

SAVING
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LIVES



Summary of evaluation evidence

Somalia 2012-2018



March 2018

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This document summarises the main findings and recommendations from evaluations conducted since 2012 to assess programmes in Somalia. Section 1 looks at evidence generated by WFP-commissioned evaluations focusing on Somalia. Section 2 introduces relevant evidence from WFP-commissioned regional or global evaluations. Section 3 analysis the results of evaluations commissioned by other humanitarian and development agencies in areas that are relevant to WFP's work in the country.

Section 1 - WFP COMMISSIONED EVALUATIONS

In the period 2013-2017, WFP commissioned three evaluations that fully or partly cover Somalia:

- *FAO/WFP Joint Evaluation of Food Security Cluster Coordination in Humanitarian Action*, August 2014.
- *WFP's Use of Pooled Funds for Humanitarian Preparedness and Response (2009-2013): a strategic evaluation*, December 2014.
- *Somalia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (200443) Strengthening Food and Nutrition Security and Enhancing Resilience 2012-2015*, April 2015.

Further, the following regional syntheses include evaluation evidence from Somalia or have a relevance to its country context:

- *RBN: Operation Evaluations Series Regional Synthesis*, November 2017
- *Nutrition in Humanitarian Contexts in the Sahel: Evaluation Synthesis*, January 2018

In addition to these sources, we included relevant information from our own notes from:

- *Debriefing of the Somalia Country Portfolio Evaluation 2012-2017*, January 2018

The main findings and recommendations are presented, grouped per thematic areas that roughly mirror those identified by the ongoing CPE. This has been a conscious decision to facilitate the use of this document in conjunction with the preliminary findings of the country portfolio evaluation.

While the majority of recommendations have been or are currently being addressed (or could seem outdated), we believe it is valuable to highlight the areas that were identified over the last 6 years as needing corrective actions as a way to promote a strategic reflection that could inform the formulation of the CSP.

Lessons learnt from the failed response to the famine

Since 2011, much was achieved to restore WFP's reputation in Somalia and to make the operational priorities more relevant to the challenging context (CPE, 2012). While WFP's weak coherence with state authorities and other humanitarian actors contributed to its loss of credibility during 2009–2010, WFP demonstrated greater inclusion of principal stakeholders in its planning processes. The link between emergency and development in programme operations received more attention. WFP focused on more stable areas where there were opportunities to improve resilience and it made significant progress in improving effectiveness by focusing on nutrition in emergency response. Better

use was made of limited resources, and WFP engaged more strategically with some of the principal humanitarian partners, such as UNICEF or FAO (CPE, 2012).

There were, however, still important areas to be addressed, especially improved accountability to beneficiaries, better evidence of the impacts that different food assistance interventions had on food and nutrition-insecure households, and – for future sustainability – the need to build more effective capacity in viable state institutions concerned with disaster risk management and sector planning for education and health (CPE, 2012).

The recommendations sought to strengthen the vulnerability analysis and mapping to make relevant and decisive strategic programme decisions; and to improve WFP's area-based strategies, its understanding of the impact of food assistance on different socio-economic groups and the approach to capacity development of both staff and counterparts. They suggested continuing recent initiatives to improve cluster coordination and communication outreach to ensure better transparency and greater accountability to stakeholders (CPE, 2012).

Emergency Preparedness and Response and Logistics

Within pooled funds, the Central Emergency Response Fund rapid response window has positively contributed to WFP's capacity to respond rapidly to unforeseen needs. In Somalia the most notable use was kick-starting the response to the 2011 drought response.

In Somalia, pooled funds played a significant role in supporting the start-up costs of common services managed by WFP including UN Humanitarian Air Service operations, common logistics services and pipelines, and shared operational hubs. However, pooled funds were not a predictable source of support for on-going operating costs. **The main added value of pooled funds for WFP lied in their timeliness and predictability, and their additionally to other sources of funding** (Pooled funds, 2014).

Main Recommendations

The recommendations sought to increase the capacity of WFP to utilize pooled funds as collateral for the release of internal advances, to enhance the contribution of pooled funds to the operation of common services in emergencies and to enhance the quality, efficiency and utility of monitoring and reporting on the use of pooled funds (Pooled funds, 2014).

