

## **COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION**

Iraq: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2010 – 2015)

### **Volume II - Annexes**

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## Annex A: Terms of Reference

### 1. Background

1. The purpose of these terms of reference (TOR) is to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation, to guide the evaluation team and specify expectations during the various phases of the evaluation. The TOR are structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides information on the context; Chapter 2 presents the rationale, objectives, stakeholders and main users of the evaluation; Chapter 3 presents the WFP portfolio and defines the scope of the evaluation; Chapter 4 identifies the evaluation approach and methodology; Chapter 5 indicates how the evaluation will be organized. The annexes provide additional information such as a detailed timeline and the core indicators for Iraq.

#### 1.1. Introduction

2. Country Portfolio Evaluations (CPE) encompass the entirety of WFP activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to make evidence-based decisions about positioning WFP in a country and about strategic partnerships, programme design, and implementation. Country Portfolio Evaluations help Country Offices in the preparation of Country Strategies and provide lessons that can be used in the design of new operations.

#### 1.2. Country Context

3. *Economy and Development.* In the 1990s, Iraq was highly regarded in the region for its public sector management capabilities, its growth strategy for an emerging economy and its social welfare programmes. Years of war since 2003 and international isolation severely damaged Iraq's economic institutions and infrastructure. The sharp drop in global oil prices in 2015 and the regional security crisis resulted in a large decline of Iraq's oil revenue with repercussions for the country's budget deficit<sup>1</sup>.

4. In 2014, the gross national income (GNI) per capita was USD 6,320 classifying Iraq as an upper-middle-income country<sup>2</sup>. Although Iraq reached the middle-income country status in 2011, by 2013 the country's development profile was characterized by significant spatial and demographic inequalities, many of which were outlined in the Iraq National Development Plan (NDP), 2010-2014. The new NDP (2013-2017) is complementary to the previous plan, with the additional aims to reduce these gaps between rural and urban areas and to promote the private sector. Deprivation of education is the most important contributor to non-income poverty, while other contributors are strongly influenced by access to public goods and services. Women fare poorly across all multidimensional poverty indicators, particularly women in rural areas or who have lower levels of education.

5. According to the 2013 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) report, Iraq achieved MDG 1 - eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, however some concerns remain regarding the prevalence of underweight children<sup>3</sup>. Goal 6 has also been achieved (combatting HIV&AIDS, malaria and other diseases). The main development challenge for the country is to strengthen national capacity concerning use of substantial resources, and to diversify the economy away from an over-reliance on oil. It is also to move from a country-centric development agenda to a more open and competitive stance<sup>4</sup>.

6. However, the 2015 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) reports that 20% of the Iraqi population (6.6 million) lives under the national poverty line, but in the poorest districts this number rises to almost 80% (26.4 million). Iraq ranks 120 out of 187 countries in the 2014

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<sup>1</sup> Iraq's Fiscal and Economic Situation, UNAMI Joint Analysis Unit, September 2015

<sup>2</sup> For GNI per capita between \$4,126 and \$12,745. The State of the World's Children 2015, UNICEF

<sup>3</sup> UNDP and the CSO, 2015 MDG, and UNDP Iraq Country Office, 2013.

<sup>4</sup> Country Partnership Strategy for Iraq 2013-2016, The World Bank, November 2012

UNDP Human Development Index and 170 out of 175 countries in the 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International.

7. Despite its middle income status and having the world's fifth largest oil reserves, Iraq faces enormous socio-economic challenges. The quality and delivery of essential services including health, education, water, electricity, housing, sanitation and food has deteriorated significantly following the imposition of sanctions, and on-going sectarian violence, and remains a high priority for a significant portion of the Iraqi population.

8. *Humanitarian situation and principles.* The current humanitarian crisis in Iraq is one of the most rapidly unfolding in the world. The relative calm period from 2008 to 2012 in terms of security allowed humanitarian actors to provide assistance and relief combined with development and capacity building support.

9. In April 2013, a raid on the protest camp in the city of Hawija by security forces sparked a renewed wave of violence. Attacks against security forces and civilians revived fears of a return to the all-out civil strife witnessed from 2005 to 2008. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), the total number of non-military casualties in 2013 was the highest since 2008. At the same time, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qaeda's local affiliate, became resurgent.


10. In December 2013, rising tensions in Al-Anbar governorate in the western part of Iraq resulted in an eruption of fighting after Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) broke up a protest camp in the capital, Ramadi. The violence spread to Fallujah, and militants from ISIL moved in and seized the city and parts of Ramadi after security forces withdrew. The Iraqi military and the allied tribesmen tried to dislodge the militants, unleashing airstrikes and besieging the regional capital in fighting that resulted in casualties including amongst the civilian population.

11. Tensions between and among the religious and ethnic groups in Iraq prevents national cohesion. The country is currently controlled by three main groups: the Kurds, the Arabs and the ISIL with control changing regularly in many areas in the conflict zones.

12. In early 2014 actors across the region worried that a failure to deal with Iraq's humanitarian emergency would result in further internal fragmentation and contribute to deepening regional instability. The exponential growth in displacement was of great concern to the humanitarian community.

13. From January 2014 through August 2015, the surge in violence between armed groups and government forces has resulted in the displacement of nearly 3.2 million<sup>5</sup> Iraqis. Chart 1 shows the trends in internal displacement as recorded by UNHCR and IOM from January 2010 to August 2015.

14. As a direct consequence of violence and prolonged conflict, 8.2 million people require humanitarian assistance<sup>6</sup> out of 36



<sup>5</sup> IOM Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix DTM Round XXVIII September 2015

<sup>6</sup> OCHA: Iraq Humanitarian Needs Overview, 2015

million people living in Iraq, with around 29% women and 47% children. The overall summary of affected people is outlined in the table below:


**Table 1: Numbers of people in need by type and location<sup>7</sup>**

Affected group	People in need in areas under Government control	People in need in areas not under Government control	Total people in Need
IDPs in camps	200,000	-	200,000
IDPs not in camps	2 million	500,000	2.5 million
Affected people in host communities	2.5 million	700,000	3.2 million
Other highly vulnerable (not IDP, non-host)	-	1.1 million	1.1 million
Returns and newly accessible	900,000	-	900,000
Syrian refugees	250,000	4,600	254,600
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5.9 million</b>	<b>2.3 million</b>	<b>8.2 million</b>

15. Given the scale of the humanitarian situation and its linkages with the crisis in Syria, in August 2014 the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) activated the highest level (Level 3) system-wide emergency in Iraq to scale up the emergency response. At the same time, the WFP emergency operation was also categorized as a WFP Level 3 Emergency Response. In November 2015, WFP Level 3 Emergency Response has been further extended until February 2016.

16. *International Assistance.* The country is currently being assisted through both humanitarian and development frameworks. The current United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) was launched in 2015 and goes through 2019. The previous UNDAF cycle covered the period 2011-2014.

17. Chart 2 compares the trends of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and Humanitarian Aid from 2010 and 2014. Notably ODA was decreasing between 2010 and 2012, signalling that the Government of Iraq was gradually taking over the task of financing its development needs. However, in 2012, this increased slightly to 2013 while the levels of humanitarian assistance increased nearly 4000% by 2014. Despite the increased humanitarian assistance since 2012, it is still insufficient to cover the needs.



18. Some 97 international humanitarian actors are working in support of a Government-led response to the current crisis as well as more than 60 national NGOs. The UN HRP<sup>8</sup> has been elaborated by the Iraq Humanitarian Country Team and presents cluster responses in 13 fields such as Food Security, Health, Logistics, etc. (see details in the TOR section 2.3 – Stakeholders).

<sup>7</sup> OCHA: Iraq Humanitarian Needs Overview 2015

<sup>8</sup> The HRP targets populations in critical need throughout Iraq but does not cover the refugee response in Iraq (this is covered in the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, launched in 2014)

19. *Nutrition and Food Security.* As shown in Table 2 below, the national prevalence of underweight is 9%, stunting 23% and wasting 7 percent<sup>9</sup>. The 2015 UNICEF report also indicates a 12% overweight, which indicates that Iraq suffers from the double burden of undernutrition and overweight. The two major factors commonly cited are a slow progress in the development of sound public health systems, and the adoption of Western diets combined with a more sedentary lifestyle, often arising from unemployment and security concerns.

**Table 2. Percentage of malnourished children < 5 years of age compared to WHO classification**

IRAQ			WHO Classification		
Underweight	Stunting (Chronic malnutrition)	Wasting (Acute malnutrition)	Underweight	Stunting (Chronic malnutrition)	Wasting (Acute malnutrition)
9%	23%	7%	< 10% is classified as : <b>Poor</b>	20-29% is classified as: <b>Medium</b>	5-9% is classified as: <b>Medium</b>

Source: Data from the State of the World Children, UNICEF 2015, and the WHO classification.

20. Iraq, a country with an ancient agricultural history, can no longer feed itself. Farmers have had their equipment destroyed and in 2015 wheat/rice supplies and stocks were not adequate to meet Public Distribution System (PDS)<sup>10</sup> requirements. Crop production has fallen and markets are ruined. Price fluctuations, reduced water supply and insecurity have devastated overall food production across the 18 governorates of the country. Food security is of particular concern for areas that were directly affected by the displacement in April 2015. According to the May 2015 Food Security Monitoring System (FSMS<sup>11</sup>), the highest rates of poor and borderline food consumption (20-33%) and the highest rate of negative coping, are found in Anbar, Duhok and Ninewa governorates (see map in Annex 1).

21. Some 4.4 million people<sup>12</sup> are estimated to need food security assistance in Iraq. Preliminary results from a REACH needs assessment<sup>13</sup> indicate that 22% of displaced households interviewed in host communities were unable to meet their basic needs. Of this, food (74%) was the most unfulfilled need amongst households unable to afford their basic needs.

22. There is a gap between social protection requirements and the state's ability to address them. As Iraq's vulnerable populations expands across demographic, economic and political lines, social protection institutions remain limited in their ability to respond to these increases.

23. Several sources<sup>14</sup> announced the launch in November 2012 of the first National Nutrition Strategy (2012-2021) by the Iraq Ministry of Health (MoH). The strategy focuses on a number of goals, including increasing political commitment and inter-sectoral collaboration on nutrition between various ministries, reviewing and updating national policies and legislations, and reducing the prevalence of stunting from 21% to less than 10% by 2021. The development of this strategy was led by the National Food & Nutrition Committee (within the MoH) and guidance provided by UNICEF, WHO, WFP and FAO.

24. *Education.* UNESCO reports that prior to the first Gulf War in 1991 Iraq had one of the best educational performances in the region with a 100% primary school gross enrolment

<sup>9</sup> Prevalences of malnutrition in children disaggregated by sex were not available.

<sup>10</sup> The PDS is a government social assistance scheme that aims to provide all Iraqis with monthly food rations.

<sup>11</sup> The monthly FSMS began in March 2015.

<sup>12</sup> OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview, June 2015

<sup>13</sup> **Present in Iraq since November 2012, REACH (the NGO) has contributed to inform the humanitarian response to the refugee and IDP crises**, conducting household and community-level assessments. In May 2015 WFP commissioned the NGO to conduct an assessment in support of a programmatic shift to food assistance.

<sup>14</sup> UNAMI Newsletter 10 November 2012, UNICEF November 2012. However, still seeking the strategy.

rate and high levels of literacy<sup>15</sup>. Due to the current conflict, economic stagnation and displacement of millions of people, the quality of education in Iraq has deteriorated significantly<sup>16</sup>. Today the literacy rate among Iraqis above 12 years old is 79.4% with 7 out of 10 young women between the ages of 15-24 being literate<sup>17</sup>. Nationally 90% of all primary school-aged children attend school, compared to only 77% amongst the poorest children. One third of girls drop out primary school before completing six years of schooling compared to only 8% of boys.

25. The Ministry of Education, with the support of UNICEF, works to improve access to quality education, including the implementation of a Child Friendly Schools strategy to ensure primary schools adopt minimum standards that enable children to learn in a healthy and happy environment. Child-friendly school standards are being adopted in hundreds of pilot schools across Iraq's 18 governorates with plans to expand to more schools.

26. *Gender, Protection*. The 2014 UNDP Human Development Report ranks Iraq at 121 out of 152 on the gender inequality index, and reports that the percentage of women and men ages 15-49 who consider a husband to be justified in hitting or beating his wife is high: 51.2 % . The 2013-2017 NDP reports that the government does not expect to achieve gender equality in the near term due to cultural and social factors.

27. The protection of civilians from violence and grave violations of both human rights and international humanitarian law is an immediate and overarching concern in the Iraq crisis. Iraq's protection crisis is characterised by targeted attacks on civilians, restricted access to basic services, sexual and gender-based violence and grave violations of child rights. Improving and advocating for the protection of civilians in this conflict must therefore underpin all humanitarian efforts<sup>18</sup>.

## **2. Reasons for the Evaluation**

### **2.1. Rationale**

28. The evaluation is an opportunity for the Country Office (CO) to benefit from an independent assessment of its 2010-2014 Country Strategy (CS) and portfolio of operations in line with WFP's Strategic Plans (2008-2013 and 2014-2017). The CPE findings are intended to inform the CO for its future operation(s) design and strategic orientation.

29. Since there has not been any previous evaluation of WFP's portfolio of activities in Iraq carried out by the Office of Evaluation (OEV)<sup>19</sup>, the CPE is an opportunity for the CO to benefit from an independent assessment of its operations.

### **2.2. Objectives**

30. Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the evaluation will:

- assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Iraq (accountability); and
- determine the reasons for observed success/failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions

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<sup>15</sup> The most updated primary gross enrolment ratio is 107 (2007-2010 data). Source UNICEF report, 2015

<sup>16</sup> In particular for secondary school age children: only 52 % attendance for boys and 44% for girls. Barriers to secondary school attendance, IOM, May 2013.

<sup>17</sup> UNICEF official website, August 2015

<sup>18</sup> OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview, June 2015

<sup>19</sup> Information on Iraq was however collected remotely during the regional evaluation on WFP's Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis (2011-2014).



about positioning itself in Iraq, form strategic partnerships, and improve operations design and implementation whenever possible (learning).

### 2.3. Stakeholders and Users of the Evaluation

The primary user of the evaluation findings and recommendations will be the WFP Iraq CO in the refinement of current operations and partnerships and design of the next Country Strategic Plan (CSP). The Cairo Regional Bureau is also expected to use the evaluation findings to strengthen its role in providing strategic guidance and regional integration of operations. Executive Management and other Managers based in Rome will use the findings for accountability and strategic advocacy. In particular in the divisions of Programme and Policy, Performance Management and Monitoring, and Emergency Preparedness and Response.

31. Table 3 below provides a preliminary list of other stakeholders and a thorough analysis<sup>20</sup> will be done by the evaluation team during the inception phase.

