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JOINT WFP/UNHCR EVALUATION OF PRO KENYA 4961.04

Food Assistance to Somali and Sudanese Refugees ¹

Number of beneficiaries	178,000
Duration	1 October 1998 to 30 September 2000
Date of evaluation	September 1999
Date approved	15 May 1998

Cost (United States dollars)

Total cost to WFP	41,711,228
Total food cost	20,440,535

ABSTRACT

In the absence of durable solutions—and given the economic, political and environmental constraints of the settlements themselves—refugees in Kenya remain dependent on a full food aid ration for survival. Nutritional levels have remained stable and within acceptable limits. Self-reliance could be increased through discrete food-for-work initiatives, but not on any significant scale. Food distribution should be streamlined. WFP's innovative use of empty food bags is commendable. Self-reliance strategies should be more geared towards the internal camp economy and refugee needs, rather than simple skills development. UNHCR and WFP should develop a more cohesive approach to cross-sectoral planning, including the appropriate choice of implementing partners. WFP staff capacity should be increased to meet the demands of the UNHCR/WFP memorandum of understanding (MOU).

¹ The mission comprised a WFP consultant (team leader), an FAO nutrition expert and a UNHCR staff member.

NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted for consideration to the Executive Board.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document, to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

BMI	Body mass index
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CDC	Centre for Disease Control
CSB	Corn-soya blend
CSM	Community self-management
DSM	Dried skim milk
EDP	Extended delivery point
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
JFNAM	Joint Food Needs Assessment Mission
JRS	Jeurist Relief Services
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
MSF-B	<i>Médecins sans frontières</i> —Belgium
PRO	Protracted relief operation
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SFP	Selective feeding programme
UNHCR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
VAM	Vulnerability analysis and mapping



ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES

1. Since 1991, WFP has been providing assistance to refugees in Kenya fleeing from military conflict and civil unrest in Somalia, southern Sudan and Ethiopia. In recent years, refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and Uganda have also arrived in Kenya. From peak of 420,000 in 1992, the refugee population is now estimated at just over 200,000, most of whom are confined to two settlements: Dadaab, near the Somali border, and Kakuma, near the Sudan border. There are approximately 120,000 refugees (mostly Somali), in Dadaab, with the remaining 80,000 (75 percent Sudanese) in Kakuma. The original protracted relief operation (PRO) beneficiary figure was 178,000, but further influxes from Somalia and Sudan in 1999 have required an upward revision.
2. WFP has provided basic food commodities under four emergency operations and six PROs, including the current PRO which was approved for two years (October 1998-September 2000) at a total cost of US\$41,711,228.
3. UNHCR remains the lead agency, overseeing camp management, food distribution, and provision of non-food items and social services as well as its usual protection role. The 1997 revised WFP/UNHCR MOU, however, requires greater involvement of WFP in the monitoring and evaluation of food commodities and a more proactive role in ensuring optimum use of resources. In this regard, the Joint WFP/UNHCR evaluation was an opportunity to review food assistance to the Kenya refugee programme and levels of cooperation between the two agencies. Although the particular focus of the evaluation is the current PRO, the team also assessed the impact of the long-term assistance provided since 1991.
4. The immediate objectives of the PRO are to: a) ensure access to a basic ration for all registered refugees through the distribution of a general ration; b) maintain or improve the health and nutritional status of malnourished children, usually under 5, and expectant and nursing mothers, through selective feeding programmes; c) in Kakuma only, provide food through the school nutrition programme to maintain or improve the nutritional status of schoolchildren who require additional energy and micronutrients; and d) increase the enrolment and attendance rate of girls in primary school through providing empty food containers.

OVERALL APPRAISAL

5. For UNHCR, WFP and NGO partners, for nine years the refugee programme in Kenya has been characterized by protracted relief with little possibility of breaking the mould of dependency. Regional wars show no sign of abating, the forecast for large-scale repatriation is not promising and resettlement provides a solution for relatively few. Moreover, the camp populations are not static. While new influxes require assistance and protection, they also cause intermittent shocks to the precarious food and economic security of a basically sedentary camp population.
6. The Joint WFP/UNHCR/Donor food needs assessment missions (JFNAMs)² and the commissioned household food economy studies (Save the Children Fund—SCF)³ both

² The last JFNAM was conducted in October/November 1997.



confirm the centrality of food aid and the necessity to continue with full general rations. A relief paradigm prevails because local politics, camp environment, socio-economic conditions and government policy together prevent any real opportunity for alternative sustainable solutions. Food aid is, and always has been, essential to refugee survival, both for consumption and as a commodity of exchange. The issue is one of entitlement as well as usage. Indeed, arrangements to deliver general food rations to over 200,000 refugees twice a month has focused the attention of operational agencies, rendering complementary self-reliance programmes as simply 'additional' rather than determinate of the programme as a whole.

