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Programme  
Alimentaire  
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de Alimentos

Executive Board  
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## EVALUATION REPORTS

### Agenda item 3



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## SUMMARY REPORT OF TERMINAL EVALUATION OF PRO MALI 5804.00

Protracted food assistance for Malian refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons and those affected by conflict in northern Mali

Date of project approval	26 March 1997
Date plan of operations signed	2 July 1997
Date of initial distribution	December 1997
Duration of project	Eighteen months
Date of project termination	June 1999
Date of evaluation	November 1998
Mission composition	FAO/WFP <sup>1</sup>

#### Cost (United States dollars)

Total cost to WFP	14,000,610
Total food cost	6,401,406

In November 1998, one United States dollar equalled 560 CFA francs.

<sup>1</sup>The mission comprised an economist (team leader, FAO); a food security expert (FAO); a sociologist (FAO consultant); and a logistics expert (WFP). The full report is available on request, in French only.

## ABSTRACT

Resources have been used primarily for rehabilitation and development operations. Direct assistance for repatriation started with resources not used under the Mali 2231.04 project. PRO Mali 5804.00 is an extension of the multi-purpose rural development project Mali 2231.04. Comparatively speaking, there has been a considerable improvement in the management and targeting of food assistance. Activities carried out satisfied the mission and met WFP's basic development objectives. They have helped solve problems of food security, develop natural resource potential, and create productive and social infrastructure that will permit the implementation of regional development in the long term. However, the many requests for assistance have generated a dispersal of activities, going beyond the available technical management capacity, and imposing serious limits on planning and monitoring of operations.

## NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

**This document is submitted for consideration to the Executive Board.**

Pursuant to the decisions taken on the methods of work by the Executive Board at its First Regular Session of 1996, the documentation prepared by the Secretariat for the Board has been kept brief and decision-oriented. The meetings of the Executive Board are to be conducted in a business-like manner, with increased dialogue and exchanges between delegations and the Secretariat. Efforts to promote these guiding principles will continue to be pursued by the Secretariat.

The Secretariat therefore invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document, to contact the WFP staff member(s) listed below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting. This procedure is designed to facilitate the Board's consideration of the document in the plenary.

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## BACKGROUND

### Origins and objectives

1. In the early nineties, northern Mali was the scene of armed conflict between governmental forces and rebel factions, leading to major displacements of civilian populations. An estimated 150,000 Malians found refuge in Mauritania, Algeria, Niger and Burkina Faso. In addition to these refugees, 50,000 nomadic and settled persons were displaced within Mali as a result of fighting and insecurity. A further 100,000 persons affected by the conflict were unable to flee, while their productive and social assets were seriously damaged or destroyed.
2. WFP launched a regional protracted relief operation in favour of Malian refugees, returnees, displaced persons, and those affected by conflict (PRO 5804.00), with the overall objective of facilitating the return of refugees, and the resettlement as well as reintegration of internally displaced persons in their regions of origin (Mopti, Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu). The immediate objectives were to: a) meet the short-term food needs of returnees during the resettlement phase; b) improve food security conditions in the resettlement areas through collective works (food for work—FFW) and capacity-building (food for training—FFT); and c) increase food availability for the most vulnerable individuals in areas with a structural food deficit and who, since unsuitable for FFW, did not benefit from free food distribution from the National Food Security Stock (SNS).

### Food security and nutrition

3. Recent years have shown that, without a major climatic setback, Mali could be self-sufficient in basic food commodities. These consist mainly of cereals which make up 90 percent of the food ration. Despite a return to generally balanced cereal stocks, major problems remain. The overall causes of food insecurity are linked to extreme poverty, economic stagnation and production systems heavily dependent on climatic vagaries.
4. Food insecurity is primarily expressed in: a) the prevalence of malnutrition, particularly in groups at risk; b) agricultural areas which continue to show a regular production deficit, in addition to regions affected by a precarious situation and in which food deficits are frequent, mainly in the north of the country; c) major difficulty in disposing of marketable surpluses; and d) weak progress in diversifying food rations, with the exception of fortunate urban groups and rural areas with regular exports of agricultural products.
5. Among the populations of the northern regions, farmers who practise rainfed agriculture, farmers of terraced irrigated land not integrated with major projects, and pastoralists and agro-pastoralists are, to different degrees, vulnerable and consistently subject to food insecurity.

