White Paper on Global Factors and Trends That May Shape WFP's Future External Operating Environment

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Executive Summary

The World Food Programme (WFP) is the world's leading humanitarian organization. This White Paper reviews the changing demand for WFP's services and the changing ability of WFP to meet that demand and then draws out implications for WFP's strategic refresh.

The demand for WFP's services is, unfortunately, not going to diminish. Uncertainty, disasters and fragility are the "new normal." Hunger and undernutrition rates are very stubborn especially in sub-Saharan Africa and some large Asian nations. The distribution of poverty and hunger is also changing. Most poverty and undernutrition is now found in "middle income countries," although some of these countries, such as India, are still very poor. Poverty and undernutrition are increasingly becoming an urban phenomenon, although less so in sub-Saharan Africa. These trends are so strong that approximately only ten percent of poverty (and presumably hunger) is to be found in low-income non-fragile, non-conflict affected countries.

The ability of WFP to meet these changing demands has also changed. There is a greater consensus that the separateness of preparedness, risk reduction, response, recovery, rehabilitation and development is a fiction that cannot easily be sustained by the agencies. The key now is to break the cycle of hunger by focusing on the resilience of systems: how can the ability to bounce back better be developed? An increasing array of resources, policies and tools can be brought to the task of breaking the cycle of hunger. New actors, such as the emerging powers, new mechanisms, such as forward purchasing and insurance tools, new technologies for tracking outcomes and services, and new interventions, such as home-grown school feeding all need to be brought to bear.

Clarifying the objectives, while broadening the perspective and bringing a wider set of approaches to the problem is challenging. To do this within a rapidly diversifying set of contexts while saving lives and contributing to longer-term solutions requires a serious investment in WFP partnerships and in WFP capacity. WFP must keep its eye on the prize (breaking the cycle of hunger) while broadening its scope in the search for solutions. To avoid duplication, competition and disharmony WFP must work more effectively though partners within and outside of the UN, globally and nationally.

To work effectively with different partners, WFP staff must be able to map diverse institutional food system landscapes, identify and forge strategic alliances, leverage resources that are not necessarily earmarked for hunger reduction, advise governments and shape narratives around hunger and access to food, identify the most useful evidence and knowledge from the wider community, capture and share innovations from the field, and demonstrate the short and long run impact of WFP's work.

In conclusion, the White Paper suggests that WFP complete its move from a mechanism-driven food aid organization to one that saves lives in emergencies while assisting nations --and which no-one can do more cost-effectively--to break the cycles of hunger. No one can do this more cost efficiently.

White Paper on Global Factors and Trends
That May Shape WFP's Future External Operating Environment

1. Introduction

WFP's strategic objectives describe the organization's role as being to break the cycle of hunger. This means: prevent acute hunger, save lives and protect livelihoods during emergencies, restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods post-emergency, and reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition at all times (see Figure 1). These objectives position WFP as one of the very few agencies that attempts to bridge the worlds of emergency, recovery and sustainable long-term solutions. Central to WFP's strategy is support to national systems so they can meet these functions with less, and ultimately no, assistance from WFP.

WFP's strategic plan of 2008-2013 was formulated in 2007-08 and even in the short space of time since then the world has changed: a global economic downturn, the realization of the long term challenge posed by increasing food price levels and volatility, the reality of uncertainty, fragility and resilience in development practice, a new set of emerging powers, growing sources of non-ODA finance that could be used for hunger reduction, new insights on the vital importance of the first 1000 days of life (from conception through age 2) for human resilience, and shifts in the location of poverty. WFP has also changed—it has several years of implementing its new strategy, with the accompanying learning, and it has a new Executive Director.

These changing contexts present a useful opportunity to: (a) review the external environment to identify the big shifts that will affect the demand for WFP services and WFP's capacity to meet that demand, and to (b) draw out some implications for WFP's strategic positioning and for the way it works. This is the purpose of the paper.

Figure 1: WFP's five SOs and their role in "breaking the cycle of hunger"



The paper first reviews WFP's role. What does the strategy document say about how WFP sees its role; what are some of the implicit assumptions underlying the strategic objectives; and has anything changed to make us think the assumptions no longer hold so strongly? In addition, what do external reviews conclude about WFP's recent performance and role? The next section reviews some of the

major external trends affecting the demand for WFP services. The following section reviews the trends affecting WFP's capacity to meet those needs. The final section draws out the implications of these demand and capacity trends for WFP's current strategy.

Many of the points made here are supported by a series of tables and figures. Rather than clutter the document with them, they are provided in a separate PowerPoint deck, with relevant reference to the graphs in the document.

2. WFP's Strategy and the Assumptions Behind it

What can be gleaned from the WFP Strategy document about how WFP sees itself and what it aspires to? (See Box 1.)

WFP clearly sees itself as part of the solution to the problem of disconnects between preparedness, risk reduction, response, relief, recovery, rehabilitation and development. The strategy is clear that WFP is about breaking the cycle of hunger. The Strategy sees WFP's strength as its role on the ground, its logistical reach and scale and its performance to date. It highlights the quality of its staff and the need to continuously invest in them. The Strategy recognizes the need for flexibility on the funding side and the programming side if these ambitious goals are to be met. The strategy assumes that most hungry people live in countries that are low income although it recognizes that stunting rates over 25 percent may occur in non low-income countries. Partnerships are obviously signaled as important – within country and within the UN. There is less aspiration on the monitoring and evaluation side—it is difficult to detect any dissatisfaction with the ability to monitor results and impacts.

Box 1: WFP's 2008-2013 Strategy and the Underlying Assumptions
(as perceived by the author of this report)

Underlying assumption: The gaps between crisis, recovery and longer-term solutions can be bridged, and WFP can play a key role in that within country and within the UN

"The gap between crises, recovery and sustainable longer-term solutions is very frequently a chasm. Yet within this context, the international system also has important tools and assets. WFP is one of these assets. Deploying WFP most effectively within this broader global context is what the Strategic Plan is all about."

"WFP also has a key role to play in the efforts to enhance coherence and reform in the United Nations humanitarian and development systems."

Underlying assumption: On the ground operations are vital to reducing the threat and consequences of hunger and undernutrition and continuous investment in skills of WFP staff is vital

"WFP is the largest and most operational United Nations agency with a key role to play in helping to address the threat and persistent consequences of life-threatening hunger and undernutrition." WFP Strategy. p. 3.

"WFP's greatest strength is its global deep field presence combined with its hunger expertise, which makes it unique in the international system."

"WFP's greatest asset is its staff, a strong and dedicated workforce of more than 10,000 women and men, 90 percent of whom are deployed in the field, often under difficult conditions where security threats and risks to personal safety are considerable."

Underlying assumption: A more flexible set of tools is needed to respond to hunger needs in a way that promotes hand-off

"This Strategic Plan marks a historic shift to WFP using a more nuanced and market-sensitive set of tools to respond to critical hunger needs." P. 3. WFP Strategic Plan.

Underlying assumption: Funding mechanisms need to be more flexible if WFP is to stay responsive to rapidly changing needs and to insure the most vulnerable against them

"Funding mechanisms should allow flexibility to respond effectively to varying contexts and needs – including through greater predictability and less earmarking – while providing accountability and transparency with regard to the allocation of WFP resources."

Underlying assumption: Hungry people and undernourished children live in poor countries

"WFP will allocate at least 90 percent of such resources to countries that are least developed or low income (gross national income per capita three-year average under US$900) and that face chronic malnutrition (measured as a 25 percent or greater rate of stunting among children under 5)."

Underlying assumption: WFP can be a key strategic partner in the global response to the consequences of climate change and the causes and consequences of high food prices

"The United Nations is at the forefront of two of the defining issues of our time: climate change and high food prices. Both will be key dimensions of the future work and collaboration of the Rome-based agencies. In this sense, they provide an almost unprecedented opportunity for WFP to be an integral part of the overall United Nations system response.."

Underlying assumption: WFP's results based reporting does not need a major improvement, and lessons will be captured, learned and acted upon

The strategy document does not stress the need to improve WFP monitoring, evaluation and reporting although it does stress the need to learn from experiences.

Recent Independently Commissioned Reviews of WFP

What do recently independently commissioned reviews of WFP tell us about WFP strengths and weaknesses? Table 1 compares the conclusions from each review. [1] Some things emerge in more than one evaluation. WFP is recognized for being very strong in delivering for its beneficiaries. Performance issues that are of most concern include the connections between humanitarian and development thinking and action, gender, and the monitoring of results via stakeholders or more formal processes. Annex 1 reports on the DFID evaluation in more detail.

