

# Country Portfolio Evaluation

## Nepal: An Evaluation of WFP's Portfolio Vol I Full report

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*Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons*

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**World Food Programme**

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## **Disclaimer**

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# Fact Sheet Nepal: An Evaluation of WFP's Portfolio Nepal (2002 – 2009)

Timeline, funding level, beneficiaries by activity and food distributed

Operation	Title	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	
CP 10093.0	Country Programme	Req: \$120.2 - Contrib: \$81.9								2010
PRRO 10058.1	Food Assistance to Bhutanese Refugees	Req: \$8.6 Contrib: \$5.4								
PRRO 10058.2			Req: \$8.6 Contrib: \$6.3							
PRRO 10058.3				Req: \$11.9 Contrib: \$11.0						
PRRO 10058.4						Req: \$9.3 Contrib: \$8.3				
PRRO 10058.5							Req: \$29.2 Contrib: \$28.1		2010	
PRRO 10058.6									Req: \$26.8 Contrib: \$17	
PRRO 10676.0	Food Assistance to Conflict and High Food Prices	Req: \$170 - Contrib: \$107								2010
EMOP 10523.0	Food Assistance to Drought	Req: \$20.7 - Contrib: \$15.6								2010
EMOP 10790.0	Food Assistance to Flooding	1.8 1								
IR EMOP 10545.0		0.5 0.4								
IR EMOP 10771.0		\$0.5 \$0.5								
IR EMOP 10687.0		\$0.5 \$0.4								
SO 10424.0	Emergency Preparedness	Req: \$1.4 Contrib: \$0.9								
Beneficiaries (actual)*		732,133	801,044	1,036,580	1,011,038	1,629,852	1,357,311	1,665,623	1,909,153	
Food Distributed (MT)*		28,420	41,711	41,075	40,969	51,499	52,462	54,509	62,666	
Direct Expenses NEPAL** (USD, millions)		\$13	\$16	\$21	\$17	\$25	\$37	\$44	\$53	
% Direct Expenses: NEPAL vs. World		0.8%	0.5%	0.7%	0.6%	1.0%	1.4%	1.3%	1.3%	

Source: WFP WINGS I and IIB, Standard Project Reports 2002 to 2009(\*), Annual Performance Report 2005 to 2009C(\*\*).

## Main donors and partners


**Donors:** United States, European Commission, United Kingdom, Nepal (World Bank funds), United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

**Partners:** Government of Nepal, 42 non-governmental organizations

Source: WFP External Relations Department, Data Collection for WFP Reports (DACOTA).

## Activities by type (planned beneficiaries)

Operation	GFD	FFW/FFA/FFT	Nutrition	HIV	Education	Cash
CP 10093.0		X	X	X	X	
PRRO 10058.1	X		X		X	
PRRO 10058.2	X		X		X	
PRRO 10058.3	X		X		X	
PRRO 10058.4	X		X			
PRRO 10058.5	X		X			
PRRO 10058.6	X		X			
PRRO 10676.0	X	X	X			X
EMOP 10523.0	X	X	X			
EMOP 10790.0	X					
IR EMOP 10545.0	X					
IR EMOP 10771.0	X					
IR EMOP 10687.0	X					



Source: WFP DACOTA<sup>D</sup> Source: Project Document.

# Executive Summary

## Background

### Evaluation Features

1. The World Food Programme (WFP) Nepal Country Portfolio evaluation covers the 1 WFP operations implemented between 2002 and 2009: the country programme (CP), seven protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs), five emergency operations (EMOPs), and two special operations.
2. The evaluation serves the dual objectives of accountability and learning, and will enable the Nepal country office to make informed strategic decisions for its next country strategy and to improve ongoing operations.
3. This report evaluates the portfolio against three questions: i) How well did WFP position itself strategically and align with Government and partner strategies? ii) How did WFP make choices, and how strategic were these? and iii) How did the portfolio perform, and what were the results?
4. The evaluation was conducted by a team of four independent consultants, with fieldwork taking place in March and April 2010.

### Context

5. There are more than 3.5 million highly food-insecure people in Nepal; more than half of the population is estimated to live on less than US\$1.25 per day.<sup>1</sup> Nepal ranks 144<sup>th</sup> out of 182 countries on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2009 human development index. In 2009 the gross domestic product real growth rate was estimated at 4.7 percent, a decrease from 5.3 percent in 2008.<sup>2</sup> The predominant livelihood system is rain-fed agriculture, which employs three-quarters of the labour force.<sup>2</sup> Reduced investment in agriculture, problems of input supply, limited irrigation, damage to infrastructure and disruption to communications caused by conflict have all contributed to slow productivity growth. Specific challenges related to food security include:

- extremely difficult geographical conditions and the remoteness of food-insecure districts, posing difficulties for the delivery of development and humanitarian assistance;
- a limited area of arable land, resulting in one of the highest ratios of population to arable land in the world;
- civil conflict and protracted political instability; although the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in 2006 ended the decade-long conflict between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal, political tension continues;
- high levels of malnutrition resulting from inadequate food quantity and dietary quality, a heavy disease burden and recurring food shortages; Nepal ranks among the world's top ten countries for prevalence of stunting,<sup>3</sup> and wasting and underweight rates in children under 5 indicate serious malnutrition;<sup>4</sup>

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1 WFP. 2010. WFP Nepal Operations Summary 2010. Rome.

2 [www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html).

3 WFP 2010. *Proposed Nutrition Strategy for WFP Nepal*. Kathmandu.

4 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, United States (CDC)/WFP. 2005. *A Manual: Measuring and Interpreting Malnutrition and Mortality*. Rome.

- food price inflation, with poor households being severely affected by increases in food prices and continued supply shortages in rural markets, due to the frequent *bandhs*;<sup>5</sup>
- natural disasters, droughts, flooding and erratic rainfall; located on a seismically active belt, Nepal is particularly vulnerable to earthquakes; flooding occurs annually owing to runoff from the Himalayas and the Asian monsoon season; landslides are increasingly common; and drought poses a serious threat to vulnerable populations who depend on agriculture for domestic food production;<sup>6</sup>
- inequalities such as gender disparities, caste differentials, ethnic and linguistic discrimination, and spatial exclusion due to the remoteness of rural villages.<sup>7</sup>

6. In addition, Nepal hosts about 100,000 Bhutanese refugees. Since 2002, WFP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have provided food, shelter and other assistance to refugees. Following international pressure, 29,000 Bhutanese refugees have recently been resettled in third countries, but humanitarian assistance is still needed for those who remain.

## WFP Portfolio

7. WFP has implemented 51 operations in Nepal since 1963, totalling almost US\$400 million. For the 2002 to 2009 period, US\$282 million in contributions have been received and the portfolio grew significantly from US\$25 million to US\$98 million. The evaluation focuses on 15 operations, which are summarized by programme category in Table 1.

**WFP Portfolio 2002–2009, by Programme category**

Programme category	Corresponding Strategic Objectives	No. of operations	Total confirmed contributions (US\$ million)	Proportion of total operations (%)
Development	3, 4 and 5	1	81 902 490	29
Emergency operations	1 and 3	5	17 057 882	6
Relief and recovery (FFA, FFT, CFA)	3	1	106 991 164	38
Relief and recovery (refugees)	1	6	74 995 547	27
Special operations (including a global special operation)	1 and 2	2	868 980	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>281 816 063</b>	<b>100</b>

Sources: WFP Information Network and Global System (WINGS) I and II

<sup>5</sup> A *bandh* is a general strike; the word means “closed” in Nepalese. This form of protest became prevalent during Nepal’s civil conflict and it involves closing markets, businesses, roads and schools to bring whole regions and/or economic sectors to a standstill. In the first six months of 2009 there were reportedly only 12 days without a major *bandh*. (*Himalayan Times*, Sunday 28 June 2009).

<sup>6</sup> UNDP. 2008. *National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management in Nepal*. Available at: [www.undp.org.np/pdf/NSDRMFinalDraft.pdf](http://www.undp.org.np/pdf/NSDRMFinalDraft.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> UNDP. 2009. *Nepal Human Development Report: State Transformation and Human Development*. New York.


8. The Nepal CP and the PRRO for conflict-affected populations constitute the two largest expenditures, accounting for 29 and 38 percent of the total budget respectively. Food assistance to Bhutanese refugees accounted for 27 percent of the portfolio budget. WFP implemented five EMOPs, with 6 percent of the budget; four were in response to flooding, and one to drought. While some programmes in the portfolio focused on capacity development of Government ministries, many activities were implemented through non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

### **Performance Highlights**

#### **Alignment and Strategic Positioning**

9. The objectives of the portfolio are well aligned with the WFP global Strategic Objectives in the WFP Strategic Plan (2008–2013), as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Evaluation model for Nepal Country Portfolio showing alignment with WFP Strategic Objectives





10. Through its ability to reach remote populations, WFP proved to be a capable and resilient strategic partner to the Government of Nepal, and was one of the few organizations able to continue providing support to communities throughout the conflict. WFP Nepal's portfolio was closely aligned with Government concerns and the population's needs from 2002 to 2008. More recently, however, although its activities have continued to address the short-term needs of food-insecure populations, WFP has been constrained in addressing the underlying causes of chronic food insecurity, now clearly a Government priority.

11. From 2002 to 2006, WFP Nepal was closely aligned with national/sub-national policies, and implemented its programmes mostly through Government partners. WFP continued to distribute food during the period of conflict, which was much appreciated by stakeholders in the field. WFP has established a reputation as a fair broker.

12. In 2006, signing of the CPA ushered in a new phase of WFP programming. From 2006 to 2008, WFP activities were aligned with the Government's Three-Year Interim Plan, focusing on peace building, reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration. During this period, WFP began a strategic shift towards using NGO partners to facilitate rapid response. It used its EMOP and PRRO to implement short-term Food-for-work (FFW) transfers for 20 days of work, focusing on restoring damaged community infrastructure – "light" FFW activities – as part of a peace dividend to support returnees, and on food-for-training (FFT) to support civic education for upcoming elections. WFP's success during the previous phase attracted additional funds from donors and the Government of Nepal, resulting in greater emphasis on short-term food security interventions.

13. Throughout the portfolio period, WFP was aligned reasonably well with Government health and nutrition strategies, and arguably held a strategic position. However, it missed the opportunity for using that position to influence and assist the Government and to promote improved nutrition responses and coordination.

14. WFP's Food-for-education (FFE), implemented in partnership with the Ministry of Education, has been well aligned with the focus on girls' education and increasing enrolment and attendance in remote and impoverished areas. From 2008, funding shortfalls in both FFE and mother-and-child health care (MCHC) activities led to significant reductions and consolidation in the mid west and far west regions.

15. The alignment of PRRO activities with Government priorities began to decline in 2009. A major focus on short-term food security interventions was not consistent with the Government's concern to address the underlying causes of chronic food insecurity. Although WFP attempted to address medium-term livelihood recovery needs, constraints related to multi-year funding for more development-oriented interventions prevented better alignment. Government capacity development has become a priority for both donors and the Government, but is not consistent with WFP's approach of working primarily with NGOs for FFW/Food-for-assets (FFA) interventions. The current programming challenge for WFP Nepal is to deliver the sustainable impact and productive safety net outcomes required by communities, while coordinating with donors and supporting the Government of Nepal in addressing chronic food insecurity.

16. WFP's portfolio is aligned with the vulnerable groups and priority sectors identified in United Nations planning tools<sup>8</sup>. Its primary partners in food assistance and disaster mitigation operations are the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United

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<sup>8</sup> The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), the consolidated appeal process and the CCA.

Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UNHCR and the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN).

### **Making Strategic Choices**

17. WFP has made a number of effective strategic choices regarding geographical coverage, programme categories and content, partnerships and delivery channels. In the early 2000s, it had a sizeable CP in place, which provided a platform for expanding the coverage of a development programme from 2002 to 2003, through FFW/FFA, and for keeping operations going in an environment where others withdrew. Nepal's civil conflict prevented the Government from working in certain areas of the country, making it imperative that WFP work with NGOs to deliver its programmes in those areas. The prepositioning of emergency response equipment and resources under the 2005 special operation was credited with facilitating a swift response to the 2006 drought in western Nepal. WFP was able to scale up when the CPA was signed, and moved FFA/FFT from the CP into the PRRO – a programme modality specifically suited for transitional programming. Following the CPA, many donors felt that it was important to provide a peace dividend to as many conflict-affected families as possible, and WFP programmes provided an excellent means of doing this because of WFP's extensive presence on the ground. Many donors therefore channelled considerable resources through WFP, to provide short-term transfers for FFW. More recently however, stability in conflict-affected areas has led donor and Government interests to shift towards capacity development and long-term development.

18. WFP has been a strategic partner for NGOs and United Nations and donor agencies, because of its operational capacity, geographical reach and willingness and ability to support programme synergies. It has been working in a large number of districts and with many village development committees (VDCs) to reach a high proportion of the food insecure population. This strategy worked well in providing as many people as possible with a peace dividend after the signing of the CPA. However, spreading resources across a wide area made it more difficult to achieve sustainable livelihood recovery objectives; greater programme concentration is now needed to address chronic food insecurity.

19. Although WFP has made significant investments in nutrition and has increasingly taken the lead in implementation, it is not seen as a key player in nutrition in Nepal and has been slow to engage in policy dialogue. It still has to position itself more strategically with bilateral agencies, as a partner with the capacity to address nutrition challenges. The MCHC programme has a very low profile and is unknown to many donors, which reduces the opportunities for promoting and enhancing funding for MCHC and nutrition and for exploiting donor interest in a more comprehensive integrated nutrition package.

20. The programme has followed Programme Review Committee recommendations to ensure there are no overlaps among beneficiaries of the various operations; however, this has limited the opportunities for synergy in the overall programme portfolio. There has been little overlap of FFW, FFE and MCHC activities within communities. In districts where activities have overlapped, participants acknowledged that food security improved, children were healthier and households migrated less. Greater impact and synchronized monitoring systems can be achieved by ensuring that programme activities are not implemented separately.

21. WFP Nepal's food security studies to improve the targeting of its resources to the most food-insecure populations are commendable. The vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) system currently manages Nepal Khadhya Surakshya Anugaman Pranali (NeKSAP), the most comprehensive food security monitoring system in the country, developed in collaboration with the Government, civil society and local expertise in food security analysis, including the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and the Nepal Food Corporation. NeKSAP collects and analyses

information and field data to monitor food security, and early warning information to inform food policy. The system relies on district food security networks, which monitor and analyse local-level food security using the food security phase classification methodology. These entities and the donor community use the information for programme targeting. WFP is institutionalizing this system in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.

22. WFP has engaged in limited analysis of the determinants of malnutrition. Most of its analytical work focuses on food security, so it has tended to respond with food products, neglecting many aspects of nutrition education for mothers, infant and child feeding issues, and the sustainability of impacts. WFP is making efforts to improve analysis, but more could be done. Better analysis would improve programming decisions as WFP integrates its nutrition and food security interventions. Updated data collection systems may be needed to capture synergistic programme impacts.

## **Portfolio Performance and Results**

### **Relevance**

23. Since the early 2000s, WFP has had a sizeable programme in the mid west and far west regions, giving it a platform for providing support to food-insecure populations located in conflict-affected areas where the Government of Nepal had withdrawn. In addition to continuous programming during the conflict, WFP was also able to scale up its FFW/FFA/FFT transition programming to provide a peace dividend when the CPA was signed. These short-term food security interventions were highly appreciated by the Government and donors, and helped reduce the recurrence of conflict. A major issue now facing the Government of Nepal is how to address chronic food insecurity, and what role WFP should play in this effort.

24. WFP is recognized as one of the most important emergency response agencies in Nepal because of its geographical reach, logistics capacity and ability to mobilize resources quickly. The Government of Nepal, beneficiary communities and partners are highly appreciative of WFP's response to urgent food needs in emergencies; the Government is currently unable to respond to emergencies to the same extent. The Government and donors want WFP to maintain this capability for some time into the future, until the Government has built its own capacity to take on this role.

25. Given the high burden of malnutrition and iron-deficiency anaemia in Nepal, WFP's MCHC programming and distribution of micronutrient powder (MNP) have been highly relevant to the population's needs. During the conflict, WFP was one of the few actors with access to remote populations, and provided an essential lifeline to vulnerable children and mothers.

26. The education system faces many challenges, including limited coverage owing to geographical remoteness, and gender and socio-economic disparities. WFP school feeding programmes are implemented in areas with high levels of food insecurity, poor maternal and child health indicators, and large gender disparities in primary school enrolment.

27. WFP support to Bhutanese refugees, in conjunction with UNHCR, prevented a major humanitarian crisis from becoming worse, and is seen as a significant contribution by the Government. WFP's support will continue to be needed until a durable solution for the entire refugee population has been found.

### **Efficiency**

28. Several factors had a substantial influence on overall programme efficiency. The combined effects of conflict, insecurity, continual strikes and civil unrest, and natural disasters affected the accessibility of project sites and the timely delivery of all

portfolio activities. Repeated school closures in conflict areas and recurring transportation strikes disrupted food distribution, resulting in lower distribution than planned in some years. The remoteness of mountain and hill districts in the mid west and far west also incurred increased transport costs, because food was delivered by air. The Government's directives to WFP in 2009, to purchase food outside the country, also resulted in shortfalls and delays in food delivery.

29. Between 2002 and 2006, WFP struggled to reach the planned numbers of beneficiaries and to distribute adequate quantities of food in MCHC. This was a result of the factors already noted, as well as the slow start up of operations and planning by WFP and its partner, and weak partner capacity. Efficiency has since improved dramatically, following appropriate steps taken by WFP.

30. The efficiency of refugee camp operations has been impressive, with only one substantial pipeline break reported throughout the portfolio period.

### **Effectiveness**

31. WFP has been very effective in building community assets through FFW/FFA/CFA; overall, the portfolio met or exceeded its targets for community assets during the evaluation period. The programme was clearly able to reach large numbers of people, reduce immediate food shortage problems and, consequently, protect assets and livelihoods in the short term. The FFE and Girls' Incentive Programme (GIP) components of the portfolio have been successful in increasing attendance and enrolment. GIP has proved efficient in retaining girls in school after first grade, when many traditionally drop out.<sup>9</sup> A cause for concern is overcrowding in classrooms, with high student/teacher ratios and subsequent deterioration in the quality of education.

32. Owing to the lack of monitoring and evaluation of MCHC programmes, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions on their effectiveness. However, anecdotal reports from stakeholders, cooperating partners and beneficiaries, along with some programme data and observations, suggest the programme is effective in preventing and treating malnutrition.

33. WFP's support to refugees has been highly effective, and has adapted appropriately to changing situations while maintaining the nutrition status of the camp population.<sup>10</sup>

### **Impact**

34. WFP food assistance through FFW/FFA/CFA has helped food-insecure people to meet immediate food needs and has mitigated negative coping strategies. From 2007, this assistance was designed to help communities affected by conflict, expanding in the following year to include those affected by the large increases in world food prices. Significant impacts in increased income, reduced migration and reduced use of credit for food purchase were shown in 2008 and 2009.<sup>11</sup> It is less clear that longer-term household assets or improved livelihood conditions are being created. One of the main problems is that most of the households that WFP works with are chronically food-insecure. Greater impact was achieved when FFW/FFA/CFA activities were combined with complementary programmes implemented by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) or Mercy Corps.

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<sup>9</sup> WFP. 2005. *SPR*. Rome.

<sup>10</sup> CDC. 2009. The Nutrition and Micronutrient Survey among Bhutanese Refugee Children (Damak, Nepal) shows global acute malnutrition rates of 7.2 percent, stunting of 28.3 percent and underweight of 22.7 percent, based on World Health Organization (WHO) Z-scores.

<sup>11</sup> PRRO 106760 mid-term evaluations, May 2009 and February 2010.

35. WFP has helped influence national policy regarding school feeding; the guidance it provided is being used in the expansion of the school feeding programme in Karnali region.

36. Implementation of MCHC in selected wards of selected VDCs across nine districts has spread the intervention too thinly; impact is not visible at the district level. More effort is needed to ensure measurable evidence of the impact of WFP activities.

37. Since 2007, following the Government's agreement to the resettlement of refugees in third countries – the first and, to date, the only durable solution available for refugees – the number of refugees supported has declined; at the end of March 2010, more than 29,000 refugees had been resettled.

## **Sustainability**

38. The country office felt that it was important to engage in livelihood recovery in its transition programming. However, the timeframe for activities was too short to restore essential productive assets sustainably, and a lack of multi-year funding made it difficult to maintain recovery-focused activities. In addition, livelihood recovery objectives were difficult to achieve in a protracted crisis situation with recurring shocks, where many households were chronically food-insecure. Livelihood recovery objectives need to be more modest and longer-term; it is difficult to address the underlying causes of chronic food insecurity with short-term food security interventions.

39. Food-for-education activities are likely to be sustainable because they are already integrated within the Ministry of Education. The programme has also improved the Government's capacity in food transport and management, and led to improvements in infrastructure and school facilities.

40. The sustainability of MCHC outcomes is related to building the capacity of Ministry of Health and Population staff and behavioural change in communities; activities have been fully implemented since only 2008/09 and their impact has yet to be seen. However, it was evident that mothers had absorbed health, nutrition and hygiene messages in the sites visited by the evaluation team.

41. Sustainability of the NeKSAP system, which was developed by WFP and is being institutionalized in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, is another area of concern. NeKSAP has been heavily funded by external actors, and it is doubtful that the Government of Nepal will be capable of providing sufficient funding to sustain NeKSAP's current functions. Given external agencies' utilization of the system, it is reasonable to suggest that they take on some responsibility for funding over the long term.

## **Recommendations**

### **Country Strategy**

**Recommendation 1** *The next country strategy should consider engaging in longer-term productive safety nets.*<sup>12</sup>

The primary design considerations to be taken into account are:

- comprehensive design and multi-year funding, to address immediate needs and the causal factors of chronic food insecurity, both of which are priority issues for the Government of Nepal;
- consolidation of programming in fewer districts;

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<sup>12</sup> Safety net programmes are one of many components in a social protection system, which generally includes cash or food transfers such as conditional cash transfers, school feeding, FFW and cash for work, social services such as health clinics, aspects of labour market policies and insurance options, and aspects of other sectoral policies for education, health, nutrition, HIV/AIDS and agriculture. (WFP. 2009. *Unveiling Social Safety Nets*. Occasional Paper No. 20, November. Rome.)

