# EVALUATION REPORTS

## Agenda item 7

*For consideration*

## THEMATIC REVIEW OF TARGETING IN RELIEF OPERATIONS: SUMMARY REPORT

# NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

**This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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Should you have any questions regarding matters of dispatch of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact Ms. C. Panlilio, Administrative Assistant, Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645).

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thematic review of WFP's experience in targeting food aid in relief operations, which is based on case studies in Ethiopia, Darfur in the Sudan, Kenya, Malawi and Myanmar, found that WFP's targeting was particularly successful in forming and participating in multi-stakeholder targeting bodies and in achieving improvements to targeting over time and in all types of emergency operation. However, the reviews found that WFP could make better use of its extensive experience of targeting to overcome recurring difficulties.

In the past decade, WFP has taken two substantial steps in targeting: (i) supporting multi-stakeholder targeting structures to develop and implement targeting methods and programme design; and (ii) adoption of community-based targeting and distribution. Multi-stakeholder targeting structures promote coordination, utilization of inter-agency experience and stakeholder buy-in to the method. Community-based targeting and distribution empowers communities to identify the neediest people while reducing agency administrative and food-distribution costs.

Two weaker areas in WFP's targeting experience are: (i) insufficient discrimination in the use of multiple food aid modalities, which can lead to double coverage and excessive administrative demands on WFP and its partners; and (ii) weak and inconsistent application of monitoring of targeting assumptions and outcomes.

WFP has considerable experience in targeting food aid in a variety of relief contexts, but it still lacks a consolidated policy and comprehensive guidance on targeting. Consequently, targeting approaches and performance tend to depend too much on the experience of individual staff and hence fail to take full advantage of wider experience in WFP and other agencies. More comprehensive analysis of this experience combined with research and improved guidance, some of which is already being prepared, could further improve the quality and consistency of targeting.

The review team recognizes that ideal targeting assumes ideal working environments that often do not exist, particularly in an emergency context, so some of the recommendations in this report might only be feasible in operations with long lead times, long duration, abundant funding and resources, cooperative governments and partners, and adequate data and infrastructure. In less than ideal contexts, the recommendations should at least help managers to take account of a broader range of factors in deciding targeting strategies and methods. In practice, targeting decisions must be made by the managers responsible for the operation: policy and guidance can set parameters, raise issues and suggest techniques, but judgment will always be required as to the right course of action in the context.

# DRAFT DECISION<sup>*</sup>

The Board takes note of the document "Thematic Review of Targeting in Relief Operations: Summary Report" (WFP/EB.1/2006/7-B).

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<sup>*</sup> This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

## SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE REVIEW

1.  WFP's Office of Evaluation (OEDE) commissioned this thematic review of targeting in relief operations to:

    ➢  develop greater knowledge in WFP and among Board members of the challenges and constraints facing WFP and others in ensuring effective and efficient targeting;

    ➢  identify opportunities for improved targeting in relief situations on the basis of systematic identification of lessons learned, good practice, recurrent difficulties and challenges; and

    ➢  inform the development of policy for relief targeting.

2.  The thematic review included five country case studies of targeting in relief operations in Darfur, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Myanmar, which represented a range of targeting contexts; factors such as the ability of country office staff to support a review also influenced the choice of countries. It was hoped that generic lessons would emerge that could be applied to the varied emergency contexts in which WFP routinely operates.

3.  The review examined nine operations from the conclusion of needs analysis to monitoring, evaluation and feedback. The needs analyses were only examined in relation to the extent to which they informed the targeting process.[1] Additional contributions to this report and further development of issues derive from consideration of the case study findings at a peer-review workshop in Rome in June 2005.

4.  The review could not measure directly the extent of targeting error in any of the operations visited; not all operations had collected and analysed data. Review of targeting costs was constrained by the unavailability of disaggregated data. Gender aspects of targeting were not studied, because WFP had conducted a global survey of compliance with its Enhanced Commitments to Women, including targeting, in 2005.

5.  In each case study country the team reviewed background documents and interviewed WFP staff, government representatives, United Nations and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners and some beneficiary and non-beneficiary households to create an overall view of the targeting process.

### Definition of Targeting

6.  For the purposes of this review targeting is defined as "…the process of identifying the intended beneficiaries of a programme and then ensuring that as far as possible, the benefits actually reach those people and not others." (Sharp, K. 1997. *Targeting Food Aid in Ethiopia*. London, Save the Children Fund (UK).