Table 1: Three Recent Bilateral Reviews of WFP

DFID March 2011		AusAID March 2012		CIDA March 2012	
Most Strong	Least Strong	Most Strong	Least Strong	Most Strong	Least Strong
Meeting international objectives	Climate change policy	Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Clear process for resource allocation	Achieving humanitarian and development objectives	Addressing gender equality
Attention to fragile contexts	Results based culture	Alignment with AusAID interests	Provides voice for stakeholders	Relevance of interventions	Ability to link humanitarian efforts to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development
	Transparency and accountability	Contribution to wider multilateral system			Systems for monitoring and reporting on program results

WFP's response to DFID's assessment was admirably non-defensive and emphasized the shift:

[1] The categories and criteria are similar but not identical for each assessment. The CIDA assessment relies on 52 evaluations undertaken by the WFP Office of Evaluation. The DFID and AusAID evaluations rely on a wider set of data.

"towards breaking the cycle of hunger and meeting hunger needs, rather than categorizing those needs as either humanitarian or development, thus limiting the range of responses. It is also more efficient and cost effective to help food-insecure communities improve their resilience rather than having to regularly scale up assistance when shocks occur."

In summary, WFP sees itself as an organization uniquely placed to break the cycle of hunger while meeting hunger needs. The sense one gets from reading the strategy, the external evaluations and the response from WFP is of an organization that knows it is performing well, but knows it can (and must) do even better. That is why the strategy refresh is being undertaken and why this White Paper has been commissioned.

We will return to some of these assumptions in section 5 when we look at the implications for WFP of the changes in the demand for its services (section 3) and changes in its ability to meet that demand (section 4).

3. Factors Affecting the Demand for WFP services

In the past 5 years, a "perfect storm" of food and energy price increases, a global economic downturn and climate change has created an unprecedented challenge for efforts to reduce hunger and malnutrition. The spike in hunger and malnutrition caused by historically moderate spikes in food prices is a key indicator of the stress the food system is under. The perfect storm has also generated a response. Commitment to reducing hunger and malnutrition is high on the international agenda and on many national ones as well. This section reviews some of the factors shifting the demand for the kinds of services WFP can provide.

3.1 Fragility and uncertainty are the "new normal"

- The number of victims of natural disasters (excluding biological disasters) is increasing per disaster (Slide 1).

Slide1

Figure 1 – Trends in occurrence and victims



Natural Disasters (not biological): Earthquake, volcano, mass movement (dry), storm, flood, mass movement (wet), extreme temperature, drought, wildfire,

Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2011. The numbers and trends. Debby Guha-Sapir Femke Vos Regina Below With Sylvain Ponserre (UNISDR). Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) Institute of Health and Society (IRSS). Université catholique de Louvain – Brussels, Belgium

- In 2010 the greatest share of those affected by natural disasters lived in the low-income countries (in previous years the majority lived in the even poorer least developed countries). (Slide 2).

Slide 2



Sources: EMDAT CRED and OECD (income groups are determined by the OECD for 2009 and 2010)

- Upper middle-income countries
- Lower middle-income countries (excl. China and India)
- Low-income countries
- Least developed countries
- % affected in low-income and least developed countries

Population In Developing Countries Affected By Natural Disasters

Disaster Risk Reduction: Spending where it should count. Jan Kellett and Dan Sparks. GHA. Development Initiatives. March 2012.

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2

- The dollar value of disaster losses is increasing—both those that are insured and those that are uninsured (Slide 3).

Slide 3

Increasing disaster losses: Insured and Uninsured

Overall losses and insured losses 1980–2011 ($ bn)



Munich Re (2012) *Münchener Rückversicherungs- Gesellschaft, Geo Risks Research, NatCatSERVICE*. Munich: Munich Re.

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3

- More poor people are living in fragile conditions. The percentage of people living in IDA eligible countries who live in fragile or conflict-affected states is projected to increase from 17% in 2010 to 38% in 2025 (Slide 4).

Slide 4

IDA clients concentrating in sub-Saharan Africa and Fragile and Conflict Affected States

	2010	2025
Number of IDA-Eligible Countries*	68	31
Total Population *(millions)*	2,820	997
% Sub-Saharan Africa	55%	81%
Population-Weighted	*31%*	*65%*
Fragile Status (% of Countries)	41%	58%
Population-Weighted	*17%*	*38%*
HIPC (% of Countries)	58%	84%

Todd Moss and Benjamin Leo. 2011. "IDA at 65: Heading Toward Retirement or a. Fragile Lease on Life?" CGD Working Paper 246.

- We also know that countries affected by violence are not reducing poverty rates as quickly as those who are not affected by violence (Slide 5).

Slide 5

FIGURE F1.3 *The gap in poverty is widening between countries affected by violence and others*

New poverty data reveal that poverty is declining for much of the world, but countries affected by violence are lagging behind. For every three years a country is affected by major violence (battle deaths or excess deaths from homicides equivalent to a major war), poverty reduction lags behind by 2.7 percentage points.



Sources: WDR team calculations based on Chen, Ravallion, and Sangraula 2008 poverty data (available on POVCALNET (http://iresearch.worldbank.org)).

Note: Poverty is % of population living at less than US$1.25 per day.

- Refugees – the number of people faced with global forced displacement has been constant in numbers and shares (from IDPs, refugees, and asylum seekers). (Slide 6).

Slide 6



UNHCR 2011 Global Trends

Drivers of fragility and uncertainty

- Climate: The number and proportion of people living in low and low middle income countries who are affected by climate related disasters are increasing (Slide 7).

Slide 7



Sources: WDR team; CRED 2009.

World Bank, *World Development Report 2010*

- Conflict: While battle deaths from civil wars have declined significantly in the past 20 years, the rise of organized international crime (gangs, trafficking) is noted by the World Bank's World Development Report (Slide 8).

Slide 8

Gangs and trafficking are global concerns

Following September 11, 2001, there was an exponential rise in media coverage of terrorism. Meanwhile, media coverage of gangs and trafficking has also been increasing. Recently, the coverage of gangs and trafficking approached that of civil war.



Source: Factiva.

Note: Data in the figure were compiled by using all available news sources from the Factiva search engine from January 2000 to December 2009 and using the following four search terms: "terrorism," "trafficking," "gangs," and "civil war" in multiple languages. Only articles where the search terms appeared in the headline and lead paragraph were counted.

WDR 2011

- Food price volatility

Lower food stocks, stronger links with energy prices and new intertwining with financial market behavior have led to the perception of increased food price volatility, and to some extent, an increase in volatility (Slide 9). The evidence on whether food price volatility has increased is mixed. Torero from IFPRI notes: "From January 2007 to December 2011, the average number of days of excessive volatility more than doubled to 76 a year" (Torero 2012). Gilbert and Morgan (2012) note: "There is weak evidence that the volatility of grains and vegetable oils prices may be increasing but it is too early to make a definite statement. Important open issues remain with respect to biofuels, climate change and the possible effects of the financialization of agricultural food markets." (Gilbert and Morgan 2010).

Slide 9

FIGURE 1.1 Food, grain, agricultural, and energy price developments (in nominal and real terms)



Source: World Development Indicators database.

Global Monitoring Report 2012. Food Prices, Nutrition, and the Millennium Development Goals

Barrett and Bellmare (2011) argue that the real issue is food price levels, not volatility: "Food price levels are at historic highs, but food price volatility, although high these past few years, is not out of line with historical experience and is generally lower than it was in the 1970s. This means that the world does not necessarily face a price volatility problem. It faces a high food price problem."

Whether FPV is at a historic high or not, it is high, and has very significant effects on lives and livelihoods (Slide 10). The most vulnerable countries are net food importers whose populations spend a high percentage of their income on food. Nearly every Sub-Saharan Country falls into this category (Slide 11).

Slide 10

TABLE 1.1 Common coping responses to food, fuel, and financial crises in 13 countries

Behavior-based responses	Number of countries	Asset-based responses	Number of countries
Reduce the quality and quantity of food	13	Sell assets	8
Reduce nonfood expenditures	13	Loan from formal lender	2
Stop primary or secondary education	6	Microfinance loan	2
Stop higher education	2	Loan from family/friends	7
Work more	12	Loan from moneylender	4
Take up illicit occupations:		Use common property natural resources for fuel and food	4
Sex work	2	**Assistance-based responses**	
Drug dealing	2	**Source of assistance:**	
Crime/theft	10	Government	4
Income diversification	9	Nongovernmental organization	4
Migration	6	Religious organization	5
		Mutual solidarity group	7
		Relatives	13
		Friends and neighbors	11

Source: Heltberg, Hossain, and Reva 2012, forthcoming.