- greater community input regarding preferred food/cash ratios for FFW/FFA activities; and
- alignment with national- and local-level planning processes, and inclusion of joint monitoring.

**Recommendation 2: *The next country strategy should develop a comprehensive integrated life-cycle approach to nutrition.***

This will involve a continuum of care, and geographical consolidation and integration of essential packages of resources.

**Recommendation 3: *The next country strategy should maintain an emergency response capacity.***

This should include:

- a standing agreements for rapid emergency response;
- buffer stocks of food; and
- building the Government's emergency response capacity.

**Country Portfolio**

**Recommendation 4: *Reintroduce local-level procurement of traditional staples.***

This could be combined with:

- adoption of the Purchase for Progress approach and local procurement of local staples; and
- piloting of home-grown school feeding.

**Recommendation 5: *Refine WFP's nutrition/MCHC programming further, and demonstrate the impact.***

This will involve:

- consolidation in fewer districts, reaching more VDCs in each district until further funding is secured;
- sustaining and enhancing WFP's existing emphasis on infant–and-child feeding practices, health, nutrition and hygiene education, and alignment with the messages of Helen Keller International, UNICEF and other nutrition actors;
- adapting the MNP strategy to improve coverage and the sustainability of outcomes, and to avoid overlap with beneficiaries of MCHC fortified food;
- enhanced attention to capacity development of Ministry of Health and Population staff and women community health volunteers, and to the delivery of health/nutrition education messages; and
- regular monitoring and evaluation of activities, using appropriate outcome indicators.

**Recommendation 6: *Combine FFE and GIP activities with other education improvement activities*** implemented by the Ministry of Education, UNICEF and NGOs, to ensure that the quality of education does not deteriorate with increased enrolment and retention.

**Recommendation 7: *Select partner NGOs with greater transparency and clear selection criteria, because of high politicization.***

Partner selection criteria should include the ability to contribute resources to implementation.

***Recommendation 8: Foster women’s participation within the country office and among cooperating partners.***

Sub-offices should continue to address the issue of low representation of women in their staffs, to provide positive role models. This will also help sub-offices to link more directly to women in beneficiary communities, and to identify concerns and factors affecting women’s participation.

***Recommendation 9: Enhance WFP’s role in policy dialogue.***

The country office should work across sectoral divisions, using its position and influence within the food security, agriculture, local development and nutrition sectors to promote greater synergy in tackling chronic food insecurity and stunting.


***Recommendation 10: Strengthen monitoring and evaluation of programme activities.***

Baseline and end-line surveys are critical for measuring impact. WFP should monitor areas where multiple activities are carried out, to capture synergistic programme impacts.

***Recommendation 11: Identify regions where local production is sufficient to allow local procurement without causing shortages or market distortion.***

Local procurement is important for stimulating local production and providing markets for farmers. In areas where farmers sell some of their produce, there is opportunity for introducing home-grown school feeding, linking children with traditional food sources and providing an additional local market for farmers.

# Map



September, 2009

World Food Programme  
 Food Security Monitoring and Analysis System





# 1. Introduction

## 1. A Evaluation Features

1. The World Food Programme Nepal has implemented 51 operations in Nepal since 1963, totalling almost US\$400 million to date. The WFP Nepal Country Portfolio Evaluation (CPE) covers the 15 WFP operations implemented between 2002 and 2009: the CP, seven protracted relief and PRROs; five EMOPs; and two Special Operations. The CPE serves the dual objectives of accountability and learning, and will enable the country office to make informed strategic decisions for its next Country Strategy. Specifically, the CPE addresses three key questions: strategic alignment, effectiveness and impact of strategic decisions, and performance and results of the Country Portfolio. The Terms of reference for this CPE are found at Annex 1, and include a comprehensive list of all WFP Nepal interventions to date, including total budget information. Annex 5 shows the geographic presence of WFP assistance during the evaluation period.

2. The inception phase of the CPE took place from February to March 2010. Fieldwork missions took place from March 29 through April 19, 2010. The evaluation team consisted of Tim Frankenberger, Team Leader; Elizabeth Kiff, Livelihoods Specialist; Ganga Datta Awasthi, Infrastructure/Governance Specialist; and Tamsin Walters, Nutrition Specialist.

3. Evaluation methodology for assessing the strategic objectives for the research questions included in-depth desk review of key WFP and non-WFP documents; structured and semi-structured interviews; focus groups with WFP, partner, donor and Government staff and with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries; key informant interviews; and direct observation. The evaluation team conducted field visits to observe the impact of WFP activities in eight of the 37 districts where the programme is operating. The team also used interviews with stakeholders and participants in the field to verify findings reported in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) documents reviewed; secondary data was also obtained from stakeholders and thoroughly reviewed. Methodology is further detailed in Annex 4. The full evaluation model, which groups WFP Nepal activities under the strategic objectives (SOs) used in the WFP Global Strategic Plan (2008-2011), is presented in Annex 6 (see also 1C).

4. Fieldwork tools convey the range of topics used by the evaluation team to obtain the views of diverse stakeholders and to ensure that the assessment, findings, and recommendations are based on a comprehensive understanding of different perspectives. The key questions of the CPE are further elaborated and presented along with indicators and data sources in the Evaluation Matrix at Annex 8.

## 1. B Context

5. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Nepal is home to approximately 27 million people and growing at an annual rate of 2.2 percent (2006-2008).<sup>13</sup> The topography of Nepal presents several challenges to development and humanitarian assistance. The north is extremely mountainous while the south (the Terai) is composed of plains, with the hill country in between. The country is transected from north to south by major river systems that flood periodically, disrupting lives and livelihoods and exacerbating food insecurity.<sup>14</sup>

## Poverty

6. Nepal ranks 144th out of 182 countries on the 2009 UN Development Programme Human Development Index. More than half the population is estimated to live on

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<sup>13</sup> [http://www.adb.org/Documents/Fact\\_Sheets/NEP.pdf](http://www.adb.org/Documents/Fact_Sheets/NEP.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html>

less than US\$1.25 per day.<sup>15</sup> In 2009 the gross domestic product real growth rate was estimated at 4.7 percent, a decrease from 5.3 percent in the previous year.<sup>16</sup> According to the UN Human Development report, there are many sources of inequality in Nepal, including gender disparities, caste differentials, and ethnic and linguistic discrimination, as well as spatial exclusion due to the remoteness of rural villages.<sup>17</sup>

7. Migration is an important survival strategy for 32 percent of households, with both the share of household income and number of households receiving remittances increasing over time.<sup>18</sup> India is the most popular destination for migrants, attracting 40 percent, followed by internal migration at 30 percent and other third countries at 22 percent.<sup>19</sup> However, while food insecurity is often a factor driving migration, it has not shown to be an ideal solution to improving food security.<sup>20</sup>

### **Food Insecurity<sup>21</sup>**

8. Over the past three years the number of highly food-insecure people in Nepal has increased to more than 3.5 million.<sup>22</sup> More than half the districts in Nepal (41 out of 75) are food-insecure.<sup>23</sup> At present it is estimated that some 40 percent of the population does not have access to the minimum calorie requirement, with a higher proportion in the Mountain regions (45 percent) and Hills (42 percent) than in the Terai region (37 percent).<sup>24</sup> (See Annex 9, Table 1 for detail on food security status by district.) Such a large shortfall means that not all needy populations are being reached by existing Government safety nets. Almost two thirds of Nepalese households are primarily reliant upon household agricultural production to meet their consumption needs.

9. Food security in Nepal has been constrained by several inhibiting factors including the 2008 rapid spike in global food prices, the global economic downturn, and climate change. Additional challenges to country food security are stagnated domestic production amidst a growing population, civil unrest, and limited access to productive infrastructure.<sup>25</sup>

### **Agriculture<sup>26</sup>**

10. Forests and farmland comprise half of Nepal's total land area and agriculture constitutes a significant livelihood strategy (35 percent) of Nepal's economy. However, agricultural production has declined significantly in the past decade, and Nepal currently has a food deficit. The ratio of population to arable land is now one of the highest in the world.<sup>27</sup>

11. Agricultural production levels for all crops in Nepal has lagged behind those achieved in neighbouring countries in the region in the last ten years, with average

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<sup>15</sup> WFP. 2010. WFP Nepal Operations Summary 2010.

<sup>16</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html>

<sup>17</sup> UNDP. 2009. 'Nepal Human Development Report: State Transformation and Human Development'

<sup>18</sup> UN. 2007. CCA Report

<sup>19</sup> WFP Nepal, and Nepal Development Research Institute. Passage to India: Migration as a Coping Strategy in Times of Crisis in Nepal. Rep. Kathmandu: WFP, 2008.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> WFP. 2009. 'The Cost of coping: a collision of crises and the impact of sustained food security deterioration in Nepal'.

<sup>22</sup> Moderately, severely and acutely food insecure WFP 2009 Food security Bulletin No 26, December.

<sup>23</sup> Moderately, severely and acutely food insecure WFP 2009 Food security Bulletin No 26, December.

<sup>24</sup> Government of Nepal (2007) Three Year Interim Plan 2006/7-2009/10 National Planning Commission, Singhadurbar, Kathmandu, Nepal. December 2007.

<sup>25</sup> WFP Nepal does not focus on urban food security, though urban areas are affected by fluctuations in the market and disrupted by the *bandhs*.

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/geography/tags/nepal>

<sup>27</sup> [http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/ess/documents/documents/food\\_security\\_statistics/Agric\\_Pop\\_Density\\_en.xls](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/ess/documents/documents/food_security_statistics/Agric_Pop_Density_en.xls)

yields stagnating while neighbouring countries' yields gradually increasing (see Annex 9, Figure 2 for a cross-country comparison of cereal yields). The decline in the agricultural sector's growth is attributed to: expansion in trade and tourism, transport, and other services; conflict in rural areas; higher production costs and lower output prices for small farmers; lack of quality inputs such as improved seeds and fertilizer; and a heavy dependency on water-intensive agriculture despite lack of access to a perennial water supply. Farmers have responded to recent crop price increases by growing wheat over paddy in some areas.

## Health and Nutrition

12. The Nepal Common Country Assessment (CCA) 2007 states that the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target for under 5 mortality is likely to be achieved and that the maternal health MDG can also be met with "sustained efforts and a positive environment." However it concedes that "under 5 mortality rates remain high in many rural areas and amongst the marginalised ethnic and caste groups where most child deaths occur."<sup>28</sup>

13. The health sector is poorly resourced and rural health facilities suffer from staff shortages. Further, rural households lack access to adequate health services due to their remote locations, and much of the population also lacks the knowledge or resources to maintain their own health and that of their children. Poor sanitation exacerbates the situation: only 24 percent of rural households and 45 percent of urban households have access to improved sanitation.<sup>29</sup> Approximately 13,000 children under 5 die annually from diarrhoea due to poor hygiene and sanitation.<sup>30</sup>

14. Nepal's high levels of malnutrition result from a combination of the inadequate quantity of food and dietary quality, a heavy disease burden, and recurring food shortages in several parts of the country. Nepal ranks among the top 10 countries in the world in prevalence of stunting,<sup>31</sup> with a national rate of 49.3 percent reported in 2006.<sup>32</sup> Wasting at 12.6 percent and underweight at 38.6 percent in children under 5 are also indicative of serious malnutrition.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless the 2006 figures are an improvement over those reported in 2001 in the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) (57 percent stunting, 43 percent underweight, and 11 percent wasting).<sup>34</sup>

15. Anemia in children ages 6-59 months at 48.4 percent in 2006 is classified by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a severe public health problem. Due to combined efforts to address the situation, this rate showed significant improvement since the 1998 Nepal Micronutrient Status Survey, which found 78 percent prevalence. The decrease is more prominent among children 24 months or older and has been largely attributed to the biannual de-worming of children ages 12-59 months.<sup>35</sup> In 2006, 36 percent of all women surveyed ages 15-49 years were found to be anemic; for pregnant women, this rate was 42.4 percent, which compares favourably with 75 percent of pregnant women in the 1998 survey.

16. The 2006 NDHS found that the highest proportion of stunted children (62.3 percent) were located in the Mountain belt, compared to the Terai (46.3 percent) and

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<sup>28</sup> UN (2007) CCA Report. Nepal

<sup>29</sup>[http://apps.who.int/whosis/database/core/core\\_select\\_process.cfm?countries=npl&indicators=PopAccessImprovedWaterUrban&indicators=PopAccessImprovedWaterRural&indicators=PopAccessImprovedSanitationUrban&indicators=PopAccessImprovedSanitationRural](http://apps.who.int/whosis/database/core/core_select_process.cfm?countries=npl&indicators=PopAccessImprovedWaterUrban&indicators=PopAccessImprovedWaterRural&indicators=PopAccessImprovedSanitationUrban&indicators=PopAccessImprovedSanitationRural)

<sup>30</sup> <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=85314>

<sup>31</sup> Webb, P. 2010 Proposed Nutrition Strategy for WFP Nepal.

<sup>32</sup> NDHS 2006. Rates calculated using WHO Growth Standards.

<sup>33</sup> CDC/WFP 2005. A Manual: Measuring and Interpreting Malnutrition and Mortality.

<sup>34</sup> N.b. The 2001 NDHS data is reported here based on the WHO Growth Standards for comparison and not as the NCHS/CDC/WHO reference as cited in the original report.

<sup>35</sup> NDHS 2006.

Hill zones (50.3 percent). However wasting was significantly higher in the Terai (16.6 percent as compared to 9.4 percent in Mountains and 8.4 percent in the Hills).

17. WFP and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) conducted a nutrition survey in six districts of the West and Far West<sup>36</sup> in late 2009 which awaits a full analysis, but initial findings reveal 55 percent stunting, 40 percent underweight and 11 percent wasting overall, with some significant differences between districts.

18. The camp population of Bhutanese refugees continues to exhibit better rates of both malnutrition and mortality than the general Nepalese population, the latest survey of 2009<sup>37</sup> showing Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates of 7.2 percent, stunting 28.3 percent and underweight 22.7 percent (WHO Z-scores) for refugee children.

19. The infant mortality rate in the camps reported by WFP at the start of the portfolio period was 21.5/1 000 live births, less than one third of the national rate (74.4/ 1000) at that time,<sup>38</sup> alongside a maternal mortality rate of 68.8/100 000 live births, compared to the national rate of 475/100 000. Additionally the annual nutrition survey of August 2001 revealed a wasting prevalence of 5.45 percent, and stunting at 33.2 percent.<sup>39</sup>

## **Education**

20. The education system in Nepal faces many challenges, including limited coverage due to geographic remoteness and gender and socioeconomic disparities. The Government of Nepal has made a significant commitment to education reform. While Nepal's literacy rate was the 11th lowest in the world in 1998<sup>40</sup>, illiteracy has been significantly reduced in recent years, with literacy rates of 85 percent for males and 73 percent for females.<sup>41</sup> The Hill districts in the Far West development region are among the least educated, with a total primary Net Enrolment Rate (NER) of 64 percent and a girls' primary NER of 49.3 percent. Across the country, drop-out and repetition rates persist, with 23 percent dropping out in first grade and 55 percent dropping out before the completion of the primary cycle.<sup>42</sup>

21. NDHS data (see Annex 23) indicate that primary school attendance has improved between 2001 and 2006 in all regions, while there has also been a noticeable improvement in the gender parity index, suggesting enhanced school attendance by girls.

## **Government Strategy**

22. Although the nascent federal democracy is in a relatively fragile state, Nepal has committed to the realization of the MDGs and has the potential to meet nine out of eleven targets by 2015. Cognizant of the challenges this poses, the Government has sought to build its capacity through strategic cooperation with the UN Country Team and technical support.

23. The Government adopted a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2003 focusing on four key issues: 1) promotion of pro-poor economic growth, 2) equitable access to social and economic infrastructure and resources for poor and marginalized

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<sup>36</sup> Rolpa, Kalikot, Mugu, Bajhang, Kailali and Kanchanpur. WFP/UNICEF. 2009. Unpublished data.

<sup>37</sup> Nutrition and Micronutrient Survey among Bhutanese Refugee Children (Damak, Nepal). May 2009. CDC.

<sup>38</sup> PRRO 10058.1 Project Document

<sup>39</sup> These indicators are based on NCHS/CDC/WHO references and are therefore not directly comparable with the NDHS figures for the Nepali population, calculated using the WHO Growth Standards.

<sup>40</sup> WFP. 2001.CP – Nepal (2002-2006), Agenda Item 5.

<sup>41</sup> [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nepal\\_nepal\\_statistics.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nepal_nepal_statistics.html)

<sup>42</sup> MoE data, 1998.

groups, 3) social inclusion through targeted programmes and 4) improved governance.<sup>43</sup>

24. The PRSP identifies the successful implementation of the Agriculture Perspective Plan (APP)<sup>44</sup> – the Government’s key policy on agriculture and rural development – as the key to meeting growth targets. The APP aims to increase cereal and cash crop production in the Terai and develop livestock, horticulture and specific high-value crops in the Hills.<sup>45 46</sup>

25. Since 2003, the Government has undergone health sector reform aimed at health care services, decentralized management of health facilities, and increased public-private partnerships. The National Health Sector Programme Implementation Plan aims to achieve health sector MDGs with improved health outcomes for the poor and those living in remote areas, with a consequent reduction in poverty.<sup>47</sup>

26. In 1998 Nepal launched its first national AIDS prevention and control programme. The national HIV and AIDS strategy for 2006-2011 focuses on universal access and prevention; treatment, care and support to the most at-risk populations and people living with HIV and AIDS; advocacy, policy and legal reform; leadership and management; surveillance; M&E; and finance and resource mobilisation.<sup>48</sup>

27. Nepal places a high priority on the development of the education sector. In August 2009 the Ministry of Education (MoE) released its School Sector Reform Plan 2009-2015 focusing on improving enrolment and attendance, expansion of teacher certification and training, and decreasing student-teacher ratios.<sup>49</sup>

28. Currently the Government does not have a strategy or policy for refugees.

29. Other social protection programmes implemented by the Government include cash transfers provided to the elderly over 75, poor widows, and the disabled; and public works programmes implemented through the Ministry of Local Development (MLD), Rural Community Infrastructure Work (RCIW) and the Karnali programme, implemented in five districts. The cash transfer programmes are significantly underfunded and face issues of transparency, and the public works programmes implemented in the Karnali are too small to have a significant impact.

## **Humanitarian Situation**

30. Nepal is particularly vulnerable to a variety of natural disasters. Due to its geographic location on a seismically active belt, earthquakes are common. Flooding occurs annually with the runoff from the Himalayas and the Asian monsoon season. In 2008 alone, over 180,000 families were displaced due to flooding. Landslides have also become increasingly common. Drought also poses a serious threat to vulnerable populations due to dependence on agriculture for domestic food production.<sup>50</sup> Paddy production is severely impacted by the late and erratic monsoons.

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<sup>43</sup> IMF (2003) Nepal: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

<sup>44</sup> Agricultural Perspectives Plan (1995) <http://www.adb.org/projects/project.asp?id=23411> accessed 22.02.2010

<sup>45</sup> Agricultural Perspectives Plan (1995) <http://www.adb.org/projects/project.asp?id=23411> accessed 22.02.2010.

<sup>46</sup> IMF (2003) Nepal: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

<sup>47</sup> Government (2004) Nepal Health Sector Programme – Implementation Plan

<sup>48</sup> National Centre for AIDS and STD Control (2009) Strategic Components of the National HIV/AIDS Strategy, 2006-2011. Accessed February 25, 2010 at <http://www.ncasc.gov.np/cms.php?id=6>

<sup>49</sup> Government of Nepal, MOE. August 2009. ‘School Sector Reform Plan’: [http://moe.gov.np/new/filedownload.php?download=resume&file=download\\_1018540956.pdf&option=download](http://moe.gov.np/new/filedownload.php?download=resume&file=download_1018540956.pdf&option=download)

<sup>50</sup> UNDP. 2008. ‘National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management in Nepal.’ <http://www.undp.org.np/pdf/NSDRMFinalDraft.pdf>

31. While the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) signed in 2006 ended the decade-long conflict between the Government and the Communist Party of Nepal that claimed over 12,000 lives, political tension still exists and the potential for conflict is high. As of April 2010, the Government has until the end of May to draft a new constitution and settle the issues of reintegration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army.<sup>51</sup>

32. Reduced investment in agriculture, coupled with problems of input supply, limited irrigation, damage to infrastructure and disruption to communications caused by conflict have all contributed to slow productivity growth and stagnation in some sectors; these conditions contribute to continued chronic food insecurity. The hoped-for improvements following successful democratic elections in 2008 have yet to materialize; chronic budget under-spending and high incidence of strikes and *bandhs*<sup>52</sup> are interrupting activities and keeping food prices high.<sup>53</sup>

33. The status of road development in Nepal is low compared to other South Asian countries (6.39 km per 100 km<sup>2</sup>), leaving parts of the country with poor accessibility. This affects overall development as well as the delivery of humanitarian assistance. At the end of 2008, six district headquarters still lacked road connections, though all are scheduled to be linked by the end of 2010.

34. Beginning in the early 1990s, Bhutanese refugees have been entering Nepal because of the enforcement of restrictive citizenship laws by the Government of Bhutan. WFP and the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) began providing food, shelter, and non-food assistance to refugees in 1992. Due to international pressure, Bhutanese refugees are now being resettled in third-party countries.