General Food Distribution should continue as an option under the 'contingency activities' but defined with clear exit strategies. Wet feeding should continue in urban centres in the South but exit strategies should be developed (PRRO, 2015).

Nutrition

Under the PRRO programme, the nutrition activities resulted in a number of positive outcomes. An increased **focus on integrated approaches**, including Mother and Child Health and Nutrition clinics, **increased the effectiveness of the nutrition activities through integrated prevention and treatment programming, including outreach**. However, functional Mother and Child Health and Nutrition clinics only existed in Somaliland and Puntland, so even if the measure was effective where implemented, **it could not be transferred to South Central Zone** at the time of the evaluation.

WFP successfully improved mobilization, outreach and effective case finding and follow-up of moderately acute malnourished cases through its large network of community nutrition workers who were trained under the PRRO. In nutrition this meant a strong focus on addressing health and hygiene, care and feeding practices as the key determinants of acute malnutrition and stunting through effective interventions aimed to change practice. **Whilst attention was given to this in the design and early stages of the PRRO, it was not sufficiently followed through in**

practice. Still, since many of the community health and nutrition cadre were affiliated with the Mother and Child Health and Nutrition centre, this was a critical aspect of an integrated programming (PRRO, 2015).

Main Recommendations

WFP Somalia should collaborate with Ministry of Health, local health authorities and UN partners under the joint mandate and Joint Health and Nutrition Programme to consolidate and scale up integrated programming at the Mother and Child Health and Nutrition (PRRO, 2015).

Food Security, Livelihoods and Resilience

The activities that were included in the PRRO were appropriate for the food security and nutrition context at the time of planning and design (mid-2012). The design of the PRRO was coherent with relevant WFP corporate strategies and policies. The resilience approach was appropriate to strengthen the links between emergency and development and improved coordination, alignment, and connectivity particularly in activities implemented within the Joint Resilience Strategy framework (PRRO, 2015).

Under the PRRO, results were mixed. The general food distribution activity provided relief food and wet feeding assistance to households and communities facing food insecurity. However, data evidence showed that **more than 10 percent of households had poor food consumption scores despite being provided food assistance.** The need for strengthening household and community resilience in order to limit the need for relief is strong. **School feeding activities, including take home rations, provided a significant pull factor for children to attend school. However, there was insufficient documentation to provide evidence of educational outcomes.** This needed to be addressed to ensure that the School Feeding activities were meeting their objectives (PRRO, 2015).

The pooled funds did not exhibit a comparative advantage in funding WFP for preparedness or resilience-building activities, even if resilience programming was a key area of WFP's portfolio in Somalia (Pooled funds, 2014).

Main Recommendations

In collaboration with FAO and UNICEF, WFP Somalia should continue to develop and implement appropriate community resilience livelihood approaches. The approach should not only focus on protecting livelihoods but on improving livelihood opportunities, increasing community capacity and building resilience at all levels (PRRO, 2015).

WFP Somalia should continue using a flexible approach that links relief and recovery, while strengthening community resilience in the next PRRO (PRRO, 2015).

WFP Somalia should collaborate with UNICEF to ensure that School Feeding makes a contribution to educational outcomes. This includes assessments of enrolment, attendance and any other impact the activity makes to education in Somalia. The comparative advantage of the current take-home-rations compared to alternative measures for promoting girls' enrolment should form the basis for the School Feeding activities in the next PRRO. Moreover, the school feeding component should include mechanisms to ensure that children from the most destitute household will be able to attend school (PRRO, 2015).

Cash modalities

Under the PRRO, while the design of the cash and voucher component was appropriate and based on sound assessment and analysis, the implementation did not proceed according to plan and the cash and voucher activities were not fully realized at the time the evaluation took place (PRRO, 2015).

WFP adopted a voucher-based transfer modality in Somalia. However, the evaluation found that whilst this choice reflected WFP area of expertise, **it provided less flexibility for beneficiaries, incurred a higher administrative burden and did not align with the broad consensus that cash-based modalities were appropriate in much of Somalia** (PRRO, 2015).