7.  Targeting is one of the most important activities in food aid design and implementation; it comprises a number of activities that occur in the project cycle. At its broadest, targeting encompasses everything from initial assessment of the context, extent and magnitude of need through strategic planning and modality selection to eligibility selection and screening, which in turn leads to re-assessment of need through monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and reconsideration of food aid modalities.

8.  Targeting food aid in emergency operations (EMOPs) and protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs) is important for three main reasons:

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[1] Needs analysis is the subject of other in-house review and development activities under the joint WFP/EC project "Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity (SENAC)".

➢ to reach those most in need of food;

➢ to maximize the use and impact of limited resources; and

➢ to prevent over-supply of food aid, which may result in negative impacts on communities, for example dependency and displacement of traditional social reciprocity networks, and on markets, for example lower prices and disincentives to production.

## WFP and Targeting

9. WFP's policy statements and guidance on targeting are dispersed across a number of documents (see Hoskins, A. 2004. *Targeting General Food Distributions: Desk Review of Lessons from Experience*. Rome, WFP). But WFP's extensive experience of targeting has not been systematically analysed and incorporated into policy and guidance materials, despite significant progress in understanding the targeting process and innovation in some aspects of targeting. The need is to consolidate WFP's experience and identify lessons learned, good practices and persistent challenges in order to inform policy and identify areas that require further research, new investment and capacity-development.

10. WFP uses a variety of mechanisms to target food aid, including vulnerability analyses and needs assessments to identify areas and groups most in need, and the help of community and administrative officials and cooperating partners in identifying the neediest beneficiaries and selecting food aid modalities that target certain groups. Over the last five years, WFP has increasingly used a new method of targeting beneficiaries based on the work of agencies such as Oxfam and Save the Children UK. Known as community-based targeting and distribution (CBTD), it utilizes the knowledge and resources of whole communities to identify those most in need of food aid and to manage food distribution.

## Conceptualization of Targeting Approaches Employed by WFP

11. For the purposes of this thematic review, targeting approaches were conceptualized as follows:

➢ **administrative targeting**, implemented by people outside beneficiary groups: this category has three types of targeting – (i) geographical, in which areas are selected, (ii) institutional, in which catchment areas are served for example through schools and mother-and-child health (MCH) centres and (iii) community-level, in which village heads, clan leaders and administrative officials draw up lists for registration, and ration cards are issued;

➢ **community-based targeting and distribution**, where beneficiaries from the community are selected by democratic and transparent methods to receive food aid, and community structures manage the food aid distribution; and

➢ **self-selection**, where individuals and households are given the choice whether to become beneficiaries in schemes such as food for work (FFW) or distributions involving low-value/status food commodities.

## Main Findings and Recommendations of the Review

12. Targeting is difficult: it often takes place in complex political, social and logistical environments. In all the countries visited, WFP staff and partners demonstrated impressive commitment in identifying and addressing the problems of targeting. There was strong evidence that WFP staff are learning from experience and strengthening targeting activities. On the basis of the case studies and the issues that emerged, this report makes recommendations for practice, policy and guidance to help WFP to enhance targeting in relief operations.

⇒ *Context Analysis*

13. The case studies show the diversity of security, political, gender, cultural and institutional factors that can influence the targeting process and its outcome. Although contextual analysis took place, it was not adequately or systematically applied to targeting decisions.

Recommendations

14. For each operation, WFP should undertake an analysis of the factors that influence targeting as the basis of its intervention strategy. In complex emergencies, it is particularly important that this situational analysis include a detailed conflict analysis. A checklist and more specific guidance on contextual factors that might affect targeting outcomes should be developed to help WFP staff to undertake practical but comprehensive situation analyses so that optimal targeting strategies can be planned.

⇒ *Targeting Structures*

15. In the case studies, there was a range of institutional mechanisms and structures for making targeting decisions. The most formal and sophisticated structures were established in Malawi, Kenya and Ethiopia; in Myanmar and Darfur, structures were less formal and coordination between agencies was limited. Experience, for example in Kenya, has shown how lack of multi-agency involvement in targeting decisions can lead to perceptions of bias and, where governments are taking decisions, to inability to resist political pressures. Targeting decisions made by governments must be credible if external resources are to be generated and maintained.

