

## COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

### Uganda: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2009-2013)

#### Evaluation Report

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## Fact Sheet: WFP's Country Portfolio in Uganda

**Table A: Overview of the portfolio operations and requirements vs. contributions**

Operation	Title	Time Frame	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
CP 108070	Supporting Government-Led Initiatives to Address Hunger in Uganda	Nov 09 - Nov 14	Req: 222,101,116 Contrib: 118,392,819 Funded: 53%				
PRRO 200429	Stabilizing Food Consumption and Reducing Acute Malnutrition among Refugees and Extremely Vulnerable Households	Jan 13 - Dec 15					Req: 133,034,819 Contrib: 64,030,503 Funded: 48%
EMOP 108110	Emergency Assistance to Communities Affected by the 2008 Drought in Karamoja, North-Eastern Uganda	Feb 09 - Dec 10	Req: 114,670,723 Contrib: 60,230,661 Funded: 53%				
IR-EMOP 200123	General Food Distribution for Populations Displaced by Landslides and Flooding in Eastern Uganda	Mar 10 - Jun 10		Req: 419,383 Contrib: 292,290			
PRRO 101213	Protracted Relief for Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees in Uganda	Apr 09 - Dec 12	Req: 191,595,607 Contrib: 87,246,677 Funded: 46%				
Direct Expenses (US\$ millions)			90,834,000	66,768,000	60,903,000	64,003,000	55,771,000
% Direct Expenses: Uganda vs. WFP World			2%	2%	2%	2%	1%
Food Distributed (MT)			137,595	44,210	39,065	60,839	45,519
Total Beneficiaries (actual)			2,493,694	939,184	761,042	879,055	938,664


Source: last SPR available in May 2014, Resource Situations, APR 2009 - 2013  
Requirements (Req.) and Contributions (Contrib.) are in US \$

**Table B. Distribution of Portfolio activities**

Operation \ Activity	Education	Nutrition	GFD	FFW/FFT/ FFA	SO's	WFP Uganda Country Priorities
CP 108070	X	X		X	2, 3, 4, 5	2, 3
PRRO 200429		X	X		1	1
EMOP 108110		X	X		1	1
IR-EMOP 200123			X		1	1
PRRO 101213		X	X		1	1
<b>Planned % of beneficiaries</b>	12%	24%	52%	12%		

Source: WFP Dakota 2013, Project Documents, Country Strategy for WFP in Uganda 2009-2014

### Percentage of actual beneficiaries



### Top Donors

CP 108070	USA, UK, Japan, Multilateral, Germany
PRRO 200429	USA, Japan, Multilateral, UK, EC
EMOP 108110	USA, UK, Multilateral, Spain, Japan
PRRO 101213	USA, Multilateral, EC, Japan, UK

## Executive Summary

### Introduction

#### Evaluation Features

1. This evaluation covered WFP's portfolio in Uganda from 2009 to 2013 under the 2009–2014 country strategy. Serving the dual purpose of accountability and learning, it focused on the three main issues of all country portfolio evaluations (CPEs): i) alignment and strategic positioning; ii) quality of and factors driving strategic decision-making; and iii) performance and results. As this was the first CPE to cover the full period of a country strategy,<sup>1</sup> an additional issue evaluated was the appropriateness and added value of the country strategy.
2. The evaluation was conducted by an external evaluation team with fieldwork in March and April 2014 including 30 site visits covering the range of operations and activities, more than 200 interviews, beneficiary focus group discussions and document review.

#### Context

3. Economic growth of 6–10 percent a year over the past 15 years enabled Uganda to reduce the prevalence of poverty from 31 to 25 percent between 2005/06 and 2009/10. With an estimated population of 37.6 million people, Uganda remains poor, ranking 164<sup>th</sup> of 187 countries in the 2014 human development index; according to the World Bank, 35 percent of the population is undernourished. Economic benefits have not reached the poorest and most vulnerable groups – refugees<sup>2</sup> and smallholder farmers.<sup>3</sup> Regional disparities exist: in 2009, the poverty rate in Karamoja was 75 percent,<sup>4</sup> compared with 24.5 percent nationally; and in 2007, the adult literacy rate was 6 percent in Karamoja against 67 percent nationally.<sup>5</sup> Plagued by chronic hunger, Karamoja reports stunting rates of more than 30 percent in most areas.
4. The evaluation period was one of stabilization and peace consolidation, with significant reductions in the long-term, inter-ethnic and regional conflicts affecting Karamoja. Environmental degradation and natural disasters remain a concern.

#### WFP Portfolio

5. WFP's portfolio in Uganda was based on the 2009–2014 country strategy whose overarching goal is to support government priorities and empower communities in reaching the Millennium Development Goal hunger target and ensuring long-term solutions to hunger. Between 2009 and 2013, the portfolio included five projects: one country programme (CP), two emergency operations (EMOPs) and two protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs).

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<sup>1</sup> The Uganda country strategy (2009–2014) was the first such document introduced under WFP's Strategic Plan (2009–2013).

<sup>2</sup> Uganda has hosted large numbers of refugees for decades; in early 2014, WFP was assisting 330,000 people, including recent arrivals from South Sudan.

<sup>3</sup> International Fund for Agricultural Development. 2013. *Enabling Poor Rural People to Overcome Poverty in Uganda*. Rome.


<sup>4</sup> Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2010. *Uganda National Household Survey 2009/2010 (Abridged Report)*, Socio-Economic Module. Kampala.

<sup>5</sup> Government of Uganda. 2007. *Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme*. Kampala and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 2008. *Education for All by 2015: Will We Make It?* Paris, quoted in WFP country strategy 2009.

6. The evaluation’s analytical framework was based on the country strategy priority areas, which are reflected across portfolio components (Figure 1):

- *emergency humanitarian action (EHA)*: general food distributions (GFDs) to various beneficiary groups and support to the treatment of acute malnutrition, through four EMOPs and PRROs;
- *food and nutrition security (FNS)*: support to education, asset creation and prevention of malnutrition, through CP 108070 component 1; and
- *agriculture and market support (AMS)*: agriculture and market development, including local purchases through CP 108070 component 2.


**Figure 1: Evaluation framework**



Source: Evaluation team based on WFP Uganda Country Strategy (2009–2014) Roadmap.


7. Data presented in Figures 2 and 3 indicate the variable performance regarding beneficiaries reached, tonnage delivered, and resourcing. Overall, the portfolio secured funding for about half of its requirements: USD 328.7 million received against USD 661.8 million for 2009–2013.

**Figure 2: Portfolio beneficiaries and tonnage, planned versus actual by project**



Sources: Project documents Standard and Project Reports (SPRs) 2009–2013.

**Figure 3: Portfolio funding levels, by project (USD)**



Sources: Project documents and SPRs 2009–2013.

8. Analysis of cumulative expenditures by calendar year indicates a significant shift in the balance of the portfolio, with EHA’s share in annual expenditures declining from 100 percent in 2009 to less than a third in 2013 (Table 1). Until 2013, a parallel decreasing trend is observed in the total numbers of beneficiaries reached, as shown in Table 2.



**Table 1: Expenditures by Priority Area (USD)**

Year	EHA	FNS and AMS	Total	EHA share (%)
<b>2009</b>	49.1	-	<b>49.1</b>	100
<b>2010</b>	88.6	18.28	<b>106.8</b>	83
<b>2011</b>	54.0	49.7	<b>103.7</b>	52
<b>2012</b>	82.1	78.2	<b>160.3</b>	51
<b>2013</b>	39.2	98.1	<b>137.3</b>	29

Source: SPRs 2009–2013.

**Table 2: Beneficiary Numbers by Priority Area**

	EHA	FNS*	Total	EHA share (%)
<b>2009</b>	2 458 653	33 593	<b>2 492 246</b>	99
<b>2010</b>	583 060	395 082	<b>978 142</b>	60
<b>2011</b>	272 664	456 508	<b>729 172</b>	37
<b>2012</b>	306 872	450 001	<b>756 873</b>	41
<b>2013</b>	432 921	401 734	<b>834 655</b>	52
<b>Yearly average</b>			<b>1 158 218</b>	

\* AMS beneficiaries are not included because activities do not provide direct transfers.

Source: SPR data.

## Evaluation Findings

### Alignment and Strategic Positioning

#### *Relevance and operational responsiveness*

9. WFP interventions were appropriately focused on providing food assistance to vulnerable populations in Karamoja and to refugee populations across the country; all external informants recognized their substantial scale and coverage. As shown in Table 2, WFP EHA and FNS interventions reached an average of 1.2 million people annually, fluctuating between 729,000 and 2.5 million; only the Government's interventions achieved similar coverage:

- Support to both established and newly arrived refugees was sustained throughout the period; WFP currently assists more than 300,000 refugees.
- The CP's extensive coverage of vulnerable households included a school feeding programme in all of Karamoja's 282 schools, which met a critical community need.

- Food transfers in exchange for participation in public works supported nearly 50,000 moderately food-insecure households in 2010. Following alignment with the Government’s North Uganda Social Assistance Fund (NUSAF-2) programme, WFP’s support reached 69,080 households in 2013 – almost 30 percent<sup>6</sup> of all households in Karamoja.

10. The shift from EHA reflected the national context of peace consolidation and emerging government priorities. As stabilization followed the 2006–2008 peace agreements, WFP shifted from blanket towards targeted assistance. By the end of 2010, it had switched to GFD for extremely vulnerable households in Karamoja, under PRRO 101213, complemented by conditional transfers through FNS activities under the CP.

11. WFP’s demand for maize for operations in the region had been a major market driver in Uganda since the 1990s, but declined during the portfolio period. AMS objectives and activities, which initially emphasized infrastructure, the private sector and market development, were revised to target smallholders more directly through support to satellite collection points, training of farmers’ organizations, and capacity development of national authorities in grain quality standards.

#### *Alignment with government and national policies*

12. During the period evaluated, WFP enhanced its engagement and alignment with the Government. WFP activities directly supported government plans and programmes such as the Karamoja Integrated Development Programme, the National Development Plan and NUSAF-2; its safety net activities<sup>7</sup> were linked to the Government’s expanding social protection programme; and its school feeding supported the Government’s 2004–2015 Education Sector Strategic Plan. WFP implemented nutrition activities in partnership with government health departments and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), in line with Uganda’s Nutrition Action Plan.

#### *Coherence, complementarity and alignment with partner organizations*

13. The Government acknowledges WFP’s crucial support in two main areas: i) advocacy and technical support for establishment of regional grain trade standards, the Ugandan Commodity Exchange and warehouse receipt systems; and ii) research in fortification and micronutrients to support the development of national policies.<sup>8</sup>

14. Complementing its advocacy efforts, WFP Uganda worked with international and local non-governmental organizations and district technical authorities to implement its food assistance activities. However, its relationship with cooperating partners was mainly contractual; capacity-development initiatives for project staff – from both WFP and partners – was oriented towards processes for delivering activities.

15. Expansion of AMS activities gave WFP a stronger, longer-term orientation in rural poverty reduction through support to livelihoods, food security, production and

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<sup>6</sup> Based on an estimated total population of 1.2 million people and an average of five people per household – 240,000 households.

<sup>7</sup> GFD for extremely vulnerable households, food for assets (FFA) and school feeding.

<sup>8</sup> Including within the inter-agency Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger and Undernutrition (REACH) initiative for ending child hunger.

post-harvest handling, but AMS activities overlap with those of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), as noted in another recent evaluation.<sup>9</sup> While appreciating WFP’s agricultural development efforts with smallholder farmers, external stakeholders<sup>10</sup> emphasized the need to demonstrate WFP’s comparative advantage by translating its analysis work into effective delivery, and to clarify respective roles and mandates.

16. Despite their – limited – technical collaboration on AMS and food for assets (FFA), WFP and FAO have not developed a strategic partnership, and are perceived as competitors. Other than dialogue<sup>11</sup> at the national level, there is no clear evidence of efforts to develop complementarity or synergy between the agencies’ support to two similar government initiatives: the Karamoja Livelihoods Programme for FAO, and the Karamoja Integrated Development Programme for WFP.<sup>12</sup>

## **Strategic Decision-Making, Appropriateness and Added Value of the Country Strategy**

### *Analysis of needs, context and vulnerability*

17. As well as on WFP’s capacity for operating food distributions at scale, the country strategy also built on WFP’s strengths in linking relief and development, as evidenced in the portfolio’s successful combination of relief through EHA activities, safety nets through GFD in EHA and FNS activities, and development through FNS and AMS activities addressing long-term vulnerability. NUSAF-2, school feeding and GFD for extremely vulnerable households helped to reposition WFP by shifting the portfolio from food aid towards enhancing resilience to shocks, in line with the 2008–2013 Strategic Plan.

18. The evaluation confirmed the perception of external stakeholders that WFP’s historical identity as the “food and logistics” agency was changing through its nutrition work and support to the Government’s grain quality standards, although food distribution is still considered WFP’s core competency.

19. Overall, WFP programme design and targeting reflected both the context and strategic direction of the country strategy and was based on comprehensive needs assessment and food and nutrition analysis, with evidence of periodic reviews of tools and partnerships.

20. The evaluation found that WFP targeted women successfully, with progress reports showing gender-disaggregated data. However the emphasis was on women’s participation in activities rather than on analysis of gender-based roles and needs. While WFP has clear policies for humanitarian protection, actions in this area received inadequate attention during programme implementation.

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<sup>9</sup> International Organisation Development Ltd. (IOD PARC) and Department for International Development (DFID). 2012. *Formative Evaluation of World Food Programme’s Livelihoods Programme, Karamoja, Uganda*. Sheffield, UK and London.

<sup>10</sup> Government, United Nations agencies, donors and cooperating partners.

<sup>11</sup> A joint FAO/UNICEF/WFP resilience strategy was developed in 2013, funded by DFID.

<sup>12</sup> IOD PARC. 2014. *Evaluation of the Impact of Food for Assets on Livelihood Resilience in Uganda (2005–2010)*. Sheffield, UK.

### *Strategic decision-making and results orientation*

21. The country strategy enhanced the possibilities for coherence and linkages between short-term and longer-term interventions and objectives, and strengthened WFP's role in advocating for pro-poor policies. By sharing the results of its analysis, WFP was able to influence policy on such issues as grain standards and agricultural markets, nutrition and food fortification, safety nets and school feeding.

22. However, evidence indicates that implementation was not always as coherent as the strategy. Dissemination and assimilation of the country strategy throughout the country office was weak or uneven, with poor attention to the quality of assets created, activities to address protection concerns, output-level reporting and process-oriented training. There were lost opportunities resulting from the outsourcing of monitoring.

23. These weaknesses were partly because the targets of this first country strategy were aspirational, and the strategy was not intended to be a results-based management tool. The targets did not lend themselves to measurement, and proved unrealistic. Evidence-based reporting on the strategy's intended changes in capacity, farm productivity/incomes, community mobilization and similar outcomes was weak; reporting was mainly input/output-oriented, although the evaluation noted improvements since 2012.

24. WFP made high-level investments in deploying qualified staff from Headquarters for the initial development and communication of the country strategy. Under-investment in programme design and implementation capacity prevented full realization of the objectives.

25. WFP has an elaborate corporate system for tracking inputs and outputs, but limited ability to monitor and analyse the outcomes of activities. Project logical frameworks often have weak links between activities and outcomes, and are difficult to use for field staff.

### *Internal capacity and structure*

26. The country office undertook periodic reviews<sup>13</sup> to align its organizational structure and staffing levels to requirements and funding realities. Efforts to build staff capacity through training and workshops in the early years were reduced after budget cuts in 2011 led to restructuring, with decreases in WFP's field staff and operational capacity when new programmes required a wider range of expertise.

27. This and other evaluations<sup>14</sup> found that the use of contractors for food-basket and post-distribution monitoring, although cost-efficient, limited the opportunities for WFP to interact with beneficiaries and for staff to understand the situation on the ground.

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<sup>13</sup> Deployment records and the 2011 staff review exercise.

<sup>14</sup> Broughton, B., Tumuhimbise, G. and Basalirwa, R. 2012. *Decentralized Operation Evaluation of the Uganda Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 101213 – Protracted Relief for Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees*. (unpublished)

## Performance and Results

### *Emergency humanitarian action*

28. GFD reached more beneficiaries than planned (Figure 2 and Table 3), but with smaller rations (Table 4). Five annual distribution/transfer cycles were planned, but only three or four were carried out each year.<sup>15</sup> GFD faced consistent shortfalls throughout 2009–2013; WFP met its EHA target in tonnage only in 2011.

**Table 3: EHA Beneficiaries Reached as Percentages of Targets**

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
GFD	133	102	104	91	94
Supplementary feeding	20	84	71	54	94
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>94</b>

Source: SPRs for EMOPs 108110 and 200123, and for PRROs 101213 and 200429.

**Table 4: Tonnages Distributed as Percentages of Targets**

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EMOP 108110	66	67	n/a	n/a	n/a
EMOP 200123	n/a	49	n/a	n/a	n/a
PRRO 101213	17	87	100	67	n/a
PRRO 200429	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	72
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>72</b>

Source: SPRs for EMOPs 108110 and 200123, and for PRROs 101213 and 200429.

29. Delayed distributions – postponed, rescheduled or conducted after dark – were a major concern for both refugees and EHA cooperating partners. Refugees reported that unannounced delays resulted in repeated journeys over considerable distances to final distribution points; cooperating partners were concerned about the associated security risks for women and from the potential for riots.<sup>16</sup> Evidence indicates that as well as resource constraints, causes of delays included irregular deliveries to final distribution points in the camps because of poor local transport infrastructure and inadequate management of transporters' contracts, particularly since 2012.

30. Under EHA, WFP implements a supplementary feeding programme for which coverage was low in the early years. By modifying its approach to include a community-based supplementary feeding (CBSF) component, WFP increased the population basin's coverage from 53 percent in 2009, to 71 percent in 2011.<sup>14</sup> Although the evaluation lacked documentary evidence for updating this figure, community focus group discussions indicated a sustained increase in outreach of supplementary feeding.

<sup>15</sup> SPRs 2011–2013 for PRROs 101213 and 200429; evaluation data from interviews.

<sup>16</sup> There is a history of riots associated with food at some camps in southwest Uganda.

31. No readmission data were available, but a recent review by DFID suggested that CBSF was inefficient, with children being repeatedly readmitted.<sup>17</sup> Evaluation sources indicated intra-household sharing of rations, while discussions with partners and direct observation suggested that in response to deficiencies in the distribution of GFD for extremely vulnerable households, CBSF assisted many non-target elderly people. Despite these shortcomings, the recovery and default rates were better than the targets<sup>18</sup> of 75 percent recovery and 15 percent default, indicating that both the supplementary feeding programme and CBSF operated effectively throughout the period.

32. WFP had intended to transfer its caseload of extremely vulnerable households to the Government’s Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment safety net programme, but interviews with government and WFP officials suggested that transfer is unlikely as the future of this programme is uncertain.

*Food and nutrition security*

33. SPR data show consistent shortfalls in actual deliveries compared with plans (Table 5).

**Table 5: Planned Versus Actual Deliveries For FNS (mt)**

	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
Planned	19 541	31 613	24 825	20 829
Actual	15 750	13 196	16 412	10 859

Source: SPRs for CP 108070, 2010–2013.

34. WFP’s FNS activities in Karamoja were designed as safety nets to contribute to social protection, and included conditional food/cash transfers, school feeding, mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN) and early childhood development.<sup>19</sup> The evaluation team found that only school feeding met two of WFP’s four good practice principles for social protection and safety nets;<sup>20</sup> none of the other FNS interventions provided an effective safety net.

35. Until 2012, WFP’s comprehensive school feeding met needs, and was timely and predictable. Following withdrawal of the main donor, by 2013 the number of meals served and school attendance rates had dropped. WFP reports and stakeholder interviews identified the reduction in WFP’s food basket as the main factor in reduced attendance. Coincidentally, national statistics<sup>21</sup> also reported a drop in school attendance in Karamoja in 2013.

36. With the abrupt decrease in funding, the sustainability of school feeding remains uncertain. Since 2013, WFP and other stakeholders such as the World Bank have been working with the Government to develop a viable national school feeding programme.

<sup>17</sup> DFID. 2013. *Sustaining Nutritional Assistance in Karamoja. Project Completion Review*. London.

<sup>18</sup> WFP. 2009. PRRO 101213 Standard Project Report.

<sup>19</sup> The evaluation of WFP’s role in social protection and safety nets included MCHN activities but argued that preventive measures do not qualify as safety nets unless coordinated with other activities.

<sup>20</sup> See “Summary Report of the Strategic Evaluation of WFP’s Role in Social Protection and Safety Nets” (WFP/EB.A/2011/7-B).

<sup>21</sup> Government of Uganda. 2012/13. *Uganda Education and Sports Sector Annual Performance Report (ESSAPR)*. Kampala.

37. Overall MCHN attendance increased throughout the portfolio period. Health centre staff reported that food assistance increased attendance, and that substantially more babies were being delivered at centres rather than at home. Staff reported a drop in attendance since a pipeline rupture affected the MCHN programme at the end of 2013. Focus group discussions with mothers suggested that entitlements lasted only 10–15 days, and rations were shared within households.

38. In Acholi, following hand-over of MCHN activities to district health authorities, interviews with health officials indicated that while outreach and health education activities were maintained, the food supplement was no longer provided.

39. The short duration of FFA activities – implemented as a relief intervention to provide a seasonal safety net – often undermined their potential contribution to disaster risk reduction (DRR) and resilience, emphasized in the country strategy.<sup>12</sup> Recent assets – which were appropriately focused on soil and water conservation and woodlots – were of weak technical design,<sup>22</sup> and seasonality was an issue, with work cycles of a maximum nine months.<sup>23</sup> This short-term approach meant that once an asset was complete, cooperating partners and WFP moved to new communities without providing follow-up, which undermined maintenance prospects.

#### *Agriculture and market support*

40. WFP AMS activities have been instrumental in establishing market standards.<sup>24</sup> WFP’s sustained advocacy for regional standards in the grain trade facilitated the creation of institutions and mechanisms such as the Uganda Commodity Exchange and warehouse receipt systems, which promote quality standards for maize in the country.

41. Focus group discussions revealed that farmers became more aware of the need to improve grain quality, as the members of farmers’ organizations and satellite collection points (SCPs) saw how the quality of grain and storage determined selling prices.

42. SCPs faced challenges in attracting very poor farmers; a study of SCP utilization<sup>25</sup> noted that farmers who did not use an SCP focused on immediate food security concerns. To address this challenge, WFP is piloting different models of household storage facility, while village savings and loan associations (VSLAs) linked to SCPs provide access to small-scale credit. Focus group discussions and beneficiary interviews suggested that these efforts were showing results, with smallholders beginning to use SCP facilities. By 2013, VSLAs had mobilized about USD 339,000 in savings, but operate without a regulatory framework.

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<sup>22</sup> Of 12 recently constructed water ponds visited, 11 were not properly designed or located.

<sup>23</sup> Partners reported this period can be shortened by funding delays and protracted tendering and contracting processes.

<sup>24</sup> “Summary Report of the Strategic Mid-Term Evaluation of WFP’s Agriculture and Market Support in Uganda” (WFP/EB.2/2011/6-A).

<sup>25</sup> Kizito, A.M. 2013. *Thematic Case Study on the Level of Utilization of Satellite Collection Points by Farmers and Traders in the Agriculture and Market Support/Purchase for Progress Catchment Areas in Uganda*. Kampala, WFP.