Main Recommendations

WFP Somalia, together with HQ, should develop a fundraising strategy to enable programming to be implemented as planned. The strategy should include focus on funds available for cash-based approaches to be more effectively utilized across multiple sectors (PRRO, 2015).

WFP Somalia should continue to provide food assistance to the most food insecure population groups based on food security assessments, but a greater emphasis should be placed on the use of alternative transfer modalities (PRRO, 2015).

Gender and Protection

Under the PRRO, gender activities have mainly consisted of targeting to promote women's opportunities including participation, training, and health activities. While the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework did not include indicators on women's empowerment, **anecdotal evidence collected during the evaluation suggested that these activities allowed women to gain more control over their lives and strengthen self-reliance.** There was a **lack of proper gender analysis** in the different contexts in which the PRRO was implemented to understand the specific conditions faced by women and girls and gender relations in general as a basis for proper gender sensitive planning and implementation (PRRO, 2015).

In practical terms, the pooled funds were judged to have little influence on how WFP addressed gendered programming. In Somalia, **donors highlighted that they would like to see more gender-aware programming** and follow-up, for example, by giving greater consideration to how food and non-food assistance might make women more vulnerable to exploitation (given that they have priority in distribution) (Pooled funds, 2014).

Assessment Capacity

The scarcity of reliable and up-to-date data in Somalia has been a significant challenge for any operation. The existence of the **Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) and the WFP Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Unit (VAM)** was therefore invaluable for providing seasonal food security and nutrition assessments, ad-hoc technical analysis, and thereby enabling the provision of relatively good baseline information. The WFP Trend Analysis 2007 to 2012 further supported the needs assessments for the PRRO and provided a good justification for the programme approach (PRRO, 2015).

Monitoring & Evaluation

Under the PRRO, while the M&E system was well developed and in line with WFP's corporate policy, staff reductions and staff turnovers put some constraints on the effectiveness of the system (PRRO, 2015).

Main Recommendations

WFP Somalia should ensure further development of the M&E system to ensure greater attention to its usefulness for planning and management purposes. Indicators should be developed to support

the strengthening of an integrated approach, as well as indicators allowing assessment of impacts of different implementation modalities such as livelihood activities implemented under the Joint Resilience Strategy. Moreover, the M&E system should develop compatible and easily accessible data bases to promote optimal use of monitoring and evaluation for planning and management purposes (PRRO, 2015).

WFP Somalia should address identified capacity gaps in a number of sectors including nutrition and health, the use of cash-based modalities, and gender analysis. The ET therefore recommends that WFP Somalia develop a comprehensive capacity development strategy. This strategy should be based on capacity needs assessments and with monitoring indicators showing the specific capacity aspects to be increased (PRRO, 2015).

Section 2 – EVALUATION EVIDENCE FROM REGIONAL/GLOBAL SYNTHESSES

In the course of 2017, WFP has commissioned syntheses of the recently concluded Operation Evaluations Series and of a series of four impact evaluations on nutrition in humanitarian settings.

While the geographic scope of the OpEv syntheses is regional and only marginally covering Somalia, the evidence generated is highly relevant to the Country Office.

The *Operation Evaluations Series - Regional Synthesis 2013-2017 East and Central Africa Region* summarizes the results of the evaluations of seven operations in five countries, Somalia PRRO 200443 being one of them. Although the findings and recommendations of the PRRO evaluation have already been analyzed in Section 1, in this section it is relevant to highlight certain results of the OpEv synthesis as they draw a comparison with other operations in the region.

Operations' objectives and overall intent were found well-aligned with the needs of food insecure populations in all seven operations. In Somalia, for example, the PRRO was characterized by a flexible approach, incorporating both relief and recovery interventions, which was appropriate for the varied implementation locations and the volatility of food emergencies. WFP allowed for dynamic adjustment between relief and recovery activities in different parts of the country as needs required. WFP's detailed beneficiary mapping/production of food security data allowed for rapid adjustment to context.

Positively, three evaluations, two in Rwanda and that in Somalia, found comparatively strong monitoring systems overall. In Somalia, monthly monitoring reports, quarterly and annual donor reports, and annual standard project reports provided a "good tool" for promoting efficiency and effectiveness.