35. Humanitarian assistance is still needed for the over 89,000 Bhutanese refugees that inhabit eastern Nepal and approximately 90,000 Nepalese children experiencing severe acute malnutrition. Humanitarian assistance requested in the Nepal Humanitarian Transition Appeal for 2010 will support improved disaster preparedness and coordination among humanitarian organizations.<sup>54</sup>

## **International Assistance**

36. Historically, Nepal has received a significant amount of foreign assistance. Since the signing of the CPA in 2006 and the 2008 elections, the development needs of Nepal have shifted dramatically from humanitarian aid to transitional programming to address chronic vulnerability. The following agencies are WFP's major partners:

- FAO is cooperating with the Government in implementing the APP, which was approved in 1995 and covers up to 2015. FAO is also involved in implementation of the three-year Interim Plan, taking forward the PRSP (2003). WFP and FAO coordinate on activities related to agriculture, rural development and food security, jointly producing Crop and Food Security Assessment reports with the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MoAC).
- **UNICEF** supports school feeding, health care and sanitation programmes in child-friendly schools in direct collaboration with WFP. UNICEF, WFP and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) also collaborated closely on the

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<sup>51</sup> <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87942>

<sup>52</sup> A *bandh* is a general strike; the word means 'closed' in Nepali. This form of protest became prevalent during Nepal's civil conflict. It involves closing of markets, businesses, roads and schools to the effect of bringing whole regions and/or economic sectors to a standstill. In the first six months of 2009 there were reportedly only 12 days without a major *bandh*. Himalayan Times, Sunday, 28 June 2009.

<sup>53</sup> WFP. 2009. Cost of Coping.

<sup>54</sup> OCHA. 2010. Nepal Humanitarian Transition Appeal.

<http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Page=1849>

emergency response to the Koshi flood with a focus on providing nutrition and health care to affected communities<sup>55, 56</sup> WFP has also partnered with UNICEF on implementation of the GIP aimed at alleviating the education gap for girls in Nepal. UNICEF is the lead agency for the Nutrition and WASH clusters in Nepal. UNICEF is also a co-leader of the health cluster with WHO, a co-leader of the education cluster with Save the Children, and a co-leader with the UN Office for OCHA and WFP of the Emergency Telecommunications cluster.

- The **European Commission** (EC) is engaged in bilateral programmes, support to NGOs, aid to uprooted people, human rights and democratic support and some Asia-wide programmes in Nepal. The largest current bilateral programme is in renewable energy. The EC supports WFP in provision of food to the Bhutanese refugees in Jhapa and Morang districts; the EC has also provided support to WFP, CARE and Oxfam for emergency humanitarian aid to flood victims, and supports WFP activities in collaboration with FAO under the European Union (EU) Food Facility-supported activities.
- **Department for International Development** (DFID) support goes to the health sector (34 percent); economic growth (26 percent), which includes rural infrastructure, agriculture and forestry; good governance (15 percent); humanitarian issues (nine percent); and education (five percent). Cooperation with WFP on FFA within the Rural Access Project has assisted in improving access to markets and communications, increasing short-term employment opportunities and reducing outmigration.
- **German Agency for Technical Cooperation** (GTZ) priority areas are local self-governance, civil society, renewable energy, health and family planning. Current programmes include poverty alleviation through employment creation and building of local assets, working with local community groups.

37. Other significant contributing organizations include the ADB, the International Development Association, the Governments of India and Japan, and the World Bank, which funds support to the Government's Education for All programme.

## 1. C WFP's Portfolio

### Overview of WFP Nepal Portfolio

38. WFP is present in Nepal since 1963 with 51 operations for a total budget of about US\$400 million to date. US\$282 million of contributions has been received over the last eight years. During this period the portfolio grew significantly, from US\$25 million in 2002 to US\$9857 million in 2009. The evaluation focuses on WFP activities undertaken between 2002 and 2009. Within this timeframe, WFP has implemented 15 operations, which are summarized by programme category in table 1.

39. The Nepal CP and relief and recovery operation for conflict-affected populations constitute the two largest expenditures (29 percent and 38 percent respectively). Food assistance to Bhutanese refugees is the third largest component, comprising 27 percent of the portfolio budget. WFP has implemented five EMOPs constituting six percent of the portfolio budget, primarily in response to flooding, with the exception of one drought-related EMOP. While some programmes in the portfolio did focus on capacity strengthening of Government ministries, many activities were implemented through NGOs, such as working with Himalayan Health and Environment Services

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<sup>55</sup> United Nations Country Team (2007) UNDAF for Nepal 2008-2010: 2007. Kathmandu: UN.

<sup>56</sup> UNDG. 2008. Resident Coordinator Annual Report (RCAR) Nepal [http://www.undg.org/RCAR/2008/finalized/pdfs/RCAR\\_2008\\_NEP\\_NAR.pdf](http://www.undg.org/RCAR/2008/finalized/pdfs/RCAR_2008_NEP_NAR.pdf)

<sup>57</sup> WFP, Bulletin Board. WFP PoW Dec 2009 (Final)

Solukhumbu (HHESS) to implement capacity-building work with Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP) staff.

**Table 1: WFP portfolio 2002-2009 by programme category**

Programme category	Corresponding strategic objective	No. of operations	Total confirmed contributions (US\$ million)	Weight of various types of operations (%)
Development	3 & 4 & 5	1	81,902,490	29
Emergency operations	1 & 3	5	17,057,882	6
Relief and recovery (FFA, FFT, CFA)	3	1	106,991,164	38
Relief and recovery (refugees)	1	6	74,995,547	27
Special operations (incl. a global SO)	1 & 2	2	868,980	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>281,816,063</b>	<b>-</b>

Source: WINGS I & II systems

40. According to the WFP 2000 Country Strategy Outline, the main activities included: school feeding, maternal and child health care (MCHC), assistance to rural infrastructure, which evolved over time from Food for work (FFW) to community asset creation, and support to Bhutanese refugees. The Outline identifies three main priorities for the new CP :

- Increased focus on areas most vulnerable to food security (Hills and Mountains);
- Increased focus on nutrition intervention for mothers and infants; and
- Increased attention to synergies and decentralisation of implementation.

41. The objectives that the various operations and their programme activities aimed to achieve fall under the strategic objectives of the 2008-13 strategic plan as listed below. These objectives and the key evaluation questions of performance and results, strategic decisions, and strategic alignment, form the basis for the evaluation model used in this report, which is presented graphically in Annex 6.

### **SO 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies**

42. This entails support to Bhutanese refugees (six relief and recovery operations) as well as support to vulnerable communities affected by disasters (five emergency operations) and to two directly related special operations. The main activities are general food distribution – mainly in EMOPS and PRROS for refugees.

43. Since 2007, following the agreement by the Government to third-country resettlement as the first (and to date, the only) durable solution available to the refugees, the number of refugees supported has declined; at the end of March 2010, more than 29,000 refugees had been successfully resettled.<sup>58</sup> The PRRO currently operates in two districts in the Southeast where refugee camps are located.

44. Three years of consecutive drought in ten districts in the Mid and Far West regions resulted in severe food insecurity for nearly 225,000 people. WFP responded by initiating its first EMOP in Nepal to drought-affected families: in 2006, WFP

<sup>58</sup> See Annex 15, Table 3 for the status of dismantled huts in camps.



provided a two-month emergency food ration. Since 2006, WFP has provided emergency food assistance to more than one million people in Nepal.<sup>59</sup>

## **SO 2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures**

45. With this SO, WFP Nepal intends to strengthen capacities of Government and partners to prepare for, assess and respond to acute hunger. This mainly includes effective early warning systems and preparedness measures.

## **SO 3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post disasters or transition situations**

46. This objective supports the re-establishment of livelihoods, the restoration of self-reliance of communities and internally displaced persons affected by conflict, high food prices and natural disasters by providing a social safety net and helping vulnerable communities to create or preserve assets. It includes mainly FFA /Cash for Assets (CFA) and Food for training (FFT) activities (protracted relief and rehabilitation and development).

47. The largest operation under SO 3 is the PRRO for Vulnerable Populations Affected by Conflict, High Food Prices and Natural Disasters. The programme, implemented subsequent to reduced funding for FFA and FFT and the phasing out of PLIC, supports the post-conflict transition process by preventing severe hunger and empowering communities in 26 districts in the Mid and Far West Hills and Mountains, creating assets to improve food security through FFA/ CFA, and operating farmer field schools. The PRRO places special emphasis on targeting marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women, children, ethnic minorities, indigenous populations, returnees, internally displaced persons and children associated with armed groups and armed forces. It also provides training for Government staff, healthcare volunteers, and caregivers in nutrition, health, and sanitation.<sup>60</sup>

## **SO 4: Reduce chronic hunger and under nutrition**

48. WFP aims to increased access to education, and improved nutritional status of targeted women and children, mainly through FFE and MCHC activities (development, protracted relief and support to refugees). WFP's provision of fortified blended food and MCHC services began in the CP in 2002. The programme was designed to contribute to the prevention or reduction of underweight among young children, reduce iron-deficiency anemia among expectant and nursing mothers and young children, raise awareness and knowledge among expectant and nursing mothers about their own and their children's health and nutrition, and increase and regularize utilization of community-based and MCHC outreach services.

49. The CPE spans two programme periods relevant to education: 2002-2006 and 2007-present. The CP for 2002-2006 included a FFE component, partially supported through Global Food for Education Initiative (GFEL), whose beneficiaries were pre-primary, primary and lower secondary schoolchildren. GIP, encourages girls to attend school by distributing monthly take-home rations of cooking oil to girls who maintain a minimum attendance level, is implemented in 17 districts (five of these in the Terai). This component was added in 2008 to target mothers of girls with regular school attendance. School feeding through FFE and GIP activities is being implemented in areas with high levels of food insecurity, poor maternal and child health indicators, and large disparities between girls' and boys' enrolment in primary

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<sup>59</sup> WFP. 2010. WFP Nepal Operations Summary 2010.

<sup>60</sup> WFP. 2010. *Aide Memoire* for WFP Nepal Portfolio Evaluation, April 10.

school. The school feeding programme provides a nutritious midday meal of wheat soya blend to 182,000 primary students in 11 districts of the Mid West and Far West.


**SO 5: Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase**

50. With this SO, WFP aims to 1) use purchasing power to support the sustainable development of food and nutrition security systems, and transform food and nutrition assistance into a productive investment in local communities; 2) develop clear hand-over strategies to enhance nationally-owned hunger solutions; and 3) strengthen the capacities of countries to design, manage and implement tools, policies and programmes to predict and reduce hunger. Capacity development has been carried out with the MoE for managing the school feeding programme, at the district level in MCHC with the MoHP through HHESS, and with the MoAC in the implementation of the food security information system.

**Key External Events**

51. PRRO funding has dramatically increased since the CPA in 2006. CP funding has gradually tapered off since 2004, as well as EMOP funding since 2006. Actual funding levels for individual operations over the entire evaluation period are shown in Annex 11; Figure 1 below shows how this trend has affected the tonnage of food distributed.

**Figure 1: Food distributed by WFP Nepal (MT), 2002 – 2009**



Source: WFP, SPR 2002 to 2009.

52. The evaluation team determined three distinct phases of the portfolio, each characterized by external events and changing programme context related to conflict, the signing of the CPA, increase in global food prices, natural disasters, and refugee resettlement. These phases are elaborated in 2A.1.

**New Initiatives**

53. WFP Nepal has carried out a number of new initiatives during the evaluation period. As part of its school feeding program, WFP Nepal has partnered with the Open Learning Exchange Nepal to provide 800 laptop computers as well as interactive teaching and learning materials to participating schools in target communities (see 2A.5).

54. In order to enhance access to health services in rural areas, WFP Nepal has increasingly collaborated with the UNFPA in health camps in conjunction with food distribution for FFW. WFP has also worked through existing HHESS clinics at health

posts or sub-health posts; this is a new initiative for WFP Nepal, and a move away from working directly with MoHP staff; additionally, Nepal HHES had not previously worked in the Far West, or in a substantial manner in nutrition programmes. Before the collaboration with HHES WFP actually had greater outreach, but it was forced to work at the health post level to be able to offer better health services to beneficiaries because these facilities have staff.

55. Finally, with the support of the Government, the World Bank, DFID and DSM, WFP Nepal began distributing MNP to more than 114,000 children (age 6-59 months) in households participating in FFW/cash for work (CFW) activities under the PRRO (10676.0) (see 2A.6).

## **Food Security Analysis**

56. The country office has developed a strong assessment and analytical capacity located in the Programme Office in Kathmandu that includes technical experts, the M&E unit, and the VAM unit. WFP Nepal's analytical work includes joint assessment missions, comprehensive food security and vulnerability assessment, Food Security Monitoring System (FSMS), Market Watch, Crop Situation and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM), and Standardized Project Reports (SPRs), and assists WFP and partners in targeting areas of food insecurity. Further description of information system components is found in Annex 12.

## **2. Evaluation Findings**

### **2. A Alignment and Strategic Positioning**

57. The components of the Country Portfolio are considered relevant and appropriate in the context of national development priorities and processes, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), and sector investments prioritized by other international agencies in Nepal. In line with the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), and UNDAF (2007-2010), WFP has tried to stay aligned with Government priorities and has coordinated its activities with various Government agencies. However, this alignment has not always been consistent over time. As discussed in "Phase One" later in this section, the need for neutrality and impartiality that is required of humanitarian actors, particularly during times of conflict, may supersede alignment purposes.

#### **2.A.1 Alignment with Government Policies**

##### **Portfolio Phases**

58. In terms of alignment with Government policies, the evaluation team determined three distinct phases of WFP's Country Portfolio since 2002. Phase One (2002-2006) was characterized by rapid response to conflict-affected areas. Phase Two (2006-2008) occurred with the signing of the CPA. Phase Three (2009-2010) is the current programming environment for WFP and is characterized by the rapid spike in global food prices, natural disasters and an MCHC and FFE focus in the west with reduced funding. WFP assistance to Bhutanese refugees through PRROs was consistently provided over these phases without any great dramatic changes in strategy. However, resettlement in the last two years has resulted in some programming shifts with regard to refugee assistance. The three phases are further elaborated in the paragraphs below.

##### **Phase One (2002 – 2006)**

59. WFP activities were closely aligned with national/sub-national policies and implemented through close networking with primarily Government partners. Continued distribution of food by WFP during periods of conflict was much appreciated by all stakeholders in the field – not only the immediate beneficiaries,

but also project implementers who found that working alongside food distribution gave them the legitimacy and acceptance by all parties to continue working, The Government's safety net implemented by the Nepal Food Corporation (NFC) previously operated in 38 districts before the conflict but reduced coverage to 23 districts. WFP food distribution was also appreciated by Government staff, particularly United States Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, who believe it helped avoid escalated conflict that could have arisen with food insecurity in their districts. Political parties across the spectrum also support the distribution of food that occurred as it was clearly based on need, rather than on a political basis. WFP's strong stand against certain Government pressure to stop food delivery to Maoist-controlled areas and its insistence on directing food to the most food-insecure areas was very much the right thing to do from a humanitarian perspective, and enhanced WFP's standing in the country as a fair broker.

### **Phase Two (2006 – 2008)**

60. The inception of the CPA symbolized the beginning of Phase Two of WFP operations through the EMOP and PRRO, involving quick FFW 'light' activities<sup>61</sup> to support returnees and repair damaged infrastructure, and FFT to support civic education for the upcoming elections. WFP success during the previous phase attracted additional funds from donors and the Government, resulting in a greater emphasis on short-term food security interventions. During this time, WFP activities were aligned with the Three Year Interim Development Plan (TYIP) of the Government with a focus on peace-building, reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration. During this period WFP also began a strategic shift away from Government partners to NGO partners to facilitate rapid response. The EMOP was extended to address ongoing flooding and security problems in affected regions. Lack of clear MoHP leadership in nutrition and health policy has resulted in a lack of coherence in the nutrition sector, with various activities being implemented by different organizations. FFE and MCHC activities were reduced due to funding shortfalls to the CP.

### **Phase Three (2009 – 2010)**

61. In Phase Three, the country began to stabilize and the Government accentuated its focus on addressing the underlying contributors to chronic poverty. Based on interviews with various ministries, stakeholders, and donors, a major portion of the PRRO remained focused on addressing the short-term needs of food-insecure populations. Given the more stable country context, these activities are not adequately addressing chronic vulnerability: chronic poverty cannot be adequately addressed using transitory responses.

62. Although WFP is attempting to also address causal factors of chronic food insecurity<sup>62</sup> in its PRRO, they are constrained by the nature of funding (short-term, unsecured, unpredictable) and objectives/ board processes for programme referral. In addition, many donors are convinced of WFP's role in transition – but not in development. At this time, WFP primarily partners with NGOs, and has given limited focus to capacity development of Government agencies.<sup>63</sup> WFP could complement the substantial engagement that it has with NGOs by including capacity development for the Government as a key component of the CP.

63. During times of conflict, the switch to NGO implementers was effective in delivering large quantities of food to remote and food-insecure areas at a time when

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<sup>61</sup> FFW 'light' activities were short-term transfers for 20 days of work focused on damaged community infrastructure.

<sup>62</sup> Longer-term initiatives are being carried out w/GTZ and Mercy Corp.

<sup>63</sup> The exceptions to this include the capacity development for FFE and local capacity development being carried out in MCHC activities.

Government officers were finding it hard to operate outside of district headquarters. While there were significant benefits to this approach, the situation has now changed and in the interests of addressing causal factors of chronic food insecurity and harmonization with donor and Government policy, there is a need to work more closely with Government actors at all levels. The current programming challenge faced by WFP is to deliver sustainable impact and productive safety net outcomes required by communities, as well as support the Government to implement interventions that contribute to medium- and long-term food security.

### **Alignment of SO 1 Activities with Government Policies/Strategies**

64. During the conflict period, many of the Government safety net activities that could be expanded to address emergencies were not functional in the conflict zones. The Government was highly appreciative of WFP's capacity to respond to the droughts and floods that have been recurrent in recent years. The emergency response capacity of the Government is one area that WFP could help strengthen as part of its next country strategy. As for refugee support, there is no Government policy on refugees (as noted in 1B).

### **Alignment of SO 2 Activities with Government Policies/Strategies**

65. Currently the Government does not have a functioning food security early warning system. The system established by WFP is currently being institutionalized in the MoAC. District MoAC extension officers already participate in the collection of food security data being used by the system set up by WFP.

### **Alignment of SO 3 Activities with Government Policies/Strategies**

66. WFP programme activities include marginal and vulnerable farm households as highlighted by the National Agricultural Policy (2004).

67. The two key Government documents that outline Government priorities relating to food security are the APP, which provides an overview of agricultural priorities (see 1.B), and the TYIP (2007-2010),<sup>64</sup> which doubles as the Government's plan for poverty reduction. WFP is aligned with the APP, which is being revised in 2010 to accommodate issues of food security in the context of food price increases, climate change and natural disasters; it has also been closely aligned by supporting the provision of marketing information. WFP's mandate to assist the most food-insecure and vulnerable aligns well – as described in this section – with five of the seven strategies outlined in the TYIP, which explicitly mentions the importance of food security, linking issues of food production, access, proper utilization, and stability and sustainability.

68. The construction of rural roads through WFP FFW support from 2002-2009 contributed to TYIP Strategy 2, “to achieve employment-oriented, pro-poor and broad-based economic growth.” It was also aligned to Strategy 4 (on infrastructure; see next paragraph), and the Green Roads Initiative – an approach to local road construction used by Nepal with support from a number of donors since the early 1990s. The initiative creates local employment, ownership, and opportunities for livelihood and asset creation among participating communities. This has recently developed into the Labour-based, Environmentally aware and Participatory (LEP) approach, designed to be implemented nationally and under Government management.

69. The creation of productive assets such as irrigation systems supported TYIP Strategy 2, as well as Strategy 4 regarding “locally identified, small-scale social and economic infrastructure” (including schools, health centres, and irrigation systems). Participation of local people in this construction has been high, and maintenance

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<sup>64</sup> Government of Nepal (2007) Three Year Interim Plan 2006/7-2009/10 National Planning Commission, Singhadurbar, Kathmandu, Nepal. December 2007.

systems have been established for longer-term sustainability. However further initiatives are required to support intended policy reforms to provide a suitable working environment for workers and labourers, particularly with regard to mainstreaming insurance schemes for protection of villagers involved in road construction.

70. One of the more innovative activities carried out by WFP immediately after the peace accord was FFT. Trainings on civic education, human rights and individual responsibilities introduced through FFT contributed to the first component of TYIP Strategy 3, the promotion of good governance and effective service delivery. Food was provided to individuals who participated in the training sessions. The work was implemented in collaboration with UNMIN, other UN agencies, and the newly formed Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. This activity does not fit neatly into WFP's current SOs but did align nicely with Government priorities. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on support to capacity development of partners, institution strengthening, and linking with local Government for effective planning and monitoring.

71. Emphasis on social development (TYIP Strategy 5) has been addressed indirectly, through partnership with implementing agencies that bring additional funding for drinking water provision, sanitation, and adult literacy.

72. WFP activities have sought to adopt an inclusive approach to targeted programmes (TYIP Strategy 6). A strong effort is made to measure the participation of women, lower-caste and ethnic minorities in all FFA activities.

73. Provision of food by WFP to food deficit areas through FFA is in direct support of both the TYIP and existing policies through 2009. However, more recently the Government wants to move away from short-term food security interventions to longer-term programmes with a focus on increased agricultural productivity. As stated in 2.A.1, this is where WFP is not fully aligned in all programme areas. WFP can continue to support transition programmes while other partners can do development work.

#### **Alignment of SO 4 Activities with Government Policies/Strategies**

74. WFP's health and nutrition activities correspond to the second pillar of the PRSP, "Social Sector Development including Human Development." Activities align to key health sector objectives of: "Extending essential health care services to all, with special emphasis on the poorer population living in rural areas" and "Management of the growing population by enhancing the accessibility of rural population to family planning services and expanding maternal and child health services." WFP's health and nutrition activities additionally correspond to the PRSP's third pillar, "Targeted programmes including social inclusion, in order to bring the poor and marginalized groups into the mainstream of development, together with targeted programmes for the ultra poor, vulnerable and deprived groups".

75. WFP's FFE and MCHC activities are aligned with the objective of the National Plan of Action for Nutrition 1998 to "Achieve and maintain health and nutritional well being of the people," and in particular with the themes of "infection, malnutrition and micronutrient deficiency states" and "nutrition education and training." The Country Strategy Outline notes that the National Plan of Action for Nutrition 1998 policy components included the prevention and control of micronutrient deficiencies through food-based approaches and dietary supplementation, as well as improved nutrition education and awareness. It also notes that geographic targeting of the CP was "in line with His Majesty's Government of Nepal's priorities".

