	UNDP/ Government World Bank
UNGASS Country Progress Report 2010	UNGASS
Country Data Sheet 2007	UNHCR
Yemen fact sheet	UNHCR
Yemen Global Appeal 2010-2011	UNHCR
Yemen Global Appeal 2011	UNHCR
Yemen Global Report 2009	UNHCR
Countdown to 2015 Report (2000-2010 Decade report)	UNICEF
Country Assistance Strategy	World Bank
The World Bank Annual Report	World Bank
Disaster and risk reduction (DRR) Policy	WFP
Accounting Procedures on the Use of Vouchers and Cash Transfers to Beneficiaries in WFP Operations	WFP
Cash and Food Transfers: A Primer	WFP
CFSS 2010	WFP
Consolidated framework of WFP policies	WFP
Evaluation of the WFP Yemen CP 2002-2007	WFP
Evaluation of Yemen CP	WFP
Executive Brief Food Security Survey	WFP
Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies Strategies for WFP (2003)	WFP
Food assistance programming in the context of WFP	WFP
Food assistance programming in the context of WFP: Ration design guide	WFP
Food for Nutrition: mainstreaming nutrition in WFP, 2004	WFP
Food for Nutrition: mainstreaming nutrition in WFP, 2004	WFP
Getting Started: HIV, AIDS and gender in WFP programmes	WFP
Global Update Food Security Monitoring	WFP
HIV/AIDS Policy (for EB approval)	WFP
Impact of Rising Food Prices on Household Food Security	WFP
Implementation Action Plan for Capacity Development and Hand-Over 2010-2013	WFP
Memorandum of Understanding between UNHCR and WFP	WFP
Micronutrient fortification: WFP experiences & ways forward, 2004	WFP
MCHN	WFP
New Approach to School Feeding	WFP
Nutrition in emergencies: WFP experiences and challenges, 2004	WFP
Regional Market Survey: Food Markets and Food Insecurity in Lebanon, Syria,	WFP

Document Title	Institution/Author
Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Palestine	
Sa'adah Update, 15 Dec 2010	WFP
School feeding and nutrition 2010	WFP
School Feeding Cost Tools	WFP
School Feeding Policy: Investment Case Manual	WFP
School Feeding Policy	WFP
Secondary Data Analysis on Food Security and Vulnerability	WFP
Strategic Results framework (related to WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2013)	WFP
Summary Report Evaluation of CP Yemen 101370 2002-2007	WFP
Sustainable School Feeding: Lifting school children out of the hunger trap	WFP
The Use of Cash Transfers to Beneficiaries in WFP Operations	WFP
Transition Strategy for Sustainable School Feeding	WFP
Vouchers and cash transfers as food assistance instruments: opportunities and challenges	WFP
Water Harvesting for improved drought preparedness using Food for Assets	WFP
WFP and World Bank Partnership: A New Approach to School Feeding	WFP
WFP Food and Nutrition handbook	WFP
WFP Gender Policy	WFP
WFP Nutrition Improvement Approach	WFP
WFP Strategic Plan 2006 to 2009	WFP
WFP Strategic Plan 2008 to 2013	WFP
Management Response Effectiveness of WFP Livelihood	WFP OE
Management Response to Evaluation of WFP's Capacity Development Policy and Operations	WFP OE
Summary Report of the Evaluation of WFP's Capacity Development	WFP OE
Summary Report of the Strategic Evaluation of the Effectiveness of WFP Livelihood Recovery	WFP OE
Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category	WFP OE
Thematic Review of Targeting in WFP Relief Operations	WFP OE
WFP-UNHCR Joint Evaluation of the Pilot Food Distribution Projects	WFP OE
JAM Yemen	WFP/UNHCR/ UNICEF
Food Security Assessment for the Flood-Affected Populations in Hadramout and Al-Mahra Governorates	WFP/VAM
Child malnutrition	WHO
Country Cooperation Strategy 2008-2013	WHO
Country Health Profile	WHO
WHO - Health Situation Report 2009	WHO
WHO - Situation Report 2010	WHO

Annex 3: List of Persons Consulted

Government of Yemen

Ministry of Planning and international Cooperation: Deputy Prime Minister Ismail El Arhabi,

Ministry of Planning and international Cooperation: Galal Mohammed Moula, DG,
International and Regional Orgs