7. Traditionally, refugee self-reliance is contingent upon external economic opportunities—integration, trading, mobility, employment, and the like. In Kakuma and Dadaab camps, enforced containment and the lack of durable solutions forces one to examine the extent to which an internal economy might be viable. All stakeholders, including refugees themselves, agree that political and economic inequalities—usually along ethnic, clan and gender lines—exist within the camps, reflective in part of the country of origin. The question is whether the degree and extent of stratification justify a radical reappraisal of food aid priorities. This would be expensive and probably dangerous. General food distribution is not a 'sectoral' activity; it pervades and determines most other activities within the camps. Changes, however small, have ramifications for welfare and security, as well as for resources.
8. Nevertheless, refugee initiatives over the last few years should be encouraged and developed further, using food aid in more innovative ways. WFP has successfully used empty food bags as an incentive for school girl attendance and as a critical resource for the construction of additional classrooms. If, however, a break from general food distribution—even if very localized—is to be considered, it should not be undertaken without clear indicators of vulnerability and targeting. The sale and exchange of WFP food commodities within the refugee community should be more fully understood. And, perhaps most importantly, greater efforts should be made to understand and distinguish between the various ethnic groups within the camps so as to identify their respective potential. For example, the potential for skills development and food for work within the Sudanese community in Kakuma was greater and arguably more necessary than within the Somali community in Dadaab.
9. The mission found no major fault in the planning and execution of PRO 4961. When measured against its own objectives, the programme has been successful. Although temporary pipeline problems—and, indeed, some nutritional problems—resulted from the El Niño flooding in 1998, a more or less constant food supply to the camps has been assured. In 1998 the general ration was increased from 1,900 Kcal/person/day to 2,100 in accordance with international standards. The mission believes that the full ration should be maintained for all refugees in both settlements.

Refugee Numbers and Registration

10. Registration problems, such as recycling of refugees, new influxes, 'ghost cards' and the like have occurred throughout the history of the programme and continue to be of central concern to UNHCR and WFP. Due to recurring problems in the countries of origin, the planning figure governing the current PRO (178,000) does not correspond to the

³ SCF-UK conducted food economy assessments in Dadaab and Kakuma in September 1996, updated in September 1997 and again in September 1999.



operational figure of just over 200,000. In Kakuma, UNHCR's registration of new arrivals is well established, with a referral reception centre in Lokichoggio. In Dadaab, there was no significant increase in numbers until 1999 when 11,000 to 12,000 new arrivals followed violent upheavals in Somalia (Kismayo). The Somalia border closure (August 1999) has not abated this flow.

11. With daily influxes in Dadaab, UNHCR is unable to establish an effective registration procedure in the camp. Screening at the border reception centre at Liboi is the only viable option and there is an urgency to re-open this centre following its closure in August 1999. The mission further noted the intention of the Government to introduce refugee identity cards, as proposed in the Draft Refugee Bill which will greatly facilitate a more accurate assessment of numbers and minimize the problem of recycling. This will not, however, be in place for at least another year.
12. A card revalidation exercise planned for October-November 1999 should permit more accurate figures for both Kakuma and Dadaab. However, problems still occur which cannot be adequately dealt with through the revalidation process. For example, the ethnic continuity between Somali refugees and Kenyan nationals in Dadaab has created a situation in which some registered refugees do not live in the camps while some Kenyan nationals are registered as refugees.