76. The absence of a clear MoHP lead in nutrition has led to a lack of coherence of partners working in nutrition. Activities are implemented largely independently by different organizations in a piecemeal approach. However, WFP MCHC activities have been implemented jointly with MoHP (50 percent internal transportation storage and handling (ITSH) and full staff payment by MoHP; 50 percent storekeeper payment) and are clearly aligned. The Government is set to launch blanket feeding of children under-2 in Karnali to complement the work of WFP, and is gearing up to produce and market an inexpensive fortified food for the 6-24 month age group.

77. To summarize, WFP was aligned reasonably well with Government health and nutrition strategies, and arguably held a strategic position throughout the period of the portfolio. However, it missed the opportunity to make use of that position to influence and assist Government and promote improved nutritional responses and coordination.

78. The MoE School Sector Reform Plan 2009-2015 emphasizes equitable access to basic education for all, focusing on girls, the impoverished, and geographically remote households.<sup>65</sup> WFP's school feeding programme implemented in partnership with the MoE aligns well with the focus on girls and increasing enrolment and attendance in remote and impoverished areas. WFP has been asked to assist the Government in expanding school feeding activities in remote areas of the Karnali region.

### **Alignment of SO 5 Activities with Government Policies/Strategies**

79. The Government wants all external assistance provided to the country to be oriented in such a way that capacity is developed for Government staff in the different ministries that work with the external agency. WFP is doing this through its work with the MoE in school feeding, local MoHP staff in MCHC, and in the institutionalization of the food security information system in the MoAC. However some Government and donor representatives feel more could be done in this regard since WFP works primarily through NGOs in the implementation of its programmes.

### **2A.2 Ownership**

80. Across the portfolio, WFP's strategies are being integrated into Government-owned structures at national and regional levels. The VAM system and network of food security committees have been established in close coordination with Government officials at the District Development Committee level and particularly with District Agriculture Development Office staff. It has also involved good coordination with peace committees and civil society representatives, ensuring transparency of the food security mapping process and support for subsequent intervention. Discussions are taking place for the integration of the system into the MoAC.<sup>66</sup>

81. Building on the MCHC work of WFP, the MoHP is about to launch blanket feeding programmes of under-2s in Karnali region in complement to the work of WFP. Additionally, the Government is gearing up to produce and market a cheap fortified food for the 6-24 month age group, implying a strong validation of the WFP programme modality.

82. In terms of FFE, Government ownership already exists since this programme is integrated into the ministry. Ownership is further suggested by the recent allocation of funding on the part of the Ministry of Finance for school feeding programmes in the Karnali region. WFP has been working with the Government to roll out this effort.

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<sup>65</sup> Government of Nepal, Ministry of Education. August 2009. 'School Sector Reform Plan': [http://moe.gov.np/new/filedownload.php?download=resume&file=download\\_1018540956.pdf&option=download](http://moe.gov.np/new/filedownload.php?download=resume&file=download_1018540956.pdf&option=download)

<sup>66</sup> NeKSAP Framework Document, January 2010

83. Government ownership of WFP's food distribution activities is less apparent. WFP does not work closely with the NFC system due to coverage and capacity issues (see 2A.1), and there has not been a well-thought-out handover strategy. The Government's decision to fund MLD programmes through WFP rather than NFC suggests performance and flexibility advantages to the WFP system of implementation through NGO partners. Building on the approach used by WFP, more effort could be made to strengthen the links between NGOs and local Government bodies in programme planning and implementation.

84. In terms of community participation and ownership of portfolio activities, considerable attention has been given to beneficiary feedback and accountability systems such as public audits and community score cards. WFP has also given importance to social inclusiveness of disadvantaged and marginalized populations in its PRRO performance monitoring. WFP has systematically and effectively targeted the participation of women in PRRO activities. More emphasis could be given to the quality of participation of women and disadvantaged groups.

85. However community ownership and maintenance of assets created through FFW/FFA activities was adversely impacted by the short contracts given to NGO implementing partners. Six-month to one-year contracts were not long enough to do proper planning, community mobilization, and establishment of proper maintenance approaches. This had an effect on the quality and sustainability of assets.

### **2A.3 Government Processes**

86. WFP collaborates with the MoAC, the MoHP, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the MoE, the MLD, the Department of Local Infrastructure Development and Agricultural Roads, and the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction under an umbrella agreement with the Ministry of Finance. Partnerships with national institutions have also been a critical component of the UN Food Security Cluster's activities.

### **Food Security**

87. The Government's food safety net is managed by the NFC, which is mandated to provide food at fair prices, stabilize food grain prices, manage food aid from donor agencies and hold emergency food stocks. The corporation previously worked in 38 districts, but is now operational in only 23; plans are to reduce district coverage further as road networks expand. According to the World Bank, the NFC is typically only able to meet 25 percent of its mandate (to deliver 39,000 MT). This contrasts with an average of 46,000 MT procured by WFP annually. NFC's distribution amounts to only five to six percent of the total deficit in the most food-insecure Hill and Mountain districts of the Mid and Far West. This is why the Ministry of Finance is very supportive of the work that WFP carries out in the Mid and Far West. Support to NFC from WFP may have to be reconsidered if it plays a more central role in future productive safety net programmes.

88. Other social protection programmes implemented by the Government include cash transfers provided to the elderly over 75, poor widows, and the disabled; and public works programmes implemented through the MLD, RCIW, and the Karnali programme, implemented in five districts. The cash transfer programmes are significantly underfunded and face issues of transparency, and the public works programmes implemented in the Karnali are too small to have a significant impact. WFP safety net support to the vulnerable is highly appreciated by the Government.

### **Agriculture**

89. WFP works with MoAC in conducting food security assessments and is provided access to MoAC production statistics for planning purposes. MoAC provides agricultural programmes in all 75 districts of Nepal and has established service centres for supply of inputs and extension advice. Discussions with MoAC staff



suggest that early warning systems are not effectively supported by Government agricultural sector coordination bodies at national (Agricultural Development Committee) and district level (Food Security Committees). WFP's support to food security network committees at the district level is filling this gap by providing information on current food security and acting as an early warning system for potential future vulnerability. The proposed adoption of responsibility for VAM by the MoAC would usefully bring the function within Government and emphasize the professional aspects to the food security networks.

### **Health and Nutrition**

90. WFP, in collaboration with the MoHP, is helping the Government address high rates of malnutrition for children under-2 by supporting MCHC activities in nine districts in the Far West region. It has also initiated a micro-nutrient supplementation programme with the MoHP for children of 6 to 59 months to address high rates of moderate acute micro-nutrient deficiencies in three districts (Dolpa, Jumla, and Rukum).

### **Education**

91. WFP has worked closely with the MoE in all school feeding programmes carried out in the West and Far West regions of Nepal. The Government is currently the main partner in the management and implementation of FFE. According to the 2008 SPR, the Government has been able to contain transport and handling costs by simplifying its logistical processes and engaging the community. Based on this success, the Government plans to implement this practice in other WFP-supported schools, leading to cost-savings in FFE implementation. It is also working closely with the MoE and UNICEF in trying to increase enrolment and attendance of girls through the GIP programme.

### **Infrastructure**

92. During the first phase of the evaluation period, rural road construction was largely within the RCIW component of the CP and was implemented under the national programme support unit, directly under the MLD with technical support from GTZ. Road construction within the PRRO started in 2007 has been implemented through a number of NGO partners. WFP is working closely with the MLD on community infrastructure programmes.

93. The FFW programme focus has shifted toward building rural infrastructure at the community level such as rural roads, mule tracks and small-scale irrigation in 25 of the 75 districts in the country.<sup>67</sup> The MLD and the Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation administer the FFW programme through local-level Government bodies. FFW has recently been broadened in scope by the World Bank Nepal Food Crises Response Programme (GFPR), and the programme now incorporates:

- targeted public works for food and cash,
- improving irrigation and water resource management,
- micro-nutrient supplementation, and
- fertilizer use in remote areas. In 2009 the Government provided WFP with US\$15 million to administer part of the programme in remote districts.

94. In 2010, the MLD will provide WFP with US\$35 million to support community infrastructure through FFW.

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<sup>67</sup> WFP Nepal Draft Country Strategy 2010.

## **2A.4 Alignment with Partners**

95. WFP's portfolio is aligned with the vulnerable groups and priority sectors identified in UN planning tools. WFP is one of 23 separate agencies that make up the UN Nepal Country Team. WFP's primary partners in food assistance and disaster mitigation operations are FAO, UNICEF, OCHA, UNHCR and UNMIN. Specific UN Team Member roles and responsibilities are outlined by the UNDAF for Nepal, which has adopted the following basic priorities:

- Consolidating Peace;
- Inclusive and Improved Service Delivery;
- Sustainable Livelihoods; and
- Human Rights and Social Inclusion.<sup>68</sup>

96. The programme components and vulnerable groups addressed in the CP are relevant and appropriate to those identified in the UNDAF, the Consolidated Appeals Process, and the CCA. The FFT activities aimed at civic education supported the governance processes emphasized in the UNDAF.

97. Under Special Operation 10718, country-specific Standard Operational Procedures were developed and implemented for Nepal. UN and NGO staff were trained on the use of the Security Telecommunications System and radio procedures. This Special Operation ensured compliance with UN Minimum Operational Security Standards.

## **2A.5 Synergies through Partnership**

98. The synergies achieved with several partners allowed WFP's food assistance to support and create social and economic assets for longer-term development activities. A full list of NGO partners for each of WFP's operations during the evaluation period is provided in Annex 15. Synergies are discussed in relation to the SO to which the partnership applies.

### **SO 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies**

#### **Food Assistance for Refugees**

99. WFP and UNHCR have collaborated in the provision of daily rations, protection, medical care and shelter in Bhutanese refugee camps, and helped coordinated humanitarian assistance to the Koshi flood in 2008. The International Organization for Migration is the lead agency for the Camp Coordination and Camp Management cluster in Nepal, and works closely with WFP and UNHCR in coordinating programme activities in the various camps.

100. Key cooperating partners in refugee response programmes have been Lutheran World Federation for food distribution and the Bhutanese Refugee Women Forum for supplementary income-generating activities. Caritas Nepal has participated in refugee school feeding, and the Association of Medical Doctors of Asia has provided supplementary feeding for refugees.

#### **Special Operations**

101. The PRRO was developed in close consultation with UNMIN and the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. WFP contributes to UNMIN peace support activities through its Office of Civil Affairs by providing WFP field monitors to collect information for the Surveillance and Programme Targeting for Post-Conflict Transformation Project. Food security and other data collected are processed in partnership with OCHA.

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<sup>68</sup> United Nations Country Team. 2007.

## **Synergies with Donors (So 1)**

102. During the conflict many donors (e.g. United States Agency for International Development [USAID], DFID, and EU) felt that providing resources through WFP was an appropriate humanitarian response mechanism due to WFP's on-the-ground presence in the conflict zone. All donor representatives interviewed felt that WFP has played a vital role in emergency response in Nepal. World Bank sees the humanitarian response function as a critical niche for WFP to fill for some time into the future until the Government can take on this role.

## **SO 2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation**

103. WFP leads the Food Security Cluster under the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee and is identified by other members as organizing coordination well, sharing information and providing clear leadership. WFP's focus on emergency aid tends to influence the group's direction, with emphasis on immediate food security issues. A more active agricultural sub-group is required, led by FAO but with WFP participation, to address low agricultural production, access to credit and inputs, access to markets and storage issues, and other factors underlying chronic food insecurity; FAO is recommended to lead the subgroup,

104. As part of an effort to improve disaster preparedness activities, the Food Security Cluster finalized revisions to its disaster contingency plans in June 2009. Partners will also pursue purchasing ready-to-eat meals to be distributed in the earliest days of an emergency. Existing FFA/CFA activities will further aim to integrate a flood mitigation aspect in existing programmes.<sup>69</sup>

105. As part of a 26-country assessment of security telecommunications, WFP assumed co-leadership of the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster Special Operation 10718.0 along with OCHA and UNICEF in order to enhance humanitarian response capacity. By proactively identifying gaps in inter-agency telecommunications, WFP assisted the wider humanitarian community to improve field coordination, upgrade emergency telecommunications facilities when necessary, and enhance staff security.

106. The VAM section of WFP has successfully developed and modified earlier food situation reporting into VAM information, which is valued and used by all partners, thus supporting ongoing working partnerships.

## **Synergies with Donors (So 2)**

107. Many of the donors feel that the food security information system established by the WFP Nepal VAM office provides one of the only mechanisms to track food security conditions in the most vulnerable areas of the country. However, one concern that EU and DFID have about the system is that having a single agency both deliver food assistance and provide the information on food insecurity may be a conflict of interest. The EU feels that WFP may be biased toward providing rice, and may not be factoring in other crops such as potatoes, other tubers and minor millets in its food insecurity calculations.

## **SO 3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations**

108. WFP has actively sought out productive partnerships, particularly with the UN, international NGOs, bilateral and foreign international donors within the agricultural

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<sup>69</sup> UNOCHA. (2009).

and food security sectors.<sup>70</sup> Productive partnerships include a contract with the World Bank and MLD for FFW activities.

109. Strong partnerships were developed with bilateral donors, GTZ, and DFID in addition to the Government-led agency, MLD, in implementation of RCIW. The EU, through the Food Facility, also provided cash resources for infrastructure development in rural areas. WFP is also working jointly with FAO on the EU-funded Food Facility project on SO 3 activities

110. Development activities included asset creation (rural roads, irrigation canals, and ponds), social mobilization (to encourage communities to form self-help groups to start savings and credit activities to support longer-term livelihood initiatives) and linking communities with Government support services for maintenance activities. DFID, GTZ and the EU provided the cash for piloting CFA.

111. In 2009, WFP and FAO planned a concerted initiative for ten targeted districts in Nepal to enhance agricultural productivity and market access. An initial WFP FFA/CFA phase was intended to maintain and improve agricultural infrastructure for enhanced agricultural productivity. FAO will complement WFP's activities by providing agricultural inputs and technical backstopping for an integrated approach to improved agricultural production.

112. To support longer-term investments in food security, WFP is partnering with organizations such as GTZ and Mercy Corps that implement a comprehensive approach using resources complementary to FFA/CFA

### **Synergies with Donors (So 3)**

113. After the CPA, many donors felt that it was important to provide a peace dividend to as many conflict-affected families as possible. WFP programmes provided an excellent means to do this because of its extensive presence on the ground. Thus many donors channelled considerable resources through WFP to provide short-term transfers for FFW. Although these were considered important in the transition period, several donors felt that food assistance was not enough to address chronic food insecurity in the long run (see also discussion in 2B.2 and 2C.4).

## **SO 4: Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition**

### **Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition**

114. For the majority of the evaluation period, limited opportunities have existed for synergies between MCHC and other programmes due to the lack of other actors in geographic areas of WFP operations. Recent joint initiatives on health and nutrition have met with some success, for example, collaborations with Helen Keller International (HKI) on including nutrition indicators in VAM, and with UNFPA on health camps. HHESS has become an important cooperating partner for WFP in MCHC activities since 2008. UNICEF, WFP and UNFPA also collaborated closely on the emergency response to the Koshi flood, with a focus on providing nutrition and health care to affected communities.<sup>71, 72</sup>

115. Attempts by WFP to synergize nutritional projects and work together with UNICEF on MCHN activities have met with difficulty. While the approaches of both agencies fall within the national MNP policy and targeting parameters, currently the two agencies operate largely in separate districts implementing similar projects through different modalities. There is a distinct lack of synergy between the

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<sup>70</sup> See Annex 10 for a summary of donors to the Government for FY07-08.

<sup>71</sup> United Nations Country Team. 2007. UNDAF Framework for Nepal 2008-2010. Kathmandu: United Nations.

<sup>72</sup> United Nations Development Group (UNDG). 2008. Resident Coordinator Annual Report (RCAR) Nepal [http://www.undg.org/RCAR/2008/finalized/pdfs/RCAR\\_2008\\_NEP\\_NAR.pdf](http://www.undg.org/RCAR/2008/finalized/pdfs/RCAR_2008_NEP_NAR.pdf)

MoHP/UNICEF and WFP with respect to approaches, products and protocols for MNP consumption. Stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation expressed frustration and confusion over two sets of messages and two brands of a similar product. The UN effort was viewed as competing, rather than harmonized. To effectively support the MoHP to distribute MNP and ensure a smooth handover, WFP and UN partners should engage in a harmonized effort, and agree on products and protocols.

### **Food for education**

116. Recently, UNICEF has focused on district-level capacity strengthening, which complements WFP's FFE programmes. WFP and UNICEF continue to further align school feeding, health care and sanitation programmes in child-friendly schools, and with GIP, aimed at alleviating the education gap for girls.

117. In December 2008, WFP and UNICEF began to pilot the One Laptop per Child (OLPC) programme with the Open Learning Exchange in Dadeldhura district. Programme goals are to equip rural children in child-friendly schools with individual laptops and engage them directly in self-learning with minimal support from teachers.<sup>73</sup> While the programme falls outside WFP's mandate, OLPC has generated a lot of interest in the importance of information and communication technologies in education. OLPC is trying to involve locals and the Government to overcome infrastructure challenges related to school electricity and Internet connections. The deployment of OLPC notebooks across almost thirty schools in the country, so far, is an important step.

### **Synergies with Donors (So 4)**

118. The Government and donors are now interested in supporting programmes that address chronic food insecurity in the more vulnerable areas of the West and Far West regions. Such programmes call for longer-term investments in agriculture that do not necessarily involve food. Many donors question whether WFP should be engaged in such longer-term programming. One role that some donors believe WFP could play is to provide support for productive safety nets.

119. The current development environment is also characterized by a stronger focus on nutrition by donors (e.g. World Bank, DFID, ADB, and USAID) and Government, and a push toward integrated approaches to address malnutrition. Although WFP has made significant investments in nutrition and increasingly taken the lead in implementation, it is not seen as a key player in nutrition in Nepal and has been slow to engage in the policy dialogue. The MCHC programme has a very low profile and is unknown to many donors, thus misses an opportunity to promote and enhance funding for MCHC and nutrition. As a result there was a lack of scale-up of WFP's MCHC activities, which resulted in small, piecemeal and sidelined activities. More could have been done by WFP to exploit donor interest in a more comprehensive integrated nutrition package.

### **SO 5: Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase**

120. WFP is working closely with UNICEF to strengthen the capacity of the MoE to provide better educational opportunities for children, especially girls, in remote areas in the West and Far West. The Government and these UN agencies are both providing resources to support this effort. WFP is also working with local MoHP staff in support of MCHC, and with the MoAC to take over the food security information system.

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<sup>73</sup> WFP. 2008. SPR 2008.

## **Synergies with Donors (So 5)**

121. The current strategies of most donors are to focus on building the capacity of the Government to reduce poverty and hunger. This focus is being emphasized despite continuous Government staff turnover. Although donors are supporting WFP's capacity-building efforts with the Government, many donors still feel that WFP is not doing enough in terms of capacity development for the Government.

### **2A.6 Alignment with WFP Corporate Strategy**

122. The programme activities of WFP Nepal's Country Portfolio are directly aligned with all five of WFP's corporate strategy objectives.<sup>74</sup> These include:

- SO 1 Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies;
- SO 2 Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures;
- SO 3 Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disasters or transition situations;
- SO 4 Reduce chronic hunger and under nutrition; and
- SO5 Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase.

123. Under SO 1, the refugee programme and the food distributed through the drought and flood EMOPs are well-aligned. Also, WFP Nepal carried out CFSVAs and emergency needs assessments to guide targeting and interagency emergency response. The food security information system set up by WFP Nepal was used to promote better targeting of food-insecure populations and disaster preparedness, and directly aligns with SO 2. The FFA and CFA work aimed at re-establishing livelihoods in conflict-affected communities – supported first through the CP and then the PRRO – are well aligned with SO 3. As for SO 4, the focus on FFE and MCHC is also aligned. Capacity building efforts with the MoE, MoHP and MoAC align with SO 5.

124. There is some overlap of MNP distribution with MCHC fortified food distribution in a few programme locations, which is in contravention of WFP corporate advice.<sup>75</sup> The M&E strategy of the MNP intervention has been significantly strengthened; because the use of MNP is a relatively new area of programming, it is important to continue to closely monitor use, outcomes and adhere to the latest corporate advice as new evidence emerges.

## **2. B Making Strategic Choices**

125. A number of strategic choices were made in the WFP Nepal portfolio regarding geographical coverage, programme categories and content, partnerships and delivery channels. These choices are influenced by the changing operating environment in which WFP Nepal conducts its activities. The use of analytical information, as described in this section, was key to making these strategic decisions.

### **2B.1 Generating and Using Analytical Information**

#### **Food Security Information and Monitoring**

126. WFP Nepal should be commended for its efforts in conducting food security studies to better focus its programme. WFP has made extensive investments in its VAM operations. VAM food security analysis involves and is highly valued by the

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<sup>74</sup> This evaluation uses the most recent corporate strategic plan as its reference point. In this way the evaluation team could determine whether the activities carried out in the Nepal portfolio align with WFP priorities.

<sup>75</sup> Bangkok meeting 2010 and WFP/WHO/UNICEF Joint Statement 2007

Government, civil society, and the donor community for targeting. Although the primary driver for creation of this information service was to inform WFP's own response and operational targeting, this information was also used to identify key areas for longer-term programmes to address chronic food insecurity which is of interest to Government and development partners.

127. The VAM system currently manages NeKSAP,<sup>76</sup> the most comprehensive food security monitoring system in the country, developed by WFP in collaboration with national institutions (including MoAC and NFC). NeKSAP collects information and analyses field data for food security monitoring, as well as early warning information, to inform food policy. The system relies on district food security networks, which conduct local-level food security monitoring and analysis using food security phase classification methodology.

128. The VAM unit has also conducted several significant studies on migration, access to markets and the impact of *bandhs* to fine tune its programming. However, WFP has engaged in limited analysis of the determinants of malnutrition, and is focusing extensively on food security. A more nuanced interpretation incorporating malnutrition would facilitate improved programming decisions and an integrated nutrition/food security approach. WFP is currently moving in this direction with HKI, and a comprehensive M&E strategy is in process for the new MNP activity, designed to measure both programme outcomes and process indicators, including community acceptance and use of the product. This demonstrates an improved commitment on behalf of WFP to monitor nutrition-related activities more thoroughly to guide future programming.