Ministry of Planning and international Cooperation: Nabil Sofan, Ministry of Planning and
international Cooperation/Sa'adah

Ministry of Public Health: Prof. Abdulkarim Yehia Rasae, Minister of Public Health and
Population

Ministry of Public Health: Dr. Majid Al-Jonaid, Deputy Minister for PHC Sector

Ministry of Public Health: Dr. Jamila Saleh Al-Raihy, Dep. Min. for Population

Ministry of Public Health: Dr Amin Al Abssay, Director of the National TB Programme

Ministry of Public Health: Dr Hamood Al Montaser, Deputy Director of Nutrition Department

Ministry of Public Health: Dr Ali Jahaf, Director General of Family Health

Ministry of Public Health: Dr. Rashad G. Sheikh, General Director, Health Policy Support Unit

Ministry of Public Health: Mr. Fesal Qamhan, Acting Director of Nutrition Department

Ministry of Public Health: Dr Bushra Al Mofadal, Director of School Health Department

Ministry of Education: H.E. Abdul Salam Al-Jawfi, Minister of Education

Ministry of Education: Hamoud Mohammed Al-Akhram, General Manager of SF Project.

Ministry of Education: Akram Muda'a (SF Director Office Manager),

Ministry of Education: Abdul Wahab Al-Iriani (Head of M&E),

Ministry of Education: Abdul Razaq Abdurab (Head of Aid and Assistance Department) and
other staff

Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour: Dr. Amat Al-Razzak Ali Hummed, Minister of Social
Affairs and Labour

Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour: Adel Dahwan, General Director, Social Protection

Executive Unit: Abdullah Al Sharafi, Head of the Executive Unit for IDPs in Haradh

Executive Unit: Ahmed Al Kohlani, Minister and CEO of Executive Unit for IDPs

Hashem Al-Hamli, General Manager, Executive Unit Main Office,

SWF: Kaism Kaleel, Deputy Director, Social Welfare Fund (SWF)

School Feeding Department, Ms. Lamis A. Al-Iryani, Unit Head Monitoring & Evaluation

School Feeding Department: Mr. Khalid A. Moheyddeen, Senior Donors Relations Officer
Monitoring & Evaluation Unit

School Feeding Department: Dr Nahla, Nutrition section

School Feeding Department: Dr Ahmed Alhidary, head of Health Sector, WNC

Governorates: Hajja,: Mr. Abdulrazak Abo Salem, Haja City District Health Office Director

Governorates: Hajja: Dr. Waled Shamsan, PHC director, Hajja

Governorates: Hajja: Ibrahim Al Kohlani: Deputy Director of Hajja Governorate Health Office
Director

Governorates: Hajja: Saleh Nassar (Nutrition Department coordinator), Haja

Governorates: Hajja: Hadrami Hadi (Statistics and Information system Department), Hajja

Governorates: Hajja: Gamal Nasser Al-Ghusheini, Deputy General Director of Education Office (Ministry of Education) at Hajja

Governorates: Hajja: Munira Al-Haddad, Girls Education Director at Hajja

Governorates: Hajja: Abdullah Hussan, Assistant School Principle, Waheda School, Hajja

Governorates: Hajja: Al Jamhori Hospital, Hajja City District, Haja Governorate: Amat Al Malek Al Galal: Community Midwife: Nutritional Unit, Hamed Naser: Stores, Moath Al Shabani: Director of the Hospital

Governorates: Hajja: Saleh Nassar: Nutrition Department Coordinator, Hajja

Governorates: Hajja: Abdulrazak Abo Salem: Hajja City District Health Office Director,

Governorates: Hajja: Mezab Health Unit, Hajja City District, Haja Governorate: Ekbal Mohsen: Nurse

Governorates: Hajja: to Sharki Abas Health Unit, Haja City District, Haja Governorate: Norea Mohammed: Nurse, Faeza Mohammed: Community midwife

Governorates: Hajja: FFE Programme, oTaur Beni Gheis District, Hajjah Governorate (representatives: did not get the names)

Governorates: Hajja: Al Algarem Health Unit, KafI Shamar District, Haja Governorate: Alwea Ali: PHCW, Mohamed Ali: Medical assistant; Saleh Nassar: Nutrition Department Coordinator, Mohamed Al Masoody: District Health Office Director,