## **Conclusions and Overall Assessment**

### **Relevance and Strategic Positioning**

43. WFP's country strategy set an appropriate strategic direction in the shift from food aid to food assistance. The country portfolio was closely aligned with Uganda's evolving priorities and policies, and responded to needs of vulnerable communities. Despite budget cuts, WFP achieved extensive coverage in the most vulnerable geographical areas and of refugees. In most cases, WFP worked with government and other stakeholders to ensure that activities were coherent and addressed critical needs not met by others. WFP used evidence to inform the redesign and targeting of interventions and increase their relevance.

44. The country office demonstrated mixed capacity for strategic decision-making on the one hand, and for delivering on results on the other, defining analysis and broad directions aptly, but lagging behind in delivery and results tracking.

#### *Effectiveness and efficiency*

45. The strategy's objectives were aspirational and were inadequately translated into implementation and delivery of results. WFP's monitoring and reporting remained input/output-based, and outcome-level progress was inadequately tracked. Technical and field staff capacity did not match the country office's strong strategic and analytical capacity.

46. Recurrent pipeline breaks jeopardized effectiveness and efficiency of all activities, undermining the adequacy and predictability of GFD transfers in particular. Besides resource constraints, other influencing factors are within WFP's control – such as weaknesses in WFP's secondary transport and logistics arrangements – and should be addressed by the country office.

47. WFP's support to the Government in implementing comprehensive nutrition interventions to address undernutrition – particularly through CBSF and MCHN – were partially effective. School feeding appeared to have a positive effect on enrolment and attendance rates in Karamoja, with key informants attributing the 2013 reduction in those to the 2013 reduction in transfers, and there is evidence that AMS activities are having effects on policies and markets, showing a potential for scaling-up.

48. WFP's support to SCPs demonstrated potential for benefiting smallholders. WFP could leverage this success to develop SCPs and farmers' organizations on a large scale, covering hundreds of villages, as part of its repositioning, especially given its capacity to deliver at scale.

49. The quality and sustainability of assets created under FFA have not received adequate attention; the short-term relief approach to FFA activities undermined effectiveness in the medium to long term. WFP needs to take a more analytical approach to its programming for DRR and resilience.

50. WFP's interventions ensured women's inclusion but made insufficient effort to assess the potential impacts on gender roles and dynamics within households and communities, or on protection.



## *Sustainability*

51. Hand-over strategies for safety net activities were limited and uncertain in all areas. WFP will need to maintain its role in social protection while it engages with the Government in developing a comprehensive framework.

52. The Government demonstrated strong ownership of the grain quality standards initiative and the development of market infrastructure. The SCPs, although far from self-sustaining, attracted significant participation from farmers, with reasonable prospects for greater ownership by farmers' organizations following a period of WFP support. Regulatory and institutional frameworks now need to be established to capitalize on SCPs' potential for growth and sustainability.

## **Recommendations**

53. **Recommendation 1: *WFP's positioning.* The country office should continue to focus on the three priority areas identified in the country strategy.** Within WFP's shift to food assistance, in its developmental programming, WFP Uganda should:

- i) scale up nutrition and social protection interventions in partnership with UNICEF and the Government, while engaging in the development of national social protection policy;
- ii) advance joint programming by developing an action plan for the resilience strategy in Karamoja and – specifically – an integrated approach for agricultural and smallholder-related work with FAO; and
- iii) where AMS is implemented, use SCPs and farmers' organizations as a pivot for scaling up and exploring integration of WFP's FFA and DRR interventions with its support to VSLAs and agricultural development, using a long-term planning perspective.

54. **Recommendation 2: *Sustainability.* The country office should maintain a dual approach of advocacy and service delivery in Karamoja.** It should:

- i) continue to support extremely vulnerable households and refugees through food/cash transfers based on vulnerability assessments and verification, while advocating for realistic and sustainable mechanisms for predictable and adequate safety nets; and
- ii) continue to support school feeding in the next programme cycle, while engaging with the Government and the World Bank on the schoolgarden and nutrition initiative for launch at the end of 2014, and working with authorities, communities and schools to ensure that they take over responsibility for the programme incrementally and effectively, while WFP gradually reduces support in a phased and predictable manner.

**55. Recommendation 3: *Future country strategy document.* Headquarters and the country office should make the next country strategy a results-based document.** This will require action to:

- i) enable tracking of impacts and changes, with reporting of measurable targets to which WFP contributes directly in the country overview section of SPRs;
- ii) translate country strategy aims and outcomes into action plans that can be systematically monitored; and
- iii) revise the corporate SPR system to integrate country strategy outcomes in annual reports, in the longer-term.

**56. Recommendation 4: *Resilience and disaster risk reduction.* Headquarters, the country office and the regional bureau should continue to implement the recommendations of the 2014 FFA evaluation and the recent FFA guidance for the country office, while improving the planning, design, implementation and monitoring of resilience and DRR interventions** by:

- i) hiring a specialist to work with sub-offices on the planning and design of a coherent multi-year approach to WFP FFA and DRR, and ensuring that activities are implemented together with relevant technical partners;
- ii) under the 2013 joint resilience strategy for Karamoja, developing joint operational plans with FAO and UNICEF to increase the synergy and impact of WFP interventions; and
- iii) using multi-year plans to advocate with donors for multi-year funding for the country programme.

**57. Recommendation 5: *General food distributions.* Under EHA, the country office should:**

- i) urgently resolve the secondary transport problems facing deliveries to refugee settlements, through more efficient management of transporters' contracts and enhanced monitoring of deliveries;
- ii) complement the current outsourcing of post-distribution monitoring with regular, tracked joint monitoring plans by WFP field staff and contracted partners, so WFP staff can engage with target populations, fostering deeper understanding of the problems faced by communities that WFP assists; and
- iii) record readmissions to supplementary feeding programmes and investigate their causes, which are likely to be partially addressed by ensuring that full food entitlements are distributed regularly and predictably to target populations.

**58. Recommendation 6: *Agriculture and market support.* To enhance the security of farmers' savings, the country office should support the Government in developing an appropriate regulatory framework and**


**operational procedures for VSLAs, so that they become legally registered bodies with legal statutes.**


**59. Recommendation 7: *Protection and gender*. The country office and regional bureau should:**

- i) provide field-based staff and cooperating partners with training and practical orientation on WFP's protection policy to ensure that assistance does not put beneficiaries at risk; and
- ii) develop staff capacity for integrating gender analysis into programme design and implementation, and verification check-lists to ensure that standards are respected.

## Maps

### PRRO 200429 Geographical Coverage & Activities, 2013-2015





## **1. Introduction**

### **1.1. Evaluation Features**

1. In accordance with WFP's established protocol for conducting country portfolio evaluations [CPE], this evaluation was commissioned by the Office of Evaluation [OEV] as part of the ongoing series of CPEs. While various aspects of WFP's work in Uganda have been the subject of independent evaluations during the past five years, this is the first CPE for the Uganda country office and offered optimal timing to feed evidence into the development of the next programming cycle.

2. The Uganda CPE is the first evaluation subsequent to the development of the first-ever WFP Country Strategy [CS]. In terms of scope, the evaluation focuses on the WFP Uganda CS [2009-2014] and the five operations<sup>26</sup> put in place to implement it, two of which remain active. In doing so, the evaluation has examined the CS process and appropriateness as well as the performance and results of the WFP portfolio.

3. As described in the terms of reference [TOR - Annex 1],<sup>27</sup> the primary users of the evaluation are WFP's country office [CO], regional bureau [RB] in Nairobi, WFP headquarters and Executive Board. Additionally, several external stakeholders like the Government of Uganda, United Nations country team, cooperating partners [CPs], beneficiaries and donors have an interest in the outcome of this evaluation.

4. The evaluation process included an inception phase to develop, on the basis of the ToR, a detailed plan, methodology and tools for the evaluation. A summarized version of the methodology presented in the inception report is attached as Annex 2. Annex 3 presents the evaluation matrix that guided the questions and criteria used by the evaluators. The IR spells out triangulation methods used by the evaluation team. Besides these, the initial findings, conclusions and recommendations were presented to the CO and a group of external stakeholders in Uganda to test and validate those.

5. The evaluation mission was conducted between 6-28 April 2014. Key informant interviews [KIIs] totaled 196 [65 external and 131 internal]; individual beneficiary interviews [21] and focus group discussions [FGDs] - 8 with women and 10 mixed groups - were also conducted. Secondary data from over 140 key documents and dozens of data files and reports from partners also fed into the evaluation. The evaluation team visited more than 30 sites/locations [Table i, Annex 4] to see various activities under different operations. The list of key informants and FGDs is presented in Annex 5, the list of key documents consulted in Annex 6, and the detailed itinerary for the field mission is provided in Annex 7.

6. The evaluation was conducted by a team of independent consultants from The KonTerra Group. An internal reference group, composed of WFP's main stakeholders at HQ, Regional Bureau and CO was established to assist the OEV Evaluation Manager throughout the evaluation process.

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<sup>26</sup> A Country Programme [CP 108070] and the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation [PRRO 200429]. During the 2009-2013 period, two emergency operations [EMOP 108110 and IR- EMOP200123] plus one PRRO [10121.3] were implemented and closed.

<sup>27</sup> WFP 2014e. Terms of Reference – WFP Country Portfolio Evaluation Uganda [2009-2013].


## Evaluation framework

7. The main focus of the evaluation was on the following four areas,<sup>28</sup> and questions and sub-questions [presented in the Evaluation matrix in Annex 2] structured around these to provide the analytical framework for the evaluation:

- i. Country strategy and strategic positioning
- ii. Quality of and factors driving strategic decision making
- iii. Performance and results of the WFP portfolio in Uganda
- iv. Appropriateness of and value added by the country strategy.<sup>29</sup>

8. In order to assess progress on outcomes, the evaluation examined key operations through which outputs are delivered under the country strategy and portfolio. The portfolio was examined and analyzed against the strategic objectives [SO] of the corporate Strategic Plan [2008-2013]; the team then drew conclusions on its contribution to the country strategy outcomes [three priority areas of the CS, as shown in Figure 1 below], instead of simply restricting the assessment to individual operation logical framework [logframe] outcomes.

**Figure. 1 Schematic diagram of evaluation framework**



Source: Compiled by evaluation team from Country strategy and operations documents

<sup>28</sup> WFP 2014e. Terms of Reference – Uganda Country Portfolio Evaluation.

<sup>29</sup> In the evaluation report, findings on this has been presented under the heading ‘country strategy and strategic positioning’ as there is overlap between these two areas.

## Limitations

9. The methodology used for CPEs is designed to provide answers to the CPE strategic questions and not for impact evaluation. In addition, most activities/operations were ongoing at the time of the evaluation or were only recently completed, with data related to impact of operations remaining limited. Furthermore, as noted in the IR for this particular CPE, there was very little data available in relation to the EMOPs which ended some time ago, with staff and external stakeholders having little to say about these operations. That no reviews or evaluations of EMOPs were conducted only compounded the situation. To mitigate those, wherever available, the evaluation has relied on secondary data.

10. Aggregate data on beneficiaries [planned and actual] and tonnage are based on data in WFP's Standard Project Reports [SPR]. In some areas, such as Agricultural and Market Support, SPRs did not provide detailed data, and the evaluation has used other relevant reports available. The evaluation team encountered considerable confusion over data because of inconsistent/confused labelling of supplementary feeding and MCHN beneficiaries in the SPRs - MCHN and supplementary feeding programme [SFP] have been reported under both emergency operations as well as food and nutrition security [FNS] interventions.<sup>30</sup> For the assessment of portfolio performance in this evaluation, MCHN has been treated as part of the FNS as this addresses chronic malnutrition, while supplementary feeding has been treated under emergency.

11. The evaluation team was provided by the CO data on various activities; however, in most cases, these were different from those in the SPRs and not always verifiable. The evaluation team has used SPR data when available in such cases. The evaluation team also noted that SPRs do not disaggregate data by geographical region. It was therefore not possible to use the data to determine the coverage of supplementary feeding. It should also be noted that CO data for SFP beneficiaries includes elderly, adolescent children aged 60 months to 17 years and adults aged 18 years to 59 years. These categories of beneficiaries are not recorded in the SPRs reviewed.

### 1.2 Country Context

12. Over the past decade and a half, the Ugandan economy has experienced 6-10 percent annual growth which has enabled it to reduce the prevalence of overall poverty from 31 percent of the population<sup>31</sup> in 2005–2006 to 25 percent<sup>32</sup> in 2009–2010. Uganda is on track to halve the poverty rate recorded in 1992/93, and has reduced chronic malnutrition among children aged 6-59 months from 38 percent in 1992/93 to 33 percent by 2011.<sup>33</sup> Since 1997, the government has promoted a development agenda based on its Poverty Eradication Action Plan [PEAP],<sup>34</sup> with generally positive

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<sup>30</sup> This may be partly due to short-term needs in acute emergencies and partly due to availability of funding.

<sup>31</sup> A 2009 survey puts Uganda's population at 34.1 million with about half the population aged below 15 years [source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2010. Uganda National Household Survey, 2009/10. Socio-economic Module].

<sup>32</sup> Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2012a. Statistical Abstract. [UNDP HDR 2013 puts the figure at 31.1%].

<sup>33</sup> Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2012b. Uganda Demographic and Health Survey.

<sup>34</sup> "With the expiration of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan [PEAP] in 2010, which had guided national development policy and public expenditure since 1997, the Government developed a comprehensive National Development Plan [NDP] covering 2010/2011-2014/2015." UNDP. 2013a. About Uganda.



consequences for welfare and hunger indicators. In 2014, the country ranked 164 out of 187 countries in the human development index.<sup>35</sup>

13. Notwithstanding this progress, Uganda remains a very poor country. Stunting rates remain of concern and are classified as serious according to WHO Classification of Severity of Malnutrition in Children under-5 years of Age [Annex 4, Table ii]. Most of the gains from economic growth have been achieved in the industrial sector. With over three quarters of the population dependent on agriculture sector for their livelihoods,<sup>36</sup> “the incomes and overall quality of life for farmers and rural populations have not significantly improved in the past 15 years”.<sup>37</sup>

## Poverty and vulnerability

14. The disparity in livelihoods between urban and rural areas remains sharp. In 2012, about 67 percent of Ugandans were either poor or highly vulnerable to poverty.<sup>38</sup> Although both rural and urban poverty declined, the poverty headcount declined from 60.2 percent to 29.1 percent in rural areas and 28.8 percent to 9.1 percent in urban areas between 1992/93 and 2009/10.<sup>39</sup> Uganda’s poorest people include hundreds of thousands of smallholder farmers [SHF] living in remote areas. In remote rural areas, SHF often do not have access to roads required to transport their produce, and market linkages are weak or non-existent, besides lacking inputs, technology and access to financial services.<sup>40</sup>

15. According to the Uganda National Household Survey 2009/10, the incidence of poverty in the northeast [Karamoja] region was a staggering 75 percent, compared to 24.5 percent nationally. With an estimated population of 1.2 million in Karamoja, poverty rose by 3.6 percent, but declined by 31 percent at the national level between 1992/93 and 2009/10.<sup>41</sup> In recent years, poverty in the northeast has fallen, but at a pace much lower than the rest of the country - declining by 5 percent between 2005/6 and 2009/10 compared to the 21 percent national reduction.<sup>42</sup> Whilst the poverty headcount of northern Uganda did reduce during 2002-2009, it has consistently remained at about double the national level.<sup>43</sup>

16. Nationwide, the adult literacy rate rose from 56 percent to 67 percent in one decade, eight percentage points above sub-Saharan Africa’s average, while HIV prevalence declined from 18 percent in 1993 to 7.2 percent in 2012.<sup>44</sup> However, in Karamoja, literacy rates remain at just six percent, and the HIV prevalence in the internally displaced persons [IDP] camps in Acholi region was almost double the national average.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> UNDP. 2014. Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience.

<sup>36</sup> WFP. 2009m. Uganda P4P Implementation Plan.

<sup>37</sup> UNDP. 2007. Uganda Human Development Report – Rediscovering Agriculture for Human Development.

<sup>38</sup> Anguyo, Innocent. 2013. “67% of Ugandans vulnerable to poverty” in *New Vision* (19 March 2013)

<sup>39</sup> World Bank. 2011. Poverty Trends in Uganda: Who gained and who was left behind? (Inclusive Growth Policy Note 1).

<sup>40</sup> IFAD. 2013. Enabling poor rural people to overcome poverty in Uganda. p1.

<sup>41</sup> WFP Uganda. 2012a. PRRO 200429. Project Document.

<sup>42</sup> Government of Uganda, 2011b. Ministry of Karamoja Affairs. Karamoja Integrated Development Programme [2011-2013]. p44.


<sup>43</sup> IOD PARC, 2014. Evaluation of the Impact of Food For Assets on Livelihoods Resilience in Uganda [2005-2010]. p7.

<sup>44</sup> UNICEF. 2013. Uganda Statistics (HIV/AIDS).

<sup>45</sup> WFP. 2009h. Country Strategy for WFP in Uganda [2009-2014].

17. Most of the communities in Karamoja also experience high levels of chronic hunger, with stunting rates well above 30 percent in most sub-counties.<sup>46</sup> Over 80 percent of children and 50 percent of women in Karamoja suffer from anaemia,<sup>47</sup> compared with national averages of 50 percent and 24 percent respectively.<sup>48</sup> Acute malnutrition prevalence among children 6-59 months old was 9.6 percent in 2008 - a significant decline when compared to the prevalence of 22 percent in 2003.<sup>49</sup> Since 2009, rates of global acute malnutrition [GAM] and severe acute malnutrition [SAM] have been stable as can be seen in Figure 2 below. These rates are classified as serious according to the WHO Classification of Severity of Malnutrition in a Community (Annex 4, Table ii) and are higher than wasting across the rest of Uganda.

**Figure. 2 GAM and SAM rates in Karamoja, 2009-2013<sup>50</sup>**



Source: [i] Makerere University, School of Public Health. 2010. Health, Nutrition, Food Security, and Mortality Assessment for the Karamoja region; [ii] ACF, 2010. Integrated Nutrition Surveillance System in Karamoja Region; [iii] ACF. UNICEF. 2011. Nutrition Surveillance Karamoja Region, Uganda; [iv] ACF. UNICEF. 2012. Nutrition Surveillance Karamoja Region, Uganda; [v] Makerere University, School of Public Health. 2013. Nutrition and Food Security Assessment in Karamoja

## Conflict

18. Since its independence in 1962, Uganda experienced a series of violent conflicts, each regime faced with a wide range of dissident groups. Following contested election results in 1980, the National Resistance Movement came to power in 1986 after five years of struggle. It launched a functioning state and promoted a development agenda that improved the economic, social and political situation in the country. The government nevertheless continued to face armed opposition groups, some allied to previous regimes.<sup>51</sup> Over time, the government has succeeded in resolving the armed

<sup>46</sup> Stunting among children 6-59 months old in Karamoja has declined significantly since 2009 from 40.2 percent to 35.3 percent. [source: Makerere University, School of Public Health. 2010. Health, Nutrition, Food Security, and Mortality Assessment for the Karamoja region].

<sup>47</sup> Broughton, Bernard. Tumuhimbise, Gaston A. and Basalirwa, Richard. 2012. Decentralized Operation Evaluation of the Uganda PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATION [PRRO]; 101213 - Protracted Relief for Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees.

<sup>48</sup> WFP Uganda. 2012a. PRRO 200429. Project Document.

<sup>49</sup> Makerere University, School of Public Health. 2010. Health, Nutrition, Food Security, and Mortality Assessment for the Karamoja region.

<sup>50</sup> It should be noted that this data covers the sub-region of Karamoja, and that fluctuations in malnutrition rates exist at district and local levels.

<sup>51</sup> WFP Uganda. 2009g. Country Strategy Document Background Paper.

rebellion and reintegrating the non-state forces into civilian life or their own armed forces, and entered a phase of stabilization.

19. The Karamoja region – primarily a pastoral area – has for several decades suffered from problems of internal and inter-ethnic conflicts caused by cattle rustling, small arms proliferation, and bride price phenomenon.<sup>52</sup> In the past few years, however, such conflicts have reduced to a significant extent indicating a period of calm in the Karamoja region, according to key informants of this evaluation.

## **Refugees**

20. In 2011, Uganda hosted close to 160,000 refugees, the majority of whom came from the Democratic Republic of Congo [54 percent].<sup>53</sup> More recently, with the ongoing conflict in South Sudan, there has been an influx of refugees bringing the total number of refugees and people of concern supported by WFP to approximately 330,000 in 2014.<sup>54</sup>

21. Refugees' food ration is influenced by the length of their stay in Uganda [Table iii in Annex 4 provides detailed criteria] access to productive land, and income. Reliance on external assistance decreases as refugees use land allocated by the government<sup>55</sup> or informally ceded by Ugandans, and as they earn income from various activities. Prevalence of GAM and SAM remain low at four and one percent respectively, but are considerably higher among new arrivals. Stunting is a high 29 percent among the refugee population. While this prevalence is lower than the general population of Uganda, it is classified as 'poor' according to WHO Classification.<sup>56</sup> Prevalence of iron-deficiency anaemia reaches 60 percent among refugee children under 5 and 45 percent among women.<sup>57</sup>

## **Food insecurity**

22. According to the World Bank, 35 percent of the country's population is undernourished.<sup>58</sup> The 2013 WFP Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis [CFSVA] found that almost half [48 percent] of Ugandans were food energy deficient, spiking at 59 percent in northern Uganda, the most food insecure region. More than 50 percent of female-headed households were energy deficient [compared to 46 percent for households headed by a man].<sup>59</sup> The 2013 CFSVA found that food insecurity was mainly a rural phenomenon<sup>60</sup> and that a fifth of households depended on 'rural mixed subsistence farming only' for their livelihood. These subsistence farmers constituted some of the poorest [37 percent live below the national poverty line and 52 percent were in the two lowest expenditure quintiles].

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<sup>52</sup> Government of Uganda, 2011b. Ministry of Karamoja Affairs. Karamoja Integrated Development Programme [2011-2013]. p15.  
<sup>53</sup> WFP, UNHCR, Government of Uganda. 2011. Final Report of the 2011 Joint Assessment of Refugees in Uganda. p1. [This report stated that other countries from which refugees came were: Somalia [13 percent], Sudan [12 percent], Rwanda [10 percent], Burundi [5 percent] and Eritrea [4 percent].

<sup>54</sup> WFP. 2014d. Regional Cross-Border Situation Report #14.

<sup>55</sup> WFP. 2009k. PRRO 101213. Standard Project Report.

<sup>56</sup> More details provided in Table ii Annex 4.

<sup>57</sup> WFP. 2012a. PRRO 200429. Project Document.

<sup>58</sup> World Bank. 2011.

<sup>59</sup> WFP. 2014e. Terms of Reference – Uganda Country Portfolio Evaluation [2009-2013].


<sup>60</sup> WFP. 2013d. Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis.

## Aid to Uganda

23. Uganda was the 34th largest recipient of official humanitarian assistance in 2011<sup>61</sup> and receives about 10 percent of its gross national income as official development assistance [ODA] every year.<sup>62</sup> However, over the last three years, Uganda's traditional donors have been shifting attention away from Uganda and suspending aid due to misappropriation of funds and governance issues. Uganda currently has the lowest ODA per capita in the East Africa region<sup>63</sup> and as can be seen from Figure 3 (below), net ODA shows a declining trend for the period 2009-2012.

24. WFP's top donors during the period under evaluation were the US, UK and Japan which accounted for 86 percent of all funding – detailed data provided in Figure i of Annex 4.

