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SUMMARY REPORT OF THE EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN EMERGENCY OPERATION

**Food Assistance to Populations Affected by
War and Drought (EMOPs 10048.0/1/2)**

NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted for consideration to the Executive Board.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WFP's emergency operation in the Sudan has been central to humanitarian efforts and its interventions have been critical in helping to saving lives. This is widely recognized by donors, humanitarian agencies and beneficiaries. WFP staff and partners have distributed food in difficult and often hazardous conditions over sustained periods.

This emergency operation aimed at reducing global acute malnutrition to below the 2002 national average of 18 percent, but the 2002–2003 annual needs assessment reported an overall global acute malnutrition rate of 21 percent, with some areas reporting much higher rates. High malnutrition has persisted for many years and unless a more holistic approach is developed, with greater participation by partners, there is little reason to believe that the situation in the Sudan will improve.

The emergency operation was resourced to an average of 70.4 percent for the three phases under review, as of March 2004. There was considerable under-delivery against plans and the timing of deliveries was not always optimal. Such factors as post-delivery redistributions and distance decay, in which distribution points were far from recipients' homes, reduced quantities received by some of the intended recipients.

WFP should be more involved in collecting and analyzing nutrition information, particularly in areas of chronic food insecurity. WFP should also enhance its field-level nutritional expertise in large emergency operations, to improve its ability to measure results and realize primary objectives.

Distribution and post-distribution monitoring are relatively strong, given that WFP staff members conduct many of the distributions.


WFP has a strong logistics operation in the Sudan, particularly in air transport, with national reach and extensive coverage. The major constraints to moving food are limited road and railway capacity and restricted humanitarian access. In addition to ongoing infrastructure-development work by the Government of Sudan, WFP has addressed infrastructure problems in the Sudan through special operations, including those for road repairs and mine clearing.

Internal transport costs are high, but with a transport system stretched to its limit and persistent insecurity in some areas, WFP has little leverage to contain costs. There is a need to improve the food-tracking system.

The expectations of donor and humanitarian communities regarding the transition to developmental activities have risen in recent years. This has been positive, but there needs to be a realistic assessment of both ongoing relief needs and the potential to implement recovery and rehabilitation activities using food aid. Relief food distributions can help to free recipients from worries about day-to-day food supplies, so that they can choose their own rehabilitation activities without the need for food-for-assets mechanisms.



DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of the information and recommendations set out in the “Summary Report of the Evaluation of the Sudan Emergency Operation” (WFP/EB.3/2004/6-E).

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.



EVALUATION SCOPE AND METHOD

1. The evaluation of WFP's emergency operation (EMOP) in the Sudan was carried out between January and March 2004.¹ The objectives were to:
 - assess achievement of the operation's objectives and make recommendations for the design of a future phase;
 - identify lessons from the Sudan for other EMOPs; and
 - provide accountability to the WFP Executive Board.
2. The evaluation addressed three phases of the EMOP covering the period April 2001 to March 2004.² The team examined implementation in what are referred to by WFP and other Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) agencies as the northern and southern sectors of Sudan.³ The complexity of the evaluation and time constraints necessitated a focus on WFP's operational performance instead of its role within OLS. The evaluation team emphasized logistics and nutrition, given their significance in this EMOP.⁴ The current crisis in the Darfur region is not covered because the evaluation team was not authorized to visit the region and WFP's response has been made the focus of a separate EMOP.

SUDAN EMOP 10048 AND EXPANSIONS

3. The main cause of food insecurity in the southern sector is the conflict between the Government and Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) that commenced in 1983. Its effects range from population displacement to decades of stunted development and impoverishment of millions in the south.
4. Conflict involving other parties has also affected parts of eastern and western Sudan, most notably Kassala State and the Darfur region, where fighting has disrupted cultivation.
5. Recurrent drought and periodic flooding also underlie food insecurity. During the period of the EMOP, drought in northern Sudan and some parts of the south depleted productive assets, natural resources and stocks.
6. Relative peace since 2002, and the peace negotiations between the Government and SPLM/A, have created expectations of a transition from relief to recovery and reconstruction in the donor and humanitarian communities. This transition is an opportunity to move away from relief, but relief needs will remain, along with challenges in utilizing food assistance to support recovery and rehabilitation.

¹ The evaluation team consisted of three international consultants, including the team leader, two local consultants and two WFP staff members from the Office of Evaluation.

² EMOPs 10048.0, 10048.1 and 10048.2. The third phase has been extended through 2004 but the cut-off point for this evaluation is 31 March 2004.

³ In this report, the northern sector refers to areas that are controlled by the Government of Sudan, which WFP manages from Khartoum. The southern sector refers to areas that are controlled by the SPLM/A, which WFP manages from Nairobi/Lokichoggio.

⁴ The evaluation team also drew on the findings and of a Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/WFP technical review of the southern sector, undertaken in 2003.