16. The case studies demonstrated features that can enhance targeting and that could usefully be replicated in similar circumstances elsewhere. A major element in success appears to be multi-agency structures that are involved in political decision-making through technical advice, thereby balancing political and technical considerations. Such structures need to be institutional so that they do not disappear when the emergency is over and so that they have credibility and authority in government decision-making. All stakeholders should be invited to participate in development of the targeting method.

17. The case studies in Kenya, Malawi and Ethiopia demonstrate how multi-agency targeting structures provide benefits for achieving successful targeting. These are:

➢ greater agreement among stakeholders regarding the existence and nature of food insecurity and the groups to be targeted;

➢ shared understanding of targeting criteria and processes so that they can be supported by political stakeholders and implemented more effectively by operational stakeholders;

> ➤ a forum for sharing experiences, resolving difficulties and promoting compliance with agreed measures; and

> ➤ reduction of political pressures on national and local government to target on the basis of lobbying rather than need.

18. Greater participation by stakeholders, however, involves more negotiation and compromise. Different agency agendas and mandates may lead to conflict over methods, as has been seen in a number of countries recently, notably in southern Africa, where the methods of vulnerability analysis committees (VACs) have been repeatedly modified under pressure from stakeholder agencies. The risk is that methods become too complex and hence unworkable. Good practice will require the means to minimize the negative impacts of participation by large groups: examples are channels for incorporating minority opinion, verification routines to ensure that methods and procedures are tested and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) to eliminate delays caused by multi-agency participation.

## Recommendations

19. WFP should continue to promote and support the formation of sustainable multi-stakeholder coordination bodies responsible for needs assessments and targeting and should participate in these bodies and technical sub-committees. The experience of these multi-agency structures should be recorded as lessons learned and institutionalized in WFP. Where political, governance or security factors preclude formation of formal bodies, WFP should strive to involve agencies and government partners in targeting decisions to maximize transparency, capitalize on the experience and knowledge of other agencies and build consensus.

⇒ *Geographic Targeting*

20. Geographic targeting is a critical element in targeting. It offers the opportunity to identify the largest number of needy individuals.

21. WFP faced a number of difficulties in implementing geographical targeting: country offices often relied too much on secondary data relating to food security. In some contexts, frameworks for analysing data and decision-making were poorly articulated and incoherent, notably in emergencies that involved large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and that affected livelihoods, and in areas where insecurity limited data collection and the amount of up-to-date information. There was frequently little or no collection of primary data or ground-truthing of secondary data and analytical results, especially in situations of conflict and insecurity, and reluctance to associate food-insecure areas or groupings with ethnic or political marginalization and to target on this basis.

22. Another difficulty that particularly affected PRRO operations related to the practicality of identifying and targeting only people affected by an acute or recent food security threat rather than all those whose food security was unacceptably low, including the chronically poor. WFP often finds itself in a dilemma on this issue: country staff cannot easily distinguish – perhaps they should not – between population groups that are equally under stress and in need on the basis that one group has only recently been exposed to trauma whereas another has been in need for a long time.

23. A further challenge for WFP is ensuring that all vulnerable groups are considered for inclusion in a programme. An inherent weakness of geographical targeting is that the data that inform such targeting often can only be disaggregated to a certain level – at best the district level or livelihood groups within districts. When a district or livelihood group is

excluded, there may still be vulnerable people who are more food-insecure than groups in included geographical areas, a phenomenon noted in Malawi and Myanmar. There is an intrinsic tension between cost and the requirement for more disaggregated data. It is rare to find good secondary data at the district level, let alone the village and household levels.

24. None of the needs assessments that informed geographic targeting in any of the case studies was subject to objective verification, for example comparing outcome indicators such as nutritional status, by any of the agencies involved, not just WFP. A recent review of household economy assessments conducted since 1995 found only one case where the validity of the assessments was tested.

25. There was a tendency in programmes to undervalue the collection of additional information that might improve geographic targeting, because the priority was to expedite operations rather than improve accuracy. These aims need not be mutually exclusive. Additional information was often not collected for reasons of cost, even though there was little knowledge in country offices of the actual costs involved in additional surveys.

## Recommendations

26. Geographic targeting must always be based on credible and transparent analytical frameworks employing a variety of data related to food security. Such frameworks should ideally be developed by key stakeholders to ensure understanding and buy-in and should determine critical data needs; analytical processes cannot always be shaped to fit the available data.