**Figure. 3 ODA to Uganda, 2009-2012**



Source: OECD-DAC, World Bank, [www.oecd.org/dac/stats](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats)

## Government policies and frameworks relevant to WFP portfolio

25. The CS and various activities to operationalize it are underpinned by key national policies and guidelines. The most important among these are: Poverty Eradication Action Plan [PEAP] and its successor, the Uganda National Development Plan 2010/11-2014/15 [NDP], which outlines a vision to transform Uganda's society into a modern and prosperous nation. The government's commitments to ensuring food security for all Ugandans are espoused in the NDP and the Agriculture Sector Development Strategy and Investment Plan [DSIP] 2010/11-2014/15]. The DSIP has two development objectives: [i] to increase rural incomes and livelihoods; and [ii] to improve household food and nutrition security.

26. More details on various government policies and how these relate to WFP portfolio and policies are provided in Table 1 below.

<sup>61</sup> Global Humanitarian Assistance. (Undated). Country Profile. Uganda (key figures 2011).

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. In 2011, Uganda received \$1.6 billion as official aid, out of which humanitarian aid was \$56 million.

<sup>63</sup> Nyanzi, Peter. 2003. "Declining donor aid" in The Independent (28 April 2013).

**Table. 1 Summary of Government’s key policies relevant to WFP programmes**

Government Policy and/or programmes	Corresponding WFP policy and/or programme
<p>1. The Uganda NDP 2010/11- 2014/15 aims to expand social protection measures to reduce vulnerability and enhance productivity of human resources.<sup>64</sup></p> <p>In 2006 the Expanding Social Protection [ESP] Programme<sup>65</sup> was developed which supports, besides strengthening of national leadership and development of a coherent social protection framework, piloting direct income support, Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment [SAGE]. The programme is piloting two types of direct income support in 14 districts across Uganda:</p> <p>a) The Senior Citizens Grant [for persons aged 65 years and above; 60 in the case of Karamoja sub-region]</p> <p>b) Vulnerable Families Support Grants of Ugandan shilling [UGX] 25,000 per month - these grants aim to reach up to 95,000 households [potentially 600,000 vulnerable people] in 14 districts.</p>	<p>WFP’s work on social protection and safety nets [school feeding, EVH, cash transfers] are directly linked to the government’s ESP. A 2004 policy paper<sup>66</sup> on safety net and social protection presented principles and roles for WFP, based on country contexts. The WFP Strategic Plan [2008–2013] mentioned that it will develop nutrition, school feeding and other safety net programmes.</p> <p>WFP FNS in Karamoja were designed as safety-nets to contribute to social protection and included conditional transfers, school feeding, mother-and-child health and nutrition, and early child development.</p>
<p>2. The National Development Plan [NDP] outlines the Government’s recovery and development plans and includes North Uganda Social Action Fund [NUSAF] which directly contributes to the Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda.<sup>67</sup></p>	<p>The Country Programme [2009-2014] is directly linked to the NUSAF through the Karamoja Integrated Development Programme [KIDP] – filling gaps not met by partners and drawing on WFP’s comparative advantages</p>
<p>3. The Education Sector Strategic Plan 2004-2015 gives the basis for free and compulsory primary education. School feeding is included in the Uganda National Action Plan [NAP] to be incorporated in sectoral plans. The government emphasizes is a parental responsibility for school feeding and approved separate parent-led school feeding modalities for rural, and urban schools, with Guidelines prepared by the Ministries of Health and of Education &amp; Sports.<sup>68</sup></p>	<p>The WFP School Feeding policy establishes school feeding as a safety-net intervention to reduce vulnerability to hunger<sup>69</sup> and requires WFP to design and implement sustainable, locally sourced programmes with an eventual handover to government. The Uganda CP aims to support the government’s initiative, through the provision of school meals and take-home rations.<sup>70</sup> The programme is implemented only in Karamoja region – WFP providing school meals to 25 secondary and 257 primary schools.</p>
<p>4. The Uganda Nutrition Action Plan<sup>71</sup> [UNAP] aims at reducing levels of malnutrition among women of reproductive age, infants, and young children by promoting consumption of nutrition of enhanced food</p>	<p>WFP supports the UNAP through REACH<sup>73</sup> including hosting international and national facilitators to support the Office of the Prime Minister [OPM] to coordinate a multi-sectoral effort to combat undernutrition.</p>

<sup>64</sup> Government of Uganda. 2010b. National Development Plan. (2010/11-2014/15).

<sup>65</sup> The five-year Programme is funded by the Department for International Development [DFID/UK AID], Irish Aid and UNICEF with financial and in kind support from the Government of Uganda.

<sup>66</sup> WFP. 2004. WFP and Food Based Safety Nets.

<sup>67</sup> Government of Uganda. 2010b. National Development Plan. (2010/11-2014/15).

<sup>68</sup> SABER Country Report. 2012. Uganda School Feeding Report.

<sup>69</sup> WFP. 2013j. Orientation Guide for Evaluation Companies: Key facts about WFP and its Operations.

<sup>70</sup> WFP. 2013m. Country Programme 108070. Standard Project Report.

<sup>71</sup> Government of Uganda. 2011a. Uganda Nutritional Action Plan, 2011-2016.

<sup>73</sup> In 2008, FAO, WHO, UNICEF and WFP committed to a partnership called the Renewed Effort Against Child Hunger and Undernutrition [REACH]. This is an inter-agency initiative focusing on assisting United Nations agencies, governments and partners to improve nutrition governance and management for the purpose of facilitating country-led efforts to address problems of child hunger and under-nutrition.

Government Policy and/or programmes	Corresponding WFP policy and/or programme
and bio-fortified varieties and production of therapeutic and complementary foods. <sup>72</sup>	
5. In 2006, Uganda adopted refugee legislation regarded as a model for Africa, recognizing the right of the refugees to work, move around the country and live in communities, rather than in special camps. In 2009 a series of bylaws were put in place that allowed full implementation of the legislation. <sup>74</sup>	WFP and UNCHR operate, in refugee contexts, under the 2002 Joint UNHCR/ WFP Memorandum of Understanding [MoU] which establishes the division of responsibility and arrangements for, <i>inter alia</i> , needs assessment, logistics, monitoring and evaluation nutritional surveillance, reporting, and coordination. <sup>75</sup>
6. The Plan for Modernization of Agriculture, 2010-2014 [PMA] provides the framework for transforming Uganda's agriculture from a subsistence-based to a commercial-oriented sector. The main goals include increasing incomes and improving the quality of life of subsistence farmers through increased productivity and greater access to market. <sup>76</sup>	WFP Uganda's Agriculture and Market Support interventions [under the CP 108070 component 2] are based on government's policy on increasing agricultural productivity and market access for smallholders in particular.
7. National Gender Policy <sup>77</sup> aims to: reduce gender inequalities; strengthen women's presence and capacities in decision making in administrative and political processes; and address gender inequalities and ensure inclusion of gender analysis in macro-economic policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.	WFP developed a Gender Policy, in 2009 <sup>78</sup> and a Corporate Action Plan [2010-2011] to operationalize the Policy. <sup>79</sup> In addition, WFP CO developed a gender mainstreaming accountability framework aimed at promoting accountability of staff at all levels.

Source: Compiled by evaluation team from various sources as cited in footnotes in the Table.

### 1.3. WFP's Portfolio<sup>80</sup> in Uganda

27. WFP's portfolio in Uganda is rooted in the 2009-2014 CS – the first of its kind. The development of a CS took place amidst the corporate shift from a food aid agency to food assistance agency, embodied in the WFP 2008-2013 Strategic Plan. The CS attempted to reposition WFP in the country as a trusted humanitarian and development partner by emphasizing long-term hunger and malnutrition. The overarching goal of the CS was to align with and support government priorities as well as empower communities to reach the hunger target of MDG1 and ensure long-term solutions to hunger in Uganda.<sup>81</sup> The CS identified three priorities for WFP in Uganda: 1] emergency humanitarian action; 2] food and nutrition security; and 3] agriculture and market support. Box 1 below summarizes the strategic targets against each priority area.

<sup>72</sup> These are aligned with the Health Sector Strategic Plan II 2005-2010 which prioritized the fulfillment of the health sector's contribution to the national development plan [NDP] and MDGs for reducing maternal and child mortality, malnutrition and disparities in health outcomes among the lowest and highest income quintiles.

<sup>74</sup> ReliefWeb. 2009. Uganda's progressive Refugee Act becomes operational.

<sup>75</sup> WFP, UNHCR. 2002. Memorandum of Understanding between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Programme.

<sup>76</sup> WFP Uganda. 2009h. Country Strategy for WFP in Uganda [2009-2014].

<sup>77</sup> Government of Uganda, Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. 2007. Uganda Gender Policy.

<sup>78</sup> WFP. 2009r. WFP Gender Policy: Promoting Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women in Addressing Food and Nutrition Challenges. (WFP/EB/2009/5-A/Rev 1). Executive Board document.

<sup>79</sup> WFP. 2009a. WFP Gender Policy: Corporate Action Plan [2010-2011].

<sup>80</sup> For the period under review.

<sup>81</sup> WFP 2014e. Terms of Reference – Uganda Country Portfolio Evaluation [2009-2013].

**Box 1: Strategic targets in the country strategy**

*“Strategic Target One by 2014: There are no deaths from acute hunger, and the productive assets of the most food and nutrition insecure households are safeguarded against droughts, floods and other shocks.*

*Strategic Target Two by 2014: Most post-conflict recovering communities have become net food producers, and chronic child hunger has been cut by one-fifth.*

*Strategic Target Three by 2014: Farmers and traders are in a position to sell to WFP more than US\$100 million annually in locally produced food commodities.”*

28. WFP programming guidelines [2010] clearly distinguished between humanitarian and recovery/development programming. The country strategy priority 1 – emergency humanitarian action – was hence translated into EMOPs and new PRROs, and priorities 2 and 3 – food and nutrition security, and agriculture and market support – were covered by a new expanded country programme [CP] which incorporated all recovery and development activities, under components 1 and 2 of CP 108070, respectively.<sup>82</sup> Gender and protection are cross-cutting.

29. Table 2 indicates the operations’ variable performance in terms of caseload reached, tonnage delivered, and resourcing. Overall, the portfolio secured funding for around half of its requirements (US\$ 328.7 million received, against US\$ 661.8 million required during 2009-2013).

**Table. 2: Beneficiaries, tonnage and resourcing (planned and actual) by project**

	Planned benef.	Actual benef.	Planned MT	Actual MT	Planned budget USD	Actual Budget USD
<b>CP 108070</b>	361,000	500,103	96,808	56,217	222,101,116	118,392,819
<b>PRRO 200429</b>	392,000	432,921	48,125	34,660	133,034,124	64,030,503
<b>PRRO 101213</b>	881,000	514,700	169,444	90,771	191,595,607	87,246,677
<b>EMOP 108110</b>	970,000	773,803	114,617	75,640	114,670,723	58,740,244
<b>IR-EMOP 200123</b>	12,000	14,846	500	249	419,383	292,290
<b>All</b>	n/a	n/a	429,494	257,537	661,820,953	328,702,533

Source: SPR of the project documents 2009-2013

30. The evaluation included the following activities under different CS priority areas:

- i. priority 1 - all general food distributions [to various caseloads], and support to treatment of acute malnutrition activities [corresponding to the four EMOP and PRROs implemented];<sup>83</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Samkange, Stanlake. Howe, Paul and Cavalcante, Marco. (Undated). Country implementation of the Strategic Plan: the case of Uganda.

<sup>83</sup> With the slight deviation under the nutrition activities for expenditures’ reporting, which has only a negligible incidence given the caseload involved – and which the evaluation has reported under the relevant Priority area, as noted in [Section 1.1.](#)

- ii. priority 2 - support to education, assets creation and prevention of malnutrition [corresponding to CP 108070 component 1];
- iii. priority 3 – development of market infrastructure and local purchases activities [CP 108070’s component 2].

### Priority area 1 – Emergency Humanitarian Action [EHA]

31. Priority area 1 of the CS was covered by two PRROs [101213 & 200429] and two emergency operations [EMOP 108110 & IR-EMOP 200123] in response to natural disasters in Karamoja [2009] and Eastern Uganda [2010], respectively. PRRO 101213, followed by PRRO 200429, addressed acute malnutrition and aimed to save the lives of IDPs and refugees through: [i] general food distribution [GFD], [ii] supplementary feeding programme [SFP] and [iii] support to therapeutic feeding [TF].<sup>84</sup> Table 3 summarizes the activities implemented under the CS priority 1 – emergency humanitarian action [EHA].

**Table. 3 Summary of work under Emergency Humanitarian Action**

Country Strategy Priority 1 – Emergency Humanitarian Action				
<b>Target</b>	People who cannot meet their basic food and nutrition needs			
<b>Strategic Objective</b>	SO 1: Save lives and protect Livelihoods in Emergencies			
<b>Activities</b>	Supplementary & therapeutic feeding [including community-based supplementary feeding]. General food distribution to IDPs and refugees [including food/ cash] and GFD to extremely vulnerable households.			
<b>Operations</b>	EMOP 108110IR	EMOP 200123	PRRO 101213	PRRO 200429
<b>Time-frame</b>	Feb 09 - Dec 10	Mar 10 - Jun 10	Apr 09 - Dec 12	Jan 13 - Dec 15
<b>Objectives</b>	To stabilize and reduce acute malnutrition among drought affected populations in Karamoja	To provide life-saving general food distributions [GFD] to the flood and landslide affected populations in eastern Uganda, and minimize their risk of malnutrition	To support the government's efforts to save the lives of extremely vulnerable households and refugees in Uganda affected by protracted humanitarian crises	To support the government's efforts in protracted, acute food and nutrition insecurity among refugees and extremely vulnerable households
<b>% Funded</b>	53%	70%	46%	48%
<b>Planned number of beneficiaries</b>	970,000	12,000	881,000	392,000

Source: Uganda Country Strategy, Project documents, SPRs 2009-2013, latest Resource Situations

32. “A poor harvest in the latter half of 2009 in Karamoja left approximately 580,000 of its inhabitants unable to provide for their immediate food needs in

<sup>84</sup> WFP’s support is limited to providing food to care givers of children and supplying food at discharge stage on specific request of UNICEF which takes the lead in therapeutic feeding.



2010.”<sup>85</sup> In response, WFP targeted 970,000 beneficiaries with 50 percent general food rations [through EMOP 108110] as it feared that almost half the population of Karamoja could be caught in a food security crisis because of a drought at the time. This was compounded by floods and landslides in 2010. To respond to the humanitarian situation, WFP then launched EMOP 200123.<sup>86</sup>

33. PRRO 101213 was launched in April 2009 to reduce or stabilize acute malnutrition among IDPs and returnees in Acholi, refugees and IDPs in West Nile and refugees in the southwest. A budget revision in March 2011 discontinued assistance to displaced persons in Acholi region and extended coverage to support 32,500 extremely vulnerable households [EVH] in Karamoja who were unable to participate in the CP’s food or cash transfer activities linked to asset creation. On completion of PRRO 100123, PRRO 200429 was launched with similar objectives. Under this operation, support to EVH in Karamoja was aligned with the goals of the KIDP which calls for targeted transfers to protect the most vulnerable households’ food and nutrition security.<sup>87</sup>

34. Table 4 shows the total coverage in terms of beneficiaries reached through EHA. As can be seen from this Table, in 2009 WFP covered nearly 2.5 million beneficiaries; in the subsequent years, the corresponding number fluctuated between 272,000 [2011] and 583,000 [2010]. In 2013, numbers increased by nearly 37 percent from 2012, mainly due to an increased caseload of refugees from DRC and South Sudan. Detailed gender-disaggregated beneficiary data itemized per activity, year and operations is presented in Annex 8 for the entire portfolio per CS priority area.

**Table. 4 Planned vs. actual number of beneficiaries under EHA by activities**

		<b>GFD</b>	<b>SFP/TFP</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>2009</b>	<i>Planned</i>	1,830,888	120,270	<b>1,951,158</b>
	<i>Actual</i>	2,435,105	23,548	<b>2,458,653</b>
	<i>Total reached (%)</i>	133	20	<b>126</b>
<b>2010</b>	<i>Planned</i>	488,019	99,415	<b>587,434</b>
	<i>Actual</i>	499,777	83,283	<b>583,060</b>
	<i>Total reached (%)</i>	102	84	<b>99</b>
<b>2011</b>	<i>Planned</i>	235,809	40,237	<b>276,046</b>
	<i>Actual</i>	244,288	28,376	<b>272,664</b>
	<i>Total reached (%)</i>	104	72	<b>99</b>
<b>2012</b>	<i>Planned</i>	311,670	41,402	<b>353,072</b>
	<i>Actual</i>	284,408	22,464	<b>306,872</b>
	<i>Total reached (%)</i>	91	54	<b>87</b>
<b>2013</b>	<i>Planned</i>	374,745	85,469	<b>460,214</b>
	<i>Actual</i>	352,595	80,426	<b>433,021</b>
	<i>Total reached (%)</i>	94	94	<b>94</b>

Source: SPRs for EMOPs and PRROs from 2009-2013.

35. WFP programming for refugees includes GFD and supplementary feeding for moderately malnourished and therapeutic feeding. A higher ration to cover 100

<sup>85</sup> WFP. 2010d. PRRO 101213 Standard Project Report.

<sup>86</sup> WFP. 2010k. IR-EMOP 200123. Standard Project Report.

<sup>87</sup> WFP. 2012a. PRRO 200429 Project document.

percent of recommended daily allowance is provided to refugees classified by WFP as EVIs since they are less self-reliant than the general refugee population.<sup>88</sup> As the number of refugees grew during 2012-2013, WFP prioritized refugees that were new arrivals who received full ration.

36. In terms of resource mobilization and actual expenditure under CS priority 1, the final SPR data (except for the year 2013) for each operation show that the CO utilized 88 to 96% of the contributions [Table 5] it received. The 2013 SPR for PRRO 200429 here reported is not the final SPR for this on-going project, hence the 61% expenditure level may not represent the overall expenditure level of this project, rather a reflection of late timing of contributions (for which expenditures will be made in the calendar year 2014). Annex 9 presents the data extracted from the SPRs on resources for CS priority 1 and CS priorities 2&3, by calendar year as well as per final SPR of projects.<sup>89</sup>

**Table. 5 Resources mobilized and spent on EHA**

Year	Approved budget US\$	Contributions US\$	Expenditure US\$	Utilization [%]
2010	419,383	292,290	255,808	88
2011	114,670,723	58,740,244	56,273,225	96
2012	191,595,607	87,246,677	81,073,350	93
2013	133,034,124	64,030,503	39,175,203	61

Source: Final SPRs for PRRO 10213 / 200429 & EMOP 108110/200123 between 2009-2013] - except for PRRO SPR 2013 [last SPR

## Priority area 2 – Food and Nutrition Security [FNS]

37. Table 6 below summarizes WFP’s work on CS priority area 2.

**Table. 6 Summary of activities under FNS**

Country Strategy Priority 2 – Food and Nutrition Security	
<b>Target</b>	People who struggle to meet their basic food and nutrition needs, and remain vulnerable to disasters
<b>Strategic Objective</b>	SO 2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness SO 3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods SO 4: Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition
<b>Activities</b>	Mother-and-child health and nutrition programmes, support to early child development and school-feeding programmes, food/cash-for-assets, HIV and AIDS
<b>Operations</b>	CP 108070 – Component 1
<b>Time-frame</b>	Nov 09 - Nov 14
<b>Objectives</b>	To achieve the food and nutrition security target, the CP will focus on disaster preparedness and mitigation, recovery and chronic hunger by: supporting the government's initiative to increase access to quality primary and secondary school education, especially for girls, through the provision of school meals and a take-home ration for girls, improve the nutritional status of pregnant women, lactating mothers and their children 6 to 23 months of age, protect livelihoods and enhance resilience to shocks and disaster preparedness through a number of asset creation activities.
<b>% Funded</b>	53%
<b>Planned number of beneficiaries</b>	Up to 361,000 in food and nutrition security activities yearly

Source: Uganda Country Strategy, Project documents, SPRs 2009-2013, latest Resource Situations.

<sup>88</sup> Broughton, Bernard. et al. 2012.

<sup>89</sup> Given the corporate financial reporting structure, it was not possible to disaggregate between the two CP components related to the CS2 and CS3.

38. Through the food and nutrition security component of CP 108070, WFP focused on livelihoods support to moderately vulnerable, food-for-assets [FFA],<sup>90</sup> support to MCHN programmes, and school feeding in Karamoja. Although the project document envisaged seasonal food and cash transfers to extremely vulnerable individuals and focus on HIV and AIDS, these activities under the CP were not undertaken – for funding constraints in the former [and given GFD was implemented under the emergency operations, see [section 1.3](#) above], and as the CO decided that there were other agencies better equipped to deal with the HIV and AIDS issue.<sup>91</sup>

39. As can be seen from Table 7,<sup>92</sup> the actual number of beneficiaries covered under FFW/FFA and supplementary feeding has shown a consistent increase during 2010-2013, while school feeding has been maintained at the same level.

**Table. 7 Actual number of beneficiaries under FNS activities**

		FFW/FFA	MCHN	School feeding	THR	Total
<b>2009</b>	<i>Planned</i>	NA	44,928	NA	NA	<b>44,928</b>
	<i>Actual</i>	NA	33,593	NA	NA	<b>33,593</b>
	<i>Total reached %</i>	NA	75	NA	NA	<b>75</b>
<b>2010</b>	<i>Planned</i>	249,950	33,313	94,404	7,873	<b>385,540</b>
	<i>Actual</i>	247,170	30,548	104,794	12,570	<b>395,082</b>
	<i>Total reached %</i>	99	92	111	160	<b>102</b>
<b>2011</b>	<i>Planned</i>	425,670	28,894	95,597	8,008	<b>558,169</b>
	<i>Actual</i>	321,865	40,847	93,796	0	<b>456,508</b>
	<i>Total reached %</i>	76	153	98	0	<b>82</b>
<b>2012</b>	<i>Planned</i>	407,255	28,803	96,737	8,390	<b>541,185</b>
	<i>Actual</i>	304,200	40,847	104,954	0	<b>450,001</b>
	<i>Total reached %</i>	75	142	108	0	<b>83</b>
<b>2013</b>	<i>Planned</i>	345,450	40,772	29,073	80,127	<b>495,422</b>
	<i>Actual</i>	345,540	42,052	112,511	0	<b>500,103</b>
	<i>Total reached %</i>	100	103	387	0	<b>101</b>

Source: Annex 8 which is derived from relevant SPRs for 2009-2013.

### Priority area 3 – Agriculture and Market Support [AMS]

40. The AMS component<sup>93</sup> of the CP aimed to enhance smallholder farmers' capacity to produce greater quantity and better quality food with 50 percent of WFP's local purchase coming from smallholder farmer [SHF] groups by 2014.<sup>94</sup> In order to establish a link between SHFs, traders and quality-oriented markets, the warehouse receipt system [WRS] that is regulated by the Uganda Commodity Exchange [UCE]

<sup>90</sup> Previously called food-for-work [FFW]

<sup>91</sup> As evidenced by a study of country strategy background documents and KII with country staff during the evaluation.

<sup>92</sup> Detailed gender-disaggregated data comprising these total figures are shown in Annex 8

<sup>93</sup> During the period under evaluation, WFP Uganda's AMS programme was supported through a global P4P pilot project which was designed as an instrument to expose smallholder farmers to markets in a manner that secures their sustainable access to incomes.