Governorates: Hajja: KafI Shamar Hospital, KafI Shamar District, Haja Governorate: Zenab Al Garb: PHCW, Abdo Galeb: Pharmacist, Saleh Nassar: Nutrition Department Coordinator

Governorates, Hajja, Al Meklaf Health Unit, KafI Shamar District, Hajja Governorate: Hagwa Ahmed: PHCW, Eman Al Remi: PHCW, Mohamed Abdo Saef: Administrator health unit, Saleh Nassar: Nutrition Department Coordinator, Mohamed Al Masoody: District Health Office Director

Governorates: Hajja: Mr. Mohamed Mohamed Al Mesawa, KafI Shamar District Health Office Director

Governorates: Hajja: Hassan Sherif, Director, Asma Bint, girls only school, Dar al Quansar, Taur Beni Gheis District, Hajjah Governorate

Governorates: Raimeh: Al Ta'awon school is situated in Bilad al Ta'am District: school principal, teachers, PTA members

Governorates: Sa'adah: Taha Abdullah Hajar Governor of Sa'adah

UN Country Team

UNDP: Pratibha Mehta, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, UNDP ResRep, UNICEF, Mr. Mohammed Bile, Chief of Basic Education and Gender Equality (BEGE),

UNICEF, Dr. Saja Abdullah. Nutrition Cluster Coordinator

UNICEF: Dr Agoshno Munyiri, Chief Health and Nutrition

UNICEF: Dr Rajia Ahmed Sharhan: Nutrition officer,

UNICEF: Mr. Nagib Abdulbaqi: Nutrition officer

UNICEF: Adnan Abdulfatah coordinator for the UNICEF office/Sa'adah

UNICEF: Geert Cappelaere, UNICEF Country Representative

UNICEF: Dr. Ali Ali Ghailan, Nutritional Consultant, YCSD, Sa'adah

WHO: Dr. Ghulam R. Popal WHO Yemen Representative

UNHCR, Jarle Tverli, programme officer education

UNHCR: Wala Abu Gharbieh, Associate Field Officer, Amran

UNHCR: Dr. Claire Bourgeois, Country Representative
 UNHCR: Nabil Othman, Deputy Representative,
 UNHCR: Berhane Taklu-Nagga, UNHCR, Head of Office, Haradh
 UNHCR: Faiz Harmal, UNHCR OIC/Coordinator
 UNHCR: Fatin Shaim, Head of Protection in UNHCR office Sa'adah
 IOM: Victoria Stanski Emergency and post crises unit
 UNFPA: Zeljka Mudrovcic, Deputy Rep.
 WFP/Yemen: Najeeb Al-Shaiba, Programme Officer
 WFP/Yemen: Teresita Mosquera, Programme Officer
 WFP/Yemen: Abdul Karim Al Hubaishi, Programme Officer
 WFP/Yemen: Ali Al Hebshi Head of WFP Sub office in Sa'adah
 WFP/Yemen: Gian Carlo Cirri, Country Director,
 WFP/Yemen: Adham Musallam, Deputy CD,
 WFP/Yemen: Yukako Sato, Programme Officer
 WFP/Yemen: Gamal Al-Magali, Senior Programme Assistant, Aden Office
 WFP/Yemen: Ahmed Al-Saidi, Programme Officer, Head of Amran Sub-Office
 WFP/Yemen: Ahmed Ismael, VAM Specialist
 WFP/Yemen: Abdulaziz Noaman, Haradh Sub Office Director
 WFP/Yemen: Georgia Warner, Reports, Media and External Relations Consultant
 WFP/Yemen: Yasir Hakim, WFP Data Base Manager, Sa'adah;
 WFP/Yemen, Imed Khanfir, Programme Officer
 WFP/Yemen: Lucy Mukuria, Nutritionist
 WFP/Yemen: Sadik Ibrahim, Logistics Officer
 WFP/Yemen: Abeer A. Noman, Senior Security Assistant
 WFP/Yemen: Zeff H. Kapoor, Logistics Officer
 WFP/Yemen: Sayaka Sato, Programme officer
 OCHA: Raul Rosende (Head of Office)
 OCHA: Carlos Abbas Geha (Deputy Head of Office)
 OCHA: Tareq Talahma, Humanitarian Affairs Officer/Haradh,
 UNDSS: Simon Butt, Chief security Adviser
 UNDSS: Yusuke Kodo, Security Information Analyst
 UNDSS: Michael Center, Chief SIOC
 FAO: Dr. Fuad Aldomy, Representative
 Gender CAP: Peter Ekayu Gender Capacity Advisor, UNHT
 Other donors:
 EC: Dr Sarah Bernhardt, EC mission Health specialist
 EC: Damien Buchon, Programme Manager, Food Security
 GIZ: Dr. Karl-Ludwig Zils, Evaluation Team Leader
 KfW: Dr. Bernd Schonewald, Director
 Netherlands: Dr Mohamed Aideroos Al-Sakaff, Senior Programme Officer, Health
 USAID: Dana Stinson, Deputy Director, Technical Programme
 USAID: Jeff Ashley, Country Director

