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Hunger Hotspots

FAO-WFP early warnings
on acute food insecurity

February to May 2022 Outlook



Global Network
Against Food Crises

Integrated
actions for
lasting solutions

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Acronyms


CARI	Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security
CH	<i>Cadre Harmonisé</i>
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GAM	Global acute malnutrition
GDP	Gross domestic product
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDP	Internally displaced persons
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
MAM	Moderate acute malnutrition
rCARI	remote Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security
SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions
UN	United Nations
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

Contents

05	Map of hunger hotspots
06	Executive Summary
07	Introduction
10	Upcoming trends of acute food insecurity
13	Countries of highest concern
17	Country narratives
17	Asia and the Pacific
19	Latin America and the Caribbean
22	West Africa and the Sahel
25	East Africa
29	Southern Africa
33	Near East and North Africa

Map of hunger hotspots

February to May 2022 Outlook



Risk type

-  Conflict/insecurity
-  Displacement
-  Dry conditions
-  Economic shocks, including COVID-19-related measures
-  Flood
-  Locusts
-  Political instability/unrest
-  Tropical cyclone

For the digital version please click [here](#).

Source of data: FAO and WFP. 2022. Hunger Hotspots analysis (February to May 2022). Source of map: United Nations. 2020. Map of the World [online]. [Cited 16 January 2022]. www.un.org/geospatial/content/map-world

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Executive Summary

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) warn that acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further in 20 countries or situation (including one region) - called hunger hotspots - during the outlook period from February to May 2022.

Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen remain at the highest alert level from the previous edition of this report. In their last available assessments, these countries all had parts of populations identified or projected to experience starvation and death (Catastrophe, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC] Phase 5), requiring the most urgent attention.

The lack of updated assessment data for Ethiopia is a major concern. Acute food insecurity levels are likely to have increased and could rise further beyond the Emergency and Catastrophic levels (IPC Phase 4 and 5) already identified in the last report. These included a projection of famine-like conditions for 401 000 people for July to September 2021 in the Tigray region. A risk that famine would occur in Tigray region by end of 2021 was identified by the IPC Famine Review Committee, conditional on the conflict worsening, humanitarian access shrinking and private sector and supply lines becoming non-functional. While an updated assessment of the situation is not available, according to the Famine Review Committee's worst case scenario, there would be a high Risk of Famine, if conflict was to resume in Tigray.

In Nigeria, while some populations in conflict-affected areas in the northeast are now projected to slide into catastrophic food insecurity at the peak of the lean season, from June 2022 onwards, it cannot be excluded that some may start to experience this even earlier, in the next months, and that the magnitude may be higher than what projections anticipate.

Across South Sudan, the magnitude and severity of already very high levels of acute food insecurity is likely to increase further. Food insecurity has likely further deteriorated beyond the latest available IPC projections and is expected to continue increasing. Preliminary results of the sectoral analysis undertaken in November 2021 identified 11 counties of extreme concern for food insecurity in 2022 as compared to 6 in 2021. In Pibor County, Jonglei State, the IPC FRC had alerted in December 2020 that several payams were in famine likely or at risk of famine for the projected period from December to July 2021.

In Yemen, the latest available IPC analysis, issued in December 2020, projected rising Catastrophic levels of food insecurity in three governorates and deteriorating Emergency levels in other parts by June 2021. While increased humanitarian assistance by July 2021 contributed to a stabilization of food insecurity, recent data across the north and south of Yemen gives indicative evidence of a deteriorating trend in the food insecurity situation while underlying drivers of food insecurity continue to deteriorate.

Compared to the previous edition of this report, the situation in Madagascar is no longer at the highest alert level as the risk of a catastrophic food insecurity situation - 28 000 people were previously projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) by October-December 2021 has been averted for now as a result of the broad coverage of humanitarian food assistance. Nonetheless, Madagascar remains a hunger hotspot due to persisting high levels of acute food insecurity.

Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Honduras, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic remain countries of particular concern, as in the previous edition of this report. This is due to the high numbers of people in critical food insecurity coupled with worsening drivers expected to further intensify life-threatening conditions. Afghanistan in particular is projected to face a record high of people in critical food insecurity and there is a serious risk that parts of the population will face starvation and death (IPC Phase 5) if the crisis is not contained. Sahel, as a region, is the new entry for this category of countries of particular concern, likely to reach the highest number of acutely food-insecure people in the past eight years under the combined effects of erratic rainfall, record high food prices and - for Central Sahel - further security deterioration. Mauritania has been added in the list of hotspots countries compared to the July 2021 edition of the report.

Organized violence or conflict remains the primary drivers, actual or potential, for acute hunger in the hunger hotspots and globally. Weather extremes such as heavy rains, tropical storms, hurricanes, flooding, drought and climate variability remain significant drivers in some countries and regions. The ongoing La Niña conditions additionally lead to an elevated risk of a two-year sequence of dry conditions, particularly in East Africa and Central Asia. Almost two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, global and national economic disruptions caused by several contagion waves have escalated while new variants bring new uncertainties and might negatively affect their economies. Overall, high food prices and low household purchasing power are major economic concerns for further increasing acute food insecurity.

Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods in the 20 hunger hotspots. Moreover, in four of these hotspots - Ethiopia, Nigeria South Sudan and Yemen - humanitarian actions are critical to preventing starvation and death. The report provides country-specific recommendations on priorities for emergency response as well as anticipatory action to address existing humanitarian needs and ensure short-term protective interventions before new needs materialize.

Introduction

For the outlook period from February to May 2022, FAO and WFP are issuing an early warning for urgent humanitarian action in 20 "hunger hotspots" where parts of the population are likely to face a significant deterioration of acute food insecurity in the coming months that will put their lives and livelihoods at risk.

Identified through forward-looking analysis, these hotspots have potential for acute food insecurity to rise in the outlook period, under the effects of often multiple drivers, interlinked or mutually reinforcing. These fall under the categories of organized violence and conflict, economic shocks including secondary impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, weather extremes and climate variability, animal and plant pests and diseases. Drivers often co-exist and reinforce one another.

In the majority of the hunger hotspots across regions, organized violence or conflict is the primary drivers, actual or potential, for a likely deterioration of food insecurity levels. This reflects a global trend where conflict continues to affect the largest share of people facing acute food insecurity. In 2020, around 65 percent of acutely food-insecure people were living in countries with conflict as the main driver,¹ and key trends indicate that conflict levels and violence against civilians continued to increase in 2021.² Almost two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, global and national economic disruptions caused by several contagion waves have escalated and, as only 8.5 percent of the people in low-income countries have been vaccinated as of January 2022,³ new variants bring new uncertainties in these countries and might negatively affect their economies. Major economic concerns are high food prices and low household purchasing power, which are further increasing acute food insecurity. Weather extremes such as heavy rains, tropical storms, hurricanes, flooding, drought and climate variability remain significant drivers, in some countries and regions. The ongoing La Niña conditions additionally lead to an elevated risk of a two-year sequence of dry conditions, particularly in East Africa and Central Asia.

Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods in the 20 hunger hotspots. Moreover, in four of these – Ethiopia, Nigeria South Sudan and Yemen – humanitarian actions are critical to preventing starvation and death. To this end, the report provides country-specific recommendations on priorities for: a) anticipatory action – short-term protective interventions to be implemented before new humanitarian needs materialize; and b) emergency response – actions to address existing humanitarian needs.

Situations of acute food insecurity continue to escalate. The mid-year update of the Global Report on Food Crises, published in September 2021, estimated that 161 million people were facing Crisis or worse (IPC/Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 3 or above) across 42 countries/territories with data for 2021 available at that time.

Importantly, due to data gaps in 2021, the September 2021 figure of 161 million people does not include data for 13 countries/ territories that qualified as food crises in 2020, notably the Syrian Arab Republic, where 12.4 million acutely food-insecure people required urgent food assistance in 2020. Moreover, higher food security numbers have been published since then in other countries, notably Afghanistan. Therefore, this figure has increased further. This recent estimate already shows a 6-million increase in food insecurity in 2021, in comparison to the 155 million people in 55 countries/territories reported for 2020 – itself an increase of around 20 million people from 2019.⁴ Over 43 million people in 38 countries across the globe are now at risk of falling into famine or famine-like conditions, unless they receive immediate life and livelihoods-saving assistance.⁵

Given a strict set of methodological parameters, the hunger hotspot countries and situations were selected through a consensus-based process, which involved WFP and FAO Rome-based and field-based technical teams, as well as analysts specialized in conflict, economic risks and natural hazards. The parameters used in the forward-looking analysis include:

- Assessed levels of recent or current acute food insecurity, especially in terms of deterioration compared to the same timeframe in the previous year – in order to account for seasonal variations;
- Assessed projections of acute food insecurity for the outlook period based on analysis of: a) primary and secondary drivers, namely economic shocks, adverse climate conditions and weather shocks, conflict and political violence, and diffusion of plant pests and animal diseases; b) the socio-economic state of each country based on assessments of macroeconomic stability (including, among others, debt stocks, foreign-exchange reserves and exposure to balance-of-payment crises), and the current rise of international and national food prices (especially for countries importing large shares of their food requirements);
- Absolute numbers of people projected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) and the prevalence of these levels of acute food insecurity on the overall analysed population;
- Presence of natural hazards, economic and conflict risks that are likely to have a direct impact on food insecurity (such as unforeseen climatic shocks) or an indirect one (for example, increased internal displacement) over the outlook period;
- Ongoing or planned agricultural activities for the February-to-May period, and existing or likely disruptions caused by different events or risks; and
- Presence of significant operational and humanitarian access constraints.

The main sources of data on acute food insecurity (current and projections) are the IPC and CH. For countries where IPC/CH analyses were not conducted and where no recent analyses were available, estimates of the number of people in acute food insecurity were primarily derived from the IPC-compatible analysis of the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), WFP assessments using the Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI), including its application to remotely collected data (rCARI) and Humanitarian Needs Overviews.⁶

WFP’s open-access Hunger Map Live, and specifically near-real time data on insufficient food consumption, was used to inform trend analysis and as a triangulation tool during the assessment phase.

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were not included as hunger hotspots due to unavailability or scarcity of updated food insecurity data, which did not allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied methodology.

The cut-off date for the analysis contained in this report is 16 January 2022.

This report is part of a series of analytical products produced under the Global Network Against Food Crises initiative, to enhance and coordinate the generation and sharing of evidence-based information and analysis for preventing and addressing food crises. In September 2021, the Global Network, in collaboration with the Food Security Information Network, released the mid-year update of the 2021 Global Report on Food Crises, which highlights the number of people, estimated to be in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) and the prevalence of these numbers within the analysed population by 10 September 2021. It is available at <http://www.fightfoodcrises.net> and <https://www.fsinplatform.org>

IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

PHASE	TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION	PRIORITY RESPONSE OBJECTIVE
1 None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Resilience building and disaster risk reduction.
2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Disaster risk reduction and protection of livelihoods.
3 Crisis	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; OR • Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies. 	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
4 Emergency	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; OR • Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. 	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to save lives and livelihoods.
5 Catastrophe/ Famine*	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality).	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

* Households can be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) even if areas are not classified as Famine (IPC Phase 5). In order for an area to be classified Famine, at least 20 percent of households should be in IPC Phase 5.

The classification of areas in Famine Likely is permitted when all IPC protocols for Famine classification are met, except for the existence of reliable evidence for all three outcomes – food consumption or livelihood change, global acute malnutrition (GAM), and crude death rate (CDR). Areas can be classified as Famine Likely if minimally adequate evidence available indicates that a Famine may be occurring or will occur. Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe, the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

Upcoming trends of acute food insecurity

To identify hunger hotspots, FAO and WFP have assessed how key drivers of food insecurity are likely to evolve and have combined effects across countries in the coming months, and the related risks of deteriorations. Below is an overview of key findings:

Organized violence and conflict risks

In the **Central African Republic, Central Sahel**, the eastern provinces of the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, northern **Ethiopia**, northern **Nigeria**, northern **Mozambique, Myanmar, the Sudan, South Sudan** and **Yemen**, conflict or organized violence remain key drivers of acute food insecurity. Violence has reduced people's access to, and the availability of food by displacing populations, limiting their access to agricultural land and other livelihoods, and disrupting commercial trade and services and markets. Movement restrictions, administrative impediments and supply chain disruptions have also hampered humanitarian operations, compounding the direct impact of conflict. These trends are likely to continue or intensify in all these countries in the outlook period.

In the **Central African Republic**, high levels of insecurity, including attacks against civilians, are likely to see a seasonal uptick in the coming months; this would disrupt the upcoming sowing period in March and April in central and southern areas of the country. In the eastern provinces of North Kivu and Ituri of the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, new joint multinational military operations are likely to lead to a further intensification of violence, in the context of increased attacks by armed groups against civilians. In **Ethiopia**, the conflict situation remains highly volatile, while extreme disruptions of humanitarian and commercial transports, and the lack of basic services, continue to severely limit humanitarian operations in Tigray. At the same time, concerns over a deterioration of the already catastrophic situation in the region are mounting. In northern **Nigeria**, attacks by non-state armed groups in the northeast, coupled with banditry and intercommunal violence in the northcentre and northwest, will continue to disrupt agricultural and market activities; this will lead to reduced incomes and new displacement, including in areas that are projected to face Catastrophe (CH Phase 5).

In **Myanmar**, intensified conflict since September 2021 will likely continue in several states and regions in the outlook period, driving displacement and disrupting access to farmland and markets. In northern **Mozambique**, sporadic attacks by non-state armed groups in Cabo Delgado as well as Niassa provinces are likely to continue and to cause new displacements during the outlook period. Civil unrest and major political instability are likely to continue to disrupt commercial supply lines in **the Sudan**. In addition, cyclical waves of intercommunal violence in Darfur have displaced tens of thousands of people in the past months. In **South Sudan**, violent cattle raiding, and revenge attacks will likely continue, especially in Jonglei, Warrap and

Unity States, during a likely early and extended lean season, which usually starts in May.

In **Yemen**, fighting is expected to further intensify around Ma'rib city over the coming months, and potentially to further expand around Hodeida port and further south; this could cause large-scale displacement and disrupt live-saving imports, especially for people who were projected to be in famine-like conditions in northern areas.