**Table 3. Other Stakeholders**

Other stakeholders	
<b>Executive Board (EB)</b>	As the governing body of the organisation, the EB has a direct interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP operations and their harmonisation with strategic processes of government and partners as well as a harmonised response to the regional crisis.
<b>Beneficiaries (women, men boys and girls)</b>	As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective.
<b>Government (including partner Ministries)</b>	<p>The Government of Iraq (GoI) has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP operations in Iraq are aligned with their priorities and harmonized with other agencies in order to provide the right kind and levels of assistance to the people of Iraq. The main GoI counterparts are the Ministries of Education, Health, and Labour and Social Affairs for the PRRO. For the EMOP they are the Ministries of Displacement &amp; Migration (Baghdad) and Planning (Kurdish region). The Ministry of Displacement and Migration is leading the humanitarian response.</p> <p>The humanitarian crisis is coordinated through the Supreme Committee for IDPs and Shelter, formed in 2014. The Crisis Unit supports the Supreme Committee and is charge of providing humanitarian assistance, primarily of food rations and cash allocations.</p> <p>Iraq is the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest donor providing 18% of the total contributions.</p>
<b>Donors</b>	WFP activities are supported by donors' contributions. They have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent effectively and efficiently. They also have an interest in knowing to which extent the WFP strategy complement their own strategies and supported-programmes.
<b>UN agencies, and the Cluster Response</b>	<p>UN agencies have a shared interest with WFP in ensuring that the ensemble of UN support is effective and complementary in support of the population's needs, gender equality and human rights.</p> <p>The main UN partners for WFP's portfolio in Iraq are UNICEF, FAO and OCHA. IOM, having a wide field presence, is responsible for registering IDPs and also supported distribution of food and non-food items (NFIs).</p> <p>The Humanitarian Country Team endorsed the priorities identified by each of the 13 clusters that were active by mid-2015 and coordinated by OCHA. They are listed below along with cluster lead agencies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Protection: UNHCR</li> <li>- <b>Food security:</b> FAO and WFP co-leads</li> <li>- Health: WHO</li> <li>- Water, Sanitation &amp; Hygiene: UNICEF</li> <li>- Shelter and Non-Food Items: UNHCR</li> <li>- Camp coordination &amp; management: UNHCR</li> <li>- Education: UNICEF</li> <li>- Social Cohesion and Sustainable Livelihoods: UNDP</li> <li>- Multi-purpose cash assistance: UNHCR</li> <li>- <b>Rapid Response mechanism:</b> UNICEF and WFP co-leads</li> <li>- <b>Logistics:</b> WFP</li> <li>- <b>Emergency Telecommunications:</b> WFP</li> </ul>

<sup>20</sup> The analysis should take account of Who,Why,How and When the stakeholders will be involved in the evaluation process. During data collection all groups (gender, age) should be included.

<b>NGO partners and other organizations</b>	NGOs are WFP's partners in programme implementation and design and as such have a stake in the WFP assessment of its portfolio performance as well as an interest in its strategic orientation. WFP works with some 15 partners covering GFD, vouchers and rapid response mechanism programme interventions; such as Muslim Aid, NRC, Acted and ISHO (national NGO). IRCS is a major provider of food and non-food assistance to the displaced people.
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### 3. Subject of the Evaluation

#### 3.1. WFP's Portfolio in Iraq

32. WFP has been present in Iraq since 1964, totalling 46 operations valued at USD 2.6 billion. The first Country Strategy document (2010-2014) was developed by the CO in 2009, when Iraq was then at a crossroads to political stability and socio-economic recovery<sup>21</sup>. The central guiding principle of the WFP vision and strategy in Iraq was that Iraq is a rich country and the main role of WFP is to support Iraq to use its resources for food insecurity solutions more effectively and transparently. The overall goal of WFP response during that period was to support the Government of Iraq to improve the efficiency of the supply chain management of the PDS and strengthen their capacity at the institution and local level to design and implement safety nets to protect vulnerable groups and integrate them in the society and the economy at large. The CS developed a framework linking social protection to productive activities. However, this shift has been overshadowed by drastically increased need for emergency response activities as described above.

33. Following the Al-Anbar crisis in January 2014, WFP Iraq launched an emergency operation (EMOP) to respond to the needs of newly displaced people. Continued conflict has resulted in the extension of the EMOP in time and scope several times to meet the changing needs. Humanitarian action in conflict areas is extremely difficult as the escalating violence impacts both the humanitarian assistance and the private sector, disrupting the move of merchandise and humanitarian missions between the northern regions and the rest of the country

34. Since January 2012, there have been five WFP operations and two Special Operations (SOs) in Iraq. The portfolio is composed of three EMOPs, one Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO), one Development Project (DEV) and two SOs as an air service, and logistics & telecommunication responses. Table 3 illustrates the timeline and the funding level of the Iraqi portfolio. The EMOP 200677, PRRO 200035 and the SO 200746 were categorized as Level 3 in August 2014. A budget revision for EMOP 200677 was prepared to extend the operation through 2016 while including some strategic shifts in the portfolio of activities to better position the response for early recovery when the situation allows.

35. Figure 1 below summarizes key events taking place during the period under evaluation along with the timeline of WFP Iraq's operations and funding levels.

36. The three emergency operations were relatively well funded (64%), compared to the development project (12 % only) and the first SO (37%) – which both started in 2010 during a transition period from crisis to recovery. As of August 2015, the current EMOP (200677) has received 63% of its total requirement and is one of the top five best funded emergency operations globally. However, due to the current funding constraints, the CO has made adjustments to the distribution cycles. As of August 2015, the portfolio's top five donors are: Saudi Arabia (48%), Iraq (18%), Japan (6%), Canada (5%), and Australia (4%). See Annex 7.

37. The Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO 200035) was launched in April 2010 and has been extended until December 2015<sup>22</sup>. Through the PRRO, WFP Iraq aimed to improve the social protection and food security of vulnerable groups most affected by


<sup>21</sup> Improvements in the overall security situation since 2008 and a successful provincial election in January 2009.

<sup>22</sup> The PRRO 200035 was originally planned to cover a 2-year period (April 2010-March 2012). The PRRO had 8 Budget Revisions. On 19 August 2015 a Concept Note has been endorsed for a Development project 200855 as a continuation of WFP's development activities currently implemented under the PRRO. The new DEV project is expected to be presented to the Executive Board in February 2016.

prolonged instability. School Feeding was the main component but was suspended in January 2014<sup>23</sup> due to an issue related to the use of imported high energy biscuits (see below). A July 2014 budget revision refocused the PRRO activities on school feeding capacity development.

38. The Development Project (DEV) started in June 2010 and continued through August 2012<sup>24</sup>. In line with the CS, the overall goal of this operation was to support the GoI to strengthen social protection for vulnerable groups through reform of the PDS and development of a more diversified system of social safety nets linked to the productive sector. The CS and the above mentioned two operations (PRRO and DEV) were designed in 2009/2010 i.e. before the security situation worsened and assistance had to focus on life-saving activities.

39. The 3 EMOPs. Two EMOPs were Immediate Response EMOPs (IR-EMOP), one launched in January 2014, the other in June 2014. The first one aimed to provide critical food assistance to 45,000 IDPs and vulnerable households in Anbar governorate. The second IR-EMOP (200729) aimed to provide emergency food assistance to 43,500 people displaced internally by the sudden onset of fighting in Mosul city in Ninewa governorate. The current EMOP 200677<sup>25</sup> was originally planned to respond to the urgent needs of 240,000 people displaced due to the Anbar crisis. The 2014 Standard Project Report (SPR) indicates that WFP planned to meet the food assistance needs of 1.3 million IDPs in all 18 governorates of Iraq. The June 2015 HRP targets 2.2 million IDPs in camps in host communities in Government-controlled areas across the country as the conflict continued to intensify, and the current EMOP was revised to align to this target.




Source: DACOTA, 2015

<sup>23</sup> Although school feeding continued in some locations using food commodities that were carried over from 2013.

<sup>24</sup> DEV 200104 was extended for 5 months (Extension in Time only) due to the slow pace in the implementation of the project activities.

<sup>25</sup> EMOP 200677 was initially planned to cover April - September 2014, and was extended until December 2015 to respond to the growing needs. The EMOP has undergone five Budget Revisions mainly for evolving needs.

**Figure 1: Timeline of Key Events and Operations Covered in WFP Iraq Portfolio Evaluation**



Source: APR 2013-2014, SPR 2010-2014, WFP Resource Situation Updates as of August 2015.

Requirements (Req.) and Contributions Received (Rec.) are in US\$. \* An initiative of the Government of Iraq for a new partnership with the international community. \*\*Announced, but document not available.

40. The 2 SOs. The first SO (2011-May 2012) provided air transport services in Iraq. In 2011 WFP established the United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) to provide air transport to remote and insecure locations in Iraq for the entire humanitarian community. Given the scale of the emergency and the scope of the humanitarian needs in 2014, the current Special Operation (SO200746) aims to provide a coordinated logistics response and augmentation of emergency telecommunications (ETC) capability to ensure efficient delivery of assistance. This SO covers the work of two WFP led clusters: Logistics and ETC.

41. Illustrated by the below table, the two interventions in the portfolio with the most with beneficiaries receiving direct assistance include general food distribution (GFD) with 52% of total and school feeding (SF) with 47 percent. Some 10% of the beneficiaries received WFP assistance through cash-based transfers, mainly through the current EMOP. The PRRO included a Mother & Child Health Nutrition activity (MCHN). During 2012 and 2014, the Standard Project Reports indicate that a total of 67,800 MT of food have been distributed to over 3.6 million beneficiaries.

42. General Food Distribution. The emergency response provides life-savings food assistance through GFD<sup>26</sup> to IDPs, host communities and population in conflict zones. GFD was the sole WFP activity for the 3 EMOPs.

43. School feeding is a major part of the Government's strategy for poverty reduction and education. In 2012 WFP and the Ministry of Education (MoE) renewed a Partnership Agreement. MoE and WFP were to provide high energy biscuits (HEB) to 512,000 primary school children in 1,860 schools in the 18 most vulnerable districts in central and southern governorates. Capacity development was a component of this project. MoE donated USD 17 million to WFP Iraq for the school feeding programme for the 2012/2013 academic year. A Trust Fund was established in 2013 to register this contribution<sup>27</sup> but an issue surrounding the use of imported high energy biscuits led to the suspension of the school feeding programme in late 2013. Restoring cooperation, a small-scale school feeding project started in February 2015 in Thi Qar governorate (South of Iraq), distributing daily meals from local manufacturers to 20,000 school children across 74 schools.

**Table 4. Food assistance planned & actual beneficiaries, by activity and by operation**

Activity Operation		School feeding	Nutrition	GFD	Cash/ Vouchers
PRRO 200035	Planned	1,957,200 96.3%	75,859 3.7%		89,896 4%
	Actual	1,680,339 97%	44,352 3%		101,010 6%
EMOP 200677	Planned			1,322,200 100%	341,000 26%
	Actual			1,771,671 100%	242,746 14%
IR- EMOP 200663	Planned			45,000 100%	
	Actual			58,072 100%	
IR- EMOP 200729	Planned			43,500 100%	
	Actual			46,806 100%	
<b>Planned % of beneficiaries</b>		1,957,200 50%	75,859 1.9%	1,860,171 47.8%	430,896 11.1%
<b>Actual % of beneficiaries</b>		1,680,339 46.7%	44,352 1.2%	1,876,549 52.1%	343,756 9.5%

\*The table covers 2012-2014. DEV 200104 is composed of capacity-building and technical advisory activities. SO are non-food operations and are not included here.

Source: DACOTA, 2015

44. Early 2014, C&V transfer modalities were considered inappropriate<sup>28</sup> due to lack of access to conduct market assessments and set up a monitoring system. WFP examined the possibilities again to respond to major displacements in June and August 2014 and started to use food vouchers to assist displaced families by October 2014. The food vouchers can be redeemed at selected local shops, empowering families to choose the food they prefer. During

<sup>26</sup> Via Family Food Parcel (FFP)

<sup>27</sup> There were issues around the quality/shelflife of the imported biscuits which deteriorated the partnership between WFP and the MoE in late 2013. As a result the USD 17 million has been frozen.

<sup>28</sup> Emergency Operation Iraq 200677, Project Document.

September and December 2015, some 450,000 IDPs are planned to receive assistance in the forms of vouchers and WFP will begin the transition to cash.

### **3.2. Scope of the Evaluation**

45. The strategic scope of the evaluation will cover the period January 2010 – June 2015 which includes the period of the CS. However the operational focus will cover the 2012 – June 2015 period which is when the nature and scope of the operations in Iraq changed dramatically in response to the crisis in the region and the country. Thus the CPE will review the WFP Iraq CS 2010-2014, and will assess overall performance of the portfolio of seven operations, including 3 EMOPs<sup>29</sup>, 1 PRRO, 1 DEV and 2 SOs<sup>30</sup>. The Regional EMOP 200433 was evaluated in 2015 by OEV under the WFP's Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis, and will not be part of the evaluation scope per se, but will be used to consider regional coherence and regional strategic management in the Iraq operations.

46. The evaluation will also cover the USD 17 million contribution received from the Iraq Ministry of Education in November 2012<sup>31</sup> for the distribution of imported high energy biscuits (HEB) for the school feeding programme, and lessons that can be drawn from that partnership.

47. In light of the strategic nature of the evaluation, it is not intended to evaluate each operation individually, but to focus broadly on the portfolio as a whole. Following the established approach for WFP CPEs, the evaluation focuses on three main areas detailed in the below key evaluation questions (Section 4.1).

48. In addition, the evaluation will be coordinated with and complementary to an Internal Audit which will be taking place around the same time and plans are also being made for an Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the Iraq response in 2016.

## **4. Evaluation Questions, Approach and Methodology**

### **4.1. Evaluation Questions**

49. The CPE will address the following three key questions common to the CPE model, which will be further tailored and detailed in a realistic matrix of evaluation questions to be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase and consider the different needs of various age groups, gender, etc. The evaluation will make forward-looking strategic recommendations.

50. Question one: What has been the Strategic Alignment of WFP's country strategy & portfolio in Iraq? Proposed sub-questions will include the extent to which the CO main objectives and related activities have been:

- i. relevant to Iraq's humanitarian and developmental needs;
- ii. coherent with the national agenda and policies;
- iii. coherent and harmonized with those of other partners and UN system, including UN-SWAP; and
- iv. Reflect on the extent to which WFP has been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference.

51. Question two: What have been the factors driving strategic decision making? Reflect on the extent to which WFP :

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<sup>29</sup> Two are Immediate Response EMOPs. EMOP 200677 has been categorized level 3 (L3).

<sup>30</sup> SOs will be evaluated to the extent that they contributed to WFP's operational results.

<sup>31</sup> Registered in 2013 as a Trust Fund. In December 2013 a second tranche of USD 17 million had been transferred to WFP to finance a second round of school feeding. However the money has been frozen because of a dispute between WFP and the MoE around the quality of the biscuits. This element of the operation was subject to a investigation from WFP Office of Inspections and Investigations.

- i. has analysed the national hunger, nutrition and food security issues including from a gender perspective, and appropriately used this analysis to understand the key hunger challenges in Iraq;
  - ii. contributed to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues; and
  - iii. to identify the factors that determined existing choices (perceived comparative advantages, corporate strategies, resources, organisational structure, etc.) to understand the drivers of a WFP Iraq CS and how they need to be considered when developing a new CS.
52. Question three: What have been the WFP portfolio Performance and Results? Reflect on:
- i. the performance against the Humanitarian Principles and Common Humanitarian Standards;
  - ii. the level of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities in Iraq;
  - iii. the extent to which WFP operations in Iraq have met the changing needs of the Iraqi people as per the UNDAF and the Humanitarian Response Plans as well as future perspectives with special focus on cash-based transfers and national social protection and also considering the specific needs of women, men, girls and boys.
  - iv. the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to and control over food, resources, and decision-making;
  - v. the level of synergy and multiplying effect between similar activities in different operations, and between the various main activities regardless of the operations; and
  - vi. the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners at operational level.

#### 4.2. Evaluability Assessment

**Evaluability** is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. It necessitates that a policy, intervention or operation provides: (a) a clear description of the situation before or at its start that can be used as reference point to determine or measure change; (b) a clear statement of intended outcomes, i.e. the desired changes that should be observable once implementation is under way or completed; (c) a set of clearly defined and appropriate indicators with which to measure changes; and (d) a defined timeframe by which outcomes should be occurring. The evaluation team will identify whether the interventions has an adequate set of gender indicators to enable the assessment of gender and options to address gender evaluability challenges during the evaluation process.

53. The CPE will benefit from the OEV commissioned evaluation report on WFP's response to the crisis in Syria and the surrounding region<sup>32</sup>.

54. The CO faces contextual and operational challenges, such as a volatile political context, funding, and major security and access constraints<sup>33</sup>, particularly in the Western part of the country. The CO uses third part monitoring (TPM) in many areas as well which may result in some data availability constraints. This will be taken into account by the evaluation team when developing their data collection strategy.

55. Requests to visit Ministries and other counterpart offices must be submitted two days in advance for approval, and are at risk of cancellation if violence arises in the city. Due to mobility constraints and the general difficult working environment in the country, it is possible that fieldwork will require more time than for most CPEs.