USAID: Sean Jones, Director, Programmes
DfID: Joanna Reid, DfID Country Representative and Head of Office
World Bank: Kamal Braham, Senior Education Specialist
World Bank: Benson Ateng, Country Manager
World Bank: Josephine Masanque, Senior Portfolio Specialist
World Bank: Naji Abu Hatim, Senior Rural Development Specialist
JICA: Ms. Joshie Hama, Project Formulation Adviser
JICA: Ms. Yuki Takako Research Fellow
JICA: Dr Toru Rikimaru, Chief Adviser, Community Nutrition and Mother and Child Health

NGOs

Islamic Relief: Khalid Ahmed Almulad, Country Director,
Islamic Relief: Yassir Khairi, Emergency Officer
Islamic Relief: Khalid Mohamed Qudam WFP/IR Team Leader, Haradh
Islamic Relief: Mohamed Al Fareq, Implementation Support, Haradh
Islamic Relief: Rania Sabbah, Camp Manager, Camp 1, Islamic Relief/Haradh
Islamic Relief: Saddam Hussein Ahmed Al-Abdeeni, Project Coordinator, Sa'adah
ADRA, Nagi Khalil Country Director
ICRC: Klaus Spreyermann, Head of Sub-Delegation, ICRC/Sa'adah
ICRC: Ibrahim El-Nigomi, Communication Delegate, Sa'adah
YWU
Yemen Polling Center: Chris Miller, Senior Research Analyst

WFP/Rome

Marian Reed, OEs, Leader of the group of CPE managers
Nasiba Nabi, WFP Procurement
Ross Smith, Evaluation Manager (Yemen)
Michel Denis, Evaluation Manager (Haiti)
Francois de Moulder, Haiti CPE Logistics Specialist (DAI, Haiti CPE Team)
Silvia Biondi, HIV Specialist, Programme Office, Programme Design and Support
Naila Sabra, former Director, Yemen CO, now Chief of Office, Operations Department
Linda Kiess, Nutrition Programme Advisor, Programme Design Unit
Emilie Sidaner, SF
Paul Turnbull, Senior Programme Advisor, Programme Cycle Unit
Arif Husain, Deputy Chief, Food Security Analysis Services
Claudia Ah Poe, Programme Advisor (VAM)
Ceren Gurkan, Market Analyst, Food Security Analysis Service, VAM Team
Caroline Heider, Director OE
John Prout, Cash and Vouchers Unit
Francesco Giusso, Procurement Officer
Antonio Salort Pons, Donor Relations
Kjersti Dale, Gender Unit

Svante Helms, Programme Officer, Division of Performance and Accountability
Federica Zelada, Information Specialist

DAI

Gaelle Le Pottier, Yemen Country Representative
Chuck Chopak, Coordinator of Relations with WFP
Katie Taratus, Advisor