Global Monitoring Report 2012. Food Prices, Nutrition, and the Millennium Development Goals

Slide 11

FIGURE 1.3 Countries' vulnerability to global food price shocks tracked by share of cereal imports in domestic consumption and food share in household expenditure



Source: World Bank 2011d.

- Resource scarcity: The evidence is mixed on resource scarcity as a direct driver of uncertainty

"There is no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states" (Allouche and Daoudy 2010), and "At the intrastate level, recent research on civil wars shows that countries suffering from environmental degradation (soil degradation, deforestation and freshwater supply linked to high population density) were indeed more likely to experience civil war but that the magnitude of the effects was secondary to political and economic factors" (Allouche and Daoudy 2010).

Evans, agrees, but adds: "Climate change and resource scarcity are rarely, if ever, the sole cause of violent conflict, then: instead they are better understood as 'threat multipliers' that will in practice interact both with other risk drivers and with diverse sources of vulnerability" (Evans 2010. p. 6)

The net impact of large scale land and water acquisitions or "grabs" are not yet clear. The High Level Panel of Experts report on the topic (HLPE 2011) to the Committee on World Food Security states "Many rural households depend on combining shifting cultivation, livestock, and forest resources to survive in their variable environments. Many recent land acquisitions by large scale investors have displaced them, damaging local livelihoods, food security and access to key resources." But few credible data are available on the scale of the impact.

- Increased recognition of the profound impacts of undernutrition

The Lancet series of 2008 on undernutrition crystallized a wide set of findings about the vital importance of the 1000 day period from conception to 2 years of age. This period highlights not only the enhanced importance of preventing infant undernutrition but also the nutrition status of girls and women. Health shocks that affect infants and pregnant women's nutrition status are transmitted throughout the lifecycle and across generations due to the poor development of

immune and cognitive systems between conception and 2 years. The economic effects of stunting are large, with the most rigorous study (Hoddinott et. al. 2011) concluding that individuals who were not stunted early in life in Guatemala are 34 percentage points less likely to live in poor households as adults. The Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement ,which was launched in 2010, has led to an increase in attention and resources for interventions during this "window of opportunity."

- Persistence of women's lack of power

Recent evidence reviews suggest that the inequalities faced by women in access to productive assets are stubborn. Peterman et. al. (2010) found that for 73 comparisons of male-female access to agricultural inputs (controlling for confounding factors), men were favoured in 29, women in 4 and neither were favoured in 40 (Slide 12).

Slide 12



Source: Peterman, Behrman and Quisumbing, 2010. IFPRI Discussion Paper 975

Despite these differences in access to formal resources, women are frequently called upon to act as the shock absorbers in households, principally via unpaid care work.[2] The increased strains placed on underpowered and overburdened women can only increase the fragility of household and community fragility as well as the wellbeing of women themselves.

3.2 The "new" geography and demography of poverty

- Regional poverty projections from the World Bank suggest that the percent of the population of Sub Saharan Africa living under $1.25 a day (2005 PPP) will decrease from 41.2 percent in 2015 to 34.8 in 2025 with the corresponding figures for South Asia being 23.9 percent and 14.8 percent. If credible, when combined with increasing population sizes, this suggests a shift in the total poverty numbers from South Asia to Sub-Saharan Africa. (Slide 13)

[2] It has been estimated that unpaid care work would, if assigned a monetary value, contribute 10-39% of GDP (UNRISD, 2010).

Slide 13

TABLE 1.9 Poverty forecast, 2015–25

Percent of population living on less than $1.25 a day, 2005 PPP

Region	2015	2025 Baseline, including climate change	2025 Doubling of productivity in developing countries
East Asia and Pacific	7.7	3.0	3.1
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	0.3	0.2	0.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	5.5	5.3	5.4
Middle East and North Africa	2.7	2.3	2.1
South Asia	23.9	14.8	11.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	41.2	34.8	33.2
Total	16.3	12.1	10.8

Source: Up to 2015: World Bank staff calculations from PovcalNet database; for 2025: Envisage and GIDD.

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- Only 25% of the world's poor now live in low-income countries. One of the consequences of some large low income countries graduating from low to low middle income country status (primarily but not only India) is that the location of the world's poor now live in middle income countries that are not eligible for IDA (Sumner 2010). (Slide 14). This also holds true for more multidimensional indicators of poverty (OPHI 2012). This split is likely to hold for the next 5 years at least given that some sub-Saharan countries will graduate to low middle income and that the decline in the Indian poverty rate is not accelerating (Datt and Ravallion 2010).

Slide 14

Changes in numbers in poverty 1998-2007



From data in Sumner 2010

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- Very few of the world's poor now live in low-income contexts that are not fragile or conflict affected. Of the 1.2 billion people living below the $1.25 a day line, only 90 million live in low-income countries that are not fragile or conflict affected (Sumner 2012). (Slide 15).

Slide 15



- The steady shift of poverty to urban locations. Between 1998 and 2008, for developing countries as a whole, the percentage of those below the poverty line who are resident in urban areas grew from 17 to 28 percent. The increases were smallest in the areas where hunger and malnutrition are most prevalent (sub-Saharan Africa--23 to 25 percent, and South Asia--14 to 19 percent), but for Asia as a whole they doubled (13 to 28 percent) and for Latin America the rates went up by half (48 to 74 percent). (Slide 16, IFAD 2011).

Slide 16



In urban areas, different actors come to the fore. For example the private sector tends to be more active in urban contexts, being a key provider of services. Similarly municipal governments and the media become more influential. Inequality tends to be higher in urban areas and property rights more contested.

- The Demographic Dividend. The switch from rural to urban is just one demographic shift. As birth rates decline, the ratio of individuals of working age/not of working age increases (see Figure 2). This is the "demographic dividend." For sub-Saharan Africa this ratio is projected to increase by approximately 60% in the next 40 years. This is slower than China (which doubled in 35 years), but nevertheless is a potential driver of economic growth. The key, according to Bloom (2011) is whether education is broad based: in China it was, in India it was not. This suggests a key role for school feeding as an education intervention, helping to convert the demographic dividend into reduced hunger. The demographic dividend may also lead to more women working in the labour force, which may also improve women's status, depending on the nature of the work and the context.

Figure 2: Regions on the Demographic Upswing



Source: Demographics and Development Policy David E. Bloom and David Canning. January 2011. PGDA Working Paper No. 66. Harvard University.

- Aging. The populations of Africa and Asia will also age as infant mortality rates fall. It is not clear what the implications of this will be for the demand for WFP services. The elderly are more vulnerable than when in their prime, but also reduce vulnerability for others in the family through the provision of experience, care and, in some countries, pension payments.

3.3 The rise of stunting on the development and the stagnation of stunting rates in Africa and in some large low middle-income countries

- Stunting rates are stagnating, but interest (and resources?) are scaling up

As Figure 3 indicates, stunting rates (low height for age of preschool children) have stagnated in Africa for the past 20 years (if stunting was an MDG indicator and based on current trends, the 1990 rate would only halve in the 22nd century!). Stunting rates are also decreasing very slowly in big

Asian countries, such as India and Indonesia, and in Pakistan stunting rates are actually increasing, according to the latest DHS survey.

Sparked by a number of factors—including the food price spike of 2007-8, the 2008 Lancet series on the consequences of and solutions for stunting, and this stagnation of progress in key regions and countries, the international and national nutrition community has coalesced around the Scaling Up Nutrition movement (www.scalingupnutrition.org) to increase commitments—national and international—to improve nutrition status (via nutrition-specific, nutrition-sensitive and enabling environment interventions).

Unfortunately the latest available analyses of DAC spending on nutrition use 2008 data, so we have no new trends post WFP's existing Strategic Plan, although we have seen increased nutrition spending on big programmes in several high burden countries (e.g. Nigeria, Zambia, Ethiopia, Nepal and Bangladesh).

Figure 3: Prevalence and trends of stunting among pre-school children, 1990-2020



Prevalence and trends of stunting among pre-school children, 1990–2020. Mercedes de Onis, Monika Blossner and Elaine Borghi. Public Health Nutrition 2011

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- A very large percentage of stunted children are living in environments where income inequality is increasing

  Global income inequality, measured on a per capita (not per country) basis has risen marginally (Slide 17). In sub-Saharan Africa, 9 countries post increasing income inequality in the early 2000s, one shows no change and 10 show declines. In South Asia, 5 of 6 countries show a decline in inequality, but the one that shows an increase in India. (Slide 18). Coupled with increasing inequality in Indonesia (with stunting rates not far below India's) almost 40% of the worlds stunted children are living in more unequal societies (Slide 19).