Natural hazard risks

Weather and climate extremes, driven among other factors by the ongoing 2021/22 La Niña episode, a second consecutive event, are expected to continue. There is very high likelihood for La Niña, at 67 percent through May, and at about 50 percent through June 2022.⁷ This puts some countries in the Greater Horn of Africa, Asia and the Pacific at high risk of below average production and experiencing worsening food insecurity conditions.

In **Afghanistan**, La Niña is likely to affect both the ongoing winter and forthcoming spring agricultural seasons, and to result in reduced production and livestock losses in large parts of the country. Forecast below-average rainfall and snowpack in mountainous areas could also reduce water availability for irrigation.

In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, consecutive below-average rainfall and resulting drought conditions, due to the ongoing La Niña event, are expected to negatively affect the current agricultural season; this applies particularly to key agricultural producing provinces in the northeast, resulting in reduced production and increasing food prices.

In **Eastern Africa**, seasonal forecasts for the upcoming long-rains season are still uncertain, with models suggesting mixed signals. However, recent analysis indicates the possibility of a fourth consecutive poor season in parts of East Africa, with the potential for profound food insecurity implications. Due to consecutive poor harvests over the past three seasons in some areas of East Africa, vulnerable households will not be able to sufficiently replenish their food stocks, even if the upcoming season turns out to be good.

In **South Sudan**, long-range forecasts indicate above-average rainfall season, starting in April. This could lead to good prospects for crops but also increase the risk of major floods in some areas, resulting in displacement and crop damages.

Consecutive below-average rainfall is expected during the ongoing agricultural season in southern and southwestern provinces of **Angola**, which is likely to reduce production and lead to crop losses for a third consecutive year. In southern **Madagascar**, below-average rainfall is forecast for the remainder of current agricultural season in areas that are still facing the residual impacts of a severe drought in 2021. In addition, eastern **Madagascar** and the **Mozambique Channel** are facing an enhanced number of tropical cyclones this year, increasing the risk of flooding in coastal areas of both countries.

In **Haiti**, current long-range forecasts suggest below-average rainfall for the upcoming first rainy season (March to June) which coincides with the main maize-producing season, especially in areas that have already suffered rainfall deficits over the past two seasons.

Economic risks

The 5.9 percent recovery of the world economy in 2021 does not conceal the ongoing pandemic-related disruptions that continue to exacerbate the severity of economic conditions in numerous countries.⁸ Most salient is soaring headline inflation, which has been triggered by disrupted supply chains and increasing fuel and energy prices.^{9, 10} Global food prices were also spiking in 2021, boosted by shortfalls in main food-producing countries.¹¹ Adding to income losses caused by the pandemic, rising prices have contributed to further reducing household purchasing power. Despite some improvements compared to 2020, the World Bank estimated that 97 million more people were living in poverty in 2021 compared to 2019, due to the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic.¹²

Unlike in developed and emerging economies, the 2021 economic bounce-back was weaker in most developing countries, whose economies only grew by 3 percent on average.¹³ Especially in low-income countries, where 91.5 percent of the population were not vaccinated as of January 2022, new COVID-19 variants have led to new, severe outbreaks.¹⁴ Many of the economic disturbances listed in the country narratives of this report, such as high inflation rates, soaring food prices, currency depreciation, disrupted labour markets and widening budget deficits, are caused or reinforced by the COVID-19 pandemic. The most drastic economic deteriorations occurred in those countries that were going through distress before 2020. In those low-income countries with low vaccination rates, the mentioned longer-term economic disturbances caused by earlier contagion waves have been further exacerbated by disruptions caused by the introduction of new movement restrictions during the pandemic's current phase. The onset of the highly contagious and already fast-spreading Omicron variant has the potential to further delay the global recovery throughout 2022.

Due to the commodity dependence of most low-income countries, increasing commodity prices strongly affected their economies in 2021.¹⁵ Whereas net commodity importers have struggled with financing their energy and fuel purchases, the balance of trade of net commodity exporters has seen slight improvements in 2021. As most commodity prices are predicted to plateau at high levels in 2022,¹⁶ revenues are expected to increase for exporting countries, supporting their currencies. However, despite the improving macroeconomic stability of these countries, the situation of their poor and vulnerable households remains highly uncertain over the short run. An additional threat to increased food insecurity in developing countries is the currently soaring price of fertilizers, which might lead to their reduced use and diminished crop yields in 2022.¹⁷

Despite a brief reduction in mid-2021, the FAO Food Price Index has been continuously increasing since May 2020.¹⁸ In December 2021, the global food price index averaged 133.7 points, (100 = 2014–2016 prices), down 1.2 points (0.9 percent) from November, which represented the highest rate of the past 10 years, but still up 25.1 points (23.1 percent) from December 2020.¹⁹ Vegetable oils have recorded the highest rise among food items in 2021.²⁰ In November 2021, the FAO Cereal Price Index also reached its highest level since May 2011, while, slightly lower in December 2021, the average

prices of staple food increased 23 percent year-on-year.²¹ For 2022, the World Bank expects that the upward pressure on agricultural prices will remain strong, which would leave many poor households worldwide vulnerable to food insecurity.²²

Several countries of the **Near East and North Africa**, many of which were already facing structural macroeconomic challenges prior to the pandemic, have experienced significant economic difficulties in 2021 which have exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities. Depleted foreign reserves, severe currency depreciation and soaring food prices, as part of an unprecedented economic crisis in **Lebanon**, have continued to push large parts of the population into poverty and food insecurity. In the conflict-torn countries of the **Syrian Arab Republic** and **Yemen**, food insecurity levels have also risen due to growing difficulties in financing imports, along with liquidity shortages and extreme price spikes.

In 2021, the developing economies of **Central and Eastern Asia**, characterized by low vaccination rates, have been severely disrupted by the eruption of new COVID-19 contagion waves.²³ In **Afghanistan**, the economic situation has significantly deteriorated since the political transition in August. A tumbling currency, soaring inflation and depleting monetary reserves are expected to have pushed well over 90 percent of the population into poverty. With no improvements of the situation in sight, increasing food insecurity in the country is pushing the need for humanitarian support to conspicuously high levels. In **Myanmar**, poverty and food insecurity are further rising, due to ongoing violent conflicts and the lingering economic crisis that has followed the military takeover at the beginning of 2021.

Latin America remains the region which has experienced the largest economic losses, in gross domestic product (GDP) terms, caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and measures taken to contain its spread.²⁴ The ongoing economic crisis in **Haiti**, characterized by a weakening currency and soaring inflation, has led to a further reduction of purchasing power for many poor and vulnerable households. In both **Honduras** and **Colombia**, despite gradual recovery from the contraction in 2020, still-depressed employment opportunities, coupled with rising prices and declining purchasing power, are exacerbating economic losses caused by the pandemic.

In many **African countries**, economic disturbances have been piling up in 2021, while record-high food prices have reduced households' access to food in many regions. In countries like **South Sudan** and **Somalia**, high fuel prices and transportation costs have further boosted food inflation in remote areas. In **Ethiopia**, the ongoing conflict and accompanying uncertainties have continued to worsen economic performance. Reduced investment inflows and export revenues have compounded the country's liquidity shortages and the depletion of foreign-currency reserves, affecting the sustainability of the external debt. The resulting currency depreciation and terms-of-trade deterioration are boosting prices and declining the population's purchasing power. After some signs of improvement in the first months of 2021, **the Sudan's** renewed political uncertainty has caused a new and dangerous economic impasse. In particular, uncertainties about foreign economic support could further destabilize the local currency and increase already high food prices.

Animal and plant pests and diseases

Starting in early 2020, a massive desert locust upsurge broke out across greater **Eastern Africa, Southwest Asia**, and the area **around the Red Sea**, as favourable climatic conditions allowed widespread breeding of the pest. After months of combatting this destructive migratory pest in the affected regions, growing evidence shows that the upsurge is recessing, however the upsurge is not yet declared over.

Current efforts to reduce swarm formation should be maintained in the **Horn of Africa**, while in other regions the situation is projected to be calm. Small, immature swarms were forming in northeast Somalia at the end of 2021. Although control operations in northeast **Somalia** were limiting the number and size of immature swarms, a southwards migration was likely to be passing over central Somalia and eastern **Ethiopia** to reach southeast Ethiopia, northeast **Kenya**, and southern Somalia. By the time swarms mature and are ready to lay eggs, conditions in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya are unlikely to be favourable due to the dry season; therefore, the swarms may remain immature until the long rains arrive in April–May, which would allow maturation and egg-laying. Field teams are expected to have the necessary resources, experience and time to control the swarms before April, and bring the current upsurge to an end.

In the Grand Sud region of **Madagascar**, the performance of the ongoing agricultural season is likely to be affected by a Malagasy migratory locust outbreak observed since August 2021. The locust threat is occurring in a context of critical rates of food insecurity and malnutrition – a result of three consecutive years of severe drought, poor harvests and people's hampered access to food. If the locust situation were to deteriorate further to the point of an upsurge, an even larger area of Madagascar would be directly threatened.

Aggravating factor: humanitarian access constraints

Urgent and scaled-up assistance is required in all 20 hunger hotspots, to protect livelihoods and increase access to food. This is essential to avert a further deterioration of food insecurity or malnutrition. In the countries of highest concern, the provision of humanitarian assistance is crucial to save lives and prevent starvation, death, and the total collapse of livelihoods (Catastrophe/Famine [IPC Phase 5]). Humanitarian access is limited in various ways, including through insecurity due to organized violence or conflict, presence of administrative or bureaucratic impediments, movement restrictions, and physical constraints related to the environment.

Five hunger hotspots are classified as having Extreme access constraints, according to the recently published ACAPS Humanitarian Access Overview.²⁵


In **Afghanistan**, humanitarian access constraints continue to be extreme, despite a reduction in movement restrictions due to an improvement of the security situation. Humanitarian access and

supply lines remain intermittent, severely limiting humanitarian operations in northern **Ethiopia**, due to insecurity and restrictions, but also in other parts of the country. These access constraints are among the key factors contributing to a risk of famine in the Tigray region. In **Mali**, humanitarian access remains extremely constrained due to insecurity, particularly in the northern, central and southern regions. In conflict-affected northern **Nigeria**, extreme access constraints are likely to continue in the outlook period due to persistent insecurity, while some areas most at risk of sliding into catastrophic situations remain out of reach. Humanitarian constraints are also extreme in the **Syrian Arab Republic**, especially in areas under opposition control in the northwest.

Eight countries are classified as having Very High access constraints. These include: the **Central African Republic**, in a context of a likely worsening security situation through 2022; **Colombia**, where access is likely to significantly worsen in areas affected by conflict; the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, where new joint multinational military operations and deteriorating insecurity are expected to further disrupt humanitarian assistance; **Myanmar**, where access constraints remain very high despite having slightly improved in areas previously inaccessible; the **Niger**, particularly along the border area with Burkina Faso and Mali, and at the border with Nigeria, due to insecurity; **Somalia**, as a result of hostilities, bureaucratic impediments and impassable roads; **South Sudan**, due to conflict and violence, logistical constraints including extensive flooding, and very poor road networks; and **Yemen**, as a result of conflict, insecurity, bureaucratic impediments and civil unrest.

Number of people in acute food insecurity in hotspot countries

In 2022 (most recent projection), in millions



The data presented is most recent projection, data is from 2022 except for Ethiopia, Honduras, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen (all 2021) and the Syrian Arab Republic (2020). For the remaining hotspots, no recent IPC/CH or CARI data is available. ¹ Most current data reported is non-peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 15. ² Less than 50 percent of population covered by IPC/CH. These figures are a combination of the December 2020 IPC covering *Beleg* and Meher areas (IPC global product with conclusions reached by the Ethiopia IPC analysis team – not endorsed by the Government of Ethiopia) and the May 2021 IPC covering Tigray, Amhara and Afar. As no recent update was published, these figures are not used in the country narrative of this report. ³ Less than 50 percent of the population covered by IPC/CH. ⁴ Based on rCARI/CARI. Data is from 2020. The 12.4 million people include also 1.7 million people residing in camps who are considered acute food insecure and in need of full support according to the Whole of Syria Food Security Sector. ⁵ Based on rCARI/CARI. Data is from 2021. The 2 million people include 735 000 Syrian refugees who are acute food insecure according to the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees. The WFP rCARI methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing, therefore there is uncertainty at this stage regarding the degree of over- and under-estimation biases. (Preliminary studies comparing the use of CARI and rCARI for Syrian refugees in Lebanon suggested around 9-10 percent under-estimation of acute food insecurity). Caution in reading the corresponding numbers should be observed. ⁶ CARI is used to classify individual households according to their level of food insecurity. All indicators included within the CARI approach can be incorporated within IPC analysis. The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator sits within the IPC analytical framework. For details see http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/manual/IPC_Technical_Manual_3_Final.pdf. Overall comparability between IPC/CH and CARI is not established.

Countries of highest concern

Countries with catastrophic situations (famine-like conditions – IPC Phase 5) or with factors leading to a risk of famine in their outlook.

Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Yemen continue to be countries at the highest alert level, as in the previous edition of this report. They all had parts of populations in the last-available assessments that were identified or projected to experience starvation and death (IPC Phase 5), requiring the most urgent attention. No updated IPC analysis was available for Ethiopia, South Sudan or Yemen. While the Yemen and South Sudan IPC analysis is planned for the coming months, timelines for Ethiopia remain unclear. This lack of information is a major concern.

The risk of catastrophic food insecurity – 28 000 people were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) by October–December 2021 – has been averted for the moment in **Madagascar**, as a result of broad coverage of humanitarian food assistance in recent months. With no populations projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes through August 2022, the situation in Madagascar is now no longer at the highest alert level, although it continues to remain a hunger hotspot due to persisting high levels of acute food insecurity.