### Social context

6. Precarious living conditions in northern Mali, aggravated by a constant population growth, recurrent drought (1972–1984) and the distance of these areas from national decision-making centres help explain the outbreak of armed conflict in 1990. This revolt also had its roots in the younger generation questioning the strongly hierarchical traditional



Tuareg society, and in a sense of political marginalization of the northern regions and their exclusion from development plans.

7. The three northern regions (Mopti is not considered "north") are arid, but two (Timbuktu and Gao) are crossed by the River Niger, whose valley offers possibilities for intensifying agro-pastoral systems and rendering them more secure. Farm production systems in the northern regions are based on agriculture (rice, fodder production and vegetable gardens), livestock raising and fishing, and are generally concentrated in two distinct agro-ecological zones: the flooded area of the Niger delta at Mopti, where most of the population and cultivation are concentrated, and the rainfed areas which are watered by seasonal rains and are the favoured site for livestock raising.

## EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE—FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

### Overall appraisal

8. PRO Mali 5804.00 covers Mopti and the three northern regions of Mali. Most of the project's resources (84 percent) have been used for rehabilitation and development operations because the share allocated for direct aid for repatriation was reduced as a result of the early and spontaneous return of numerous refugees.<sup>1</sup> PRO Mali 5804.00 can therefore be seen as an extension of the former multi-purpose rural development project Mali 2231.04 which concentrated on these regions. Implementation of the PRO has been useful in considerably improving the effectiveness of food assistance for the development of the regions affected by the conflict, by introducing forms of joint management between the government (WFP's National Project Office—NPO—under the supervision of the Ministry of Rural Development and Water) and the WFP country office for Mali. Efforts to improve the targeting of activities and beneficiaries, as well as monitoring of operations, have produced convincing results. Improvements have been most noticeable in increased decentralization and awareness of responsibility in WFP's regional clusters in terms of resource programming and management, application of a new method for calculating rations more in line with the volume of work carried out, systematic identification of all beneficiary microprojects, and more rigorous monitoring of the transport of supplies up to the sites in which food assistance is deployed. This notable progress has been achieved thanks to the human and material resources available in the framework of a PRO marked by a reinforced operational and logistical management. With the necessary changes, these improvements could be repeated in the implementation of the Country Programme, many components of which are the same as those of PRO Mali 5804.00.
9. Rehabilitation and development activities carried out within the framework of the PRO were the basis of assistance—irrigated village perimeters (IVPs), dams, wells, reforestation, dune consolidation, vegetable gardens—and both satisfied the mission and met WFP's basic development objectives. Overall, they aimed at responding to problems of food security at the household level through the development of natural resource potential for increased agricultural production; they continued the efforts displayed in the

<sup>1</sup> Only 70 percent of the commitment envisaged for repatriation has been distributed. However, repatriation and resettlement of refugees had previously benefited from WFP assistance in the framework of project Mali 2231.04 (1,551 tons of food distributed).



emergency by linking rehabilitation and development; and they created productive and social infrastructure that will permit regional development in the long term.

10. Relatively limited, support to the development of human resources for training and assistance targeted to vulnerable groups do not represent a justifiable use of food assistance in the context of very worrying social indicators and a high level of food insecurity.
11. Food assistance is more efficiently used in the framework of projects that benefit from financial means and technical assistance. A systematic study has been carried out to link food assistance to these projects. Despite the results, the share of resources allocated to so-called "basic initiative" (BI) operations without a clearly defined technical framework still represents a relatively high proportion of allocations—around 35 percent—and this has led to a great number of requests that are difficult to analyse and monitor correctly. On the whole, and despite efforts made to provide a consonant structure, the dispersal of activities still characterizes FFW activities, and WFP's NPO managerial staff is reactive rather than active in terms of activities to be carried out. This does not encourage the programming and thought necessary for a strategy of action in a given sector of intervention and weakens WFP's position as the only real negotiator and partner in the running of development operations.