Annex 4: Methodology/Evaluation Matrix

EVALUATION MATRIX: ISSUE #1: STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT OF WFP/YEMEN PORTFOLIO

Key Questions for the Evaluation	Main Sources	Indicators	Analyses
i) its main objectives and related activities have been in line with the country's humanitarian and developmental needs, priorities and capacities			
What were the main humanitarian and development needs, priorities, and capacities during 2005 - 2010?	World Bank, WFP docs, FEWS NET, Government docs	Importance of issues in Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis, & government docs	Chronology of key events
Were the objectives of WFP operations and activities clear and consistent with these needs, priorities, and capacity?	WFP docs Staff interviews (esp CD, DCD) Partner interviews	Alignment of WFP strategy with development needs in programme operations docs	Qualitative assessment
How did changes in the humanitarian and development conditions on the ground influence changes in operations (timing, content)?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Evidence of adaptations to WFP programmes	Comparison of key events and WFP objectives
Is there alignment of WFP's operations with main focus of the government as highlighted in Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and sectoral policies in terms of objectives, geographical areas of focus, and activities?	WFP docs Staff interviews (esp CD, DCD) Partner interviews	Alignment of WFP strategy in programme operations docs	Qualitative assessment
If not aligned, are Government objectives in sync with assessment results, etc?	WFP docs Staff interviews (esp CD, DCD) Partner interviews	Alignment of government strategy with development needs	Qualitative assessment
How do WFP's strategies for addressing issues of nutrition, gender, education and food insecurity at different levels work together (different needs in different regions)?	WFP docs Staff interviews (esp CD, DCD) Partner interviews	Alignment of programme planning with regional needs	Qualitative assessment
Are the objectives of WFP operations aligned with the relevant Millennium Development Goals?	WFP docs Staff interviews (esp CD, DCD) Partner interviews	MDG Monitor MDG Report 2010	Qualitative assessment
How do WFP's objectives and activities regarding gender, social protection, and food security fit into the overall strategy and general political orientation in Yemen? And at what level of priority?	WFP docs Staff interviews (esp CD, DCD) Partner interviews	Presence in the general political strategy documents	Qualitative assessment
What is the capacity (financial and organizational) of WFP and counterparts in the areas of intervention? Is the resource allocation appropriate to the development need?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Degree of success in implementation in different regions	Qualitative assessment
ii) its objectives and related activities have been aligned with the relevant agenda and policies, including sector-specific policies			
Did the Government have a stated agenda related to emergency assistance, food security, gender, health/nutrition, and education/SF?	Government docs Partner interviews	Existence of government strategy	Qualitative assessment
Was this agenda adhered to (sufficient resources and follow up)?	Government docs Partner interviews	Government programme funding records	Qualitative assessment
Were the objectives of WFP operations and activities clear and consistent with the stated humanitarian and development agenda?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Alignment of WFP strategy with government strategy	Qualitative assessment

Key Questions for the Evaluation	Main Sources	Indicators	Analyses
Did this agenda change over the 2005 – 2010 time period? If yes, what were the changes?	Government docs Partner interviews	Evidence of adaptations to government strategies	Qualitative assessment
iii) its objectives and related activities have been harmonized and coordinated with those of partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs), reflecting also the extent to which harmonization and coordination was possible given the implementation environment			
Were partner objectives and strategies clearly stated and available?	Partner docs Partner interviews	Existence of partner strategies	Qualitative assessment
How did the composition and activities of partners change during 2005 – 2010?	WFP docs Partner docs Partner interviews	MOUs over time	Qualitative assessment
Were WFP staff aware of partner objectives and strategies?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Evidence of adaptations to partner strategies	Qualitative assessment
Were WFP objectives coherent and harmonized with its partners?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Evidence of adaptations to partner strategies	Qualitative assessment
To what extent did the objectives of WFP receive support and backing from the donors? Did the donors have a good reading and understanding of the WFP's objectives?	Donor community WFP programme manager	Programme funding records	Qualitative assessment
Has WFP, in the course of the period under review, been compelled to modify or alter its objectives in order to accommodate the views and/or priorities of the donors?	Donor community WFP programme manager	Programme funding records	Qualitative assessment
Was there a deliberate strategy or strategic planning tool to situate WFP well in the context and focus on comparative advantage?	WFP docs Staff interviews (esp CD, DCD) Partner interviews	Evidence of strategy or tool	Qualitative assessment
Do synergies exist between WFP operations and the relevant objectives in the UN Development Assistance Framework 2007-2011?	WFP docs Staff interviews (esp CD, DCD) Partner interviews	Existence of MOUs, implementation reports, etc.	Qualitative assessment
iv) there have been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies on the other hand			
Were trade-offs between aligning with national strategies and WFP strategic plans and corporate policies necessary?	WFP docs Staff interviews (esp CD, DCD, and programme)	Evidence of adaptations to accommodate discrepancies	Qualitative assessment
Was the evolution of WFP corporate strategy over the course of the evaluation period, particularly the introduction of the new strategic plan, presented and discussed with different partners?	Staff interviews (esp CD, DCD) Partner interviews	Communication plan/report	Qualitative assessment
Were there periods where WFP was not able to realize its strategic plan because of a lack of resources?	WFP docs Staff interviews (esp CD, DCD, and programme)	Programme evaluation reports	Qualitative assessment
What strategies did WFP adopt in order to communicate internal or external repositioning to partners? Memos, meetings, revision of agreements?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Communication plan/report	Qualitative assessment
What were the major positive or negative impacts of WFP's strategic realignment and how were they surmounted?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Programme evaluation reports	Qualitative assessment