27. WFP needs to establish minimum data needs for geographic targeting, and must resist the temptation to economize by using whatever data happen to be readily available. This may be a necessary initial stop-gap in sudden-onset emergencies, but it should not be considered adequate for anything other than the early stages of a rapid-onset emergency pending collection and analysis of more reliable data.

28. WFP should always ensure that secondary data and analytical constructs are complemented by some primary data collection and by ground-truthing of important secondary data, critical assumptions and analytical outcomes. The accuracy of geographic targeting must always be monitored after a period of implementation.

29. WFP has an obligation to bring to the attention of host governments and donors the existence of groups experiencing life-threatening food insecurity, irrespective of its cause. Although WFP cannot ethically make decisions about saving some individuals and not others on the basis of the transience of their predicament, pragmatic responses may nonetheless be necessary. For example, WFP could determine on a case-by-case basis and in consultation with the government and donors whether relief assistance for a chronically food-insecure population should meet only the needs of those threatened by acute food insecurity or of all whose food security is unacceptably low. The decision-making process should include consideration of the likely effects on targeting of attempting to meet only the needs of acutely food-insecure groups.

30. In each emergency, consideration should be given to ways of assisting pockets of vulnerable people excluded by the aggregation of limited geographic information. Potentially vulnerable pockets in non-targeted areas should at least be identified and monitored.

31. WFP should develop a consistent approach for determining when resident populations are to be supported because they are hosting or in proximity to large displaced populations unless otherwise indicated, for example for political or peace-building objectives; such decisions should be based on an objective assessment of food needs. When data collection

is impossible, a temporary approach should be used that is specific to the operation and that will be reassessed as soon as possible.

32.   WFP should develop indicative budget guidelines and tools for different assessment methods to enable managers to understand the resource implications of the different options. Agencies implementing or supporting assessments must routinely collate cost information. In most situations, the cost would be minimal in relation to the potential savings of rigorous needs-based geographic targeting. More accurate and expensive surveys should be reserved for areas where there are likely to be large inclusion errors, and hence potential savings, rather than to areas where all or most sample households are in dire need.

⇒ *Community-Based Targeting*

33.   CBTD, which WFP has implemented only since 2000, is a standard approach in many non-refugee/IDP EMOPs that gives the community control over two aspects of food aid allocation: distribution and selection of households. Community control over distribution should lead to improved accuracy, transparency, fairness and accountability and should in theory reduce the costs incurred by cooperating partners, even though the costs to communities will be increased.

34.   Community control over targeting means that an outside agency does not have to distinguish need among households. The assumption is that the community is better placed to make these distinctions; empowering communities to identify target households results in greater likelihood that the community will accept intra-community targeting. CBTD was employed in four of the five country case studies.

35.   A finding of this review is that in practice CBDT gives communities only a limited amount of decision-making power. This may have been partly related to the food aid resources available and partly to the preconceptions of WFP and collaborating partners (CPs) about which households are vulnerable, which in turn guided communities as to the percentage of households that should be eligible and for which there were resources. This is effectively community-based targeting combined with an element of administrative targeting. There were no examples of genuine CBTD because communities were also guided as to the types of household eligibility criteria that should be employed. Communities were informed that they were entitled to modify the eligibility criteria on the basis of the local context, but in practice they rarely diverged significantly from the suggested criteria.

36.   The case studies show that the degree to which collaborating partners (CPs) and WFP impose criteria and resource levels on communities will, depending on context, ultimately have a bearing on the degree to which communities comply with CBTD.

37.   Other factors also affect the success or failure of CBTD. In the first EMOP in Malawi and in Ethiopia and Kenya, post-distribution monitoring (PDM) data clearly reflect reluctance to conform to the CBTD approach. Inclusion errors were high because relief committees were under considerable pressure from the community to share resources more widely. In the PRROs in Malawi and Myanmar, on the other hand, there was general conformity with the targeting even though only a low percentage of households could be included because resources were scarce and there was limited community control over setting eligibility criteria.

38.   CBTD may have worked more effectively in the Malawi and Myanmar PRROs because (i) the crisis was less acute than in Kenya and Ethiopia, (ii) there were many other food aid modalities from which communities could benefit and (iii) there was greater emphasis on

social rather than economic targeting, including households with orphans, households headed by women and chronically sick people.