After projecting famine-like conditions for 401 000 people in the July to September 2021 period, the lack of updated IPC data for **Ethiopia** is a major concern.* Acute food insecurity levels are likely to have increased and could further rise beyond the Emergency and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 4 and 5) levels already identified in the last projections. Since the previous edition of the report in July, the conflict in northern Ethiopia has expanded from Tigray into neighbouring Amhara and Afar, disrupting key transport routes to Djibouti, devastating agricultural production and causing large-scale displacement. The situation remains highly volatile and violence is likely to continue in this report's outlook period. According to the Humanitarian Response Plan Mid-Year Review and Northern Ethiopia Response Plan (NERP), there are close to 18 million people requiring food assistance in Ethiopia.** Of these, there are 5.2 million people requiring humanitarian assistance in Tigray and 12.8 million in the other regions.²⁶ In addition, the IPC Famine Review Committee identified in July 2021 that there was a risk that famine would occur in Tigray by the end of 2021, depending on: (1) the intensity of the conflict; (2) sustained humanitarian access and level of operations; and (3) functionality of the private sector and informal supply lines, including availability of commercial goods and services. As of December 2021, humanitarian access remained low to sporadic, and commercial supply lines and services largely non-existent.²⁷ This corresponds to the Famine Review Committee's worst case scenario which foresaw that there would be a high Risk of Famine, if, in addition, conflict was to resume in Tigray.²⁸ Due to the extension of conflict into Amhara and Afar region between July and mid-December, concerns over severe levels of acute food insecurity are also high for

these two regions.

Over the past six months, food inflation has remained two times higher than one year ago, while the economic strain of the conflict is gradually destabilizing the country's balance of payments and its debt sustainability. In addition, a below-average rainy season from October to December, among the poorest on record, has extended to severe drought conditions, marking the third consecutive poor season in southern and southeast Ethiopia. This has led to increased livestock emaciation and death, and the consequent reduced milk and meat production, limiting income and food sources for pastoral communities. Additionally, crop production failed for agropastoral households, resulting in limited access to food from own production and labour activities.

A third consecutive year of unusually high and extensive flooding, on top of continued sub-national violence and insecurity, along with elevated food prices, is likely to increase further the magnitude and severity of already very high levels of food insecurity in **South Sudan**.

The most recent IPC analysis projected that around 7.2 million people would face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of food insecurity between April and July 2021. This included more than 2.4 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 108 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Though there have been no recent IPC updates, food insecurity has likely further deteriorated and is expected to continue increasing, due to the impacts of the flooding, soaring food prices, violence and very high humanitarian access constraints.²⁹

Preliminary results of the sectoral analysis undertaken in November 2021 identified 11 counties of extreme concern for food insecurity in 2022, as compared to 6 in 2021. The counties are in Jonglei, Lakes, Unity and Warrap States.³⁰ In Pibor County, Jonglei State, the Famine Review Committee had alerted in December 2020 that several payams were in famine likely or at risk of famine for the projected period from December to July 2021. While coordination of humanitarian assistance in Pibor has slightly improved since then, humanitarian access continues to face very high constraints. In September and October 2021, violence and threats against humanitarian organizations disrupted the movement of supplies and pre-positioning of commodities and prompted the temporary relocation of humanitarian personnel. In addition, the nutrition situation remains critical, as assessments conducted in 2021 reported global acute malnutrition (GAM) levels above the already high national level of 13 percent, with a GAM prevalence reaching 23.1 percent in Aweil South and 21 percent in Pibor.

Concerns are at the highest level for conflict-affected **northern Nigeria** and in particular Borno State, where at least 13 550 people are projected face catastrophic food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) from June to August 2022 if adequate humanitarian and resilience-building assistance are not provided, according to the latest *Cadre Harmonisé* and in line with our previous warnings. While there are no projections for the February–May 2022 outlook period, it cannot be excluded that people will start sliding into catastrophic food insecurity levels even before the peak of the lean season, which is June–August.

*Between May and June 2021, in Tigray and neighbouring areas of Afar and Amhara, an estimated 5.5 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) levels of acute food insecurity, of whom 2.1 million people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The situation was expected to worsen further through September, with the number of people facing starvation and death set to rise to 401 000 from 353 000 as of June 2021 – the highest number since the 2011 famine in Somalia. **Humanitarian Response Plan figures are not fully compatible with IPC. The figures for the rest of the country were informed by the HEA analysis, which was undertaken in August. For Tigray the food cluster maintained a figure of 5.2 million, which was already in use before the release of the IPC findings. IPC projected 3.9 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in Tigray alone between July – September 2021, of which 401 000 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

In addition, the number of people in IPC Phase 5 may be even higher, as several out-of-reach localities in Borno State were not included in the analysis due to insufficient data.

The Local Government Areas not analysed include Abadam, Guzamala and Marte; these were already identified as being at risk of reaching catastrophic food insecurity levels back in July 2021, in our last report. Mitigation from humanitarian assistance on these projections remains very limited, as persistent insecurity is likely to continue to bring extreme access constraints on humanitarian delivery.

Precarious security conditions and high inflation rates are likely to further aggravate acute food-insecurity levels beyond Borno State in the outlook period. Countrywide, about 620 000 people – over 74 percent of them in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe – are projected to face Emergency (CH Phase 4) from June to August 2022, up from about 230 000 in the 2021 post-harvest period, within a total of 18 million people expected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity. This represents a sharp increase – by 6 million – from previous estimates. While this relates mostly to increased geographic coverage in the analysis, nonetheless it is also a reflection of an overall deterioration of food security in northwestern, northcentral and southeastern states, driven by high food prices and the upsurge of violence, which are expected to further constrain agricultural livelihoods and access to food.

In the outlook, the likely deterioration of acute food insecurity levels is the result of persistent attacks by non-state armed groups in the northeast, coupled with banditry and intercommunal violence in the northcentre and northwest that continue to disrupt humanitarian access, and agricultural and market activities. On the economic front, higher year-on-year prices, underpinned by market disruptions and difficult macroeconomic conditions, continue to constrain food access for vulnerable households. In the next months, prices will likely be further affected by the effects of conflict coupled with currency depreciation and foreign exchange shortages.

Food security monitoring data across the north and south of **Yemen**, gives indicative evidence of a deteriorating trend in the food insecurity situation since June last year. Over the past months, the underlying drivers of food insecurity in Yemen have continued to deteriorate, with conflict and macroeconomic conditions worsening since the previous edition of the report and poised to continue this way in the outlook period. Since July 2021, conflict has intensified in Yemen, focused on the governorates of Ma'rib, Shabwah and Al Bayda. This raises the prospects of fighting further escalating towards Ma'rib city in the coming months. Fighting may further expand around Hodeida port and further south, potentially resulting in additional population displacement beyond the current 4 million. Price inflation and depreciation have sharply increased in late 2021, particularly in the south. The economic crisis is poised to continue to limit employment opportunities, affect purchasing power and restrict people's access to food.

The latest IPC analysis in Yemen, issued in December 2020, projected that between January and June 2021, 16.1 million people were to experience Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity; this included 5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)

and approximately 47 000 (a threefold increase from December 2020) in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), the latter located mainly in Al Jawf, Amran and Hajjah governorates.

While increased levels of assistance between April 2021 and July 2021 contributed to a stabilization of food insecurity, key food insecurity indicators show a clear deterioration in the second half of 2021. Should humanitarian assistance decrease or be impacted by further financial or operational constraints – currently very high – any gains are at risk of being lost.

Other countries of highest concern

Several other hunger hotspots need urgent action to avert extreme hunger or death. These are countries with sizeable populations – over 500 000 people – estimated or projected to be in critical acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 4) or identified as severely food insecure as per WFP's CARI or rCARI methodology; life-threatening conditions are expected to further intensify in the outlook period. Countries of high concern remain mostly those highlighted in the last edition of the report: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Honduras, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic. The new warning at this level is for the Sahel region.

By March 2022, a total of 8.7 million people in **Afghanistan** are expected to slide into critical levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 4) – more than double the number from the same time last year and hitting a record high for the country. Even worse, if the fast-deepening crisis is not contained, there is a serious risk that parts of the population will face starvation and death, as catastrophic levels of food insecurity emerge (IPC Phase 5). The cumulative impact of the worst drought in decades, now entering its second year, is severely affecting already debilitated Afghan communities and their capacity to produce food; labour opportunities in agriculture and livestock practices are also seriously impeded. Amidst the drought, the Afghanistan economy collapsed in the wake of the suspension of international financial assistance and the freezing of the country foreign reserve that followed the political transition in August. The economic deterioration is likely to continue deepening, with rising food prices and declining purchasing power for a population projected to fall below the poverty line almost in its entirety (97 percent).

The protracted food crisis in the **Democratic Republic of the Congo** – counting already 5.4 million projected in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) nationwide for the January–June 2022 period – will likely see a deterioration. This is expected to be the consequence of further intensification of violence in the eastern province and the secondary impact of a fourth wave of COVID-19, potentially leading to restrictions by neighbouring countries that will affect trade and other livelihood activities.

Haiti is expected to continue a steady deterioration of acute food insecurity, under the effects of persistent political instability, growing insecurity and recurrent natural disasters, the last of which was in August 2021. Over 1.3 million people are likely to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during the lean season from March to June 2022. By then, almost half of the country's population will be in crisis-or-above food insecurity.

The impact of the October coup and its economic repercussions is likely to worsen the last projection made for **the Sudan** – issued last May – which estimated over 1.3 million facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) up to February 2022, a slight improvement compared to October–December 2021. Confirming this prediction of a deterioration, the last Humanitarian Needs Overview indicates an increasing trend of people expected to require food and livelihood assistance in 2022, reaching over 10.9 million people, up from 8.2 million in 2021.

In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, the number of food-insecure people is likely to increase beyond the 12.4 million identified at the end of 2020,³¹ which included 1.3 million severely food insecure. High levels of acute food insecurity continue to be driven by a lingering economic crisis, protracted displacement and drought-like conditions impacting agricultural production.

In the **Central African Republic**, the number of people in critical levels of acute food insecurity (Phase 4) is expected to rise, reaching 620 000 by March 2022 and up to 690 000 by August 2022 – the highest since 2014. These people are mostly in areas affected by the conflict, particularly in the northwest where humanitarian access remains highly constrained. Insecurity is expected to further worsen, with a seasonal uptick of attacks against civilians in the outlook – increasing displacement and further affecting transport of essential goods.

Cumulative poor rainfalls in 2021, affecting agricultural production through localized crop losses, combined with the socio-economic effects of the pandemic, are likely to further impact the already increasing food insecurity levels in **Honduras**. This is expected to worsen earlier projections that had identified over 600 000 people projected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 4) by September last year.

The **Sahel** is likely to reach the highest number of acutely food-insecure people in the past eight years, under the combined effects of erratic rainfall, record high food prices and – for Central Sahel – further security deterioration. Already by December 2021, an estimated 343 000 people were classified at critical food-insecurity levels (Phase 4), with Mali, Mauritania and Niger showing the worst deterioration. This situation will further deteriorate significantly towards the pastoral and agricultural lean seasons, reaching over 1.1 million people projected in Emergency (CH Phase 4) between June and August 2022.

Explanatory note

Famine is the most severe type of hunger and accordingly, it is the most extreme phase of the IPC scale. As per the IPC definition, famine occurs in areas where: "at least one in five households has or is most likely to have an extreme deprivation of food. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will likely be evident. Significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease, is occurring or will be occurring."³² As such, famine classification and projections are subject to a rigorous technical process at country level which is validated by an external Famine Review Committee led by international food security nutrition and mortality experts.

The information contained in this section should therefore not be interpreted as a statement that famines are imminent in these countries.


The purpose of this section is to highlight those situations where specific factors are contributing to a risk of famine should certain conditions persist.

It is important to note that talking about the risk of famine does not mean that famine is the most *likely* scenario in these contexts but that it is a *possible* outcome. Given the severity of these situations, an understanding of the key drivers and how they may deteriorate over the forthcoming period provides critical early warning information which can support a scale-up of monitoring efforts as well as advocacy and interventions to curb further deterioration. Within the framework of the IPC, work has been initiated to define technical parameters and processes to better identify countries and areas facing a risk of famine. At this early stage, the following context-specific parameters are tentatively being considered, among others, to work towards the identification of contexts facing a risk of famine: prevalence of IPC Phase 4 in the population, constraints to humanitarian access and co-presence of compounding shocks to food security.



Acute food insecurity trends in the hotspots of highest concern

2019–2022¹ peak numbers and prevalence, ordered by magnitude of latest peak number



¹ Data for 2022 is considered as expected peak based on information available as of January 2022. For Ethiopia, Honduras, South Sudan, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, no data is available for 2022, for the Syrian Arab Republic, no data is available also for 2021.

² Based on Flowminder population data. 2021 and 2022 peaks are based on the same projection (November–March).

³ 2021 peak number is a combination of the December 2020 IPC covering Belg and Meher areas and the May 2021 IPC covering Tigray, Amhara and Afar. The IPC analysis released in May 2021 is an IPC global product. It is based on the conclusions reached by the Ethiopia IPC analysis team. This report has not been endorsed by the Government of Ethiopia.

⁴ Based on CARL.

Disclaimer: Comparison over time indicates a general trend however comparability issues exist in terms of (i) geographical/population coverage for Afghanistan (Significant increase of population analysed), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Significant increase of population analysed), Ethiopia (Significant increase in population analysed), Honduras (Significant increase in population analysed), Nigeria (Significant increase of population analysed between 2020 [16 states + FCT] and 2021/2022 [21 states + FCT] and the Sudan (In 2019, the state of Wast Dafur was not analysed) and in terms of (ii) analysis time periods for Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, Nigeria and Yemen. Caution in reading and using this analysis should be observed. Trends of prevalence and total numbers can diverge due to changes in population covered.

Country narratives

Asia and the Pacific

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Key drivers of food insecurity: consecutive droughts and economic crisis

Spiralling levels of acute food insecurity are expected to further deteriorate as a result of an earlier-than-usual winter lean season, driven by La Niña-induced drought – considered the worst in decades – and amid a deepening economic crisis.³³

While active conflict has significantly subsided since the political transition in August 2021, the suspension of international assistance to the de facto government and the freezing of the country's foreign reserves are likely to continue driving the economic deterioration. Rising food, non-food and agricultural input prices, alongside declining purchasing power, will likely reduce access to food and basic necessities for vulnerable communities – which are already on the brink of collapse. Approximately 97 percent of people in Afghanistan are projected to fall below the poverty line in early 2022.