### **Using Information for Targeting**

129. WFP has generally made good use of assessment data for targeting; for example, the beneficiaries and geographical reach for PRRO 10676.0 were identified using findings from the 2007 WFP/OCHA Impact of Conflict and Priorities for Assistance study, the 2007 WFP/FAO Joint Crop and Food Supply Assessment, and VAM's ongoing food security surveillance.

130. Despite good geographical targeting by WFP and cooperating partners to identify vulnerable communities (discussed in 2B.2), many of the implementing partners did not collect the kind of food security information needed to make strategic targeting decisions at the household level. WFP and implementing partners on short contracts used self-targeting of beneficiaries as the targeting approach for FFW/FFA/CFA activities, as lower wages and hard physical labour are thought not to attract higher-income groups. However, both the 2006 CP evaluation<sup>77</sup> and the evaluation on livelihood recovery<sup>78</sup> found self-targeting to be somewhat ineffective, as the marginal value of labour varies considerably between households and over time, making short-term employment attractive to less food-insecure households that nevertheless lack other work opportunities. This evaluation team agrees with these findings, noting that communities, mindful of social harmony, address the high demand for work by spreading the employment benefits evenly across all households and rationing the number of days each household can work. This results in inclusion error (discussed in 2C.2).

131. Self-targeting can be a positive feature in terms of social capital and peace-building, yet it tends to reduce the intended food security and recovery effects of the

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<sup>76</sup> *Nepal Khadhya Surakshya Anugaman Pranali*.

<sup>77</sup> CP Evaluation (2006)

<sup>78</sup> Strategic Evaluation of the Effectiveness of WFP Livelihood Recovery Interventions (2009)

assistance. While the approach used<sup>79</sup> works well for reaching the majority of households where widespread food insecurity exists, it is not effective in reaching small groups of disadvantaged, or communities within better-off areas, and leads to exclusion error. Reaching those unable to engage in FFA/ CFA schemes is dependent on the implementing partner's relationship with the community, and awareness-raising around equity and fairness issues.

## **Monitoring and Evaluation**

132. Much progress has been made in the area of M&E; no functional system existed four years ago. WFP has established an impressive network of M&E field-level officers who employ a range of tools, such as vulnerability and coping indexes, to conduct comparisons of the efficiency and effectiveness of relief and recovery programmes across districts. The monitoring system looks at progress and results in achieving physical targets, as well as the efficiency of food aid distribution.

133. While the M&E system generates useful information on the impact of food aid (e.g. average number of months that beneficiaries can feed their households, perceptions of increased food security, etc), it only indirectly captures the impact of WFP Nepal's interventions on the restoration of assets, income and positive coping strategies of affected households. M&E systems for all components of the Country Portfolio could be usefully expanded to include more quantitative and qualitative information about changes to household assets, well-being indicators, and income as a result of WFP's interventions. Income can be measured using expenditures as a proxy. Well-being indicators may include access to health and education, environmental living conditions, or basic human rights.

134. Surveys are collecting an abundance of data in a collaborative manner, but improvements can be made in the collection of data needed to help WFP make better programme decisions and demonstrate programme achievements, especially for MCHC and FFE. For example, the lack of collection of any outcome data in MCHC has left WFP in a position where it is confident of the benefits of this activity but has no hard evidence to convince donors or partners of its success. This will no doubt have contributed to the inability to solicit additional funds, and continues to restrict the potential size and scope of the intervention. Additionally, it has limited WFP's understanding of both outcomes and sustainable impact within the communities and rendered impossible any evidence-based decisions regarding exiting communities to move to new ones. Overall, over the portfolio period, too few programme evaluations have been conducted to be helpful to making well-informed programming decisions.

## **2B.2 Developing Response Strategies**

135. ***Choice of activities.*** As the operating environment changed over time, the portfolio activities changed in terms of programme categories, but not so much in programme content. From 2002-2006, WFP was operating in conflict-affected areas carrying out FFW (SO 3), FFE and MCHC (SO 2) through its CP. After the CPA was signed these same activities continued to be carried out under the PRRO and the CP, with a major expansion of FFW activities. The refugee programme continued to operate throughout this period with consistent funding.

136. The country office is very open about prioritizing peoples' needs and demonstrated that they were flexible and adaptable in applying available activities to provide suitable, timely responses based on these needs. For example, one EMOP originally targeted drought-affected victims, later assisted flood-affected communities, and then expanded to a considerably greater area and size to support

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<sup>79</sup> A DFID-funded project, which aims to assess the different targeting approaches used with the PRRO FFA programme for the purpose of improving WFP's targeting for operations, is ongoing and is expected to be finalized by October 2010.



conflict-affected communities. The process and timeframe required to set-up a new programme would not have been conducive to a quick response. Thus, in terms of making humanitarian-based choices and working effectively, WFP Nepal is making the right choices.

137. **Delivery channels.** Delivery channels and partnerships changed through time as well. WFP shifted from Government partners to NGO partners to facilitate better implementation of the transitional programme. This strategy made sense in the short-term when a peace dividend needed to be distributed broadly over a short time span, addressing the need for a large peace dividend with the inception of the CPA. This strategy was appropriate for a short-term food security transfer. However, moving away from strengthening Government capacity could delay the implementation of programmes aimed at addressing chronic food insecurity.

138. **Geographical targeting.** The geographical coverage of the portfolio is consistent with the most food-insecure locations in the country: the Mid West and Far West regions (see 1.B). This is justified by the higher incidence of calorie shortfall in these regions (44 percent and 45 percent respectively) compared to the Central, Western and Eastern regions (37-40 percent).<sup>80</sup> Other significant factors influencing targeting in these regions are that Government representation is minimal and few development partners operate on any significant scale beyond the district headquarters. In these areas, WFP is the largest humanitarian or development organization present and in some it is the only international organization present. For this reason, WFP Nepal has developed significant local capacity to meet the humanitarian need; this includes strong working relationships with NGOs, other international and national organizations and district Government officials. The Government and other development partners recognize and value the significance of this capacity.

139. Although geographical targeting is appropriate, the implementation of the portfolio in different geographical areas has limited a more comprehensive response to food insecurity. In 2006, the CP was operational in 21 districts for the FFE component but 25 for RCIW and 11 for MCHC. Only in five districts did all three components overlap; consequently, connectedness among components is limited, and the same users are not benefitting from the package as a whole.<sup>81</sup> This lack of overlap of programme activities, with little intersection of CP and PRRO activities, has continued up to 2010, reducing opportunities for synergy. Yet in most areas where WFP is working, chronic food insecurity is pervasive and multiple interventions are needed. For example, the introduction of MNPs in FFW suggests nutritional initiatives are necessary in the same communities, yet WFP staff stated that their request to put nutritional/MCHC activities in the PRRO to achieve a comprehensive approach was declined. As evidenced by the FFW activities in the PRRO, greater impact was achieved when they were combined with complementary programmes implemented by GTZ or Mercy Corps. Other cases showing successful overlap of interventions were the civic education activities promoted through FFT, MNP distributed with FFA rations, and the OLPC programme implemented through FFE. Programme separation also leads to fragmented monitoring systems.

140. **Contingency planning.** Faced with fluctuating climatic and political conditions, WFP Nepal decided that it would be important to develop contingency plans in case it was necessary to ramp up emergency responses. These plans involved pre-positioning food and developing a stand-by agreement with the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS) so that responses could be implemented immediately. Although this plan was effectively implemented in one of the emergency responses to floods, one of

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<sup>80</sup> Government of Nepal (2007) Three Year Interim Plan 2006/7-2009/10 National Planning Commission, Singhadurbar, Kathmandu, Nepal. December 2007.

<sup>81</sup> WFP. 2006. WFP Nepal CP Evaluation cum Appraisal Mission, May-June.

the problems facing this contingency plan was that donors were reluctant to replenish the food needed for pre-positioning.

141. **Livelihood recovery.** Following the CPA, WFP Nepal felt it was important to engage in livelihood recovery in its transition programming. The difficulties in pursuing this objective were that the timeframe for activities was too short to restore key productive assets, and constraints related to multi-year funding for more development-oriented interventions made it difficult to maintain recovery-focused activities. In addition, livelihood recovery objectives were difficult to achieve in a protracted crisis situation faced with recurring shocks, where many households were chronically food insecure. In such a context, livelihood recovery objectives need to be more modest and longer term. WFP did try to partner with agencies like GTZ that could provide other types of livelihood support, but such linkages were not always possible where WFP worked.

### **2B.3 WFP Priorities and Operating Model**

142. It is clear from the types of activities implemented in this portfolio that WFP was very aware of the types of activities which could be funded in a transitional environment that were also consistent with the corporate strategy, however these approaches were not necessarily the best strategy for dealing with chronic food insecurity and livelihood recovery. This finding is consistent with the findings presented in the global evaluation on livelihood recovery.<sup>82</sup>

143. WFP's tonnage-based funding model is a key constraint to the ability of WFP and its partners to effectively implement livelihood recovery-related activities. While support costs are tied to food aid tonnage, recovery activities require higher support costs due to more complex implementation; at the same time, food aid tonnages are often reduced. This quandary continues to present constraints to sufficient investment in the capacities of staff and partners and meeting the non-food costs needed to implement more effective recovery programmes.

144. The WFP Strategic Plan (2008-2011) names gender sensitivity and equality among its core principles. Low representation of women within sub-offices persists despite recent improvements (in the Mid West eight out of 41, and 20 percent of Far West staff are women). In addition, presently a strikingly low number of women are present as staff within some implementing partners. While there are certainly constraints to women's involvement, GTZ's high proportion of women as community organizers demonstrates that these constraints are not insurmountable.

## **2. C Portfolio Performance and Results**


### **Summary Statistics of Operations**

145. Figure 2 compares the trends in planned and actual food distribution and annual average number of beneficiaries, and direct expenses and gross needs, for all of WFP Nepal's operations in the evaluation period. Summary statistics for each of the individual projects in the WFP Nepal Country Portfolio are provided in Annex 17.

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<sup>82</sup> Strategic Evaluation of the Effectiveness of WFP Livelihood Recovery Interventions (2009)

**Figure 2: Comparison of trends of actual as a percentage of planned food distribution and annual average of beneficiaries and direct expenses as a percentage of gross needs - Nepal, all operations from 2002 to 2009**



Note: A/P: Actual/Planned.

## 2C.1 Beneficiaries and Assistance Provided

### SO 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies

#### Food Assistance for Refugees

146. From 2002-2005 WFP provided supplementary feeding for local and refugee schoolchildren and since 2008 WFP has provided MNP to all children under 5 in the camps. From 2002 to present, some 100,000 Bhutanese refugees have been supported on a bi-monthly basis with general food rations, supplementary feeding for malnourished children under 5, pregnant and lactating women, and vulnerable groups comprised mainly of the sick and elderly. As shown in Table 3, the number of refugees receiving general food distribution increased from 99,282 in 2002 to 107,043 in 2007; this responds in part to strong population growth during this period, with annual birth rates of 14.8 – 17.82 per thousand and death rates of 3.4 – 3.8 per thousand.

**Table 2: Beneficiaries of WFP general food distribution, 2002 – 2009**

Year	Planned			Actual			Actual as % of planned			* Crude Birth Rate/ 1000/yr	* Crude Death Rate/ 1000/ yr	New Entry
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male %	Female %	Total %			
2002	52,071	50,029	<b>102,100</b>	50,611	48,671	<b>99,282</b>	97	97	<b>97</b>	17.82	3.80	1,392
2003	52,071	50,029	<b>102,100</b>	50,973	48,973	<b>99,946</b>	98	98	<b>98</b>	15.58	3.40	1,217
2004	52,964	50,886	<b>103,850</b>	51,417	49,380	<b>100,797</b>	97	97	<b>97</b>	15.30	3.60	1,179
2005	53,733	51,567	<b>105,300</b>	52,854	50,756	<b>103,610</b>	98	98	<b>98</b>	14.80	3.50	1,171
2006	54,498	52,302	<b>106,800</b>	53,678	51,573	<b>105,251</b>	98	99	<b>99</b>	17.70	3.70	1,474
2007	54,498	52,302	<b>106,800</b>	54,622	52,421	<b>107,043</b>	100	100	<b>100</b>	17.50	3.50	1,499
2008	55,212	52,988	<b>108,200</b>	51,887	50,166	<b>102,053</b>	94	95	<b>94</b>	16.30	4.44	1,210
2009	52,048	49,952	<b>102,000</b>	51,798	50,087	<b>101,885</b>	100	100	<b>100</b>	18.00	3.60	1,467

Source: SPRs for PRRO 10058.1-6.

\*Birth rate and death rate figures provided by AMDA.

147. WFP has sustained excellent performance on outputs for refugee support throughout the period of the portfolio despite facing strikes and insecurity, achieving greater than 90 percent of commodity distribution annually (except for 2008, with 83.2 percent), and reaching beneficiaries in a timely manner. Earlier chronic Vitamin B deficiencies have been addressed through fortified foods and distribution of vitamins to children aged 6-59 months. See Annex 19 for annual statistics on food tonnage distributed.

148. Gardening activities have been promoted from programme inception to supplement the diets – particularly the vegetable and micronutrient intake – of refugees, as well as to provide productive activity and interest. These activities have been well-received. However this programme has faced constraints due to limited space for cultivation (see 2C.4). Some 945 of the plots vacated by refugees who have resettled have been officially handed over for expanded gardening activities, with 29 groups formed for their management, involving 1,928 households.<sup>83</sup> (See Table 9 in this section for planned/actual beneficiaries in gardening activities.)

### **Emergency Operations**

149. Beneficiary numbers for drought and flood operations are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Subsequent to a budget revision following a Government-led, WFP/FAO crop and food security assessment in November 2006,<sup>84</sup> the combined number of beneficiaries for drought and flood assistance more than doubled from 253,489 in 2006 to 584,650 in 2007 and planned distribution of food commodities was increased to 8,864 MT. In the initial stage of the operation, obstacles such as resource shortfalls, torrential rains, floods and transport strikes hampered timely delivery of the food to beneficiaries. WFP also paid US\$405,458 to 23,000 households to transport food from extended delivery points to remote implementation areas.<sup>85</sup>

**Table 3: Beneficiaries in drought-affected populations receiving food assistance**

Year	Planned			Actual			Actual as % of Planned		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
2006	112,411	112,589	225,000	90,597	90,742	181,339	80.6	80.6	80.6
2007	320,240	320,760	641,000	271,607	272,043	543,650	84.7	84.8	84.8
2008	50,085	50,165	100,250	113,688	113,869	227,557	227.0	227.0	227.0

Source: WFP. 2006-2008. SPRs for EMOPs.

\*Beneficiaries include all targeted persons provided with WFP food during the reporting period

150. In the 2007 drought EMOP, WFP provided food assistance to 543,650 people in 21 districts via a FFA modality where the provision of food and employment

<sup>83</sup> Data supplied by Lutheran World Federation staff, January 2010.

<sup>84</sup> WFP. 2006. SPR EMOP for 2006.

<sup>85</sup> WFP. 2006. SPR EMOP for droughts for 2006.

contributed to building community assets and addressing issues around pronounced out-migration. Over half of beneficiaries were female, and half of food management committee leadership positions were occupied by women.<sup>86</sup> In 2008, some drought-affected communities worked fewer days and received less food than initially planned.<sup>87</sup> WFP continued their strong recommendation to partners to involve female community members in assessments of distribution plans.

151. In July and August of 2007, floods and landslides displaced more than half a million people in 13 districts. WFP provided immediate food assistance to 41,000 displaced people in transit centres and later at their homes.<sup>88</sup> The NRCS sought, where reasonably possible, to ensure that food was extended directly to women.

**Table 4: Beneficiaries in flood-affected populations receiving food assistance**

Year	Planned			Actual			Actual as % of Planned		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total%
2006	34,973	35,027	70,000	35,800	36,350	72,150	102.4	103.8	103.1
2007	29,976	30,024	60,000	20,484	20,516	41,000	68.3	68.3	68.3
2008	66,856	66,962	133,818	66,856	66,962	133,818	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: WFP, SPRs for EMOPs.

\*Beneficiaries include all targeted persons provided with WFP food during the reporting period

152. Table 6 shows the tonnage distributed for the five emergency operations.

**Table 5: Actual vs planned distribution of commodities for emergency operations (in MT)**

Operation	2006			2007			2008		
	Planned	Actual	Actual as % of Planned	Planned	Actual	Actual as % of Planned	Planned	Actual	Actual as % of Planned
IR EMOP 10771.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	786	778	99
IR EMOP 10687.0	--	--	--	936	661	71	--	--	--
IR EMOP 10545.0	1,293	1,235	96	--	--	--	--	--	--
EMOP 10790.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	1,681	1,681	100
EMOP 10523.0	3,784	2,681	71	11,232	8,703	77	5,483	4,406	80

Source: WFP, SPRs for EMOPs.

<sup>86</sup> WFP, 2007. SPR EMOP for 2007.

<sup>87</sup> WFP, 2008. SPR EMOP for 2008.

<sup>88</sup> WFP, 2007. SPR EMOP for 2007.

## SO 2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures

153. As discussed in 1C and 2B.1, WFP Nepal has made extensive investments in its VAM operations, and particularly in NeKSAP – to address disaster preparedness and mitigation. Output data on beneficiaries, food tonnage, etc. is not applicable to this activity. The contribution of SO 2 activities to longer-term changes is discussed in 2C.2.

## SO 3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations

154. The SPRs for PRRO 10676.0 show that about half the intended participants in both the FFA and FFT components of the project were reached (see tables 7 and 8).

**Table 6: Number of participants<sup>89</sup> planned and actual within FFW component of PRRO 10676.0**

	Planned			Actual			Actual as % of planned		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
<b>2007</b>	97,500	90,000	187,500	875	398	1,273	0.9	0.4	0.7
<b>2008</b>	201,300	134,200	335,500	130,845	87,230	218,075	65.0	65.0	65.0
<b>2009</b>	147,120	147,354	294,474	89,570	79,430	169,000	60.9	53.9	57.4
<b>Annual average</b>	<b>148,640</b>	<b>123,851</b>	<b>272,491</b>	<b>73,763</b>	<b>55,686</b>	<b>129,449</b>	<b>49.6</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>47.5</b>

Source: WFP, SPRs for PRRO 10676.0

155. Rice was the only ration provided through SO 3 FFA and FFT activities in the CP. Overall, from 2002 to 2008, 88 percent of planned tonnage was distributed (table 9).

156. The programme aimed to improve household food security by some 160 days, through provision of some 70-80 days work, providing 240-320 kg of rice. This was achieved during the first two years of operation, but over subscription in 2004 by 65 percent and 2005 by 50 percent (Annex 20, Table 1) meant that participating households could not work for 70 days as planned, but for only 30 to 40 days per year, earning only about half the amount of food.<sup>90</sup> WFP records suggest that this smaller allocation of rations to a larger number of beneficiaries continued during the last two years of RCIW implementation. Reaching a greater number of beneficiaries was seen as meeting the conflict prevention and humanitarian aims of the programme, however this approach reduced the potential livelihoods-building impact per household.

<sup>89</sup> A participant is a person physically participating in a WFP activity. Thus, a participant of a FFW project is the person participating in building a small road (for example), while the beneficiaries include the family also benefiting from the ration.

<sup>90</sup> WFP, Nepal CP Evaluation cum appraisal report, August 2006

**Table 7: Number of participants<sup>91</sup> planned and actual within FFT component of PRRO 10676.0**

Year	Planned			Actual			Actual as % of planned		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
2007	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2008	201,300	134,200	335,500	71,734	55,624	127,358	35.6	41.4	38.0
2009	147,120	147,120	294,240	89,570	79,430	169,000	60.9	54.0	57.4
Annual average	116,140	93,773	209,913	53,768	45,018	98,786	46.3	48.0	47.1

Source: WFP, SPRs for PRRO 10676.0

157. A similar pattern is shown in the FFW activities carried out under the PRRO in terms of less rice per beneficiary household than planned. The first mid-term review, which interviewed households between September and November 2008, found that households had worked 36 days on average and received an average of 119 kg of rice.<sup>92</sup>

**Table 8: Actual versus planned distribution of rice under RCIW component of the CP**

Year	Planned (MT)	Actual (MT)	Actual as % of Planned
2002	15,100	13,340	88
2003	15,100	13,570	90
2004	13,100	13,064	100
2005	13,100	10,302	79
2006	13,637	13,927	102
2007	13,100	10,821	83
2008	2,240	0	0
Total	85,377	75,024	88

Source: WFP, SPRs for CP 10093.0

158. As shown in Table 10, supplementary FFT activities were undertaken in 2006 and 2007, including civil education, training in improved agricultural techniques, slope stabilization activities, construction of drinking water systems, and community buildings, and vocational training for alternative livelihoods such as animal husbandry, beekeeping, and fruit cultivation. These initiatives helped some community members unable to take part in FFA activities – particularly women, who constituted 83 percent of beneficiaries – develop capacity for improved livelihood options. Loans for small businesses have also been very popular, with some 1,849 loans distributed (see Annex 18, Table 1 for detail). The logframe called for disaggregation of this data by gender and youth but this data was not reported in the SPRs.

<sup>92</sup> PRRO 10676.0 First Mid-term Evaluation, May 2009



**Table 9: Supplementary activities undertaken with refugees in seven camps**

Year	Home Gardening (no. families)			Vocational Training (no. participants)			Small business enterprises (no. participants)		
	Planned	Actual	Actual as % of Planned	Planned	Actual	Actual as % of Planned	Planned	Actual	Actual as % of Planned
2002	9,600	9,600	100	234	234	100	133	133	100
2003	9,400	9,400	100	238	238	100	108	108	100
2004	12,050	12,050	100	350	357	102	110	110	100
2005	3,535	3,542	100	416	392	94	315	315	100
2006	21,252	22,669	107	450	519	115	315	315	100
2007	10,000	9,724	97	500	411	82	315	315	100
2008	18,000	16,582	92	596	477	80	210	210	100
2009	7,000	8,847	126	436	419	96	420	343	82
<b>Annual average</b>	<b>11,355</b>	<b>11,552</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>403</b>	<b>381</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>231</b>	<b>96</b>

Source: SPRs for PRRO 10058.1-6.