In Somalia and Djibouti, WFP engagement with responsible government institutions, including at decentralised level, resulted in improved capacities for disaster risk preparedness, management and response.

A common trait of gender programming in the region is the focus on quantitative results, however three evaluations (Somalia and both Rwanda operations), reported qualitative gender results, that reflected more progressive approaches to gender equality. Achievements included: increased self-reliance for women; better relations between spouses; improved access to markets for women; and a stronger role for women in household decision-making over food and cash.

In regards to future sustainability, Somalia and Ethiopia were found to be un conducive contexts for transition; here, operations focused on incrementally strengthening the capacities of local authorities.

The potential for sustainability in the region is mixed, with high potential overall in Rwanda, and some potential in Djibouti. In Ethiopia and Somalia, potential was low.

Main Lessons

Lesson 1: Leverage evidence to map strategic entry points. Balancing WFP emergency response-capacity with identifying opportunities for more strategic engagement in partnerships is a priority for country strategic plans going forward.

Lesson 2: Improve capacity analysis and strengthening. As part of the country strategic planning process, WFP offices could complement the region’s strong use of evidence in design through a robust analysis of national capacities in the country.

Lesson 3: Clarify resilience and self-reliance. Whilst funding and external constraints exist, a clearer articulation of how WFP envisages its operational activity supporting self-reliance and resilience would enhance its advocacy basis.

Lesson 4: Expand approaches to gender. WFP approach to gender requires a revised conceptualisation, more in tune with current approaches to gender equality and the empowerment of women, which **go beyond the “equal numbers”** to seek **transformational change.**

Lesson 5: Attention to data availability, quality and reliability will continue to require regional oversight, but nuanced programme monitoring, geared to operational decision-making, is key to ensuring that WFP achievements in the region – which are considerable - are made visible to its stakeholders, and that WFP itself can use its own information to learn from, and improve, its own performance.

The *Impact Evaluations synthesis – Four Evaluations of the Impact of WFP Programmes on Nutrition in Humanitarian Context in the Sahel* summarizes the main findings and lessons from WFP-funded impact evaluations of nutrition and food security interventions in four countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Chad, Mali, Niger and Sudan. Although results and recommendations are specific to the particular context of the Sahel region, these impact evaluations contribute to the literature on effective ways to improve nutrition and food security outcomes in humanitarian contexts and could be relevant for Somalia.

The impact evaluation for Chad found that the prevention programme – blanket supplementary feeding – had a positive effect on the incidence of moderate acute malnutrition during the lean season, particularly for households supported by seasonal work. When looking at the interaction between the prevention and treatment programmes, the blanket supplementary feeding programme had a larger positive impact on moderate acute malnutrition incidence among households with poorer than average access to the treatment programme (targeted supplementary feeding).

The evaluation for the Sudan found a significant reduction in the prevalence of children at risk of malnutrition where food-based interventions for preventing moderate acute malnutrition were added to the treatment programme (targeted supplementary feeding).

The Niger evaluation concluded that continued provision of food assistance for assets in combination with treatment and/or prevention programmes significantly reduced the incidence of moderate acute malnutrition, serving as a nutrition-sensitive form of assistance. The combination of nutrition-

sensitive and nutrition-specific assistance provided by WFP turns out to have had the strongest positive impact on moderate acute malnutrition among children.

The impact evaluation in Mali found that access to general food distribution led to increases in households' non-food and food expenditures and in micronutrient availability. The evaluation examined the delivery of a package of multisector nutrition interventions and found that households living close to conflict and receiving at least two forms of assistance – particularly general food distribution and school feeding – registered statistically positive effects on nutrition outcomes, while the effects were not significant for households that received only one form of food assistance. Disaggregating by degree of exposure to conflict, the **evaluation** also uncovered that the effects on children's nutrition outcomes were concentrated mostly in areas that were not in the immediate vicinity of conflict and that this might in part be because these households had greater access to aid.

Main Lessons

Lesson 1: Greater attention to the **timing, sequencing and roll out schedule** of a package of interventions is likely to result in enhanced effectiveness.