Slide 17

Global Inequality,1988-2005, is fairly flat



Source: Milanovich 2012.

On a sub-national per person basis, not on an average per capita basis

Slide 18



Inequality is falling in more countries than it is rising in

Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators and World Bank. 2012. "China 2030"

Slide 19



Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators and World Bank 2012. "China 2030."

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UNICEF's modeling work, Narrowing the Gaps to Meet the Goals (2010), suggests that while it may cost more to reach the most excluded children and women, the returns to doing so are higher, generating larger benefit cost ratios. (Slide 20). Moreover, they argue that the cost of reaching the most excluded will come down as information and communications technologies and hard infrastructure improve.

Slide 20



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4. Factors affecting the supply of WFP services to meet these changing needs

This section focuses on the different dimensions of the increasing conflation and convergence of the humanitarian and development paradigms with a view to capacity to deliver. It also focuses on how humanitarian reforms have changed the ability of the humanitarian community to meet changing needs.

4.1 A slow but steady acceptance that operations have to recognize that preparedness, risk reduction, relief, recovery, rehabilitation and service provision do not occur in neat sequences

This perspective can be seen in several key documents.

The GPPI (2011) report on donor strategies for addressing the gaps between humanitarian and development assistance highlights several disconnects:

- Conceptual: "linkage" language is not helpful. It is not about administratively linking preparedness, recovery and relief programmes, it is about doing them differently so they do not need to be administratively linked. It is about development that does more to reduce the risk of disasters and emergency work that does more to lay the foundations for long term development.

- Institutional: generated by the different humanitarian and development principles (humanitarian—independent of political and economic objectives; development cooperation is by or with the state)

- Incentives: risk taking not encouraged across a strict division of labour; the two communities do not intermingle or cross-fertilise; DRR does not make the headlines in terms of tangible or visible benefits. All of these features disincentivise integration.

- Implementing partners: This specialization is unhelpfully reproduced in implementing partners.

Donor approaches to counter this include: decentralization, institutional integration, whole of government approaches, and attempts to strengthen linkage capacities of national partners. The key seems to be to know when to do this in a very demonstrable way and when to do it in a low-key way. Insensitive integration can easily hinder humanitarian efforts.

The UK government's Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR, 2011) notes:

- "Little is routinely done about disasters in development strategies, nor are they mentioned in the Millennium Development Goals. Conventional thinking has been that scarce resources sho uld be used to promote growth and that this is ultimately the answer anyway. This approach is no longer defensible. The body of academic evidence that disasters and shocks must be taken seriously is growing, as is the evidence that investment in reducing disaster risk shows good returns. Flood defense and retrofitting buildings for earthquakes in the US found on average cost benefit of one to four. The same is true in developing countries. Incorporating disaster costs into longer term economic planning is necessary if valuable development resources are not to be diverted to recovery." P. 16.

The GPPI report reviews evidence that these various disconnects generate funding gaps. They find little evidence of a temporal transition gap (development funding is not slow to fill the downturn in the humanitarian funding). There is some evidence (although it is mixed and inconclusive) of a recovery gap – it is difficult to attract funding to recovery type activities. They find strong evidence of a fragile states funding gap, especially when the big recipients (Iraq, Afghanistan, the West Bank and Gaza are taken out of the picture).

The New Deal for Fragile States advocated for by the g7+ signatories at Busan reflects this dissatisfaction with the current situation. The 2010 statement of the g7+ Heads of State to High Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly MDG Summit, New York City includes the following:

"Mired by fragility, conflict and vulnerability to natural disasters, our countries and regions have the highest poverty rates averaging 54%. Compared to developing countries, we have a 50% higher prevalence of malnutrition; 20% higher child mortality rate; and 18% lower primary education completion rate. If 94% of disasters and 97% of natural disaster related deaths occur in developing nations, then fragile and post conflict countries and regions face even greater challenges in responding to emergency situations. We are the countries and regions farthest away from meeting the MDGs and acknowledge that we will not meet the expectations of the MDGs by 2015 unless strong measures are undertaken. Urgent action is required. All too often international engagement is slow in action and blocked by administrative and bureaucratic constraints. These hinder the effective and real time engagement required to counter uncertainty, conflict, destruction and loss of life."

The New Deal asks donors for better transparency in aid allocation, higher risk tolerance, greater speed and predictability of funding, and more investment in country systems and capacities.

The post-2015 debate. The g7+ initiative is designed to feed into the post 2015 debate. The MDG's come to an end in 2015 and there is an active debate as to what will take their place. The proposed replacements can be classified into 4 groups (1) "MDGs plus", basically an evolution of the current set of MDGs, fixing obvious problems (such as the environment MDG), (2) "MDG 2.0", a revisit of the Millennium Declaration and a new set of MDGs that are more faithful to the declaration, bringing in MDGs around peace, rights, and justice in addition to the more outcome oriented MDGs, (3) a set of SDGs, sustainable development goals, which are more environmentally focused, and (4) hybrids that try to combine planetary limits and social floors to define "a safe and just operating space for humanity" (Oxfam 2012).

Integrating uncertainties that are driven by climate, conflict and intensity of resource into the standard MDG space will be a key challenge for post 2015.

4.2 The rise of the Resilience Agenda and the challenge of implementing it

The need for development processes to be able to navigate uncertainty, bounce back from shocks and minimize future disasters together with the need for humanitarian processes to lay the sustainable foundations for development, has led to the rise of the resilience agenda.

There is no formal agreement on what resilience means, but there is a consensus that it is about how a system maintains function in the face of shocks.

- The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) defines it as: "The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner"

- The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change defines it as: "The ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances while retaining the same basic structure and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-organisation, and the capacity to adapt to stress and change". The Resilience Alliance describes it as: "The capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change."

- DFID says: "Disaster Resilience is the ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses - such as earthquakes, drought or violent conflict - without compromising their long-term prospects." Defining Disaster Resilience: A DFID Approach Paper. 2011

- For the IFRC, resilience is "The ability of individuals, communities, organisations, or countries exposed to disasters and crises and underlying vulnerabilities to: anticipate, reduce the impact of, cope with, and recover from the effects of adversity without compromising their long- term prospects."

- The simplest representation of the resilience of a system is probably: (1) to bounce back better, (2) to bounce back, (3) to recover but worse than before, and (4) collapse.

- The Mid-Term Assessment (ISDR 2010) of the Hyogo Framework for building resilience of nations and communities to disasters concludes that: "Concerns remain about the lack of systematic multi-hazards risk assessments and early warning systems factoring in social and economic vulnerabilities; the integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable development policies and planning at national and international level, and the still insufficient level of implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action at the local level. It remains difficult to increase resilience to hazards, especially in the most vulnerable segments of society. Regional level implementation of HFA has resulted in cooperation agreements and joint plans of action in all regions of the world, including one legally binding regional instrument. International support resulted in the creation of important tools such as the Global Platform and the Global Assessment Report. Concerns remain about the need to increase coordination and coherence of international efforts in support of HFA implementation, including by the United Nations." P10

It is clear that building resilience places many demands on multisector coordination and coherence and on the need for the comprehensiveness of risk assessments. It is also clear from the ISDR mid-term assessment that the relative paucity of benefit-cost ratios that assess the returns to DRR is a major constraint to building momentum for scaling up. This is important, because it is also clear that resilience does not *have* to be pro-poor (Béné et. al. 2012).

4.3 Humanitarian and UN reform

Key elements of the humanitarian reform agenda are: (1) the Cluster Approach; (2) greater leadership, (3) more adequate, timely, flexible and effective humanitarian financing; and (4) the development of strong partnerships between UN and non-UN actors (IASC and OCHA Online).

Cluster Approach: The UK's HERR had this to say about the cluster approach: "The cluster approach is the correct vision—strategic networks bring together the main actors involved in response. But its implementation has been too inflexible. Clusters need to be grouped around need rather than mandate, including all key actors, not just UN agencies and international NGOs. They need to be strategic and often then need to work on several levels. They need to be creative decision-making bodies not uninspiring talk shops." P31

A 2010 GPPI evaluation of the cluster approach noted many positives, but also many negatives (see Table 2).