<sup>94</sup> WFP. 2009d. Country Programme 108070 [2009-2014].

was set up, giving a receipt once commodities are deposited by a farmer, trader or farmers' organization [FO] in a UCE-certified warehouse.<sup>95</sup>

41. The programme's private sector approach involved creating production and marketing capacity geared toward meeting the demands of markets beyond WFP.<sup>96</sup> WFP Uganda planned to help establish a series of warehouses equipped with cleaning, drying and grading equipment, to enable smallholder groups to store their surpluses, meet East African quality standards and reach large buyers such as WFP through the warehouse receipt system. Through its interventions on the supply and demand sides, WFP expected to stimulate development of a more competitive, open market, to the benefit of smallholders.<sup>97</sup>

42. At the village level, WFP constructed and/or rehabilitated satellite collection points [SCPs] – village based storage facilities with capacity ranging between 100 and 300 MT. SCPs were equipped with cleaning, drying, and grading equipment. WFP also improved transportation infrastructure by rehabilitating feeder roads thus linking the SCPs to markets. Furthermore, WFP facilitated training of farmers in post-harvest handling [PHH], stores management, farming as a business, and provision of market information.<sup>98</sup> Working with seven NGO partners,<sup>99</sup> by the end of 2013, WFP trained 13,267 farmers in PHH, 3,450 in store management, 14,735 in farming as business [female 56.8 percent], and 9,677 in Village Savings and Loan Association [VSLA].<sup>100</sup>

43. Table 8 below summarizes WFP's activities under priority area 3 [AMS].

**Table. 8 Summary of work under AMS**

<b>Country Strategy Priority 3 – Agriculture and Market Support</b>	
<b>Target</b>	People who can meet their basic food and nutrition needs, but require increased incomes to become fully food secure
<b>Strategic Objective</b>	SO 5: Strengthen the countries capacity to reduce hunger
<b>Activities</b>	Warehouse Receipt System, AMS infrastructure work and training, Purchase-for-Progress
<b>Operations</b>	CP 108070 – Component 2
<b>Time-frame</b>	Nov 09 - Nov 14
<b>Objectives</b>	To support local agriculture and markets through infrastructure development, post-harvest handling, local purchase and agricultural livelihoods.
<b>% Funded</b>	53%
<b>Planned number of beneficiaries</b>	Up to 211,000 in agriculture and market support activities yearly.

Source: Uganda Country Strategy, Project documents, SPRs 2009-2013, latest Resource Situations.

<sup>95</sup> WFP. 2011f. WFP 2008-2013 P4P Initiative: A Strategic Evaluation [Mid-term].

<sup>96</sup> WFP. 2010h. Uganda P4P Country Programme Profile.

<sup>97</sup> WFP. 2011f.

<sup>98</sup> WFP. 2013q. Quality Markets for Maize, Beans and Sorghum Beyond WFP in Uganda.

<sup>99</sup> Note: The SPRs do not provide this type of data and hence the evaluation has used the following report: WFP Uganda. 2013a. AMS/P4P Annual Report 2013.

<sup>100</sup> WFP Uganda. 2013a. AMS/P4P Annual Report 2013.

44. SPR data does not show breakdown of expenditure between CS priority 2 and 3 in the CP 108070.<sup>101</sup> The combined cumulative expenditures, by calendar year, on CS priorities 2 and 3 show significant under-spending during 2010 and 2011 against contributions, as Table 9 shows. This may be indicative of contributions being received late (which are then spent in the following year) in the calendar years especially in the early years of the project.

**Table. 9 Resource [mobilized/ spent] under CP 108070 [CS 2 & 3]**

Year	Approved Budget [US\$ million]	Contributions received [US\$ million]	Expenditure [US\$ million]	Percentage of utilization [%]
2010	158.41	62.41	18.00	29
2011	246.32	78.51	49.73	63
2012	246.31	95.05	78.18	82
2013	222.10	118.39	98.08	83

Source: CP108070, SPRs 2009-2013

45. Taking the expenditure on EHA and CS2/CS3 together, the portfolio balance has shifted significantly from focusing exclusively on emergency activities in 2009 to about a quarter [29 per cent] of annual expenditure now going into EHA, as the Table iv in Annex 4 shows.

## 2. Evaluation Findings

### 2.1. Country Strategy and Strategic Positioning

#### Alignment with changing context and government policies<sup>102</sup>

##### *CS priority 1 – emergency humanitarian action*

46. WFP’s country strategy development [2008] coincided with a post-conflict transition and stabilization phase in the country. IDPs returned home, GAM rates showed a continuing decline, especially in Karamoja [Figure ii of Annex 4] and Acholi regions where WFP had its largest emergency caseload. The Government of Uganda started emphasizing the need for sustainable solutions to hunger and food insecurity. In response, WFP’s GFD caseload was in steady decline since 2008-2009,<sup>103</sup> assistance to IDPs in Acholi was discontinued in early 2011,<sup>104</sup> and in Karamoja, WFP shifted from blanket general feeding to vulnerability-based targeted distributions [2009].

##### *CS priority 2 – food and nutrition security*

<sup>101</sup> However, based on the CO’s plan of work and resources update provided to the evaluation team, it is estimated that during 2011-2013, the split has been about 75-80 per cent on FNS and 20-25 percent on AMS.

<sup>102</sup> The issue of government ownership is discussed later in Sustainability section [section 3.4].

<sup>103</sup> However, increasing conflicts in the region have affected Uganda as there has been a large influx of refugees from neighbouring countries to Uganda since 2011.

<sup>104</sup> Broughton, Bernard. et al. 2012.

47. KII with government stakeholders revealed that the CS helped articulate and reorient WFP’s priorities in line with national development priorities and, for the first time, presented WFP as a ‘development partner’ in the eyes of the Government of Uganda. The development of the CS enabled WFP to have greater engagement with the Government of Uganda as the latter embarked on developing policies and institutions addressing issues related to hunger, agricultural sector modernization and market development. WFP implemented comprehensive nutritional activities in partnership with government health departments and UNICEF [section 2.2] and food and nutrition security activities such as ECD and school feeding, and prevention of malnutrition / MCHN, in line with Uganda Nutrition Action Plan [UNAP], as shown in Table 10 below.

**Table. 10 WFP activities in line with UNAP**

Objective of UNAP	WFP activities
Objective 1: Improve access to and utilization of services related to maternal, infant, and young child nutrition.	MCHN-Infants and Pregnant and Lactating women; CBSF; Early Childhood Development [ECD]
Objective 2: Enhance consumption of diverse diets.	School feeding; MCHN-Health and Hygiene Education; CBSF-Health and Hygiene Education; General food distribution [GFD]-Refugees; Agricultural market support [AMS]
Objective 3: Protect households from the impact of shocks and other vulnerabilities that affect their nutritional status	Cash for Assets [CFA] Food transfers to EVH
Objective 4: Strengthen the policy, legal, and institutional frameworks and the capacity to effectively plan, implement, monitor, and evaluate nutrition programmes	Partner capacity development including government Engagement with School Feeding Policy Development; Micronutrient Powder Research Support
Objective 5: Create awareness of and maintain national interest in and commitment to improving and supporting nutrition programmes in the country	Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger [REACH] Partnership

Source: Compiled by evaluation team from UNAP<sup>105</sup> and various documents and discussions

48. As shown in Table 1, the school feeding, MCHN and ECD programmes contribute to the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda [2007–2010]. These three programmes also assist the KIDP’s aim to promote human security as well as support conditions for recovery and development.

### *CS priority 3 - AMS*

49. WFP’s work on AMS including purchase-for-progress<sup>106</sup> [P4P] is aligned with the Government of Uganda’s PMA under which productivity enhancement and development of markets for agricultural produce in general, and targeting smallholders in particular, is emphasized. As part of market development, the government has focused on development of warehousing capacity in the country which

<sup>105</sup> Government of Uganda. 2011a. Uganda Nutritional Action Plan, 2011–2016

<sup>106</sup> P4P is a global project of WFP to promote access to market for smallholders and stimulate increased productivity of local farming sector.

is supported by WFP – WFP has assisted eight major warehouses<sup>107</sup> in the country - besides supporting improvement in quality of grains and access to markets for farmers.

## **Relevance, responsiveness and coverage in relation to humanitarian and development needs**

### *CS priority 1 – emergency humanitarian action*

50. WFP's programme interventions evolved and responded to emerging needs. Three years of drought leading up to 2009 resulted in a major EMOP [108110] for that year, which provided blanket food distribution to almost the entire population of Karamoja.<sup>108</sup> During this time, WFP revisited its approach in Karamoja, resulting in the KPAP. KPAP was a specific attempt to 'break the eternal emergency' response to Karamoja over which many donors had increasingly begun to voice concern.

51. By December 2010, under the PRRO 101213, WFP was undertaking GFD to EVH in Karamoja where the GAM rates [among children 6-59 months] were higher than 10 percent. However, given the protracted situation in Karamoja and that access to food was only one of the several factors causing the high prevalence of acute malnutrition, WFP's approach changed to address underlying causes of malnutrition through long-term interventions on food and nutrition security.<sup>109</sup> At the same time, it was necessary and appropriate to continue some relief, targeting EVH and the acutely malnourished, complementing conditional transfers available to the general population through the CP 108070. This approach of combining emergency response with long-term interventions was relevant in the context.

52. WFP has continued to address refugees' food needs. Through its PRRO 200429, WFP provided food assistance to existing refugees as well as new arrivals upon requests from UNHCR/OPM – currently the total number of people assisted is about 330,000, up from about 190,000<sup>110</sup> in August 2013.

### *CS priority 2 – food and nutrition security*

53. In 2010, the first year of KPAP, WFP supported nearly 50,000 poor households across the sub-region with conditional food transfers in exchange for their participation in public works activities. Subsequently in the same year, the KPAP was realigned with the government's NUSAF 2 programme, funded by DFID. NUSAF 2 is a response to the WFP's strategic shift from food aid to food assistance. The programme under NUSAF 2 [[Section 2.3](#)] supports moderately food insecure households with labour capacity to receive conditional food or cash transfers, in exchange for their participation in asset creation activities in Karamoja.

54. In 2012, NUSAF 2 reached 60,840 participants [304,200 beneficiaries, Table 6] with funding from the UK, Korea, Japan and Norway. In 2013, due to funding constraints, the programme was scaled down and took place in only four of Karamoja's seven districts,<sup>111</sup> but it still covered 69,080 moderately vulnerable households which

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<sup>107</sup> Seven private sector warehouses and one WFP warehouse which has been leased to a private company.

<sup>108</sup> IOD PARC, DFID. 2012. Formative Evaluation of World Food Programme's Livelihood Programme, Karamoja, Uganda.

<sup>109</sup> Broughton, Bernard. et al. 2012.

<sup>110</sup> WFP. 2013e. Concept of Operations for Cross-border Population Movement from Democratic Republic of Congo.

<sup>111</sup> WFP. 2013c. Uganda Country Programme Activities.

is significant in terms of scale – covering almost 29 percent of households<sup>112</sup> in Karamoja. School feeding covered all the schools [282] in Karamoja and met a critical community need - during 2013, it covered more than 112,000 children, as the output data presented in Table 6 shows.

55. WFP’s programme interventions are known for their substantial scale and coverage, according to external key informants at national and district levels interviewed during the evaluation. With seven field offices in the country – four in Karamoja alone and one in Gulu covering the Acholi region – WFP can access the most vulnerable areas of the country. As can be seen from Table 11, WFP’s food/cash transfer interventions in different areas reached out to a combined total of an average of 1.2 million people per year, and the caseload [not including AMS]<sup>113</sup> has fluctuated between 729,000 to a peak in 2009 of 2.5 million people – a scale no other agency except the Government of Uganda is able to match.

**Table. 11 Combined beneficiary coverage under EHA and FNS**

	CS Priority 1			CS Priority 2			Combined
	<i>M</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>2009</b>	1,151,250	1,307,403	2,458,653	0	33,593	33,593	2,492,246
<b>2010</b>	267,113	315,947	583,060	172,646	222,436	395,082	978,142
<b>2011</b>	132,747	139,917	272,664	218,027	238,481	456,508	729,172
<b>2012</b>	148,025	158,847	306,872	223,391	226,610	450,001	756,873
<b>2013</b>	199,219	233,702	432,921	179,945	221,789	401,734	834,655

Source: SPRs for 2009-2013. WFP Dacota. For detailed data, see Annex 8.

56. On the aggregate, the coverage is substantial when one compares these against the needs, especially in Karamoja. According to CFSVA 2009, Karamoja had the largest proportion of food insecure households in the country – 34,600 households [20%] and 64,400 [38%] moderately food insecure households. In relation to safety net and social protection to which several of WFP activities contribute, if one goes by the government’s estimate of vulnerable households requiring assistance [95,000, as shown in Table 1 under the NDP], WFP’s scale of operation is significantly large - FFA alone covered about 60,000-70,000 households. The eastern and central regions also had a large proportion [15%] of households classified as food insecure [See Table v, Annex 4]. While focusing on Karamoja, WFP attempted to address food insecurity in other regions through its AMS activities.

### *CS priority 3 - AMS*

57. WFP has been one of the three major market outlets for maize, along with domestic market and exports to neighboring countries. Since the 1990s, WFP’s demand for this commodity had been a major market driver. WFP’s local purchase in Uganda totaled over US\$53 million [107,587 MT] in 2008<sup>114</sup> when WFP caseload was near the peak. This has declined sharply since then – during 2012 and 2013, WFP’s

<sup>112</sup> Total population of 1.2 million in Karamoja, which, with an average household size of five, works to roughly 240,000 households.

<sup>113</sup> AMS is not included in the caseload as AMS activities are of a very different nature from WFP’s EHA and FNS interventions involving direct transfers.

<sup>114</sup> WFP. 2009h. Country Strategy for WFP in Uganda [2009-2014]



local procurement in Uganda was 30,675 MT and 22,650 MT respectively, which accounts for roughly 10 percent of all grain traded through the formal market.<sup>115</sup>

58. Although WFP's importance as a major buyer of grains has declined in the past 4-5 years with decline in its caseload, it nonetheless has been instrumental in setting market standards<sup>116</sup> for maize quality; its ongoing advocacy for regional standards in grain trade has facilitated the government's steps toward creating institutions and mechanisms to promote quality standards in maize in the country. Besides this, through its support to FOs, WFP is meeting a critical need of small farmers for access to inputs and market outlets [[section 2.3](#)].

59. WFP's work on grain storage and quality currently covers maize, which is estimated to provide a livelihood for about 3 million Ugandan farm households.<sup>117</sup> The CO reports that the number of smallholder farmers covered by the country programme in 2013 [including P4P] was 62,643<sup>118</sup> - about 2 percent of total maize smallholder producers in the country. Besides WFP, at least two other agencies in the country have significant scale of work in market development and grain quality:

- i. UNDP's DIMAT project<sup>119</sup> [Development of Inclusive Markets in Agriculture and Trade] through which it is supporting 30,000 SHFs [rice growers] in Busoga region where P4P is also operational.
- ii. Sasakawa Africa Association [formerly Sasakawa Global 2000] is supporting farmers in PHH and agro-processing in maize, beans, upland rice, soybeans and groundnut production.<sup>120</sup> It has also supported construction of 77 SCPs, 95 drying floors and 148 improved granaries.

### **Appropriateness and value added by country strategy**

60. As discussed in [section 2.1](#), the CS created space for the CO to engage with the government and other stakeholders on major issues of poverty, food insecurity and vulnerability in the country. With the return of relative peace after years of conflict, the government was eager, according to several senior government and United Nations officials interviewed for this evaluation, to see WFP move from distributing food through seasonal relief activities to a long-term approach of community and institutional capacity building at local and national levels.

61. The aim of repositioning WFP through the country strategy was to align the organization with the priorities and strategies of the Government of Uganda and WFP's corporate Strategic Plan [2008-2103], by identifying key gaps and needs where WFP had a comparative advantage for providing solutions. The CS built on WFP's strengths in linking relief and development – as evidenced by its various operations

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<sup>115</sup> Food Security & Nutrition Working Group. 2014. East Africa Crossborder Trade Bulletin. January 2014. It is estimated that of the total annual trade of about 850,000MT, only about 28% of grain trade in Uganda goes through formal market.

<sup>116</sup> WFP. 2011i. WFP's Agriculture and Market Support in Uganda, 2009-2014: Mid-term Evaluation.

<sup>117</sup> FAO. 2012. Analysis of Incentives and Disincentives for Maize Production in Uganda.

<sup>118</sup> WFP Uganda. 2013a. AMS/P4P Annual Report 2013.

<sup>119</sup> DIMAT in Uganda is a project [initially for 2 years starting 2013] supported by the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] and the Government of Uganda. Enterprise Uganda and Kilimo Trust are the cooperating partners for the project. The aim of the project is to contribute to Programme 2 of the Uganda's Agriculture Development Strategy Investment Plan [DSIP] in relation to "enhancing Market Access and Value Addition". DIMAT Project is focused on building strong business linkages and inclusive business approaches to link small and medium scale producers and enterprises to profitable markets at national, regional and global levels.

<sup>120</sup> Source: [www.saa-safe.org](http://www.saa-safe.org)

combining relief activities, safety net and developmental approaches, addressing long-term issues of vulnerability - as well as its competence in large-scale food distribution and operating to scale to reorient the portfolio. NUSAF 2, school feeding and GFD-EVH were all aimed at repositioning WFP, utilizing its comparative advantage and simultaneously taking the portfolio beyond food aid, as outlined in WFP's corporate plan.

62. Within the CO, the strategy has given the staff a clear focus and analytical tool to examine WFP activities from a longer-term perspective. Instead of disparate projects and activities implemented through various operations, the CS has enhanced possibilities of seeking greater coherence and linkage between short-term interventions and longer-term objectives of addressing vulnerability, food insecurity and poverty issues.

63. The CS enabled WFP to develop strategic partnerships in the country: the REACH initiative, with the private sector on AMS and nutrition supplements, with FAO on cassava multiplication, with NGOs and local health authorities, besides several government agencies. WFP's policy influence on key issues like grain standards and agricultural markets, nutrition policy and food fortification [[section 2.2](#)], safety nets and school feeding were possible because of the analysis and approach WFP was able to bring to the table. This would have been unlikely had WFP continued in its old way of planning and implementing short-term projects based on meeting emergency needs and/or filling gaps. However, evidence indicates that implementation is not always as coherent as the strategy [[section 2.3](#)].

64. The KIIs with external stakeholders revealed that all these have brought about some change in WFP's historical identity as the 'food and logistics' agency in the perception of donors, other United Nations agencies and NGOs, though food aid is still considered WFP's core competence in the perception of external stakeholders.

65. WFP's work on AMS which was expanded through the CS has given it a stronger role to work on long-term issues of livelihoods, food security and production linked to rural poverty reduction. This however has also raised potential for overlap and confusion over mandate between WFP and FAO which needs to be addressed. This issue arises particularly because stakeholders still see WFP's core competence being in food distribution, besides nutrition and assisting the government in developing quality standards. Much as they appreciate WFP's efforts to move into livelihoods and agricultural production, stakeholders have not seen enough of its expertise in these areas on the ground.

### **WFP Uganda's comparative advantage and alignment with corporate strategy**

66. WFP country office identified its comparative advantage as:<sup>121</sup> [i] hunger knowledge and analysis; [ii] linking humanitarian and development assistance; [iii] community-based presence; and [iv] demand-side interventions - providing significant demand incentives through its local purchases. Interviews with internal and external stakeholders during this evaluation showed that, while the first three of the above are still valid, the assumption that WFP had a comparative advantage in

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<sup>121</sup> WFP. 2011a. Budget Increases to Development Activities – Uganda Country Programme 108070.

demand-side interventions proved to be wrong. The thrust of AMS and P4P programmes, as designed, was premised on WFP being a big buyer of food grains in Uganda. However, as this did not materialize as intended [section 2.3], WFP was quick to redefine the objectives, and focus its AMS programme by directing its support to FOs and enabling smallholders to access local markets.

67. KIIs with both internal and external sources [including beneficiary interviews] during this evaluation showed that WFP is also recognized by the government and partners for its distinctive competence in food distribution/transfer and school feeding in the country and does command a significant amount of trust among local populations and administration particularly because of its long – perhaps the longest among all external agencies – involvement in food distribution in Acholi and Karamoja.

68. The country strategy was in strong alignment with the corporate strategy. WFP Uganda’s CS emphasized the importance of effective emergency response, while underlining the need to focus on prevention, including disaster risk reduction [DRR] and adaptation to climate change. Achieving the plan’s objectives also implied greater strategic and policy alignment and a more proactive approach to governments and partners than was necessary in the past.<sup>122</sup> The emphasis on safety nets not only neatly fitted the government’s priorities, but also WFP’s corporate emphasis. The WFP Strategic Plan [2008–2013] mentioned safety nets as a means of strengthening resilience to shocks, and proposed that WFP develop nutrition, school feeding and other safety net programmes,<sup>123</sup> as part of strategic objective 3 and 4.<sup>124</sup>

### **Coherence, complementarity and alignment with partner organizations**

69. The CS emphasized the need for building partnership in different areas related to food security, nutrition and agricultural market development. Through its involvement in REACH, WFP has worked with the Government of Uganda to develop the UNAP, 2011-2016. In Karamoja, WFP developed a similar partnership with UNICEF and local health authorities in addressing critical MCHN issues. Besides these, WFP Uganda worked through international and local NGOs, and district line departments to implement food aid and food assistance activities in various parts of the country. Under AMS interventions, WFP developed partnership with several private enterprises [warehouses, traders, consulting firms] and NGOs which worked closely with farmers, especially smallholders, in developing the latter’s capacity.

70. WFP programmes have supported government efforts toward food security policies. WFP is credited by the government and United Nations stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation for two major areas of its engagement with the government which enabled the latter to develop its policy and institutional framework. First, WFP’s advocacy and support for East African Grain Standards along with associated support on implementing a WRS and creation of the UCE gave stimulus to

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<sup>122</sup> Samkange, Stanlake et al. (Undated).

<sup>123</sup> WFP. 2011h. WFP’s Role in Social Protection and Safety Nets: A Strategic Evaluation.

<sup>124</sup> WFP’s Corporate Strategic Plan [2008-2013] objectives were - strategic objective 1: save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies; strategic objective 2: prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures; strategic objective 3: restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations; strategic objective 4: reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition; and strategic objective 5: strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase.

the government's intention to develop agricultural and grain markets. Currently, according to KIIs with CO staff, the Government of Uganda is seeking WFP's technical help in establishing a grain reserve in the country. Besides the government, the private sector are now sensitized on the issue of quality and standards in grain production and marketing, and all those from the private sector interviewed during the evaluation acknowledged WFP's leadership in this area.

71. Second, WFP has also made significant contribution in research and analytical work of importance to national policies and practices related to nutrition. WFP contributed to the report "Cost of Hunger in Uganda"<sup>125</sup> which quantified the socio-economic losses that undernutrition caused.<sup>126</sup> The results are the main advocacy reference for Government to scale up investment in nutrition and present an example of WFP providing close technical guidance to the government. WFP CO is now supporting the government with technical guidance and sharing of best practices on food fortification [as below]. The Ministry of Health (MoH) is spearheading the promulgation of a law pertaining to food fortification.

72. WFP, through its partner [Andre Food Consult], is supporting the substitution of imported corn-soya blend [CSB] with local blends made from locally available foods<sup>127</sup> especially in districts where there is evidence of moderate malnutrition due to food insecurity during the lean seasons. Initial results of the research are encouraging and this may be a more sustainable approach to providing a nutrient rich supplement to the moderately undernourished.<sup>128</sup> WFP, with assistance from the University of British Columbia, is also supporting the MoH to undertake research to determine the most effective way of introducing micronutrient powders [MNP] in Uganda, which is one of the aims of UNAP [Table 9] to help improve the health and nutrition status of young children.