56. The WFP Iraq CS developed in 2009 guided the design of two operations covered by the CPE (the PRRO and the DEV). However the CS is not a results-based management document. Thus the primary benchmarks for assessing performance will be a combination of

<sup>32</sup> Regional EMOP 200433 presented to the June Board in 2015

<sup>33</sup> Given the security limitations, field visits may require armed escorts, advance planning, etc.

the operation project documents, standard project reports (SPR) as well as qualitative assessment of WFP's work.

### 4.3 Methodology

57. The evaluation will employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and connectedness – appropriately linked to the three key evaluation questions.

58. During the inception phase, the evaluation team will design the evaluation methodology to be presented in the inception report<sup>34</sup>. The methodology will:

- Examine the logic of the portfolio based on the Country Strategy and its relationship to the objectives of the operations comprising the portfolio;
- Addressing the evaluation questions using triangulation of information from diverse sources and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data<sup>35</sup>. A model looking at groups of “main activities/sectors” across a number of operations rather than at individual operations should be adopted.
- Take into account the limitations to evaluability (including security and mobility challenges) as well as budget and timing constraints.

59. The methodology should demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, Monitoring reports, etc.) and following a systematic process to answering the evaluation questions with evidence.

### 4.4 Quality Assurance

60. WFP's evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes quality assurance of evaluation reports (inception, full and summary reports) based on standardised checklists. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. The OEV evaluation manager will conduct the first level quality assurance, and the OEV Director will conduct the second level review. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis.

61. The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases.

## 5. Organization of the Evaluation

### 5.1. Phases and Deliverables

62. The evaluation is structured in five phases summarized in Table 5 below. The three phases involving the evaluation team are: (i) The *Inception phase* with a briefing of the evaluation team in Rome, followed by an inception mission to the CO Iraq (team leader and evaluation manager), then by the inception report providing details for conducting the evaluation fieldwork; (ii) The *Fieldwork phase*: primary and secondary data collection and

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<sup>34</sup> The evaluation matrix – presented in the inception report - will be a crucial organizing tool for the evaluation. The matrix will identify the possible efficiency sub questions and the appropriate techniques of efficiency analysis.

<sup>35</sup> To ensure that diverse perspectives and voices of both males and females are heard and used. The team should develop data collection methods ensuring integration of gender considerations.



preliminary analysis with at least 3 weeks in the field; (iii) the *Reporting phase* concludes with the final evaluation report (a full report and an EB summary report) that is planned to be presented to WFP’s Executive Board in November 2016.

**Table 5: Summary Timeline – key evaluation milestones**

Main phases	Timeline	Tasks (Team deliverables in BOLD)
1. Preparatory	Oct – Dec 2015	Draft and Final TOR Evaluation company selected & contracted
2. Inception	Jan – Feb 2016	Document review Team briefing at WFP HQ Inception mission and <b>Inception Report</b>
3. Evaluation	Mar-Apr 2016	Evaluation mission and data collection Teleconference ( <b>Debriefing PPT</b> ) Analysis
4. Reporting	Apr – July 2016	<b>Report drafting</b> Comments & process reviews <b>In-country learning workshop</b> <b>Final evaluation report (including SER)</b>
5. Executive Board and follow-up EB 2/2016 (Nov session)	Aug-Nov 2016	Summary Evaluation Report Editing Evaluation Report formatting Management Response and Executive Board preparation

## 5.2. Evaluation team/expertise required

63. The evaluation will be conducted by a team of independent consultants with relevant expertise for the Iraqi portfolio. It is anticipated that a core team of minimum four evaluators (including the team leader), will be required for the evaluation. It is expected that the evaluation will be conducted by a gender-balanced, geographically and culturally diverse team with appropriate skills to assess the gender dimensions as specified in the TOR.

64. The team leader (TL) will have the additional responsibility for overall design, implementation, reporting and timely delivering of all evaluation products. The TL should also have a good understanding of the 2012-2015 Iraqi context, food security issues in a humanitarian crisis, and familiarity with the relevant portfolio issues. He/she will have excellent synthesis and reporting skills in English.

65. The evaluation team - composed of at least two national consultants - should combine between its various members the following competencies and expertise:

- Strong experience in strategic and political economy analysis related to humanitarian assistance, relevant to the complexity of the Iraqi context;
- Knowledge of WFP work modalities, WFP types of programmes, and the UN clusters operating in Iraq (in particular the Food security, Rapid Response mechanisms, Logistics, and Emergency Telecommunication clusters);
- Expertise in strategic issues specifically related to WFP operational areas of: Safety nets/social protection, School Feeding, Capacity Building, Cash & Voucher transfers, Logistics and Humanitarian Response Management;
- Deep understanding of the Humanitarian Principles and challenges faced in a conflict crisis when access is constrained; and

- Ability to conduct a complex evaluation with a strong strategic dimension, and to design an appropriate and realistic methodology for a difficult working environment.

### **5.3. Roles and Responsibilities**

66. This evaluation is managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV). Eric Kenefick has been appointed as Evaluation Manager (EM). The EM has not worked on issues associated with the subject of evaluation in the past. He is responsible for conceptualizing and drafting the evaluation TOR; selecting and contracting the evaluation team (via contracting a consultant firm); managing the budget; setting up the review group; organizing the team briefing in HQ; assisting in the preparation of the field mission; conducting the first level quality assurance of the evaluation products and soliciting WFP stakeholders feedback on the evaluation report. The EM will also be the main interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.

67. WFP stakeholders at CO, RB and HQ levels are expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation and engaged with the evaluation team to discuss the portfolio's performance and results. The CO will facilitate the organisation of the two missions<sup>36</sup> in Iraq; facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders in the country; set up meetings and field visits and provide logistic support during the fieldwork. The Country Office should nominate a focal point to communicate with the evaluation team. A detailed consultation schedule will be presented by the evaluation team in the Inception Report. The CO will also organise a learning workshop in Iraq for both internal and external stakeholders with support from the Team Leader and Evaluation Manager.

68. The contracted company will support the evaluation team in providing quality checks to the draft evaluation products being sent to OEV for its feedback. Particularly, the company will review the draft inception and evaluation reports, prior to submission to OEV.

69. To ensure the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias the responses of the stakeholders.

### **5.4. Communication**

70. WFP stakeholders at CO, RB and in HQ will engage with the evaluation process and will be invited to provide feedback on the TOR and the Evaluation Report, which are the two core draft evaluation products.

71. During the last day of the fieldwork there will be an internal exit debrief with the evaluation team and the CO. After the fieldwork, the initial evaluation findings and conclusions will be shared with WFP stakeholders in CO, RB and HQ during a teleconference debriefing session.

72. All evaluation products will be written in English.

73. The SER along with the Management Response to the evaluation recommendations is planned to be presented to the WFP Executive Board in November 2016. The final evaluation report will be posted on the public WFP website.

### **5.5. Budget**

74. The evaluation will be financed from the Office of Evaluation's budget at a *total* estimated cost of USD 270,000. The total budget covers all expenses related to consultant/company rates, international travels, and OEV staff travel. The evaluation team will be hired through an institutional contract with a consultant company.


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<sup>36</sup> The Inception Mission and the Evaluation Mission.

## Annex B: Cost Analysis of Iraq CO Operations


IRAQ CPE 2010 - December 2015 - ANALYSIS of COSTS														
Operations	PRRO 200035		DEV 200104		IR-EMOP 200663		EMOP 200677		IR-EMOP 200729		SO 200117		SO 200746	
	Support to Vulnerable Groups		Capacity Development to reform PDS and Strengthen Social Safety Nets		Food assistance for IDPs (Fighting Falluja and Ramadi)		Emergency Assistance to Populations affected by Iraq crisis		Food assistance for IDPs (Fighting Mosul City)		Provision of Humanitarian Air Services		Logistic Cluster and Emergency Telecommunication Support	
Time frame	Aug. 2010	Ext. Dec. 2016	May 2010	Ext. Aug. 2012	Jan. 2014	Apr. 2014	Apr. 2014	Ext. Dec. 2016	Jun. 2014	Aug. 2014	Dec. 2010	May 2012	Jul. 2014	Ext. Dec. 2016
	SPR 2010 - 2015		SPR 2010 - 2013		SPR 2014		SPR 2014 - 2015		SPR 2015		SPR 2010 - 2015		SPR 2014 - 2015	
Food Costs	10,780,639		-		879,219		129,745,028		882,253					
External transport	442,006		-		-		33,186		-					
LTSH	4,334,041		-		173,731		19,843,404		152,642					
ODOC	3,652,395		336,397		48,331		11,919,771		209,801					
<b>Total food and related costs</b>	<b>19,209,081</b>	<b>19,209,081</b>	<b>336,397</b>	<b>336,397</b>	<b>1,101,281</b>	<b>1,101,281</b>	<b>161,541,390</b>	<b>161,541,390</b>	<b>1,244,696</b>	<b>1,244,696</b>				
<b>Stock transfer + or -</b>		<b>252,485</b>		<b>-</b>		<b>(299,254)</b>		<b>633,330</b>		<b>(332,934)</b>				
Net Cash & Vouchers paid out	8,931,430						71,773,978							
Costs paid to NGOs /IPs	1,001,950						3,107,200							
Costs paid to bank or paying out org.	29,320						2,515,299							
<b>Total C &amp; V and related costs</b>	<b>9,962,700</b>	<b>9,962,700</b>		<b>-</b>		<b>-</b>	<b>77,396,477</b>	<b>77,396,477</b>		<b>-</b>				
<b>Cap. &amp; Dev't &amp; Augmentation</b>		<b>69,241</b>		<b>-</b>		<b>-</b>		<b>-</b>		<b>-</b>		<b>6,201,953</b>		<b>3,908,445</b>
<b>Total direct operational costs</b>		<b>29,493,507</b>		<b>336,397</b>		<b>802,027</b>		<b>239,571,197</b>		<b>911,762</b>		<b>6,201,953</b>		<b>3,908,445</b>
DSC	15,448,131		2,335,025		78,922		27,661,132		90,870		1,978,220		507,682	
<b>Total Direct project costs</b>	<b>44,941,638</b>		<b>2,671,422</b>		<b>880,949</b>		<b>267,232,329</b>		<b>1,002,632</b>		<b>8,180,173</b>		<b>4,416,127</b>	
ISC	2,305,268		163,551		-		21,758,964		-		359,813		481,552	
<b>Total</b>	<b>47,246,906</b>		<b>2,834,973</b>		<b>880,949</b>		<b>288,991,293</b>		<b>1,002,632</b>		<b>8,539,986</b>		<b>4,897,679</b>	
<b>Approved budget</b>		96,624,986		25,391,910		1,497,731		449,883,977		1,490,252		17,071,954		15,087,568
<b>Conf. Contributions</b>		75,012,793		2,863,732		880,949		330,622,439		1,002,632		8,539,986		7,750,140
<b>Funding</b>		77.64%		11.28%		58.82%		73.49%		67.28%		50.03%		51.37%
<b>Balance of contribution av.</b>		<b>27,765,887</b>		<b>28,758</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>41,631,147</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>2,852,460</b>
<b>Tonnage of food distributed</b>	up to 31/12/15		up to 31/08/12		up to 15/04/14		up to 31/12/15		up to 15/08/14		up to 31/05/12			
	2010	0	2010	0							2010	0		
	2011	2,672	2011	0							2011	0		
	2012	4,546	2012	0							2012	0		
	2013	5,295												
	2014	608			Rations 2014	756	Rations 2014	56,004	2014	550			2014	0
	Rations 2015	449					Rations 2015	95,605					2015	0
	<b>Total MT:</b>	<b>13,570</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>756</b>		<b>151,609</b>		<b>550</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>0</b>
FOOD	Food cost/MT	794.49			Food cost/MT	767.15	Food cost/MT	855.79	Food cost/MT	998.77				
	Ext. Transp/MT	32.58			Ext. Transp/MT	0	Ext. Transp/MT	0.22	Ext. Transp/MT	0				
	LTSH/MT	319.39			LTSH/MT	229.81	LTSH/MT	130.89	LTSH/MT	277.52				
	ODOC/MT	269.16			ODOC/MT	63.93	ODOC/MT	78.63	ODOC/MT	381.56				
	<b>Total cost/MT</b>	<b>1415.62</b>			<b>Total cost/MT</b>	<b>1060.89</b>	<b>Total cost/MT</b>	<b>1065.53</b>	<b>Total cost/MT</b>	<b>1657.85</b>				
Transp. & Distr. cost per net US\$ 100 worth of food		<b>78.19</b>		N/A		<b>38.29</b>		<b>24.51</b>		<b>65.98</b>		N/A		N/A
TRAINING CAP. DEV - ODOC				336,397										
CASH and VOUCHERS														
Net Cash or Voucher distributed		8,931,430		0		0	71,773,978		0		0		0	
Distribution cost per net US\$ 100 Cash or Voucher		<b>11.55</b>					<b>7.84</b>							
DSC														
DSC per US\$ 100 worth of DOC		<b>52.38</b>		<b>694.12</b>		<b>9.84</b>		<b>11.55</b>		<b>9.97</b>		<b>31.90</b>		<b>12.99</b>

## Annex C: Summary timeline of political and security events 2008-2015



## Annex D: Monthly displacement figures from March 2014 to April 2016

### Number of Internally Displaced by month 2014-2016



Source: IOM, 2016, Displacement Tracking Matrix.

### Number of Returnees by period of former displacement

Period of Former Displacement	Returnees, Families	Returnees, Individuals
1. Pre-June 2014 wave	581	3,486
2. June-July 2014	31,487	188,922
3. August 2014	29,766	178,596
4. Post September 2014	16,160	96,960
5. Post April 2015	14,190	85,140
<b>Total</b>	<b>92,184</b>	<b>553,104</b>

Source: IOM, 2016, Displacement Tracking Matrix.