Table 2: Evaluating the Humanitarian Cluster Approach on the Ground

Positives	Negatives
• Coverage of humanitarian needs has improved in some contexts • Gaps in assistance better identified, duplication reduced • Ability of humanitarian actors to learn is improved • More predictable leadership	• Exclude national and local actors, fail to link with/build on existing coordination and response mechanisms • Clusters can compromise humanitarian principles via increased possibility of CoI • Poor cluster management and facilitation:

• Partnership between UN agencies and with INGOs has improved • Humanitarian identify improved—strengthened resource mobilization • Major funding appeals more effective	e.g. process rather than action oriented • Intercluster coordination is weak, cross cutting themes get lost

Cluster Approach Evaluation 2 Synthesis Report. Julia Steets, François Grünewald, Andrea Binder, Véronique de Geoffroy, Domitille Kauffmann, Susanna Krüger, Claudia Meier and Bonaventure Sokpoh, 2010. GPPI

Leadership: The HERR has this to say about skills and leadership in the humanitarian space:

"There has been progress on staff skills in the past decade and a number of worthwhile initiatives. But in every major emergency there are still significant numbers of aid personnel who lack some of the skills essential to their jobs. The consequences are hard to measure but are bound to include lost lives and wasted funds. The gulf is starkest when one considers the investment the UK military make in their preparedness. Typically professional military forces spend 95% of their time training and 5% of their time in action. For humanitarians this figure is reversed: 95% of their time is spent in action and 5% of the time training would be a high figure. Training is not the only method of learning and should complement not replace learning on the job. It need not be expensive or lengthy. It should be based on an assessment of the skill needed for the job, taking account of skills that are already there. Ideally it should be combined with a range of career development measures, which over time, result in strong individuals within well managed teams." p. 21

ALNAP's Global Humanitarian Report of 2012 also highlights the need for skills improvement in leadership and surge capacity for improving the effectiveness of humanitarian responses.

Financing: Mechanisms

- Pooled Funds have become more popular and now account for 16% of humanitarian funding for countries that have them (Slide 21, GHA 2012). The UK is the most committed to pooled funds, allocating 29% of its humanitarian funds to them over the 2006-2011 period. (GHA 2012, DI)

  Slide 21

Figure 2: Donor contributions and other income to the CHFs (excluding carry over), 2006-2011, and as a share of total humanitarian aid, 2006-2010, to countries with a CHF



Note: Humanitarian aid data for 2010 is preliminary. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and OECD DAC data

Global Humanitarian Assistance: Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs). Profile March 2012.

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- The ALNAP SoHS 2012 report suggests that evaluations of pooled mechanisms have found a tradeoff between timeliness and inclusivity.

Delivering as One:

The UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) has been in place for some while now, with the intent of increasing the coherence of the UN response to a nation's priority needs. It has evolved into the UN Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP)--more of a business plan. (Slide 22).

Slide 22

UNDAF Jan 2007 - Jun 2011	UNDAP Jul 2011 - Jun 2015
1. A framework for the UN agencies to operate within Tanzania	1. A business plan for the UN agencies in Tanzania
2. Echoes Tanzania's development priorities to which the UN would contribute	2. Articulates the contribution of the UN system to the national priorities
3. Agencies developed individual plans using UNDAF as the overarching framework *(out of these, 9 Joint Programmes developed)*	3. UNDAP is the plan for all UN agencies in Tanzania
4. Only Joint Programme reports reviewed annually *(performance based fund allocations)*	4. Entire UN Programme reviewed annually *(performance based fund allocations)*

United Nations Tanzania. United Nations Development Assistance Plan
(UNDAP, July 2011- June 2015)

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The first implementation is in Tanzania. The UNDAP will hopefully respond to some of the weaknesses (duplication and fragmentation) of the UN's Delivering as One (DaO) initiative identified by the independent International Evaluation Team (Table 3).

WFP's Country Strategy roll out is one positive response to improve ownership and alignment of WFP and country priorities. Their utility in promoting cross-UN collaboration is less clear.

Table 3: Progress towards four outcomes under Delivering as One[3]

Outcome	Strength	Weaknesses	Progress
Enhanced capacity for strategic approaches	Inclusion of broader range of Agencies enables more strategic approach, related to stated country needs First generation One Programme coordinated with Government. Second generation One Programmes, jointly planned by Agencies and Government	Desire to maximise inclusion of Agencies and partners has sometimes reduced strategic dimension	Moderate
Reduced duplication	Joint procurement procedures Common ICT systems Common recruitment systems Joint programming introduced to reduce duplication.	Inadequate HQ support Incompatible regulations and procedures prevent some desired reforms Duplicate reporting required by Governing Bodies and Boards.	Little
Reduced competition for funds	One Voice ensures better communication among Agencies and with Government, assisting more strategic approaches Improved programme coherence has reduced competition for funds	Reservations remain on funding implications of "firewall."	Moderate
Reduced fragmentation	Long term supplier agreements More coherent programmes Joint programming introduced to reduce	Slow decisions from HQs Some Joint Programmes fragmented by excessive number of agencies and Reservations remain on funding implications of "firewall." Most Most programmes still highly dependent on Agency non-core funding	Little

[3] Independent Evaluation Of Lessons Learned From Delivering As One. Draft Final Report. Main Report. 10 April 2012. This Draft Final Report Has Been Prepared By The International Evaluation Team Composed Of Consultants For The Consideration By The Evaluation Management Group

	fragmentation	partners Programmes fragmented into excessive number of outputs or outcomes Accountability structures fragmented.	

4.4 Financing: Levels and Composition

- Overall ODA flows have risen steadily for the past 10 years, but preliminary estimates for 2011 (DAC) suggest a modest decline (Slide 23). Recent modeling work done by the IMF reviewing the period 1977-2007 suggests that ODA tends to drop off five years after a major economic downturn, so 2011 might signify a static or even declining ODA total envelope. (Slide 24).

Slide 23



Source: OECD, 4 April 2012.

Slide 24

ODA has held steady since 2008, but for how long?



Impact of Banking Crises on Net Disbursed Aid Provided by Crisis-Affected Donors, 1977-2007

Source: Authors' calculations using LV data, as described in the text. Note: The figure shows the coefficient on the individual-year counter dummy for years after crisis, as estimated in regressions controlling for donor-country per-capita income and population, as well as country fixed effects and year dummies across all donors. Year t=1 corresponds to the first year of the crisis.

Policy Research Working Paper 5162. International Aid and Financial Crises in Donor Countries. *Hai-Anh Dang Steve Knack, Halsey Rogers. 2009.*

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- Development financing is becoming less reliant on ODA: flows from OECD countries to developing countries in terms of remittances and private investment overtook ODA in 2009 and private philanthropic flows were half of ODA in 2009. (Slide 25).

Slide 25



More Diverse set of resources for development

Hudson Institute for Global Prosperity. 2011. The Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances

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- ODA variability (excluding debt relief) does seem to increase with the number of years of high conflict and fragility, one of the key points of the g7+ (Slide 26).

Slide 26



WDR 2011 Lawrence Haddad, Institute of Development Studies 26

- Domestic resource mobilization within Sub Saharan Africa is increasing rapidly and as countries grow, the ratio of tax to GNI grows too. (Slide 27).

Slide 27



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- Climate finance requirements for developing countries (mitigation and adaptation) are estimated at USD 90-210 billion per annum. In 2009 approximately USD 8 billion has been made available, and mostly for mitigation (Global Canopy Programme 2009). A 2011 update from the Climate Policy Initiative notes:

- The amount of private finance is almost three times greater than public finance (USD 55 billion private sector, 21 billion from public budgets and 20 billion more leveraged by public agencies in the form of direct equity and debt investments)
- Intermediaries such as bilateral and multilateral financial institutions play a key role in distributing climate finance, around USD 39 billion a year (40% of the total)
- Bilateral institutions distribute a greater share (USD 24 billion) of finance than multilateral agencies (USD 15 billion)
- Dedicated climate funds, typically managed by bilateral and multilateral institutions, channel a small but growing portion of climate finance (currently USD 1.1 - 3.2 billion)

- Official humanitarian aid from DAC members as a percent of their total ODA has been constant at between 8 and 10% over the past 10 years. (Slide 28).

Slide 28



- Official humanitarian aid from outside the DAC group has roughly doubled in the 2006-2010 period, compared to 2001-2005, and stands at 4-5% of the DAC totals (Slide 29).

Slide 29



Humanitarian Aid From Governments Outside The OECD DAC Group, 2001–2011

GHA Report 2012, DI

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- The composition of DAC humanitarian aid by activity type (emergency, reconstruction, relief, DRR) has been stable over the past 5 years (GHA 2012) (Slide 30).