WFP's Operating Environment

7. The unique characteristics of the operation, and its constraints, must be acknowledged when assessing accomplishments and weaknesses. OLS was the first negotiated access model. As expected in a civil war, securing and maintaining access has been a major concern for WFP, which uses 350 drop sites and airstrips in the Sudan. In 2002, there were a record number of flight denials.
8. Significant constraints face WFP's operations in the Sudan, particularly in the southern sector. Sudan's transport infrastructure is poor and relief operations are obstructed in the rainy season, when many roads become impassable and airstrips unusable. Access denials from authorities, security problems, staff evacuations and attacks have also hindered WFP's ability to reach beneficiaries and monitor programmes. Insecurity dictates WFP's mode of operation, such as air drops in the southern sector where distribution teams can only spend up to three days on site. This needs to be borne in mind when considering the effectiveness of final distribution. Neither the Government nor SPLM/A has a satisfactory humanitarian response strategy and the capacity of civil authorities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is limited, particularly in the southern sector.
9. Operation management is complicated by the need to operate separate northern and southern sectors in a country divided by war. It has been hard to attract staff; the number of vacant posts is high and staff rotation is frequent at senior levels. Stress levels are also high.

EMOP Objectives and Targets

10. The main objectives of the third phase of the EMOP are to:
 - contribute to saving lives by improving the nutritional status of target persons, with specific emphasis on women;
 - contribute to the prevention of distress migration of the food-insecure population by supporting the peace-building process and the resettlement of returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); and
 - contribute to the recovery and rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure through asset creation.
11. For the latest phase of the EMOP, 90 percent of food requirements were to be met through general food distributions to vulnerable groups and IDPs. A target of 10 percent was set for other modalities, including 3 percent for supplementary feeding, 2.5 percent for food for work, 2.5 percent for food for training and 2 percent for emergency school feeding (ESF). Of beneficiaries for the latest phase, 73 percent were targeted because of conflict while the remainder was targeted because of drought and acute food insecurity.
12. As may be expected for a protracted EMOP, emphasis is on general distributions to vulnerable groups and IDPs. Recovery and peace-related objectives with modest targets were included.
13. Converting the EMOP to a protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) requires rigorous strategic planning and a longer timeframe. Although WFP's guidelines emphasize the development of a recovery strategy, strategists should bear in mind that PRROs combine relief and recovery elements. The planning process should build on the development of local strategies.



Recommendation⁵

- Relief and recovery strategies should be developed for the conversion of an EMOP to a PRRO, starting with locally-determined strategies and targets based on realistic assessments of how to meet immediate relief needs and protect and strengthen livelihoods. Donors may be invited to participate in the assessment process. (2.31)

THE PERFORMANCE OF THE EMOP

Saving Lives

14. It is widely recognized by beneficiaries, local authorities and the humanitarian community that WFP's interventions have been critical in saving lives. It is difficult, however, to estimate the contribution made by general and selective feeding programmes because it is unclear how much WFP food assistance reaches beneficiary households, or how it is utilized. There is no baseline or trend data on mortality, morbidity and malnutrition; many factors come into play and WFP's food aid contribution is difficult to isolate.
15. WFP could more easily demonstrate its successes if they were better documented. Monthly reports indicate situations in which WFP assisted vulnerable populations and contributed to saving lives, such as in western Upper Nile in 2001–2002, where flight denials had previously prevented access. But there is no systematic recording or analysis so the evaluation team had to rely on anecdotal accounts.

Recommendations

- With support from the East and Central Africa Regional Bureau (ODK) and Headquarters, the country offices should document best practices where the provision of food aid may have contributed to saving lives in the Sudan. (6.9)
- In the context of rolling out results-based management (RBM) principles and reporting requirements to the field, Headquarters should review the current corporate Strategic Priority 1 and the feasibility of measuring the objective of saving lives in conflict situations, as well as attributing this measurement to WFP food aid. (6.10)

Improving Nutritional Status

16. The objective of contributing to saving lives is to be effected by “improving and/or maintaining the nutritional status of target persons with specific emphasis on women”. The main indicator is the reduction of global acute malnutrition (GAM) to below the national average of 18 percent, or maintenance below this rate where it is less than 18 percent. In accordance with WFP corporate standards, it may be more appropriate to have set a target

⁵ The bracketed number following the recommendation refers to the paragraph number in the full evaluation report. This summary report contains only the most important recommendations of wide corporate interest. Readers are referred to the full evaluation report for additional recommendations made by the mission. Executive Board document word limits do not allow all recommendations to be included in the summary report and attached tracking matrix.



of reducing GAM to below 15 percent. This standard was actually used in the southern sector and is referred to in the 2003–2004 annual needs assessment (ANA) as the critical threshold.⁶ This is not entirely within WFP's control, however, given the role of non-food factors in nutrition.⁷