General Distribution

13. Prior to July 1995 (Expansion 2 of the PRO) bulk distribution of food through camp elders and/or leaders had been undertaken and problems of food diversion were recognized. This was, however, at a time when the planning figure was in excess of 350,000. Of these, 182,000 were in coastal and border camps where the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) was responsible for distribution. With Expansion 2 of the PRO came the family head ("ration shop") distribution system, first introduced in Dadaab, then in Kakuma and coastal camps. Today, with a considerable reduction in numbers and the hosting of all refugees in the two settlements of Kakuma and Dadaab, the situation is more stabilized.
14. The mission believes that inappropriate staff time is taken in the distribution process, particularly in Kakuma. Currently, reportedly mainly for security reasons, food distribution in both camps is carried out on a bi-monthly basis. The result is that implementing partners utilize staff and resources exclusively for distribution to the detriment of other programmes. In Kakuma, for instance, school attendance drops during distribution, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) shelter provision programme is undermined by lack of transport and social services staff, and vehicles are monopolized twice a month for five days.
15. The solution lies in a combination of: a) increasing the capacity of the distribution centres; b) moving to a once-monthly distribution; and c) having alternative extended delivery point (EDP) storage to reduce in-camp transport costs. For the latter, discussions are already under-way on the pros and cons of developing EDP stores in each of the three Kakuma camps. If security is ensured, this might cut the cost and time of distribution; however, EDP management is currently under WFP and there are staff implications for opening three rather than one EDP. The mission questioned why EDP management in Kakuma was under WFP, whereas in Dadaab it was under the implementing partner (CARE). Food distribution modalities as a whole should be revisited urgently and the cost-effectiveness of several options explored.



Post-distribution Monitoring

16. In accordance with international standards, WFP increased the food basket from 1900 to 2,100 Kcal/person/day from the first quarter of 1998. According to the food basket monitoring reports of WFP and *Médecins sans frontières*-Belgium (MSF-B), this has been consistently maintained.
17. However, post-distribution monitoring is limited to: a) market price indicators collected regularly by WFP in both settlements; and b) checking of the food basket at the end of the distribution line by MSF-B in Dadaab.
18. Due to the lack of alternative income-generating opportunities and the deficiency in complementary foods, refugees are compelled to sell some of their ration to diversify their diet and buy non-food items. Without a comprehensive and regular study of household food consumption patterns, it is not possible to know how much of the 2,100 Kcal is actually consumed and how much is sold for other foodstuffs. WFP cannot, therefore, measure the impact of the food basket increase.

Empty Food Containers

19. WFP has used empty food containers (sacks and oil tins) in a number of innovative ways in Kakuma and Dadaab. In Dadaab, for instance, between October 1998 and July 1999, WFP distributed 778,069 sacks and 210,770 tins for various purposes. First, the sacks (with a market value of 8-10 Kenyan shillings each) were distributed to girls in schools to encourage enrolment and regular attendance. From 1993 to 1999 girl attendance in primary schools rose from 1,524 to 8,295, in part attributable to this incentive programme. Sacks and tins were also distributed within the various income generating and skills programmes in both refugee settlements, again to encourage female attendance.
20. The most impressive use of empty containers has been in Dadaab, where WFP raised 2.52 million Kshill by selling them to CARE, then using the money to construct 33 classrooms from October 1998 to August 1999. In addition, 91,456 tins were used in constructing school walls and latrines. In Kakuma, they have also been used for home roof construction by unaccompanied Sudanese minors.
21. Ironically, it is the continuance of mass food distribution which lends itself, through its by-products, to the generation of additional refugee income as well as low-cost construction materials.

NUTRITIONAL ISSUES

Nutritional Indicators

22. Trends in acute malnutrition have been consistently monitored in Dadaab and Kakuma through the use of weight-for-height (W/H) parameters. Data gathered over the last eight years indicate a significant reduction in moderate and severe malnutrition in both camps for children under 5. For example, in Dadaab, the rate of global malnutrition (<80 percent W/H of the median) decreased from about 35 percent in 1992 to under 10 percent in 1999, and severe acute malnutrition (<70 percent W/H of the median) from 8.2 percent to under 2 percent in the same period. The difference noted in the nutritional status and mortality decline between Dadaab and Kakuma could partly be explained by the difference in the quality of services provided. The mission felt in particular that the



International Rescue Committee's curative medical services in Kakuma were not of a sufficiently high standard.

23. The weight-for-height parameter measures only acute changes in nutritional status which may occur spontaneously for a number of reasons including food intake, infections, lack of proper child care, etc. It does not measure the level of chronic malnutrition which is a manifestation of long-term food insufficiency.