A second consecutive La Niña event is resulting in cumulative drought conditions in large swathes of the country. This follows the 2021 La Niña event which had decreased agricultural production compared to 2020. This is likely to further debilitate households' food production, livestock practices and agricultural labour opportunities.

Reduced rainfall and snowcover are likely to induce reduced yields, lower production and challenging conditions for livestock. Drought conditions are likely to further sustain high food inflation and to constrain purchasing power. Up to March 2022, the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) is projected at 22.8 million or 55 percent of the population – the highest ever recorded in the country – a nearly 35 percent increase from the same period last year. This includes 8.7 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Four out of five people facing acute food insecurity live in rural areas. In addition, 3.9 million children and 800 000 pregnant and lactating mothers will likely suffer from acute malnutrition in 2022.³⁴

If the fast-growing crisis is not contained as a matter of urgency, there is a serious risk that catastrophic levels of food insecurity will emerge, greatly increasing humanitarian needs and threatening to overwhelm the humanitarian community. Despite a reduction in movement restrictions due to an improvement of the security situation, access constraints remain extreme.³⁵

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Develop and distribute market and agro-climatic bulletins at the national and community level, to highlight the evolving drought situation, and provide tailored advice on actions to be taken to protect agricultural livelihoods.
- Distribute agricultural inputs, including stress-tolerant wheat seeds, backyard vegetable-cultivation packages and fertilizers (where possible) for the spring and summer planting seasons starting in February/March.
- Provide livestock protection packages (feed and health kits), particularly for nomadic herders and settled livestock keepers, in areas where a deterioration of grazing conditions is expected.
- Scale up food or cash assistance for asset creation and resilience-oriented activities, including the building of vocational skills and improvement of community infrastructure; an example of the latter is the creation and/or rehabilitation of infrastructure to improve access to water during drought, such as water catchments, irrigation and *kareez* (underground canal systems).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) calls for USD 4.4 billion in 2022. This includes USD 2.66 billion for food security and agricultural livelihoods security situation for people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) and USD 287.4 million for nutrition related interventions.

- Implement a large-scale crisis response targeting populations facing acute food insecurity in rural and urban areas, in order to predictably meet their most basic food needs during the compounded crisis, mitigate loss of life, hunger-induced conflict and migration, and provide the necessary conditions to enable recovery.
- Substantially uplift support to protect critical livelihoods in rural and urban areas – with particular attention to agriculture and livestock-based livelihoods – to prevent total systemic collapse in rural areas which would have a widespread humanitarian impact across the country.
- Provide emergency livelihood assistance to the most vulnerable urban and rural populations, including farmers, herders and landless people, to sustain the local production of food, protect productive assets and boost short-term income streams.
- Increase coverage for prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition in drought and conflict-affected areas, using both mobile teams and existing health systems. Wherever possible, these interventions should be delivered as part of an integrated package of health, nutrition, and water and sanitation services.

- OTHER KEY ACTIONS
- Support food security and nutrition assessments ahead of the next IPC exercise in spring 2022.
 - Strengthen climate-smart food systems and value chains, and enhanced market access, including measures to ensure markets remain functional.

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic instability, conflict and civil unrest

The combination of a persisting political and economic crisis since the 1 February 2021 military takeover, with secondary impacts of COVID-19 outbreaks, and rising conflict in many parts of the country is expected to further raise acute food insecurity in the outlook period. Conflict and civil unrest will continue to disrupt livelihoods and essential public services, which could further strain an already vulnerable population.

Economic turmoil, including a currency crisis and a tumbling banking system with cash shortages severely affecting businesses, has resulted in an 18 percent contraction of GDP.³⁶ Expected reductions of foreign investments and trade will further drive up already high inflation rates.^{37, 38} In late 2021, rice prices peaked due to a reduced main crop, and the cost of a basic food basket was up by 30 percent (year-on-year).³⁹ In contrast, declining farmgate prices, caused by market uncertainties in rural areas, further reduced farming households' incomes.⁴⁰ Coupled with high input prices, mainly of fertilizers, and labour constraints, this will likely lead to low yields in

2022, and will exacerbate farmers' already below-normal agricultural productivity.^{41, 42, 43}

Continuing violence in 2022 will likely further drive up the more than 550 000 already internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁴⁴ As of early December, over 284 700 people remained displaced due to conflict since 1 February 2021, of whom 180 500 were displaced in southeastern Myanmar.⁴⁵ The spread of armed conflict in several states and regions has escalated since September, leading to increased displacement.⁴⁶

Food insecurity is expected to grow and continue along the alarming trajectory that has been set in 2021,⁴⁷ with 13.2 million people estimated to be food insecure in September 2021, based on WFP's rCARI methodology.⁴⁸ One third of the households have food expenditure shares of more than 70 percent, and about half of the households apply crisis or emergency livelihood coping strategies.⁴⁹ Despite increasing needs, humanitarian access constraints are very high.⁵⁰

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Support vulnerable farmers with agricultural inputs such as vegetable seeds, fertilizers and poultry feed, to improve their income and nutrition, and support local community market conditions (including for the benefit of non-farming households). Such inputs will further ensure that farmers can partake in the monsoon season agricultural activities.
- Establish "green corridors" to safely move produce from farmers and fisherfolk to markets in urban or peri-urban areas.
- Conduct cash-for-work activities to support landless labourers, particularly to boost their income during the dry cropping season, and small-scale aquaculture targeting newly displaced people and landless families.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2021 HRP called for USD 79.3 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 21.2 million for nutrition interventions.*

- Increase food and cash-based assistance to vulnerable households in rural, urban and peri-urban areas.
- Integrate malnutrition-prevention activities for the most vulnerable (children under 5 years of age, and pregnant and lactating women) with general food distributions.
- Provide preservation equipment to fisherfolk who have problems accessing markets, to ensure the long shelf-life of products.
- Advocate for access and humanitarian assistance as well as to conduct crop and food security assessments.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Ensure phased transition from emergency response in poor urban centres to a more targeted response focused on vulnerable groups, through collaboration between humanitarian and other actors.

*Preliminary figures from the forthcoming HRP 2022 indicate that USD 826 will be required to provide humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable populations, a significant increase from USD 276 million in 2021.

Latin America and the Caribbean

The Republic of Colombia (including Venezuelan migrants)

Key drivers of food insecurity: political and social instability, economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and migratory crisis

Food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further in Colombia over the coming months due to a combination of political instability, economic challenges and the ongoing impact of the regional migratory crisis amplified by internal displacement.

Delays in the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement between the Government and non-state armed groups have led to new waves of violent attacks, with 61 000 new IDPs between January and September 2021 – three times the levels of 2020.⁵¹ Social unrest and economic disruptions are likely to continue in the midst of electoral processes scheduled for the first half of 2022.⁵² This could contribute to continued high levels of displacement in the coming months.⁵³

The COVID-19 pandemic has further amplified existing disparities and its economic effects will continue to be felt by vulnerable households, despite an economic rebound in 2021 and expected GDP growth of 5.5 percent in 2022.^{54, 55} While pandemic-related employment losses have now been almost fully recovered, the unemployment rate is still high, at over 11 percent in October 2021.⁵⁶ Also of concern is the high inflation rate, which stood at 12.4 percent year-on-year in September 2021, and which is likely to continue affecting the purchasing power of vulnerable households.⁵⁷

In addition, Colombia continues to host the largest number of Venezuelan migrants in the region.⁵⁸ As of August 2021, over 1.8 million migrants from Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) were reported to be in the country, representing an increase of 100 000 since the beginning of 2021,⁵⁹ despite official border closures between

the two countries until October 2021. The Temporary Protection Status given to Venezuelan migrants in February 2021, together with the recent opening of the borders, might drive a further increase in migration flows over the coming months.⁶⁰ Additionally, the number of people transiting from South America and the Caribbean through the Darien Crossing to Panama rose sharply in 2021; it is projected to further increase in 2022, mostly due to economic repercussions of the pandemic in Columbia. Between January and September 2021, more than 91 000 migrants crossed the Darien Crossing, three times the previous record number of 30 000 in all of 2016.⁶¹

According to the 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7.3 million Colombians are food insecure and in need of food assistance in 2022.⁶² Approximately 64 percent (1.1 million) of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia were food insecure by July 2021, including 14 percent severely insecure, based on rCARI.⁶³ The data shows a slight improvement in the situation from a year ago, when 73 percent were food insecure.⁶⁴ However, the situation remains concerning. The food security situation of Venezuelan migrants in Ecuador (0.5 million) and Peru (1.3 million) shows a similar picture: the share of food-insecure migrants remains high, at 66 and 57 percent respectively, despite an improvement compared to 2020.^{65, 66, 67, 68}

There are very high humanitarian-access constraints in Colombia. Access has deteriorated over the second half of 2021 and is likely to significantly worsen in areas affected by the conflict.^{69, 70}

The ongoing economic crisis, successive below-average harvests and

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Supply agricultural inputs essential for the survival of animals and the maintenance of crop production (animal feed, veterinary supplies, seeds and fertilizers); the prices of these inputs are expected to increase further in times of crisis.
- Provide technical assistance for the production and conservation of animal feed (silage, haylage and artisan concentrate), the preparation of fertilizers with local inputs and the establishment of seed banks.
- Distribute cash transfers to the most vulnerable people in rural and urban areas, to mitigate the impact of expected increases in food prices on food security.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2021 HRP called for USD 34.5 million for food security and nutrition interventions.
- Provide cash-based transfers and/or food assistance to vulnerable populations (both Venezuelan migrants and host population) in different territories.
 - Provide food assistance and agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers and materials) for the rapid, diversified and safe production of food in rural, urban and peri-urban contexts, to close the food gap of people affected by the conflict/violence, social crises and other shocks/disasters.
 - Support Venezuelan migrants and host communities in bordering rural areas, by rehabilitating water systems, establishing areas for rapid food production and supporting rapid fodder production (fodder banks, protein banks and live fences).
 - Provide emergency veterinary medical care and delivery of feed for animals, to recover the surviving livestock and avoid further losses and damage to productive livestock assets.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Increase household income and local employment, preserving agricultural livelihoods and mitigating the inflation that affects access to food, by supporting the supply chain to local markets.

The Republic of Haiti

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, dry conditions, political instability and gang-related insecurity

socio-political instability aggravated by gang violence will exacerbate already alarming levels of acute food insecurity, especially in southern departments.⁷¹

The depreciation of the gourde against the US dollar, hike in fuel prices in December resulting from the removal of fuel subsidies,⁷² and high international commodity prices, are likely to continue negatively impact purchasing power, in a highly import-dependent country. The cost of the average food basket increased by 18 percent year-on-year in September 2021, and 40 percent since last January, mainly because of the rise in prices of imported products including vegetable oil, cream sugar, corn and wheat flour.⁷³

Levels of insecurity resulting from gang activities and political instability will remain high. This situation will continue to negatively affect socio-economic development and hinder humanitarian access and operations.

The food security situation is also likely to be affected by forecasted below-average crop production in the 2021 minor second season,

due to poor rainfall. Average rainfall up to January 2022 could aid the development of the 2021 minor third season maize and rice crops; however, the planted area is anticipated at a below-average level, reflecting costly and scarce agricultural inputs.⁷⁴

In addition, current below-average rainfall for the upcoming first rainy season (March–June), which coincides with the main maize-producing season, is forecast to impact especially in areas that have already suffered rainfall deficits over the past two seasons.

Up to February 2022, approximately 4.3 million people (44 percent of the population analysed) are estimated to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) and to be in need of urgent action.⁷⁵

The situation will deteriorate further from March to June 2022 – coinciding with the lean season – when approximately 4.6 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above). Of these, over 1.3 million people are projected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – a two-percentage point increase compared to the same period last year.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide high-nutrient animal feed and animal health treatments to vulnerable livestock herders to anticipate and mitigate the impact of forecast below-average rains on animal conditions.
- Distribute seeds of early maturing and drought-tolerant crop varieties, along with tools and technical support, to vulnerable households with access to land; doing so by February 2022 will ensure they can plant in time for the spring crop season in earthquake-affected areas (southern peninsula).
- Provide vulnerable populations with food commodities pre-positioned at strategic locations in the region, ahead of expected shocks.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2021-2022 HRP called for USD 161.2 million for food security and nutrition interventions.
- Rehabilitate earthquake-affected community agriculture infrastructures, including seed-storage areas, water-catchment areas and irrigation systems.
 - Supply vulnerable households in Crisis or above (IPC Phase 3 or above) with food/cash transfers and crop and livestock inputs, to restore their livelihoods and support productive safety nets.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Conduct access assessments for the movement of food commodities amidst increased gang control and fuel shortages.
- Pre-position trucks, forklifts, vehicles and other logistics support items in the Dominican Republic, functioning as a humanitarian corridor for Haiti.

The Republic of Honduras

Key drivers of food insecurity: below-average rainfall and socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic

Poor cumulative rainfall in 2021, due to deficits during the *primera* season (April to July) and below-average rainfall in October and November 2021, are likely to worsen food insecurity levels as a result of localized production shortfalls of *postrera* crops, particularly in the Dry Corridor of Honduras. The impact of the deficit is likely to aggravate the socio-economic situation that had already been worsened by the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Although the main maize production is likely to decline by only 3 percent compared to the five-year average, the expected decrease in sorghum production is likely to impact agricultural livelihoods. The United States Department of Agriculture is currently projecting a decline in the 2021 sorghum output of almost 60 percent below the five-year average.⁷⁶ In addition, the forecasted reduction of agricultural production is likely to exacerbate the socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the World Bank and UNDP, 32 percent of people employed lost their jobs or left the labour force as a result of the pandemic-generated economic disruptions.⁷⁷

On the political front, congressional gridlock and widespread mistrust at public institutions may represent a challenge for the newly appointed Government and hamper its policies to tackle poverty. Protests might happen to pressure the Government to increase public spending, among widespread socio-economic grievances.