159. As shown in Annex 21, a range of assets was created through FFW under the CP prior to 2006, including roads, irrigation systems, flood control measures, community buildings, and fish ponds/catchment ponds. After 2007, more emphasis has been placed in FFA activities on rehabilitating drinking water schemes and expanding schools, as well as on some irrigation schemes. Cumulatively speaking, the portfolio has met or exceeded its targets for roads, community buildings, catchment ponds, fruit plantations, and freed bonded labourers' houses built, and come close to target for irrigation systems (95 percent) and agro-forestry projects (84 percent). However performance on flood control measures lagged, after 2002, for a cumulative achievement against target of only 55 percent.<sup>93</sup>

## **SO 4: Reduce chronic hunger and under nutrition**

### **Maternal and Child Health**

160. The MCHC programme currently distributes monthly take-home rations of wheat soya blend to 31,000 beneficiaries (20,370 children ages 6-36 months and

<sup>93</sup> As noted in the annex, SPRs were not consistent in their use of units of measure for irrigation and flood control.

7,930 pregnant and lactating women) across 42 VDCs in eight districts of the West and Far West and one district in Eastern Terai. The ration is coupled with health check-ups and counselling provided by the health staff at health posts in the VDCs where the programme is implemented.

161. Table 11 shows the percentage of MCHC beneficiaries reached relative to the number planned.

**Table 10: MCHC activities-actual beneficiaries as a percentage of planned, 2002-2009**

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>Children</b>	10% n=744 (365M/ /379F)	14.8% n=2450 (1225M/ 1225F)	29.4% n=7852 (3926M/ 3926F)	33% n=1272 4 (6362M/ 6362F)	76.9% n=38993 (20045M/ 18948F)	82.9% n=40753 (19758M/ 20995F)	185.2%* n=35181 (17755M/ 17426F)	132.1% n=25106 (12547M/ 12559F)
<b>Pregnant &amp; lactating women</b>	13.4% n=338	18.3% n=1027	30.1% n=2737	30.8% n=4027	62.7% n=11703	67.5% n=12153	118.2% n=12412	78.9% n=7893

\* The number of actual beneficiaries exceeded the planned number due to inclusion of beneficiaries later phased out.

162. In 2006 MCHC activities were reported to have positively affected attendance at prenatal and antenatal clinics and growth monitoring (GM) sessions for children under-36 months, with attendance levels rising from 10 to 90 percent in programme areas.<sup>94</sup>

163. Table 12 shows some key improvements in access to health care by pregnant women and children after the introduction of WFP's MCHC activity, implemented by HHESS in five VDCs of Solukhumbu district in the Eastern Terai in 2008.

164. Distribution of MNP was introduced in PRRO 10676.0 in April 2009. It was initially piloted in three districts and is now in 17. The household monitoring report for the pilot districts stated that the compliance target was exceeded, with 67.4 percent of children having consumed above 80 percent of the required number of sachets, against the target of 60 percent.

**Table 11: Key output measures noted in MCHC VDCs through HHESS, Solukhumbu district 2008**

Indicator	Before HHESS/MCHC implementation (monthly)	After HHESS/MCHC implementation (monthly)
Antenatal care attendance (# of cases)	115	246
Number of women receiving 30 iron tablets	35	244
Number of women receiving 120 iron tablets	17	39
Number of children <6 months growth monitored	30	110
Number of boys 6-36 months growth monitored	32	923
Number of girls 6-36 months growth monitored	35	845

Source: MCHC Activity-3 (NO. 10093.0) Solukhumbu district, Review Report on the NGO support, 21 to 25 July 2008, WFP/HHESS/MoHP.

<sup>94</sup> WFP Nepal CP Evaluation cum Appraisal Mission of May/June 06

## Food for Education and the Girls Incentive Programme

**Table 12: Number of beneficiaries undertaking FFE activities within the CP**

Year	Planned			Actual			Actual as % of Planned		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
2002	156,000	120,000	276,000	110,271	92,589	202,860	70.7	77.2	73.5
2003	149,350	130,650	280,000	95,283	95,901	191,184	63.8	73.4	68.3
2004	152,500	139,500	292,000	104,065	124,059	228,124	68.2	88.9	78.1
2005	150,450	160,650	311,000	133,103	176,870	303,973	88.5	106.4	97.7
2006	151,050	176,600	327,650	159,180	214,445	373,625	105.4	121.4	114.0
2007	148,200	176,800	325,000	150,085	222,888	372,973	101.3	126.1	114.8
2008	199,908	200,093	400,001	255,785	267,631	523,416	128.0	133.8	130.9
2009	215,100	215,300	430,400	169,788	112,426	282,214	78.9	52.2	65.6
Annual average	165,320	164,949	330,256	147,195	163,351	309,796	89.0	99.0	93.8

Source: WFP Nepal. 2002-2009 SPRs.

165. Table 13 indicates the number of beneficiaries undertaking FFE activities annually. Again the actual numbers reached in some years is well below that which was planned. (It bears noting that although repeated school closure in conflict areas also disrupted the regularity of food distribution, FFE saw a significant increase in beneficiary figures over 2005 because 2004 figures had been slightly underestimated).<sup>95</sup>

166. The supplemental food distribution supported through GFEI began in mid-2002 and was phased out completely as of July 31, 2007 (see Table 14). More than 100 percent of the beneficiary target was achieved.

<sup>95</sup> WFP. 2005. Standard Project Report. 2005.

**Table 13: Number of beneficiaries receiving supplemental food supported by GFEI**

Year	Planned			Actual			Actual as % of planned		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
2002	128,800	128,800	257,000	9,828	19,572	29,400	7.6	15.3	11.4
2003	128,800	128,200	257,000	74,992	113,147	188,139	58.2	88.3	73.2
2004	128,800	128,200	257,000	75,756	151,036	226,792	58.8	117.8	88.2
2005	128,800	143,000	271,800	81,319	184,729	266,048	63.1	129.2	97.9
2006	114,800	166,500	281,300	97,753	204,453	296,206	79.9	122.8	105.3
2007	105,000	200,000	305,000	95,995	203,828	299,823	91.4	101.9	98.3
Annual average	122,500	149,117	271,517	72,607	146,128	217,735	59.3	98.0	80.2

Source: WFP Nepal. 2002-2007 SPRs.

167. Fourteen thousand beneficiaries were added to the GIP in 2008.

168. Table 15 indicates summary figures for food distributed under FFE and GFEI from 2002-2009. Despite the volatile security situation, the FFE component has achieved 58 percent or higher of targeted distribution for all commodities (see Annex 22 for detailed annual data on individual commodities).

**Table 14: Commodities distributed under FFE and GFEI, 2002-2009**

Commodity	Planned (MT)	Actual (MT)	Actual as % of Planned
Ghee oil	6,675	4,223	63
Vegetable oil	15,728	10,291	65
wheat Soya blend	47,894	32,598	68
Sugar*	2,640	1,526	58

Source: WFP. 2002-2009, SPRs

\*Distributed under GFEI only.

169. WFP has worked with GIP management committees on basic management skills and on inclusive practices. The majority of committees meet monthly and over time, the practice of maintaining regular meeting minutes has improved. In December 2009, 90 percent of the committees maintained minutes whereas in the previous reporting cycle only 43 percent reported keeping minutes. Overall, at the end of 2009, 33 percent of schools were keeping proper records; 51 percent kept them moderately well, while 15 percent did not keep them well or at all.<sup>96</sup> Committees have a varying extent of representation of females, e.g. at the end of 2009, 50 percent of members were female, yet on the majority of committees (79 percent) females did not occupy leadership positions. On the remaining committees they were either chairpersons (11 percent) or secretaries (10 percent). These figures have shown improvement over the life cycle of the portfolio. Changing the composition of food

<sup>96</sup> WFP Nepal. 2010. GIP: Programme Monitoring Report, March.

management committees, particularly to include members from socially excluded communities, has led to a slight decrease in the percent of women in leadership positions.<sup>97</sup>


## 2C.2 Attaining Objectives

### SO 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies

#### Food Assistance for Refugees

170. Despite the achievements in outputs reported in 2C.1, GAM rates in the refugee camps have remained consistently above four percent and hovered around eight percent over the portfolio period, significantly higher than the WFP programme outcome indicator of less than two percent (see Figure 3). A persistent level of malnutrition has been linked with a period of lack of rigor in the supplementary feeding programme implementation in use of entry and exit criteria,<sup>98</sup> in combination possibly with infection and/or poor feeding practices stemming from neglect.<sup>99</sup> However the reasons behind these high rates have not been systematically investigated and merit closer inspection and understanding. WFP SPRs report poorly on outcome data, and consistently compare malnutrition rates against those of the Nepali population, rather than conducting trend analyses of the situation within the camps. While a situation of >5 percent GAM is generally considered indicative of a poor situation, the statement, “Overall health and nutrition status of the refugees is satisfactory and remains stable” has been quoted annually.

**Figure 3: Global acute malnutrition in refugee camps Damak, Nepal, 2002-2009**



Source: AMDA nutrition surveys 2002-2005; CDC surveys 2007-2009

171. The Association of Medical Doctors of Asia (AMDA) nutrition survey of 2005 found a significantly lower rate of GAM in children living in households with kitchen gardens (5.8 percent) in comparison with those without (10.7 percent). Rates of stunting have also remained high at 26.5 percent in 2005, 26.9 percent in 2007 and 24.9 percent in 2008.<sup>100</sup> AMDA reports indicate that both crude and under 5 mortality rates have been kept well below targets of <1 per 10 000 per day between 2002 and 2009. Low birth weight has also been held in check between 5-10 percent throughout the portfolio period, substantially surpassing the indicator of <15 percent. A significant reduction in anemia in children from 44 percent (October 2008) to 36 percent (May 2009) has been noted since the introduction of MNP in 2008.<sup>101</sup>

172. Vocational trainings are reported as well targeted and adapted to changing circumstances; however no comprehensive figures on re-employment and business

<sup>97</sup> WFP. 2009. SPR 2009.

<sup>98</sup> Centres for Disease Control, 2008; IOM case finding.

<sup>99</sup> AMDA Nutrition Survey, 2005; anecdotal suggestions from interviews.

<sup>100</sup> National Centre for Health Statistics/Centres for Disease Control/WHO z-score.

<sup>101</sup> Centres for Disease Control. 2009.

development following training are available. Repayment of small business loans has been very good, with an average of over 96 percent repaid (see Annex 18, Table 1).

### **Emergency Operations**

173. Outcome data were not collected in the emergency operations due to the limited duration of these operations.

### **SO 2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation**

174. There were no outcome measures for these activities. Noted achievements are described below.

### **Special Operations**

175. SO 10718.0 focused on increasing local security telecommunication capacity to guarantee provision of clearly defined inter-agency security telecommunications services for UN agencies, NGOs, and other partner agencies at all times along with clearly defined, understood, and adopted mechanisms for local cluster activation in the event of a humanitarian crisis. Country-specific standard operational procedures were developed and implemented for Nepal. Communication Centres were established and UN and NGO staff were trained on the use of the UN Security Telecommunications System and radio procedures that ensured compliance with UN Minimum Operational Security Standards. As discussed in 2A.5, by taking the initiative to identify gaps in inter-agency telecommunications, WFP improved field coordination, upgraded emergency telecommunications facilities, and enhanced staff security for the wider humanitarian community.

176. SO 10424.0, with an overall budget of US\$1,368,825, was implemented as a response to the deteriorating political and security situation in 2005. Because WFP Nepal CP and PRRO activities have been disrupted by blockades and transport *bandhs* in the past, WFP developed an updated contingency plan to enable the country office to continue its regular activities and maintain capacity to respond to operational constraints in the event of potential emergency scenarios, including a sudden escalation of hostilities. Under this Special Operation, WFP planned, organized, and put specific preparedness actions into place by prepositioning non-food items, expanding storage and transport in terms of capacity and flexibility, and strengthening communications in order to handle emergency traffic.

### **Food Security Information Systems**

177. The variety of NeKSAP food security information products (described in 1.C and Annex 12) has greatly contributed to Government and partners' ability to assess and plan food security responses. These resources are used by the Government to make allocation decisions, and complement its safety net programme by informing the national food corporation's targeting strategy. NGOs use the products for targeting, and donors use them to formulate strategy and make allocation decisions.

178. Sustainability of NeKSAP is an area of concern. NeKSAP has been funded heavily by external actors and even though there has been an attempt to integrate the Government into the system's management and planning, it is doubtful that the Government will be capable of assuming a funding role at the level required to sustain NeKSAP's current functions. Given the ongoing utilization of the system by external agencies, it is reasonable to suggest that they take on some responsibility for funding over the long term. This is consistent with the recommendation of a recent WFP-FAO joint evaluation, which noted that "...sustainability [of food security

information systems] should be redefined to include the long-term continuation of shared funding to ensure continuation of benefits to all parties.”<sup>102</sup>

179. While much has been invested in building NeKSAP as a strong food security monitoring system to identify and target vulnerable areas, less emphasis has been placed on developing analytical processes that enable utilization of the data the system produces. A stronger analytical component is necessary to facilitate programming decisions and improve impact measurement.

### **SO 3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations**

180. The PRRO 10676.0 started in 2007 was designed specifically to help communities affected by conflict and expanded in the following year to include those impacted by the large increases in world food prices. Significant impact in increased income, reduced migration and reduced use of credit for food purchase is shown in years of operation<sup>103</sup> (Annex 24). Increase in income, improvement in living conditions and reduction in migration was greater in the second year (2009) than the first (2008). However this did not translate into greater food sufficiency, nor higher level of food stocks, which were lower, probably due to lower agricultural production. It is not clear if productive asset creation, or if improved livelihood conditions are being created.

181. The programme was clearly able to reach a large numbers of people, reduce immediate food shortage problems and consequently protect assets and livelihoods in the short term. Enhanced resilience to shocks, however, is dependent on effective asset creation and diversified/ enhanced livelihood sources. It is not yet apparent from M&E reports, nor field visits whether this is being achieved.

182. The difference in mean Coping Strategy Indices for programme and non-programme households in 2009 was not statistically significant (mean Coping Strategy Indices of 18.7 and 18.5, respectively); nor was the difference between programme households when comparing 2008 and 2009 (17.3 and 18.7. respectively) (see Annex 24, Table 2).

183. As reported in the mid-term evaluation of PRRO 10676.0, households in programme areas had a higher Food Consumption Score<sup>104</sup> (FCS) among all wealth groups (except 'poor' households) than those in non-programme areas; the overall difference however was not very significant. The difference in FCS reported in mid-terms was minimal (51 in 2008 and 50 in 2009).<sup>105</sup>

184. The introduction of CFW has opened new possibilities, including better meeting the needs of beneficiaries, and introducing efficiencies and savings into implementation of programmes. WFP is responding to these opportunities very well with careful monitoring and assessment of impact and best approaches to follow.

185. Roads construction using the 'LEP' approach <sup>106</sup> (previously known as the 'green roads' approach) has generated the largest share of short-term employment to those food-insecure people in the food-insecure districts where RCIW is operational. While the work is welcomed by communities and includes active participation by women (36 percent in FFW), a possible unintended and negative outcome concerns the suitability of the work for pregnant women. Questions have arisen regarding the

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<sup>102</sup> WFP and FAO. October 2009. Joint Thematic Evaluation of FAO and WFP Support to Information Systems for Food Security. Final Report.

<sup>103</sup> PRRO 10676.0 Mid-term evaluations, May 2009 and February 2010.

<sup>104</sup> The FCS measures the adequacy of food consumption and takes into account the variety and frequency of foods consumed within a household.

<sup>105</sup> PRRO 10676.0 Second Mid-term Evaluation Report

<sup>106</sup> Norms for LEP are set by the Department of Local Infrastructure Development and Agricultural Roads.

suitability of heavy manual work without prescribed rest periods during and after pregnancy in areas where there is already a high instance of uterus prolapsed among women, linked to over-exertion around childbirth.

186. A number of WFP's cooperating partners have raised other concerns about the safety of workers employed under FFW/FFA schemes, particularly road construction, citing examples of accidents that had caused either death or permanent disability. This is a serious occupational health and safety issue, which also negatively impacts the livelihoods of affected workers, their families and communities. Both GTZ and the Rural Access Programme funded by DFID have developed successful worker insurance schemes, which provide effective useful models for use in future FFA/CFW activities.

187. Some issues have been raised during external evaluations<sup>107</sup> and by Government road engineers with regard to the quality of assets created, following the switch to implementation through NGOs. The response by the country office to instigate monitoring and capacity development via a third party company, Scott Wilson Nepal, was an appropriate response to this concern over quality.

188. While no FFT activities were recorded during 2007, some 2,040 participants took part in basic human and protection rights and civic education training to complement the work activity, as noted in 2C.1. The seminars explored citizens' rights and responsibilities in the Constituent Assembly elections. These were popular and seen as successful by a wide range of stakeholders, leading to wide-scale implementation in 2008. FFT opportunities were provided for communities undertaking FFA activities, thereby increasing skills for livelihood improvement.

## **SO 4: Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition**

### **Maternal and Child Health**

189. The only objective quantitative outcome data comes from two baseline and follow-up studies conducted in Doti and Makwanpur in 2002 and 2005. (WFP did not collect data on the outcome indicators for improved nutritional status that were stated in the logframe for CP 10093.0. The data is not available at the level at which the MoH is working.) The comparison of baseline data on underweight from Doti district in 2002 with a follow-up in 2005 revealed no statistically significant change in underweight, wasting or stunting over the first three years of CP implementation of MCHC. Anemia in children decreased from 58 percent to 49 percent, while in pregnant women it was almost halved from 55 percent to 30 percent; in lactating mothers it increased from 26.9 percent to 34.3 percent. The follow-up survey reveals overall improvements in uptake of health care by pregnant and lactating women.

190. In *Makwanpur* a significant decrease in underweight was found, from 47.2 percent in 2002 to 29.4 percent in 2005, however no significant changes were noted in wasting or stunting. Less than half the children in the follow up survey were found to be anemic (47.5 percent) compared with 73.4 percent in the baseline survey. 43.1 percent of pregnant women were anemic compared with the baseline 66.9 percent in 2002. For nursing mothers the prevalence of anemia was 22 percent while the baseline was 73.5 percent. Postnatal and antenatal care and health seeking behaviour had improved.

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<sup>107</sup> "In all three FFA asset sites visited in Jumla, Nepal, the communal assets visited by the evaluation team were sub-standard. A bridge and foot/mule trails had been built below the flood line in a steep watershed gully and without proper bracing that will likely be washed away within one or two years and a school had been built with weak walls that have a substantial chance of collapsing one day – this is an ethical safety issue as much as it is an issue about cost-efficiency and assets durability." Strategic evaluation of the effectiveness of WFP livelihood recovery interventions, March 2009, Rome, Italy. *Ref. OEDE/003/2009*



191. It is likely that the limited impact on wasting and stunting seen in these districts resulted from the underperformance in outputs detailed in 2C.1. While the programme no doubt influenced the impressive results on anemia, there were concurrent efforts by MoHP to address iron-deficiency anemia in both children and pregnant women which will also have contributed.

192. There is also some concern regarding the quality of services provided at prenatal and antenatal clinics and GM sessions.

193. MCHC was reported by beneficiaries, health staff, female community health volunteers and partners to have reduced malnutrition, increased access to health services (ANC, post-natal care, GM) and enhanced health, nutrition and hygiene awareness. Low levels of beneficiary underweight are quoted in HHES monitoring reports (e.g. September 2009 monitoring in three districts found 9 percent of boys and 12 percent of girls 6-36 months were underweight) in comparison with national figures, but no baseline data exists to measure the situation prior to intervention within those communities. Since MCHC activities are self-selecting, care must be taken with interpretation of this monitoring data as the beneficiary caseload may be biased, for example toward children whose mothers are more educated, more interested in health care, have more time or are better-off. An October 2009 monitoring report of the MCHC programme in the eight Mid West and Far West districts found an average of 76 percent of eligible children attending GM sessions. Investigation of these potential biases, and outreach to those children not attending should be conducted.

194. Both the implementing partners and parents of beneficiaries of MNP reported enhanced appetite and increased liveliness of children as well as community satisfaction with the product. However, the present delivery strategy, which includes only beneficiary families of FFW, is likely to reveal short-term gains but a lack of significant sustainable impact in the long term as it only targets a proportion of under 5 children in each community for the limited duration of the FFW project. WFP is working to adapt the implementation strategy and has recently conducted a baseline in new sites to enable analysis of impact on nutritional indicators.

195. WFP expanded NGO support across all nine programme districts in the second half of 2009 following a pilot project in *Solukhumbu* district that reported a significant reduction of underweight children, from 101 to 22 cases,<sup>108</sup> noting that the quality of antenatal and postnatal care services and GM of children under-3 has significantly improved in all targeted districts through technical support provided by HHES, to the Government structure.

### **Food for Education**

196. The FFE programme (16 districts) and the GFEI programme (five districts) targeted different beneficiary groups GIP currently covers all districts in the Far West where FFE operates and in 102 schools in 23 VDCs.<sup>109</sup> GIP beneficiary targets differed depending on whether implemented in conjunction with FFE or GFEI. There is no clear programme rationale for such differing approaches, except that under the GFEI resources were available to the country office to cover additional grades. The 2006 evaluation team recommended that additional resources be used to cover additional schools in districts, rather than more grades in selected districts.<sup>110</sup>

197. The targeting of FFE/GFEI in 2002 at district level did not correspond to data available at the time on VAM 2001. Of the five districts added in 2002 with GFEI funding, none were listed as highly vulnerable. Four were categorized as having

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<sup>108</sup> WFP/FFE Project/MOE/HHES Joint Review Mission, Sept 09, quoted in CP SPR 2009

<sup>109</sup> WFP Nepal. 2010. GIP: Programme Monitoring Report. WFP Nepal, Food Security Monitoring and Analysis Unit.