The Food Basket and Complementary Foods

24. Although corn-soya blend (CSB) is included in the food basket, education on its cooking and storage has been inadequate. Thus, the loss of some of its micronutrient content, such as Vitamin C, is highly likely.
25. Micronutrient deficiencies, especially iron deficiency, is still of major concern in the two settlements, and unless some serious action is taken to improve the quality of the food basket with complementary foods the problem will persist. UNHCR pledges of complementary food items have not ever been met, primarily due to shortage of funds and partly due to logistic problems. Apart from external supply, productive activities such as horticulture together with food preparation, processing and preservation should be explored.

Selective Feeding

26. Children under 5 who fall between 70 and 80 percent W/H of the median reference value are eligible for dry supplementary ration which provides about 850-900 Kcal/person/day. Children with less than 70 percent W/H are admitted to the hospital for wet therapeutic feeding with high-density foods (dried skim milk (DSM)+oil+sugar) providing about 1,300 Kcal/person/day along with other necessary medical attention. When their condition improves, they are transferred to the day-care centres, where they continue to receive wet feeding and the necessary medical care until they reach 75 percent W/H. Thereafter, they join the supplementary feeding programme.
27. The default and readmission rates for supplementary feeding are high in Kakuma. As in the case of all take-home feeding programmes, there is no control over sharing of the supplementary ration with other family members. Yet, there appears to be more emphasis on food provision and less on the educational components such as breast feeding, weaning, etc. This could partly be explained by the low level of knowledge and training of the field personnel, who are usually from the refugee community.
28. The mission observed that, due to staff shortages, therapeutic and day-care feeding have not been properly supervised and the educational component is negligible in both settlements.
29. Supplementary feeding aimed at expectant and nursing mothers, and debilitated patients such as tuberculosis and AIDS. has been irregular and unsystematic. In Kakuma, supplementary feeding to ante-natal and post-natal women is based on individual assessment, while in Dadaab it has just been reintroduced to all after an interruption for over a year.



Unaccompanied Minors in Kakuma

30. A one-year cooked meal feeding programme was started in all schools in Kakuma towards the end of 1997, mainly in response to concerns over levels of malnutrition and anaemia among unaccompanied Sudanese ‘minors’, usually boys.⁴ Discrimination solely in favour of these boys would have been inappropriate, so the feeding programme, begun in September 1997, was for all 17,000 schoolchildren, 25 percent of whom were girls. A study conducted by the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) in 1998 found that although the prevalence of anaemia among adolescent boys was high, it was neither different from the rate observed among accompanied Sudanese adolescents, nor from that of any community in Africa. Since no surveys have been undertaken after the CDC study, it has not been possible to measure the impact of the school feeding programme. Indeed, as has been found in many other similar programmes, measuring the impact of such a specific intervention is extremely difficult, given so many other variables.
31. There are population groups more vulnerable than the grown-up minors, and it would be hard to justify the continuation of this intervention on nutritional grounds alone without supportive evidence. In effect, what was initially a nutritional intervention has become an institutional feeding programme with a quite different scope. The SCF-UK Food Economy Update for Kakuma noted that school feeding ‘could play an important role in meeting minimum calorific requirements of children in poorer households’. Given that since the initial 12-month feeding programme a further 12 months have already passed by, UNHCR, WFP and implementing partners should urgently review the objectives and benefits of the programme.
32. Many of the unaccompanied ‘minors’ are growing vegetables using waterstand spillage, but whether this important additional source of nutrition is sold, consumed, or exchanged is not known.

SELF-RELIANCE STRATEGIES

Trade in Food Commodities

33. The general consensus among refugee and agency representatives is that self reliance on anything more than a piecemeal basis is not a viable option for people within a closed and barren environment. Integration as a durable solution has not been pursued by the Government, though the mission found a surprising level of economic integration between refugees and local populations. In Dadaab in particular, a large number of Kenyans act as ‘middlemen’ for trade in food commodities between the camps and regional towns. In Kakuma, Turkana people will purchase small quantities of rations from refugees and subsequently sell them at the local markets.
34. Post-distribution monitoring on a bi-monthly basis has to date included regular commodity pricing in local markets by WFP. In addition, CARE in Dadaab and LWF (through Don Bosco and JRS) in Kakuma have encouraged skills development and income-generating activities, some of which have an external market. In Dadaab, for instance, loans are given to some refugees setting up business in the market which in turn relates to the ‘export’ of food items. It is estimated that up to 20 percent of WFP food items are sold by refugees so as to obtain other essential commodities (including different

⁴LWF now puts the figure at 1,381.



foods). What is not known, however, is the manner and scale of such trade and what impact this has upon the refugee community as a whole. The mission believes it is necessary to have a much clearer picture of the *internal* economy of the refugee camps and the *external* economy *vis-à-vis* Kenyan traders. Regular monitoring of trade between the camps and local towns should determine levels of 'exported' food and whether these are within acceptable levels.