EVALUATION MATRIX: ISSUE #2: MAKING STRATEGIC CHOICES

Key Questions	Main Sources	Indicators	Analyses
i) Has analyzed the national hunger, food security, education, and nutrition issues, or used existing analyses to understand the key hunger challenges in the country			
What analytical framework was used?	WFP docs Staff interviews	Project planning documents	Qualitative assessment
Did the analytical framework that was used allow for a consistent determination of key nutrition, education, and food security indicators?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Consideration of issues in project planning docs	Qualitative assessment
Did key WFP documents reflect the national hunger, food security, education, and nutrition issues during 2005 - 2010?	WFP docs (operations, SPRs, ...)	Alignment of WFP strategy with development needs in programme operations docs	Qualitative assessment
Role of assessments/surveys in generating and using analysis to make strategic choices? Was the data collection and analysis done: Timely? High enough quality? Sufficient coverage? Credible?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Consideration of issues in project planning docs	Qualitative assessment
Was the analysis used in making decisions (broad strategy, geographic location of activities, technical choices, or operational choices)?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Consideration of issues in project planning docs	Qualitative assessment
Were evaluations or reviews done? If yes, were they: Timely? High enough quality? Sufficient coverage? Credible?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Programme evaluation reports	Qualitative assessment
Is monitoring data being collected (both output and outcome), and is it: Done when needed? Timely? Quality? Used to strengthen portfolio performance?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	System analysis	Qualitative assessment
How were response strategies developed? Were they based on: Donors' interest? Resource level and balancing/distribution of different funding levels for different operations? Context realities (e.g., security, staffing, access, time limitations)? Absence of accountability mechanisms?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Consideration of issues in project planning docs	Qualitative assessment
Were data and information available on national hunger, food security, education, and nutrition issues during 2005 - 2010?	World Bank, WFP docs, FEWS NET, Government docs	Existence of data sets	Qualitative assessment
Were staff available to do this analysis consistently over this time frame?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Reliability and consistency of M&E data	Qualitative assessment
ii) contributed to placing food security issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues			
Is there an official WFP policy that outlines the role and expectations for COs?	WFP Rome docs and interviews	Existence of policy	Qualitative assessment
If yes, are the expectations clear and have they been communicated adequately to the CO? Are these expectations realistic?	WFP Rome docs and interviews WFP CO docs and interviews	Communication plan/report	Qualitative assessment
What specific actions/activities has the CO undertaken to place these issues on the national agenda?	Staff interviews Partner interviews (especially Government)	Evidence of WFP leadership in elevating issue at national level	Qualitative assessment
What specific actions/activities has the CO undertaken to place these issues on partner agendas? Has WFP been proactive within the UNCT and with partners as a leader or advocate for	Staff interviews Partner interviews	Evidence of WFP leadership in elevating issue with partners	Qualitative assessment