Lesson 2: Closer **partnerships** and **coordination** can support more effective and efficient delivery.

Lesson 3: Barriers to achieving better coverage and access include, but are not limited to, **infrastructure deficits**. **Awareness of the availability** of quality services is also important.

Lesson 4: The **quality, availability and lack of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data** are problematic.

Section 3 – EVALUATION EVIDENCE FROM OTHER AGENCIES

In the period 2013-2017, other humanitarian and development agencies also commissioned evaluations covering Somalia. This section presents the main findings and recommendations relevant to WFP's activities in Somalia divided per thematic areas. While we strive to provide a comprehensive picture, it is possible that relevant evaluations were inadvertently overlooked.

Food Security, Livelihoods and Resilience

The on-going challenges facing Somalia demonstrate that communities and institutions have limited capacity to deal with a broad spectrum of risks and shocks and struggle to absorb or adapt to risks. Under the FAO's resilience programme, results were promising. Cash-for-work activities contributed to household food security, had positive spill overs on the local economy and supported communal assets. Farmer and Pastoralist Field Schools are a useful approach as part of a resilience building agenda; however **more focus is required on knowledge transfer opportunities and scaling out these islands of success** (FAO, 2015).

“In theory humanitarian/emergency resources can be used to protect development gains in times of crisis. **However, in practice it was found that focal areas for resilience-building were not the most vulnerable areas and were consequently less likely to receive humanitarian funding in times of crisis.** For example, the NGO resilience consortia in Somalia focused on the more stable and accessible areas which were more conducive to ‘developmental’ programming, rather than the areas typically affected by emergencies and acute need in south-central Somalia.” (EU, 2017)

Among UN organisations, NGOs and DFID, there was a fairly standard way that partners define resilience that includes how individuals, households and communities anticipate, withstand and recover from climatic and conflict-based shocks (DFID, 2015). **Nevertheless, one of the main challenge for SomReP¹ was field staff capacity in understanding resilience** (SomReP, 2016). “In order to maximize the benefits of emerging best practices for improving adaptive capacity, the consortium must focus on combining approaches to achieve system-wide resilience improvements. This means **ensuring field teams have integrated design for resilience with a tighter of focus on the key livelihood impact groups rather than targeting all three equally** (pastoralist, agro-pastoral, and peri-urban) in every district. A tighter focus will also ensure that the technical requirement of the designs for impact groups will be limited so as to focus on the most important program objectives in that specific location.” (SomReP, 2016)

The level and effectiveness of operational coordination on building resilience to food crises differed considerably at country level. Major donors often tended to seek visibility through their own flagship resilience projects, which exacerbated coordination problems between donors. In Somalia, the EU and DFID have supported relatively large consortia made up of NGOs, while USAID has supported other NGOs individually. (EU, 2017)

Main Recommendations

Partnership should be strengthened between FAO, UNICEF and WFP, as well as with national stakeholders to better address their common goal of building resilience (FAO, 2015).

Humanitarian and Development agencies should develop a set of ratios and systemic-based indicators to gauge the effectiveness of resilience. These should draw on common models, best practices, and literature, related to financial management and complex adaptive systems. (DFIF, 2015).

Cash and Voucher

In Somalia, “deemed convenient, affordable and fast, mobile money has been widely adopted. It has reached a penetration rate of 73%, compared to a penetration rate of 15% for formal bank accounts. Mobile money has become the primary financial instrument in Somalia and Somaliland, while cash usage is decreasing” (World Bank, 2017). Investments in telecommunications, almost exclusively led by Somalis have managed to create, from scratch, products suited to the complex and instable Somali context (World Bank, 2017).

While mobile money services are broadening the reach of financial services for the unbanked, the most vulnerable are more likely to be excluded from the system (difficulty to access cellular coverage, electrical power, cost of phone ownership and use, illiteracy and predominance of mobile money services offered in USD rather than the local Shilling). Nevertheless, there is strong evidence of a social impact. Mobile money circulates across groups of different vulnerability levels, enables more fluidity within the family and clan, and constitutes a lifeline for the poor (World Bank, 2017).