Food for Work

35. The mission believes it is useful to designate three basic refugee categories in terms of wealth and access to resources: those with trading opportunities, those with job opportunities, and those with no income opportunities. It is clear that those in a relatively higher earning bracket are few⁵ and a strategy of discriminatory food distribution is simply not feasible because: a) the most vulnerable form a large majority; b) although not a tested hypothesis, resistance to discriminatory food distribution may provoke security incidents; and c) the social dynamics of the camps would probably 'rebalance' food distribution in such a way that the most vulnerable would be no better off.
36. Targeting food through alternative mechanisms such as food for work—including, for instance, skills development and environmental improvement—might, nevertheless, be possible on a limited scale. The mission believes that the scope for pilot projects of this kind is more apparent in Kakuma than in Dadaab. For example, water catchment projects for extending vegetable gardens is an area in which the Sudanese community in particular might benefit. However, any infrastructural improvement works should be undertaken with the close cooperation and involvement of the local Kenyan authorities and efforts made to include the most destitute Turkana in such schemes.

Income Generation

37. To obtain non-food items refugees must sell part of their food rations. Most of the NGO training programmes are not geared towards 'marketable' skills within the camps, but rather towards employment skills 'upon return'. The production of low-cost basic items such as shoes, clothes, soap, etc. has not been a priority. Skills training should be reoriented in this direction, with some incentives provided for those participating in training.

GENDER PRIORITIES

38. The summary gender-disaggregated figures at 1 September 1999 for Dabaab and Kakuma are as follows:

	Total population	Female under 18	Female over 18	Female % of total
Kakuma	81 343	16 251	16 720	40.5
Dadaab	122 712	28 802	27 725	46

⁵ The SCF-UK Food Economy Updates indicate that this group has increased in the last three years to about 10-15 percent.



39. WFP's Commitments to Women require positive action in favour of women at all levels of programming. In Kakuma and Dadaab there are three main areas in which gender-specific programming takes place:
- a) **Distribution.** WFP, UNHCR and its implementing partners have made concerted efforts to encourage a greater number of women to collect rations on behalf of their family. There has been an increase in female attendance at distribution, but this should be understood taking into account the fact that: i) in Dadaab, there is a cultural preference for Somali women to collect food anyway; and ii) in both sites, women are not necessarily given priority at the distribution sites themselves.
 - b) **Participation.** The mission noted an encouraging increase in female membership in all community participation structures and committees, including the acceptance of women as 'spokespersons' for their ethnic groups. Sudanese female participation in Kakuma, however, remains low.
 - c) **Gender-specific violence.** Implementing partners in Kakuma (LWF) and Dadaab (CARE) have each formed female focus groups which address issues of violence, theft and banditry.
40. Women's groups frequently express concern over the number of sexual attacks occurring during the collection of firewood outside the camps. In Dadaab in 1998, 149 cases of sexual violence were reported to UNHCR. This dropped to 45 in the period January-August 1999. Since July 1998, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) has distributed 25 percent of firewood needs to all families. However, no correlation between firewood distribution and the reduction in sexual attacks can be established because: a) reported cases are not disaggregated—i.e. they occur both inside and outside the camps; and b) GTZ's own November–December 1998 survey showed relatively few women going outside the camps solely for firewood, and concluded that great care should be taken in arguing for this correlation.
41. Establishing a link between firewood collection and rape incidence has been important because in 1998 a US\$1.5 million grant from the United States Department of State (Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration) was channelled by UNHCR through GTZ for the firewood distribution programme, primarily premised on the above correlation. Notwithstanding the seriousness of rape crimes and insecurity in the camps as a whole, it should also be recalled that within its resettlement programme (and the United States Government's own selection criteria), UNHCR gives preference to victims of sexual violence, and some abuse of this system has been noted.
42. Approximately 3,000 refugee incentive workers (i.e. those paid by aid agencies), 40 percent of them women, were employed from 1997–98 by NGOs for positions in education, community health, security and food handling and distribution. Their income from these activities was estimated at about US\$29 per month. UNHCR states that although the number of incentive workers dropped following cuts to its budget in 1998, these incentives represent between 15 and 20 percent of its budget filtered through NGOs. This, coupled with WFP's specific input of incentives for many of these schemes, represents a significant additional non-food strategy for improved livelihoods.