73. WFP Uganda works closely with a range<sup>129</sup> of NGOs. Throughout the country, they act as key CPs, helping to implement the CO's programmes. All these NGOs have long-term presence in the areas where they work and are known for their capacity for community mobilization and work with vulnerable communities. Partners have expertise in relevant sectors like nutrition, health, food distribution, refugees, livelihoods and related areas they work in, although in areas like soil and water conservations, technical expertise seems to vary [[section 2.3](#)].

74. In general, good relationships prevail between CPs and WFP, and CPs say they have adapted to working with WFP systems and procedures. However, KII with CPs<sup>130</sup> revealed that the nature of the relationship is still essentially a contractual one between WFP and the contracted NGOs, limited to delivery of short-term activities for the duration of a grant. The aim of most WFP capacity development efforts, according to CPs and WFP staff, has been to ensure that adequate capacities are in place for the

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<sup>125</sup> ECA, WFP 2013. Cost of Hunger in Uganda, Implications on National Development and Prosperity.

<sup>126</sup> This study was done in collaboration with the Economic Commission of Africa and national bodies including the OPM and Ministry of Health.

<sup>127</sup> WFP is supporting development and piloting of the use of a sorghum-peanut blend mixed with honey and ghee- locally available commodities in Karamoja.

<sup>128</sup> Amegovu, A. et al. 2013. Formulation of Sorghum-Peanut blend using linear programming for treatment of moderate acute malnutrition in Uganda.

<sup>129</sup> The SPR 2013 for CP108070 lists 16 NGOs as partners, including Norwegian Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council, ACF, MAP International, Caritas, World Vision, African Humanitarian Action, Gweng Coo–Okidi community, and Samaritan's Purse, among others.

<sup>130</sup> There are a large number of NGOs whose experience is in emergency work in Karamoja that either moved from other parts of Northern Uganda following the peace process, or came to assist in the 2009 drought year and have remained.

smooth implementation of WFP-supported food aid and immediate assistance activities, and compliance with WFP's procedural requirements. Emphasis and preoccupation with short-term delivery impedes engagement on long-term capacity issues or challenges, as exemplified by capacity issues related to, for example, watershed management or DRR [[section 2.3](#)].

75. The CS and subsequent programming emphasized disaster preparedness, DRR and resilience as a key objective of WFP's work. In Uganda, a joint resilience strategy was developed in 2013 by FAO, UNICEF and WFP through funding from DFID. The Joint Strategy seeks greater synergy and coherence with FAO and UNICEF through coordination of efforts to achieve the outcomes of the strategy.<sup>131</sup> The Resilience Strategy<sup>132</sup> aims to address conflict, climate change and economic resilience; it also backs a government supported shift in Karamoja away from relief to longer-term livelihood support. From the KIIs, the evaluation noted that while the work continues, it is unclear as to where exactly the potential synergy lies, as planning and implementation of activities are done by individual agencies independently on their own.

76. As discussed in [section 2.1](#), an important partnership for WFP is its collaboration with FAO on various aspects of AMS interventions [cassava cultivation, distribution of seeds, household storage, etc.] and soil and water conservation under FFW/FFA, resilience strategy. FAO also implements the Karamoja Livelihoods Programme [KALIP] funded by the European Union [EU] which has similar emphases to NUSAF 2; potential exists for interaction between the two. However, beyond dialogue between WFP and FAO at the national level, there is no clear evidence of meaningful partnership between these programmes.<sup>133</sup> In 2011 WFP and FAO set up a technical working group in Karamoja and joint plans were developed on watershed management.<sup>134</sup> Little progress was made on its implementation. A regional mission reported, "limited joint progress was made on the five watershed sites. This was caused by various circumstances like staff turnover, limited current flexibility within existing projects, communication challenges between the UN agencies [mainly at field level] and partners."<sup>135</sup>

## **2.2. Quality and Factors Driving Strategic Decision Making**

### **Analysis of needs, context and vulnerability**

77. The 2008 WFP Uganda CO country strategy background paper<sup>136</sup> shows extensive research and analysis of the country context, vulnerability factors and national development priorities to identify its overall strategy, priorities and targets. Besides detailed analysis of development and humanitarian scenarios, the CO analyzed its own strengths and weaknesses [[section 2.1](#)] as part of the strategic

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<sup>131</sup> The strategy adopted a three-pillar approach to resilience building: Strengthen the productive sectors – [a] to increase household income; [b] improve basic social services – to protect and build human capital; and [c] establish predictable safety nets - to address the most vulnerable people's basic needs.

<sup>132</sup> FAO, UNICEF, WFP. 2012. A Joint Strategy for Building Community Resilience in Karamoja.

<sup>133</sup> The evaluation team did not find any clear explanation for this and it heard different versions and perspectives from the two organizations, WFP and FAO.

<sup>134</sup> IIRR. 2012. Report on Watershed Plans for 5 Selected catchments in Karamoja Region, AWACH in Abim, Loputuk in Kotida, Kathaile/Narube in Kaabong, Musupo/Rupa in Moroto and Kakomongole in Nakapiripitit.

<sup>135</sup> Franken, Aisja. 2013. FAO, Back to Office Report.

<sup>136</sup> WFP. 2009g. Country Strategy Document Background Paper.

planning process. The move from continuous food aid to a safety net and developmental programme [section 2.1] addressing medium to long-term issues of hunger and food security was timely and appropriate.

78. WFP's comprehensive analysis of the nutrition situation in Karamoja and refugee settlements in particular was equally apt and enabled it to design interventions based in partnership with UNICEF, UNHCR [refugee settlements] and the district health authorities. Vulnerability analysis and mapping [VAM] and food security analysis is a key strength of WFP for which it is recognized by the Government of Uganda and partners. This depth of analysis and targeting is what makes WFP interventions appropriate in terms of humanitarian needs.

79. The initial design of P4P assumed that WFP would be a major buyer of Ugandan grains and the country strategy set a target of over US\$100 million [some 280,000 metric tonnes [MT] of food grains per annum].<sup>137</sup> This target was not fully based on a market analysis, given that the annual production in the country is 1.8 million MT, of which about 850,000MT is estimated to be traded in the market, of which only 28 percent going through formal trade.<sup>138</sup> The total local food procurement by WFP during 2013 was 22,650MT<sup>139</sup> – about 9 percent of the original target of 280,000MT. Even in 2008 with a large caseload, WFP's local procurement was 107,587 MT – which means that even if WFP's caseload had not declined substantially after 2008, it would have been unlikely that WFP would have been able to procure any more than a half of the intended target.<sup>140</sup>

80. The market analysis also missed the fact that smallholders, rather than dealing with the WRS or private warehouses, preferred selling to local traders who paid instant cash. A 2011 mid-term evaluation of AMS programme noted “the AMS logic is also based on a number of meta-assumptions, which have not been sufficiently acknowledged or tested at design stage.”<sup>141</sup> WFP quickly incorporated this into the interventions and changed the approach [2012 onwards]; it now focuses on enabling SHFs to produce better quality grains, handle storage at household level and access local markets at better prices, thus avoiding distress sales.

81. The CS identified five programme priorities<sup>142</sup> for gender mainstreaming based on WFP's corporate Gender Policy,<sup>143</sup> and Corporate Action Plan [2010-2011] to operationalize the Policy.<sup>144</sup> All WFP reports give gender-disaggregated data. WFP Uganda developed Implementation Guidelines on Gender<sup>145</sup> which cover gender-related protection challenges focusing on eliminating gender-based violence. The MCHN programmes include men and boys while school feeding targets girls who are withdrawn from primary school. For promoting positive gender relations and

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Food Security & Nutrition Working Group. 2014. East Africa Crossborder Trade Bulletin. January 2014.

<sup>139</sup> Another 1,934 MT were reportedly sold to other buyers by FOs [source: WFP Uganda. 2013a. AMS/P4P Annual Report 2013].

<sup>140</sup> An additional factor compounding this is also WFP's strict adherence to grain quality standards.

<sup>141</sup> WFP. 2011i. WFP's Agriculture and Market Support in Uganda, 2009-2014: Mid-term Evaluation.

<sup>142</sup> The programme priorities are: [i] addressing gender-related protection challenges; [ii] integrating gender perspective into HIV/AIDS programmes; [iii] breaking gender barriers through improved MCHN programmes; [iv] promoting gender equality through WFP supported schooling feeding; and [v] promoting positive gender relations and supporting sustainable livelihoods. Institutional support for gender mainstreaming includes: capacity development, accountability, advocacy, gender mainstreaming in operations, partnerships and research.

<sup>143</sup> WFP. 2009n. WFP Gender Policy: Promoting Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women in Addressing Food and Nutrition Challenges (WFP/EB/2009/5-A/Rev 1). Executive Board document.

<sup>144</sup> WFP. October 2009a. WFP Gender Policy: Corporate Action Plan [2010-2011].

<sup>145</sup> WFP Uganda. (undated). Implementation Guidelines on Gender [2009-2014].

supporting sustainable livelihoods, activities like cash or voucher transfers incorporate sensitization for both men and women.

82. The evaluation found that in several areas, WFP succeeded in targeting women as beneficiaries of various activities within its portfolio [Box 2]. However, these mainly focused on women's participation and not on gender-based roles, division of labour and decision-making regarding access to and control of resources. For example, while decisions to plant woodlots with timbers and fruit trees were made in community meetings [men and women], FGDs and individual interviews with women indicated that they would have preferred to plant bushes that provide firewood as they currently spend significant amount of time gathering firewood. This also raises questions as to how and who takes decisions on choice of species to be grown - the FGDs indicated that the CPs came up with their 'suggestions' which were then endorsed by the chairperson of the village committees.

**Box 2: WFP's interventions targeting women**

- In P4P, the target was to have 50% women's registration in FOs and management committees. 51% of the members of FOs are women while 50% of the leaders are women with the Chairpersons and Treasurers of FOs including VLSAs being women [AMS P4P Annual Report 2013].
- Issuing food ration cards to women. In Karamoja, 84% of the food recipients are women [PRRO 200429, SPR 2013].
- In PRRO 200429, the target was to have women hold at least 50% of leadership positions in the food management committees. The FGDs in the refugee settlements revealed that more than 50% of the leadership positions were held by women. In Karamoja, the number of women on food management committees increased from 83% in 2012 to 93% in 2013 [PRRO 200429, SPR 2013].
- Introducing energy saving stoves [NUSAF 2 in Karamoja] to reduce the burden women have of collecting firewood.

83. CFA may have involved a large number of women, but beneficiary interviews and FGDs with communities [both men and women] indicated that there was very little intervention at community or household level to sensitize and ensure that women have a say in utilization of the cash, or that the cash went toward meeting nutritional needs of women and children. WFP has made limited attempts to operationalize gendered analysis of vulnerability due to limited staff and CPs capacity in assessing potential impact of various interventions on gender roles and dynamics within households and communities.

84. In 2007, there were reports of violence at food distribution sites in Karamoja which prompted WFP to assess the protection risks faced by beneficiaries and the wider community, and their causes.<sup>146</sup> In response, WFP introduced new modalities for food distributions under the 2009 emergency operation, illustrated in Table 12. The evaluation team was able to verify many of these actions by triangulating secondary information and feedback from key informants. Verification was not always possible; however this does not imply that these actions were not taken.

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<sup>146</sup> WFP. 2012g. Protection in Practice, Food Assistance with Safety and Dignity. p140.

**Table. 12 WFP actions promoting humanitarian protection in Karamoja**

Agenda for promoting humanitarian protection <sup>147</sup>	Actions Taken by WFP in Karamoja	Actions verified by the evaluation team
Capacity for context and risk analysis	2008 Protection risk assessment	Yes
Incorporating Protection concerns into programme tools	2009 Region wide registration and verification Regular beneficiary verification by partners	Yes Not verified
Integrating protection objectives into design and implementation of food assistance	Greater reliance on staff with community links Staff with local language skills More sensitive targeting, ration size and distribution modality Wood lots as part of FFA in order to prevent attacks on women collecting firewood	Not verified Yes Yes Yes
Developing staff capacity	Protection workshops of staff and partners carried out in 2009 <sup>148</sup> Specific staff hired with knowledge of protection	Yes Not verified
Establishing informed and accountable partnerships	International NGOs as cooperating partners Better terms for coordinating with local leaders, the military and the police regarding their roles	Yes Not verified
Establishing clear guidance / systems to manage protection information	Specific system in place to manage protection information – post-distribution reports collect protection data	If collected, its use for managing interventions has little evidence.

Source: WFP. 2012. Protection in Practice, Food Assistance with Safety and Dignity; WFP. 2012. Humanitarian Protection Policy; WFP. 2009. Protection Workshop Report, Kotido, Kaabong and Abim Districts; WFP. 2009. Protection Workshop Report, Moroto and Nakapiripirit.

85. KIIs with staff and CPs suggest that the changes made in Karamoja resulted in safer, more transparent and better-organized food distributions, and reduced mistrust among communities and among local leaders.<sup>149</sup> However, since these efforts in 2008 and 2009, there has not been a reassessment of risks faced by beneficiaries of WFP assistance in Karamoja despite changes in the type of WFP’s assistance and in the evolving situation following post-conflict transition context.

86. The woodlot interventions in Karamoja were proposed as a means to reduce attacks on women collecting firewood.<sup>150</sup> However, during implementation, woodlots were planted with timber and fruit trees instead, thus missing out the protection rationale behind the concept. WFP field office staff reported that there have not been any recent initiatives to build the capacity of staff in protection, which supports comments from other key informants suggesting uneven protection knowledge among

<sup>147</sup> WFP. 2012d. Humanitarian Protection Policy.

<sup>148</sup> WFP Uganda. 2009a. Protection Workshop Report, Kotido, Kaabong and Abim Districts. See also, WFP Uganda. 2009b. Protection Workshop Report, Moroto and Nakapiripirit.

<sup>149</sup> WFP. 2012g. Protection in Practice, Food Assistance With Safety and Dignity

<sup>150</sup> WFP Uganda. 2009a. Protection Workshop Report, Kotido, Kaabong and Abim Districts. See also, WFP Uganda. 2009b. Protection Workshop Report, Moroto and Nakapiripirit.



WFP staff. Staff reductions and changes have occurred over the portfolio period, which may have contributed to this.

87. Within the context of refugees, UNHCR has the overall protection mandate; however as the WFP humanitarian protection policy states, WFP assistance should not place beneficiaries at risk. During key informant interviews with various partners and beneficiaries in refugee settlements, it became evident that secondary transport to Final Distribution Points [FDPs] in the camps has been irregular, particularly since 2012, often resulting in delayed distributions<sup>151</sup> and distributions take place after dark; external stakeholders, senior field office and CO officials also corroborated this. There are also internal reports which have noted this.<sup>152</sup> The irregular nature of secondary transport to FDPs has resulted in reduced trust between the refugee population and partners. It has also placed beneficiaries at risk due to potential riots resulting from delays.<sup>153</sup> In addition, when distributions started late and continued into the night, women and EVIs were placed at risk of attack when returning home. Beneficiaries and partners reported occurrence of such attacks and the need to resolve these transport issues.

### **Strategic decision-making and result-orientation**

88. WFP bases its interventions on systematic needs assessments for which it uses several tools, namely, food security assessments and vulnerability mapping, joint assessments, and nutritional assessments. For this, it works in partnership with the government and United Nations agencies: FAO, UNHCR and UNICEF in particular. In 2009, WFP carried out a vulnerability analysis in Karamoja which categorized households into Extremely Vulnerable [EVH], Food Insecure [FI] and Moderately Food Insecure [MFI] households with the help of the International Organization for Migration [IOM]. WFP undertakes an annual review of the list of vulnerable, through its CPs, and ensures that its activities target the vulnerable.

89. The evaluation found that beneficiary targeting for all safety net activities was guided by the findings of joint food security and vulnerability assessments and nutrition assessments. School feeding numbers are determined through head count that is jointly conducted during each school term. The food assistance for the refugee caseload is also determined through the joint assessment mission [JAM]<sup>154</sup> that is carried out once every two years in partnership with UNHCR. The targeting of food distributions in Karamoja is based on a vulnerability assessment exercise undertaken in 2009 and reviewed annually. In order to address the practice of polygamy in

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<sup>151</sup> In some cases delays have meant refugees having to return from a planned distribution without receiving food.

<sup>152</sup> For example, an internal WFP Situation Report [WFP. 2014. Internal Situation report # 1] in January 2014 noted “WFP could not conduct GFD in four out of five settlements because of delayed deliveries of food to EDPs. The same report notes “secondary transport trucks are unable to reach all but one FDP in Kyaka II, due to poor road conditions. Currently, refugees are required to walk for up to 13km to pick food from the only operational FDP.” Delayed distributions were noted as early as 2009 in a JAM report [UNHCR, WFP, OPM. 2010. 2009 Joint Assessment of Refugees in Uganda] that observed “that in the last three months, food deliveries to the EDP’s were not regular leading to delayed distribution; the entire region has experienced pipe line breaks that have negatively affected timely delivery of food aid to the refugees. The report also highlighted the use of WFPs Strategic fleet for secondary transport and noted “Occasionally, there have been delays in dispatching the trucks for distribution partly because the capacity is not sufficient to serve all of WFP’s interventions at the same time”. The 2011 JAM report [WFP, UNHCR, GoU. 2011. Final Report of the 2011 Joint Assessment of Refugees in Uganda] stated that “capacity of secondary transporters in Nakivale/Oruchiga is inadequate.”

<sup>153</sup> There has been a history of riots associated with food in some of the camps in the South West of Uganda.

<sup>154</sup> The actual tool used to assess the needs is the Food Security and Nutrition Assessment (FSNA) survey undertaken annually.

Karamoja, women were registered as the head of household with husbands then registered to one wife's household.

90. WFP utilized evidence and lessons from previous evaluations to redesign some of its interventions, for example:

- i. as recommended by an evaluation,<sup>155</sup> MCHN interventions were better integrated into the normal operations of health facilities;
- ii. the emphasis of P4P shifted from WFP being a main buyer to enabling smallholders to produce improved quality of grain and access local markets at better price;
- iii. the PRRO 200429 design integrated key recommendations of another evaluation,<sup>156</sup> namely: [i] link WFP assistance to refugees' time in-country, as a reasonable indicator of food security; and a cash option in areas where market conditions are favorable; and [ii] in Karamoja: targeting at the household rather than the individual level, to reduce inclusion error.

91. KIIs with staff showed that at the field office level, understanding of the strategic shifts WFP has been making is varied, with most staff still fixated on food aid approach. This evaluation echoes the observations made by another evaluation<sup>157</sup> that while WFP has made high-level policy investment in the initial development and communication of the programme strategy, underinvestment in programme design and implementation capacity has militated against realizing the objectives in full. The same evaluation had concluded that there was insufficient attention to tracking effectiveness during field level monitoring i.e. the achievement of operational objectives in terms of results for the well-being of beneficiary populations – something this evaluation has also noted [as below].

92. WFP has an elaborate system for tracking and managing inputs and outputs/activities of its operations. However, its ability to monitor and analyse outcomes of various activities has been weak. A major restructuring following cuts in funding<sup>158</sup> in 2010-11 undermined WFP's own capacity and capacity development [section 2.2] of counterparts.<sup>159</sup> While field staff did a good job of keeping track of tonnage and cash distributed in asset creation activities, the quality of assets created and how these were utilized was not receiving due attention [section 2.3]. The use of contractors for Post Distribution Monitoring [PDM] may be cost-efficient but limiting staff interaction with beneficiaries by reducing monitoring visits to households compromises their knowledge of operations on the ground [section 2.3].<sup>160</sup>

93. The logframes of operations are often inconsistent, with weak linkage between outcome, output and activities [Table 13], especially in relation to the CP operation [CP 108070]. The risks and assumptions specified in the logframe were inadequate because these did not make adequate reference to other factors and actions required to realize a result: an assessment of assumptions about P4P would have shown that WFP was not going to be an attractive buyer to smallholders and traders who had alternate markets. WFP's best strategy would have been – as adopted later – to work

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<sup>155</sup> WFP. 2011a. Budget Increases To Development Activities— Uganda Country Programme 108070.

<sup>156</sup> Broughton, Bernard. et al. 2012.

<sup>157</sup> IOD PARC, DFID. 2012.

<sup>158</sup> This followed a decline in overall funds from donors for Uganda following the peace process in Acholi and return of IDPs.

<sup>159</sup> IOD PARC, DFID. 2012.

<sup>160</sup> Broughton, Bernard. et al. 2012.

with smallholders and farmers on improving production, quality at farm gate and household/village storage.

**Table. 13 Logframe of operations and projects – weak linkages**

Operation	Outcome/output sought	Remarks
CP108070	Outcome 1.1 and related outputs are about early warning & food security monitoring system	Indicators are about communities having disaster preparedness and response systems, although there is no evidence of activities linked to these, except FFA which were implemented as safety net.
CP108070	Outcome 1.3 indicator is stated as 20% reduction in iron deficiency anaemia [IDA] in school aged children	WFP undertook no interventions in this regard.
CP108070	Outcome 1.4 seeks increased access to education and human capital development in schools	Indicators are all related to increase in enrolment, attendance, retention and pass rates, while WFP intervention was limited to school feeding only, with no complementary interventions in the areas of quality of education and learning environment – assumption made that increased enrolment or attendance will lead to human capital development. <sup>161</sup>
CP 108070	Output 2.1.1 relates to increase in local purchase through smallholders	Indicators <sup>162</sup> and targets were unrealistic as these were based on assumptions that were not properly analyzed/assessed.
<b>Social protection and food security project [2011-2013]<sup>163</sup></b>	Objective 2 outlines “livelihoods assets developed, built or restored by targeted communities and individuals”	Three output indicators are: [i] no. of food beneficiaries; [ii] MT of food distributed; and [iii] variety of assets created (asset scores).

Source: Compiled by evaluation team from Project document CP108070 and logframes

94. The evaluation team reviewed a number of randomly selected monthly and quarterly progress reports<sup>164</sup> from WFP’s P4P CPs and those involved in Community-based supplementary-feeding (CBSF). The team also reviewed several end-of-project [EOP] reports.<sup>165</sup> While the monthly reports keep WFP and the CPs informed of the progress of activities, the EOPs focus more on activities and outputs, risks and policy environment update, analysis of the main issues/challenges and actions taken, but not on performance indicators and outcomes.

95. WFP Uganda’s SPRs are now paying attention to outcomes as per WFP’s corporate Strategic Results Framework [SRF]<sup>166</sup> which was refined to better demonstrate results of WFP operations. The revised SRF focuses on the performance

<sup>161</sup> Although it needs to be noted that parallel to the increased enrolment incentivized by school meals, the Government of Uganda has been introducing universal primary education grants to enhance the quality of education provided in primary schools.

<sup>162</sup> For example, ‘50% of the CO’s local purchase come from smallholder farmer groups’.

<sup>163</sup> WFP Uganda. (Undated). Comprehensive Results Matrix for Social Protection and Food Security (2011-2013).

<sup>164</sup> Of the 118 reports provided to the evaluation team by the CO, the team randomly selected 32 reports for detailed study. These reports were: ACF AMS/P4P June and July 2013; ACTED AMS/P4P March, May, June and July 2013; Cesvi March and July AMS/P4P 2013; FH Kitgum April 2013; Office of Relief and Development Support [ORDS] April 2013; Soroti Rural Development Agency [SORUDA] July and October 2013; and Andre Food Consult [AFC]: February and March 2013 Moroto and August 2013; for Napak District, December 2012 and June 2013 Nakapiripit. The quarterly reports that were reviewed were by AFC and were for the periods January to March, April to June and July to September 2013.