17. In areas where nutrition data were collected for long enough to demonstrate trends, malnutrition rates persisted at levels well over the critical threshold of 15 percent. While evidence suggests that WFP has been able to improve nutrition in some locations, GAM rates cannot be reduced unless an effort is made with implementing partners (IPs) and others to develop a comprehensive approach to tackling malnutrition.
18. In areas of WFP assistance with high GAM, such as in the Red Sea State and Kassala, WFP should not conclude that malnutrition is unresponsive to food aid. There is not enough evidence that WFP's assistance has met assessed needs and insufficient information on the other factors contributing to malnutrition. Decreasing food aid in areas of chronic food insecurity and persistent malnutrition may result in worsening malnutrition. Instead, WFP should forcefully advocate for a multi-sector approach.
19. There are inadequate nutrition data and insufficient analysis of the role of food needs in malnutrition to guide programming in Sudan, or to monitor trends. Regular, systematic nutritional surveillance, or a combination of surveillance and periodic surveys, needs to be established. This depends on adequate security conditions; which are not currently in place in southern Sudan.
20. WFP must be more involved in the collection and analysis of nutrition data and information. This includes analyzing the causality of malnutrition that is unresponsive to food relief in areas with chronic food insecurity. WFP's global memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) assigns UNICEF the lead, but its terms related to nutrition are not being implemented. Critical situations will continue to arise where neither UNICEF nor an NGO can conduct a survey or provide adequate analysis. WFP should be able to fill these gaps and this will require both short-term and long-term solutions.
21. Additional technical expertise in the field of nutrition is needed to: (i) manage nutrition information; (ii) provide guidance to sub-offices on nutrition and selective feeding programmes; (iii) build the capacity of WFP and IP staff in nutrition; and (iv) monitor WFP's progress towards meeting its primary nutrition objective. WFP should strengthen its corporate expertise and role in nutrition surveillance and analysis.

⁶ The February 2004 FAO/WFP joint assessment report states that "Malnutrition rates have somewhat declined from high levels (>20 percent) experienced in 2002, but they remain above the 15 percent critical threshold level. Compared with 2002, the overall wasting rate (acute malnutrition) declined from 24 to 21 percent". The report qualifies the nutritional outlook as follows: "The nutritional situation is becoming chronic rather than seasonal in most areas, because of other unmet needs. This report therefore urges caution concerning expectations of any immediate dramatic improvements in nutrition status following a better overall food supply situation in the country".

⁷ In nutrition-in-emergencies texts, including World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines, GAM above 10 percent is a serious nutritional crisis. In the WFP Food and Nutrition Handbook, the figure of 15 percent is used.



Recommendations

- The target for future Sudan EMOPs and PRROs should be reduction of high malnutrition rates to below 15 percent GAM, or maintained where they are less than 15 percent. Given the need for a holistic approach, WFP should advocate that the next United Nations Humanitarian Consolidated Appeal develop an inter-agency/government strategy for achieving this target. (2.30)
- WFP should gather qualitative information on the causes of malnutrition in areas with chronic food insecurity and persistently high levels of acute malnutrition, security conditions permitting. (3.53)
- WFP staff training plans should include training in basic nutrition concepts. (3.36)
- An annual work plan for nutrition surveys should be developed together with UNICEF and IPs to obtain their commitment. (3.34)
- Each EMOP or PRRO should consider nutrition surveillance needs and reaffirm arrangements with UNICEF. In situations where neither UNICEF nor an NGO can provide data and analysis, WFP should include a budget for this. (3.37)
- WFP should strengthen its expertise and role in nutrition surveillance. (3.38)

22. The issue of programming food aid arose in relation to the abrupt but temporary break in assistance in January 2004 for some long-staying IDPs in the northern sector. WFP did not put any additional monitoring in place to determine whether the break negatively impacted the IDP population, including women who bear the main burden of coping. Although the three-month cessation in the provision of rations to some IDPs may have been appropriate because they were assumed to be self-sufficient, WFP made inadequate preparations for this transition.

Recommendation

- WFP should ensure that checks are in place before stopping the provision of food assistance to encamped IDPs, including additional monitoring and a means of responding to the needs of the most vulnerable. (3.56)

23. WFP provides fortified oil to address vitamin A deficiency, iodized salt for iodine deficiency and corn-soya blend (CSB) for micronutrient deficiencies, but does not closely monitor their provision or consumption. Little is known about the use of these food commodities in households. Although WFP food aid is aimed at alleviating micronutrient malnutrition, outcomes are unknown.

24. Modification tables were developed in the Sudan to provide guidance on short-term substitutions for missing food basket commodities. Reports suggest that cereals were often increased to make up the total planned kcal. Long-term shortages of other food-basket commodities would have reduced the beneficiaries' intake of required macro and micronutrients however, contributing to the high levels of malnutrition.⁸

⁸ A better-resourced pipeline, with a correct balance of commodities, would avoid these problems. Donors are to be encouraged to provide resources, including cash for more flexible regional or local purchases of micronutrient-fortified commodities.



Recommendations

- Corporate guidelines should be developed in case of shortfalls in micronutrient-rich food commodities. (4.43)
- WFP staff and beneficiaries should be given information on the importance of micronutrients, micronutrient malnutrition, and guidelines for enhancing micronutrient status. (4.44)