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

43. An important economic category among refugees is that of incentive workers. In Dadaab, the number has decreased from 1,730 in 1996 to 1,283 in 1999. In Kakuma in the



same period, the figure has risen from 1,150 to 1,350. Taking into account population increases in both camps since 1996, the percentage of incentive workers has dropped significantly. NGOs point to cuts in the UNHCR budget in 1997 as the prime reason for reducing the number of paid workers, though the mission found that restructuring and rationalization of services were in some cases necessary and have not significantly affected the quality of the programme.

44. Mechanisms for community participation and management put in place by NGO implementing partners include:

- *In Kakuma*—the Group Leaders (drawn from each of the main eight ethnic groups) participate in all sectoral meetings and are the key to community liaison and information sharing. There are weekly meetings covering protection and community services. In addition, food aid issues are relayed through the Food Advisory Committee. The Group Leader mechanism does not correspond to services delivered at the group level; rather, these are done at individual levels. The process of food distribution, for example, does not allow any level of community responsibility or reinforcement of positive cultural values in the identification of those most in need.
- *In Dadaab*—CARE's Community Self-Management (CSM) programme, in which refugees take an active part in managing and implementing all sectoral activities, was introduced in 1998 with the aim of promoting greater participation and self-reliance. The CSM programme is perhaps wrongly presented as a 'self reliance' strategy. In food distribution, for example, its management component is one of implementing, through voluntary labour, what previously had been done through incentive workers. The emphasis is on service delivery rather than empowerment.

REFUGEES AND THE LOCAL POPULATION

45. Since the establishment in 1991 of the Kakuma refugee settlement, the local population has grown from about 5,000 to 30,000–40,000. In Dadaab, the population has grown from about 800 in 1992 to more than 10,000 (18,000 in the district as a whole) today. In Dadaab, ethnic allegiances (usually along clan lines) and related trading have ensured something of a symbiosis between camp and local populations. This is not the case in Kakuma. Here, the local Turkana population, following years of successive drought and lack of investment in infrastructure, are considerably worse off than refugees. Indeed, food distribution in Kakuma creates a magnet for Turkana pastoralists (particularly women and children) keen to benefit from small-scale labour, petty trading and even begging.
46. The environmental damage caused by refugee settlement in Kakuma may have been more severe than in Dadaab. WFP's Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) Unit concluded in September 1999 that food-for-work projects in areas such as reforestation, water management and sanitation would improve conditions for the local population while lessening tensions between them and the refugees.



COORDINATION, PLANNING AND STAFFING

Joint Planning

47. The joint UNHCR/WFP Memorandum of Understanding, revised in 1997, requires close cooperation in the planning of camp activities. The mission found this to be the case, but was concerned that no camp-level joint plan was being followed in respect of: a) inter-agency coordination; b) the development of monitoring indicators; and c) a phase-down strategy which may be envisaged in the long run. The 1997 WFP/UNHCR/Donor JFNAM recommended that a Joint Plan of Action be prepared, and updated on a quarterly basis, for Dadaab and Kakuma. Although the requirement of a quarterly update is perhaps unrealistic, the Plan was drafted only once in Dadaab (1997) and not at all in Kakuma.
48. The mission reiterated the importance of a forward-looking Joint Plan of Action with an emphasis on projected outcomes and mutually agreed agency roles. It should be re-negotiated and redrafted every 12 months.