Mobile money in Somalia offers significant opportunities but also comes with substantial risks that any operator and agency working with cash should take into account. The system lacks formal Know-Your-Customer requirements on customer identity², as well as formal parity between e-Money and cash in banks. Further developments will require reliable regulatory support from the government, as

¹ A multi-year effort by seven leading NGOs to tackle the challenge of recurrent droughts among pastoralists, agro pastoralists, and peri-urban households across Somalia.

² Know your customer (KYC) is the process of a business identifying and verifying the identity of its clients. One of the objectives of KYC guidelines is to prevent banks from being used, intentionally and unintentionally, by criminal elements for money laundering activities.

well as private sector adherence to financial and consumer security requirements. This could then help the industry gain more trust from the International community (World Bank, 2017).

The unconditional cash and voucher response, though largely implemented after the peak of the crisis, quickly achieved an impressive scale. The evidence suggests that cash and vouchers made a quantifiable difference in reducing hunger and improving food security, enabling a more rapid recovery than would have been possible without assistance. **Contrary to initial concerns, cash transfers at scale did not result in food price inflation to the detriment of the most vulnerable.** Rather they ensured access to critical food and non-food items and services. (UNICEF, 2013)

Given the Somali aid environment, corruption and diversion were an acknowledged (and accepted) risk. **Unsurprisingly, the evaluation raises issues of misuse of funds.** Evidence suggests that these were less serious than comparable in-kind interventions, but still could have been countered through **better risk analysis and preparedness** and were not sufficiently identified by the monitoring systems. Future emphasis should be on **prevention**; sharing lessons learned about diversion, effective M&E, and how best to conduct the rigorous investigation that must follow allegations of abuse. (UNICEF, 2013)

Cash/voucher & Resilience: Significantly, during the current cash and voucher intervention, households had higher and more regular income and so were able to reduce household debt as well as access new credit for household and livelihood assets. Over the course of the intervention, households began spending less on food and more on debt repayment and non-food items (including business investments, school and medical fees) while dietary diversity continued to improve (especially in urban, agricultural and agro-pastoral livelihood zones and within female-headed households). Furthermore, the social status and participation of beneficiaries in community affairs was significantly enhanced. It is apparent from the Somalia experience that **cash transfer has the versatility to shift from a lifesaving response to a modality that supports livelihood recovery** and enhances resilience, determined principally by the household receiving those resources. (UNICEF, 2013)

Main recommendations:

To allow a sustainable growth of the mobile banking services, agencies should be aware of the risks and support the implementation of the following policies:

- “Establishing parity between online and offline credit for mobile payments;
- Developing trusted “Know-Your-Customer” systems;
- Ensuring interconnection of mobile payments between Mobile Network Operators;
- Passing the Communications Act to license Mobile Network Operators;
- Enabling Shilling-based mobile money transactions (alongside US\$-based payments)” (World Bank, 2017).

Retargeting should be undertaken (in both urban and rural contexts) no more than six months after a cash and voucher intervention has become operational, particularly when food security conditions change considerably, but also as a risk mitigation strategy. Where beneficiaries are not retargeted – because a more than six month cash transfer is meant to achieve livelihoods-related objectives – ensure that M&E systems can measure livelihoods impacts and that targeting criteria reflect objectives. (UNICEF, 2013)

Continue to experiment and innovate with M&E and investigative methods that produce results about sensitive topics such as diversion, fraud and targeting errors. This is not limited to cash and vouchers, and should involve M&E experts that use conventional and unconventional means of collecting information. (UNICEF, 2013)

While it is clear that cases of misuse of funds will need to be handled on a case by case basis, establish minimum standards vis-à-vis risk assessment, mitigation, monitoring, investigation, reporting, and transparency. Work collectively with field staff of NGOs and the UN to reduce tolerance for diversion, including that which results from targeting errors. Investigate the real obstacles to greater transparency and communication between field staff and headquarters, agencies and donors. Consider transparency and accountability in the decision making process when deciding the need for repercussions. This demands ongoing reflection on what shared risk means in the Somali aid environment. (UNICEF, 2013)

Capacity building

Historically, the nature of humanitarian interventions in Somalia was largely focused on direct service delivery and generally low field staff capacity in community development techniques (SomReP, 2016).