## Annex E: Alignment of Country Strategy Goals with WFP Strategic Plans

WFP 2014-2017 Corporate Strategy	<b>Strategic Objective 1:</b> Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies	<b>Strategic Objective 2:</b> Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies;	<b>Strategic Objective 4:</b> Reduce undernutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger.
WFP 2008-2013 Corporate Strategy	<b>Strategic Objective 3:</b> Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post conflict, post disaster and transition situation	<b>Strategic Objective 4:</b> Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition	<b>Strategic Objective 5:</b> Strengthen the capacity of countries to reduce hunger, including through handover strategies and local purchase
2010-2014 Country Strategy Goals	<p>To support the resettlement and reintegration of refugees and returnees through vouchers and cash-based programmes to rebuild livelihoods</p> <p>To support and strengthen the capacity of the Gol to prepare for, assess and respond to acute food insecurity by 2014.</p> <p>To support the re-establishment of livelihoods and food and nutrition security of communities and families affected by shocks through Government safety nets by 2014.</p>	<p>To increase the levels of education and basic nutrition and health through food and nutrition assistance and food and nutrition security tools in Iraq.</p>	<p>To promote value added procurement to support rehabilitation of the agricultural sector.</p> <p>To design and implement effective social safety nets targeting vulnerable groups.</p> <p>To improve efficiency in managing the supply chain of the PDS for vulnerable groups including procurement, shipping, commodity tracking, warehousing and storage.</p> <p>To strengthen the capacity of the Gol to design, manage and implement tools, policies and programmes to predict and reduce food insecurity.</p>

### Annex F: Planned vs actual beneficiaries for PRRO 200035 and EMOPs

Mother and child health and nutrition									
	Planned			Actual			% A vs. P		
Year	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
2010									
2011	10224	20501	30725	0	0	0	0	0	0
2012	17672	38078	55,750	17516	16305	33821	99	43	61
2013	10385	9724	20109	2405	2314	4719	23	24	24
2014									
2015									
<b>Total</b>	<b>38281</b>	<b>68303</b>	<b>106584</b>	<b>19921</b>	<b>18619</b>	<b>38540</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>28</b>
Cash for Work									
	Planned			Actual			% A vs. P		
Year	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
2010									
2011									
2012	23,250	22,338	45,588	30,025	28,259	58,284	129	127	128
2013	29,619	28,458	58,077	30,747	29,541	60,288	104	104	104
2014	16,228	15,591	31,819	20,743	19,979	40,722	128	128	128
2015									
<b>Total</b>	<b>69,097</b>	<b>66,387</b>	<b>135,484</b>	<b>81,515</b>	<b>77,779</b>	<b>159,294</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>118</b>
School Feeding									
Year	Planned			Actual			% Actual vs. Planned		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
2010/2011	278,746	267,814	546,560	305,986	249,248	555,234	109.8%	93.1%	101.6%
2011/2012	332,724	319,676	652,400	341,815	282,216	624,031	102.7%	88.3%	95.7%
2012/2013	332,724	319,676	652,400	366,632	303,055	669,687	110.2%	94.8%	102.6%
2013/2014	339,248	313,152	652,400	201,043	185,578	386,621	59.3%	59.3%	59.3%
2014/2015	0	0	0	0	0	0			
2015/2016	11,550	9,450	21,000	11,229	9,566	20,795	97.2%	101.2%	99.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,294,992</b>	<b>1,229,768</b>	<b>2,524,760</b>	<b>1,226,705</b>	<b>1,029,663</b>	<b>2,256,368</b>	<b>94.7%</b>	<b>83.7%</b>	<b>89.4%</b>

IRAQ CPE 2010 - 2015 Beneficiaries Planned versus Actual.									
PRRO				Beneficiaries planned			Beneficiaries Actual		
Year	Programme	Start date	End date	Male	Female	Total M & F	Male	Female	Total M & F
Total 2010				0	0	0	0	0	0
Total 2011				312,220	310,653	622,873	336,011	277,507	613,518
Total 2012				380,015	386,212	766,227	387,825	330,255	718,080
Total 2013				359,337	344,991	704,328	389,612	326,903	716,515
Total 2014				339,248	313,152	652,400	201,043	185,378	386,421
Total 2015				11,550	9,450	21,000	11,229	9,566	20,795
<b>Total 2010-15</b>				<b>1,402,370</b>	<b>1,364,458</b>	<b>2,766,828</b>	<b>1,325,720</b>	<b>1,129,609</b>	<b>2,455,329</b>
EMOP				Beneficiaries planned			Beneficiaries Actual		
Year	Programme	Start date	End date	Male	Female	Total M & F	Male	Female	Total M & F
Total 2010				0	0	0	0	0	0
Total 2011				0	0	0	0	0	0
Total 2012				0	0	0	0	0	0
Total 2013				0	0	0	0	0	0
Total 2014				690,275	720,425	1,410,700	917,953	958,597	1,876,550
Total 2015				1,085,350	1,129,650	2,215,000	933,165	896,571	1,829,736
<b>Total 2010-15</b>				<b>1,775,625</b>	<b>1,850,075</b>	<b>3,625,700</b>	<b>1,851,118</b>	<b>1,855,168</b>	<b>3,706,286</b>



### Annex G: Rations for FFPs as detailed in BR 4

	General Ration (FFP)	PDS (Complementary Ration)
	Revised	Unchanged
Wheat Flour	150	
Rice	140	
Lentils	40	33
Vegetable Oil	30	
Dry chick peas	60	33
White beans		17
Sugar	33	33
Salt	5	5
Cash/voucher (US\$/person/month)	16	10
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>458</b>	<b>121</b>
<b>Total kcal/day</b>	<b>1,755</b>	<b>420</b>
% kcal from protein	11.3	75
% kcal from fat	19.3	6
Feeding days per month	30	30

## Annex H: Supply Chain Management Details

### CPE IRAQ – Detailed analysis of the WFP on basis of the procurement returns.

Quantities as per: Programme - Trade Terms - Supplier

Programme	Quantity MT	Trade Terms	Quantity MT	Bought from	Quantity MT
PRRO 200035	15,762	CFR – Cost and freight	2,746	Manufacturer	127,865
IR-EMOP 200663	1,197	DAP - Delivered at place	173,393	Trader	23,100
EMOP 200667	171,915	FCA – Free carrier	2,185	Not specified	40,435
IR-EMOP 200729	1,115	FOB – Free on board	13,076		
S 0003	1,411				
<b>Totals:</b>	<b>191,400</b>		<b>191,400</b>		<b>191,400</b>

Quantities as per type of commodity and country of origin.

Commodity	Quantity MT	Value US\$ Min - Max	Country of origin	Quantity MT	Main commodities supplied
Bulgur wheat	450	424 / 458	Algeria	492	W. Sugar
Chick Peas	1,395	775 / 909	Brazil	331	W. Sugar
HEB	15,022	1,150 / 2,500	Eur. Union	550	Horse Bean
Horse Beans	550	648 / 678	France	235	Ready to Use/ Plumpy dosz
Lentils	599	885 / 930	India	2,930	
Rations	156,796	675 / 3,467	Indonesia	8,856	HEB
Ready to Use/ Plumpy dosz	235	3,053 / 3,533	Iraq	23,438	Rations, HEB,W.Flour
Rice	3,618	465 / 523	Kazakhstan	599	Lentils
Salt	160	248 / 290	Mexico	231	W. Sugar
Sugar	1,055	618 / 654	Oman	492	HEB
Vegetable oil	1,007	1,150 / 1,209	Pakistan	688	Rice
Wheat Flour	10,513	375 / 520	Russia	509	Chick Peas
			Turkey	147,785	Rations, W. Flour, Veg. Oil
			U.A.E.	4,264	HEB
<b>Totals:</b>	<b>191,400</b>			<b>191,400</b>	

**DEV 200035 Analysis of the movements of commodities:**

<b>Type of movement of commodity</b>	<b>Quantity - MT</b>	<b>Number of consignments activated</b>
Delivery / Reception into WFP indicated warehouse	13,970	839
Commodities disposed off	40	1
Cooperating Partner internal transport	186	15
WFP internal transport	40	1
Commodities given as loan	487	76
Commodities returned	67	1
Food commodities distributed	13,530	750
<b>Total tonnage handled</b>	<b>28,320</b>	

## Annex I: Evaluation Methodologies

The methodologies undertaken during the evaluation built on those mentioned in the TOR. Considering the time lag between the closure of some of the programmes and the timing of the CPE it was of course difficult to gather information due to the high turnover of staff, both within WFP and its co-operating partners as well as within Government departments. As such a multi-layered mixed methodology approach was followed as is commonly used in such types of evaluations. Details of the methodologies and tools used and how they will be triangulated are indicated below and in the evaluation matrix.

This CPE has used three principle points of reference to guide the evaluation process, which include:

- The five objectives of the WFP Strategic Plan of 2008-2013, being the relevant comparative document at the inception of the Country Strategy (2010-2014), and the four objectives of the WFP Strategic Plan of 2014–2017
- The outcomes of the PRRO 200035, DEV 200104, SO 200117, IR-EMOP 200663, EMOP 200677, IR-EMOP 200729 and SO 200746 operations including their budget revisions, and their performance against expected results.
- The key evaluation questions relative to the strategic alignment of the country strategy, and the decision-making factors that have driven that alignment.

In order to achieve the goals of the CPE, guided by the specifications and objectives from the three points of reference, and taking into consideration the complexity of the Iraq context, the team has used, as indicated above, a mixed method approach for this evaluation. This methodology was a combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques and tools to capitalize on the advantages and strengths of each method. Use of this approach assisted in ensuring the reliability of information by providing additional sources for corroborating findings and enhancing insights. A mixed method approach also allowed for triangulation, complementarity and clarification, and the expansion of both the range and the breadth of investigation.

The approach used four main sources of information to augment the limited accessibility of primary data, ensure validity and reliability of results, and deliver credible and evidence based recommendations. These sources were:

1. **Literature review.** This included exploring and understanding the context of WFP operations generally and within the Iraq context based on the documents provided through the e-library with the support of the OEV and Iraq CO.
2. **Secondary data review.** This served a dual purpose: firstly, to evaluate and amalgamate the comprehensive CO-related data, such as audit reports, annual work plans, and SPRs. This work also helped the evaluation team understand, incorporate and build on currently available data to eliminate any possibilities of effort duplication. The second purpose also helped optimize primary data collection to focus on areas that warrant triangulation, complementarity, and expansion.
3. **Primary data collection:** using qualitative and quantitative data collection instruments, the primary data collection portion used online surveys, semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions (FGDs).

- i. **Qualitative data** collection occurred in the form of semi-structured in-depth interviews and FGDs with key informants, stakeholders, and different beneficiary groups (including gender based groups when needed). (Please see Annex K for a comprehensive list questions utilised for these various groups that link back into the evaluation matrix).
  - ii. **Quantitative data** instruments included two separate surveys that were collected online. One instrument targeted the government and food security cluster members, including co-operating partners and other international and local NGOs active in the response, in order to gather the insights of other operational actors working in the same sector as WFP of the relevance and quality they feel the work of WFP has been, the timeliness and impact of the work, and its coherence with other actors in the field. The second instrument focused on the perceptions of current and former WFP employees to gather their perspective on their organisation's activities in Iraq between 2012 and 2015.
4. **Site visits** to both camps and host communities that observed WFP's programmes currently ongoing with a view to reviewing their implementation over time by talking to beneficiaries, both individually and in FGDs. Wherever possible, separate FGDs were arranged especially for women. Site visits were also used to talk to WFP staff, co-operating partners, and local authorities in those areas. These visits helped assess the field level application and outputs of support programmes as compared with the intended results expected at a strategic level.
  5. School visits to both the recent pilot project in Thi Qar and to schools previously supported within the WFP operations were also scheduled within the evaluation workplan. This provided an insight into the operational effectiveness of previous interventions as well as an indication of the necessity and implementation possibilities of future school programmes. These visits were guided both locally by the evaluation team members and remotely by the evaluation team school feeding programmes expert.

These methodologies together have amassed different sources of information both quantitative and qualitative from numerous sources that have provided insights into operations undertaken that were compared and triangulated by the ET both in-country and on their return home.

Evaluating the gender considerations taken into account during the entire process of programme planning, implementation and performance results also played a central role in this analysis. This included investigating a number of gender based factors such as: (i) how the WFP strategic plans supported gender sensitive capacity development with implementing partners and Government agencies; (ii) what accountability measures and systems were put in place by the CO to strengthen a gender perspective; (iii) in what ways did the CO work to mainstream gender through its programme cycle, and (iv) what successes did the CO accomplish and what challenges did they face in furthering gender focused partnerships.

The evaluation matrix listed below presents the TOR questions to be answered as well indicating those questions that will be asked so meet such a demand. Methods of triangulation are also indicated there. Additionally, the ET members, both in the field and remotely, have, to a certain extent, updated their findings to these questions using the evaluation matrix as a base as the evaluation progress. This had a dual benefit of

enabling all ET members to see the findings and feedback provided by their colleagues, as well as signalling any gaps that needed specific attention.

The CO did not utilise the Theory of Change approach within its CS design process, and as such this has not been considered as an area for the evaluation team to investigate.

The efficiency of the operations in terms of the timeliness of goods and services provided as well as the cost of providing such services and support was evaluated by the logistics expert within the evaluation team. This will be done remotely; however, the TL has acted as the responsible person for gathering information during the field mission.

An initial debrief was undertaken prior to the departure of the evaluation team where initial findings and conclusions were presented to the country directors and senior staff members.

### The Evaluation Matrix

The evaluation matrix in Annex J below aligns the three major evaluation questions with key indicators and main sources of information, data, and data collection methods. The matrix breaks each key evaluation question into a number of sub-questions designed to collect the needed information to answer the respective question. Each sub-question is linked to measurable indicators and a data collection plan. Table 10 below summarizes the evaluation matrix, linking the key evaluation questions with the planned analysis and data collection methods.

### Summary of Evaluation Matrix

<b>Key Evaluation Topics</b>	<b>Analysis</b>	<b>Main Sources of Information</b>
Strategic alignment of WFP's country strategy and portfolio	Mixed analysis of qualitative and quantitative primary data sources with desk and timeline analysis.	CO and EOVS material from e-library; interviews with beneficiaries, communities and partners; survey with co-operating partners.
Factors driving strategic decision making	Primary qualitative analysis with desk analysis.	Documents from CO and EOVS office and interviews with co-operating partners, communities and beneficiaries.
Portfolio performance and results	Analysis of output data with mixed method analysis of qualitative and quantitative primary data.	CO and EOVS material from e-library; interviews with beneficiaries, communities and partners; survey with co-operating partners.

The evaluation matrix has driven both the qualitative and quantitative elements of the evaluation. The matrix was also the basis for the semi structured questionnaires the ET has used for their key informant interviews, while the two surveys were designed to generate responses to the sub questions within the evaluation matrix.

## Annex J: Evaluation Matrix:

Evaluation focus and key questions	Sub-questions	Key indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods/tools	Data analysis & triangulation
<b>A. What has been the Strategic Alignment of WFP's country strategy (2010-2014) &amp; portfolio in Iraq?</b>					
<i>1. Were the CO main objectives and activities relevant to Iraq's humanitarian and developmental needs?</i>	a) Was the Country strategy based on a comprehensive analysis of current humanitarian and development needs in Iraq at that time?	Depth of context analysis, risk assumptions, and logical frameworks inherent within the CS.	Country strategy document (2010-2014) and PRRO, EMOP and BRs; background documents; and logframes; food security situation in the country. UNDAF and Humanitarian Response Plans.	Desk research. KII/SSQ.	Qualitative analysis and feedback from relevant key stakeholders.
	b) Were the most vulnerable populations and areas of the country targeted? Did WFP reach the most vulnerable/poorest in an impartial manner? If not, why?	Clear needs assessments, and prioritization criteria available for all activities.	Needs assessment reports; FSMS reports, Project Documents etc.; primary data from vulnerable communities. VAM reports, HCT, UNHCR and OCHA information. IOM registers.	Desk research, site visits, KII/SSQ/ FGD with communities & partners.	Feedback from communities, partners & local governments in multiple locations.
	c) Were WFP interventions in proportion to the needs and targeted for maximum impact? If not, why not?	Relative scale of WFP operations in the context of humanitarian needs.	Needs assessment reports; primary data from vulnerable communities; evaluation reports; other stakeholders' intervention reports; UNDAF, Strategic Response Plan 2014, Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan 2015, CS & Project Documents, Contingency Plans	Desk research, site visits, KII/SSQ/FGD with communities & partners.	As above
<i>2. Were strategies, objectives and programming aligned with those of government and coherent with the</i>	a) Was there a good understanding of Government policies and strategies? Which specific policies and strategies did WFP align	Alignment with National Development plan (2010-2014, 2013-2017), National Strategy for Poverty Reduction 2009, National Strategy	Key policy documents of GoI; CS /background documents and project documents; Operations Concept Notes, interviews with senior programme staff.	Desk research and KII/SSQ.	Qualitative analysis to examine coherence and feedback from

<b>Evaluation focus and key questions</b>	<b>Sub-questions</b>	<b>Key indicators</b>	<b>Data sources</b>	<b>Data collection methods/tools</b>	<b>Data analysis &amp; triangulation</b>
<i>national agenda, policies, systems and capacities?</i>	its work with (or not), and why?	for Infant and Young Child Feeding, 2005. National Education Strategy 2012.			Gov't officers and senior WFP staff.
	b) Were there any challenges in aligning WFP work with Government policies?	As above.	Senior programme staff, GoI Counterparts.	KII/SSQ.	Feedback from Gov't officers and senior WFP staff.
<i>3. Were strategies &amp; operational plans aligned and harmonised with other partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs) so as to achieve complementarity of interventions?</i>	a) What types of partners did WFP work with or align its work with? Were there any challenges of this alignment?	Partnership with UN agencies, INGOs, NNGOs & Gov't; (signed MoUs & FLAs).	WFP focal points in WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR & FAO; National & international NGOs; MoU, Joint Action Plans and FLA register	KII/SSQ & desk research. Survey monkey with co-operating partners.	Feedback from co-operating partners and senior WFP staff. Desk Analysis.
	b) What did partners think of WFP's contribution to the national agenda? To what extent did partners find WFP's interventions complementing those of other key players?	As above. Any mention of WFP CS/Project Documents in other stakeholders' documents, number of partners providing complementary inputs and services Proportion of project activities implemented with the engagement of complementary partners.	As above; as well as donors; Other stakeholders' programme documents, SPRs.	As above.	As above.
<i>4. Did the Country office make strategic alignments and programmatic adjustments in response to evolving</i>	a) How did the country strategy and implementation change over time in response to the evolving situation?	Timeline for CS; project documents over time (programme categories shifts and overlap).	Needs assessments, CFSVA, FSMS, SPRs; programme staff, Government officials; CS, project documents, Humanitarian Needs Overview and HRP & UNDAF	KII/SSQ & desk research.	Timeline analysis. Feedback from external stakeholders and senior WFP staff. Desk Analysis.