WFP Staff Capacity

49. In 1997 the revised UNHCR/WFP MOU came into effect, demanding negotiating parity at the field level. Yet, to date WFP has fielded a staff member in Kakuma who is junior in relation to UNHCR, creating some problems in the realization of the MOU. Where there are differences of opinion (for instance, in the level of NGO involvement in the preparation of the Joint Plan of Action), UNHCR's opinion has prevailed. The upgrading of WFP staff was only recognized as an issue after the approval (in May 1998) of the fourth expansion of PRO 4961, which means that any changes can be effected only after the end of the current phase of the PRO (September 2000).
50. The three camps in Kakuma are covered by only two field monitors (Kenyan women on SSA contracts). They are responsible for food monitoring and the following of gender priorities. Although they are well trained and competent, at least one more field monitor should be appointed so that each camp can be adequately covered. Likewise, with the imminent erection of two additional rubbhalls, bringing the total to eight, it may be necessary to employ at least one more EDP clerk. In summary, staff and equipment, including vehicles, are insufficient for the current workload in Kakuma. Although computers and vehicles have been purchased, they are held up for months in Mombassa pending government release.

MOU and Staff Capacity

51. Changes to the UNHCR/WFP Memorandum of Understanding (latest draft 1997) indicate increased responsibility for WFP, particularly in respect of joint monitoring, programme design and the setting of food aid priorities. This, combined with WFP's Commitments to Women, implies an upgrading and increase in staff numbers. Currently, WFP field staff are disadvantaged in three key respects: first, in Dadaab and Kakuma, the heads of sub-offices are junior to UNHCR's equivalent; second, field monitors have been given inadequate training in their enhanced roles; and third, the increase in the work load is not reflected in staff numbers. There has been some confusion between UNHCR and WFP over the respective roles of each, with UNHCR not fully understanding its joint responsibility, for example, for post-distribution and household-level monitoring.



52. The mission recognized that global financial constraints have determined staffing and resources not only at the camp level but also throughout the programme. This has implications for security, vehicle allocations and training. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the mission further recognizes that measured purely in terms of commodity delivery and staffing, the programme is more cost-effective than similar WFP programmes worldwide.

RECOMMENDATIONS

General

53. A full general food ration of 2,100 Kcal/person/day should be maintained for all refugees in both settlements.

Refugee Registration

54. UNHCR should liaise with local authorities and re-establish, as a matter of urgency, the Liboi (border) reception centre for screening new refugees from Somalia. Refugees should not be registered at the camps.
55. UNHCR should encourage the swift introduction of refugee identity cards in line with government policy and provide appropriate resources to this effect.
56. UNHCR and WFP, with the support of the Government, should jointly establish procedures for assessing the magnitude and consequences of registration abuses.

Food Distribution

57. In Kakuma in particular, UNHCR, WFP and implementing partners should revisit the whole issue of the food distribution, bearing in mind security concerns. An inter-agency review should take into account the following variables:
- a) the return to a monthly distribution;
 - b) a concomitant effort to improve community security to ensure the safety of household food stocks;
 - c) a cost/benefit analysis of having one EDP in each camp; and
 - d) an assessment of relative costs/benefits of WFP versus implementing partner as the EDP manager.
58. In line with the requirements of the UNHCR/WFP MOU, a regular household food security surveillance system should be established on a sample basis in order to monitor consumption patterns, diet diversification, intra-family food distribution, etc.

Nutritional Indicators

59. Now that the majority of the refugee population is no longer in an acute emergency, it would be advisable to include in the annual surveys additional parameters such as age-for-height, body mass index (BMI) of adults and low birth weight which will enable measurement of chronic malnutrition.
60. More technical input is necessary to improve the health and nutrition surveillance system in Kakuma, far beyond that of occasional consultancy advice currently provided. In



Dadaab, the recording, data collection analysis, interpretation and utilization by MSF-B are very professional. The same standards should be required in Kakuma.

The Food Basket and Complementary Food

61. UNHCR should urgently examine ways to enhance education and demonstration on cooking of CSB to prevent loss of micronutrients during preparation.
62. UNHCR should make sufficient resource allocations to regularize the supply of complementary foods. In addition, UNHCR should further study ways of increasing local production, including processing and preservation methods.