39.    There is evidence that in certain contexts social targeting criteria may be easier to use in CBTD because economic criteria are more contentious, particularly when the majority of a population are poor. However, proxy indicators of social or health status such as people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) may correlate poorly with food insecurity. Experience in Kenya suggests that CBTD works better in an agricultural and agro-pastoral setting than in a pastoral setting where household or clan relationships make it difficult for communities to identify the most vulnerable households.

40.    Over time, compliance with and support for CBTD improved in Myanmar, Ethiopia and Malawi as cooperating partners learned lessons and increasingly engaged communities in developing the approach.

41.    Overall, there appears to be a need for greater understanding of the contexts in which CBTD may work. Experiences are increasingly being analysed, but there has not been adequate collation of experiences or in-depth analysis.

42.    Data on the costs of establishing CBTD systems were only available in North Rakhine State in Myanmar, and Kenya. Lack of information on costs is a significant constraint on providing guidance as to whether to establish CBTD. This is a complex area: for example, costs need to be considered in relation to the implementing agency and in terms of community or beneficiary costs, and cost information is only meaningful in relation to alternative forms of targeting or the resources saved by intra-community targeting, for example if 50 percent of households were to be excluded. Where an operation is spread over a large area and assists a relatively small percentage of the population, the normal maximum rates of direct support costs (DSC) may be inadequate to meet the cost of establishing and monitoring CBTD.

43.    The most effective CBTD models are likely to rely on several small-scale community-based organizations (CBOs) and NGOs that are close to communities and inspire trust. CBTD set-up costs therefore include training and capacity-building for all participating organizations, many of which often lack experience. WFP budgeting procedures do not facilitate significant up-front investment from other direct operational costs (ODOC): the financial mechanisms that relate funding disbursement to expected and actual tonnages do not permit the required investment from ODOC before implementation.

44.    The case studies show that substantial time was needed to establish a fully functioning CBTD approach, which involves sensitizing communities and local governments, setting up relief committees and establishing and agreeing targeting criteria and monitoring. The time depends on whether systems have to be established and whether communities and CPs have experience of the approach. In Myanmar, for example the system is being improved. The duration of set-up impacts on costs and determines appropriateness in a given context: if the duration of the emergency is expected to be short, it may not be appropriate to establish CBTD. If a longer duration is envisaged or there is a need to implement CBTD to establish capacity for future emergencies, the time taken to set the programme up may be less important.

45.    Sustainability is a related issue in that CBTD is a developmental approach to emergency programming. Where agencies invest in CBTD, they should consider ways of establishing sustainable capacity so that start-up is more efficient in future emergencies. This would affect WFP's choice of partners: for example agencies with long-term presence and with an interest in establishing disaster-preparedness systems may be preferred. Currently, WFP tends to adopt a crisis-management approach of partnering with any agency that can

implement the approach rapidly. This contrasts with the situation in Kenya, where WFP provided CBTD training in high-risk districts in 2003 and early 2004 even though no EMOP or PRRO was ongoing.

Recommendations

46.     More evidence is needed to develop guidance material that can help agencies to decide whether to opt for CBTD in a particular context. Such guidance will in the short term need to be a working document in order to take account of experience.

47.     To generate this information, PDM must routinely analyse factors that lead to CBTD success or failure in terms of targeting effectiveness. For this kind of monitoring, it may be useful to develop checklists that include appraisal of factors such as insecurity and the availability of other institutional support mechanisms. PDM reports would then be able to disaggregate findings across programme areas.

48.     Where communities resist targeting households on the basis of economic criteria, a pragmatic solution may be a two-stage process in which beneficiaries are first selected on the basis of social criteria, then further assessed on economic criteria.

49.     Donors should encourage implementing agencies to provide cost information in future programming, including costs to communities. This information should then be compared to the costs of administrative targeting, for example household registration and ration cards. Research should be undertaken to compare the costs of the two approaches in the same emergency context. It should also be possible to model the cost savings of CBTD – resources saved by not targeting all households – and to compare this with the actual costs of implementing CBTD to assess savings in resources. Information on the time needed to set up CBTD needs to be included in guidance material.

50.     As part of the process of selecting CPs for CBTD, WFP should consider CP mandates and longer-term goals for the beneficiary community to maximize capacity-building related to implementation and sustainability. In food-insecure and disaster-prone countries with frequent EMOPs, there may be a case for maintaining CBTD capacity through training even when no EMOPs are planned or ongoing.