Approximately 3.3 million people (35 percent of the population) were projected to face acute food insecurity of Crisis level or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above),⁷⁸ including over 600 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), between July and September 2021,⁷⁹ they could see their food security situation further deteriorating in the outlook period, especially in northern and central areas. The context is characterized by high access constraints.⁸⁰ As a result of the combined effect of below-average rainfall, socio-economic impacts of COVID-19 and protests, there is a high likelihood that poor households experience a further deterioration of their economic situation and require humanitarian assistance in the next few months.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Increase water harvesting and storage capacities, and set up new micro-irrigation systems, to support the most vulnerable farmers cultivating crops in the Dry Corridor for the upcoming *primera* season.
- Provide livestock keepers with animal health support such as vaccination kits and treatments to reduce mortality in areas where pastures are expected to rapidly deplete as result of below average rains during the 2021 *postrera* season.
- Distribute fodder seeds that allow them to set up pasture plots rapidly for direct grazing.
- Provide cash+ assistance to households expected to be affected by the reduced harvest and ensure they can cultivate during the upcoming *primera* season.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Support household food security by extending the coverage and quality of national school meals programmes.
- Provide emergency livelihood assistance to the most vulnerable populations to enhance local food production, protect productive assets and boost short-term income streams.
- Provide a platform for community engagement and a market for local produce, increasing the income of smallholder farmers.
- Expand the duration and scope of cash and food assistance programmes.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Pre-position food commodities to allow for rapid response in case of an emergency.



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West Africa and the Sahel

The Central African Republic

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict

Food insecurity is likely to continue rising, due to high levels of insecurity which are likely to experience a seasonal uptick in the first months of the year. This is likely to push and compound displacement while disrupting communities' access to, and ability to produce, food.

An estimated 1.4 million people – almost one-third of the country's population – are either internally displaced or are refugees in neighbouring countries as of November 2021, marking an increase of 7 percent since the start of the year.⁸¹ Meanwhile, conflict-driven disruptions of transport routes, such as blockades, are likely to continue having a disproportionate impact on national food supplies, given the country's high dependence on imports.⁸² Decreasing access to agricultural production inputs, notably seeds, is another cause of deteriorating food insecurity, with the sowing period in March and April in the centre and south of the country.

As a result of these drivers, 2.1 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity up to March 2022, including 620 000 people in Emergency

(IPC Phase 4).⁸³ This represents a 9 percent deterioration compared to the same post-harvest period last year, and the highest numbers of IPC Phase 3 and above in the post-harvest period since 2014. Between April and August 2022, acute food insecurity is expected to further deteriorate to 2.4 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), and the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is expected to increase to 690 000 people. The areas mostly affected by the conflict, particularly in the northwest, coincide with those where the food insecurity is most severe.⁸⁴ Between September 2021 and August 2022, nearly 214 000 children under 5 years of age, and more than 98 000 pregnant and lactating women and girls, are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition.⁸⁵

Humanitarian access constraints remain very high, in a context of a likely worsening situation through 2022.⁸⁶ Armed clashes, direct targeting of humanitarian assets and facilities, an upsurge in the use of explosive ordnance, security operations, denial of access and logistical constraints have all resulted in frequent restrictions on, and suspensions of, humanitarian operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute agricultural inputs, such as seeds and fertilizers that are not easy to access to vulnerable farming households ahead of the planting season starting in March.
- Distribute home-gardening inputs to mitigate a further deterioration of food security to the households in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including IDPs and host communities.
- Implement cash-for-work activities, to support the upcoming planting season and allow an income for landless labourers and IDPs.
- Rehabilitate infrastructure where possible, to support the 2022 planting and harvesting season.
- Ensure that adequate food and nutrition supplies are available in high-risk areas ahead of the lean season.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2022 HRP calls for USD 163.4 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 29.8 million for the nutrition interventions.
- Provide immediate life-saving assistance to the most vulnerable populations.
 - Advocate for unimpeded supply and essential goods from the Douala corridor to Bangui, and for humanitarian access to conflict-affected provincial towns located in the northern prefectures.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria

Key drivers of food insecurity: insecurity and inflation

Precarious security conditions and high inflation rates are likely to further aggravate acute food insecurity levels in the outlook period. This situation is of highest concern in conflict-affected Borno State, where parts of the population are projected to slide into catastrophic acute food insecurity (CH Phase 5).

Persistent attacks by non-state armed groups in the northeast, coupled with banditry and intercommunal violence in the northcentre and northwest, will continue to disrupt agricultural and market activities, leading to reduced incomes and new displacements.⁸⁷ Higher year-on-year prices,⁸⁸ underpinned by market disruptions and difficult macroeconomic conditions, continue to constrain food access for vulnerable households, whose purchasing power has been eroded by the COVID-19 pandemic-induced economic downturn. Despite seasonal supply pressure from the near-average cereal output in 2021,⁸⁹ conflicts, coupled with currency depreciation and foreign exchange shortages – which sustained high inflation rates in 2021 – are expected to persist in 2022, further weighing on prices in the outlook period.

The November 2021 CH analysis indicated that, across 21 states and the Federal Capital Territory, around 12.9 million people were facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity

during the October–December 2021 post-harvest period. This number will increase to 18 million people in the June–August 2022 lean season if humanitarian interventions are not sustained. The sharp increase is also a result of the geographic expansion of the latest CH analysis.⁹⁰ The projected figures include about 620 000 people who face Emergency (CH Phase 4), up from about 230 000 in the 2021 post-harvest period, while 13 550 people will be facing Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in northeastern Borno State, in Bama, Gubio and Magumeri localities. These estimates of people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) might be higher, as access constraints impeded the conduction of the analysis in several other areas of Borno State, particularly the Abadam, Guzamala and Marte localities. This raises severe concerns, as these localities were assessed as being in Emergency (CH Phase 4) in the previous CH analysis, with the current food security situation likely to be at catastrophic levels (CH Phase 5). In addition, over 1.74 million children under 5 years of age are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition through August 2022, showing a marked increase in levels compared to the same period last year.⁹¹

Extreme access constraints are likely to persist in the outlook period due to persistent insecurity, with negative effects on the delivery of humanitarian assistance.⁹²

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute home-gardening inputs to IDPs and host populations to allow diversification of diets.
- Support agricultural-based livelihoods activities for the upcoming planting season.
- Provide cash transfers to conflict-affected communities in the northwest and northeast, using the rapid response registry and the national social register where appropriate to establish a predictive, shock responsive social protection mechanism.
- Provide agricultural inputs and livestock-support assets to the most vulnerable farming households, ahead of the planting season in June.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2021 HRP called for USD 354 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 129 million for nutrition interventions.
- Sustain humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected areas in the northeast, particularly Borno State and the Middle Belt, allowing for the lean-season scale-up of protection-sensitive life and livelihoods-saving assistance, including food, agricultural-based livelihoods, livestock restocking and aquaculture.
 - Increase the coverage of nutrition assistance to women and children in the northeast and the northwest, in coordination with Government and nutrition partners.

Sahel (Burkina Faso, the Republic of Chad, the Republic of Mali, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, the Republic of the Niger)

Key drivers of food insecurity: erratic rainfall, high food prices and conflict

In the outlook period, the Sahel is likely to face the highest number of food-insecure people since the launch of the CH in 2014, driven by the effects of erratic rainfall in 2021, together with record-high food prices. In Central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso and the Niger). Further security deterioration is expected to be an additional aggravating driver.

Despite average cumulative rainfall, the rainy season was marked by a poor spatio-temporal distribution of rains, with late onset, excess rains during the peak period, and an early end of the season in September, which affected crop and pasture development. This led to cereal production being 7 percent below the five-year average, and therefore the available pasture barely covers just one to three months of needs. This resulted in an earlier-than-normal start of transhumance, which could exacerbate conflicts between farmers and herders, especially in off-season production areas. A very severe pastoralist lean season is expected in the outlook period, especially in Mauritania and the Sahelian zone of Chad. The below-average cereal production is particularly concerning in the Niger, where it has been recorded at 38 percent below the five-year average, and where millet, the country's staple food, is already becoming scarcer on markets.

Central Sahel faces growing insecurity, punctuated by daily deadly attacks and the consolidation of armed groups in northern and eastern Burkina Faso, western Niger and northern and central Mali, and their expansion into previously more stable areas. In Burkina Faso, the security situation has been deteriorating sharply in recent months as evidenced by record numbers of newly displaced people.⁹³ Political instability in Chad, and the withdrawal of French forces from northern Mali, could worsen the situation further. In addition, the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin is also unlikely to improve significantly, because of fragmentation of Boko Haram into smaller

groups and clashes with the Islamic State in West Africa which are intensifying the crisis. Insecurity is leading to further population displacements, adding to the current 2.4 million IDPs in the region,⁹⁴ as well as the disruption of livelihoods and trade flows.

Between October and December 2021, around 6.7 million people in the region are classified in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), with an estimated 343 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4) – a 50 percent increase compared to the same period in the previous year, highlighting the difficult post-harvest season. The most marked annual increases of people in Crisis or above (CH Phase 3 or above) are observed in Mali (+166 percent), the Niger (+110 percent) and Mauritania (+96 percent). The situation will deteriorate further towards the pastoral and agricultural lean seasons. Over 10.5 million people are projected to be in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above), including 1.1 million in Emergency (CH Phase 4) between June and August 2022 – a 20 percent increase compared to 2021. The prevalence will be highest in Mauritania and the Niger, where 15 percent of the analysed population will be in Crisis or above (CH Phase 3 or above) between June and August 2022. The nutrition situation is critical, as GAM national levels are above 10 percent for Mauritania, the Niger and Chad. The situation is even more dire in conflict-affected areas in Central Sahel (Burkina Faso and Niger), where GAM rates are above the emergency threshold of 15 percent, except for Mali (10 percent).⁹⁵ Preliminary estimates from the Nutrition Cluster suggest that 5.4 million children are expected to be affected by acute malnutrition in 2022 in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger – an 18 percent increase from 2021.⁹⁶

The deteriorating security situation in Central Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin could further hamper humanitarian access.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Scale up support to pastoralist communities ahead of the upcoming pastoral lean season, through the provision of livestock feed and targeted animal health support.
- Boost dry-season vegetable production, especially in communities affected by rising food prices and reduced accessibility to food.
- Provide unconditional and conditional cash (for asset-creation activities) support for the rehabilitation of degraded lands and rural infrastructure during the January to May 2022 dry season.
- Scale up the early detection and treatment of acute malnutrition at community level, especially in areas with limited access to basic social services.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2021 HRP called for: Burkina Faso: USD 251 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 46.4 million for nutrition interventions; Mali: USD 232.4 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 66.2 million for nutrition interventions; the Niger: USD 110.2 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 104 million for nutrition interventions; and Chad: USD 159.7 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 75.9 million for nutrition interventions.
- Scale up life-saving assistance during the lean season, to meet the vital needs of crisis-affected populations.
 - Improve and expand humanitarian access in conflict-affected areas, to provide the necessary, consistent assistance and to mitigate additional populations' movements.
 - Strengthen national response plans, especially for pastoralists ahead of the lean season.
 - Strengthen the nutritional surveillance system to generate evidence and guide emergency preparedness and response planning and deploy preventive and treatment packages in high-risk areas.
 - Support existing social protection programmes, targeting most-at-risk households in the high-risk areas ahead of the lean season.

East Africa

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Key drivers of food insecurity: food security concerns are mounting due to conflict, macroeconomic challenges and drought in southern areas

Between July and December, the conflict had expanded from Tigray into neighbouring Amhara and Afar, disrupting key transport routes to Djibouti and devastating agricultural production. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced in Amhara and Afar, with 4.2 million displaced in total across northern Ethiopia as of the end of September 2021.⁹⁷ While frontlines have returned and stalled along the borders of Tigray as of late December, the situation remains highly volatile, and violence is likely to continue in the outlook period. Food inflation remains two times higher than one year ago,⁹⁸ and the economic strain of the conflict is gradually destabilizing the country's balance of payment and debt sustainability.^{99, 100, 101} A third consecutive below-average rainy season, among the poorest on record, has also caused drought conditions in southern regions, severely impacting rural livelihoods. Current forecasts for the *Belg* rainy season (between March and May in southern areas), which is notoriously difficult to forecast, are showing mixed signals, while a recent multi-agency analysis suggests the possibility of another poor season which could trigger a sharp deterioration of food insecurity in southern Ethiopia.¹⁰²

According to the Humanitarian Response Plan Mid-Year Review and Northern Ethiopia Response Plan (NERP), there are close to 18 million people requiring food assistance in Ethiopia.* Of these, there are 5.2

million people requiring humanitarian assistance in Tigray and 12.8 million in the other regions.¹⁰³

After projecting famine-like conditions for 401 000 people in the period of July to September 2021, the lack of updated assessment data for Ethiopia is a major concern. In July 2021, the Famine Review Committee alerted that there was a risk that famine¹⁰⁴ would occur in Tigray by the end of 2021, depending on the intensity of conflict, humanitarian access, functionality of formal and informal supply lines, and availability of services. As of December, humanitarian and commercial supply lines remained low to sporadic, and services largely in-existent.¹⁰⁵ This corresponds to the Famine Review Committee's worst case scenario which foresaw that there would be a high Risk of Famine, if, in addition, conflict was to resume in Tigray.¹⁰⁶ In addition, the nutrition situation in Tigray remains critical as GAM levels are above the 15 percent emergency threshold.¹⁰⁷ Also, every second, pregnant and breastfeeding woman is affected by acute malnutrition. Humanitarian access and supply lines are also deteriorating in parts of the country other than northern Ethiopia.¹⁰⁸ Due to the extension of conflict into Amhara and Afar regions between July and mid-December, concerns over severe levels of acute food insecurity are also high especially for these two regions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide agropastoral farmers in *Belg* rain-receiving areas with assorted seeds of drought-tolerant crops.
- Deliver early warning messages and advisories to vulnerable farming communities on actions to mitigate harvest losses and prepare for the March–May 2022 planting season of impacted communities.
- Provide information on potential drought impacts and tailored agricultural advice, to strengthen communities' capacities to anticipate climate shocks.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2021 HRP Mid-Year Review called for USD 858.9 million for food security and livelihoods, USD 46.5 million for agriculture interventions, and USD 181.1 million for nutrition interventions. Additionally, the 2021 Revision of the Northern Ethiopia Response Plan called for USD 416.4 million for food, USD 75.5 million for nutrition and USD 70.9 million for agriculture interventions.