Selective Feeding

63. For both settlements, UNHCR and other implementing partners should increase efforts to educate mothers on child feeding.
64. A nutrition working group should be setup among those involved in nutrition to establish appropriate admission criteria. Subject to further discussion within the working group, the mission suggests gradually lowering the criteria of admission to <75 percent W/H, with discharge at >80 percent W/H. Simultaneously, the characteristics of the families who default and those with high rates of re-admission should be studied and priority given to these families during home visits.
65. UNHCR and WFP should require from the implementing partner an evaluation of the selective feeding programme (SFP) two years after the above changes are implemented. Consideration should then be given to moving away from selective feeding towards general ration distribution, while maintaining the therapeutic feeding programme and intensified nutrition education to mothers. In order to do so, a well organized recording system of admissions, defaulters, re-admissions, length of stay, etc. is necessary along with strict monthly compilation.
66. UNHCR and implementing partners should review their procedures in the following manner:
 - a) Supplementary feeding for expectant mothers should be given on the basis of nutritional assessment.
 - b) For nursing mothers, a ration card for the newborn should be provided immediately after delivery. This will enable mothers, who receive food rations, to improve their diet and produce more milk for the baby until weaning age. This approach gives the mother a better opportunity to diversify her diet through the purchase of nutritious foods such as meat, milk, vegetables, etc.

Unaccompanied Minors in Kakuma

67. UNHCR, WFP and implementing partners should review the objectives of the school feeding programme, measure, if possible, the impact of the original specific nutritional intervention, and, in the light of this evidence, assess options available for its continuance or otherwise.
68. The link between vegetable production, consumption and nutritional education in the schools should be established so that Sudanese boys in particular become aware of the nutritional value of the limited resources available to them.



Trade in Food Commodities

69. UNHCR/WFP should undertake a regular monitoring of trading relations between refugees, 'middlemen' and Kenyan suppliers/purchasers. This should include an analysis of: a) the relative importance of food aid as an exchange commodity; and b) whether the amount of food (and non-food) aid 'exported' from the camps is consistent with anecdotal evidence of acceptable levels of exchange (and if not, why not).

Food for Work

70. A feasibility study should be undertaken for a pilot food-for-work scheme in Kakuma based on water catchment (from seasonal floods) and the extension of vegetable growing along the river bank. This should include a cost/benefit analysis, including an assessment of community participation in monitoring and management and resource implications for WFP and UNHCR.

Income Generation

71. As a step towards generating income within the confines of the camp, skills training should be reoriented towards marketable low-cost products. There should also be some incentive for those participating in training, and materials for such purposes should be provided free of charge.

Gender Priorities

72. The findings and recommendations of the UNHCR/WFP Gender Study undertaken in 1997–98 should be revised, updated and made available to all partner agencies.
73. A security assessment should be undertaken by UNHCR in order to identify some of the major weaknesses in current arrangements. If the answer lies in community self-protection measures (night patrols, better fencing, etc.) a more integrated inter-agency approach to the problem should be planned and reflected in the annual Joint Plan of Action.

Community Participation

74. UNHCR and implementing partners should be encouraged to reassess the terminology and corresponding duties assigned to refugee participants so that a clear distinction is made between participation, self-management and empowerment.
75. Greater efforts should be made, particularly in Dadaab, to ensure that community representatives are not 'self-elected' and do not always represent the political or economic elite. Zonal-level representation might, for instance, be introduced.

Refugees and the Local Population

76. UNHCR, the Government, WFP and implementing partners should conduct a feasibility study on food-for-work projects that benefit the local Turkana population in Kakuma while addressing the negative impacts of long-term refugee settlement.

Coordination, Planning and Staffing

77. A Joint Plan of Action should be prepared (or updated in the case of Dadaab) by UNHCR, WFP and implementing partners with specific deadlines, indicating, *inter alia*:



- a) the delivery and distribution of food and non-food items for the forthcoming 12 months;
 - b) a set of monitoring indicators, a division of labour for adherence to these, and a reporting format;
 - c) a matrix of agency activities within the camps;
 - d) the setting of priorities for certain activities above others so that any financial cuts follow previously agreed patterns; and
 - e) a strategy in relation to several scenarios. These would include, *inter alia*: contingency planning in the event of major changes in refugee numbers, including large influxes; large-scale repatriation organized through UNHCR; the closure of camps for security reasons and/or by government edict; the enforced reduction of resources by donors; a change in food aid modalities towards greater self-sufficiency and a reduction in the general ration.
78. The Joint Plan of Action should be prepared with an emphasis on projected outcomes and mutually agreed agency roles. It should be renegotiated and redrafted every 12 months.
79. WFP should review in particular its camp staffing capacity in terms of numbers, training and seniority so as to adequately meet the demands of the MOU. It is further recommended that UNHCR and WFP, through the Joint Plan of Action and on a bilateral basis, urgently review the respective responsibilities of each agency at the field level, and ensure that this review is reflected in job descriptions, vehicle allocations, and the like.