## Relevance of objectives and results achieved

### Overall objectives

12. In its design, the PRO targeted in a privileged fashion resettlement sites for returnees (former refugees were to account for 50 percent of all beneficiaries of FFW activities). The project did not maintain records allowing identification of beneficiaries according to their status as former refugees, but it seems clear that the proportion of returnees covered by the project is lower than envisaged. The main reason was the limited absorption capacity of resettlement sites. Moreover, in the post-conflict situation, assistance could not be concentrated on a fraction of the population and the totally justifiable approach adopted was to contribute to regional development as the basis for reconciliation and integration.
13. The operation envisaged allocating 53 percent of food assistance to FFW activities. This objective has been largely exceeded in proportion to the duration of the project (see table in the Annex). However, the relative importance of the PRO's development activities responds more to circumstances than to deliberate choice. In fact, when the PRO started in December 1997, the major part of returnee movement had already taken place. A sizeable quantity of food assistance was therefore available for the development component in a relatively short period corresponding to an emergency operation. Major efforts were made to clarify and improve the procedures for identifying microprojects and, in general terms, organization and management of operations. However, use of a considerable volume of available food assistance in the short period of the emergency operation was marked by a lack of planning and difficult monitoring of activities.
14. The initial objective of the development component (including FFW and FFT) was to improve food security conditions in resettlement areas, giving priority to activities in agricultural production and livestock raising. Objectives and related activities were not sufficiently well-defined in the project document and covered a wide range of interventions: education, community health, irrigation, income-generating activities, environment, livestock raising. The increase in objectives led to a certain dispersal of



activities, characteristic of multi-purpose projects, which made it difficult to plan and programme activities even though this was necessary for greater effectiveness. This dispersal and variety of interventions contributed to making management of the PRO cumbersome, monitoring difficult, and to increasing logistical costs.

### ***Agricultural production***

15. The application of FFW has been most important in the sectors of construction and/or rehabilitation of hydro-agricultural works. Most interventions concerned controlled or semi-controlled irrigation projects aimed at exploiting the river and its internal delta (IVPs, development of ponds and lakes). For these works, FFW support was generally offered within the framework of projects already benefiting from external assistance, thus guaranteeing adequate technical management. The main benefits achieved were an increase in food production yields (mainly rice) and rendering food supplies more secure (production primarily for consumption). The second level of intervention concerned reclamation of lowlands through reparation of dams and/or dykes in areas distant from the river. These activities permitted the inauguration of a system of producing food for consumption which previously had not been possible or had been uncertain. For beneficiary populations, these works constituted a fundamental investment in improving their food security, and contributed to keeping them in their settings, though they benefit little from training and supervision.
16. Field visits and discussions with beneficiaries and their representatives identified a number of commonly encountered problems: a) hydro-agricultural works need technical support which, if lacking, jeopardizes investments; b) the economic feasibility of investments was given little emphasis or was not even considered in the choice of microprojects; c) supplementary technical support is necessary for certain populations, primarily nomads in the process of settling down, because cultural techniques are not always known or well-mastered.

### ***Environment***

17. FFW-supported activities are in the areas of reforestation, biological and mechanical consolidation of dunes, and preparation of stone cordons. All these activities meet the objectives of arable land protection and soil regeneration, and have been recognized as effective if well run and crucial for sustainable development in the northern regions, where desert encroachment and soil impoverishment constitute the main obstacles to development. However, FFW support in this field has been relatively fragmentary and, as a result, has had limited impact. In addition, the effectiveness of some operations has not always been assured because of the lack of technical support. In terms of reforestation, the choice of species to plant has not always corresponded to soil conditions or the needs of the population. On occasion, management of reforested areas has lacked definition.

### ***Livestock raising***

18. Livestock raising is the dominant activity in the regions covered by the PRO and pastoralism characterized the lifestyle of most refugees prior to exile. Degeneration of roads as a result of a combination of repeated drought and excessive grazing has led to a process of settling down. Forms of activity aimed at promoting livestock raising, and consonant with FFW support, are limited. Regeneration of grazing land, construction of





vaccination centres and abattoirs, and drilling of pastoral wells were supported within the framework of the PRO. However, despite the potentially significant impact of these activities, mainly those related to the regeneration of grazing land, operations carried out were small-scale because of the priority given by pastoral populations to settling down and the difficulty of mobilizing populations with a pastoral tradition around collective activities.