<b>Evaluation focus and key questions</b>	<b>Sub-questions</b>	<b>Key indicators</b>	<b>Data sources</b>	<b>Data collection methods/tools</b>	<b>Data analysis &amp; triangulation</b>
<i>situations and arising needs so as to ensure its maximum impact?</i>	b) What were the causes of any changes to the Country Strategy or implementation approach?	Changing needs; change in priorities of donors, Government of Iraq, HQ.	NDP, donor documents, HQ policies and updates; Interviews with Staff, GoI, donors.	As above.	As above.
	c) What implications did these changes have in project documents?	Timeline for CS; project documents over time, budget revisions, revised logframes.	CS, project documents, Needs assessments, SPRs, prog-ramme staff, Government officials, CO staff	As above.	As above.
	d) What were WFP's comparative advantages? Were the ones stated in the CS valid? Were WFP's objectives, strategies and implementation aligned with its comparative advantages to achieve the best possible impact?	Alignment of intended outputs and outcomes with WFP comparative advantage.	Senior programme staff; Government officials; UNICEF; FAO; WHO; OCHA; partners; WFP documents (CS, Project Documents). HCT, UNCT, Resident coordinator, humanitarian coordinator	KII/SSQ; desk research.	Feedback from external stakeholders and senior WFP staff.
<i>5. Has WFP positioned itself as a strategic partner based on comparative advantage and entered into / managed appropriate operational partnerships?</i>	a) What partnerships did WFP built up? Were these partnerships appropriate, i.e. did they meet WFP and National Agenda priorities, as well as needs of the population?	Sectoral partnerships in food security education, nutrition, health, UN agencies, government, technical partners, private sector. (traders and transporters)	Senior Programme staff; Operational Partners; (UNICEF, WHO, NGOs); Government counterparts: Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Displacement and Migration, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. IOM/UNHCR.	KII; SSQ with key Government staff and operational partners.	Feedback from external stakeholders and senior WFP staff.
	b) What were the perceptions of WFP's donors, partners and	Perceived WFP role and operational performance.	As above plus beneficiaries.	KII/SSQ. FGD with beneficiaries.	Feedback from external stakeholders,

Evaluation focus and key questions	Sub-questions	Key indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods/tools	Data analysis & triangulation
	beneficiaries on the role WFP played in country? How did this change over time?			Survey monkey of FSC.	beneficiaries, and senior WFP staff, plus survey monkey results.
	c) Was WFP perceived as a reliable partner, was it doing the right things and in right quality?	As above.	As above.	As above.	As above.
<b>B. What have been the factors driving strategic decision making?</b>					
<i>1. To what extent was a proper analysis of national context undertaken, and was the analysis appropriately used to design interventions?</i>	a) What was the extent and quality of analysis of national food security, nutrition and gender issues in the CO programming?	Quality of analysis and clearly detailed logframes; Gaps identified in sectors (namely in cross sector themes such as gender, protection, beneficiary accountability).	CFSVA; mVAM; CS/back-ground documents; Review of national level analysis documentation by sector; CS background documents; sectoral analysis (e.g. FSMS, School Feeding, MCHN etc.); Senior Programme Staff, key Government officials.	Desk research; KII /SSQ.	Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff.
	b) To what extent did the interventions directly correlate with this analysis, and has WFP substantially attempted to address the key issues that emerge?	Effective response analysis: linkage of actual activities, outputs and outcomes with needs.	Project documents; key programme staff and regional bureau staff and beneficiaries.	KII / SSQ, Desk research; site visits and FGDs/SSI with beneficiaries.	Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff and beneficiaries.
	c) Have WFP interventions been operationalized to respond to the needs of women and other marginalized populations, and based	Food basket composition. Complementarity with other organisations' distributed items. Analysis of indicators related to questions C1 below.	Government reports, PDMs; SPRs; evaluation reports; local government leaders; co-operating partners; beneficiaries.	As above.	As above.

<b>Evaluation focus and key questions</b>	<b>Sub-questions</b>	<b>Key indicators</b>	<b>Data sources</b>	<b>Data collection methods/tools</b>	<b>Data analysis &amp; triangulation</b>
	on indicators of poverty and vulnerability?				
<i>2. Did WFP contribute to placing key food security issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies, and to developing national capacity in the context of transition towards development and national ownership?</i>	a) Has WFP been able to influence national discourse on the key issues it has identified in its CS, Concept of Operations and various programming instruments?	WFP recognised for its leading contributions to national strategy on food security, vulnerability.	Government counterparts: Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Displacement and Migration, Ministry of Trade; Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs); UNICEF, FAO, WHO, NGOs and donors; official documents; senior Programme staff; donors and co-operating partners.	KII /SSQ with co-operating partners and key Government staff plus desk research.	Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff and external stakeholders.
	b) What role has WFP played in building the capacity of key partners/ institutions in taking forward major food security and vulnerability related issues in the country?	Measurable advances in terms of the capacity of relevant government offices/depts. Activities undertaken by such offices/depts. on food security issues.	As above.	As above.	As above.
<i>3. Were decision-making processes information-based and geared towards programmatic performance?</i>	a) Was relevant information available to make decisions in a timely manner, and did WFP use this information to inform its decisions?	Timeliness of key decisions. Operational impact.	Senior Programme staff; Government officials; beneficiaries; progress reports; co-operating and operational partners; project evaluation reports; M&E reports (PROMISS, SitReps, PDM, monthly M&E).	KII/SSQ.	Feedback from key WFP staff and external stakeholders.
	b) Were WFP's operational and strategic decisions systematically based on evidence and	Direct links between empirical evidence, key decisions, and operational impact.	Primary data and secondary gathered during this evaluation on operational activities.	KII/SSQ, desk research, site visits, FGD, group interviews.	Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP

Evaluation focus and key questions	Sub-questions	Key indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods/tools	Data analysis & triangulation
	geared towards operational impact? c) Were WFP's targeting and programming decisions considered to be needs-based and independent of outside influence?				staff, beneficiaries and external stakeholders.
4. What were the drivers of strategy – factors that affected the choices made in country strategy?	a) Which external (funding, country context etc.) and internal factors (perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, organisational structure etc.) were critical in the choices the CO made during its country strategy development and subsequent programming?	Details of SWOT or other analysis used during strategy development.	Senior programme staff (current and previous); progress reports; co-operating partners; CS background documents; key field staff; SWOT/analysis under CS development process.	KII/SSQ, Desk Review.	Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff.
	b) How did these factors affect the country strategy decision making process?	As above.	As above.	As above.	As above.
	c) Were there any unforeseen factors that undermined the Country Strategy and its assumptions and pre-conditions?	As above.	As above.	As above.	As above.
<b>C. What have been the WFP portfolio performance and results?</b>					

Evaluation focus and key questions	Sub-questions	Key indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods/tools	Data analysis & triangulation
<p>1. Were WFP's operations designed and implemented to effectively address the assistance and protection needs of population?</p>	<p>a) Was WFP able to provide food assistance and protection to the populations in need and in proportion to their needs?</p>	<p>IDPs and Food insecure vulnerable have needs met. DEV results to date. PRRO outcomes: SFP recovery and default rates against Sphere standards; School feeding, average annual enrolment rate and retention rates in WFP assisted schools. NCI for Food Security &amp; school feeding. EMOP Outcomes: CSI target 9.1, DDS target 6.1, sex disaggregated, FCS % with poor &lt;0.7 sex disaggregated.</p>	<p>WFP protection policy; food basket monitoring report; district level nutritional data M&amp;E reports (FBM, PDM, etc.); senior programme staff; key government officials; and co-operating partners; beneficiaries.</p>	<p>FGD, site visits, KII/SSQ, desk research.</p>	<p>Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff, beneficiaries and external stakeholders.</p>
	<p>b) Were programmes /activities given precedence or put on hold in line with the resources (HR – finance) available and the security /access situation on the ground?</p>	<p>Programme outcomes. Monthly resource returns. Annual SPRs.</p>	<p>Analysis of Project documents and Budget Revisions against the Standard Project Report (in terms of anticipated costing figures with the real costing figures).</p>	<p>KII/SSQ; desk research.</p>	<p>Analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff.</p>
	<p>c) Were there any sections of the population facing life-threatening situations due to food insecurity whose humanitarian needs were not met, including by WFP?</p>	<p>Needs assessment reports; Communities' perceptions. Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), HRP</p>	<p>m-VAM, Sit Reps, Briefs etc.; primary data from vulnerable communities; other stakeholders' interventions; UNDAF, Humanitarian Response Plans. IOM, UNHCR</p>	<p>KII/SSQ; desk research. FGDs and site visits.</p>	<p>Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from WFP staff, beneficiaries and external stakeholders.</p>

Evaluation focus and key questions	Sub-questions	Key indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods/tools	Data analysis & triangulation
	d) How effective was WFP's needs assessment, planning and delivery in ensuring that the food insecure population benefit from the food assistance interventions in a timely manner?	Objectives in log frames of EMOP, PRRO, and other project documents met. Timing between event, launch and activation of the IR-EMOPs	Progress reports, Senior Programme staff, key Government officials, key local government officials and technical staff, beneficiaries, co-operating partners, donors. HNO/HRP, IOM & UNHCR	As above.	As above.
1. continued	e) To what extent have the planned outcomes been achieved? Were there any additional outcome(s) being achieved beyond the intended outcome? f) How was the communication with the beneficiaries managed if programmed / planned distribution (food and C&V) could not be met? g) What have been the challenges to achieving the outcomes expected?	DEV outcomes to date. PRRO outcomes: CAS based on latest follow up? SFP recovery and default rates against Sphere standards; School feeding, average annual enrolment rate and retention rates in WFP assisted schools. NCI for school Feeding. Number of technical assistance provided by type. EMOP Outcomes: CSI target 9.1; DDS target 6.1 sex disaggregated; FCS % with poor <0.7 sex disaggregated.	Project documents, M&E reports, Health centre/government statistics on nutritional surveillance; School records; WFP surveys Senior Programme and field staff, co-operating and operational Partners; beneficiaries, key local government and technical staff, progress reports on finance resourcing versus pipeline output. Beneficiary complaints and feedback mechanism	KII/SSQ; desk research. FGDs and site visits. Survey Monkey of c-operating partners.	Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff, beneficiaries and external stakeholders, Plus survey monkey report.
	h) To what extent did the level of funding impact the supply chain and the final output?	Occurrence of pipeline breaks anticipated or not, downsizing of the programme and the number of beneficiaries, reduction in the food rations, substitution of commodities.	SPR and COMPAS extracts, WFP surveys and progress reports, monthly financial progress reports, WFP Senior Programme officers, and pipeline officers.	Desk review and research, KII and SSI with key operational partners	Feedback from key WFP staff and beneficiaries

Evaluation focus and key questions	Sub-questions	Key indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods/tools	Data analysis & triangulation
	i) What were the key gaps that WFP interventions could have addressed within its comparative advantage, which would significantly contributed to the achievement of the outcome?	Gaps in meeting humanitarian and food security needs among communities.	Needs assessment reports; Communities' perceptions; OCHA; UNICEF; FAO, WHO; donors; key Government officials; co-operating partners, monthly cluster activity reports. UNDAF, HNO/HRP	FGD with communities and KII/SSQ with key stakeholders.	Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff, beneficiaries and external stakeholders.
	j) What mechanisms did the CO have to ensure that it tracked the results it was achieving?	Dashboards, Monthly reports. M&E and PDM reports.	M&E reports; senior programme staff; key field staff; co-operating partners.	KII/SSQ, desk research.	Qualitative analysis of desk research results plus KII feedback.
	k) What specific M&E mechanisms were in place? Were these sufficient and timely to measure progress and inform strategic decision making?	M&E reports feeding back to management decisions.	Senior Programme & M&E staff; key field staff; progress reports.	As above.	As above
	l) Was the current set of indicators for both outcome and output effective in informing progress made towards the outcomes? Were the progress reports evidence-based and did they track outcomes?	Programmatic monthly reports. Dashboards, Monthly reports. M&E reports.	As above.	As above.	As above.

<b>Evaluation focus and key questions</b>	<b>Sub-questions</b>	<b>Key indicators</b>	<b>Data sources</b>	<b>Data collection methods/tools</b>	<b>Data analysis &amp; triangulation</b>
	m) Were operations implemented in line with Humanitarian Principles and Common Humanitarian Standards?	Measurement against Sphere standards, the Humanitarian Code of Conduct, and the concept of “Do No Harm”.	Programme reports. Output analysis. Communities’ perceptions. Government officials; co-operating partners. WFP staff member and protection cluster colleagues/IOM.	FGD with communities and KII/SSQ.	Feedback from key WFP staff, beneficiaries and external stakeholders.
<i>2. Were WFP’s food assistance modalities interventions efficient?</i>	a) Were programme resources/funds efficiently applied? What internal (management, design, human & financial resources, field delivery capacity etc.) and what external factors (physical, political, security) affected achievement of planned results?	Gap between planned and realized outputs and outcomes; timeliness in delivery; do results compare favourably with comparator organizations.	School-feeding costs (per child per year), comparison of in kind vs cash transfer programming past evaluations or reviews internal and external, project documents; audit reports, senior Programme and field staff, finance and logistics staff, key local government and technical staff.	Desk research; KII/SSQ (in country and remotely).	Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff.
	b) Were the activities and modalities WFP used for delivering various components of its programme timely and cost-effective, and did they deliver value for money? How was value for money monitored, and if so, what type of data /mechanism was used?	Total transit times of commodities in the supply chain, idle time in EDPs and FDPs, Unit costs of delivering outputs and outcomes <sup>37</sup> ; systematic cost-effectiveness monitoring records available. Drift between the agreed/planned output and the effective output.	Progress and weekly pipeline reports, Senior programme, logistic, finance and Field staff, co-operating partners, donors.	As above.	As above.

<sup>37</sup> For example, unit cost of school feeding programme per child per year; cost of delivery of food aid per ton; potential value of outputs created through productive assets programme; input-output ratio in food-for-assets programme



Evaluation focus and key questions	Sub-questions	Key indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods/tools	Data analysis & triangulation
	c) To what extent did the GoI instructions (e.g. in respect of national procurement) alter WFP's food supply chain? What was the resulting effect on the costing?	Procurement policy changes, variations in food supply, time and cost.	WINGS extract listing purchase orders with cost price; WFP staff, Head of LOGs/Supply Chain.	Desk research, KII, SSI (in country and remotely).	As above
	d) What were the practical implications from switching from a policy of distributions modalities (e.g. bulk rations versus prepacked emergency rations and/or family packs)?	Changes in the modalities for storage, distribution and stock inventories.	Operational and co-operating partners. WFP staff.	As above.	As above.
3. Are the interventions sustainable?	a) How strong was the level of ownership of the results by relevant government entities and other stakeholders?	Management, control and continuation of activities and outcomes by relevant Government institutions.	Progress reports, Senior Programme and field staff, key local government and technical staff, beneficiaries, operational and co-operating partners.	KII/SSQ	Qualitative analysis of secondary data & feedback from key WFP and Government staff.
	b) Did the projects/ programmes have an exit strategy? What will happen at the end of the project/ programmes? What could be done to strengthen sustainability?	Realistic hand over strategy with clear timelines and areas of responsibility indicated; degree of Government ownership.	Project/programme proposals, senior programme and field staff, co-operating partners, beneficiaries, donors.	Desk review; KII /SSQ.	Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff.