<sup>165</sup> These were from Andre Food Consult, Samaritans’ Purse and ORDS for the period March to December 2013.

<sup>166</sup> WFP. 2011d. Strategic Results Framework, Revised.

of outcome indicators measured and reported at the beneficiary and community levels. The evaluation team reviewed several SPRs from 2010 to 2013 and found that while the SPR format [2012 and 2013] required reporting on and analyzing outcomes, these were still heavily focused on short-term outcomes like change in food consumption scores and output parameters like tonnage delivery, number of families reached, etc. Evidence-based reporting on changes in capacity, increased farm productivity/income, community mobilization and similar outcome parameters which underpin the CS is still weak in the SPRs which tend to have predominant focus on tonnage and beneficiary numbers.

96. The CS document had defined clear priorities and goals. However, the targets [like 'No death from acute hunger', see box 1], as stated were unrealistic and did not render themselves to be measurable and tracked, except by way of ex-post impact evaluation at a national level. The targets were more appropriate for a national plan of the government to which various programmes and agencies contributed than for WFP's own country programme.

97. Routine monitoring is also weak. The SPR is produced once a year, so senior managers do not receive outcome level information regularly enough to make decisions. The CO has now strengthened its monitoring and analytical capability, with the recruitment of a senior M & E staff [April 2014] who will be developing tools to aid outcome tracking and reporting.

### **Internal capacity and structure**

98. A key element in driving the entire strategy has been WFP's country office management which brought high level strategic and analytical thinking in shaping the country strategy and programme. It needs to be acknowledged that for an organization like WFP with a long history of food distribution around which all its systems and staff capacity were built, this transformation could not have been easy. Making transition to the new approach required WFP to ratchet up its CO capacity in a short time. Uganda was the first country office to undertake this task, so tools, mechanism and procedures had to be developed, tested and implemented for the first time. A team of senior managers and staff from WFP headquarters was moved to the CO to manage the process. This enabled the CO to develop new and appropriate tools and procedures [like cash transfers, grants to private warehouses, purchase from farmers, reporting on and monitoring complex development results, etc.] with support from various divisions in Rome.

99. WFP RB has supported the country office with inputs on strategic analysis on a regular basis. WFP ensured that project staff was trained on results management systems, data management systems, compliance procedures with the reporting systems and project implementation.<sup>167</sup> Evidence from field staff indicates that there were efforts to build staff capacity through trainings and workshops in the first two years. However, subsequent budget cuts in 2011 led to a reduction in such opportunities. Cooperating partner staff were also trained and reoriented on reporting mechanisms and implementation procedures by technical staff at sub-offices and from headquarters.

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<sup>167</sup> WFP. 2010e. Steps Forward. Implementation of WFP strategic Results Framework [2008 - 2013].

100. Funding for Uganda started to decline from about 2008 and WFP, like most other agencies, had to adjust to the new reality. In 2011, a major review of the country office and sub-office structure was undertaken which resulted in reducing the number of sub-offices from fifteen to seven, with annual savings of approximately US\$2.2 million per year.<sup>168</sup> This reduced WFP’s field staff and operational capacity at a time when new activities and programmes required a range of expertise in specific areas [like watershed management, livelihoods development, cash transfers, etc.]. WFP’s CO has not had a gender focal point since 2009 and has not had any capacity building for staff in gender mainstreaming. Further, as discussed previously, staff capacity for supporting CPs on results monitoring remains weak.

## 2.3. Portfolio Performance and Results

### Emergency humanitarian action [EHA]

#### *Targeted General Food Distributions*

101. Overall, WFP reached more beneficiaries than planned under GFD, albeit a decline in the number of beneficiaries receiving GFD over the country portfolio period [Table 14] which reflects the strategic direction of the Uganda portfolio described in the CS. This was implemented through a change from blanket food distribution in Karamoja to targeted food distributions for EVH and population that had a prevalence of acute malnutrition greater than 10% [among children aged 6-59 months old], in addition to FFA programming. The reduction in GFD also coincided with conflict ending in the north and the return of IDPs to their villages. “Due to the strategic shift in WFP’s focus, no food was provided to the planned returnees, however support was instead provided through safety net programmes through the CP 108070.”<sup>169</sup>

**Table. 14 Planned vs. actual beneficiaries under GFD**

Year	Planned			Actual			Actual vs Plan- %
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
2009	888,526	942,362	1,830,888	1,139,581	1,295,524	2,435,104	133
2010	225,411	262,608	488,019	229,559	270,218	499,777	102
2011	109,012	126,797	235,809	119,535	124,753	244,288	104
2012	149,604	162,066	311,670	137,736	146,672	284,408	91
2013	183,335	191,410	374,745	163,326	189,169	352,495	94

Source: WFP SPRs for EMOP 108110 and 200123 PRRO 101213 and 200429 [2009-2013]


102. EVH food transfers were planned to provide 50 percent of the calorie requirements [1100 kcal] during the lean season [April to September] in Karamoja. Key informants reported that current distributions are at 25 percent for all food commodities other than CSB, calling into question the adequacy and predictability of the transfer as a safety net (see [section 2.3](#)). In addition, key informants noted that although the transfer was to take place over five cycles every year [every 45 days], the actual delivery was no more than 3-4 cycles [every 60-70 days]. Besides inadequate

<sup>168</sup> WFP. 2011b. Organizational Review - WFP Uganda Country Office.

<sup>169</sup> WFP. 2009k. PRRO 101213 Standard Project Report.

quantity, the fact that maize grain has replaced maize meal meant that EVHs had to find their own resources or part with some of the grain to get the maize milled [milling costs about UGX150-250<sup>170</sup> per kilogram], further eroding the value of the already inadequate transfer. Figure 4 below shows the number of planned versus actual distribution cycles to EVH between 2011 and 2013. The graph shows that WFP has not been able to provide food in a timely or predictable manner to EVH in Karamoja, therefore reducing the effect of the intended safety net.


**Figure. 4 Annual distribution cycles to EVH in Karamoja**



Source: WFP SPRs for PRRO101213 and 200429 [2009-2013]

103. Consistent shortfalls occurred in the provision of commodities for GFD throughout 2009-2013. Figure 5 below describes planned versus actual metric tons [MT] distributed for each year of the portfolio.<sup>171</sup> In fact, WFP met its planned tonnage target for EHA only in 2011 despite considerable reductions in the planned metric tons since 2009. WFP has consistently reduced ration sizes to meet the target number of beneficiaries, including new refugees coming to Uganda.

**Figure. 5 Planned vs. Actual MT of food delivered under EHA, 2009-2013**



Source: WFP SPRs for EMOP 108110 and 200123 PRRO 101213 and 200429 – see Annex 8

<sup>170</sup> About US\$0.7-0.10 cents.

<sup>171</sup> See Annex 8 for the details per project per year.

104. Acute malnutrition rates in refugee population have consistently been low, with no significant change realized between 2009 [3.3 percent] and 2013 [4.7 percent].<sup>172</sup> However, stunting among refugees has remained high throughout the portfolio period with no significant change in chronic malnutrition between 2010 and 2013 when prevalence was 25.7 percent and 24.0 percent.<sup>173</sup> These rates are classified as poor according to the WHO Classification.

105. FGDs with refugees in Nakivale and Rwamwanja raised a number of concerns about the food distributions. These included the lack of notice about delayed distributions; focus groups reported cases of refugees traveling considerable distances to FDPs, only to find that distribution had been postponed. Distribution delays were also key concerns of CPs for the associated security risks.

106. WFP PRRO document<sup>174</sup> describes a potential handover strategy to support EVH interventions that includes the transfer of EVHs to SAGE, and/or to CP asset-creation activities. The document goes on to describe preconditions for handover to SAGE. These are that SAGE: i] covers a high proportion of PRRO beneficiary households; ii] provides a transfer sufficient to protect household food consumption; iii] reaches scale during the PRRO period; and iv] is backed by a clear government plan for responding to acute needs during recurrent shocks.

107. Key informant interviews with government officials suggested that while the Government of Uganda will continue the Senior Citizens grants, the Vulnerable Families Support Grants will be phased out after the pilot. In the Karamoja districts, targeted Vulnerable Families Support Grants were never implemented due to difficulties in determining household composition and the risks of causing conflict. Given the current SAGE plans, [i.e., the phasing out of Vulnerable Family Support grants], it seems unlikely that WFP will be able to hand over a large proportion of its EVH beneficiaries to SAGE. The elderly population above 60 years in Karamoja has the potential for handover to the Senior Citizens Grant, but the current SAGE transfer value [UGX 23,000 per month]<sup>175</sup> is considerably lower than the value of current WFP food transfers.

### *Supplementary feeding/Therapeutic feeding*

108. WFP continues to provide supplementary feeding in Karamoja and the refugee settlements; in Acholi sub-region, supplementary feeding was handed over to the government following the resettlement of IDPs in 2010. The current SFP ration consists of 229 grams of CSB, 25 grams of oil and 15 grams of sugar, providing a total of 1197 Kcal/person/day through two distributions per month. This is in line with good practice for take-home rations and the government's Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition [IMAM] guidelines.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> WFP, UNHCR, Government of Uganda. 2010. Food Security and Nutrition Assessments in Refugee Settlements.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> WFP. 2012a. PRRO 200429 Project Document.

<sup>175</sup> About US\$9 per month.

<sup>176</sup> In 2013, WFP intended to provide super cereal plus [a supplement more suitable for children 6-59 months] for children under five years and super cereal for other SFP beneficiaries, but this was not undertaken due to funding constraints.

109. WFP set an annual target of 88,002 beneficiaries<sup>177</sup> for supplementary feeding. These included children<sup>178</sup> aged 6-59 months, adolescents, pregnant and lactating women as well as old persons. As Table 15 shows, WFP has not achieved this target throughout the duration of the portfolio.

**Table. 15 Planned vs. Actual beneficiaries under SFP/CBSFP**

Year	Planned			Actual			Actual Versus Planned % achieved
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
2009	45,885	60,070	105,955	9,534	9,728	19,262	18
2010	41,118	48,781	89,899	35,598	42,086	77,684	86
2011	16,980	20,755	37,735	12,515	14,467	26,982	72
2012	16,212	19,816	36,028	9,773	11,591	21,364	59
2013	35,986	45,570	81,556	35,124	43,850	78,974	97

Source: WFP. SPRs for EMOP 108110, PRRO 101213 and 200429 [2009-2013]

110. Coverage of the SFPs in northern Uganda was reported to be low early in the portfolio period. Due to SFP being institution-based, beneficiaries had to travel long distances to access the services. WFP took steps to change the approach by moving to a CBSF approach, training village health teams to screen community members and provide referral services. In addition, the supplementary ration was provided closer to beneficiary locations, for example at schools rather than health centres. A 2012 evaluation of PRRO 101213 stated that coverage had increased from approximately 53 percent in mid-2009 to 71 percent by the end of 2011.<sup>179</sup> The evaluation team was unable to calculate coverage of the SFP because SPR data is not disaggregated by geographical area [section 1.1].

111. No readmission data was available for analysis. A DFID review [covering support to WFP and government on supplementary feeding] suggested CBSF was inefficient since many children were repeatedly readmitted despite having been discharged 'cured'.<sup>180</sup> It seems likely that given the morbidity data from nutrition surveys and the poor public health environment in Karamoja, there is a high level of readmissions. WFP will need to examine the reasons for readmissions<sup>181</sup> and address this in order to improve the efficiency of the programme.

112. FGDs and KIIs point to CBSF inefficiency due to household sharing of the supplementary ration; at times of stress, the pre-mix was treated as a household safety net. Discussions with partners suggested that they received many 'elderly' cases who should normally be on the EVH register; however due to delays in distributions and a reduced number of cycles, they attend CBSF sites. Partners try to discourage this but

<sup>177</sup> WFP. 2009k. PRRO 101213 Standard Project Report.

<sup>178</sup> Includes IDPs, refugees and Karamoja.

<sup>179</sup> Broughton, Bernard. et al. 2012.

<sup>180</sup> DFID. 2013. Sustaining Nutritional Assistance in Karamoja. Project Completion Review.


<sup>181</sup> The evaluation team noted during visits to CBSF in Karamoja that a partner was using MUAC as entry criteria for the CBSF programme. The use of MUAC was related to the fact that the weight-for-height tables used were too complicated for staff to interpret. New charts were being sourced and should be in operation soon. This may have resulted in increased admissions, although MUAC criteria is part of the Government of Uganda IMAM guidelines.



faced with few alternatives, these cases are admitted. At a review workshop, partners agreed that there was a need to adjust criteria for admitting adults to CBSF programme as applying the IMAM guidelines admitted far too many [typically elderly persons], sometimes overwhelming the system for admission of children.<sup>182</sup> Stresses caused by unreliable food distributions and FFA activities may therefore be increasing sharing of the supplementary ration.


113. Throughout the portfolio period, SFP recovery rates exceeded the target of 75 percent set by WFP.<sup>183</sup> This target is also in line with government guidelines.<sup>184</sup> Figure 6 shows the recovery rate for SFP admissions over the portfolio period. Default rates [Figure 7] remained below the target rate of 15 percent, suggesting that programme design was well adapted to the operational contexts.

**Figure. 6 Recovery rate in SFP, 2009-2013**



Source: WFP SPRs for PRRO 101213 and PRRO 200429 [2009-2013]

**Figure. 7 Defaults rates in SFP, 2009-2013**



Source: WFP SPRs for PRRO 101213 and PRRO 200429 [2009-2013]

114. The CBSF programme in Karamoja is currently unsustainable; efforts supported by WFP to develop a locally produced blended food make programme sustainability more likely. It is anticipated that programme coverage will reduce if WFP and partners

<sup>182</sup> The response of adults to supplementary feeding is poor. [WFP. 2013i. Karamoja Sub Region Nutrition Programme Review Workshop, Observations and Recommendations].

<sup>183</sup> WFP. 2009k. PRRO 101213 Standard Project Report.

<sup>184</sup> Government of Uganda. 2010a. Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition Guidelines.

hand over the programme to the Government of Uganda which is likely to revert it to institutional SFP due to limited resources.

115. WFP also plays a limited role in therapeutic feeding where UNICEF leads implementation in partnership with health authorities. WFP mainly provides food for children at the pre-discharge stage in the form of porridge, in addition to food for caretakers who remain with patients at therapeutic feeding centres.<sup>185</sup>

## Food and Nutrition Security

116. Tonnage data show consistent shortfalls in delivery against plans [Table 16].

**Table. 16 Planned vs. actual tonnage (mt) under FNS**

	2010	2011	2012	2013
<b>Planned [MT]</b>	19,541	31,613	24,825	20,829
<b>Actual [MT]</b>	15,750	13,196	16,412	10,859

Source: SPRs for CP108070, 2010-2013

### *Safety net and social protection*

117. WFP designed activities in Karamoja to contribute to social protection and safety nets, including conditional food/cash transfers through FFA/CFA, school feeding, MCHN and ECD.<sup>186</sup> Table 17 provides an assessment by the evaluation team of WFP activities against the four good practice principles of social protection and safety nets.<sup>187</sup> WFP's 2011 evaluation of *WFP's Role in Social Protection and Safety net* noted the following good practice principles for transfers in the context of social protection and safety nets: (a) adequate to meeting people's needs; (b) provided on time and when needed; (c) predictable, so that people know the transfer will be available when needed and can plan for it; and (d) sustainable, used by the evaluation team to assess the CO Uganda activities [Annex 10 provides an explanatory note on definitions]. Except for school feeding which, though inadequate in terms of quantity, meets at least two key principles, all other interventions can hardly be said to provide an effective safety net. Pipeline breaks have become a regular feature since 2012, according to FGDs with beneficiaries and KIIs with partners and field staff. The FFA/CFA activities provide either a food or cash transfer to food insecure households with labour capacity during the lean season for a total of 39 working days. However as noted, the programme is unpredictable. KIIs and FGDs indicated that due to funding constraints, delays were experienced during the portfolio period.

<sup>185</sup> WFP. 2013n. PRRO 200429. Standard Project Report

<sup>186</sup> These activities make up all the transfer activities outside of emergency interventions that WFP does in Karamoja. The evaluation of WFP's Role in Social Protection and Safety Nets included MCHN activities while arguing that preventive measures would not qualify as a safety net unless coordinated with other activities.

<sup>187</sup> WFP. 2011h. WFPs Role in Social Protection and Safety Nets: A Strategic Evaluation.

**Table. 17 WFP activities against the characteristics of social protection**

Activity	Adequate	Timely	Predictable	Sustainable
FFA/CFA	No	No	No	No; recent programme scale-back due to lack of funding
EVH food transfers	No	No	No	No; Senior Citizen Grants may allow some caseload handover
School Feeding	No longer adequate since 2012	Yes	Yes	No; current plans for home grown school feeding have the potential to address this
MCHN	Yes	No	No	No; there has been a pipeline break since November 2013
ECD	Yes, when available	No	No	No; programme funding ceased after 2012

Source: Compiled by evaluation team

### *Maternal and child health and nutrition [MCHN]*

118. MCHN activities aimed to prevent stunting by targeting pregnant and lactating mothers and children under-2 years of age in Karamoja as well as reducing the prevalence of anaemia. The programme had multiple objectives including acting as a safety net<sup>188</sup> and increasing access to health services, particularly antenatal services.

119. The MCHN ration consists of CSB, oil and sugar. The calorific value provided is 1197 Kcal/person/day. FGDs with mothers suggest that the ration often only lasts 10-15 days. Mothers also reported sharing the ration among other children in the family. The evaluation team noted that in Moroto, the ration was not pre-mixed. This made it more likely that the ration was shared or that part of it was sold [e.g. high value commodities such as oil], reducing the effectiveness of the ration. Food pipeline challenges during 2009 and 2010<sup>189</sup> resulted in a failure to meet distribution targets under the MCHN activities [Table 18].

**Table. 18 Planned vs. actual beneficiaries under MCHN, 2010-2011**

Year	Male		Female		Percent achieved
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	
2009	0	0	44,928	33,593	75
2010	9,849	8,288	23,464	22,260	92
2011	7,879	11,923	21,015	28,924	153
2012	7,788	11,923	21,015	28,924	142
2013	10,210	11,341	30,562	30,712	103

Source: WFP. SPRs for CP108070 [2010-2013]


<sup>188</sup> While the initial CP 108070 did not refer to MCHN as a safety net the Standard Project Report of 2010 states that “the MCHN programme provided a safety net to identified vulnerable groups in the sub region.” This activity provided a take home food ration as an incentive to pregnant and lactating women and children under 2 years of age to attend antenatal care.

<sup>189</sup> WFP. 2010i. Country Programme 108070 Standard Project Report.

120. Overall attendance at MCHN has increased throughout the portfolio period, although the evaluation team observed that since November 2013 until the time of the evaluation, no food had been provided through the MCHN programme across Karamoja due to pipeline break. Staff in health centres reported a drop in attendance, although data in the above table suggests that there has been an increase in the number of children aged 6-23 months receiving MCHN services and only a marginal decrease in the number of pregnant and lactating women attending MCHN in 2013.

121. Key informants in Health Centres that were visited in Moroto and Kotido where MCHN-supported activities took place reported that the food ration increased attendance and that they were now undertaking many more deliveries of babies at the health centres than before the programme. Figure 8, based on data provided by the WFP Moroto sub-office of Karamoja supports this. The graph also shows a decline in home deliveries and increase in hospital deliveries.

**Figure. 8 Number of deliveries at health centres in Moroto and Kotido**



Source: WFP Sub-Office Moroto

122. Attendance at the MCHN provides an opportunity to vaccinate children, undertake growth monitoring and provide nutrition and health education to mothers in addition to having a safe environment for deliveries. FGDs with mothers suggested that they have seen improvements among their children and understood the health and nutrition education messages.

123. WFP handed over MCHN activities in Acholi, with the District Health Offices taking on the outreach, health and nutrition education aspects of the programme. WFP provided materials to support growth monitoring including scales and height boards. KIIs with health officials indicate that while outreach and health education activities have been maintained, the food supplement is no longer provided to beneficiaries. In addition, the evaluation team found that growth monitoring equipment was not maintained by the District Health Office.

124. There are no clear plans to ensure sustainability of the programme once WFP stops providing a food ration in Karamoja. The CP document stated that WFP will work closely with the government from the outset and jointly formulate detailed handover strategies. However, the inability of district governments to own and “absorb” this project would be a threat to sustainability.<sup>190</sup> Based on the evidence seen

<sup>190</sup> WFP. 2009d. Country Programme Uganda 108070 [2009-2014] Project Document.

in Acholi, it is unlikely that the government will be able to sustain food rations for such a programme and there is a risk that attendance rates will decrease dramatically when WFP support ends.

### *Food for Assets and NUSAF 2*

125. FFA<sup>191</sup> represented approximately 2 percent of WFP's total inputs<sup>192</sup> into Northern Uganda between 2005 and 2010. Table 19 shows the planned versus actual FFA beneficiaries for the portfolio period.<sup>193</sup> Coverage expanded significantly after 2009. Under the KPAP and NUSAF 2, infrastructure-based FFA is considered integral to the strategy for building up markets and driving productivity.<sup>194</sup>

**Table. 19 Planned vs. Actual beneficiaries under FFW/FFA**

Year	Planned		Actuals		% Achieved	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
2010	124,975	124,975	104,625	142,545	84%	114%
2011	212,835	212,835	152,240	169,625	72%	80%
2012	175,120	232,135	151,795	152,405	87%	66%
2013	148,545	196,905	148,545	196,855	100%	100%

Source: WFP SPRs for CP 108070 [2009-2013]

126. WFP's work on FFA in Uganda evolved from support to resettlement [2002], to livelihoods [2008], to market-oriented public works [2010], as can be seen in WFP's programme documentation over the past decade. An evaluation of WFP's FFA projects in 2008 found that while 87 percent of participants saw a benefit from the assets, only 41 percent reported that their incomes had improved. The evaluation identified several reasons for the limited impact on income: the projects were not directly commercial [e.g. health structures, water points] or were not maintained [e.g. valley dams].<sup>195</sup> By 2009 FFA had begun to be conceptualized in the language of DRR and climate change adaptation.<sup>196</sup> The CP formulated in 2009 emphasized market-oriented structures that were relatively simple to maintain once constructed [e.g. access roads and market collection points] and used participatory approaches to ensure better maintenance of assets requiring more regular upkeep.<sup>197</sup>

127. With the aim of increasing water availability and soil productivity in a degraded environment, WFP focused on rainwater harvesting, soil and stone bunds, erosion/gully erosion control, trenches, and the planting of trees, shrub and grass varieties. As follow-up to an evaluation of WFP's Karamoja livelihoods programme<sup>198</sup> which highlighted the issue of the limited linkages between public work subprojects,

<sup>191</sup> FFA has replaced the former food for work, cash for work and food for recovery, etc. Any former food or cash for training [FFT/CFT] related to creation and maintenance of assets, or natural resource management, is now regarded as FFA. [Source: WFP. 2013j. Orientation Guide for Evaluation Companies: Key facts about WFP and its Operations. WFP. 2013p. WFP Orientation Guide Final, 05112013].

<sup>192</sup> Across the period 2005-2010, an average of some 170,000 metric tonnes [MT] of food was distributed annually for all WFP activities in northern Uganda. Of this, around 3,000 MT of food were distributed each year for FFA, except for 2010 when the WFP Karamoja Productive Assets Programme [KPAP] increased this to 7,656 MT. [Source: IOD PARC, 2014].

<sup>193</sup> Data for 2009 not available in the SPR for that year.

<sup>194</sup> IOD PARC. 2014.