### **Social infrastructure**

19. Most of the activity in this sector was carried out in partnership with UNHCR in the framework of rehabilitation of returnee sites. A water source, health centre and school were considered fundamental elements of site rehabilitation. Most FFW resources went into well construction and rehabilitation, and around 200 sites have been put in place. There have been technical problems in implementation, due to difficult soil conditions, lack of infrastructure and limited capacity of executing partners.

### **Role of food assistance**

#### **Food assistance and FFW**

20. Food assistance plays a clear stimulating/facilitating role, above all in high labour-intensive activities such as hydro-agricultural works, but also in projects that do not benefit or benefit little from external aid. For investment activities, food assistance represents crucial support, without which it would be difficult to mobilize the community. In rural settings, the value of a family ration is fixed at around 650 CFA francs on average and represents 65 percent of the daily wage of a seasonal agricultural worker. Given the weak cost of work opportunities, reflecting the rare possibilities of employment in the project intervention areas, WFP assistance has thus represented a substantial transfer of income for project beneficiaries.
21. Calculation of the number of food rations to be distributed is based on technical work norms corresponding to types of activity but is independent of number of participants. Communities are totally responsible for the organization of distribution. Without monitoring and a specific study of this sector, it is difficult to establish the relationship between quantity of food distributed and the work performed by beneficiaries. Some communities have placed the emphasis on having the greatest number possible of individuals participate. Generally speaking, therefore, it is difficult to estimate the nutritional impact and per capita transfer of income represented by food rations. It should be stressed that the PRO was launched after the very bad harvest of 1997/98 which badly affected most of the population in the regions covered by the project. In this context, FFW beneficiaries identified food assistance as a major contribution to improving their short-term food security.

#### **Food assistance and FFT**

22. The project document only touches on training activities and contains no real definition of intervention strategy. Only 114 tons of food were distributed within the framework of FFT, accounting for 1.5 percent of total food distribution. Training activities were supported in the fields of literacy, health, hygiene and agriculture, and the beneficiaries were almost exclusively women. Generally speaking, training lacked measures of support and food assistance acted as a major incentive. Within the framework of FFT activities,



“inter-community meetings” have also been supported. Organized by UNHCR, these meetings aim to promote dialogue to reinforce the peace process. It was decided not to continue support for such meetings because their growth in scale exceeded the means and scope of intervention.

### **Food assistance and free food distribution (FFD)**

23. The objective of this component was to increase the availability of food during the bridging period for the most vulnerable individuals living in structurally food-deficit areas and who, because of their unsuitability for FFW assistance, did not benefit from the general food distribution operations of the SNS. Out of 1,000 tons allocated for this component, only 18 percent was distributed, partly because of the lack of a clear definition of target groups. In practice, it proved difficult to apply the objective outlined in the project document without superimposing interventions on an existing mechanism, already recognized as effective, which offers free food distribution (in rare and last-resort cases) and subsidized sales on a case-by-case basis.
24. While maintaining vulnerable groups as its target, this component has been used to meet diverse and ad hoc requests: school meals (full or supplementary rations), meals in orphanages or centres for the disabled, supplementary rations for nutrition centres supported by other partners, relief operations. Food assistance constitutes a crucial food contribution for such beneficiaries. In fact, in most cases (the disabled and orphans), no other alternative is possible or available. Operations carried out under this component use small volumes of assistance whose short-term impact on beneficiaries is substantial.