<sup>110</sup> WFP. 2006. WFP Nepal CP Evaluation cum Appraisal Mission, May-June.

medium vulnerability and one, as low vulnerability. Likewise, little correlation was seen between the targeting of GIP and gender disparity in schools for FFE and GFEI programmes.<sup>111</sup> The CP component focused on FFE is relevant and appropriate in the context of Nepal's development priorities, UNDAF and sector investments. However, complementary programming relevant to the FFE was weak given poor planning around significant increases in school enrolment rates and related infrastructure issues. (See 2C.4 regarding factors that influenced FFE results.)

198. Enduring challenges around food distribution stem from the unstable political situation. In some cases, storage facilities were inadequate. Additional concerns include water and sanitation conditions, food management capacity and lack of cooking facilities at the school level. Despite these constraints, the 463 Kcal ration provided through FFE beginning in 2003 is considered a significant dietary contribution to school age children in the prevailing environment of food insecurity. Teachers report that the supplement has generally enhanced attention spans while also reducing afternoon absenteeism.<sup>112</sup>

199. In 2007, the Government piloted a new modality of school feeding in the remote Karnali districts: cash was directly provided to the schools which, in turn, managed daily snacks for the students.<sup>113</sup> Unfortunately in the more remote areas where markets were not well stocked, local food purchases were very expensive.

200. As shown in Table 16, attendance at WFP-assisted primary schools has improved for both boys and girls since the programme's inception. This is consistent with the upward trend demonstrated by the two NDHS surveys conducted during the evaluation period (2001 and 2006) (see Annex 23). However, these findings should be interpreted with caution for two reasons: field visits to schools revealed that there are discrepancies in the attendance figures relative to the actual head count reported. These discrepancies occur due to students leaving early (59 percent), agricultural chores (41 percent), social events (30 percent), or other (18 percent). Wrong records (seven percent) or weather (four percent) were reported in a few cases.<sup>114</sup> For FFE, GFEI and GIP, regular reports were often delayed and their reliability questioned. Second, comparisons with NDHS data are not fully valid, because the NDHS covers the entire country while WFP works in remote areas: the strategies and resources needed for increasing attendance (and enrolment) in the diverse areas of the country are likely to differ.

201. The data indicate that enrolment at WFP-assisted primary schools has increased between 2008 and 2009; no comparable NDHS data on enrolment are available.<sup>115</sup>

202. In FFE and GFEI, GIP has proved its success by increasing the growth in girls' enrolment in educationally disadvantaged communities and encouraging girls' enrolment in areas that are relatively more economically secure. The GIP has proven to be efficient in retaining girls in school after first grade, a point at which many traditionally drop out.<sup>116</sup> Figure 4 shows that compared to 2007, attendance rates in GIP schools in 2008 improved and the gender parity index increased. This can be attributed to the expansion of GIP take-home rations in four additional districts.<sup>117</sup> In one school visited for the 2006 evaluation, the ratio was approximately 3:1. These results support the conclusion of a 2006 United Nations Educational, Scientific and

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<sup>111</sup> WFP. 2006. WFP Nepal CP Evaluation cum Appraisal Mission, May-June.

<sup>112</sup> WFP. 2003. SPR. 2003.

<sup>113</sup> WFP. 2007. SPR. 2007.

<sup>114</sup> WFP Nepal. 2010. GIP: Programme Monitoring Report, March.

<sup>115</sup> The NDHS (2006) reports net enrolment ratios in primary education as 88.8 for males, 84.2 for females, and 86.6 for total. The only other NDHS survey available for the evaluation period is 2001, and this survey did not report enrolment data.

<sup>116</sup> WFP. 2005. SPR. 2005.

<sup>117</sup> WFP. 2008. SPR. 2008.


Cultural Organization (UNESCO)<sup>118</sup> study on scholarship and incentives, that GIP is a crucial element in reducing the gender gap in primary and upper primary education.<sup>119</sup> The upward trend in gender parity also follows that of the available NDHS data (see Annex 23).

**Table15: Comparison of primary school attendance and enrolment ratios of WFP-assisted schools between baseline and 2009**

Outcome	Base value (at start of project)	December 2008	December 2009
<b>ACT2 – Food for Education</b>			
Attendance rate (boys) number of schooldays in which boys attend classes as % of total number of school days	83.2	85.87	97
Attendance rate (girls) number of schooldays in which girls attend classes as % of total number of school days	83.9	86.02	92
Absolute enrolment: Number of boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools		98,277	102,633
Absolute enrolment: Number of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools		102,376	102,424

Source: SPR 2009

**Figure 4: Average daily attendance rate in GIP schools by gender**



203. No evidence of hand washing or basic hygiene practices was found, even in those schools where water supply was available within the compound.<sup>120</sup>

<sup>118</sup> The Functioning and Effectiveness of Scholarship and Incentive Schemes in Nepal, UNESCO Kathmandu Series of Monographs and Working Papers: 9, 2006

<sup>119</sup> WFP. 2006. WFP Nepal CP cum Appraisal Mission, May-June.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

## **SO 5: Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase**

204. WFP Nepal has prioritized strengthening the capacity of the Government to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of food security monitoring.<sup>121</sup> VAM is building the capacity of MoAC to manage and take over food security information systems, and the WFP Nepal Food Security Monitoring and Analysis System Team has begun collaborating with MoAC, FAO and others to strengthen NeKSAP.

205. Various training and orientation programmes conducted by WFP have improved the capacity of Cooperating Partners in emergency needs assessments, project implementation, logistics management, and monitoring and reporting. Many of these national NGO partners, however, still lack the capacity to generate and contribute their own resources to the projects.<sup>122</sup>

206. Through HHES, WFP Nepal is building capacity of local MoHP (district health officers) in MCHC programming. The sustainable components of the MCHC activity relating to capacity building of MoHP staff and behavioural change have only been fully implemented since 2009. However, it was evident that health, nutrition and hygiene messages had clearly been appropriated by mothers in sites visited by the evaluation team.

207. The MoE has institutionalized school feeding activities, and WFP has trained FFE staff in the MoE in food logistics.

### **2C.3 Contribution of the Portfolio to National Humanitarian/ Development Changes**

#### **SO 1: Saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies**

208. WFP's mandate for emergency response is acknowledged and supported by all actors in Nepal. No other organization has the logistics for the coverage and rapid response provided by WFP. The Government, beneficiary communities and partners are highly appreciative of WFP's response to emergencies in Nepal, particularly its response to urgent food needs. WFP Nepal is recognized as one of the most important agencies to respond to emergencies because of its geographical reach, logistical capacity and ability to mobilize resources quickly. The Government and donors want WFP to maintain this capability for some time into the future until the Government builds its own capacity to take on this role. While hand-over of some of these activities and expansion in the role of NFC is in the interests of sustainability and Government ownership,<sup>123</sup> continued problems in timely distribution and effective targeting of the food-insecure by NFC constrain hand-over.

209. WFP support to Bhutanese refugees has also been a significant contribution from the Government's perspective. This effort in conjunction with UNHCR prevented a major humanitarian crisis from becoming worse. WFP's support will continue to be needed until the refugees have been resettled over the next five years.

#### **SO 2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation**

210. Building the NeKSAP system to monitor food security in Nepal has been a major contribution of WFP. This system is used extensively by the Government and donors for targeting programmes aimed at addressing food insecurity. Such a system did not exist before WFP developed it. WFP is also working hard to institutionalize this system in the MoAC.

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<sup>121</sup> WFP. 2009. WFP Food Security Monitoring and Analysis System. September.

<sup>122</sup> WFP. 2006. SPR EMOP for 2006.

<sup>123</sup> Recommendation from the final evaluation of EMOP 10523.0, WFP, February 2008

### **SO 3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations (FFW/A, CFA and FFT)**

211. FFW/FFA activities carried out by WFP have significantly contributed to reducing hunger under MDG 1 in that they have addressed food needs in the short term for a major proportion of the population that is food-insecure in the West and Far West regions of Nepal. WFP support for transition programmes after the CPA was signed was highly valued by the Government and donors.

212. After 2007, the PRRO impact reports<sup>124</sup> identify reduced migration, improved food security, and asset protection in the short term, In an area where migration is an established and long-term response to food insecurity, provision of short-term work opportunities is rapidly adopted as an alternative coping mechanism.

213. FFA as a means to build or rebuild assets is relevant if sufficient work is available to enable beneficiaries to increase assets in addition to meeting immediate needs, or if used as an additional input to and complemented by other non-food inputs to enhance livelihoods. Positive examples were seen during field trips where WFP works with NGOs that include FFA into an integrated plan, developed in consultation with communities. FFA activities are combined with capacity development, training and livelihood micro-projects in addition to the technical expertise needed for the assets to be built.

214. By contrast, where FFW takes place without additional inputs, schemes focus on asset creation with manual labour, with little development of livelihoods through vocational training or increased agricultural production. With regard to road construction, sometimes culverts, small bridges and erosion control measures are required for all-weather roads. Without access to additional funding, technical compromises are made that can reduce the sustainability of the road.

215. Key issues with regard to addressing short-term food insecurity, or seasonal food insecurity in rural populations through work creation schemes, are that the period of work does not conflict with existing agricultural activities, and that food earned arrives in time for the lean season. Delivery of food rations was generally managed in a timely manner, except on a few occasions when *bandhs* disrupted distribution and in one case when supplies were raided.<sup>125</sup>

216. Benefits to the introduction of cash were identified in terms of enabling timely delivery, being the preferred modality by some beneficiaries, and reducing delivery costs. A recent WFP study has also identified stimulation of local markets as a positive impact experienced in the Far West region. Contribution of CFW in conjunction with food is preferred by some communities because of the requirement of cash for school fees, medicines, clothing and other small daily expenditures.

217. Asset creation has to be carefully considered when comparing the benefits of communal assets versus individual household assets. Certain activities, such as slope stabilisation and the construction of drinking water systems and community buildings have benefited communities as a whole. Alternative livelihood trainings have provided for the landless or nearly-landless poor. Yet in other cases, for example in the development of irrigation sources or flood control measures, asset creation has not benefited all – particularly not the landless. This introduces a divide between immediate benefits for all participants and longer-term benefits for those who benefit from the services of the asset. In such situations, choice of asset for development is key to avoid elite capture and to balance benefits accruing to different sectors of society. The capacity of communities to monitor and manage equity issues varies, but

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<sup>124</sup> First Mid-term Report PRRO 10676.0, May 2009; Second Mid-term Report PRRO 10676.0 February 2010.

<sup>125</sup> CP SPR 2002

where they identify issues and are able to improve equity, support should be provided.

218. The civic education activities implemented via FFT have been an important contribution to the post-conflict and transition aspects of this SO. In fact, the programme contributed to peace both before 2006 and after the conflict because WFP was proved and recognized as a fair balance broker between the Government and warring parties.

#### **SO 4: Reduce chronic hunger and under nutrition (MCHC, FFE)**

219. On a national scale the Nutrition Assessment and Gap Analysis reports that the Government has done extremely well in scaling up and sustaining micronutrient interventions and had impressive impacts on child mortality (vitamin A supplementation) and maternal anemia (iron intensification program), outcomes which both contribute to MDG 1. However it notes that interventions to address feeding and care behaviour is not on track. Additionally, NDHS 2006 data reveal minimal improvements on rates of acute and chronic malnutrition at a national level.

220. WFP's nutrition activities within the portfolio have had limited capacity to impact even at district level as a result of small and scattered beneficiary caseloads. While WFP has no doubt influenced Government strategy through its practice and joint programming, leading to the Government's new blanket feeding for under-2s in Karnali and the provision and social marketing of an affordable fortified food for under-2s nationwide, it has had a limited role in driving the agenda, guiding policy and influencing change. This is largely due to WFP's lack of prioritization of nutrition programmes and limited staff capacity and expertise in nutrition, resulting in under-representation in national nutrition fora and inadequate promotion of its experience and knowledge. This in turn has resulted in lack of funding for MCHC and nutrition programme implementation, further exacerbating the lack of impact.

221. The FFE component has had minimal national impact due to its limited coverage (15 districts). However, the programme has helped influence national policy regarding school feeding since the guidance provided by WFP is being used in the expansion of the school feeding programme in the Karnali region. In the West and Far West regions where WFP does operate, school attendance has increased, the gender parity index has improved, and the new pilot project, OLPC, implemented in 2008, is considered an important step in taking advantage of technology opportunities in education. These outcomes contribute to MDGs 2 and 3 regarding education and gender equality. The programme has also improved Government internal capacity in terms of food transport and management as well as improvements in infrastructure and school facilities.

#### **SO 5: Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase**

222. Significant training and capacity development for MoE staff have taken place over the years. In 2003 management of FFE was handed over to the MoE and recently the programme has been institutionalized by the MoE as evidenced by the inclusion of school feeding as a national policy in the 2008/2009 fiscal year and the Government's expansion of FFE in the Karnali region with its own resources. Further, the de-worming component of FFE, which has been implemented by WFP since 2002, has been included by the Government as a part of the school health and nutrition programme. Hand-over of this activity occurred in 2009. MCHC and MNP distribution will likely be taken on more directly by MoHP since the MoHP is currently piloting these activities in several districts.

223. Despite these capacity building efforts, both the Government and many donors feel that WFP could do a lot more capacity development for the Government.

## 2C.4 Factors Explaining the Results

224. A variety of external and internal factors have had a substantial influence on overall programme performance and in relation to activities under particular SOs. This section discusses these factors, with reference to their impact on specific activities where these have not yet been discussed.

### External Factors

#### Factors Influencing the Overall Programme

225. **The combined effects of conflict, insecurity, continual strikes and civil unrest, natural disasters affected accessibility of project sites and timely delivery for all portfolio activities.** For example, in 2007, the timely delivery and distributions of relief food aid was severely hampered by frequent *bandhs* and communal violence.<sup>126</sup> In 2008, food delivery was delayed due to the limited capacity of the suppliers to provide food on time, given the festival (Dashain) period. Such factors negatively affected programme effectiveness and impact in that they prevented WFP from achieving many of its targets throughout the portfolio time period, including the timely delivery of food. These challenges highlight the importance of contingency planning and closer cooperation with the cooperating partners.<sup>127</sup>

226. **Donor priorities in response to changes in Nepal's economic and environmental context caused a shift in resources that affected performance and results of the PRRO.** From 2002-2009, major donors to WFP Nepal included the United States, the Government, Norway, and the United Kingdom. From 2002 and the present, WFP Nepal also received considerable funding from multi-lateral donors (World Bank, EC) and United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund. Funding trends for individual operations have shown significant change since 2006. Most notable is a distinct increase in the average contribution versus approved budget for PRRO operations. Annex 11 provides figures for the approved budgets of each operation and confirmed contributions, and Annex 16 provides similar trend analyses of WFP Nepal Operations in terms of beneficiaries and commodity distribution.

227. Throughout the portfolio period, donors have been consistently supporting the refugees (SO 1). In addition, from 2002 to 2006, donors were providing considerable resources to the CP in support of FFE and MCHC (SO 4) and FFW (SO 3) activities. Because WFP was working in conflict-affected areas, donors channelled resources into the CP to reach these populations. Once the CPA was signed in 2006, donors were reluctant to continue to put their resources into what was viewed as a development programme and were more interested in investing in transitional programmes through the PRRO that was initiated in 2007. FFW (SO 3) activities were supported in the conflict-affected areas in this way. WFP used FFW 'light' to reach more people, but the effect was not enough to pull people out of chronic food insecurity (see also discussion in 2A.5 and 2B.2).

228. In 2008 the food price crisis hit Nepal hard, which accelerated chronic food security because of the extent to which the poor rely on food for purchase; here again, donors were highly motivated to provide support. Several donors (EU, World Bank, DFID, and USAID) mobilised resources to respond, and much of this money was again channelled through the FFW activities being implemented by WFP.

229. The PRRO has provided the perfect vehicle for donors to expand and rapidly deploy resources in response to the conflict and the food price crisis. However, due to donor restrictions on resources and a priority on moving money quickly, there have

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<sup>126</sup> WFP. 2007. SPR EMOP Floods for 2007.

<sup>127</sup> WFP. 2008. SPR EMOP Floods for 2008.

been to more short-term contracts with less emphasis on targeting, planning, or building productive infrastructure. Currently, many donors feel that the focus must shift to longer-term food security programmes to address chronic food insecurity. Some donors (e.g. USAID, EU) were not sure that WFP is the right organization to promote these types of interventions.

**230. Nepal's civil conflict prevented the Government from working in certain areas of the country, which made it imperative that WFP work with NGOs to deliver its programmes.** More recently however, stability in conflict affected areas has led donor and Government interests to shift toward capacity development and long-term development. Donors recognize WFP's forte in emergencies but are hesitant to commit to WFP doing livelihood recovery work in the long term.

**231. Government direction to WFP to purchase food outside the country resulted in shortfalls and delays in food delivery.** In a shift from previous policies for local purchase, the Government's directive to import food affected the timeliness of food deliveries. The data in Annexes 13 and 14 give a sense of Nepal's capacity for cereal production and food security based on local production.

**232. The remoteness of the Mountain and Hill areas served in the Mid West and Far West required increased transport costs in relation to the quantity of food distributed, because food was delivered by air.**

#### **Factors Influencing Food Assistance for Refugees and Emergency Operations (SO 1)**

**233. In 2006, the actual number of emergency project schemes was higher than planned due to community needs; the operation was implemented in eight of ten planned districts.** The target population was able to meet their food needs for approximately two additional months, and outmigration due to food insecurity was also reduced.

**234. The programme experienced a pipeline break at the end of 2009 as a result of funding constraints.** Limited supplies were redirected from other WFP activities. Thus a reduction in rations had to be introduced until further funding could be assured. This caused great concern in camps, and there was some unrest, but it was contained through negotiation and dialogue.

**235. While garden activities have been popular, the contribution of this initiative to diets has been limited by the limited space available for cultivation within the camps.** Space limitations also curtail the extent to which this is a productive activity: all gardens visited used produce for own consumption and sold none. More land is becoming available as resettlement takes place.

**236. Transportation costs during the resettlement process is an issue for International Organization for Migration, consequently there is pressure for early closure of the most easterly camps, Goldhap and Timai.** However, the Government has concerns related to squatting and appropriation of the camp sites on closure, wanting clear exit strategies, with return of the sites to their previous forest status. Clear planning is urgently required for ordered closing of camps and efficient development of gardening activities.

#### **Factors Influencing Food for Work, Food for Training, and Asset Creation (SO 3)**

**237. Reduced funding for CP activities started to influence RCIW activities in 2007, with resources sufficient for only 70 percent of FFA and 44 percent of FFT participant coverage.** By July 2007 all PLIC activities had been phased out; no funds were available for these components in 2008.



**238. Until quite recently, asset creation activities suffered from a lack of funding for construction tools and materials to complement unskilled labour inputs paid through WFP food aid.**<sup>128</sup> In spite of selection criteria that require activities to be identified with minimum requirements for such items, most communal infrastructure building requires a minimum quality standard of tools and materials. As a result, some of the communities' priority activities could not be fully implemented, e.g. there were limited resources for permanent concrete irrigation canals. However impressive efforts have been made by several implementing agencies to link with other funding sources to finance school roofs, and by the community to supply required timber through Forest Users Groups.

#### **Factors Influencing Maternal and Child Health and Food for Education (SO 4)**

**239. Lack of cohesion within the nutrition sector and the obstacles of working jointly with UNICEF in a coordinated front on malnutrition have limited the impact that the MCHC and WFP nutrition programmes could achieve.** These difficulties with potential partners have limited WFP's ability to implement a more holistic approach to nutrition. A stronger WFP/UNICEF relationship would raise the profile of WFP's work and likely elicit further programme funding.

**240. Various external factors affected MCHC programme performance between 2002 and 2006.** The programme's underperformance in outputs during this period is linked to WFP and MoHP slowness in start-up and expansion of the programme. The limited capacity of MoHP to carry out the MCHC activity also posed a significant constraint to programming, particularly during the conflict period when staff were often absent. The WFP Nepal CP Evaluation cum Appraisal Mission of May/June 06 found that in most districts a limited number of VDCs had actually implemented MCHC activities, reporting that only 37 VDCs out of a planned 128 had carried out distributions by the end of 2005. The evaluation/appraisal also noted that limited maternal and child health expertise within WFP prevents the country office from providing needed technical support at national and decentralized levels. Monitoring of MCHC was found to be insufficient and this continues to be evident in the paucity of outcome data available.

**241. Repeated school closures in conflict areas along with recurring transportation strikes in the country disrupted the regularity of food and resulted in lower distribution than planned in some years.** Other chronic concerns included water and sanitation conditions, food management capacity and lack of cooking facilities at the school level.

**242. The food that is allocated by quota to the districts does not correspond to the need, but adjustments to meet increased enrolments are not made until at least three months into the school year.** This delay results in distribution problems at the school level.<sup>129</sup>

**243. Adequate water supply was a problem in some schools, negatively affecting the proper preparation of the snack and cleaning of cooking and serving utensils.**

**244. Effective storage of food has been a challenge over the programme.** The most common locations for storing food are the chairperson's house and the school building, as well as other miscellaneous places. Accessibility and quality of storage facilities is also of issue in many cases. At the end of 2009, only 19 percent of

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<sup>128</sup> Strategic evaluation of the effectiveness of WFP livelihood recovery interventions, March 2009, Rome, Italy. Ref. OEDE/003/2009

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

the schools had inaccessible storage while the majority (74 percent) had neat and clean facilities and 27 percent had adequate ventilation; only one percent had “technically sound” stacking.<sup>130</sup>

**245. Toilet facilities, for girls in particular, have also been an issue.** By the end of 2009, 82 percent of the committees reported there were toilets on the school grounds. The majority of schools having toilets reported they were functional (70 percent). For the majority of schools, water sources are close to the school (83 percent at end of 2009) or within a 15 minute walk (17 percent).<sup>131</sup>

## **Internal Factors**

### **Factors Influencing the Overall Programme**

**246. WFP has been well pre-positioned for implementation of various activities.**

- WFP had a sizeable CP in place in the early 2000s that gave it a platform to expand coverage under a development programme between 2002 and 2003 through FFA and keep operations going in an environment where others – including the Government – withdrew. WFP was able to scale up again when the CPA was signed, and able to move FFA/FFT into the PRRO, a programme modality specifically suited for transitional programming.
- Substantial and steady resources from refugee operations enabled WFP to build good human resource capacity, which complemented the portfolio as a whole.
- Prepositioning of emergency response equipment and resources through the Special Operation of 2005 was credited with facilitating a swift response in 2006 to the drought in western Nepal. Standby agreements for emergency response similar to the one with the NRCS, are important and should be signed with all NGOs.