<b>Evaluation focus and key questions</b>	<b>Sub-questions</b>	<b>Key indicators</b>	<b>Data sources</b>	<b>Data collection methods/tools</b>	<b>Data analysis &amp; triangulation</b>
	c) Did synergies arise within the various WFP interventions or with the interventions of other organizations?	Linkages between programme activities and outcomes.	Project/programme proposals, senior programme and field staff. UNDAF/HRP and other coordinating mechanisms.	Desk review; KII/SSQ plus survey monkey of co-operating partners. UN partner interviews	Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff, and external stakeholders, plus survey monkey report.
	d) To what extent have lasting hand-over strategies with the Government of Iraq been implemented? What were the results?	Activities or sub-activities successfully handed-over to the Government of Iraq.	Senior programme officers in CO & RB, Government of Iraq senior officers, field visits.	KII/SSQ with GoI officials, desk review.	Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP and Government staff.
	e) What trainings were undertaken to improve gov't/ CP counterpart capacities?	Trainings provided and feedback received. Follow up on trainings to gauge impact.	Government of Iraq officers and staff, Co-operating partners.	KII/SSQ with GoI officials, CPs.	Feedback from CP and Government staff. Survey monkey reports.

Evaluation focus and key questions	Sub-questions	Key indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods/tools	Data analysis & triangulation
4. How well did WFP co-lead the Food Security Cluster (FSC) and how has this contributed to the overall humanitarian response?	<p>a) To what extent has the FSC been able to efficiently allocate the response capacities to match humanitarian needs amongst the FSC members?</p> <p>b) Have there been any gaps or overlaps?</p> <p>c) How has the cluster contributed to assessing humanitarian needs? How has it provided input as to how those needs can be met?</p> <p>d) Have national or local level contingency plans been developed between cluster members and the local authorities?</p>	<p>Cluster performance standards.</p> <p>Reported incidences of duplication or overlaps.</p> <p>Assessment undertaken and usage thereof.</p> <p>Availability of local or national level contingency plans.</p> <p>Perceived level of readiness and co-operation within the humanitarian community and between themselves and government actors.</p>	<p>4 W Documentations</p> <p>Feedback from FSC members.</p> <p>Minutes of meetings.</p> <p>Assessment reports and contingency plans.</p> <p>HNO, HRP , OCHA &amp; HCT plus FAO Rep in Jordan.</p>	<p>KII/SSQ with cluster members.</p> <p>Survey monkey of FSC members.</p> <p>Secondary research.</p>	<p>Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff, and external stakeholders, plus survey monkey report.</p>
5. Did WFP HQ and the Regional Bureau ensure adequate organisational structure, resources & technical expertise to manage different interventions?	<p>a) Was the CO human resource capacity (profile, number) and RB support adequate in terms of numbers, quality and technical capacity to deliver the CS and heightened levels of programming in an L3 emergency response?</p>	<p>Leadership and management capacity at strategic, operational, M&amp;E and technical levels.</p>	<p>Organogram; Country Director &amp; senior programme staff, key Regional Bureau staff.</p> <p>Copies of any mission reports from the Regional bureau staff</p>	<p>KII/SSQ and rapid assessment of capacity in core areas.</p>	<p>Feedback from key WFP staff, and results of rapid capacity assessment.</p>

Evaluation focus and key questions	Sub-questions	Key indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods/tools	Data analysis & triangulation
	b) Was adequate funding secured to implement programmes? If not, why and what was the effect on planned outcomes?	Funding gap; Delivery rate of annual work plans. Timing of contributions.	Pipeline reports, Resourcing updates, SPRs; CO & SO staff; key Regional Bureau staff; donors; co-operating partners.	KII/SSQ; desk research.	Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff.
6. <i>Did WFP Special Operation activities meet intended goals?</i>	To what extent have the SOs (air transport, logistic cluster services and communication facilities) filled existing gaps and assisted WFP, UN Agencies and third party NGOs fulfilling their respective objectives.  Were/are the SOs activities (UNHAS air transport, logistics cluster services and communications and IT facilities) designed and conducted in such a way that these can be handed over as a lasting and sustainable service to the humanitarian community with backing from the Government of Iraq?	Level of requests for services (air transport, clearance and storage operations, surface transport, distribution, connection to telephone and internet facilities).	SPR, logistic and communications clusters and UNHAS monthly reporting.	KII/SSQ (in country and remotely) with cluster members and co-operating partners, desk review.	Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key external partners and WFP staff.

Evaluation focus and key questions	Sub-questions	Key indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods/tools	Data analysis & triangulation
7. <i>Did WFP interventions address cross-cutting issues?</i>	<p>a) How has WFP's programming reduced gender gaps in relation to control over food, resources, and decision making, and incorporated gender equality, HIV/AIDS, protection and beneficiary accountability in all aspects of planning and implementation?</p> <p>b) Have protection issues been integrated into/addressed by WFP programming?</p>	<p>Plans and progress reports reflect emphasis on cross-cutting issues; Capacity development initiatives target men and women;</p> <p>Proportion of Women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees (e.g. PRRO target is 30%)</p> <p>Monitoring of safety of beneficiaries disaggregated by sex (Target is 100 %.)</p> <p>Usage of beneficiary feedback mechanisms.</p>	<p>Progress reports, senior programme and field staff, beneficiaries, co-operating partners, key government officials, key local government and technical staff.</p> <p>Adherence with WFP Gender Policy. Gender Marker scoring of projects.</p> <p>Feedback mechanism reports.</p>	<p>Desk review; KII /SSQ plus survey monkey of co-operating partners.</p>	<p>Qualitative analysis of secondary data and feedback from key WFP staff, and external stakeholders, plus survey monkey report.</p>

## Annex K: Suggested Questions for Key Informant and Stakeholder Interviews

Stakeholder	Questions
Government-Central	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What has been the nature of your relationship and partnership with WFP?</li> <li>2. Do you feel WFP have fully understood how to operate in the Iraqi context alongside your Government?</li> <li>3. Do you feel that WFP have found a role within the overall humanitarian response that fits in well with the roles of other organisations?</li> <li>4. Do you feel that the activities undertaken by WFP were well implemented and have fully met the needs of the beneficiaries? If not, how could these interventions be improved?</li> <li>5. How do you believe WFP has reacted to the changing operational environment over the last few years?</li> <li>6. Did WFP activities contribute appropriately to the advancement of National Agendas and plans and did they complement the efforts of other partners?</li> <li>7. Did WFP engage with the appropriate Ministries and Government Authorities to align its Country Strategy and work with Government Strategies and priorities?</li> <li>8. Do you believe the geographical areas targeted by WFP are those where the most vulnerable are?</li> <li>9. What do you believe is WFP's comparative advantage that makes them best placed to do the work they are doing?</li> <li>10. What were the challenges faced in working with WFP and what can be improved in the future?</li> <li>11. What lasting capacity development and improvements has WFP built within specific Government Ministries and partners? At which level of the organisational structure did this occur?</li> </ol>
Donors	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Do you feel WFP have fully understood how to operate in the Iraqi context?</li> <li>2. Do you believe their activities were of good quality, and appropriate to the needs of the beneficiaries?</li> <li>3. Did WFP activities contribute appropriately to the advancement of National Agendas and strategies and did they complement the efforts of other partners?</li> <li>4. Has WFP influenced the National discourse in areas such as school feeding or food security/the provision of safety nets?</li> <li>5. What do you believe is WFP's comparative advantage that makes them best placed to do the work they are doing?</li> <li>6. How do you believe WFP has reacted to the changing operational environment over the last few years?</li> <li>7. Did WFPs assessments adequately support funding requests, EMOPS, PRRO, CP and SO?</li> <li>8. Were the geographical areas targeted by WFP those where the most vulnerable were staying?</li> <li>9. Has WFP proved to be a reliable partner in terms of reporting on their activities and providing quick feedback to any questions you may have had?</li> <li>10. In what ways can WFP improve their operations or the manner in which they work with your organisation?</li> <li>11. Were there any challenges in supporting WFP? If so, what were these?</li> </ol>
WFP Country Office	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Was WFPs analysis of the situation in Iraq of good quality and was it reflected in the interventions it carried out?</li> <li>2. What was it based on?</li> <li>3. Was the WFP Country Strategy appropriately aligned to Government plans and strategies?</li> <li>4. Was the WFP Country Strategy aligned to WFP Strategic Plan and how was this adapted to the changing situation?</li> </ol>

Stakeholder	Questions
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Did WFP contribute appropriately to the National Agenda and did they complement the efforts of other partners?</li> <li>6. Did WFP engage with the appropriate Ministries and Government Authorities to align its Country Strategy and work with Government Strategies and priorities?</li> <li>7. Do you feel that WFP have found a role within the overall humanitarian response that fits in well with the roles of other organisations?</li> <li>8. Do you feel that the activities undertaken by WFP were well implemented and have fully met the needs of the beneficiaries? If not, how could these interventions be improved?</li> <li>9. How do you believe WFP has reacted to the changing operational environment over the last few years?</li> <li>10. Were the geographical areas targeted by WFP those where the most vulnerable were staying?</li> <li>11. What is WFPs comparative advantage that makes them best placed to do the work they are doing?</li> <li>12. What were the challenges faced in working with Government and partners and what can be improved in the future?</li> <li>13. What were the strong points/low points of WFPs response during the period covering the Country Strategy 2010-2014 and activities undertaken in response to IDP movements in the recent crisis?</li> <li>14. What lasting capacity development and improvements has WFP built within specific Government Ministries and partners? At which level of the organisational structure did this occur?</li> <li>15. How well did the CO co-ordinate with other co-ordinating bodies such as OCHA, UNAMI, CMCOORD, CMWG, HRP, HOPS and others?</li> <li>16. How well do you think WFP has led the clusters for which they are responsible?</li> <li>17. What support did you get from the RB and HQ throughout the CPE period?</li> <li>18. Do you feel adequate support was provided by the RB and HQ? If not how could this have been improved?</li> </ol>
<p>Local Government Offices (Erbil/ Dohuk/ field locations).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What has been the nature of your relationship and partnership with WFP?</li> <li>2. What has been the level interaction and communication between yourselves and WFP with respect to the IDP support and other programmes?</li> <li>3. Do you feel WFP have fully understood how to operate in the Iraqi context alongside your Government?</li> <li>4. Do you feel that WFP have found a role within the overall humanitarian response that fits in well with the roles of other organisations?</li> <li>5. How do you believe WFP has reacted to the changing operational environment over the last few years?</li> <li>6. Do you feel that the activities undertaken by WFP were well implemented and have fully met the needs of the beneficiaries?</li> <li>7. If not, how could these interventions be improved?</li> <li>8. Were the geographical areas targeted by WFP those where the most vulnerable were staying?</li> <li>9. Do you believe beneficiary targeting was well done?</li> <li>10. Were beneficiary targeting criteria and interventions determined through participatory approaches with community members, including adequate representation by women?</li> <li>11. Were the resources (material, financial and human) available adequate to meet the needs and were they provide in a timely manner?</li> <li>12. What, if any support, WFP has provided you in terms of strengthening your capacity?</li> <li>13. Were their delays in providing support to the beneficiaries and if yes what consequences did this have?</li> <li>14. What were the challenges in working with WFP?</li> </ol>

Stakeholder	Questions
WFP Field Offices	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Was WFPs analysis of the situation in Iraq) of good quality and was it reflected in the interventions it carried out?</li> <li>2. Do you feel that WFP have found a role within the overall humanitarian response that fits in well with the roles of other organisations?</li> <li>3. How do you believe WFP has reacted to the changing operational environment over the last few years?</li> <li>4. Do you feel that the activities undertaken by WFP were well implemented and have fully met the needs of the beneficiaries?</li> <li>5. If not, how could these interventions be improved?</li> <li>6. Did you undertake voucher programming in your location/district/site?</li> <li>7. If yes, did you feel this was appropriate and were you adequately equipped to undertake such programming?</li> <li>8. What changes did you have to make to normal operating procedures to undertake voucher programming, if any?</li> <li>9. How do you feel about this choice of modality?</li> <li>10. What would be the biggest challenges to implement them? Do the risks outweigh the benefits?</li> <li>11. Was the target population consulted on the use of vouchers instead of food rations? And did they approve?</li> <li>12. In your opinion, was the use of vouchers by WFP something that should be considered in future assistance in Iraq?</li> <li>13. Are vouchers more appropriate for use in the Iraq context than cash or direct food aid? Please explain why you think so.</li> <li>14. Were the geographical areas targeted by WFP those where the most vulnerable are?</li> <li>15. How were beneficiaries targeted? Did this work well?</li> <li>16. Were beneficiary targeting criteria and interventions determined through participatory approaches with community members, including adequate representation by women?</li> <li>17. Were gender issues well analysed and taken into account in programme design and/or implementation?</li> <li>18. Were protection issues well analysed and taken into account in programme design and/or implementation? What are the protection issues that WFP focused on?</li> <li>19. Were the resources (material, financial and human) available adequate to meet the needs and were they provide in a timely manner?</li> <li>20. What support do you receive from your CO in day-to-day work?</li> <li>21. What system do you have in place to monitor activities, outputs and outcomes, and what assistance do you receive from CO in this regard?</li> <li>22. What are the management reporting and feedback mechanisms between your office and the CO/Erbil?</li> <li>23. Were there delays in providing support /pipeline breaks and if yes what consequences did this have on beneficiaries?</li> <li>24. What were the challenges in working with partners, including Government and NGOs as well as communities?</li> <li>25. Did programme implementation strategy change over time, and if so, in which way and what are the main reasons according to you?</li> </ol>
NGO Partners	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What is your working relationship with WFP like? Does it run well or are there any problems or challenges?</li> <li>2. Do you feel you are in a partnership with WFP or is it a donor / implementer type of relationship? Do you undertake field missions together?</li> <li>3. How well are the FLA processes and procedures managed? Was your FLA well managed?</li> <li>4. In terms of field programmes, do you believe your opinion was listened to in terms of programme design and implementation? Were you given space to make your own decisions if required?</li> </ol>



Stakeholder	Questions
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Do you feel WFP have fully understood how to operate in the Iraqi context?</li> <li>6. Do you believe the work undertaken by WFP was of good quality appropriate to beneficiary needs, and provided on a timely basis?</li> <li>7. Did you undertake voucher programming in, partnership with WFP, in your location/district/site?</li> <li>8. If yes, did you feel this was appropriate and were you adequately supported by WFP to undertake such programming?</li> <li>9. What changes did you have to make to normal operating procedures to undertake voucher programming, if any?</li> <li>10. Was the target population consulted on the use of vouchers instead of food rations? And did they approve?</li> <li>11. In your opinion, was the use of vouchers by WFP something that should be considered in future assistance in Iraq?</li> <li>12. What do you think is the most appropriate transfer modality to use given the context in Iraq (Vouchers, Cash, food aid)? Please explain your answer.</li> <li>13. Were gender issues well analysed and taken into account in programme design and/or implementation?</li> <li>14. What happens to ensure that the specialized needs of women, girls, men and boys are met?</li> <li>15. Were protection issues well analysed and taken into account in programme design and/or implementation?</li> <li>16. What beneficiary feedback mechanisms did you have in place?</li> <li>17. Did WFP discuss with you to determine needs and the best modality for intervention?</li> <li>18. Were beneficiary targeting criteria clearly defined and appropriate given the context and needs?</li> <li>19. Were targeting criteria and interventions determined through participatory approaches with community members, including adequate representation by women?</li> <li>20. Were the resources provided by WFP appropriate in quantity and quality? Were they always provided in time or did pipeline breaks occur? If so, what consequences did this have?</li> <li>21. Did WFP provide any internal and external capacity building support during the intervention period? If so, what were you trained on? What effect/impact did this have?</li> <li>22. What were the challenges you faced in working with WFP?</li> <li>23. How do you think WFP can improve its operations or its management of yourselves as a co-operating partner.</li> <li>24. Did the services and facilities provided by the WFP (lead or co-lead), Food Security, logistics and ECT clusters meet your expectations? Have you made use of these services?</li> <li>25. Have these facilities enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of your activities? Did these services assisted you in making cost savings?</li> <li>26. To what extent was the UNHAS service helpful (period 2011 – 2012) to your organization. When the UNHAS services were withdrawn, as from May 2012, how did you cope?</li> </ol>
<p>School Feeding meetings: Local authorities/ Schools</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What support did your school/schools in your area receive? And when was this?</li> <li>2. Were activities undertaken in line with National and Local Government policies and initiatives?</li> <li>3. How were schools selected? Were the criteria for targeting appropriate?</li> <li>4. To what extent have you been consulted in the design and implementation of the programme?</li> <li>5. Have you been involved in deciding which products are provided in the food basket?</li> <li>6. Do you know how the funding for the programme was provided?</li> </ol>