Northern Ethiopia response

- Continue to scale up assistance and distribute full rations for people in Emergency and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 4 and 5).
- Scale up the emergency nutrition response and increase the coverage of nutrition programmes, by leveraging all opportunities to access the most vulnerable, with special attention to IDPs.
- Advocate for unhindered and unrestricted humanitarian access to conflict-affected populations in need.

Drought response

- Support drought-affected populations through food and nutrition assistance, including unconditional cash along with livelihood support to maintain production capacity.
- Protect and safeguard livestock assets through treatment and vaccination; distribution of animal feed for core breeding animals; and training, extension and advisory services in drought-affected areas.
- Identify, establish and activate emergency slaughtering points/areas, and, if suitable, undertake slaughter destocking and meat distribution in pastoral drought-affected areas.
- Provide water-trucking interventions for domestic and livestock usage, with distribution of water-storage tanks in drought-affected areas.

*Humanitarian Response Plan figures are not fully compatible with IPC. The figures for the rest of the country were informed by the HEA analysis, which was undertaken in August. For Tigray the food cluster maintained a figure of 5.2 million, which was already in use before the release of the IPC findings. IPC projected 3.9 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in Tigray alone between July – September 2021, of which 401 000 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

- OTHER KEY ACTIONS
- Support a full food security and nutrition survey in northern Ethiopia, especially among IDPs, and conduct wider, joint multi-cluster-coordinated food security and vulnerability assessments.
 - Develop supply chain augmentation plans to assess transport, storage and fuel capacities.
 - Advocate and support comprehensive nutrition assessments in drought-affected areas.

The Republic of Kenya

Key drivers of food insecurity: drought and high food prices

A third consecutive below-average rainy season is expected to drive significant increases in food insecurity across the arid and semi-arid land regions of Kenya,¹⁰⁹ with the President declaring drought a national disaster on 8 September 2021.¹¹⁰

For agropastoral households, the two previous poor rainy seasons (October to December 2020 and March to May 2021) resulted in below-average crop production,¹¹¹ and the outlook for the current season is again poor, despite improved rains in December that were too late for crop production. Affected households have been market-dependent for a prolonged period while facing rising cereal prices (up 10 to 25 percent compared to last year).¹¹² For pastoral households, continued deteriorations in rangeland and water availability have driven poor livestock body conditions, below-average milk production, declining terms of trade, livestock deaths and a spike in atypical migration.^{113, 114, 115} This has resulted in resource-based intercommunal conflicts that are expected to intensify in the coming months.¹¹⁶

Looking forward, the March to May rainy season in Kenya is notoriously difficult to forecast, with current models showing mixed signals. However, a recent multi-agency analysis suggests the possibility of another poor season in 2022.¹¹⁷ If this were to occur, it would result in an unprecedented (in the past 40 years) sequence of four below-normal rainfall seasons. Under this scenario, major increases in food insecurity are likely in 2022.

About 2.4 million people faced Crisis or Worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity in December 2021 and January 2022 (including about 368 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) according to the latest IPC analysis, issued in September 2021.¹¹⁸ A more recent assessment estimated that 2.8 million people were acute food insecure during this period.

Access constraints remain high and are likely to worsen in 2022, primarily due to drought-related, resource-based conflicts.¹¹⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide farmers with assorted seeds for fast-maturing crops and drought-tolerant crops, in areas expected to receive below-average rainfall between March and May 2022.
- Deliver early warning messages and action advisories to mitigate harvest losses and prepare for the March to May 2022 planting season.
- Scale up unconditional cash assistance, along with other resilience-oriented activities and training, including water management, rangeland conservation, fodder production and storage, conservation agriculture, and drought-management practices for crop and livestock production, to support vulnerable pastoralists and agropastoralists.
- Scale up voluntary destocking through market linkages, support to logistics to access markets, and the reactivation and sensitization of Livestock Market Associations and County Livestock Marketing Council branches.
- Support rehabilitation and improvement of water-source infrastructure such as borehole and water pans ahead of the rainy season, especially in the dry grazing areas, for improved water access for livestock and vulnerable populations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Support food and nutrition interventions during the lean season to meet the immediate food needs of populations at high risk, and to protect the livelihoods of those affected by severe climate variability.
- Provide unconditional cash assistance, along with assorted feed supplements, and conduct animal health campaigns, targeting the most vulnerable pastoral households in drought-affected areas.
- Identify, establish, and activate emergency slaughtering points/areas, and undertake slaughter destocking and meat distribution.
- Provide water-trucking interventions for domestic and livestock usage, with distribution of water-storage tanks.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Integrate nutrition interventions across food and social protection systems, to address both chronic and acute malnutrition, including treatment of acute malnutrition, Positive Deviance/Hearth approaches, and Social and Behaviour Change Communication.

The Federal Republic of Somalia

Key drivers of food insecurity: below-average rains, high food prices and conflict

The combination of consecutive below-average rainfall seasons,¹²⁰ high food prices and localized conflict is likely to further aggravate acute food insecurity in Somalia.

Sixty-two percent of the population live in areas with significant rainfall or vegetation deficits due to the ongoing drought.¹²¹ The scarcity of rangeland resources has led to below-average livestock and milk production, livestock deaths, atypical migration and displacement. Conditions are expected to worsen during the typically dry and harsh January to March *Jilaa* season, likely leading to further livestock deaths and population displacement, as well as intercommunal violence. Consecutive poor rainy seasons have already driven three below-average harvests, causing agropastoral households to be market-dependent for a prolonged period.¹²² Cereal prices have also risen to historically high levels in marginally productive and conflict-affected areas;^{123 124} they are likely to continue increasing due to a fourth poor *Deyr* harvest, expected to be 50 to 70 percent below average.¹²⁵ Heightened insecurity due to delayed presidential elections and increased attacks by al-Shabaab have worsened the situation,¹²⁶ with 731 000 people displaced in 2021, over 70 percent by conflict.¹²⁷

Rainfall in the April to June season is difficult to forecast, with current 2022 projections showing mixed signals. However, a recent multi-agency analysis suggests the possibility of another poor season.¹²⁸ If this were to occur, it would result in an unprecedented sequence of four to five below-normal rainfall seasons (depending on the area), with severe food security consequences. With the upcoming lean season in the first half of 2022, food insecurity is expected to increase beyond the 3.5 million people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between October and December 2021 (including about 641 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)).¹²⁹ For example, updated estimates by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) and FEWS NET indicate that 4.6 million people will require food assistance to prevent Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between February and May 2022 (including about 1.1 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)).¹³⁰ Malnutrition caseloads have also increased by 20 percent compared to early 2021 projections, with 1.2 million people affected through July 2022.¹³¹ Very high humanitarian access constraints also continue due to armed hostilities, bureaucratic impediments and inference, and impassable roads during the rainy season.¹³²

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide farmers with assorted seeds for fast-maturing crops and drought-tolerant crops, in areas expected to receive below-average rainfall between March and May 2022.
- Monitor climate forecasts for the spring 2022 season, deliver early warning messages and advisory to vulnerable farmers on how to protect livelihoods despite successive failed seasons, and prepare for the maize and sorghum planting seasons in April.
- Provide food and nutrition assistance, alongside resilience-oriented activities and training, including water management, rangeland conservation, fodder production and storage, conservation agriculture, and drought-management practices for crop agriculture and livestock, to support vulnerable pastoralists and agropastoralists in effectively managing their livelihoods.
- Distribute unconditional cash (where markets are functioning), along with livelihood support, to enhance production capacity ahead of the planting season, especially among the most vulnerable smallholder farmers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2022 HRP calls for USD 624.4 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 178.8 million for nutrition interventions.
- Support emergency response through unconditional food and cash-based transfers to vulnerable populations.
 - Target immediate food needs of the population and restore community productive assets to prevent households from adopting negative coping mechanisms to absorb the impact of multiple shocks on the country's food systems.
 - Provide livestock supplementary feed and animal-treatment services to pastoralists potentially affected by drought.
 - Identify, establish and activate emergency slaughtering points/areas, and, if suitable, undertake slaughter destocking and meat distribution in pastoral drought-affected areas.
 - Provide water-trucking interventions for domestic and livestock usage, with distribution of water-storage tanks in drought-affected areas.
 - Support pregnant and lactating women and girls, and children under 5 years of age, as well as TB/HIV clients, through nutrition assistance.
 - Support the restoration of community productive assets, to prevent households from adopting negative coping mechanisms to absorb the impact of multiple shocks on the country's food systems.

The Republic of South Sudan

Key drivers of food insecurity: flooding, continued record food prices and sub-national violence

The severity and magnitude of food insecurity is likely to continue deteriorating, as a result of record floods for a third consecutive year, compounding the impact of sub-national conflict and soaring food prices.

The floods destroyed crops, limited households from accessing farmlands and led to the death of livestock in eight of the ten states. An estimated 850 000 people have been affected by flooding and 365 000 have been displaced since May 2021.^{133, 134} Prospects for the November–December 2021 harvest were also expected to be less than last year due to floods, as well as erratic rains and insecurity. This is expected to lead to an early and extended lean season, which usually starts in May, especially in areas affected by floods. Recent long-range forecasts indicate another above-average rainfall this season, starting from April. While this could lead to good crops prospects, the risk of major floods and related impacts remains. Despite a slight stabilization of the macroeconomic situation, food prices remain exceptionally high compared to the five-year average.¹³⁵ The impact of flooding and high food prices is likely to drive a new cycle of conflict over scarce resources, especially in areas already prone to food insecurity in Jonglei, Lakes, Warrap and Unity states.¹³⁶

The most recent IPC analysis projected that around 7.2 million people – 60 percent of the population analysed – would face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of food insecurity between April and July 2021.

This included more than 2.4 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 108 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). While there have been no recent IPC updates, food insecurity has likely further deteriorated, and is expected to continue increasing, due to the impact of the flooding, soaring food prices, violence and humanitarian access remaining highly constrained.

Preliminary results of the sectoral analysis undertaken in November 2021 identified 11 counties of extreme concern for food insecurity in 2022 as compared to 6 in 2021. These counties include Tonj North, Tonj East (Warrap), Cueibet, Rumbek North (Lakes), Mayendit, Lee (Unity), Fangak, Canal/Pigi, Ayod, Uror and Pibor (Jonglei).¹³⁷ In Pibor County, Jonglei State, the Famine Review Committee had alerted in December 2020 that several payams were in famine likely or at risk of famine for the projected period of December to July 2021. While coordination of humanitarian assistance in Pibor has improved since then, humanitarian access continues to face very high constraints.¹³⁸ In September and October 2021, violence and threats against humanitarian organizations in Pibor disrupted the movement of supplies and pre-positioning of commodities and prompted the temporary relocation of humanitarian personnel.¹³⁹ In addition, the nutrition situation remains critical, as assessments conducted in 2021 reported GAM levels above the already high national level of 13 percent; GAM prevalence reached 23.1 percent in Aweil South and 21 percent in Pibor.¹⁴⁰

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Pre-position agricultural inputs and equipment and distribute them to the most vulnerable people as soon as floods are forecast, to protect their livelihood assets.
- Strengthen early warning systems and monitor weather and seasonal climate forecasts for the April (Greenbelt and Mountain zones) and June (main) rainy seasons and provide tailored advice to protect lives and livelihoods ahead of a potential flood.
- Pre-position food to mitigate disruption of distribution of emergency food assistance to vulnerable people in flood-prone areas, and in anticipation of an early and extended lean season from January 2022 onwards.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2021 HRP called for USD 644.2 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 204.8 million for nutrition interventions.
- Continue to scale up unconditional food and cash transfers, and emergency livelihood assistance, to vulnerable populations, returnees and IDPs, particularly women and children, in areas where famine is most likely happening or identified as a risk. Scale up cash-based transfer programmes in highly food-insecure areas with functional markets.
 - Leverage life-saving humanitarian programming in hotspots for hunger and violence, including in hard-to-reach locations, across large areas of the country, for more proactive contributions to peace.
 - Scale up nutrition assistance to women and children in areas with high malnutrition rates, and reinforce integration with Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) interventions and with health partners.
 - Provide emergency livelihood and livestock support across farming, agricultural and pastoral communities, for the medium and longer term, to build both the absorptive and adaptive capacities of vulnerable communities.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Support local peacebuilding initiatives to reduce sub-national and intercommunal violence that may arise due to population movements and increased competition for natural resources.
- Advocate for humanitarian needs and continue to alert donors to pre-positioning requirements, to encourage early commitment of financial resources; this will enable the pre-positioning of commodities to communities ahead of the start of the rainy season, when road access becomes impossible.

Southern Africa

The Republic of Angola

Key drivers of food insecurity: drought, economic recession and high food prices

Following another drought-stricken harvest in 2021 across the southern provinces, poor weather conditions continued into the start of the current cropping season, further reducing recovery prospects.

Although an upturn in rainfall was observed from late November, conditions remained un conducive for crop establishment, reflected in generally below-normal soil-moisture reserves. Forecasts point to an increased probability of below-average rainfall in southern and western provinces through March 2022,¹⁴¹ just prior to the harvest period; if such conditions materialized, they would likely curtail agricultural production for a third successive year. In addition, shortages of agricultural inputs and the continued impact of locusts are further downside risks that are weighing on production prospects in 2022.

Despite a positive economic outlook for 2022, the predicted -0.7 annual percentage change of real GDP in 2021 would mean further contraction of the economy.¹⁴² A lack of income opportunities, reflected by an unemployment rate of 31 percent,¹⁴³ and a steep increase in food prices – 36 percent year-on-year in September 2021 – have severely reduced households’ purchasing power.¹⁴⁴

These income constraints are also restricting farming households’ economic access to agricultural inputs.