Recovery and Rehabilitation

25. Although recovery and peace-related objectives were included in the operation, with modest targets for food for work (FFW), food for training (FFT) and emergency school feeding (ESF), the approval documents did not connect the planned activities to the achievement of the recovery objectives. This reflects inadequate application of corporate guidance.
26. FFW and FFT activities have been difficult to initiate and scaling up ESF has been constrained. Although concrete outputs have been achieved, targets have not been met. Setting global targets, while necessary as a guide, ignores the local situation; activities move ahead despite inadequate staff, implementing partner capacity and technical expertise.
27. ESF is viewed as successful by partners and local authorities, especially in southern Sudan where education is a high priority. Areas of improvement include: the timely delivery of commodities; better coordination and collaboration with UNICEF; and effective monitoring. Field staff noted that the pace of introducing ESF may exceed the capacity of schools to provide for an increased number of students.
28. Among the donor and humanitarian communities, expectations of the transition to developmental activities have risen in recent years. While this is positive, the move away from relief is propelled by this expectation instead of a fair assessment of ongoing relief needs. There are challenges to effectively using food aid to support recovery and rehabilitation, particularly given that WFP's principle modality is FFW. They include geographic coverage, targeting, timing and capacity. WFP managers need to provide more guidance and counsel caution and realism, without dampening enthusiasm for a shift from relief to recovery.



Recommendations

- UNICEF and WFP should carry out a mapping exercise to determine common areas of ESF operation and establish joint programming in these areas. (7.32)
- WFP should focus on a few crucial recovery activities in Sudan rather than develop a diverse portfolio that may be difficult to manage. (7.41)
- In areas where it is not feasible to undertake food-for-assets projects, no new projects should be approved. Staff and partners should focus on improving targeting and monitoring of general distributions and preparing relief and recovery strategies. (7.42)
- Country offices should review the concept of food-for-recovery that appears in the 2004 Sudan strategy paper to ensure that it meets necessary standards. Headquarters should also review the concept as it appears in the WFP *Programme Design Manual* (PDM). (7.43)

PROGRAMME THEMES

Needs Assessments

29. Along with crop and food supply assessment missions, the ANA exercise in the Sudan has been the most extensive source of information on food security. The tonnages included in the EMOP reflect ANA recommendations, adjusted after consideration by WFP. Some donors and partners rely on this information. But despite the time and energy that WFP has put into strengthening the process, donors are not always convinced by ANA recommendations. This was most notable in 2003.⁹
30. Over the past two years, limitations in the ANA process have been addressed and efforts have been made to improve the methodology.¹⁰ Training has been conducted for NGOs and counterparts that participate in the regional assessments that underpin the ANA, which has contributed to local capacity-building. While the regional assessment stage of the process is participatory however, some field staff and partners feel they were inadequately consulted about final programming decisions.
31. The ANA is valuable and valued, but has limitations to be addressed by WFP. The ANA should evolve into a lighter, more iterative process, but a unified model has yet to be agreed upon. Ideas circulating in WFP in Sudan for several years should finally be formalized.

⁹ According to a response to the draft evaluation report from the WFP southern-sector staff, Nairobi-based donors believe that the southern sector ANA may underestimate needs.

¹⁰ At the corporate level, WFP has made considerable efforts to improve needs assessment, especially the methodologies used. An Emergency Needs Assessment Unit (OEN) was established in 2003.



Recommendations

- Based on WFP's extensive experience with large-scale needs assessments in Sudan, Headquarters should document lessons learned in assessing food needs in a chronic, complex emergency. (3.14)
- To address credibility and ensure that the participatory approach is followed, WFP should develop a communications strategy for needs assessments. (3.17)

Targeting

32. Although 66 percent of planned distributions in 2001–2003 were delivered to the final distribution points, the proportion of commodities reaching beneficiaries is unclear. In addition to access, targeting has been an issue in Sudan and many exercises have been undertaken to improve it. Redistribution by sharing on the basis of kinship is widespread, however. There seems to be no viable alternative to working directly with customary distribution systems. This is a challenging approach, requiring analytical and proactive staff to build on the strengths of customary distribution systems and address their weaknesses, such as women's weak role in decision-making.
33. There has been some taxation of resources, further reducing the quantities available to beneficiaries. This has been organized by local authorities in the southern sector through traditional structures.¹¹
34. Given the reductions in distributed commodities because of under delivery, timing problems and the effects of redistribution, senior managers need to consider that the hungry poor in Sudan sometimes do not receive enough food to make a significant nutritional impact.
35. The evaluation team believes that WFP must make improving the effectiveness of final distribution a high priority, according to WFP's core mandate.

¹¹ The 2003 FAO/WFP technical review of the southern sector operations concluded that food rations were shared among members of a clan, but the reduction of hostilities had lessened the burden on households to share food with the wider community.



Recommendations

- WFP should decentralize responsibility for distributions to the lowest possible administrative level so that the community can impose greater accountability on leaders. (5.13)
- Field staff should be aware that WFP accepts positive customary practices; staff should be trained to negotiate mutually satisfactory distribution arrangements. (5.14)
- An analysis of socio-political structures, community dynamics and power relations should be commissioned to determine the risks of people being discriminated against in food relief distribution. (5.15)