### **Beneficiaries**

25. Beneficiary populations of the project are divided among the four northern regions which, by themselves, make up two thirds of the country's surface area. Most of the population is Songhoy (basically "river people" and farmers), Peul (both farmers and animal breeders), and Tuareg and Maure (basically shepherds and often nomads).
26. Activities assisted by the project did not run into any particular problems regarding beneficiary targets insofar as populations are characterized by relatively homogeneous socio-economic conditions and the decision was taken to intervene in the ensemble of the regions' communities, not only in those of former refugees, even though particular attention was paid to the latter. The new system of food distribution set up (see the section on logistics) constitutes a better guarantee for reaching project beneficiaries. These beneficiaries have been classified in each project according to type of activity in each of the regions covered by the PRO (see the Annex).
27. In the processing of requests for food assistance, beneficiary participation is concrete. The associative mechanism, even though weakly structured, is active and requests are often processed by beneficiaries themselves. Most often, managers only assist them in their activities. Decision-making levels of beneficiaries regarding choice, programming and organization of activities respond to specific interest groups: village communities and clans (forms of family groupings that constitute the social and territorial basis for Tuareg organization). The quantitative objectives outlined in the project document which called for part of the assistance to benefit women specifically turned out to be less realistic than envisaged given the minority participation of women in works carried out.





28. Project selection criteria and the need for the financial participation of beneficiaries go in the direction of an ownership of works carried out. The measures necessary for ensuring continuation have generally been respected: initiatives must come from the populations themselves and must correspond to real community needs; the participation of beneficiaries must be real, including the use of their own funds; the commitment of and arrangements made by populations must be very well defined to ensure continuation of works and forms of maintenance.

### **Project cycle, monitoring and evaluation**

29. In order to create transparency and improve the management of development activities, procedures for selecting requests, and monitoring and evaluating microprojects, have been put in place. These procedures are defined around the microproject cycle and include the following phases: a) sorting of requests according to selection criteria; b) joint WFP/NPO identification mission with the executing partner; c) approval of microprojects and contract signing; d) food delivery; e) joint WFP/NPO monitoring mission; f) final report on activities by the executing partner; and g) joint WFP/NPO evaluation mission. Thanks to their clarity and simplicity, these procedures constitute a model for the management of FFW activities. The technical note "Practical guidelines for WFP partnerships" explains the general forms of WFP intervention in the framework of the PRO. The main criteria include: non-assistance for individual projects, non-retroactive distribution of food, priority for projects in areas of food insecurity, and priority for well-framed projects.
30. WFP's sub-offices have been forced to concentrate on identification of microprojects, leaving little or insufficient time for monitoring and evaluation activities. Some important aspects, such as the financial feasibility of productive microprojects, have not been taken into account in a systematic fashion. Even though field visits usually combined different types of missions (identification as well as monitoring), priority was given to identification, primarily due to the sizeable quantity of food available for FFW activities. Monitoring and evaluation has been difficult because of the considerable distances involved using a practically non-existent road system. Finally, an "à la carte" approach left space for the proliferation of requests for microprojects. In some cases, the absence of monitoring has been compensated for by the presence of partners.
31. The PRO has been used to promote a computerized management and information system known as "JULIA". Once up and running, this system will be an effective tool that could be extended to other WFP country offices. Above all, the system permits collection of all project information, planning of food distribution, targeting project areas, and acquiring a complete record of food movements. It constitutes a tool for planning PRO activities.

### **Logistics**

32. Between December 1997 and October 1998, 7,655 tons of food were distributed, equivalent to 58 percent of commitments. At the halfway stage, the rate of food distribution was generally in line with the volume envisaged and project duration. It should be noted that 46 percent of cereals distributed was purchased locally. WFP is responsible for transporting food supplies up to distribution points. Warehouses in the regions, rented or loaned by the government, are run by staff employed by the Government. Food movements in the warehouses require the joint approval of the WFP Country Director and the NPO Coordinator. Project Mali 2231.04 was implemented differently, with logistics falling



under the complete responsibility of the government, including secondary transport (from warehouse to beneficiary).