Key Questions	Main Sources	Indicators	Analyses
current and chronic food security, nutrition, and education issues?			
Did WFP look for complementary interventions in nutrition, education, or food security to address the main determinants of issues in these sectors?	Staff interviews Partner interviews	Evidence of partnership exploration; MOUs	Qualitative assessment
What specific actions/activities has the CO undertaken to develop national capacity?	Staff interviews Partner interviews	Informal and/or formal training opportunities	Qualitative assessment
Is WFP seen as a leader in terms of food security, hunger, nutrition and education issues?	Partner interviews	Partner perception	Qualitative assessment
How active is WFP in cluster issues? Is there a strategy to advocate for food security issues or just operational coordination?	WFP docs Staff interviews (esp CD, DCD) Partner interviews	Participation and leadership at cluster meetings Existence of strategy	Qualitative assessment
iii) positioned itself as a strategic partner for the government, multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners and in which specific areas			
How has WFP dialogued with government, multilateral, bilateral, and NGO partners?	Staff interviews Partner interviews	Meeting minutes/participation	Qualitative assessment
How do these partners perceive WFP as a strategic partner?	Partner interviews	Partner perception; MOUs	Qualitative assessment
How would partners have liked to change the nature of this relationship?	Partner interviews, SWOT	Partner perception	Qualitative assessment
What would WFP like to see changed in the nature of their relationship with different partners (Government, other UN agencies, donors, NGOs)?	Staff interviews Partner interviews, SWOT	Staff perception	Qualitative assessment
Have WFP or other UN agencies taken advantage of WFP's leadership role in the field of logistics? Sharing of transport, warehousing and monitoring facilities?	Partner interviews	Evidence of shared logistics chains	Qualitative assessments
iv) identify the factors that determined existing choices (perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organizational structure, monitoring information, etc.) to understand these drivers of strategy and how they need to be considered and managed when developing a country strategy			
What were the drivers of strategic choices made by WFP during 2005 - 2010?	Staff interviews	Project planning docs	Qualitative assessment
Were these drivers the most effective ones?	Staff interviews Partner interviews	Expected vs. actual impact	Qualitative assessment
Were there other objectives that might have been more important (e.g., water and sanitation) that might have contributed more to food security and nutrition outcomes?	Staff interviews Partner interviews	Expected vs. actual impact	Qualitative assessment
How were these strategic choices perceived by partners (Government, other UN agencies, donors, NGOs, and beneficiaries)?	Partner interviews	Partner perception; budgeted vs. funded amounts; strategic partnerships	Qualitative assessment

EVALUATION MATRIX: ISSUE #3: PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS OF THE WFP/YEMEN PORTFOLIO

Key Questions	Main Sources	Indicators	Analyses
i) the relevance to the needs of the people			
Was programme development adapted based on documented needs?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Evidence of adaptations to development context	Qualitative assessments
Were the programmes operationally realistic and did they take into account changing contexts?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Expected vs. actual impact	Qualitative assessments
Were appropriate partners identified?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	MOUs	Qualitative assessments
Do the WFP interventions respond to unique regional conditions?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Evidence of adaptations to regional context	Qualitative assessments
Are the food products provided culturally and nutritionally appropriate for the target beneficiaries?	WFP docs Partner interviews Beneficiary interviews	Level of satisfaction of beneficiaries	Qualitative assessments
Are the short and long term goals of WFP interventions complementary?	WFP docs Staff interviews	Evidence that short term planning is aligned with long term strategy	Qualitative assessments
ii) the level of efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities and explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control)			
How efficient has programme delivery been for the different technical activities (FFW, SF, nutrition, logistics)?	Operation documents WFP CO Partner interviews Clinic/school/camp records	Transit times Final cost Compliance with agreed-upon time frame Quality of information exchange	Review of actual cost Least cost method Competitors cost Cost of other options
How effective has programme delivery been for the different technical activities (FFW, school feeding, nutrition, logistics)?	WFP documents (e.g., project, SPR, JAM, ...) WFP CO Partner interviews Beneficiary interviews Clinic/school/camp records	Quantity and quality of food aid secured	Qualitative assessments
What impact has the programme activities had? Nutritional status improved? Improved access to education? Policy changes? Other stakeholder impacts?	Data and information from World Bank, VAM, SPRs, JAMs, FEWS NET WFP documents (e.g., project, SPR, JAM, ...) WFP CO Partner interviews Clinic/school/camp records Beneficiary interviews	global acute malnutrition /severe acute malnutrition rates MUAC Chronic malnutrition rates Micronutrient deficiencies Disease rates Clinic/school attendance (male, female, total) Quality of clinic/school facilities	Quantitative analysis (establish baseline and compare with trend data) Qualitative assessment