In situations of fragility where State institutions are weak or absent, opportunities for policy alignment were being capitalized on through NGO-led models. The entry point for EU support to resilience-building has been through NGO-led resilience consortia. However, they have themselves increasingly recognized the importance of working with the nascent federal and decentralized Governments and show evidence of strategic alignment on resilience programming. (EU, 2017)

Building local civil society and governance capacity is lagging behind and one of SomReP's greatest challenges currently. A rethink is required to ensure that sufficient technical skill is available in the field to support longer term civil society development. **Key to this could be the role of district and regional government and the option to engage them as longer-term capacity building agents in communities.** This approach is showing promising results in Eyl, where *Action Contre la Faim* is working closely with the Puntland Ministries of Agriculture, Livestock, and Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency to deliver project services in partnership. (SomReP, 2016)

Both the Assessment of Development Results (ADR) and previous evaluations have found that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) contribution to strengthening national capacities has been less than expected. New joint initiatives aimed at broad capacity development in the public sector should recognize past failures and undertake analysis of context-specific constraints and opportunities (UNDP, 2016).

Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) has highly regarded capacity development strategy and capacity needs assessments guided a number of important capacity development interventions. The evaluation team found that some initial capacity for conducting food security assessments (primarily in terms of data collection) was developed within the targeted ministries, and that inter-ministry coordination and communication has improved. It is critical to continue strengthening the capacity development measures in the upcoming phase, in order to create Somali ownership of the process. (FAO, 2017)

Main Recommendations

There is a need to review the country programme's current approach to capacity development and to develop a conceptual framework for more effective and sustainable capacity development across the board :

- Focusing capacity development towards core government functions;
- Focusing capacity development support on the internal capacities of supporting institutions; and
- Stimulating consistency in the approach to capacity development throughout the country programme. (UNDP, 2016)

For the next phase of the FSNAU, the focus should be on higher level of involvement and capacitation of the Somali government in the data analysis process. Furthermore, the communication to donors on progress on and achievements made on capacity development should be strengthened. (FAO, 2017)

Gender

Among DFID, NGOs and UN organisations, cross-cutting issues did not have the same level of coherence and consistency. Gender equality, while addressed in most project designs, did not include a clear, common definition. Nor was there consistent use of the Gender Marker or other common tools. (DFID, 2015)

Attention to gender within FAO was increasing and there was growing recognition of the changing social and economic roles of women in the country. However, the implications of these changing roles for the FAO's resilience programme remained unclear. A number of positive steps and initiatives were taking place to advance a gender analysis and perspective in the programme (FAO's resilience programme, 2015).

FSNAU has taken important and commendable initiatives with regard to gender, including employment of a gender specialist, preparation of the Standard Operating Procedures for Integrating Gender into FAO Somalia Programmes, and considerable training of FSNAU staff in Nairobi and Somalia. There remained, however, a need to mainstream gender into the project design and to disaggregate gender in data collection and analysis. (FAO, 2017)

Main Recommendations


Partners should develop a common definition and possible approaches for how they address gender equality. This definition should be common to both UN and NGOs. (DFID, 2015)

“UNDP should prioritize substantive gender mainstreaming in the next country programme, focusing on the following:

- Mainstreaming gender equality and women's empowerment into the next country programme;
- Continued delivery of specific initiatives to advance gender equality and women's empowerment, including on women's political participation, the gender dimension of the NDP and Sustainable Development Goal 5;
- Building and strengthening strategic partnerships to increase the impact of effort towards gender equality and women's empowerment, as recommended by the ADR;
- Improving gender-responsive planning, monitoring, reporting and evaluation.” (UNDP, 2016)

Under the FSNAU project, the design and formulation of the coming phase should be based on a gender analysis, and gender should be integrated at the objective, results and indicator levels; data should be further sex-disaggregated and data analysis should include gender to a greater extent; and a gender baseline should be conducted if funding permits. (FAO, 2017)

TIMELINE SOMALIA



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