**247. WFP has short-term advantages in implementation compared to the Government; however lack of attention to Government capacity building poses challenges to sustainability.** WFP was able to work on all sides of the civil conflict and cover areas where the Government had limited outreach; WFP also had its own logistics operations and numerous NGO implementing partners in place. These factors facilitated coverage of areas in need, and enabled WFP to carry out short-term food security responses. Understandably, decisions about working with The Government have been based partly on past negative experiences. Nevertheless, working more closely with Government agencies – especially those responsible for livelihood recovery of the food-insecure – is needed to build the country’s long-term capacity to reduce chronic food insecurity.

**248. WFP has supportive partners and little competition for resources in niche areas.** WFP’s unique strengths include food security analysis, large scale food security project implementation at the community level, and food insecurity/poverty targeting.

**249. Short-term contracts with implementers to provide a peace dividend may have undermined implementing partner capacity to engage more effectively with communities.** Six-month and one-year contracts are too short for anything more than short-term food security interventions. Indeed, attempts to deliver more within short time frames have negative impacts because they create community expectations that cannot be fulfilled. Programme quality is also difficult to monitor. Implementing partners have difficulty finding and keeping suitable staff

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<sup>130</sup> WFP Nepal. 2010. GIP: Programme Monitoring Report, March.

<sup>131</sup> WFP Nepal. 2010. GIP: Programme Monitoring Report, March.

to run short programmes in remote areas. The resulting high turnover causes a loss of the skills and experience required for effective implementation and places high demands on remaining staff, as well as on recruitment and training.

### **Factors Influencing Food for Work, Food for Training, and Asset Creation (SO 3)**

**250. WFP's has honed effective, time-tested approaches to FFW/FFA over a long history in Nepal.** WFP has been involved in FFW activities and asset creation at the community level in Nepal since 1976.<sup>132</sup> Key factors highlighted for the success and sustainability of interventions over this period are community choice in asset identification and community ownership to ensure maintenance. Good community mobilisation and involvement are dependent on the quality of community consultation, which in turn depends on the nature of community engagement by implementation agencies. Experience with these practices has favoured performance of the FFW/FFA/CFA activities in this portfolio.

**251. The modality used to implement FFW/FFA activities, high beneficiary numbers and high numbers of implementing agencies on short-term contracts, was similar to that used in emergency response.** This style fits with saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies, but does not fit with rebuilding livelihoods and activities one would expect to see in recovery operations.

### **Factors Influencing Maternal and Child Health and Food for Education (SO 4)**

**252. Planning for the FFE component in 2006 did not take into account increases in enrolments to be expected over the next five years; the planned number of beneficiaries for the CP was equal to the previous CP.** This discrepancy led to an unacceptable situation in which the amount of food provided to each target district was insufficient to provide full rations to all eligible beneficiaries.<sup>133</sup> It also contributed to severely overcrowded classrooms, - a situation compounded by the shortage of teachers, which was often below the minimum Government quota.<sup>134</sup> <sup>135</sup> This situation is still a problem today in the schools being supported by the GIP programme in the Terai.

**253. The food rations appear appropriate for both on-site feeding and take-home rations.** Lack of variety in the mid-day meal is more an issue of convenience and a combination of lack of knowledge about and reluctance to adopt alternative recipes. No communities are reported to have supplemented the ration with additional food items locally.<sup>136</sup>

## **3. Conclusions and Recommendations**

### **3. A Overall Assessment**

#### **Alignment and Strategic Positioning**

254. WFP has proved itself a capable and resilient strategic partner to THE Government in its ability to access remote populations and has remained one of the few organizations able to continue providing support to communities throughout the conflict period. WFP Nepal's portfolio was closely aligned to Government concerns and population needs from 2002-2008. More recently, however, while WFP's activities have continued to address the short-term needs of food-insecure

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<sup>132</sup> WFP (2000) Country Strategy Outline, Nepal. WFP/EB.3/2000/6/1

<sup>133</sup> WFP. 2006. WFP Nepal CP Evaluation cum Appraisal Mission, May-June.

<sup>134</sup> WFP. 2006. WFP Nepal CP Evaluation cum Appraisal Mission, May-June.

<sup>135</sup> TANGO International. 2010. WFP Nepal Portfolio Evaluation: Presentation of Initial Findings, April 19.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

populations, WFP has been constrained in addressing underlying causes of chronic food insecurity, now clearly part of Government priorities.

255. From 2002 to 2006, WFP Nepal was closely aligned with national/sub-national policies and implemented its programmes through mostly Government partners. WFP continued the distribution of food during the period of conflict, which was much appreciated by stakeholders in the field. WFP has established a reputation as a fair broker.

256. In 2006, the CPA was signed and ushered in a new phase of WFP programming. WFP implemented FFW light activities as part of a peace dividend to support returnees, repair damaged infrastructure and support civic education for upcoming elections. WFP's success during the previous phase attracted additional funds from donors and the Government, resulting in greater emphasis on short-term food security interventions. From 2006 to 2008 WFP activities were aligned with the TYIP of the Government with a focus on peace building, reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration. It is during this period that WFP began a strategic shift toward NGO partners to facilitate rapid response. This coincided with funding shortfalls in both FFE and MCHC. These activities were significantly reduced and consolidated in the Western region.

257. Alignment of WFP PRRO activities and THE Government priorities began to diverge in 2009. A major focus on short-term food security interventions was not consistent with Government's concern to address underlying causes of chronic food insecurity. Although WFP was attempting to address medium-term livelihood recovery needs, funding constraints (short-term, unsecured, and unpredictable) prevented better alignment. Capacity development of the Government has become a priority for both donors and Government, which is not consistent with working primarily with NGOs. The current programming challenge for WFP Nepal is to deliver sustainable impact and productive safety-net outcomes required by communities, as well as to coordinate with other donors and support the Government in addressing chronic food insecurity.

### **Making Strategic Choices**

258. WFP has made a number of strategic choices in terms of geographical coverage, programme categories and content, and partnerships and delivery channels. WFP has made extensive investments in its VAM operations to target its resources to the most food-insecure populations. The creation of the food security information system has involved key Government, civil society and local representatives in food security analysis. This information is used by Government, civil society and the donor community for targeting their respective programmes. WFP is currently in the process of institutionalizing this system in MoAC.

259. WFP has engaged in limited analysis of the determinants of malnutrition. The majority of WFP's analytical work focuses on food security and therefore WFP has tended to respond with food products, neglecting many aspects of nutritional education of mothers, Infant and Young Child Feeding issues and consideration of long-term sustainability of impact. While WFP is making efforts to improve analysis, more could be done. Increased effort on this type of analysis would improve programming decisions as WFP moves forward to integrate nutrition and food security interventions.

260. WFP has been working in a very large number of districts and VDCs within districts in its attempt to reach a high proportion of the food-insecure population. This strategy worked well when it was important to reach as many people as possible with a peace dividend following the signing of the CPA. However, by spreading resources across a wide area, it is more difficult to achieve livelihood recovery

objectives that are sustainable. Greater programme concentration is now needed to address chronic food insecurity.

261. Although WFP Nepal has devoted considerable resources to food security monitoring systems, it must also begin to engage in data collection that will enable the country office to capture synergistic programme impacts.

262. WFP has played a role as a strategic partner for NGOs and UN agencies due to its operational capacity, geographic reach and willingness and ability to support programme synergies. It has yet to position itself more strategically with bilateral agencies as a partner with the capacity to address nutritional challenges.

263. The programme has dutifully followed Programme Review Committee recommendations to ensure there is no overlap between the various activities and beneficiary case load; as a result the overall programme portfolio limits opportunities for synergy. There is little overlap of the FFW, FFE, and MCHC activities in the same communities. In districts where activities overlapped, such as some villages of *Bajhang* and regions where GTZ was operating, participants acknowledged that food security was improved, children were healthier, and households were migrating less. Greater impact and synchronized monitoring systems can be achieved by ensuring that programme activities are not implemented separately.

264. Programme efficiency has been negatively impacted by the difficult operating environment where WFP is targeting its activities. It is very expensive to move food into the Mid West and Far West, and timely distribution of food is problematic, which affects impact.

## **Portfolio Performance and Results**

### **Relevance**

265. WFP had a sizeable programme in place in the Mid West and Far West regions since the early 2000s that gave it a platform to provide support to food-insecure populations located in conflict-affected areas where the Government withdrew. In addition to continuous programming during the conflict period, WFP was able to scale up its FFW/FFA transition programming to provide a peace dividend when the CPA was signed. These short-term food security interventions were highly appreciated by the Government and donors, and helped reduce the recurrence of conflict. A key issue now facing the Government is how to address chronic food insecurity, and what role WFP should play in this effort.

266. In terms of emergency response, WFP Nepal is recognized as one of the most important agencies because of its geographical reach, logistical capacity and ability to mobilize resources quickly. The Government, beneficiary communities and partners are highly appreciative of WFP's response to urgent food needs in emergencies in Nepal. The Government is currently not able to respond to emergencies to the same extent as WFP.

267. Given the high burden of malnutrition and iron-deficiency anemia in Nepal, WFP's programming in MCHC and distribution of MNPs has been highly relevant to the needs of the population. During the years of conflict, WFP was one of the few actors able to access remote populations to continue supporting communities, and provided an essential lifeline to vulnerable children and mothers.

268. The education system in Nepal faces many challenges, including limited coverage due to geographic remoteness and gender and socioeconomic disparities. WFP school feeding programmes are implemented in areas with high levels of food insecurity, poor maternal and child health indicators, and large gender disparities in primary school enrolment.

## **Efficiency**

269. A variety of factors had a substantial influence on overall programme efficiency. The combined effects of conflict, insecurity, continual strikes and civil unrest, and natural disasters affected accessibility of project sites and timely delivery for all portfolio activities. Repeated school closures in conflict areas along with recurring transportation strikes in the country disrupted the regularity of food distribution and resulted in lower distribution than planned in some years. The remoteness of the Mountain and Hill districts served in the Mid West and Far West by WFP also required increased transport costs in relation to the quantity of food distributed because food was delivered by air. In addition, Government directives to WFP in 2009 to purchase food outside the country resulted in shortfalls and delays in food delivery as well.

270. Between 2002 and 2006, WFP struggled to reach the intended numbers of beneficiaries and distribute adequate quantities of food in MCHC. This was a result of the factors mentioned above, as well as slow start-up of operations and planning by WFP and its partner and weak partner capacity. Efficiency of the operation has since improved dramatically following appropriate steps taken by WFP.

271. Efficiency of refugee camp operations has been impressive, with only one substantial pipeline break reported throughout the portfolio period, despite the challenges of floods, *bandhs* and insecurity.

## **Effectiveness**

272. The FFE and GIP components of the WFP portfolio have been successful in increasing attendance and enrolment, although a cause for concern is the overcrowded classrooms with high student/teacher ratios and subsequent deterioration in quality of education.

273. WFP has been very effective in building community assets. Cumulatively speaking, the portfolio has met or exceeded its targets for community assets during the period under investigation.

274. Due to the lack of M&E of MCHC programmes it remains difficult to draw firm conclusions on the effectiveness of the operations. However, anecdotal reports from stakeholders, implementing partners and beneficiaries themselves alongside limited programme data and observation suggest the programme is proving effective at preventing and treating malnutrition in the communities where it is implemented.

275. WFP's support to refugees has been highly effective and adapted appropriately to changing situations and needs.

## **Impact**

276. WFP food assistance through FFW/FFA/CFA has helped food-insecure people to meet immediate food needs and mitigate negative coping strategies, but is less effective at supporting longer-term processes of livelihood recovery through restoring key productive assets. For example, there is evidence that FFW/FFA activities have had impacts on beneficiaries in terms of increased income, reduced migration and reduced use of credit for food purchase. However it is not so clear if longer-term household asset creation, or improved livelihood conditions are being created. One of the main problems is that most of the households that WFP works with are chronically food-insecure.

277. In the West and Far West regions where WFP does operate, school attendance has increased, the gender parity index has improved however the component has had minimal national impact due to its limited coverage (15 districts). The programme has helped influence national policy regarding school feeding since the guidance

provided by WFP is being used in the expansion of the school feeding programme in the Karnali region.

278. The implementation of MCHC in selected wards of selected VDCs across nine districts has left the intervention spread too thin and impact is not visible at district level. In order to demonstrate impact, more effort should be made to focus interventions to ensure measurable evidence of the impact of WFP activities.

279. In the Bhutanese refugee camps, WFP's activities have clearly had an impact, maintaining the nutritional status of the camp population.

### **Sustainability**

280. WFP Nepal felt that it was important to engage in livelihood recovery in its transition programming. However the timeframe for activities was too short to restore key productive assets in a sustainable manner, and constraints related to multi-year funding for more development-oriented interventions made it difficult to maintain recovery-focused activities. In addition, livelihood recovery objectives were difficult to achieve in a protracted crisis situation with recurring shocks, where many households were chronically food-insecure. Livelihood recovery objectives need to be more modest and longer term; it is difficult to address the underlying causes of chronic food insecurity with short-term food security interventions.

281. FFE activities are likely to be sustainable because these activities are already integrated into the MoE.

282. The sustainability of the outcomes of the MCHC activity relate to capacity building of MoHP staff and behavioural change in communities – activities that have only been fully implemented since 2008/09 – and their impact is yet to be seen. However, it was evident that health, nutrition and hygiene messages have clearly been appropriated by mothers in sites visited by the evaluation team.

283. Sustainability of NeKSAP is another area of concern. NeKSAP has been funded heavily by external actors and it is doubtful that the Government will be capable of assuming a funding role at the level required to sustain NeKSAP's current functions. Given the ongoing utilization of the system by external agencies, it is reasonable to suggest that they take on some responsibility for funding over the long-term.

## **3. B Recommendations**

### **Considerations for the Country Strategy**

284. *The next Country Strategy should consider engaging in longer-term productive safety nets.*<sup>137</sup> The primary design considerations that should be taken into account are:

- Safety net programmes should be comprehensive and involve multi-year funding to better address immediate needs and causal factors of chronic food insecurity – both Government priority issues;
- Consolidated programming in fewer districts will enable better synergy between programme activities and more intensive use of resources;
- Communities should have greater input on preferred food/cash ratios for FFW/FFA activities;

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<sup>137</sup> Safety net programmes are one of many components of a social protection system, which generally includes cash or food transfers (e.g. via conditional cash transfers, school feeding, FFW and cash for work), social services (e.g. health clinics), aspects of labour market policies and insurance options, and aspects of other sectoral policies for education, health, nutrition, HIV/AIDS and agriculture. (WFP. 2009. Occasional Paper No. 20: Unveiling Social Safety Nets. November.)

- Programme activities should be aligned with national-and local-level planning processes and encourage joint monitoring.

**285. *The next Country Strategy should develop a comprehensive integrated lifecycle approach to nutrition.*** This involves vertical integration of interventions (continuum of care), and horizontal integration (consolidation geographically and integration of essential packages of resources). By implementing multiple activities in the same area, WFP Nepal can take full advantage of any potential for synergy

- Support should be provided to communities through MCHC and FFE, programmes targeting 3-5 year olds, and FFA/CFA, giving emphasis to behavioural change and soliciting partnerships in water and sanitation. UNICEF would be a likely partner here because the latter areas fall within its mandate;
- WFP should ensure that FFW/CFW activities provide opportunities for women to engage in work that enables them to spend sufficient time at home or in the community, allowing adequate infant and young child care and feeding. Efforts should be made to protect pregnant and lactating women from engaging in activities that could be detrimental to their health. In this way WFP would ensure consistency in programming so that infant and young child feeding messages can be effectively implemented while women earn a living for their household;
- FFE should be enhanced with a training package on health and nutrition for school children;
- WFP should build the capacity of MoHP, implementing partners, and communities.

**286. *The next Country Strategy should continue to maintain emergency response capacity.***

- WFP Nepal should create standing agreements with implementing partners and other agencies for rapid emergency response. For example, for effective mobilization in the instance of emergencies, WFP has a stand-by agreement with the NRCS whereby they are able to mobilize immediately, without having to go through the one to two month process of new contract agreement. Similar standby agreements are needed with other agencies.
- In addition, greater buffer stocks of food are needed to facilitate both emergency and development operations;
- More emphasis should be given to building the Government's emergency response capacity.

### **Specific Recommendations for the Country Portfolio**

**287. *Re-introduce local level procurement of traditional staples.*** This could be combined with the adoption of the P4P approach and local procurement of local staples, rather than just rice and lentils. Elasticity in production in response to recent food price increases shows that price and market constraints are factors limiting current production in Nepal. There is potential to link with farmers' co-operatives and producer groups to ensure benefits accrue to producers rather than traders.

**288.** In addition, piloting of home-grown school feeding is recommended in areas with food surplus and long-term school feeding history. This would combine increasing nutritional awareness with providing a market for producers, suited to



areas where greater production is possible and community commitment to nutritional issues is high (e.g. Choukhabang VDC, Rukum).

**289. WFP should take steps to further refine its nutrition/MCHC programming and demonstrate impact.**

- The MCHC programme should be consolidated in fewer districts reaching more VDCs in each district until further funding can be secured;
- WFP Nepal should sustain and enhance its existing emphasis on Infant and Young Child Feeding practices, health, nutrition and hygiene education, and ensure alignment with HKI, UNICEF and other nutrition actors in messages. The behaviour change components are of utmost importance and the route to ensure sustainability of outcomes;
- The MNP strategy should be adapted to improve coverage and sustainability of the outcomes, as well as to avoid overlap with beneficiaries of MCHC fortified food. Coordination with MoHP/UNICEF should be enhanced to standardize implementation modalities;
- Exit strategies will involve enhanced attention to capacity development of MoHP staff and female community health volunteers, and to the delivery of health/nutrition education messages. They will be further assisted by a comprehensive package of interventions within communities incorporating all aspects of WFP programming;
- Regular M&E of activities, using appropriate indicators to demonstrate achievement of outcomes, must be urgently incorporated into MCHC programming.

**290. FFE and GIP activities need to be combined with other education improvement activities** being implemented by the MoE, UNICEF and NGOs to ensure that the quality of education does not deteriorate with increased enrolment and retention. Joint planning exercises should be carried out with the MoE and partners to ensure a more holistic approach to strategic targeting of resources. WFP should play a more active role in integrating its activities within the Education for All Framework and the School Sector Reform plan. Coupling WFP resources with other complementary resources could be started internally by linking FFA/FFW/CFW with the development of school infrastructure and water and sanitation.

**291. Selection of partner NGOs should be conducted with greater transparency and clear selection criteria because of high politicization.** Implementing partner selection criteria should also include the ability to contribute additional resources to implementation. This is to ensure that additional income-generating, agricultural, and social mobilization activities are included in activities, and that the implementing partner can remain committed to community development in area for a minimum of three years.

**292. Foster participation of women within the country office and among implementing partners.** Employment of women by country offices and partners is important for involving women in activities, particularly in societies that have strong gender divides. Sub-offices should continue to address the issue of low female representation in their staff in order to provide positive role models. This will also help sub-offices to link more directly with women in beneficiary communities, as well as identify key issues of concern and factors affecting the participation of women.

**293. Enhance WFP role in policy dialogue.** WFP Nepal should work across sectoral divisions using its position and influence within the food security, agriculture, local development and nutrition sectors to promote greater synergy in

tackling chronic food insecurity and stunting. It should work with UNICEF to support MoHP to strengthen coordination and lead the nutrition sector.

294. ***Strengthen M&E of programme activities.*** Baseline surveys measured against end-line surveys are critical to measure impact. This is especially the case for the MCHC activities carried out in the Far West. Data collection and analysis can be improved to better inform programme design and decision making during mid-term evaluations, and WFP should specifically monitor areas where multiple activities are carried out to capture any synergistic programme impacts. For example, programme areas where an implementing partner is combining complementary resources with WFP assistance could be compared with areas where WFP activities are implemented separately to determine if more sustainable impact can be achieved. WFP should also assess the unintended consequences of some of its operations, for example, the impact of increased enrolment on the quality of education when facilities and teaching personnel are inadequate.

295. ***Identify regions where there is sufficient local production to allow local procurement without causing shortages or market distortion.*** Local procurement is important for stimulating local production and providing markets for farmers. Similarly, in areas where farmers sell some of their produce, there is opportunity for introducing home-grown school feeding, where food is sourced locally, linking children with traditional food sources as well as providing an additional local market for farmers.

## Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AMDA	Association of Medical Doctors of Asia
APP	Agriculture Perspective Plan
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CDC	Center for Disease Control and Prevention, United States
CFA	Cash for Assets
CFW	Cash for Work
CP	country programme
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Accord
CPE	Country Portfolio Evaluation
EC	European Commission
EMOP	emergency operation
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFA	Food for assets
FFE	Food for education
FFT	Food for training
FFW	Food for work
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GFEI	Global Food for Education Initiative
GIP	Girls Incentive Programme
GM	Growth Monitoring
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
HHESS	Himalayan Health and Environment Services Solukhumbu
HKI	Helen Keller International
IDD	Iodine Deficiency Disorder
LEP	Labour-based, Environmentally aware and Participatory
MCHC	maternal and child health care
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MLD	Ministry of Local Development
MNP	Micronutrient Powder
MoAC	Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoHP	Ministry of Health and Population
MT	metric tons
NDHS	Nepal Demographic and Health Survey
NeKSAP	<i>Nepal Khadhya Surakshya Anugaman Pranal</i> (Nepal's food security monitoring system)
NFC	Nepal Food Corporation
NGO	non-governmental organization
NRCS	Nepal Red Cross Society
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OE	Office of Evaluation
OLPC	One Laptop per Child
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RCIW	Rural Community Infrastructure Works
SO	Strategic Objective
SPR	Standardized Project Report
TYIP	Three Year Interim Development Plan
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping
VDC	Village Development Committee
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization



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