Slide 30



Official Humanitarian Aid From OECD DAC Members By Activity Type, 2006–2010

GHA Report 2012

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- Within an increasing overall humanitarian aid spend private voluntary contributions have increased from 17% in 2006 to 31% in 2010 (27% projected for 2011). (Slide 31). Private foundations still account for under one tenth of these voluntary contributions.

Slide 31

International Humanitarian Response, 2006–2011



GHA Report 2012

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- Private sector contributions are small, but increasing (excluding Haiti, the percent of humanitarian aid from the private sector rose from 1% in 2007-8 to 2% in 2009-10; including Haiti the corresponding increase was from 1% to 6%: (Slide 32).

Slide 32

Table 5: Private-sector contributions to humanitarian action

	Private sector contributions	Percent of total flows	Excluding Haiti	
Avg 2007-08	$114 m	1%	$114 m	1%
Avg 2009-10	$813 M	6%	$278 M	2%

ALNAP (SoHS 2012)

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- Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) funding is very low (below 1% of DAC total ODA) and has not increased significantly over the past 10 years (Slide 33).

Slide 33



DISASTER RISK REDUCTION: Spending where it should count. Jan Kellett & Dan Sparks. GHA.

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4.5 Emerging Powers

The emergence of countries in terms of their economic and political importance has continued apace since 2008. Brazil, India and China are even more dominant in their regions and increasingly influential on the world stage. In terms of regional importance, others are not far behind: Turkey, Qatar, Mexico and Indonesia. These emerging powers are important for WFP because:

- They are sources of funding (Slide 34). The HERR (2011) notes:
  "China's contribution to WFP doubled in 2005 and it was one of the largest donors in Burma after Cylone Nargis in 2008 (and in Pakistan during the floods in 2010). Brazil was a major responder in Haiti. Saudi Arable was the single largest donor to Bangladesh following Cyclone Sidr (and was one of the top five global donors in 2009). India gave through multilateral challenges to Pakistan flood relief." p 32.

Slide 34

Giving to large-scale natural disasters by emerging powers (2005–2010)



Emerging Powers, Emerging Donors: teasing out developing patterns. Stacey White. February 2011. Centre for Strategic and International Studies, DC.

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- They may well require new operating procedures outside of conventional humanitarian norms. In some cases the nontraditional approaches will be positive (such as the emerging powers not being locked into relief and development institutions), in some cases they will be challenging (i.e. the potential for humanitarian assistance to become more political) and in some cases they will just be different (e.g. the regional versus global focus—see Slide 34 again). Humanitarian principles may evolve more quickly with these new actors in the mix.

- They are sources of learning and innovation. Learning from these countries--still dealing with their own emergency response capacity issues – will be vital. On the other hand some emerging countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, might not have their own disasters to learn from and will need increased support if they are to meet beneficiary needs.

- Their growing regional influence. They will become increasingly influential in terms of facilitating and supporting WFP access and relationships with host governments that are particularly wary of the West. And the neighbourhood nature of some of the humanitarian assistance from these new players might strengthen WFP's capacity to work with host governments.

4.6 Programming innovations in the Humanitarian Space

The WFP is recognized as a leader in innovations in this space. For example, the HERR states: "The World Food Programme is innovating the way it delivers food aid" p. 23. The HERR also calls for more innovation in the humanitarian and emergency response arena: "There is an urgent need to leverage appropriate forms of science, research, technology and private sector knowledge to support humanitarian innovation ……. there has been relatively less attention paid to research for humanitarian action and none of it has focused on Southern capacities." p23

- Convergence of DRR, social protection and climate adaptation agendas: There has been some innovation in bringing the DRR, Social Protection and Climate Adaptation agendas together (Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme is one example of attempts to do this), and there have been some successes in bringing them together (Slide 35), but many challenges remain: institutional, political and organizational.

Slide 35

It is possible to integrate the DRR, SP and CCA approaches



IDS WORKING PAPER 345
Adaptive Social Protection: Mapping the Evidence and Policy Context in the Agriculture Sector in South Asia. Alex Arnall, Katy Oswald, Mark Davies, Tom Mitchell and Cristina Coirolo September 2010

Lawrence Haddad, Institute of Development Studies

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- Increasing use of different transfer modalities in humanitarian assistance. The context must drive the modality, based on impact per dollar, striking an appropriate balance between short and medium term impacts. Cash for work is still the predominant modality, but unconditional cash transfers and vouchers have also become more popular, as have blends of the various delivery mechanisms. Nevertheless, cash-based transfers still accounted for under $200 million of humanitarian assistance in 2010 (Slide 36). The HERR goes so far as calling for cash and vouchers to be the default mechanisms for assistance rather than the especial case. The HERR argues that cash might well be less susceptible to corruption (the traditional argument against) if linked to modern methods of transfer and accountability.

Slide 36



Figure 4: Types of cash transfer funding for full programmes, 2006-2011.
Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

Global Humanitarian Assistance. Tracking spending on cash transfer programming in a humanitarian context. Breifing March 2012. GHA. Development Initiative

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- Initiatives to insure against risk. The proposed African Risk Capacity Facility, a pan-African drought insurance facility, is the prime example. Under the ARC, international donors and member countries would pay annual premiums, which would in return pay timely claim payments to insured governments if satellite weather indices indicate that a large drought is underway. An IFPRI and Oxford University assessment (Clarke and Varga Hill 2012) concludes: "Benefits will be higher when the insurance is for extreme rather than frequent events; when the cost of insurance is not too high; when payouts are triggered by indexes that accurately capture the impact of extreme events; and when payouts provide insurance for well-functioning sub-national aid provision."

- Initiatives to work in an ex-ante way: WFP's Forward Purchasing Facility is a prime example. In 2008 US$60 million from the Working Capital Financing Facility was used for a pilot Forward Purchase Facility to enable WFP to buy food based on estimated aggregated regional needs and funding forecasts to further reduce lead times for the delivery of food. The objectives are to: Reduce supply lead-times, improve timeliness of food deliveries, procure food at advantageous times, in developing countries where possible and Reduce response times, particularly in emergencies. This Facility is being scaled up. A WFP assessment in a report to its Board in October 2010 concludes that the FPF "has been successful in achieving both time and cost savings: estimates based on sample consignments show an average in time savings of 53 days and cost savings of 3 percent." We could not find an independent evaluation of the FPF.

- Listening to beneficiaries, especially women, who typically have fewer opportunities to be heard. There have been many calls to listen to beneficiaries—in humanitarian and development spheres (Haddad et. al. 2010). Some evidence that community scorecards can promote health programme effectiveness has helped to promote this agenda, as has the rise of mobile phone technology. DFID is experimenting with people-centered evaluations of some of development programmes it supports.

- Greater focus on preventing and reducing chronic undernutrition nutrition in early life (see above)

4.7 Technology innovations in the Humanitarian Space

In addition to innovations such as the increased use of cash and vouchers, pooled funding, UN DoA and DRR programmes, the increased penetration of mobile technologies into even low income countries and remote areas has stimulated a number of technological innovations.

ALNAP (2012) note: "The 2007-2008 pilot period saw key innovations in humanitarian action, including the use of cash and mobile communications technology. These methods have reached a transformative scale, their use having become significantly more widespread, indeed mainstream, during 2009-2010. The subject of innovation itself became a major area for action in the system, with new funds and mechanisms designed to study and support innovation in humanitarian programming." p. ALNAP SoHS 2012. ALNAP's Humanitarian Innovation fund gives another window into ongoing innovations, again highlighting the prominent role of technology (see Box 2)

Box 2: ALNAP's Humanitarian Innovation Fund

It was again a competitive round, with 150 Expressions of Interest submitted leading to over 50 requests for full proposals. Full details of the projects which received funding are available online, but in summary the funded projects are:

- UNICEF Rapid Family Tracing - a project in partnership with Thoughtworks and New York University to innovate a technological application to rapidly collect and distribute data on separated children, with testing planned in Uganda and potentially Haiti.
- CARE Nederland Bio-rights - a project linking community- and ecosystem-based approaches to disaster risk reduction
- Valid International - Innovating the measurement of coverage and access in CMAM programmes to provide real time data to improve targeting, impact and cost effectiveness, with testing in Somalia
- Internews Europe - a project in partnership with OCHA, FrontlineSMS and Ushahidi, aimed at integrating Local Media and ICTs into Humanitarian Response in Central African Republic.