Key Questions	Main Sources	Indicators	Analyses
		Clinic staff/teacher qualifications Literacy rates percent of pop food security Income Calorie intake per day etc	
How sustainable are outcomes of the operations, including outcomes and continuity? Is there an exit strategy around each action?	Data and information from the World Bank and Government WFP CO Partner interviews Beneficiary interviews	Public expenditure data and assessment of will, capacity, and resource availability Partner, government, and beneficiary perception of activities and their appropriateness	Institutional assessment of government using public expenditure data and qualitative assessment Qualitative assessment of perception of activities
Are efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability realistic goals in Yemen (because of the cost, insecurity, seasonality of delivery ...)?	WFP CO Partner interviews	Expected vs. actual impact	Qualitative assessment
What technical support role does the Regional Bureau play? Are they helping to fill gaps in capacity?	WFP staff interviews	Staff perception	Qualitative assessment
Do the Special Operations support the emergency and development operations? If so, how? What else is needed to support operations?	WFP CO Partner interviews	Evidence of logistics support from SO	Qualitative assessment
Does WFP have the correct staffing structure to undertake the necessary operations in Yemen? Do the staff have the correct skill sets? Are they properly supported by Rome and Regional Bureau?	WFP CO Partner interviews	Impact of interventions compared to need	Qualitative assessment
To what degree do external factors, such as insecurity and government capacity, have on the level of efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the main WFP portfolio activities?	WFP CO Partner interviews	Programme evaluation reports	Qualitative assessment
Was the level of participation from different communities sufficient? If not, why not?	WFP CO Partner interviews Beneficiary interviews	Evidence of community ownership	Qualitative assessment
Do beneficiaries value the interventions?	Beneficiary interviews	Beneficiary perception	Qualitative assessment
iii) the level of synergy and multiplying effect between similar activities in different operations and between the various main activities regardless of the operations			
How well do the technical staff working on different operations interact (share data, information, lessons learned)?	WFP CO(Sana'a and ad sub-offices)	Formal and informal KM mechanisms	Qualitative assessment
How well does the WFP CO team work with their sub-office technical counterparts (share data, information, lessons learned)?	WFP CO(Sana'a and ad sub-offices)	Formal and informal KM mechanisms	Qualitative assessment
What are staff perceptions on what has increased or limited working together regardless of operation?	WFP CO(Sana'a and ad sub-offices)	Partnering incentive structure	Qualitative assessment
What are staff perceptions on how WFP Rome resources could be leveraged to improve synergy	WFP CO(Sana'a and ad sub-offices)	Partnering incentive structure	Qualitative assessment

Key Questions	Main Sources	Indicators	Analyses
and the multiplying effect of CO activities?			
How is the impact of synergies between complementary activities measured?	WFP CO(Sana'a and ad sub-offices)	Formal and informal KM mechanisms	Qualitative assessment
iv) the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners (multilateral, bilateral, and NGOs) at operational level			
How well do WFP staff interact with partners (share data, information, lessons learned)?	WFP staff Partners (government, multilateral, bilateral, and NGOs)	Formal and informal KM mechanisms	Qualitative assessment
How well does the WFP staff in Sana'a with their counterparts outside Sana'a (share data, information, lessons learned)?	WFP staff Partners (government, multilateral, bilateral, and NGOs)	Formal and informal KM mechanisms	Qualitative assessment
What are perceptions (WFP staff and partners) on what has increased or limited working together?	WFP staff Partners (government, multilateral, bilateral, and NGOs) Beneficiaries	Partnering incentive structure	Qualitative assessment
Were exit strategies successful in reinforcing national capacity?	WFP staff Partners (government, multilateral, bilateral, and NGOs) Beneficiaries	Formal and informal training	Qualitative assessment
Were activities regionally or thematically divided among partners?	WFP staff Partners (government, multilateral, bilateral, and NGOs)	MOUs	Qualitative assessment
Were there examples of co-financing and/or co-piloting of activities?	WFP staff Partners (government, multilateral, bilateral, and NGOs)	MOUs	Qualitative assessment

Acronyms

CAP	Consolidated Appeal(s) Process
CD	Country Director
CFSS	comprehensive food security survey
CO	Country Office
CP	country programme
CPE	Country Portfolio Evaluation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEV	Develop Projects (same as CP)
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPPR	Development Plan for Poverty Reduction
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EU	European Union
EQAS	evaluation quality assurance system
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFW	food-for-work
GDP	gross domestic product
GFD	general food distribution
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MAM	moderate acute malnutrition
MCHN	maternal and child health and nutrition
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MT	metric ton
MUAC	Mid-Upper Arm Circumference
NFSS	National Food Security Strategy
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OE	Office of Evaluation
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
SO	Special Operation
SPR	Standardized Project Report
THR	take-home rations
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations country team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping
WHO	World Health Organization

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