Resources and Logistics

36. WFP has a strong logistics operation, particularly in air transport, with national reach and extensive coverage. WFP logistics have long provided the backbone to OLS. WFP recognizes the need to improve overland transport corridors to move commodities, and funds for this have finally been received.
37. There have been annual increases in commodity requirements, however this EMOP has been resourced to an average of only 70.4 percent over its three phases.¹² This is below the global average for EMOPs in the three-year period under review. The timing of commitments has also been a problem, resulting in shipments reaching Port Sudan and Mombasa during the second part of the year. It has been possible to mitigate these difficulties by using carry-over stocks and borrowing from other projects.
38. Another issue is pipeline flow. The relatively large stocks in the northern sector in December 2002, and between December 2003 and February 2004, indicate congestion that is only partly explained by normal build-up. The main constraint has been limited road and air off-take capacity from northern sector WFP hubs. A further increase of food aid into the northern sector will require additions to transport facilities such as planes, trucks and barges.
39. Commodity tracking remains problematic. The Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System (COMPAS) is invaluable for capturing pipeline information. The four COMPAS desks in the Sudan operate as stand-alone systems, however, making it difficult to monitor the whole pipeline. In addition, WFP logistics and programme staff use separate, incompatible systems to monitor the flow of commodities to beneficiaries. This information must be combined in order to present an intelligible overview to senior managers. Country staff recognizes that a programming database should be linked with COMPAS. While the database has been created, there has been no progress in making the link. WFP operations in other countries face the same challenge.

¹² This was the percentage of resources received for the three phases as of February–March 2004. With subsequent budget revisions to the ongoing phase, the coverage for the three phases dropped to 66.9 percent as of August 2004. WFP's global emergency operations were funded at 85 percent in 2001 and 76 percent in 2002, according to the WFP annual reports for these years.



Recommendations

- A pipeline officer should be appointed immediately. Logistics should remain under control of the senior logistics officers for the northern and southern corridors. (4.21)
- Full COMPAS connectivity between Khartoum, Mombasa, Nairobi, Kampala and Lokichoggio should be implemented. (10.18)
- Headquarters should determine a way to reconcile pipeline logistics information with programme information at the country office level. (10.20)

Gender

40. WFP has been a leader and an advocate for women within the Sudan EMOP, a role recognized by its partners. Both in the northern and southern sectors, WFP has made progress towards institutionalizing the Enhanced Commitments to Women (ECW). Oversight procedures are in place, such as focal points and task forces. Formats for contractual agreements with partners have been modified to reflect the ECW. Close attention is paid to gender in the ANA. At WFP's insistence, women are represented on relief committees.
41. The staff responsible for gender in both the northern and southern sectors agree that management must shift its focus toward monitoring the implementation of the ECW. This includes ensuring that WFP staff and IPs monitor and submit reliable information on achieving gender targets.

Recommendations

- Country office management should ensure that management and appraisal of performance (MAP)/Performance and Competency Enhancement Programme (PACE) for gender focal points and all staff reflect individual responsibility for implementing the ECW; ECW-related responsibilities should be reviewed when staff performance is assessed. (8.6)
- Gender training should be increasingly mainstreamed into other types of training. (8.8)

Monitoring and Evaluation

42. Monitoring at the output and outcome levels remains an institutional weakness, which is a reflection of practical difficulties and the low priority given to performance information. There is limited performance monitoring at the outcome level, both in relation to relief and recovery activities. One problem is that WFP does not play a direct role in collecting information relevant to its major indicator, trends in malnutrition.
43. The Khartoum country office has recently taken steps to improve monitoring by creating a dedicated unit in 2003 and has prioritized setting up a comprehensive database. In the southern sector, frequent fighting, the unpredictable nature of access and a limited field presence have made a comprehensive monitoring system difficult to implement. Distribution and post-distribution monitoring are relatively strong because WFP staff members conduct many distributions, but monitoring reports appear to be under-utilized by



managers. The difference between reporting formats in the northern and southern sectors is a hindrance to country-level reporting.

44. Headquarters has not yet introduced a corporate management report for country offices, leaving a gap in the monitoring cycle. Presently, the only tool is the standard project report (SPR), which was designed primarily as an annual donor report. The SPR is not suited to evaluating operational performance and does not fully cover management needs.

Recommendation

- Headquarters should introduce a standard country office reporting format to help managers make informed programme decisions. Sudan should be a pilot user, given the size and complexity of its operation. (10.11)

Management Issues

45. The management structure for the EMOP is divided between two country offices; WFP has had no choice but to operate two systems in tandem. Coordination should be improved between the two sectors, with more leadership provided at senior levels to build a sense of common purpose.¹³ Given the current peace initiatives, WFP could now review its operational management structure in the Sudan.
46. With the shift toward recovery activities over the past year, some staff require different skills sets to assess, plan and monitor recovery-oriented activities. In preparing a PRRO strategy, WFP should review the staffing structure and profiles in both the northern and southern sectors.
47. The direct support cost (DSC) budget is split between the northern sector at 51 percent and the southern sector at 49 percent. There is concern about whether this allocation ensures adequate programme support funds for both sectors. Considering that 75 percent of the commodities are routed via the northern corridor and 60 percent of food aid is distributed in Government-controlled areas, management may need to review the DSC allocation.¹⁴

Recommendations

- WFP should review the management structure of its operations in the Sudan. (10.27)
- Headquarters should lead a human resources review to ensure that the structure, number and profile of posts are suitable for implementing a recovery-oriented operation. (10.46)
- WFP should review the partition of DSC between the two sectors, including the food aid that is routed through and distributed to beneficiaries in each sector. (10.44)

¹³ Current support provided by Headquarters and the regional bureau should be acknowledged, including support for programme development, logistics, pipeline management, procurement, information and communications technology (ICT), human resources and resource mobilization.