33. The system set up at the start of the operation has permitted a) improved monitoring of food up to delivery to beneficiaries; b) faster transportation; and c) effective coordination of food arrivals—or purchases—through reliable management of storage capacity. The system of records, handling of information and planned delivery in line with needs has eliminated stock interruptions, even in areas with difficult access.
34. As a result, food management has been considerably improved. Quantities and the state of food are always documented, food storage meets recognized quality standards, and procedures put in place have eliminated uncontrolled outflow. Warehouse losses do not exceed 0.4 percent, and the cost of maintenance and transport loss is borne by the transport company. The introduction of warehouse handling documents and the fact that inventories are prepared at the end of each month have led to easier monitoring.
35. The availability of written information at each point in the logistical chain and media (radio) diffusion of deliveries have increased operational effectiveness. Representatives of beneficiaries control deliveries. Under the terms of the project contract, partners or beneficiaries know the volume and nature of the food they will receive; all exit and transport documents for the commodities refer to a single project number.
36. UNHCR has had priority in the allocation of food for resettlement operations. With the least possible delays, food has been available for UNHCR's returnee and resettlement activities, and UNHCR has picked up the costs of transport from extended delivery points (EDPs) to distribution sites. WFP's logistical relations with other partners have not always been defined in advance. Transport could be taken care of by WFP or the partner. To date, UNHCR and other partners have covered 52 percent of transport costs in the areas but, with the withdrawal of UNHCR, WFP's share is destined to increase. The cost of internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) envisaged for the operation was 57 dollars per ton and this figure has proved sufficient. However, for the second phase of the operation, and with the end of UNHCR's mandate, the running of development-related activities (returnee operations have ended) and the increase in microprojects imply higher logistical costs. Today, it seems necessary to carry out a detailed study of ITSH structure in view of eventual modification.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### From emergency to development

37. Research should be continued to link WFP activities with projects being carried out by external partners (NGOs, government, bilateral and international cooperation) to guarantee technical management, and adequate financial support. In the long term, activities not envisaged by projects will continue to constitute too important a volume of requests to be considered by WFP's sub-offices and the NPO. Efforts should also be made to group requests and structure them around technical themes. To this end, effective local NGOs of sufficient status exist and should be contracted by sub-offices to form an "NGO chain" for sponsoring and supervising local associations which would permit WFP to focus its efforts with a view to introducing a more systematic approach towards achieving the objectives of



intensifying agricultural production and protecting natural resources. In this fashion, sub-offices could better plan interventions, taking account of cultural calendars for example, and better position themselves as true development partners by ensuring that intervention methods and targets are in line with their objectives.

38. Within the agro-ecological context of northern Mali, productive investments must necessarily be accompanied by environmental protection measures. Of a certain scope and well-conducted, activities aimed at soil regeneration and the protection of arable land have shown their effectiveness. In addition, activities must have an impact on food security. In terms of structuring requests around common technical themes, it is recommended that FFW activities concentrate on: a) agricultural enhancement of the River Niger (introduction of IVPs, hydro-agricultural works for semi-controlled irrigation, vegetable gardening, regeneration of grazing lands; b) introduction of water and soil conservation measures (dams) for dry cultivation; and c) activities aimed at soil regeneration and protection of arable land (reforestation and dune consolidation).
39. Development activities should follow an annual programme. Taking into account the nature of support and agricultural calendars in the different regions covered by the project, programming could be designed in such a way that one period be earmarked for project identification and another for implementation and monitoring of activities. In this way, a project cycle calendar could be drawn up for each area. Planning and programming of activities would permit better selection of priorities, better management of food allocations to EDPs and project sites, with a positive impact on logistical costs.
40. Governmental evaluation resources already existing on site should be better used. The regional technical services of ministries should be directly involved in project monitoring. Technical service staff should be able to participate in missions carried out by WFP offices to identify, monitor and evaluate microprojects. Resource persons should be identified and forms of cooperation defined for each region.
41. In cooperation with technical services, the list of specific criteria for identifying and selecting microprojects should be fine-tuned and finalized. Economic and financial feasibility criteria, as well as environmental criteria, should be identified and incorporated in the list. In order to intensify WFP intervention in favour of women, new project ideas should be studied and lines of WFP intervention in favour of income-generating activities and enterprises traditionally the responsibility of women should be defined—including the possibility of monetizing food assistance to finance microcredit operations.
42. Taking into account the low rate of FFD use, the allocation for this component should be reduced. An inventory should be compiled of possible interventions targeting vulnerable groups not currently benefiting from assistance, such as the disabled and orphans. On the basis of this inventory, programming of allocation use for this component could be designed up to the end of the operation. A share of the allocation for this component should be earmarked for small emergency interventions.