Kim Scriven ALNAP January 2012 http://www.alnap.org/forum/post/131.aspx

Other examples of the use of mobile technologies are:

- Real time monitoring of hunger and nutrition. Investment in surveillance systems to monitor hunger and malnutrition hot spots has fallen out of favour with governments and donors (Nutrition Works 2006). The high penetration of mobile phone technology in the high burden countries is potentially a game changer. The use of mobile phone technologies in the health sector more broadly has been widespread. Can their use in hunger and malnutrition reduction lower the cost of data collection, improve the timeliness and accuracy of data collected, and make data use more likely? These hypotheses have been tested in a Malawian collaboration between the Ministry of Health, UNICEF and Columbia University. An SMS entry system for nutrition data (within 140 characters) used by community health workers was evaluated and the following was concluded: the nutrition data were more accurate, lower cost and more useful than data collected using standard methods[4]. Whether this will lead to faster and better action to reduce hunger and undernutrition is not certain yet.

- The Digital Food Initiative: Where markets are stable, WFP increasingly distributes vouchers that are redeemable in local shops for food and other staple items. These vouchers help boost

[4] http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/academics/concentrations/epd/documents/UNICEFFinalReport_2009.pdf

local economies while allowing poor communities to receive food assistance with dignity. Through the "Digital Food Project," MasterCard's payment and technology expertise will help WFP to refine and improve its systems that deliver food vouchers via mobile phones or banking cards to people without regular access to banks or financial services.

5. Implications for WFP's strategy

What are the implications of these demand side and supply side factors for WFP's strategy? This section briefly summarizes these factors, and then draws some preliminary implications for WFP's strategy: overall and then on a Strategic Objective by Strategic Objective basis.

5.1 Summary of Demand and Supply Factors and Trends

The demand and supply side factors are summarized in Table 4. On the demand side, poverty is moving (urbanizing, albeit slowly in sub Saharan Africa), is stubborn in fragile and conflict affected contexts and is being reclassified as low-middle income and the GNP/capita of some large countries move across the IDA threshold. Stunting is also stubborn in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.

On the supply side, old divisions also seem increasingly anachronistic: relief/development, food/cash, DRR/CCA, ex-ante/ex-post.

Overall, the premium is on being an adaptive organization—firmly fixed on its goals, but more flexible on how it does this--within the role/space its Board want it to operate in.

Table 4: Recent trends and factors that have implications for WFP's Strategy

Demand side	Supply side
Fragility and uncertainty as the "New Normal" • Increased number of victims per disaster, increased share of those affected by disaster outside of the least developed countries • Persistent drivers of climate, conflict, food price volatility, resource scarcity, stunting • Persistent gender asymmetries in access to rights, resources	Increasing recognition that risk reduction, preparedness, response, recovery and rehabilitation are an important part of the development process and that different approaches to development can significantly affect the likelihood of emergencies happening—challenges: • integrating uncertainties that are driven by climate, conflict and intensity of resource into the standard MDG and post 2015 space
New "geography of poverty" • More fragile • Shift to low middle income • Shift to urban • Demographic Dividend	Rise of the resilience agenda and the challenges in implementing it in increasingly diverse contexts • integrating DRR, SP, CCA at national and local levels—evidence and funding Increased returns to educational attainment and school feeding
Stunting: Stubborn and more focused in Africa and some key Asian states • The increased recognition of the importance of reducing stunting • increased commitments • the slow down in actually reducing stunting in Africa and some key Asian states (e.g. India, Pakistan, Indonesia)	Humanitarian and UN Reform • Clusters, leadership –vital and lacking • Funding—levels, sources, expenditures, modalities→ flexibility is vital • DaO – not so effective for reducing fragmentation of response and accountability
	Programming innovations in humanitarian service provision • Forward purchasing, insurance • Cash and vouchers • Listening to beneficiaries
	Technology innovations Tracing, coverage, response, cash transfers
	Funding • Has ODA peaked? Other sources of development finance are increasing, including taxes • ODA is more variable in extended emergencies • Humanitarian ODA constant at 8-10%, little change in composition by function; very little ODA to DRR • Private donations are up, private sector contributions are low but

	rising • Non DAC contributions are high in certain regions • Climate finance is increasing, but the amount through low transaction climate funds is small

5.2 Overall Implications for WFP

Such a fluid and rapidly changing external context can generate manifold distractions. It is vital for WFP to retain its focus on "breaking the cycle of hunger." But this focus on goal should not be conflated with a narrow range of tools. It is important to broaden approaches while retaining focus on what only WFP can do. This means refreshing capacities within the organization to think and link broadly in order to act decisively and incisively. Three overall implications follow.

1. Be at the forefront of operationalising "resilience" at the national and subnational level

What does a resilient strategy look like at the ground level? It is clear that building resilience places many demands on multi-sector coordination and coherence and on the need for the comprehensiveness of risk assessments, all within a more systemic approach. What are some of the elements of a systemic approach?

Elements include:

- The achievement of conceptual clarity as to what "food assistance" means and how it contributes to "bouncing back better" from disaster. This echoes the second of 6 recommendations from the Synthesis of Strategic Evaluations from May 2012.

- Direct non-emergency resources to activities that reduce the risk of disaster and increase preparedness. Some of WFP's Country Strategy documents recognize this but it is not clear whether this is accomplished.

- Make sure recovery and rehabilitation resources are development orientated. The HERR focuses on this issue, as does the recent ICAI evaluation of DFID's Humanitarian Emergency Response in the Horn of Africa (September 2012), but neither report offers much guidance on how to do that.

- Try to convince donors and other partners to provide more multi-use funds ("resilience funds"). Forward Purchasing Facility-type funds are increasing, but still remain rather modestly funded activities. Our sense is that rigorous evidence on the benefit-cost ratios of operating in a resilience smart way would put a lot of pressure on WFP partners to change their practices.

- Begin to incentivize the breakdown of these funding and administrative barriers within WFP and partners. Link DRR, social protection and climate change adaptation approaches to develop resilient food systems (Slide 37). This is not easy, but if WFP, the world's largest humanitarian organization, can show some leadership it will influence the wider field.

Slide 37



- Focus more on the 1000-day period after conception, including the nutrition status of adolescent girls and women.
    - Investing in this period does improve the ability of the very young infant to withstand future shocks because this is the period when nutrient requirements per g are vey high and when cognitive and immune systems are being laid down. WFP has a nutrient gap strategy (Right Food, Right Time, Right Place) and has an emerging stunting nutrition strategy (May 2012).
    - The stunting strategy does not state where the priority emphasis should be: on nutrition specific, multi-sectoral, or enabling environment activities or how this would be prioritized by context.
    - A recent systematic review for South Asia (Acharya et. al. 2010) suggests that lack of schooling attainment is a risk factor for adolescent pregnancy. Hence if school feeding prolongs school duration, it may well delay age at first pregnancy, and thus promote birth weight and infant stunting.
- Continue to develop and use tools that promote WFP's own organizational resilience. If WFP is disabled by shocks it will not be able to support beneficiaries. WFP's work on forward purchasing, risk capacity, flexible modalities and dialogues with donors on pooled funds needs to develop further.

2. Develop strategies for responding to the new geography of hunger

The vast majority of the developing world's hungry people now live in middle-income countries. An increasing percent are living in fragile, conflict affected areas. In fact, less than 10% of the world's poor live in low-income non-fragile contexts. More of the world's poor are living in urban contexts (although not so in sub-Saharan Africa).

Similarly, stunted children no longer live mostly in low-income countries. Artificial as the GNP/capita boundaries are, crossing them means that countries are no longer classified as IDA eligible or a priority for many bilateral agencies (see Table 5).

Table 5: Stratifying approaches to stunting by GNP/capita and level of stunting

	GNP/cap, 3-year average below $900	GNP/cap, 3-year average above $900
Stunting above 25%	Declining share of countries and children of preschool age e.g. the majority of countries in sub-Saharan Africa	Growing share of countries and children of preschool age e.g. India, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Lao PDR, Pakistan, Zambia, Nigeria, Indonesia
Stunting below 25%	Very few, if any, countries	Emergency only

These new geographies will require modified and sometimes new approaches:

- Lower Middle-Income Countries are emerging from aid dependency and so WFP needs to find ways of working that reflect a greater equality of power within working relationships. The role of WFP becomes less of a food purchase and provision and more of food system strengthening, policy support, promoting UN and donor coherence, strategic capacity development and specialized technical assistance.

- In MICs, WFP's partnerships will need to be different. WFP's role will need to be ever more integrated with well-developed government systems that are either not as efficient as they could be or have significant gaps in coverage. WFP's partnerships will have to help to (a) meet the needs of those who are not covered by government programs because they are marginalized by history, culture or geography, (b) strengthen system capacity in the margins so they can mesh better with the national food system and (c) pilot, innovate and evaluate programmes that are politically difficult for governments, but which if successful, governments can then adapt and adopt.