<sup>195</sup> WFP. 2009d. Country Programme Uganda 108070 [2009-2014] Project Document

<sup>196</sup> IOD PARC. 2014.

<sup>197</sup> WFP. 2009d.

<sup>198</sup> IOD PARC, DFID. 2012.

the CO intended to introduce a multi-year planning and budgeting cycle comprising a series of sequential subprojects in each community. This was also keeping in mind that creating resilience required long-term planning. However, as discussed below, this has not happened because CO's public works programme is restricted to a 9-month funding cycle.

128. The evaluation saw at least a dozen ponds in different villages, of which two were constructed during 2011-2012 and the rest completed in the past 3-4 months, using the FFA approach. Except for one,<sup>199</sup> all the ponds were shallow [average depth 1 metre] and either did not have properly designed inlet or were sited in locations which were/will be subject to heavy silting. Communities in several villages said that most of the ponds held water for 2-4 weeks following heavy rains and then dried up. The evaluation believes that with properly designed structures and with proper treatment<sup>200</sup> of catchment areas using a micro-watershed approach, these ponds can hold water for longer periods. However, this would require a minimum level of technical expertise within the CPs and WFP to plan, design and construct such structures. The evaluation concluded that as an approach, soil and water conservation holds great potential in Karamoja and WFP has rightly identified this as a key activity, but because of poor technical content in the design of such activities, their role has remained confined to providing short-term relief in the form of food or cash as wages.

129. Another activity WFP has implemented in the past three years on a substantial scale is the creation of village woodlots in village commons. The woodlots generally were planted with a few timber species<sup>201</sup> and sometimes fruit trees. Of the 13 woodlots visited, only four were well maintained by communities, the rest were in a state of neglect – over 50-70 per cent of the planted trees had either died or were damaged indicating that communities were not looking after them. The reason for the neglect was either the long distance from homes to the woodlots, or very little short-term incentives derived from the woodlots in relation to the time and energy required for maintenance. FGDs with women's groups revealed that if they had to choose, they would include Acacia species and similar bushes which would grow fast and provide them with firewood. It now appears that the woodlots are geared more toward fetching long-term financial gain than meeting the short and medium-term needs of the communities. These findings of the evaluation are at variance with findings of another evaluation<sup>202</sup> conducted earlier in 2013/14 which noted that most assets were functional and 75% of trees in woodlots were surviving.

130. A previous evaluation in 2012<sup>203</sup> highlighted the weaknesses in follow up and maintenance of assets created in Karamoja. Evidence gathered through key informant interviews, site visits and FGDs with communities show that progress in this regard has been limited. WFP currently funds partners in Karamoja in nine-month cycles<sup>204</sup> from July to March for the FFA programme. At the time of the evaluation, all cooperating partners had laid off their staff and were unsure if any of them will have further contracts, and if they do, will they be asked to work in a new area or continue

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<sup>199</sup> Kalogwang village, Nakapelimoru sub-county, Kotido: a large water tank about 60x50 mtr, about 2 metres deep. Constructed in 2011 and holds water most of the year as the catchment is large. Community undertakes desilting every year.

<sup>200</sup> The catchment area treatment is a soil and water conservation term used to denote a comprehensive management plan for treatment of erosion prone area of a catchment through biological and engineering measures to maximize water conservation and increasing the productivity of land.

<sup>201</sup> Neem [Azadirachta indica]; Teak [Tectona grandis]; Cassia species; citrus, papaya.

<sup>202</sup> IOD PARC, 2014.

<sup>203</sup> IOD PARC, DFID, 2012.

<sup>204</sup> Partners reported that this period can be shorter due to delayed funding, and protracted tendering and contracting processes.

in the same area. This short-term approach to asset creation means that once physical implementation of an activity is completed, CPs and WFP move on to new areas/counties or sub-counties, with little scope for providing follow-up to the communities who are supposed to manage the completed assets. The evaluation has seen dozens of completed subprojects [village woodlots, water tanks/ponds in Kotido and Moroto districts of Karamoja] implemented 1-3 years ago and over half of these are in poor condition as communities have little incentive to maintain these. Commenting on the potential contributions of assets to wider change, another evaluation of FFA<sup>205</sup> earlier this year noted, “the actual designs tended to reflect an urgency of implementation and were largely focused on providing a solution to an immediate problem”.

131. DRR is about reducing disaster risks<sup>206</sup> through: [i] reducing exposure to hazards; [ii] reducing vulnerability of people and property; [iii] management of resources and environment and [iv] enhancement of preparedness to respond to disasters when they occur and help the affected people to recover. Water harvesting structures, woodlots and the unpredictable ‘safety net’ are unlikely to contribute to these elements of DRR. Resilience involves strengthening the ability of a community or society exposed to hazards to absorb the effects of hazard and maintain its basic structure and functioning or bounce back and recover quickly. WFP interventions as discussed above were far from delivering these results, though they do have potential to do so.

132. WFP needs to bring more analytical rigour to its analysis of community vulnerability and programming for DRR and resilience. Long-term returns are heavily discounted if the factors of immediate vulnerability are not addressed – the prospect of making windfall gains from timber 6-8 years from now does not stop communities from continuing to destroy whatever meagre forest resources they currently have in order to meet immediate needs of firewood. Proven models of agro-forestry exist which can meet the pressing needs of communities for firewood and short-term income while providing long-term benefits, and these need to be explored.<sup>207</sup> Likewise, well run safety nets do contribute to resilience, but these need to be predictable, adequate and sustainable. Another evaluation<sup>208</sup> made a similar observation, emphasizing the need for the programme to have sharper focus, greater analytical and technical capacity and attention to quality.

133. CP 108070 introduced cash- and voucher-for-assets as a new modality for the country office, initially as a pilot and, only if successful after one year, it was to be scaled up during subsequent years through budget revisions.<sup>209</sup> The planned beneficiaries under the cash and voucher project were not reached due to increased implementation costs resulting in the suspension of the project until additional resources were mobilized. In 2012, cash was distributed initially through a telecom

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<sup>205</sup> IOD PARC. 2014.

<sup>206</sup> Disaster risk is determined by four critical factors namely: hazard in term of intensity and spatial coverage and duration; exposure in terms of spatial distance to the hazard and its timing; vulnerability [social, economic, structural and environmental]; and emergency response and recovery capability of the society.

<sup>207</sup> In the semi-arid context of Karamoja, planting bushes like pigeon pea [*Cajanus cajan*] which grows fast – in 4-6 months – and provide pulses and firewood, besides enriching the soil can bring immediate returns for farmers. These can be planted [with other tree species with longer life cycle] and harvested every year. Other fast growing trees for semi-arid conditions are *Leucena leucocephala* which provides excellent firewood and fodder and *Gliricidia sepium* which grows in 6-8 months providing fodder and is excellent for coppicing, lopping etc. for use as firewood.

<sup>208</sup> IOD PARC, DFID. 2012.

<sup>209</sup> WFP. 2009d. Country Programme Uganda 108070 [2009-2014] Project Document

mobile money facility, and later a direct distribution was adopted for the last distribution cycle due to poor network coverage. The amount of cash distributed was low in proportion due to less than planned numbers of distribution cycles.<sup>210</sup> It was reported to the evaluation team that the current mobile money system does not have sufficient capacity to efficiently transfer cash to so many small and remote locations. Thus the piloting of cash transfers under this activity will not continue in view of the limited coverage of CPs for cash transfer.<sup>211</sup>

### *School feeding*

134. WFP provides school meals to all schools in Uganda's most food-insecure region, Karamoja, with the broad objective of addressing chronic hunger and micronutrient deficiencies while contributing to increased pupil enrolment, sustained attendance rates and improved cognitive development of learners.<sup>212</sup> Until 2012, WFP's comprehensive school-feeding programme adequately met needs, was timely and predictable. Funding from a major donor<sup>213</sup> to school feeding activities stopped at the end of 2012, and it is currently run by WFP from carry-over funds. As per agreement with the government, WFP implements school feeding in the Karamoja region only,<sup>214</sup> and initially it included a morning porridge and midday lunch to school-aged children. However, the programme currently provides only a porridge meal as a snack in primary and secondary [boarding] schools. In 2013, WFP planned to provide school meals [on-site hot meals] for boarders and take-home rations for all day scholars. However, due to limited resources, WFP decided to provide all assistance as on-site hot meals to both boarders and day students, resulting in the unusually high rate of achievement for that year under school-feeding, as illustrated in Table 20.

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<sup>210</sup> Cash transfer programmes in Uganda [as per correspondence from Cash for Change WFP HQ unit, dated 07 Feb 2014, forwarded by Elise Benoit].

<sup>211</sup> Ibid

<sup>212</sup> WFP Uganda. 2011. Brief on School Meals.

<sup>213</sup> The McGovern-Dole School Meals Fund.

<sup>214</sup> WFP. 2013c. Uganda Country Programme Activities.



**Table. 20 School children reached through school feeding, 2010-2013**

	Male		Female		Percent achieved
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	
<b>2010</b>	50,904	59,733	43,500	45,061	111
<b>2011</b>	51,247	53,864	44,350	39,932	98
<b>2012</b>	55,140	59,673	41,597	45,281	113
<b>2013</b>	16,572	63,979	12,501	48,532	387

Source: SPR CP108070, 2010-2013

135. In addition to providing a safety net, the programme aimed to improve educational indicators [e.g. enrolment, attendance, retention and completion] and thus give children a better chance to strengthen their families' livelihoods in the future. The logframe on school feeding included indicators<sup>215</sup> for attendance, retention, pass rates and ratio of girls to boys. Take-home rations were also provided to girls who attended at least 80 percent of the school days in a term. In 2010, these take-home rations [consisting of CSB and vegetable oil] contributed to improved attendance of girls enrolled in primary schools, according to WFP report.<sup>216</sup> This was implemented only in 2010, but though planned in subsequent years, was not implemented due to resource constraints [Annex 8 data on THR].

136. There is no evidence of links between school feeding and pass rates and retention rates, as stipulated in the logframe. In 2013, the attendance rate is reported to have dropped compared to 2012 - key informants reported that with reduced ration of one midday meal, boarding schools experienced reduced attendance towards the end of the term.<sup>217</sup> WFP's reduced food basket was, according to WFP reports, believed to be the key factor contributing to reduced attendance.<sup>218</sup> According to government statistics,<sup>219</sup> there was an overall reduction in enrolment in Karamoja sub-region in 2013 – from 141,332 [79,990 M & 61,342 M] in 2012 to 135,315 [77,819M & 57,496F] in 2013.<sup>220</sup>

137. Key informants reported that it is difficult to meet the cost of cooks and other related expenses<sup>221</sup> because parents could not afford to pay a contribution of UGX 1000 in primary schools and UGX 20,000<sup>222</sup> in boarding schools to cover the costs. In some schools, WFP had also installed energy saving stoves and supported tree planting in schools as a firewood resource. The stoves helped to reduce firewood consumption. The woodlots have the potential to reduce the need for parental contributions for firewood.

<sup>215</sup> WFP. 2009d. Country Programme Uganda 108070 [2009-2014] Project Document. [Annex 21, Results and annexes Pg 27]. The indicators are: annual rate of increase in assisted schools' enrolment above 6 percent; attendance rate of 80 percent in assisted schools; retention rate of 80 percent in assisted schools; pass rate of 50 percent at assisted schools; and ratio of girls to boys enrolled equals 1 in 95 percent of assisted schools.

<sup>216</sup> WFP. 2010i. Country Programme 108070 Standard Project Report.

<sup>217</sup> This has not been validated through any randomized control trial based evaluation. However, all stakeholders [school authorities, Government officials, WFP field offices] claim to have observed strong anecdotal evidence of this linkage between school feeding and attendance.

<sup>218</sup> WFP. 2013m. Country Programme 108070 Standard Project Report.

<sup>219</sup> Government of Uganda, Ministry of Education & Sports. 2013. The Education and Sports Sector Annual Performance Report.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid. The report noted that in the country as a whole, total enrolment increased by 9% from 179,569 [110,255M & 86,135 F] in 2012 to 198,066 [111,831M; 86,235F] in 2013.

<sup>221</sup> For example, firewood costs.

<sup>222</sup> About US\$16.

138. The government is working towards implementing a community-led school feeding programme that encourages parents to cater for the cost of feeding children at school and encourages school gardening to ensure that schools are learning centres for parents on improved agronomic practices. Since 2013, WFP is working with the government [and other stakeholders like the World Bank] to find a viable national school meals programme, which will ultimately provide an exit strategy for WFP.

### *Early Childhood Development*

139. In 2011 and 2012 WFP supported ECD centres in Karamoja sub-region in partnership with UNICEF and the government. The programme lasted 2 years and targeted pre-school children aged 3-5 years to improve nutritional status and support cognitive development. However, the programme was stopped after 2012 due to lack of funding. A transfer of food or cash was provided for each eligible child enrolled in ECD centres on 6-8 week cycle basis. The food transfer consisted of CSB, oil and sugar, totaling approximately 1200 Kcal/person/day, while the cash transfer value was UGX25,500<sup>223</sup> every 6-8 weeks.

140. An impact evaluation<sup>224</sup> of WFP's food and cash transfers in ECD programme on prevalence of malnutrition for children aged 6-35 months found that the impact of food transfers relative to cash was significant. These impacts include a 9.5 percentage point reduction in prevalence of stunting as a result of spillover effects on children under-3 when the household received food transfers. These results suggest that some of the food rations given to households for their children attending ECD centers were being provided to younger children in the household. Specifically, the same evaluation found consistent evidence of significant impact of cash transfers linked to ECD centre participation for children age 3-5 years on:

- i. household food security and household consumption
- ii. child nutrition and development
- iii. improved diet quality [more meat/eggs and dairy] and reduced anaemia, and
- iv. increased ECD centre participation improved cognitive development.

### **Agriculture and Market Support and Purchase for Progress [AMS & P4P]**

141. WFP has played a key role in grain quality discussions between government and the private sector [[section 2.1](#)]. FGDs with the SCPs revealed that even at the level of SHFs, FOs and individual farmers, there was greater awareness of the need to improve grain quality. Farmers who are members of FOs/SCPs have seen first-hand how the quality of grain they produce and how they store it determine the price they fetch when selling their produce.

142. The outputs achieved during 2010-2013, according to SPRs for 2010-2013, are as follows [Table 21]. These data show limited realization of planned target for number

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<sup>223</sup> About US\$10.

<sup>224</sup> IFPRI, WFP, UNICEF. 2013. Impact Evaluation of Cash and Food Transfers at Early Childhood Development Centers in Karamoja, Uganda. Final Impact Report.

of farmers or farmers' groups supported through local purchase. The SPR data capture very little on outcome of AMS, outside of WFP's local purchase.

**Table. 21 Planned vs. Actual output under AMS, 2010-2013**

	2010		2011		2012		2013	
	<i>Planned</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Planned</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Planned</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Planned</i>	<i>Actual</i>
<b>Food purchased from farmers' groups as % of total food purchased locally</b>	10	2	-	3	10	9	10	10
<b>Local purchase as % of total food purchased</b>	-	-	-	42	30	46	99	99
<b>Number of farmers groups supported through local purchase</b>	-	-	-	6	28	8	56	3
<b>Number of individual farmers supported through local purchase</b>	7803	3778	-	-	980	280	2487	184

Source: SPRs for CP108070, 2010-2013

143. The Uganda P4P Annual Report<sup>225</sup> provides more detailed data and analysis than the SPRs. According to this, by the end of 2013, CPs directly assisted 32 farmers' organizations [FO] with total membership of 20,867 farmers, besides providing training to dozens of other FOs. During 2010-2013, WFP has built 33 SCPs. A study<sup>226</sup> of SCPs in 2013 found that maize and bean farmers who stored at the SCPs were generally large-scale farmers, sold large quantities, and obtained higher yields compared to those who did not store with the SCPs. Farmers who sold at the SCPs to large scale-buyers also obtained higher prices partly because traders who bought from SCPs were prepared to pay a higher price at the SCPs due to reduced transaction and transport costs involved.

144. SCPs face challenges in bringing into their fold the very poor farmers. The SCP Utilization study [2013]<sup>227</sup> noted that farmers who stored at the SCP had a commercial-oriented vision or aimed at obtaining higher prices while those who did not store at the SCP focused on household food security concerns. Acknowledging the challenges that limit smallholders' effective utilization of SCPs, the CO is piloting six models of household storage facility with 200 households in Acholi and Teso. If farmers can store grain in their own houses or villages for a few months and avoid distress sales to meet cash needs, this would significantly improve household food security.

145. FGDs with five SCP users and FOs indicated that farmers derive maximum benefit if they can improve their grain drying and are able to store grains for a few

<sup>225</sup> WFP Uganda. 2013a. AMS/P4P Annual Report 2013.

<sup>226</sup> Kizito, Andrew Muganga. 2013. Thematic Case Study on The Level of Utilization of Satellite Collection Points by Farmers and Traders in the Agriculture And Market Support / Purchase For Progress Catchment Areas in Uganda.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid.

months after the harvest, instead of selling immediately on harvest when the prices are low. For this the village bulking centres,<sup>228</sup> which are easily accessible, are the preferred option. Smallholders who usually sell about 150-300kgs of grain in a season do not find it economical to access commercial warehouses or central SCPs due to prohibitive transport cost involved.

146. Box 1 in Annex 4 gives the experience of one of the SCPs visited during the evaluation in enabling SHFs to benefit from collective marketing – several SCPs had similar stories. FGDs and beneficiary interviews showed that some of the village-based SCPs are already benefitting smallholders who are beginning to use the village SCP facilities. Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA) that were linked to SCPs have also complemented this by providing access to small credit. Beginning with 40 FOs in Agago district with savings of UGX 6,912,000 [US\$2,706] in 2010, the total number of VSLAs went up to 948 in 2013 and had collected a total of UGX 866,352,000 [US\$339,195]<sup>229</sup> which, due to lack of agricultural credit in the country, is playing a critical role in enabling SHFs to access credit. The evaluation team noted that the VSLAs were not operating in accordance with any regulatory framework<sup>230</sup> which needs to be addressed, given the fact that they take deposits from members.

147. The AMS interventions focused on supporting WRS, SCPs and FOs to be able to clean, grade and aggregate their produce and market it collectively. The availability of market information enables SHFs to get better prices for their produce.<sup>231</sup> As a result of the capacity building of the FOs, SHFs have been able to increase their incomes. FGDs with the SCPs revealed that even at the level of SHFs, FOs and individual farmers, there was greater awareness of the need to improve grain quality. Farmers who are members of FOs/SCPs have seen first-hand how the quality of grain they produce and how they store it determine the price they fetch when selling their produce.

148. As part of P4P market development, WFP also provided private warehouses and millers with grain cleaning and drying equipment worth US\$2.58 million at 50 percent subsidy to eight warehouses<sup>232</sup> with a total capacity of 22,100MT.<sup>233</sup> The assumption was that developing the private sector warehouses would ultimately benefit the small farmers who would obtain higher prices by selling better quality grain through these warehouses. Additionally, the support to warehouses was predicated on the assumption that the WRS<sup>234</sup> would be operational and smallholders would be using it. All KIIs and FGDs showed that for the most part, WRS remained a non-starter as the receipts issued by warehouses were not honored by any financial institution – which

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<sup>228</sup> Where farmers can aggregate [store their produce in a facility and sell these collectively].

<sup>229</sup> WFP Uganda. 2013a. AMS/P4P Annual Report 2013.

<sup>230</sup> The evaluation noted that the P4P team undertook lessons learning exercise, but the documents are silent on the issue of legal framework.

<sup>231</sup> FGDs with several SCPs and their users [smallholders] revealed a similar pattern of benefits the latter were obtaining from these - [i] being able to store for a few weeks to 2-3 months; [ii] market information about price from the SCP; [iii] cheaper inputs bought in bulk [some cases] through SCPs; [iv] VSLA membership and access to emergency credit; and [v] training and knowledge about agronomic practices, drying practices and grain quality.

<sup>232</sup> Each warehouse provided with equipment worth US\$280,000, of which 50 per cent is to be paid back in installments.

<sup>233</sup> WFP Uganda. 2013a. AMS/P4P Annual Report 2013.

<sup>234</sup> The warehouse receipt system [WRS] is, theoretically, a way of establishing a link between smallholder farmers, traders and quality-orientated markets. The system in Uganda is regulated by the UCE and functions by giving a receipt once commodities are deposited by a farmer, trader or FO in a UCE-certified warehouse. WRS can benefit farmers in two ways. First, by separating the acting of depositing into a warehouse from the sale, the system allows farmers to sell crops at a time of their choosing – when prices are high – rather than immediately after harvest time when prices are low. Second, WRS can facilitate farmers' access to credit [banks lend money which is secured against the warehouse delivery receipt] – so that farmers can meet their cash needs [e.g. for school fees, for inputs for the next crop, for debts] without having to sell their crops when the prices are low.

meant that farmers had to wait for months until they sold their produce in the warehouse and pay for the storage in the intervening period, a proposition which did not attract most farmers.

149. WFP invested US\$952,356 in the construction of 33 SCPs with a total storage capacity of 5,290MT in 17 districts in the country.<sup>235</sup> With an average investment of only US\$28,859 in setting up a village-level SCP and equipping them, the benefits are going directly to farmers, mostly smallholders, as seen in five SCPs. In this regard, the evaluation questions the appropriateness of investing over US\$1.25 million, providing 50 percent subsidy to private warehouses; this amount would have established 35 village bulking centres/SCPs. This is not to question the need for support to private sector and market development which WFP prioritized, but the balance of the investment and benefits needs to be carefully weighed, especially because WFP has no way of ensuring that the private warehouses work with smallholders.

150. Using WFP's import parity approach,<sup>236</sup> P4P should adhere to the WFP procurement principle of cost-efficiency by ensuring that P4P purchases compare favorably to the cost of imported and local food. However, data from Uganda<sup>237</sup> shows that WFP purchased maize within the country in 2012 at a price of \$364/MT. During the same year, it purchased 47,000MT of maize from outside Uganda at a price of \$237/MT.<sup>238</sup> While allowances need to be made for full costs of the purchases, including management costs and amortized costs for supply side investments,<sup>239</sup> one would expect that, over time, this would be reversed, or at least brought on par, if the supply side interventions to build capacity is bearing any fruit.

151. Financial and tonnage data from CP 108070 SPRs for the period 2010-2013 and PRRO 200429 for 2013<sup>240</sup> show that cost per MT of food distributed has declined slightly [10-12 per cent] between 2010 and 2013 [Table 22]. Likewise, if one compared the direct support cost [DSC] for CP 108070 over the four years starting 2010, the data [Table vi, Annex 4] show a decline from 37.12 percent in 2010 to 21.34 per cent the following year, and to similar levels in the subsequent years.

**Table. 22 Cost per Metric Tonne of Food Distributed<sup>241</sup>**

	CP 108070				PRRO 200429
	2010 <sup>242</sup>	2011	2012	2013	2013
<b>Tonnage distributed [MT]</b>	60,839	13,196	16,412	10,859	34,660
<b>Expenditure [US\$ million]</b>	52.70	12.48	14.28 <sup>243</sup>	7.14 <sup>244</sup>	26.53 <sup>2</sup>
<b>Cost per MT [US\$]</b>	866.22	945.74	870.10	657.52	765.44

Source: SPRs for 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 for the operations implemented in each of those years

<sup>235</sup> WFP & UCE. 2014. Study of the Efficacy of the WRS in Uganda.

<sup>236</sup> WFP. 2011j. Efficiency at WFP. (WFP/EB.2/. 2011.5-E/1.) Executive Board document.