⇒ *Food Aid Modalities*

51.     The case-study operations all consisted of similar modalities: (i) general food distribution under EMOP arrangements and vulnerable group feeding under PRRO arrangements, (ii) selective therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes, (iii) school feeding and (iv) FFW, food for assets (FFA) and food for training (FFT). There is an increasing trend towards food aid programming through structures and programmes for PLWHA, as in Malawi, Myanmar and Kenya.

52.     The combination of modality type, number and relative share of resources does not vary substantially according to the scale, nature or length of an emergency or any other criterion. The case studies show that multiple food aid modalities are typically employed in relief programming as a matter of course rather than intent, and that as a consequence multiple programme objectives are invoked. There was an assumption that multiple objectives and modalities would cover all target populations.

53.     WFP's usual delivery modalities have different strengths and weaknesses in terms of targeting that need to be taken into account in deciding the modality or combination of modalities for a given situation. The review found that once modalities had been established, there was little monitoring by WFP to determine coverage of target groups in

selective feeding or school feeding, though general food distribution and vulnerable group feeding programmes were monitored.

Recommendations

54. Modalities should be selected primarily on the basis of priority programming objectives, which implies an understanding of the likelihood of modalities reaching the target groups and having the maximum impact.

55. Field staff should be provided with clearer guidance on assessing the likely strengths and weaknesses of different modalities with regard to targeting in a given context so that they can plan ways of maximizing coverage of target groups in line with primary programming objectives. There are two aspects to this: (i) before implementing a programme, examining data on coverage through institutions, for example data on enrolment in schools or on catchment areas and coverage by health institutions; and (ii) considering the intrinsic targeting strengths, weaknesses and risks of different modalities, for example which age cohorts or ethnic groups are likely to be accessed through the modality.

56. Where various modalities exist to reach the same groups, consideration should be given to the human, financial and material costs associated with setting up and maintaining each modality to identify the most efficient in the circumstances.

⇒ *Monitoring of Targeting*

57. A well designed M&E system should determine (i) the appropriateness of the decision to target food in a given area, (ii) whether the groups in greatest need were identified by the assessment and (iii) whether the objectives were achieved.

58. In the case study countries, monitoring of targeting was generally weak for a variety of reasons. In Myanmar, the operational imperative of establishing the programme precluded the establishment of a monitoring system; in Darfur, insecurity and the inexperience of CPs prevented systematic PDM. Currently, there is no WFP system for monitoring targeting that can be used in all contexts.

59. The monitoring model used in Malawi is an excellent example of rigorous monitoring. But the focus was predominantly on data collection rather than analysis of findings, so the considerable amount of valuable data collected was not used fully.

60. In Ethiopia, Kenya and Malawi the monitoring led to calculations of inclusion and exclusion errors as well as targeting efficiency ratios.[2] However, in almost all cases there were methodological uncertainties with regard to the approach as well as a lack of transparency.

61. The case studies show that WFP did not verify the accuracy of geographic targeting. This is a serious omission in view of the known limitations of the data used for geographic targeting in some case-study countries. In Myanmar, for example, lack of food-security information and the poor correlation between food-security analysis and nutritional outcomes shed doubt on the accuracy of geographic targeting. In Malawi, there were considerable uncertainties about the intra-district targeting in the EMOP, which was partly a result of the pragmatic process of negotiating and compromising with district officials to obtain support and buy-in.

62. WFP did not collate data in any of the country programmes with regard to coverage of institutional feeding programmes, so it was not clear what proportion of the eligible

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[2] The term "efficiency ratio" used in the country case studies invariably referred to the effectiveness ratio as defined in the introduction to this review.

population for school feeding was enrolled at school, nor was it clear what proportion of malnourished children under 5 was enrolled in supplementary feeding programmes. These are serious omissions. In the case of school feeding, there is a high probability that the poorest families will either be too remote to send their children to school or unable to afford school fees, in spite of the incentive of a food ration. Information about the status of enrolled children would show the degree to which the poorest are being served.

63.    In the case of supplementary feeding, many factors such as insecurity and poor infrastructure can constrain coverage. Knowledge of coverage and default is essential to understanding how a programme is performing and whether the design should be altered, and to determining the extent to which target beneficiaries are participating.