- Urban areas have different challenges and opportunities. On the challenge side, the potential for intensity of disaster may increase due to higher possibilities for infection, construction collapse, and conflict casualties due to population numbers and density. On the opportunity side, municipal authorities may be able to get things done in ways that stymie district and regional governments and logistics costs might be lower on a per person basis.

- Preventative versus recuperative approaches such as in Haiti where two approaches to health and nutrition programmes were piloted: one targeting all malnourished children under the age of 5 versus targeting all preschoolers under the age of 2 (and their mothers), malnourished or not (Ruel et. al. 2008). The results are in Figure 4 and showed that the preventative approach significantly outperformed the recuperative approach, although total costs (but not variable costs) were higher for the preventative approach. In the relatively data-free zones of emergency and disaster prone districts, such approaches may be warranted.

Figure 4: Prevention or Cure?
Comparing Preventive and Recuperative Approaches to Targeting Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition Programs in Rural Haiti



Prevalence of stunting, underweight, and wasting at baseline and final survey, by programme group: Groups were not different at baseline. p values are for differences between preventive and recuperative groups at final survey. Ruel et al. 2008.

3. Increase investments in capacity, knowledge management, leadership and partnerships—the returns are likely to be higher than ever

Working under increasing uncertainty, using more flexible approaches and tools, where innovation is happening rapidly at the field level and where working in partnerships with organisations with different ways of working and values: all of these challenges require frequent updating of skills that help:

- Form alliances to get the job done. Often these will have to be with organisations that have different cultures and ways of working and, sometimes, different priorities

- Lead teams in messy or flat hierarchies with other UN agencies, with governments who are not aid dependent and with private sector employees who may see things very differently

- Capture innovations in the field, sharing them widely and learning from them so that some of them can be scaled up elsewhere (WFP's gender innovation work is taking this approach)

- Being intelligent and efficient users of evidence and knowledge generated elsewhere—getting up to speed on the latest technical knowledge, but also being able to assess which is most useful and where to go to find out more. This evidence and knowledge capacity is particularly vital for WFP's ability to navigate the more diverse contexts it will face and the more diverse vulnerabilities that will be manifest in different ways in different places for different people.

- Understand where WFP's work fits within different, crowded, increasingly diverse and rapidly changing contexts

- Be an effective advocate for hunger reduction, creating more space for WFP, its partners and other organizations and movements dedicated to breaking the cycle of hunger

- Advise governments and partners on strategies, approaches and new partners

- Be a leader in assessing impact of humanitarian work, especially systematic beneficiary feedback and assessment. This will help guide WFP, will establish meaningful relations with national and local constituencies, and provide funders (public, private, foundations, individuals) with credible evidence that their investments are saving and transforming lives

- Leverage new resource opportunities in an increasingly complex and competitive funding landscape

The development of these skills and capacities need to be mainstreamed throughout the strategic plan refresh.

Returning to the first point made in this section, to be leader in operationalizing resilience, an organization has to be an exemplar of resilience.

While we are generally allergic to management-speak, Table 6, from "Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back" by Zolli and Healy (2012), is a useful communication device for some of the skills that need to support a good balance of mitigation and adaptation mindsets. Naturally these skills have to be identified and then cultivated through a sustained institutional commitment to investment in them in the face of seemingly more urgent expenditure needs.

Table 6: Risk mitigation and adaptation mindsets

Risk *mitigation* mindset	**Risk *adaptation* mindset**
Slow down; turn back	Move forward; no turning back
Hold on to the past	Embrace the future
Stasis	Dynamism
Sustainability	Adaptability, innovation, & experimentation
Top-down (centralized) planning & solutions	Bottom-up (decentralized), evolutionary, organic solutions
Anticipatory laws should guide progress	Reactive norms & strategies should guide us
Precautionary principle ("Better to be safe")	Resiliency ("Better to be flexible")

Zolli and Healy 2012.

5.3 Implications by WFP Strategic Objective

Given our lack of insider knowledge of how WFP works, these more specific implications should be viewed as starting points for discussion. They are summarised in Table 7.

More detailed implications by Strategic Objective (SO) and a number of cross-cuts are presented in Table 8

Table 7: Potential Implications for WFP's SO's of demand and supply trends

WFP Strategic Objective	**Possible implications for WFP strategy (to be refined after discussion with WFP strategy team)**

1. Save Lives And Protect Livelihoods In Emergencies	Disasters increasing in intensity, especially for the most vulnerable→ keep investing in core competence Disasters less easily separated from fragile and stressed development contexts, greater number of more diverse responders→ find ways of bringing some harmony to the response
2. Prevent Acute Hunger And Invest In Disaster Preparedness And Mitigation Measures	DRR funding likely to remain low, despite prospect of increased number and impact of disasters→ Find ways of connecting DRR, Social Protection and Climate Adaptation programming "First 1000 day" commitment is going to be around for a while→ experiment with ways of getting nutrition inputs to all at risk infants and other vulnerable populations such as pregnant and lactating mothers, children under 5, elderly and those with HIVAIDS or other chronic disease
3. Restore And Rebuild Lives and Livelihoods In Post-Conflict, Post-Disaster Or Transition Situations	Vital to partner with "development" agencies to advise and partner them on how to build back in a way that promotes resilience, rather than further fragility
4. Reduce Chronic Hunger And Under-nutrition	Stunting is stuck in Sub Saharan Africa and in some large Asian countries→ work to make WFP social protection work the most nutrition sensitive ones in the world
5. Strengthen The Capacities Of Countries To Reduce Hunger, Including Through Hand-Over Strategies And Local Purchase	The only way to end hunger is to strengthen national systems → Make this the core or central SO, not the 5th → Make local purchases a greater percent of volume → Develop strategy around this (in addition to the country strategy plans), focusing on the link between WFP expertise in implementation and norms and standard setting (e.g. early warning or in making food systems more resilient) → Develop WFP's own capacity to implement its capacity strategy, including issues such as knowledge management and ensuring results measurement is part of programming and funding strategies
Across all	→ Intensify learning and sharing from WFP and partner field innovations (esp. around gender) → Intensify staff capacity development—emphasis on adaptive way of working → Intensify impact assessment (for learning, accountability and fundraising) → Implement Knowledge Management and connect to broader UN KM capacities

6. Conclusion

WFP is the world's leading humanitarian organization. This White Paper reviews the changing demand for WFP's services and the changing ability of WFP to meet that demand and draws out implications for WFP's strategic refresh.

The demand for WFP's services is, unfortunately, not going to diminish. Uncertainty, disasters and fragility are the "new normal." Hunger and undernutrition rates are very stubborn, especially in sub-

Saharan Africa and some large Asian nations. The distribution of poverty and hunger is also changing. Most poverty and undernutrition is now found in "Middle Income Countries," although some of these countries, such as India, are still very poor. Poverty and undernutrition are increasingly becoming an urban phenomenon, although less so in sub-Saharan Africa. These trends are so strong that approximately only ten percent of poverty (and presumably hunger) is to be found in low-income non-fragile, non-conflict affected countries.

The ability of WFP to meet these changing demands has also changed. There is a greater consensus that the separateness of preparedness, risk reduction, response, recovery, rehabilitation and development is a fiction that cannot easily be sustained. The key now is to break the cycle of hunger by focusing on the resilience of systems: how can the ability to bounce back better be developed? An increasing array of resources, policies and tools can be brought to the task of breaking the cycle of hunger. New actors such as the emerging powers, new mechanisms such as forward purchasing and insurance tools, new technologies for tracking outcomes and services, and new interventions such as home grown school feeding all need to be brought to bear.

Clarifying the objective, while broadening the perspective and bringing a wider set of approaches to the problem is challenging. To do this within a rapidly diversifying set of contexts while saving lives and demonstrating longer term requires a serious investment in WFP partnerships and in WFP capacity. WFP must keep its eye on the prize (breaking the cycle) while broadening its scope in the search for solutions. To avoid duplication, competition and disharmony WFP must work more effectively though partners within and outside of the UN, globally and nationally.

To work effectively with different partners, WFP staff must be able to map diverse institutional food system landscapes, identify and forge strategic alliances, leverage resources that are not necessarily earmarked for hunger reduction, advise governments and shape narratives around hunger, access and identify the most useful evidence and knowledge from the wider community, capture and share innovations from the field, and demonstrate short and long run impact of WFP's work.

In conclusion, the White Paper suggests that WFP complete its move from mechanism-driven organization to one that does what it takes--and which no-one can do more cost-effectively--to break the cycles of hunger.