¹⁴ The DSC budget is based on need, not on tonnage. Logistics in southern Sudan, where there are hardly any roads and existing roads need rehabilitation, are more complicated and costly than in the northern sector. DSC budget allocations should consider this.



ANNEX: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY — SUDAN EMERGENCY OPERATIONS		
Recommendations* (March 2004)	Action by	Management response and action taken (July 2004)
Relief and recovery strategies should be developed for the conversion of an EMOP to a PRRO, starting with locally-determined strategies and targets based on realistic assessments of how to meet immediate relief needs and protect and strengthen livelihoods. Donors may be invited to participate in the assessment process. (2.31)	ODK in consultation with the two country offices.	In addition to the annual joint WFP/FAO crop and food supply assessment mission in October/November, WFP will support and work within the inter-agency humanitarian framework to address humanitarian needs in a transition phase. In preparing the next phase, it is essential that food aid is fully complemented with non-food assistance, with full donor support. The regional bureau, with assistance from Headquarters if needed, will support the WFP country office team. A database on NGOs to facilitate partnerships has been created. A draft field manual is under review and will guide the new transition processes. The VAM technical support unit is being restructured and strengthened to widen its scope of work to include livelihoods analysis, policy advice, capacity-building and technical support.
With support from the East and Central Africa Regional Bureau (ODK) and Headquarters, the country offices should document best practices where the provision of food aid may have contributed to saving lives in the Sudan. (6.9)	ODK in consultation with the two country offices.	Best practices will be documented with guidance from ODK and Strategy Policy and Programme Support Division Rome. The complex nature of the EMOP and insecurity place constraints on collecting reliable baseline and survey information, however, particularly for mortality and nutrition. WFP is concerned about protection issues and hopes to improve documentation of humanitarian impact, including continuing to report on denials of access to conflict-affected civilians.
In the context of rolling out RBM principles and reporting requirements to the field, Headquarters should review the current corporate Strategic Priority 1 and the feasibility of measuring the objective of saving lives in conflict situations, as well as attributing this measurement to WFP food aid. (6.10)	Headquarters/OEDP	WFP's Long-Term Vision Project is examining all the Strategic Priorities (SPs), including SP1, in the context of a participatory planning exercise that will eventually lead to refined vision statements, measurement indicators and tools. OEDP circulated an Indicator Compendium for all SPs in May 2004, outlining output and outcome indicators, detailing purpose, frequency, measurement tools, methods of measurement, responsible offices, providers and interpretation. For the outcome indicators on mortality and malnutrition, further detailed guidance is being developed jointly by PSPP, Nutrition Service (PSPN), OD and OEDP, as some methods are still being piloted.

* The following are abbreviated recommendations. For the full recommendation, see the relevant paragraph in the full report (paragraph number in brackets)



ANNEX: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY — SUDAN EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

Recommendations* (March 2004)	Action by	Management response and action taken (July 2004)
<p>The target for future Sudan EMOPs and PRROs should be reduction of high malnutrition rates to below 15 percent GAM, or maintained where they are less than 15 percent. Given the need for a holistic approach, WFP should advocate that the next United Nations Humanitarian Consolidated Appeal develop an inter-agency/government strategy for achieving this target. (2.30)</p>	<p>ODK in consultation with the two country offices.</p>	<p>Determination of the primary nutrition target will be based on discussions with all stakeholders and definition of complementary activities that will enable the realistic attainment of the target. Difficulties faced in obtaining timely and adequate resources for the operation have to be recognized, as they will impact on the target.</p>
<p>WFP should gather qualitative information on the causes of malnutrition in areas with chronic food insecurity and persistently high levels of acute malnutrition, security conditions permitting. (3.53)</p>	<p>ODK in consultation with the two country offices.</p>	<p>To the extent that security conditions and the capacity of field staff and of partners allow, WFP will gather all possible information on beneficiary nutrition levels, including causality of malnutrition where feasible, in close cooperation with the United Nations agencies concerned and NGOs.</p>
<p>WFP staff training plans should include training in basic nutrition concepts. (3.36)</p>	<p>Headquarters PSPN, in consultation with ODK and HRC.</p>	<p>PSPN has been undertaking food and nutrition workshops globally since 2000. Some of the WFP staff from the Sudan have participated in the regional training. A training with UNICEF is planned for the Sudan in 2004.</p>
<p>An annual work plan for nutrition surveys should be developed together with UNICEF and IPs to obtain their commitment. (3.34)</p>	<p>ODK in consultation with the two country offices.</p>	<p>Agreed. This will be done.</p>
<p>Each EMOP or PRRO should consider nutrition surveillance needs and reaffirm arrangements with UNICEF. In situations where neither UNICEF nor an NGO can provide data and analysis, WFP should include a budget for this. (3.37)</p>	<p>Headquarters PSPN in consultation with ODK.</p>	<p>A high-level meeting of the UNICEF and WFP Executive Directors has taken place and a revision of the MOU between the two agencies is being undertaken, to clarify roles and responsibilities. Plans are underway to develop a nutrition surveillance system for the Sudan.</p>