<sup>237</sup> WFP Uganda. 2013a. AMS/P4P Annual Report 2013.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid. Derived from data in Annex 6.

<sup>239</sup> WFP. 2011f. WFP 2008 – 2013 Purchase for Progress [P4P] Initiative: A Strategic Evaluation [mid-term].

<sup>240</sup> The first full year of operation.

<sup>241</sup> Financial data for 2010, 2011 and 2012 are reported against the same format and included commodity, transport and LTSH; 2013 SPRs report against a combined item – food transfer.

<sup>242</sup> The 2010 figure includes all operations implemented during the year, namely: EMOP 108110, CP108070, PRRO101213, IR-EMOP 200123.

<sup>243</sup> Source: SPR financial data: commodity, transport and LTSH.

<sup>244</sup> Source: SPR financial data: food & related cost.

152. The Annual Progress Report for 2013 notes that the initial aims of Uganda P4P were ambitious and the cross-border trade had a negative impact on the grain quality improvement. The CO did realize that the target was unrealistic, and by 2011, P4P activities were realigned to more realistic interventions involving support to SCPs, training of FOs, traders and warehouses on grain quality standards, and capacity building of government to develop, monitor and enforce quality standards. Instead of WFP as the main market buyer, market development was made the core of the P4P strategy with its focus on four areas: increasing farmers' productivity [through partner actions]; developing FO capacity to reach profitable markets; strengthening market structures; and promoting an enabling environment through policy advocacy.<sup>245</sup> However, the initial target did raise expectations for some stakeholders in Uganda because a range of WFP interventions in agricultural development and production were predicated on WFP enabling the country to realize this target – “WFP’s purchases stimulating production from the demand side”.<sup>246</sup>

153. With WFP moving away from this unrealistic target, the focus shifted on FOs, household storage, improving production and PHH. While appreciating WFP’s efforts in supporting agricultural development at SHF level, external stakeholders [government, other United Nations agencies, donors and CPs] want WFP to demonstrate its distinctive competence in this area to minimize overlap and duplication with FAO and expect better clarity about WFP’s role vis-à-vis FAO’s mandate as both are on occasion seen to be doing similar activities in the agriculture sector. This duplication of activities on the ground was also noted about two years ago by another evaluation.<sup>247</sup>

154. It needs to be noted here that P4P is not the only initiative in the country supporting market development for smallholders. As mentioned in [section 2.1](#), like P4P, the DIMAT project links farmers to buyers and processors and gives them modern tools for increasing production and improving quality of produce. It operates through FOs comprising SHFs producing upland rice and is linked to Upland Rice Millers in Jinja, one of the warehouses that received support from WFP. Linkages with the DIMAT project and other marketing initiatives operational in the same areas as WFP need to be established for creating synergy.

### **3. Conclusions, overall assessment, lessons and recommendations**

#### **3.1 Relevance and Appropriateness**

155. As discussed in [section 2.1](#), WFP’s country portfolio is closely aligned with the Government of Uganda’s evolving priorities and policies for addressing post-conflict development, agricultural development, vulnerability reduction, nutrition and children’s education. Programme interventions were, by and large, based on good analysis of humanitarian and development context in the country and responded to local needs of vulnerable communities.

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<sup>245</sup> WFP. 2011k. Management Response to the Recommendations of the Summary Report of the Strategic Mid-Term Evaluation of WFP’s Purchase for Progress Initiative [2008–2013].

<sup>246</sup> Samkange, Stanlake et al. (Undated).

<sup>247</sup> IOD PARC, DFID. 2012.

156. Despite budget cuts, WFP was able to provide extensive coverage through its targeted and relevant support to vulnerable households and school feeding programme in Karamoja. WFP demonstrated flexibility in its programming by being able to change its approach and priorities to deliver relevant interventions in response to evolving humanitarian and development context, especially in relation to the influx of refugees and vulnerable households in Karamoja.

157. To respond to emergencies, WFP made use of its flexible tools namely PRROs and EMOPs to provide timely response to sudden onset and chronic humanitarian needs in the country. Its activities like GFD, SFP and TFP, based on systematic assessments, combined with a safety net approach were relevant and appropriate [section 2.1]. WFP worked closely with government, other key agencies namely UNHCR and UNICEF and NGOs/community-based organizations to ensure that its activities were coherent and addressed the critical needs. Emergency operations, in line with the principle of connectedness, took into account recovery and development context and ensured linkages between emergency interventions (emergency relief under EMOPs, GFD-EVH and recovery interventions like FFA/public works programme [PWP], livelihoods assistance).

158. Initially the P4P laid emphasis on heavy infrastructure and private sector and market development, with substantial financial assistance provided to private warehousing. The objectives were rightly revised and activities appropriately realigned to realistic interventions directly targeting smallholders: support to SCPs, training of FOs, traders and warehouses on grain quality standards, and capacity building of government to develop, monitor and enforce quality standards. Initially predicated on WFP's purchases stimulating production, with the shift to FOs, household storage, improving production and PHH, key stakeholders now expect better clarity about WFP's role vis-à-vis the mandate of FAO.

### **3.2 Effectiveness & Efficiency**

159. The country strategy enabled WFP to align the country portfolio with the priorities and strategies of the Government of Uganda and it gave the staff a clear focus and framework to examine WFP activities from a longer-term perspective. However, its dissemination and assimilation at different levels within the country structure has been weak [2.2].

160. WFP's support to the government to develop its policies and institutions for development of agricultural markets and quality standards for grains, as well as putting in place comprehensive measures for nutritional interventions to deal with chronic malnutrition have been effective. The P4P interventions have been effective and demonstrated their potential to benefit small farmers.

161. The nutrition interventions - CBSF and MCHN interventions in particular – have been effective, despite pipeline breaks and some delays in distribution. That the malnutrition rate has been stable in Karamoja during the past four years suggests that the interventions have made a contribution to achieving this outcome. The CBSF recovery rates show that the programme has proven its effectiveness. Likewise, the MCHN has increased attendance at health centres and there is evidence of reduced home deliveries in the MCHN catchment areas. Although this evaluation has not measured impact, the data on recovery rates in the SFP and attendance at MCHN

centres clearly show that these were contributing to nutritional and health outcomes for children and pregnant and lactating women. The use of food and cash as incentives for access to services has improved attendance in schools, MCHN and ECD services.<sup>248</sup>

162. WFP has initiated and strengthened strategic partnership with UNICEF on nutrition, and has played a leading role in the multi-agency initiative, REACH. WFP's agricultural activities overlap extensively with those of the FAO, and the two agencies are seen as competitors, rather than working together. While appreciating WFP's efforts in supporting agricultural development at smallholder level, external stakeholders would like to see WFP demonstrate its distinctive competence in this area. In this regard, WFP's support to SCPs has demonstrated its potential to benefit smallholders. There is potential to leverage this and develop SCP and FOs on a large scale covering hundreds of villages. Already SCP/FOs have developed VSLAs which have the potential to provide credit to members. Using these, WFP could develop an integrated approach to support livelihoods, farming, DRR, safety net, marketing and access to credit. This may help reposition WFP, especially given its capacity to deliver at scale. Such an approach would however require substantial CO capacity for technical assistance and implementation.

163. The GFD-EVH and NUSAF 2 witnessed delays and irregularity in distribution, affecting the adequacy and predictability of the transfers, thus undermining effectiveness of the intervention. The school meal programme was making a significant difference in school enrolment and attendance, with key informants attributing the 2013 decrease in attendance and enrolment to the reduction in school-feeding transfers. WFP has done all in its capacity to continue providing school meals despite lack of traction from donors and the government.

164. The public works programme under NUSAF 2 has been executed with a short-term relief approach to provide a seasonal safety net to vulnerable households, with quality and sustainability of the assets created often receiving inadequate attention from both CPs and WFP. Without substantial strengthening of capacity for quality control and monitoring of the work, the intervention is unlikely to prove effective in the medium to long run. While field staff did a good job of keeping track of tonnage and cash distributed in asset creation activities, the quality of assets created and how these were utilized received inadequate attention [[section 2.3](#)]. WFP needs to bring more analytical rigour to its programming for DRR and resilience. Ineffective water harvesting structures, woodlots and the unpredictable 'safety net' are unlikely to contribute to effective DRR.

165. WFP's programme interventions were generally based on good analysis of humanitarian and development context in the country and interventions did well in ensuring inclusion of women in targeting and progress reports show gender disaggregated data. However, these made limited attempts to assess potential impact of various interventions on gender roles and dynamics within the household and community. Gender analysis, even at basic project planning and implementation level, was weak and this often meant that opportunities to address gender issues of vulnerability were missed.

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<sup>248</sup> As described in sections on school feeding and MCHN.



166. While WFP has put in place clear policies and guidelines on protection, field staff needs orientation on these and there is need to ensure that these are followed strictly in the operations so that vulnerable communities are not put at risk.

167. WFP CO has demonstrated mixed capacity for strategic decision making and delivering on results – while the analysis and broad directions have been aptly defined and were based on reasonable analysis, it lagged behind in tracking how it achieved intended results. WFP’s monitoring and reporting have been mostly input and output based due to limited staff and partners’ capacity, though in recent months the CO has strengthened its staff capacity to provide support in this area. Project/operations logframes have often been incoherent and have not rendered themselves as user-friendly tools for field /programme staff. SPR reports on operations are mainly input/output oriented. As WFP moves into comprehensive country strategy development, it will be important for reporting system to capture performance on strategic objectives and complex outcomes like contribution of increasing farmers’ income, DRR and institutional capacity building.

168. Operational efficiency in WFP corporate management results framework covers timely response to assessed needs, cost-efficiency, continuity [in delivery] and appropriateness of WFP response.<sup>249</sup> For all its projects, WFP works with in-country partners including national and local governments and NGOs which help leverage existing capacity and distribution networks to reduce the overall cost of delivery.<sup>250</sup> For AMS, WFP has seven NGO partners, besides several private sector organizations and dozens of farmers’ organizations and for its various safety net activities, WFP works through a number of NGOs as well as local authorities who bring in the requisite expertise for each activity.

169. In terms of delivery, particularly of WFP’s food and cash transfers, frequent delays and shortfalls have been noted by previous evaluations<sup>251</sup> as well as the present evaluation. While some of the shortfall is due to resource constraints [in Karamoja], delayed delivery and unreliability of transfer delivery is owed more to WFP not getting its secondary transport and logistics right (under the refugee intervention). Besides this, as discussed in [section 2.3](#), the efficiency of CBSF is compromised by inability to monitor readmissions in CBSF and the practice of families sharing rations within the household.

170. The data showed in Table 22 above reveals that overall WFP has achieved some efficiency gains through reducing direct support costs, mainly through the restructuring the CO went through in 2011.

171. Under AMS, WFP’s local purchase does not conform to its efficiency criteria of import-parity, though one hopes that with time, the situation will improve. This evaluation questions the direct subsidy provided to the eight private/leased warehouses as there were other options which would have provided better value for money in terms of benefits to smallholder farmers [[2.3](#)].

172. WFP ensured that project staff (both WFP and CPs) was trained on results management systems, data management systems, compliance procedures and project

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<sup>249</sup> WFP. 2013k. WFP’s Draft 2014-2017 Strategic Results Framework.

<sup>250</sup> WFP.2010j. Action Plan for the Implementation of the Capacity Development and Hand Over Components of the WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2013 (WFP/EB.A/2010/4-D1). Executive Board document.

<sup>251</sup> IOD PARC, DFID. 2012.

implementation [2.1]. In its effort toward seeking efficiency improvements, WFP Uganda has undertaken periodic reviews of its structure and size to align the organizational structure and staffing level to operational requirements, and outsourced PDM. The use of contractors to undertake PDM may well be cost-efficient, but this limits opportunities for WFP's interactions with beneficiaries and weakens staff understanding of ground reality.<sup>252</sup> Despite the additional cost associated with WFP itself undertaking the PDM, the evaluation team supports recommendations of another evaluation<sup>253</sup> that the value outweighs the cost.

173. The programme unit structure is now aligned to the three pillars of the CS. While this provides an optimal administrative and operating structure, the 2011 restructuring of the CO structure and reduction in staff resulting from budget constraint affected WFP's field presence and programming capacity at a time when new activities and programmes required a range of expertise in specific areas WFP wanted to move toward. For the future, WFP needs to reassess its staff capacity in the light of needs of its evolving programme which requires technical and field staff capacity beyond strategic and analytical capacity for which the WFP CO has already demonstrated its strength.

### **3.3 Sustainability**

174. Capacity development is one aspect of WFP exit strategy.<sup>254</sup> WFP has engaged with the government and local authorities to develop a sense of ownership of various activities. However, based on the evidence seen in Acholi [of MCHN activities handed over to local authorities], the evaluation concluded that while there may have been some capacity development of district authorities in terms of the health staff's knowledge and skills for nutritional interventions, the government simply has not invested the necessary resources to defray the operational costs involved in running CBSF, TFP or MCHN. Given the vulnerability in Karamoja and the fact that recovery is only beginning to take root, terminating the nutritional interventions in the next few years may contribute to a humanitarian crisis of the sort Karamoja has witnessed over the past four decades.

175. NUSAF 2 is a government-owned programme and there is a sense ownership of NUSAF 2 at both the local government and community level. On the AMS interventions, capacity building initiatives focusing on the government agencies and private sector have started to bear fruit. There is a good sense of ownership on part of the national government with regard to development and enforcement of grain quality standards and development of market infrastructure. The SCPs, though far from self-sustaining, have generated strong participation of farmers and it is expected that after a period of support to consolidate their roles, there will be greater ownership by the FOs. The VSLAs are now collecting and controlling substantial amount of funds, but remain outside any regulatory and institutional framework, thereby undermining their potential for growth and sustainability.

176. There is need for a clear strategy for sustainability to support the government in its process to nationally own, resource and implement school feeding. At this stage, the future of this programme is unclear except that the Government of Uganda is

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<sup>252</sup> This was also observed in a 2012 evaluation [Broughton, Bernard. et al. 2012.].

<sup>253</sup> Broughton, Bernard. et al. 2012.

<sup>254</sup> WFP. 2012f. Project activities: Capacity development.

launching a nationwide project to promote school garden and education on nutrition through World Bank funding. WFP has engaged with both the government and World Bank on this initiative which is likely to be launched later this year. To what extent this will address the need remains to be seen – the evaluation has no basis to make any prediction in this regard.

177. The handover strategy for EVH in Karamoja included transitioning some extremely vulnerable households from WFP assistance to the nascent national social assistance programme that was piloted under the Uganda SAGE.<sup>255</sup> However, SAGE in its current form does not have the potential to play a safety net role, and the future of social protection in the country is unclear as policies are still being worked on. At this point there does not appear to be any exit strategy for WFP and sustainability of the safety net provided through school meals and transfers to EVH remains in doubt. Likewise, most current refugees – and at least in the foreseeable future, the number is unlikely to reduce significantly - in the country will continue to require protection and assistance within Uganda.

178. Sustainability of many of the interventions like school feeding, ECD, nutrition interventions and EVH support will be a difficult issue. In Karamoja, most people live below the poverty line and have very few resources on which to build their livelihoods and face recurring shocks and emergencies. In protracted crises and contexts with high levels of chronic poverty, interventions need to have a longer time horizon in order to bring these to a point of sustainability where governments can be expected to take over responsibility. In this context, the evaluation concurs with WFP that it may need to accept ongoing reliance on relief as necessary<sup>256</sup> in some situations while being proactive in linking beneficiaries of food assistance with other forms of livelihood support provided by other actors.

### **3.4 Impact**

179. WFP interventions have been life-saving for refugees, other vulnerable groups and communities as they helped them recover from shocks. The nutrition programme also has saved lives through CBSF and TFP, besides the nutrition education creating awareness and change in behaviour in some of the communities in feeding practices. The AMS work is already making an impact at the level of policies and markets in the country as well as on rural livelihoods in the pockets it is being implemented, showing the potential of this programme for scaling up.

### **3.5 Key Lessons**

180. WFP's shift to a food assistance approach is welcomed by many stakeholders. However, WFP has yet to demonstrate its distinctive competence in areas related to agricultural production. This may be why the same stakeholders still see it as a food aid agency and hence question the overlap and duplication with FAO.

181. Having a theory of change is not enough; it needs to be backed by a thorough analysis of assumptions underlying the theory of change. This would have shown that

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<sup>255</sup> WFP. 2012a. PRRO 20049 Project document.

<sup>256</sup> WFP. 2009e. Management Response to the Summary Report on the Strategic Evaluation of The Effectiveness of the WFP Livelihoods Recovery Interventions.

the assumption about WFP driving market demand and thus incentivizing the small farmers was untenable, given the limitations faced by smallholders.

182. The 9-month cycle of funding to CPs and short-term nature of CPs' contracts in Karamoja, especially for NUSAF 2, does not augur well for effective work on DRR or for creating resilience as the short-term contracting cycle with CPs offers little time for providing follow-up and building the capacity of communities. If WFP is to get into DRR and resilience work, this will require longer-term commitment involving risk assessment, addressing issues of local governance and risk management, as the Hyogo Framework of Action stipulates.

### **3.6 Recommendations**

**183. Recommendation 1: *WFP's positioning.* The country office should continue to focus on the three priority areas identified in the country strategy.** Within WFP's shift to food assistance, in its developmental programming, WFP Uganda should:

- i) scale up nutrition and social protection interventions in partnership with UNICEF and the Government, while engaging in the development of national social protection policy;
- ii) advance joint programming by developing an action plan for the resilience strategy in Karamoja and – specifically – an integrated approach for agricultural and smallholder-related work with FAO; and
- iii) where AMS is implemented, use SCPs and farmers' organizations as a pivot for scaling up and exploring integration of WFP's FFA and DRR interventions with its support to VSLAs and agricultural development, using a long-term planning perspective.

**184. Recommendation 2: *Sustainability.* The country office should maintain a dual approach of advocacy and service delivery in Karamoja.** It should:

- i) continue to support extremely vulnerable households and refugees through food/cash transfers based on vulnerability assessments and verification, while advocating for realistic and sustainable mechanisms for predictable and adequate safety nets; and
- ii) continue to support school feeding in the next programme cycle, while engaging with the Government and the World Bank on the schoolgarden and nutrition initiative for launch at the end of 2014, and working with authorities, communities and schools to ensure that they take over responsibility for the programme incrementally and effectively, while WFP gradually reduces support in a phased and predictable manner.

**185. Recommendation 3: *Future country strategy document.* Headquarters and the country office should make the next country strategy a results-based document.** This will require action to:

- i) enable tracking of impacts and changes, with reporting of measurable targets to which WFP contributes directly in the country overview section of SPRs;
- ii) translate country strategy aims and outcomes into action plans that can be systematically monitored; and
- iii) revise the corporate SPR system to integrate country strategy outcomes in annual reports, in the longer-term.

**186. Recommendation 4: *Resilience and disaster risk reduction.* Headquarters, the country office and the regional bureau should continue to implement the recommendations of the 2014 FFA evaluation and the recent FFA guidance for the country office, while improving the planning, design, implementation and monitoring of resilience and DRR interventions by:**

- i) hiring a specialist to work with sub-offices on the planning and design of a coherent multi-year approach to WFP FFA and DRR, and ensuring that activities are implemented together with relevant technical partners;
- ii) under the 2013 joint resilience strategy for Karamoja, developing joint operational plans with FAO and UNICEF to increase the synergy and impact of WFP interventions; and
- iii) using multi-year plans to advocate with donors for multi-year funding for the country programme.

**187. Recommendation 5: *General food distributions.* Under EHA, the country office should:**

- i). urgently resolve the secondary transport problems facing deliveries to refugee settlements, through more efficient management of transporters' contracts and enhanced monitoring of deliveries;
- ii). complement the current outsourcing of post-distribution monitoring with regular, tracked joint monitoring plans by WFP field staff and contracted partners, so WFP staff can engage with target populations, fostering deeper understanding of the problems faced by communities that WFP assists; and
- iii). record readmissions to supplementary feeding programmes and investigate their causes, which are likely to be partially addressed by ensuring that full food entitlements are distributed regularly and predictably to target populations.

**188. Recommendation 6: *Agriculture and market support.* To enhance the security of farmers' savings, the country office should support the Government in developing an appropriate regulatory framework and operational procedures for VSLAs, so that they become legally registered bodies with legal statutes.**

**189. Recommendation 7: *Protection and gender.* The country office and regional bureau should:**

- i) provide field-based staff and cooperating partners with training and practical orientation on WFP's protection policy to ensure that assistance does not put beneficiaries at risk; and
- ii) develop staff capacity for integrating gender analysis into programme design and implementation, and verification check-lists to ensure that standards are respected.

## **Annexes**

**Annex 1:** Uganda CPE – Terms of Reference

**Annex 2:** Uganda CPE – Evaluation Methodology

**Annex 3:** Evaluation Matrix

**Annex 4:** Additional Data used in the Evaluation Report

**Annex 5:** List of interviews/FGDs conducted by the evaluation team

**Annex 6:** Bibliography

**Annex 7:** Itinerary of the evaluation mission

**Annex 8:** Beneficiary data [consolidated]

**Annex 9:** SPR resources' extract [planned, received, used] by CS1 [EHA] and CS2/3 [FNS & AMS]

**Annex 10:** Explanatory note on definitions and examples of how the criteria for social protection and safety nets were used

## Acronyms

ACF	Action contre la Faim
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
AMS	Agricultural Market Support
BAIDA	Bugiri Agribusiness and Institutions Development Association
CBSF	Community Based Supplementary Feeding
CFA	Cash for Assets
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
CFW	Cash for Work
CPs	Cooperating Partners
CP	Country Programme
CPE	Country Portfolio Evaluation
CS	Country Strategy
CSB	Corn-Soya Blend
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development/UK Aid
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRR/M	Disaster Risk Reduction/Management
ECD	Early Childhood Development
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
EMOP	Emergency Operations
EOP	End-of-Project
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
EU	European Union
EVH	Extremely Vulnerable Households
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individual
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FBM	Food Basket Monitoring
FDP	Final Distribution Point
FFA	Food for Assets
FFW	Food for Work
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FO	Farmers' Organization
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GFD	General Food Distribution
GNI	Gross National Income
GoU	Government of Uganda
HC	Health Centre
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
HISP	Household Income Support Programme
HOSO	Head of Sub-Office
IDA	Iron Deficiency Anaemia
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMAM	Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition
IR	Inception Report



JAA	Joint Action Agreement
KIDP	Karamoja Integrated Development Plan
KII	Key Informant Interview
KPAP	Karamoja Productive Assets Programme
LTA	Long Term Agreement
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MCHN	Mother and Child Health & Nutrition
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MNP	Micro-nutrient Powder
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MT	Metric Tonne
MTIC	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Commerce
NAP	National Action Plan
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non Government Organization
NUSAF	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEV	Office of Evaluation
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
ORDS	Office of Relief and Development Support
P4P	Purchase for Progress
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PHH	Post-Harvest Handling
PMA	Plan for Modernization of Agriculture
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PWP	Public Works Programme
RB	Regional Bureau
SAGE	Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment
SCP	Satellite Collection Point
SER	Summary Evaluation Report
SFP	Supplementary Feeding Programme
SHF	Smallholder Farmers
SO	Strategic Objective
SPR	Standard Project Report
SRF	Strategic Results Framework
SSR	Staffing Structure Review
TFP	Therapeutic Feeding Programme
TOR	Terms of Reference
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UCE	Uganda Commodities Exchange
UGX	Ugandan Shilling [US\$1=UGX 2,500]
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group

UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
VSLA	Village Savings and Loan Association
WHO	World Health Organization
WRS	Warehouse Receipt System
US\$	United States Dollar

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