Stakeholder	Questions
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>7. If the community was more involved, would there be a possibility of mapping local-level businesses and the possibility of sourcing it locally?</li> <li>8. What are the benefits of the school feeding programme? To what extent do the SF activities improved access to education and retention at school, and encouraged completion of primary education, particularly for girls? What evidence is there to show this?</li> <li>9. Does the programme benefit boys over girls? Are the needs of young women identified and addressed?</li> <li>10. Were there sufficient monitoring arrangements within the programmes previously implemented?</li> <li>11. What have been key operational challenges that have detracted from the successful implementation of the programme?</li> <li>12. To what extent has there been effective cooperation and coordination in the design and implementation of the SF activities between WFP, government, cooperating partners and beneficiary communities?</li> <li>13. Is there an exit strategy outlining the timing, allocation of responsibilities on handover to the government and/or other agencies?</li> <li>14. Does the local gov't feel they are capable of taking over this programme should gov't funding become available? What are the capacities the government needs to do this transition? (technical, human and organizational competencies). Have they been identified and are the appropriate people involved to build these capacities?</li> <li>15. What important lessons are we learning that we can carry forward to future interventions?</li> <li>16. How can the programme be improved should it be restarted?</li> </ol>
UN Agencies	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What partnerships have you entered into so far with WFP? How well did the partnership work? How well did WFP fulfil their role?</li> <li>2. What future partnerships can you see between your organisation and WFP?</li> <li>3. Do you feel WFP have fully understood how to operate in the Iraqi context?</li> <li>4. How has WFP contributed to the overall coordination of the humanitarian and development response (contributions to the UNDAF, HCT, Clusters, HRP, and Social Protection etc.)?</li> <li>5. How do you believe WFP has reacted to the changing operational environment over the last few years?</li> <li>6. What do you feel have been the strengths of WFP, and what can they do better?</li> <li>7. Did WFP work well alongside the gov't, and did activities contribute appropriately to the advancement of National Agendas and plans, complementing the efforts of other partners?</li> <li>8. Do you feel that WFP has played a role within the overall humanitarian response that matches its comparative advantage? How well have they played that role?</li> <li>9. Do you believe the work undertaken by WFP was of good quality appropriate to beneficiary needs, and provided on a timely basis?</li> <li>10. To what extent were the UNHAS service helpful (period 2011 – 2012) to your organization. When the UNHAS services were withdrawn, as from 05/2012, how did you cope?</li> </ol>
Beneficiaries (men and women: separate FGDs in some cases where women's empowerment related issues to be discussed;	<p><i>FFP, IRR, Cash/Food for assets:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What assistance have you received from WFP? How often did u receive this?</li> <li>2. What do you think of the quality of the food/support provided?</li> <li>3. Was the targeting of food assistance fair and appropriate? Did some people not receive the support that they should have done?</li> <li>4. Did you participate in the selection of beneficiaries or are you aware of community involvement in the selection of beneficiaries?</li> </ol>

Stakeholder	Questions
<p>mixed groups in other cases where women are direct beneficiaries along with men)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Were men women and children adequately represented in the selection of beneficiaries?</li> <li>6. What would have happened if WFP had not provided you the services you received?</li> <li>7. Was the choice of community assets for CFW programmes made with the participation of community representatives? Were women adequately represented? Did they have an effective role in decision making? If so, in which type of decisions?</li> <li>8. Are the assets created sustainable from your point of view?</li> <li>9. Were you always aware of your entitlement (amount of transfer and regularity of transfer)?</li> <li>10. Did the transfer (food, voucher, or cash) meet your needs, either wholly or partially? (N.B. ration entitlement varies by population group targeted).</li> <li>11. Would you have preferred to receive another type of transfer (than food / cash) – if so why?</li> <li>12. Do you prefer cash/voucher or food transfers? Why?</li> <li>13. Did you always receive your entitlement on time according to your need and if not what consequences did this have?</li> <li>14. Who receives the food ration / cash? Are there any problems linked to receiving WFP assistance, if so which kind? Are beneficiaries involved in the distribution process? Can WFP do something to mitigate those risks?</li> <li>15. Was there a complaints mechanism available for you if you want to use one? Did anyone use it?</li> </ol> <p><i>For Nutrition:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>16. Were you or any of your children enrolled in the child nutrition support programme / MAM support / MCHN?</li> <li>17. Was the treatment and food provided helpful and how?</li> <li>18. Did you share the food among family members? (for take home rations)</li> <li>19. How long did you/child receive the food/?</li> <li>20. Did you always attend to collect the food or did you skip attendance and why?</li> <li>21. Were there times when food ration was not available and if yes what did you do?</li> </ol>
<p>Food Commodity Suppliers (local and regional)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How well were you able to manage the procurement procedures of WFP with respect to the supply of food and other commodities?</li> <li>2. Do you consider the call for quotations and the awarding procedures to be fair, transparent and equitable?</li> <li>3. What was your experience in using the online system for making bids?</li> <li>4. Were you provided with guidance and assistance?</li> <li>5. Were the delivery instructions clear and steady?</li> <li>6. Were your supplies subject to General Superintendence controls (quality controls and sampling)?</li> <li>7. How were discrepancies dealt with? In a pro-active way?</li> <li>8. Were the terms of payments respected?</li> <li>9. Were you offered facilities with the customs clearance and surface transport of your supplies?</li> <li>10. Did problems arise when WFP switched from bulk rations to pre-packed rations (monthly food packages and immediate response rations)?</li> <li>11. Were gov't regulations clear in this matter? Did we have any difficulty following them?</li> </ol>
<p>Local traders who participated in Cash &amp; Voucher based transfer programmes</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How were you invited to take part in this programme?</li> <li>2. Was the scope of the C&amp;V programme, its rules and your commitments properly explained?</li> <li>3. Were you properly instructed about the type and quantities of commodities you had to stock and the duration of the programme?</li> <li>4. What worked well – what were the problems you faced?</li> </ol>

Stakeholder	Questions
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. What can be done to improve this process in the future?</li> <li>6. Did you encounter difficulties with the beneficiaries in respect of quantities and entitlements they were to receive?</li> <li>7. Were the Vouchers timely and properly honoured by WFP? Was inflation a factor that affected your anticipated profits?</li> <li>8. How were discrepancies, if any, promptly settled? Was this done in a proactive manner?</li> <li>9. Do you think such programmes could be implemented on a larger scale? Do you foresee any difficulties with that?</li> </ol>
<p>Service providers to WFP (ships agents, C &amp; F agents, road transport operators, warehouse operators, fleet maintenance contractors)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How was your relationship with WFP - CO?</li> <li>2. Did your relationship yield added value for you and/or WFP?</li> <li>3. Do you rate the tender procedure as fair, equitable and transparent?</li> <li>4. Was there an interest on the part of WFP to find out how you operate and how you cope with the ever changing economic and security environment?</li> <li>5. Where your invoices promptly settled in line with the agreed terms of payment?</li> <li>6. How were claims and discrepancies dealt with? Promptly and in a proactive way?</li> <li>7. Did you enjoy the benefit of security prevention and assistance facilities when requested, required or otherwise?</li> <li>8. Were your services hampered by a lack of security for your own staff and your commodities or assets?</li> </ol>
<p>Beneficiaries of WFP cluster services (Log. and ETC)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Were you timely informed about the Service Operations and the cluster services WFP was intending to provide to the humanitarian community?</li> <li>2. Were your suggestions for additional or alternative services correctly entertained? (Air and surface transport, storage, logistics information, clearance, maps, ETC).</li> <li>3. How do you rate the quality and the efficiency of the services provided by WFP (Air and surface transport, Logistics and ETC)?</li> <li>4. To what extent did the WFP SOs and cluster services contributed to the success/failure of your organisation's activities in Iraq?</li> <li>5. Do you feel the start of the WFP SOs and cluster operations was timely, too late or too limited in scope and geographical coverage?</li> </ol>

## Annex L: Meetings List

List of stakeholders contacted by the Evaluation Team during the Evaluation Mission:			
Date	Name	Position	Organisation
20/03/2016	PEARCE Jane	Country Director	WFP - Baghdad
20/03/2016	WEISS Thomas	Country Director	IOM
21/03/2016	MORTENSON, Ron	Programme Officer	USAID
21/03/2016	GHEDDO Bruno	Country Director	UNHCR
21/03/2016	DURANGO Daniel et al	HQ Auditors Team	WFP Rome HQ
22/03/2016	WALI Ibrahim Abid et al	Deputy Minister	MoE
22/03/2016	Dr AWAD Dhiaa	CSO Chairman	MoP
22/03/2016	NAWROOZ Satar	Director General	MoDM
22/03/2016	FARHAN Hussein	Director General	MoD
22/03/2016	HAWKINS Peter	Country Director	UNICEF
22/03/2016	MUSANI Altaf	Deputy Representative	WHO
23/03/2016	Dr KHALD Hind, Dr HUSSEIN Alaa Shalaan	NRI Programme Manager and National Director	NRI
23/03/2016	IBRAHEEM Muntajab	Director	ISHO
23/03/2016	ABDULFATTAH Khalid	Director	Muslim Aid
23/03/2016	Dr. MANSHIS Asaad	Govt. Liaison Officer	WFP - Baghdad
23/03/2016	ITHAWI Haidar	RRM Programme Officer	WFP - Baghdad
24/03/2016	SCHLUNKE Paul	Country Director	FAO
24/03/2016	ENNEST, Aaron	Programme Manager	World Vision
24/03/2016	DEUTECOM, Stef	Programme Manager	DRC
25/03/2016	AHMED Maha	Deputy CD	WFP - Baghdad
25/03/2016	OPIYO Nelly	Programme Officer	WFP - Erbil
25/03/2016	LEMMA Amare	Finance Manager	WFP - Erbil
25/03/2016	JAMEEL Phyza	CWC/Gender Focal Point	WFP - Erbil
25/03/2016	AHMED Saman	VAM Assistant	WFP - Erbil
25/03/2016	NAGAMUNE Ami	Programme Manager	WFP - Erbil
26/03/2016	TONEA Diana	Programme Manager	NRC

27/03/2016	MUSTAFA, Fallah	Minister	Ministry for International Relations
27/03/2016	AHMED Abdu	Camp Manager	Barsai Charity Foundation
27/03/2016	Site Visit – Harsham Camp	IDPs	8 men, X Women
27/03/2016	CHEETRI Hom	Head of Erbil Field Office	WFP - Erbil
27/03/2016	AHMED Hemin	Programme Manager	REACH
27/03/2016	MERKX Jozef	Head of Office	UNHCR _ Erbil
28/03/2016	HAMMED Elrashid	Head Dohuk Field Office	WFP - Dohuk
28/03/2016	AHMED Ismail Mohammed et al	Deputy Governor	KRG
28/03/2016	DORSEY Jeff	Programme Manager	ACTED
29/03/2016	SITE Visit Zakho		
29/03/2016	KHALAT Othman Mohammed	Representative	BRHA
29/03/2016	FGD	Urban Household Representatives for IDPs	BRHA (7 men)
29/03/2016	SABRY Mr.	Deputy Camp Manager Berseve 1	BRHA
29/03/2016	SALIH Ahmed Mohamed	Camp Manager – Chamisku camp	BRHA
29/03/2016	FGD	IDPs in camp	4 women
29/03/2016	Site Visit – Amidiya		
29/03/2016	AKAR Mr.	Representative	BRHA Amadiya
29/03/2016	FGD	Host Community	6 men 2 women
29/03/2016	PARACHID Mustafa	Mayor	KRG Amadiya
29/03/2016	SALIN Shahel Jamal	Dawoodiya Camp Deputy Camp Manager	BRHA KRG
29/03/2016	FGD	Camp inhabitants	4 men 3 women
29/03/2016	DOSKY Ihsan et al	Programme Manager	Islamic Kuristan League
30/03/2106	BRACQ Celine	Programme Officer-RRM	WFP - Erbil
30/03/2106	HUTCHINGS Nicholas	Programme Officer	ECHO
31/03/2016	MAQDSI Farid	Programme Officer	WFP - Erbil
31/03/2016	HASAN Samir	Data Base Assistant	WFP - Erbil

02/04/2016	IBRAHIM Neiaz	OIC – Suleymaniya Field Office	WFP - Suleymaniya
02/04/2016	SITE Visit – Chamchamal		
02/04/2016	AHSAN Abdel Rahman	Deputy Mayor	KRG
02/04/2016	PISHTIFLAN Ali	MoE Representative	KRG
02/04/2016	FGD	IDPs	10 men
02/04/2016	SLEMEN Ehsan AbdulRahman	Representative of Mayor	KRG
02/04/2016	FGD	IDPs	12 men
02/04/2016	Site Visit Darbandikhan		
02/04/2016	WALI Abdul Rahman	Representative of Mayor of Darbandikhan	KRG
02/04/2016	SYAMAND Mohammed	IDP Representative	KRG
02/04/2016	FGD	IDPs	12 men 4 women
02/04/2016	SABRI Faisal, IBRAHIM Aso	Distribution and Community Mobilisation Officers.	SAVE
03/04/2016	JAMAL Dylan, RAYMI Ali et al	Programme Co-ordinator, Distribution Officer	Save - Suleymaniya
03/04/2016	HANNA Richard, JAZA Rezheen	Regional Co-ordinator, Deputy Distribution Manager.	ACTED - Suleymaniya
03/04/2016	HSU Michelle	Food Security Cluster Co-ordinator - KRI	WFP- Erbil
03/04/2016	ERSKINE Brian	Procurement Officer	WFP- Erbil
03/04/2016	PERRONE Matteo	Cash/Voucher Manager	WFP - Erbil
04/04/2016	NIAZI Asif (Skype)	Head of Basra Field Office	WFP - Basra
04/04/2016	SADIK Basil	Director	Stars Orbit
04/04/2016	LEE Sunjoo	M&E Manager	WFP - Baghdad
05/04/2016	BAHAR Ala	School Feeding Officer (former)	WFP - Baghdad
05/04/2016	MAHDI Waleed	PDS Focal Point	WFP - Baghdad
05/04/2016	ACKLEY Adair	Fundraising officer	WFP - Baghdad
05/04/2016	BROWNE Craig	Reporting Officer	WFP - Baghdad