ANNEX: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY — SUDAN EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

Recommendations* (March 2004)	Action by	Management response and action taken (July 2004)
WFP should strengthen its expertise and role in nutrition surveillance. (3.38)	Headquarters PSPN	Current initiatives include three policy papers on nutrition, which have recently been endorsed by the Board, and strengthening of WFP's capacity in nutrition assessment through an enhanced training programme, with the involvement of the Centres of Disease Control (CDC). WFP is also a member of the United Nations Standing Committee on Nutrition (SCN). PSPN agrees that WFP should seek to ensure that adequate nutrition expertise is assigned to the field in major EMOPs so that nutrition surveillance is improved.
WFP should ensure that checks are in place before stopping the provision of food assistance to encamped IDPs, including additional monitoring and a means of responding to the needs of the most vulnerable. (3.56)	ODK in consultation with the two country offices.	WFP seeks to ensure that the most vulnerable beneficiaries are protected when food assistance is curtailed; the regional bureau will work with the two country offices to develop safety nets in such circumstances. Political interference is a factor that needs to be recognized in some situations, however.
Corporate guidelines should be developed in case of shortfalls in micronutrient-rich food commodities. (4.43)	Headquarters/PSPN	A policy paper on micronutrient fortification was recently endorsed by the Board. Operational guidelines will be disseminated by PSPN.
WFP staff and beneficiaries should be given information on the importance of micronutrients, micronutrient malnutrition, and guidelines for enhancing micronutrient status. (4.44)	Headquarters/PSPN	See response to recommendation 11 above.
UNICEF and WFP should carry out a mapping exercise to determine common areas of ESF operation and establish joint programming in these areas. (7.32)	ODK in consultation with the two country offices.	The Sudan country office will work with VAM and UNICEF to determine common areas of operation for ESFP and establish joint programmes in these areas.
WFP should focus on a few crucial recovery activities in Sudan rather than develop a diverse portfolio that may be difficult to manage. (7.41)	ODK in consultation with the two country offices.	The Khartoum country office is adopting this approach already. There is an on-going series of consultative workshops which will facilitate focusing on recovery activities. See also the response to the first recommendation.



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Recommendations* (March 2004)	Action by	Management response and action taken (July 2004)
In areas where it is not feasible to undertake food-for-assets projects, no new projects should be approved. Staff and partners should focus on improving targeting and monitoring of general distributions and preparing relief and recovery strategies. (7.42)	ODK in consultation with the two country offices.	Agreed in principle. It should be noted, however, that there is more FFA in the southern sector, while the northern sector is able to focus on recovery interventions.
Country offices should review the concept of food-for-recovery that appears in the 2004 Sudan strategy paper to ensure that it meets necessary standards. Headquarters should also review the concept as it appears in the WFP PDM. (7.43)	Headquarters/Operations Department, in consultation with ODK and the two country offices.	The issues raised regarding improved recovery strategies are being addressed by WFP in the broader framework of programme quality improvement, strengthening emergency food security assessment methods and other initiatives that respond to recommendations made during the earlier PRRO thematic evaluation.
Based on WFP's extensive experience with large-scale needs assessments in Sudan, Headquarters should document lessons learned in assessing food needs in a chronic, complex emergency. (3.14)	Headquarters/OEN	The recommendation is clear and OEN will take action on it, in collaboration with the regional bureau and the two country offices. Corporately, WFP has taken many measures recently to improve needs assessment, including the establishment in 2003 of the Emergency Needs Assessment Unit.
To address credibility and ensure that the participatory approach is followed, WFP should develop a communications strategy for needs assessments. (3.17)	ODK in consultation with the two country offices.	The country office will continue to involve the Government, donors and implementing partners in needs assessments, as feasible. More explicit guidance from the evaluation mission on the proposal for a communications strategy would have been appreciated.
WFP should decentralize responsibility for distributions to the lowest possible administrative level so that the community can impose greater accountability on leaders. (5.13)	ODK in consultation with the two country offices.	Agreed, where appropriate, notwithstanding political interference in food aid allocation and distribution activities.
Field staff should be aware that WFP accepts positive customary practices; staff should be trained to negotiate mutually satisfactory distribution arrangements. (5.14)	ODK in consultation with the two country offices.	The notion pursued by the evaluation mission is not clear. WFP does not work against positive customary practices in the Sudan. Targeting must be pursued in its broader context, however, notwithstanding traditional customary practices.