## Management

43. The arrangements contained in the Letter of Understanding signed between the Government of the Republic of Mali and WFP Bamako in June 1997 have been shown to be relevant and should be maintained. Particular reference is made here to the modalities of project execution, to WFP's responsibility for the transport of food products in warehouses to the EDPs in Timbuktu, Mopti, Gao and Kidal, to NPO's responsibility for the reception



and storage of WFP food products in regional warehouses, and to WFP's responsibility for the subsequent transport and distribution of food. Existing efforts to reinforce monitoring and evaluation should be continued. In addition, the protocol signed within the framework of the PRO Mali initiative constitutes the letter and spirit of the design of plans of operation necessary for implementing Country Programmes.

44. Observance of these arrangements calls for maintaining and reinforcing the intervention capacity of WFP sub-offices in Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, without which WFP interventions in northern Mali would be ineffective. Implementation of the Country Programme runs the risk of being translated into a drop in means of support, and training and supervision (indirect costs) from which the PRO has benefited. Efforts already made to ensure external funding should be continued.
45. To the extent that cash resources are available, WFP should continue to give priority to the purchase of commodities in local markets, in line with the measures and privileges currently in force in the country. It is likely that at the date of the envisaged conclusion of the PRO (June 1999), some operational resources will still be available. These resources should be used beyond this date to ensure smooth transition to a Country Programme. This will permit consolidation of experience acquired in improved management of FFW activities, better operational planning, slowing down the pace of project identification, and leaving space for monitoring and evaluation.

## Logistics

46. Implementation of the logistics system in line with the principles laid down at the start of the operation should be continued. The personnel involved have now acquired knowledge of WFP's logistics basis and operational principles, and can thus participate in their improvement. Documents and procedures are not limited to use within the framework of PRO Mali 5804.00, but have been designed in such a way as to be adaptable for other WFP development projects. Future projects should be run according to the same methods. Other countries of the sub-region of WFP intervention could benefit from the system adopted in the case of Mali.
47. Taking into account the current economic situation of the country, WFP should continue to bear most of the logistics costs. For transportation of supplies from the EDPs, commercial transport should be maintained. For transportation to projects, the three modalities currently in use should be continued: a) transportation organized, effected and financed by WFP; b) transportation organized, effected and financed by the partner; and c) transportation organized and effected by the partner with a financial contribution from WFP. The choice of option should be made according to the logistical and financial capacity of partners.
48. WFP should possess advance knowledge of the logistics capacity of potential partners. An analysis of partners' logistics capacity and the respective responsibilities of parties to the plan of operations should be included. Furthermore, the logistics system will be even more effective if development operations are better planned. Once the logistics system is in place in its entirety, the presence of an international expert in logistics should no longer be necessary. The officer-in-charge of the Mopti coordination office should have global responsibility for logistics, and operational tasks should be delegated.



**BREAKDOWN OF COMMODITIES AND BENEFICIARIES BY USE AND REGION  
DECEMBER 1997–SEPTEMBER 1998**

**ANNEX  
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	<b>Tons</b>	<b>FFW Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Tons</b>	<b>FFT Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Tons</b>	<b>FFD Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Initial resettlement Tons</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Tons</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Total Beneficiaries</b>	<b>%</b>
Mopti	637 473	31 168	4 193	753	91 792	5 597	145 986	3 805	879 444	12	41 323	18
Gao/Kidal	2 701 084	77 495	84 794	21 946	71 771	11 513	665 767	18 415	3 523 416	46	129 369	58
Timbuktu	2 800 181	28 588	25 402	12 877	15 771	947	412 059	10 217	3 253 413	42	52 629	24
<b>Total</b>	<b>6 138 738</b>	<b>137 251</b>	<b>114 389</b>	<b>35 576</b>	<b>179 334</b>	<b>18 057</b>	<b>1 223 812</b>	<b>32 437</b>	<b>7 656 273</b>		<b>223 321</b>	
Percentage	80	61	1	16	2	8	16	15	100	100	100	100