This dire situation is also driving population displacements, with reports indicating outmigration to northern Namibia. According to a rapid assessment, conducted by the United Nations in collaboration with the Office of the Prime Minister in Namibia in May 2021, more than 3 000 Angolan migrants, particularly in Omusati and Kunene regions, cited hunger as a push factor, hence seeking food assistance in Namibia.¹⁴⁵ The latest IPC analysis indicates that about 1.58 million people (58 percent of the population analysed) in the southern provinces of Cunene, Huila and Namibe are facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between October 2021 and March 2022. Out of this population, 417 000 people are facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) conditions and have difficulties in accessing food or are only able to meet the minimum food requirements through crisis and/or emergency coping strategies. Admissions of children with severe acute malnutrition already exceeded by 65 percent those from January to August 2020.¹⁴⁶

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Scale up food, cash and livelihood assistance in anticipation of additional migration from drought-affected areas in the southern provinces of Angola to northern areas of Namibia, particularly in the camps along the border. This should take place during the first six months of 2022, to mitigate the expected impact of below-average rains that would result in another poor harvest.
- Provide livestock support to mitigate drought and disease-induced mortality and morbidity, such as vaccination kits, treatment, and fodder/livestock feed.
- Provide irrigation kits including solar water pumps, drip irrigation and water tanks to vulnerable farmers, to overcome the increasingly high cost and scarcity of fuel.
- Distribute post-harvest storage equipment, to mitigate potential harvest losses, and conduct training on managing food stocks.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Implement a cash+ approach to allow vulnerable households to meet their immediate food and livelihood needs.
- Provide livelihood assistance in the most affected regions in southwestern parts of the country.
- Increase coverage of acute malnutrition treatment in all drought-affected provinces.
- Ensure that the drought response includes commodity stock pre-positioning, capacity strengthening and knowledge mapping.
- Scale up outreach to migrant camps to facilitate access to health care and enable screening and referral for malnutrition cases.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Support water harvesting and reforestation initiatives.



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The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Key drivers of food insecurity: protracted conflict

The protracted food crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo will likely deteriorate in the country’s eastern provinces, driven by continuing insecurity and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

A further intensification of violence is likely in the eastern provinces of North Kivu and Ituri, as a result of new joint multinational military operations. This comes in the context of the ongoing “state of siege”, in place since May 2021, which has already seen an aggravation of attacks by armed groups against the civilian population.¹⁴⁷ More than a million civilians were reported to have been displaced in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2021.¹⁴⁸ This comes on top of potential economic impacts following the Government’s declaration of a fourth wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Restrictive measures could be implemented by neighbouring countries, negatively affecting cross-border trade and other livelihood activities.

In the January–June 2022 period, 25.9 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity in the country, with 5.4 million in Emergency

(IPC Phase 4).¹⁴⁹ This would mark a moderate improvement from the 27.3 million acutely food insecure for the same period in 2021. This is based largely, however, on the assumption of a gradual nationwide recovery from the negative economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, which could be reversed in the event of a national and regional snapback of restrictive measures.¹⁵⁰ In eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, insecurity is likely to drive pockets of deterioration, particularly in Ituri which is the focus of ongoing joint military operations and is already projected to see a slight deterioration. The nutrition situation is likely to be precarious as the reporting period coincides with a peak in malnutrition. Out of the 70 zones analysed in the first-ever IPC Acute Malnutrition analysis, eight have GAM levels above 15 percent and 42 zones have GAM between 10–15 percent, highlighting a critical nutrition situation.¹⁵¹ The joint military operations and deteriorating insecurity are expected to further disrupt humanitarian access to vulnerable populations, with access constraints already very high.¹⁵²

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute cash+ to vulnerable rural households through livelihoods assistance, following a conflict-sensitive approach in volatile areas to mitigate a potential deterioration in food security.
- Arrange for agri-inputs contingency stocks in the most vulnerable provinces and territories in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2021 HRP called for USD 830.9 million for food security and USD 260.5 million for nutrition interventions.
- Scale up assistance (food, nutrition and cash-based assistance) to support vulnerable populations, including IDPs and refugee and host communities.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Advocate for continued investment in Ebola vaccine research and epidemic prevention.
- Promote investments towards food systems and value chains where possible.
- Improve real-time food security monitoring, particularly in conflict-affected areas.
- Support the transition in the Kasais and in Tanganyika.
- Improve humanitarian access and protection against sexual exploitation, abuse, and gender-based violence, through enhanced advocacy and stakeholder collaboration.

The Republic of Madagascar

Key drivers of food insecurity: consecutive drought, enhanced number of tropical cyclones and high prices of staple foods

A below-average rainfall is forecast for the remainder of the agricultural season through March 2022 in southern Madagascar, which has already experienced severe, recurring drought, especially in the Grand Sud region.¹⁵³ The start of the rainy season in southern areas was delayed by three to four weeks, with rainfall deficits reaching 40–60 percent of the 20-year average in areas that already suffered severe drought last year. These deficits are likely to disrupt planting and pastoral activities and raise concerns for vulnerable people. This is likely to lead to another consecutive year with reduced yields and crop losses.

Moreover, the food security situation could be exacerbated by an enhanced number of tropical cyclones expected this year in eastern Madagascar and the Channel of Mozambique.¹⁵⁴ More than 300 000 people in eastern and northern Madagascar live in flood-prone areas;¹⁵⁵ they might be at risk of flooding and disruption of livelihoods over the next few months.

Soaring fuel prices are significantly increasing transportation costs, which will likely have an impact on already high staple food prices.¹⁵⁶ In the drought-affected and deficit-producing areas of southern Madagascar, such as Ampanihy and Amboasary, staple food prices remain nearly double the five-year average, further reducing the purchasing power of poor households, and pushing them to rely heavily on food assistance.¹⁵⁷

Three years of consecutive drought conditions, together with high food prices and locust damage in the Grand Sud region of Madagascar, have severely hampered people's capacity to produce and access food; it has also depleted their ability to use coping strategies to overcome difficult times. As a result, around 1.64 million people – or 37 percent of the population analysed (including 1.47 million in the Grand Sud) – are projected to face acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between January and April 2022 in the Grand Sud and eastern provinces, of whom around 334 000 people are projected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).¹⁵⁸ This represents a 29 percent increase in the Grand Sud compared to the April to September 2021 period. Although humanitarian food assistance has recorded very broad coverage (in terms of number of beneficiaries) in recent months, making it possible to avoid previously projected catastrophic outcomes, the response remains insufficient to sustainably meet households' consumption deficits, leaving them in need of urgent action.

Although the latest SMART surveys reported GAM levels lower than 10 percent in the ten affected districts,¹⁵⁹ the nutrition situation could deteriorate during the peak of the lean season until April 2022. Around 309 000 cases of acute malnutrition among children are expected through August 2022.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide food and non-food items pre-positioned at strategic locations in high-risk areas ahead of cyclones or floods. This can include distribution of cook stoves and flood-proof storage equipment to protect valuables, seeds and tools ahead of a shock.
- Provide cash transfers, based on a pre-agreed trigger system, to support vulnerable households in protecting their livelihoods before a cyclone makes landfall.
- Continue surveillance and control of Malagasy migratory locust, to avoid impact on the next crop production campaign until March/April.
- Provide livestock support to mitigate drought and disease-induced mortality and morbidity, such as feed, vaccination kits and treatments in Grand Sud until April/May.
- Scale up social protection support for vulnerable population groups forecasted to be exposed to climate events.
- Scale up income-generating activities (cash+) and reconstruction of agricultural infrastructure or roads that lead to markets for agricultural products.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2022 Madagascar Grand Sud Flash Appeal calls for USD 52.5 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 4.3 million for nutrition interventions.
- Scale up emergency food, nutrition and cash+ assistance during the lean season, with special attention to households in IPC Phase 3 or above, to cover extreme gaps in food consumption through the peak of the lean season and early in the harvest season (April to June).
 - Continue providing immediate treatment to children aged 6 to 59 months suffering from acute malnutrition, particularly in the southern regions of Androy, Anosy and part of Atsimo-Andrefana.
 - Rehabilitate water points to improve access to water for agriculture, livestock and human consumption.
 - Distribute materials for agricultural recovery, including replacement of pirogues, nets and accessories for fisherfolk.
 - Implement asset-creation activities (food/cash-based assistance) following the lean season response, by supporting the cleaning of irrigation and drainage canals to supply markets with agricultural products.

The Republic of Mozambique

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict in Cabo Delgado, floods, cyclones and recurrent natural shocks

The high volatility of the Cabo Delgado crisis is likely to continue to drive food insecurity in northern Mozambique, where some 745 000 people were displaced as of November 2021.¹⁶⁰

Despite the Government and allies having gained territory, sporadic attacks continue to be reported in various Cabo Delgado districts, notably Mueda, Nangade, Macomia and Muidumbe.¹⁶¹ Further attacks on remote villages remain likely in the coming months, causing more displacements.¹⁶² As of December 2021, non-state armed groups have reportedly expanded their activities to Zambezia and Niassa provinces.

Rains have been below average since the start of the season in October 2021. In combination with the effects of the conflict, this is expected to result in a reduced planted area, weighing on early production prospects in Cabo Delgado and impacting food insecurity by mid-2022. During the October 2021 to May 2022 cyclone season, the development of eight to twelve tropical systems is forecast, with four to six reaching the stage of a tropical cyclone.¹⁶³

From January 2022, oceanic and atmospheric conditions could favour tropical storm activity in the Mozambique Channel and western basin, bringing Mozambique at risk of direct impact.¹⁶⁴ Potential flooding and cyclone impact could rapidly increase acute food insecurity in the southern and central regions.

Around 1.9 million people (13 percent of the analysed population) face Crisis or worse levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between November 2021 and March 2022. This includes 1.3 million people in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia, of which around 23 500 people are classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). This marks a deterioration of 12 percent from the previously projected January to March 2021 figure of 1 178 000 people. In addition, 74 700 children and 22 000 pregnant and lactating women are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition through January 2022, in Cabo Delgado.

While most districts are accessible, access to conflict-affected areas remains highly constrained. Protection risks, especially for women and children, remain a critical challenge in the conflict-affected districts.¹⁶⁵

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Monitor forecasts for cyclones and deliver early warning messaging and agricultural advisory on how to protect lives and livelihoods ahead of forecast, to cope with potential cyclone/flood events.
- Support livestock evacuations before a cyclone makes landfall and floods occur.
- Based on a pre-agreed trigger system, deliver cash transfers to support vulnerable households in protecting their livelihoods before a cyclone makes landfall.
- Provide vulnerable populations with food and non-food items, pre-positioned at strategic locations in high-risk areas, ahead of cyclones or floods. This can include distribution of cook stoves and flood-proof storage equipment to protect valuables, seeds and tools ahead of a shock.
- Provide unconditional cash transfers to support livelihood and household consumption needs for IDPs and host families, expected to be affected by conflict, displacement and below-average harvests in Cabo Delgado.
- Scale up social protection support for vulnerable population groups forecasted to be exposed to climate events.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2021 HRP called for USD 135.8 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 15 million for nutrition interventions.
- Strengthen advocacy for improved humanitarian access, to support scale-up of conflict-sensitive, life-saving assistance.
 - Distribute unconditional cash transfers to support IDPs and host families, while supporting the 2021/22 agricultural season production.
 - Implement food assistance through asset-creation activities for IDPs and vulnerable households in host communities, to rapidly (re)build crucial agricultural livelihoods and household assets.
 - Provide training on pre- and post-harvest losses, including the distribution of storage technology to vulnerable smallholder farmers, IDPs and host populations.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Ensure the pre-positioning of agriculture inputs in strategic locations through collaboration with agro dealers, to ensure availability for recovery actions after cyclones.

Near East and North Africa

The Lebanese Republic

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis and political instability

Lebanon’s unprecedented economic meltdown is likely to keep worsening, exacerbated by political uncertainty and the COVID-19 pandemic. Its repercussions are affecting livelihoods and deteriorating food security of both Lebanese citizens and the refugee population.

Dwindling foreign exchange reserves have already pushed the Central Bank to completely phase out several subsidized items such as gasoline and cooking gas, while others were further reduced, making it difficult for households to afford basic needs. Furthermore, the marked economic deterioration may trigger communal tensions ahead of crucial parliamentary elections scheduled for March 2022.¹⁶⁶ The economy contracted by 44 percent in US dollar terms from 2018 to 2020, and is expected to have contracted by a further 10.5 percent in 2021.¹⁶⁷ As the country imports most of its food requirements, rapid depreciation, exacerbated by supply-chain bottlenecks and fuel shortages, has boosted food inflation, which stood at 304 percent as of October 2021.^{168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173} Food imports (unloaded food weight in Port of Beirut) decreased by 13 percent during the

period January to November 2021 when compared to the same period in 2020.¹⁷⁴ In the meantime, the ongoing political stalemate has undermined all attempts to obtain key financial support from international organizations and donor countries.^{175, 176}

As a result of the ongoing economic crisis, over 1.3 million Lebanese citizens, 35.8 percent of the total population, were estimated to be food insecure (including 190 000 severely food insecure) by the end of September 2021, based on rCARI.¹⁷⁷

Of the 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, 735 000 were food insecure in September 2021. In addition, 88 percent of the Syrian refugee population were dependent on humanitarian assistance, as they were not able to afford the absolute minimum amount required to cover lifesaving needs.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity was estimated at about 23 percent of the surveyed population, with 70 percent of households worried about not having enough food. Nearly all the agricultural households surveyed indicated a need for assistance in the coming 3–6 months.¹⁷⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Expand cash assistance to reach a potentially increasing number of households experiencing higher levels of poverty and unable to purchase priority goods – as subsidies are expected to be phased out – and expand food and cash assistance to vulnerable farmers’ community.
- Provide animal health treatments such as vaccinations and deworming tablets to vulnerable livestock herders and distribute feed for small ruminants to vulnerable small herders.
- Support small-scale farmers through provision of vouchers to purchase agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers, equipment, vaccines, etc.), contributing to their resilience in maintaining farming in 2022.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

Lebanon’s Emergency Response Plan 2021–2022 calls for USD 115.4 million for food security, and USD 25 million for nutrition interventions; this is to address immediate basic needs, including food needs of the most vulnerable Lebanese (400 000) and migrant populations (90 300).