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Recommendations* (March 2004)	Action by	Management response and action taken (July 2004)
An analysis of socio-political structures, community dynamics and power relations should be commissioned to determine the risks of people being discriminated against in food relief distribution. (5.15)	ODK in consultation with the two country offices.	The Sudan country office is unaware of any discriminatory practice, nor was evidence presented by the mission.
A pipeline officer should be appointed immediately. Logistics should remain under control of the senior logistics officers for the northern and southern corridors. (4.21)	ODK in consultation with the two country offices and OTL.	A pipeline officer has been assigned to the country office.
Full COMPAS connectivity between Khartoum, Mombasa, Nairobi, Kampala and Lokichoggio should be implemented. (10.18)	ODK in consultation with the two country offices and OTF.	OTF agrees with the recommendation to have a full country office COMPAS database in Khartoum. This has been planned for some time and was scheduled to be implemented with the roll-out of COMPAS Version 2.0. The Sudan roll-out is scheduled for mid-August 2004 and, once completed, the Khartoum COMPAS database will have complete information of commodity receipts, movements and distributions for Sudan operations.
Headquarters should determine a way to reconcile pipeline logistics information with programme information at the country office level. (10.20)	Headquarters/Operations Department, with OTF.	OTF will discuss this recommendation further with the country offices and with ODO to ensure that a standard database format is adopted. The OD Directive of 1 October 2003 gives guidance on this issue.
Country office management should ensure that management and appraisal of performance (MAP)/Performance and Competency Enhancement Programme (PACE) for gender focal points and all staff reflect individual responsibility for implementing the ECW; ECW-related responsibilities should be reviewed when staff performance is assessed. (8.6)	ODK in consultation with the two country offices.	Agreed. The country offices are taking action to ensure that this is done through their human resources units.
Gender training should be increasingly mainstreamed into other types of training. (8.8)	Headquarters/HRC	HRC already ensures that its new corporate training materials are reviewed by the gender unit and that gender messages are included on their advice. HRC also engineers collaboration between training partners such as OEDP and OEN and the gender unit to ensure this type of "screening". In addition to cross-cutting training, HRC supports the gender unit in design of their gender training, as foreseen in the Management Plan for 2004-2005.



ANNEX: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY — SUDAN EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

Recommendations* (March 2004)	Action by	Management response and action taken (July 2004)
Headquarters should introduce a standard country office reporting format to help managers make informed programme decisions. Sudan should be a pilot user, given the size and complexity of its operation. (10.11)	Headquarters/ODO	OD has introduced a suggested non-mandatory standard reporting format as part of the country office reporting (COR) provisional guidelines, which are integrated into the on-line PDM and accessible to all country offices. The further development of the COR guidelines will be addressed as part of the programme quality improvement and RBM initiatives.
WFP should review the management structure of its operations in the Sudan. (10.27)	ODK, with OD and HR.	Agreed. The relationship between the northern and southern sectors should be clearly defined.
Headquarters should lead a human resources review to ensure that the structure, number and profile of posts are suitable for implementing a recovery-oriented operation. (10.46)	Headquarters/HR Division, with ODK.	Agreed by ODK. The HR response had not been received by the extended deadline.
WFP should review the partition of DSC between the two sectors, including the food aid that is routed through and distributed to beneficiaries in each sector. (10.44)	ODK, in consultation with OEDB.	The regional bureau and country offices are currently reviewing the DSC allocation between the two sectors.
The CO/Khartoum, in collaboration with HQ, should develop a contingency plan in case an impasse is reached on the genetically modified organism issue. (4.5)	Khartoum country office, with Headquarters/ODP and ODF.	The Khartoum country office will discuss the issue with ODP and ODF at Headquarters.
HQ should determine how to better align the timing of food deliveries with programming requirements in the Sudan. (4.10)	Headquarters/ODP.	With insufficient multilateral and directed multilateral cash contributions available for local/regional purchases for the Sudan EMOP, the timing of in-kind contributions is basic to ensuring timely food delivery. Various units, within the context of BPR, are currently reviewing ways and means of increasing WFP efficiency and contribution throughput. The outcome of BPR, including the proposed expansion of the Immediate Response Account, is expected to reduce this problem.
The COs should document for future guidance the risk assessment processes used when needs and circumstances dictate that food aid has to be distributed in an area where there is a military conflict (5.26)	ODK, in consultation with the two country offices.	The field security unit will work with the programme staff and management to document decisions made, based on access and security assessments.



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Monitoring reports should include estimates of the furthest beneficiaries have had to walk to a distribution point to assist managers to monitor the effectiveness of each distribution (5.30)	ODK, in consultation with the two country offices.	This issue of distance to distribution points will be reviewed by country office management, in consultation with VAM and programme staff.
Improving the effectiveness of final distribution in reaching the "hungry poor" has to be accorded higher priority. (5.31)	Headquarters/ODO.	Provisional food distribution guidelines have been published and made available through the PDM. Further development of these guidelines will be undertaken as part of the programme quality improvement initiatives in response to the ongoing findings and recommendations of the thematic evaluation of the PRRO category.



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

ANA	annual needs assessment
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System
CSB	corn-soya blend
DSC	direct support cost
ECW	Enhanced Commitments to Women
EMOP	emergency operation
ESF	emergency school feeding
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
GAM	global acute malnutrition
ICT	information and communications technology
IDP	internally displaced person
IP	implementing partner
MAP	management and appraisal of performance
MOU	memorandum of understanding
ODK	East and Central Africa Regional Bureau
OEN	Emergency Needs Assessment Unit
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
PACE	Performance and Competency Enhancement Programme
PSPN	Nutrition Service
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
PSPP	Food Security, Safety Nets and Relief Service
RBM	results-based management
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPR	standard project report
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