05/04/2016	TUTTINGHOFF Hildegard	Programmes Manager - PRRO	WFP - Baghdad
06/04/2016	IBRAHIM Aziz	General Director Vocational Training Dept	MoLSA
List of stakeholders contacted by the Hasan Wahab and Ilham Makki, Local Consultants, during the Evaluation Mission:			
22/03/2016	Site Visit - Wasit		
22/03/2016	MAJID Sirag	IDP Representative Wasit	MoDM, GoI
22/03/2016	HAMID Sabah	IDP Affairs Co-ordinator	MoDM, GoI
22/03/2016	ELEWI Kathum Karim	IDP Representative - Alhay	IDP
22/03/2016	FGD - Alnumia	Camp inhabitants - Alsadrain	6 Men
22/03/2016	FGD - Alnumia	Camp inhabitants – Abu Alfathel	4 Men
22/03/2016	FGD - Alnumia	Camp inhabitants – Abu Alfathel	7 Men
22/03/2016	FGD - Al Numaniya	Camp inhabitants – Hye- Alsadrain	4 women
22/03/2016	FGD - Al Numaniya	Camp inhabitants – Abu Alfathel	6 women
22/03/2016	FGD - Al Numaniya	Camp inhabitants- Al- qeela Zainab	9 women
23/03/2016	GABR Kadhom Risn	General Director - Al Hay	MoE
23/03/2016	HASAN Mohammed	Head of Distribution Unit	MoE
23/03/2016	Head teacher/teachers	Altt'akhhi School for girls	MoE
23/03/2016	FGD	Al Maaml Village	Parents 7 Men
23/03/2016	FGD	Jamela Village	Parents 5 Men
23/03/2016	Head teacher/teachers	Al Shabab School	MoE
28/03/2016	Thi Qar Site Visit		
28/03/2016	MHESIN Hakem Abr	General Director - Al Fuhod Education Directorate	MoE
28/03/2016	MUHHAMAD Rafiq Hakem Abr	General Director – Alchibaish Education Directorate	MoE



28/03/2016	Head teacher/teachers	Jafar Al Tayar School for Girls	MoE
28/03/2016	FGD	Al Gibaish	Parents – 6 Women
29/03/2016	Head teacher/teachers	Albasala School for Girls	MoE
29/03/2016	FGD	Ikram School	Parents – 4 Women
29/03/2016	Head teacher/teachers	Ikram School for Girls	MoE
29/03/2016	Head teacher/teachers	Bataeh School for Boys	MoE
29/03/2016	FGD	Almar	Parents – 6 Women
30/03/2016	HASSAN Shahid Ahmad	Head of Education Committee – Thi Qar Provincial Council	MoE
30/03/2016	MOHAMMAD Ali Salih	Head of MoDM – Thi Qar	GoI
30/03/2016	FGD	Al Hawalita Village	3 Women - IDPs
30/03/2016	FGD	Displaced from Ninevah Plain, Shirqat and Tal Afar	8 Women – IDPs
06/04/2016	Diyala Site Visit		
06/04/2016	HATAM Mr.	Director Alwajehia Local Council	GoI
06/04/2016	FGD	Al Wajehia (CFW project)	15 Men
06/04/2016	FGD	Al Wajehia (CFW project)	10 Women
06/04/2016	HADAD Zaid	Mayor – Al Muqdadia	GoI
06/04/2016	FGD	ALMuqdadya- Aleizzi (MCHN project)	3 women
06/04/2016	SAMI Karam Abas	Head of nutrition unit (MCHN project)	MoH
List of stakeholders contacted by F. De Meulder – Logistics Consultant –during the Evaluation Mission, via phone or Skype			
21/03/2016	REGAN Tania	Senior officer – Logistic cluster	WFP - Baghdad
21/03/2016	NOWACK Daniel	Senior logistic officer	WFP - Baghdad
21/03/2016	SABRE ALKADI Hussein	North Iraq Area Manager	PDS - Dohuk
22/03/2016	SHARKA Rami	Senior officer - ETC	WFP Erbil

23/03/2016	ESKINE Brian	Senior Procurement Officer	WFP - Baghdad
23/03/2016	AHMAND Bakhtyar	General Manager	Civil Development Organisation – CDO
24/03/2016	MIRAN Abdulameed	Supply chain manager	IOM Erbil
23/03/2016	MOHAMMED Ali	Operations Manager	Mercy Hands - Baghdad
24/03/2016	MOHAMMED Abdelrazzak	Country Director	Muslim Aid - Baghdad
04/04/2016	FAHAD H. Kirbit	Managing Director	Al-Taef Al Abead Transport
08/04/2016	UNEDDU Sylvia	Head of logistics	UNICEF - Erbil / Baghdad
08/04/2016	FREEMAN Anthony	Supply chain manager	WFP - Baghdad
11/04/2016	GHAFFUR HAMA Gareedb	General Manager	BZWAT Cy – Trading - Transport
11/04/2016	RASHID D. Batal	Manager	AZRA Cy – Trading - Transport
<b>List of stakeholders contacted by Team Leader during the Evaluation Mission, via skype:</b>			
12/04/2016	MUHANNAD Hadi	Regional Director	WFP RB Cairo
20/04/2016	LOAN Chris	Deputy Director	Canadian Govt – Global Affairs Dept. (Donor)
11/05/2016	KALLON Edward	UN Resident/ Humanitarian Co-ordinator – Amman (former WFP Country Director – Iraq)	UNDP
<b>List of stakeholders met by the Team Leader during the Inception Mission:</b>			
12/02/2016	PEARCE Jane	Country Director	WFP - Baghdad
13/02/2016	RAVINDRAN Dhanya	HR Manager	WFP - Baghdad
13/02/2016	SENIBULU Sosi	Security Manager	WFP - Baghdad
13/02/2016	FREEMAN Antony	Supply Chain Manager	WFP - Baghdad
14/02/2016	SCHNITTKER John	PDS Consultant	WFP - Baghdad
14/02/2016	WASAN Hasan, MAKKI Ilham	ET Iraqi Consultants	Evaluation Team
14/02/2016	GHEDDO Bruno	Country Director	UNHCR

14/02/2016	Dr. MANSNIS Asaad	Govt. Liaison Officer	WFP - Baghdad
14/02/2016	REGAN Tania	Logistics Cluster Co-ordinator	WFP - Baghdad
14/02/2016	DESOJO Maria	Food Security Cluster Co-ordinator	WFP - Baghdad
14/02/2016	MORTENSON, Ron	Programme Officer	USAID
15/02/2016	JAMEEL Phyza	CWC/Gender Focal Point	WFP - Erbil
15/02/2016	LORENTZEN Mick	Programme Co-ordinator	WFP - Erbil
15/02/2016	PERRONE Matteo	Cash/Voucher Manager	WFP - Erbil
15/02/2016	GRANDE Lisa	DSRSG	UN RESident Co-ordinator
15/02/2016	LA MALFA SARA	School Feeding Officer	WFP - Erbil
15/02/2016	HUTCHINGS Nicholas	Programme Officer	ECHO
16/02/2016	LEMMA Amare	Finance Manager	WFP - Erbil
16/02/2016	ZAIN Ulabedin	Programme Manger	SAVE
16/02/2016	Dr. JAMAL	Ministry of Planning	KRG
16/02/2016	NAGAMUNE Ami	Programme Manager	WFP - Erbil
16/02/2016	LEE Sunjoo	M&E Manager	WFP - Baghdad
17/02/2016	DAHASH Ismael Khalil	MODM	GoI
17/02/2016	Dr SARHAN Alaa	MoH	GoI
17/02/2016	McARTHUR Alistair	Programme Officer	DFID
17/02/2016	Alithawi Haider, ADBULSATTAR Ahmed	Emergency Programme Officers	WFP - Baghdad
17/02/2016	ABDELMOULA Adam	Country Director	UNDP
17/02/2016	IRONSIDE Pernille	Chief of Field Operations	UNICEF

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
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
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## Annex N: Food Security Cluster survey report (English and Arabic survey results combined)

Q1: If relevant, can you describe the history of your working relationship with WFP? n=27




Q2: In your opinion, would you say that the work undertaken by WFP between 2014 and mid 2015 has endeavored to meet the needs of the displaced population? (n=30)







Q3: Do you think gender considerations have been taken into account within the WFP activities undertaken? (n=28)




Q4: Do you think protection considerations have been taken into account within the WFP activities undertaken? (n=25)




Q5: How would you rate the timeliness of WFP's work? (n=31)




Q6: How would you rate the quality of WFP's support provided? (n=29)




Q7: How would you rate the quality of commodities provided? (n=29)




Q8: How would you rate the impact of WFP's assistance provided on the population affected? (n=30)



Q9: Has WFP intervention been flexible in meeting the changing needs of the population affected? (n=30) – no open ends available



Q10: How would you rate WFP's complementarity and coherence with other actors? (n=28)



Q11: What do you think WFP could have done better in terms of their support to the affected population from 2014 to mid 2015?

**Considering cash modality earlier**

*It would have been better if WFP distributed cash rather than FFP*

**RRI and FFP items**

*Many Iraqi IDPs come from rural areas and did not know what to do with some FFP items (such as canned food). The items should included rice, cooking oil, some dried goods, and even tomato paste*

**Considering cash for work**

*Cash-for-work program has a significant impact on beneficiaries*

*WFP should invested in creating job opportunities for IDPs rather than just provide food. Distributing food is not a sustainable solution.*

**Improve consistency of distribution schedule and communication with beneficiaries**


*Some locations did not have a consistent in kind distribution schedule. Also, areas between major population centers (like homes between Dohuk and Zawita) suffered from inconsistency distribution more than Dohuk and Zawita*

*Quality Information Dissemination and Awareness among the community. Timely provision of the food-basket*


**Flexibility with cooperating partners**

*Provide more flexibility to implementing partners for procurement and exact ration contents suitable to local contexts (based on a standard kcal ration). This would significantly cut costs, reduce procurement and transport times, and increase beneficiary satisfaction.*


Q12: How would you rate WFP's contribution to the Humanitarian Response Plan design and implementation? (n=28) – no open ends available



Q13: Do you think WFP has found a strategic role in the response that gets the best out of its organisational comparative advantages? (n=30)



Q14: If provided, how would you rate the capacity building support WFP provided to your organization? (n=25)



Q15: What are the lessons learned in your collaboration with WFP that you will be taking forward either to operations in Iraq, or elsewhere?

#### Importance of assessment

*Joint planning Joint Assessment Targeted Assistance*

*Conducting baseline assessment and creating responses given the assessment*

#### Logistics

*WFP helped us develop our logistics to correspond with quick response needs, regardless of location, and develop a wide range network of communication*

#### Quality assurance

*Check all the parcels before accepting them, ask for written confirmation on everything*

*monitor better the items received from WFP. national staff is more flexible and cooperative in south and central than the expats in Erbil*

#### Information sharing

*Sharing information with all organizations through the food cluster meetings ... also coordination with different partners to cover real needs and eliminate duplication of effort and aid*

#### Large scale assistance mobilization

*Dealing with huge number of beneficiaries as we learned how to plan and determine the right response mechanism that is clear and transparent. Learning how to execute responses through coordinating with local governments, local NGOs, inventory management, etc. all of this in order to support being transparent and applying certain standards during distribution.*

Q16: Do you have any final comments to add on your impression of the work undertaken by WFP over the last two/three years?

#### Make reasonable requests

*it is very difficult to partner with them, they have many, sometimes impossible requests (like asking CP staff to cross frontlines while WFP staff won't) and little response capacity*

#### Ensure sustainable staffing


*The WFP should do a longer planning and have more permanent staff in each region as the crisis may continue for longer than anyone predicted*

#### Better partnership with local NGOs


*Impression on the WFP Programme through the past years is that opportunities [go] to international organizations, even if they are not from the province. This leaves other local organizations that have sufficient experience in the field to only contract with other IO*

## Annex O: Staff survey report

Q1: Were the activities undertaken prior to mid-2015 by WFP relevant to target groups' priorities and appropriate in the local context? n=12



Q2: To what extent have WFP operations been flexible to changing situations and needs of the targeted populations? n=12





Q3: To the best of your knowledge, on what information were these interventions based?

EMOPs were seen as based on the following:


- mVAM food security data
- FSC assessments
- CP verification of needs
- Rapid needs assessment

Surveyed staff questioned the quality and durability of this information. The rapid assessment was cited as using secondary data only and lacking field interviews. Lack of assessment was also cited as a cause for lacking a targeting criteria that is not based on status.

*No household surveys were available for targeting purposes. Interventions were based on inter-sector rapid needs assessments and "categorization" of beneficiaries. I.e. displaced people would be assisted, host communities not.*

*The Iraq Rapid Food Security Assessment of July 2014 was the basis. However, the analyst used secondary data with no field interviews. Field interviews would have allowed profiling and separation of the rich, moderate and poor IDPs thus reducing the target group and allowing focus on the vulnerable.*


Q4: Has WFP been able to maintain its impartiality in terms of the targeting of beneficiaries and the selection of activities? n=12




Q5: To what extent did national authorities (provincial and/or local levels) influence or help design the type of work undertaken? n=12

*no proper tracking of IDPs movement as result no good updated database of beneficiaries across the sectors.*


*In Kurdistan the coordination with the KRG were formal. However, in areas of Northern Iraq including Ninewa, the school authorities were involved at all stages of the project implementation including selection of schools and determining the food basket.*




**Q6: Were Gender issues built into the WFP portfolio operations? n=12**




**Q7: Were protection issues built into the WFP portfolio operations? n=12**



**Q8: How effective were the arrangements for monitoring implementation? n=11**



**Q9: In your opinion, has WFP been able to promote food security solutions into broader national policy frameworks and context?**



Q10: What have been the key operational issues that have helped / detracted from the successful implementation of the operations?

### Top detractors

#### Security & Political unrest

*Security situation restricting movement and limiting frequent engagements with all stakeholders and also bringing technical missions as necessary.*

#### Staffing

*Capacity building programme lacked experienced staff, the EMOP CO Programme Unit was run by junior staff in 2014. This improved in 2015.*

### Factors that helped (only 2 respondent provided feedback


on what helped implementing operations successfully)

#### Supply chain capacity


*Pipelines from Turkey were reliable. Trading networks were existing. All this was easy and ready to use for WFP.*

*Helped - supply chain capacity*

Q11: To what extent are the processes, systems (HR, Finance, M&E and Reporting) in place that support operations functioning well? n=12



Q12: To what extent are/were the development project activities likely to continue without WFP support? n=13 (no open ends were provided)



Q13: What have been the most positive and negative impacts / aspects of the work undertaken? Did any of these surprise you?

### Negative Impact

#### HR and staffing shortages

*Negative: very high turn over of international staff at CO. no delegation authority.*

*Negative - high staff turnover resulting in limited institutional memory.. inability to hire several important posts (surprising given L3 operation).*

#### Coordinating across UN agencies

*Strong attempts at central coordination by HC/OCHA, not always helpful to response, including heavy administrative burden*

#### Inadequate reporting

*Better sharing of results/reports with stakeholders requires strengthening, particularly through use of story telling. Equally- further emphasis is required on setting realistic indicator targets to better monitor progress made*

### Positive impact

#### Food security

*Positive: Managed to serve the needy and reaching them under the severe security risks and restrictive environment.*

*Positive - prevented the significant prevalence of food insecurity across Iraq (in the face of conflict and limited PDS rations). Supported the humanitarian community (Special Operations).*

#### WFP positioning in Iraq

*Positive is that WFP remained strong in Iraq despite the challenges on security. WFP was a strong member of the integrated mission structure that maintained visibility of the UN through its activities like school feeding and nutrition.*

Q14: Do you have any suggestions as to how WFP could improve its operations?

#### Ensuring sustained staffing needs

WFP needs to develop strategies to sustain its staff to better implement and monitor its programmes - Particularly there is very alarming staff turn over of Monitoring and Evaluation staff which cripples effective monitoring and evaluation of WFP programmes.

Encourage retention of staff/hiring of staff to fill gaps - Promote greater targeting - Focus on what WFP is best at (Supply Chain strengths) when planning for future resilience/development initiatives.

Internally, there is a need to secure some international posts to ensure that there is no constant turnover.

#### Maintain positive relations with Iraqi Government

Govt of Iraq provide funds for the operation. WFP should continue trying to keep that trust and confidence so the partnership is long term and strong.

#### Consider a phased approach to implementing new targeting scheme

*At this point in time a much more serious targeting system must be put in place. A phasing out of in kind distributions for long-term beneficiaries should also be thought of.*

#### Improve staff reporting and feedback channels

*More regular HQ oversight missions that have access to field staff concerns and inputs would ensure compliance and better results.*

**Rome, October 2016, OEV/2015/025**

**Office of Evaluation**  
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