- Continue the scale-up of cash-based transfers, including the roll-out of the Emergency Social Safety Net, to reach an increased number of vulnerable households, in collaboration with the Government.
- Maintain and augment the capacity to deliver life-saving assistance in an environment where banking services, supply chains, prices and currency stability are increasingly challenged.
- Extend the logistics sector fuel operation until March 2022, to facilitate reliable access to fuel through the supply chain networks and prevent negative impact on critical life-saving activities.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Orient the monitoring strategy and activities on a risk-basis to alert options for programmatic design and adjustment, which address and/or mainstream conflict-sensitivity, social stability, community relations, gender and protection risks, and the expected rise of negative coping strategies.
- Leverage existing and functioning health, education, food, social protection and WASH systems to address sub-optimal infant-feeding practices.

The Republic of the Sudan

Key drivers of food insecurity: macroeconomic crisis, political instability and intercommunal violence

Renewed political instability in the Sudan, high food prices and low purchasing power, and intercommunal conflict are projected to continue driving food insecurity conditions during the outlook period.

The likely prolonged suspension of international financial assistance following the October coup could reverse signs of economic improvements resulting from reforms initiated in 2021.¹⁸⁰ Inflation stood at over 350 percent in October 2021, down from 365 percent in September, but is likely to remain extremely high due to continued instability, the low value of the local currency and a lack of structural reform.¹⁸¹ Civil unrest and subsequent trade disruptions and market shortages could also continue to drive food inflation.¹⁸²

Staple food prices in October 2021 were 60–120 percent above the same period in the previous year, and almost five times higher than the five-year average.¹⁸³ The beginning of the main sorghum and millet harvest in November is expected to result in a seasonal improvement in household food access, amidst generally favourable crop production prospects,¹⁸⁴ but staple food prices will likely remain

significantly above the five-year average.¹⁸⁵ The number of IDPs has increased throughout 2021 and stood at more than 3 million people at the end of the year. The vast majority are in the Darfur region, where recurrent intercommunal violence is likely to cause further displacement and food insecurity.¹⁸⁶

Acute food insecurity levels are likely to be worse than the last projection – issued in May 2021 – which estimated about 6 million people (13 percent of the analysed population) expected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) up to February 2022; of these, over 1.3 million were facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) due to the impact of the October coup and its economic repercussions. According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, issued in December 2021, 10.9 million people are expected to require food and livelihood assistance in the coming year, from 8.2 million in 2021. The number of people requiring nutrition assistance is estimated to reach 3.9 million in 2022, a 9 percent increase from 2021.¹⁸⁷

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute agricultural tools and seeds (sorghum and millet) to allow timely planting for the main season starting in June.
- Set up cash-based transfers and distribute food items to households affected by the economic crisis or by trade disruptions stemming from social instability, ahead of the lean season commencing in May.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2022 HRP calls for USD 708.3 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 160 million for nutrition interventions.
- Provide host communities with agricultural livelihood and food assistance through in-kind and cash transfers, to back up the Sudan Family Support Programme.
 - Sustain life-saving assistance to refugees who have fled into the Sudan from Ethiopia's Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz regions.
 - Provide comprehensive food security and nutrition programming in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, where humanitarian access is possible for the first time in ten years.
 - Provide support to strengthen institutions, in order to enhance communities' food and livestock production.
 - Maintain life-saving nutrition prevention and treatment programmes.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Explore contingency corridors into the Sudan, noting supply chain delays at the Port of Sudan.
- Strengthen cash readiness in the event of further macroeconomic deterioration.

The Syrian Arab Republic

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, conflict and dry conditions

High levels of acute food insecurity in the Syrian Arab Republic continue to be driven by lingering economic crisis, protracted displacement and drought-like conditions impacting agricultural production.

Price increases of essential items are eroding the purchasing power of Syrian households across the country.¹⁸⁸ The relative stabilization of the Syrian pound since August 2021, after it had lost over 70 percent of its value on the informal market since 2019,¹⁸⁹ has failed to stop the increase of food prices;¹⁹⁰ these are mainly caused by higher costs for agricultural inputs,¹⁹¹ fuel shortages increasing transportation costs, supply chain bottlenecks and lack of hard currency to ensure sufficient imports.¹⁹² In October 2021, the national average price of the standard-reference food basket was the highest ever recorded – 128 percent higher than the same month in 2020.¹⁹³

Wheat production in 2021 is estimated at around 1.05 million tonnes,

down from 2.8 million in 2020; it is one quarter of the pre-crisis average of 4.1 million tonnes, mainly due to insufficient and poorly distributed rainfall and high input costs.¹⁹⁴ Another consecutive below-average rainfall forecast for the current 2021/22 rainy season, potentially exacerbated by the ongoing La Niña event, will compound the situation, and food prices are expected to further increase, pushing more Syrians into food insecurity. High feed prices and lack of access to pasture are also likely to result in extensive destocking.¹⁹⁵ Humanitarian access constraints are extreme, especially in those areas under opposition control in the northwest of the Syrian Arab Republic.¹⁹⁶ Also, occasional localized outbreaks of violence, as in the southern province of Dar'a, can cause major disruptions to humanitarian operations.¹⁹⁷ Overall, the number of food-insecure people is likely to increase beyond the 12.4 million people (almost 60 percent of the population) identified at the end of 2020.^{198, 199} In addition, 6.7 million people remain internally displaced.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Activate and strengthen monitoring and early warning systems for natural hazards and food security, and more effectively disseminate information and warnings ahead of a shock.
- Rapidly distribute quality inputs for vegetable production to the most vulnerable households, by February–March 2022.
- Provide immediate support to livestock herders expected to be affected by depleted (or inaccessible) pastures and water scarcity, through provision of high-nutrient feed and mineral supplements.
- Rehabilitate and maintain water-harvesting structures, pumping stations and water infrastructure in conjunction with the winter rainy season; restore basic irrigation schemes before summer season, particularly in regions affected by water deficits across the whole country, with capacity building on water-use efficiency for water-users' associations.
- Rehabilitate the bread value chain, starting with public bakeries, to increase the efficiency of bread production and its availability across the country; this can partially offset the impacts of the expected wheat deficit.
- Deliver protective food and/or cash assistance to farming households in areas expected to have reduced cereal harvest (especially northeast Syrian Arab Republic), to pre-empt further deterioration of food security.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The HRP 2021 called for USD 233.3 million for early recovery and livelihoods, USD 1.63 billion for food security and agriculture, and USD 184.4 million for nutrition interventions.
- Continue the introduction and increase of crossline food delivery into northwestern Syrian Arab Republic, to complement cross-border modalities.
 - Continue the provision of in-kind food assistance to food-insecure families across the country and increase hybrid cash assistance to the most vulnerable among them, to support their eroded purchasing power.
 - Pre-position food in northwestern Syrian Arab Republic ahead of the expiration of the cross-border resolution.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Strengthen high-level advocacy to maintain access to northwest Syrian Arab Republic, enabling provision of life-saving assistance currently authorized until July 2022.
- Enhance the capacity of crisis-affected farmers to adapt to, and mitigate, climate change. The actions should include training on context-specific, climate-smart agriculture, as well as management of agriculture and livestock systems under drought conditions.

The Republic of Yemen

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict and economic crisis

Food insecurity could further deteriorate in some areas of Yemen over the outlook period, as the conflict intensifies and the economic crisis continues.

Fighting escalated in the second half of 2021 in Ma'rib, Shabwah and Al Bayda governorates, and is expected to further intensify.²⁰⁰ A potential siege of Ma'rib and expansion of conflict to Hodeidah port and further south could displace hundreds of thousands of additional people and drive further shortages, inflation and depreciation of the local currency.²⁰¹ Over 4 million people are already internally displaced.²⁰² Price inflation and currency depreciation, which again sharply increased in late 2021,²⁰³ are particularly acute in the south, contributing to an increase in civil unrest.²⁰⁴ Due to depleting foreign currency reserves, the country – which is highly dependent on imports of fuel and food – is struggling to procure these goods. Resulting shortages,^{205, 206} conflict and socio-economic challenges will also continue to hinder agricultural activities.²⁰⁷

The latest IPC analysis, issued in December 2020, projected that between January and June 2021, 16.1 million people were to experience Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food

insecurity, including 5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and approximately 47 000 (a threefold increase from December 2020) in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), the latter located mainly in Al Jawf, Amran and Hajjah governorates. Malnutrition levels remain very high, with 19 out of the 35 zones having combined GAM rates above 15 percent and reaching 31 percent in Hodeidah.²⁰⁸ In 2021, more than 2.25 million children and more than 1 million pregnant and lactating women were affected by acute malnutrition.²⁰⁹ No update has been conducted since then, but Acute Food Insecurity and MAM IPC analyses are planned to take place in January 2022.

While increased levels of assistance between April and July 2021 contributed to a stabilization of food insecurity, key food insecurity indicators show a clear deterioration in the second half of 2021.²¹⁰ Food security monitoring data show a significant increase in food consumption scores across the north and south of Yemen since June last year – indicative evidence of a deteriorating food insecurity situation. Should humanitarian assistance decrease or be impacted by further constraints – currently very high – any gains are at risk of being lost.²¹¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute key inputs to the most food-insecure farmers, including crop and vegetable seeds and agricultural tools, to allow timely planting for the summer planting season starting in June.
- Provide irrigation kits including solar water pumps, drip irrigation and water tanks to vulnerable farmers, to overcome the increasingly high cost and scarcity of fuel.
- Provide unconditional cash transfers and implement cash-for-work activities to mitigate the impact of food-price inflation on the most vulnerable people.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2021 HRP called for USD 1.71 billion for food security and agriculture, and USD 442.9 million for nutrition interventions.
- Distribute emergency agricultural, livestock or fisheries kits to severely food-insecure households, to increase food availability and enhance capacity to sustain productive assets.
 - Improve access to livelihood opportunities and rehabilitate assets and infrastructure in areas with high levels of food insecurity.
 - Provide emergency livelihood support and cash interventions to vulnerable people affected by the economic crisis.
 - Provide high-nutrient animal feed and animal health treatments to vulnerable livestock herders.
 - Maintain nutrition prevention and treatment for vulnerable populations, including host communities and IDPs.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Sustain services for the humanitarian community, including the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and Logistics Cluster.
- Continue to provide humanitarian actors with fuel services, by supplying and delivering vessels to Hodeidah port.
- Enhance focused advocacy to improve humanitarian access and ensure consistent assistance provision, particularly in the north of Yemen.

Glossary

Acute food insecurity

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods regardless of the causes, context or duration.

The IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale categorizes acute food insecurity into five Phases of severity, ranging from IPC Phase 1, corresponding to No/Minimal acute food insecurity, to IPC Phase 5, corresponding to Catastrophe/Famine. Each of these phases has important and distinct implications for where and how best to intervene.

Chronic food insecurity

Chronic food security refers to food insecurity that persists over time, largely due to structural causes. Chronic food insecurity has relevance in providing strategic guidance to actions that focus on the medium- and long-term improvement of the quality and quantity of food consumption required for an active and healthy life.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

The IPC results from a partnership of various organizations at the global, regional and country levels, and is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of food insecurity. (For further details, please see http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Factsheet_2020.pdf.)

Cadre Harmonisé (CH)

The *Cadre Harmonisé* is the multi-dimensional analytical framework used by the Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), for the analysis and identification of areas and groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon. (For further details, please see <http://ecoagris.cilss.int/index.php/analyse-cadre-harmonise/>)

Emergency – IPC/CH Phase 4 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is a level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale at which households either have large food-consumption gaps – which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality – or are able to mitigate large food-consumption gaps by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. Households face critical levels of acute food insecurity/critical acute food insecurity. Urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods. If nothing is done, the population could face starvation or death.

Catastrophe – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is a level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale at which households face an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs, even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. Urgent, immediate action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death, and the total collapse of livelihoods. Households can be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) even if areas are not classified in Famine (IPC Phase 5).

Famine – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Famine is the highest level of the Acute Food Insecurity scale. 'Famine' exists in areas where at least one in five households has, or is most likely to have, an extreme deprivation of food and face starvation, death, destitution. Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition (at least 30 percent of children malnourished) and significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease (at least 1 person for every 5 000 dies each day), are occurring. Urgent action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death.

Famine Likely – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Famine Likely is the highest level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale (Phase 5), used to classify situations when famine is likely occurring. If there is insufficient data for famine classification, usually because either nutrition or mortality data are lacking, but the available information indicates that famine is likely occurring or will occur, then the famine classification is called "Famine Likely". Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe; the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

Risk of famine

Risk of famine refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine in the projected period. While this is not perceived necessarily as the most-likely scenario, it is a worst-case scenario that generally has a realistic chance of occurring.

Food security

A situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. There are usually four dimensions of food security: food availability, food access, food utilization and stability over time.

Food access

Access by households/individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.

Food availability

The availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.

Livelihoods

People's capabilities, assets – both material and social – and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being; and the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about activities.

Coping strategies

Activities to which people resort in order to obtain food, income and/or other essential goods or services when their normal means of livelihood have been disrupted or other shocks/hazards affect their access to basic needs.

Malnutrition

Malnutrition is an umbrella term that covers undernutrition and overweight, obesity and diet-related noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes and cancer. Undernutrition is a consequence of inadequate nutrient intake and/or absorption, and/or illness or disease. Acute malnutrition, stunting, underweight and micronutrient deficiencies are all forms of undernutrition.

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Global Network Against Food Crises

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) are the founding members of the Global Network Against Food Crises, together with the European Commission for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) and European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO). The Global Network seeks to better link, integrate and guide existing programmes and policy processes to sustainably address the root causes of food crises along the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus.

Within the Global Network's approach and framework, FAO and WFP, together with relevant partners, have established a coordinated monitoring system for food security, livelihoods and value chains in order to identify and inform critical anticipatory actions.

This report is the first joint FAO-WFP early warning analysis of food insecurity hotspots and is part of a series of Global Network's analytical products contributing to the generation and sharing of consensus and evidence-based information for preventing and addressing food crises.

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Website:

www.fightfoodcrises.net

Contact information

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Viale delle Terme di Caracalla
00153 Rome, Italy
T +39 06 57051 fao.org
Office of Emergencies and Resilience OER-Director@fao.org

World Food Programme

Via Cesare Giulio Viola 68/70,
00148 Rome, Italy
T +39 06 65131 wfp.org
wfpinfo@wfp.org



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