64.    HIV programmes with a food aid element are increasingly being introduced, for example in Kenya, Malawi and Magway in Myanmar, so targeting issues specific to this type of programming take on an increased significance, including (i) the validity of chronic illness as a proxy for HIV, (ii) the correlation or lack of it between HIV status and socio-economic status and (iii) the extent to which such targeting increases stigma for beneficiaries.

## Recommendations

65.    Staff must be encouraged to view M&E as a way to make things work rather than as an accountability mechanism, which will make them more likely to demand the resources for effective monitoring. Such a view will be established more rapidly if staff have easy-to-use tools that can be deployed quickly with quick returns for management and reporting.

66.    Resources should always be made available for comprehensive analysis of monitoring data.

67.    WFP needs to develop and support a form of light, flexible monitoring that can be implemented quickly and routinely to inform management decisions in various contexts. Even an informal system such as asking CP or WFP monitors to put certain questions about targeting to beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries can give managers an early indication of the success of targeting. In secure situations with adequate staff and programme capacity, more statistically valid monitoring should be introduced and incorporated into a results-based management framework.

68.    The method for determining targeting error and efficiency needs further development.

69.    Best practice in monitoring geographic targeting would involve monitoring the food security and related indicators of populations in non-intervention areas and comparing them with populations in intervention areas. This could involve nutrition and mortality surveys and forms of rapid food-security monitoring such as a coping strategy index, light forms of household economy analysis (HEA) and implementation of the Cornell Radimer scale. Ideally, monitoring of geographic targeting could be included with ongoing monitoring such as PDM impact assessments. Combining monitoring and assessment for different purposes into a single activity, where possible, would save on costs and reduce respondent fatigue.

70.    WFP should ensure that coverage and enrolment data for selective and school feeding programmes are compiled by implementing agencies, and should systematically examine these data in assessing targeting performance.

71.  Monitoring systems for newly emerging food aid distributions in HIV programming need to be established. They should include sets of questions that address targeting issues associated with this type of programming such as the role of chronic illness as a proxy for HIV status, correlation between HIV and socio-economic status and stigmatization associated with targeting on the basis of HIV status or its proxies.

⇒ *Guidance Materials for Targeting*

72.  In view of WFP's enormous experience in targeting during emergency programming and of the disparate nature of much of this information, there is a need to collate lessons learned in order to strengthen institutional memory and to compile guidance material.

73.  Current guidance material does not sufficiently address unresolved and problematic aspects of targeting so that field staff are aware of gaps in knowledge and understand that recording experience could enhance understanding in WFP.

Recommendations

74.  There is a need to develop stronger guidance material for field staff designing targeted programmes, incorporating guidance already developed by several country offices. Given WFP's rapidly increasing experience of targeting and changing targeting scenarios, such guidance material needs to be a living document that is updated regularly.

| ANNEX: REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY—<br>THEMATIC REVIEW OF TARGETING IN RELIEF OPERATIONS | | |
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| **OEDE recommendations** | **Action by** | **Management response and action taken** |
| **1. Context analysis (paras 13–14 )** | | |
| a) In every relief operation, WFP should ensure that critical factors affecting targeting are included in its situation analysis in order to inform targeting strategy more effectively. Detailed conflict analysis should inform targeting decisions in all complex emergencies. | **PDPT** | In conjunction with this review, PDPT is completing a new policy for presentation at EB.1/2006 to guide decision-making with regard to targeting. This policy will reconfirm the importance of situation analysis, including conflict analysis, in WFP programme design, and including situational factors relative to targeting. |
| b) WFP should further develop and disseminate normative and operational guidance on situation and conflict analysis, and ensure that staff and consultant capacity is sufficient to implement such guidance. | **ODAN, ODAV** | The current *Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) Handbook* contains preliminary guidance on situation and conflict analysis. ODAN will include more detailed guidance incorporating this recommendation in its revision of the handbook scheduled for 2007. ODAV will review normative and operational guidance relative to situation analysis and augment such guidance as required. |
| | **PRC** | The Programme Review Committee (PRC) will be involved in an advisory and quality-assurance capacity by routinely checking that once it is developed and disseminated the above guidance is fully taken into account in all new emergency relief and recovery proposals. |
| **2. Targeting structures (paras 15–19 )** | | |
| a) WFP should enhance its participation in and support for coordinated, multi-stakeholder needs assessments and targeting activities; where political or security conditions preclude formal stakeholder bodies, WFP should adopt an inclusive and transparent approach to targeting, soliciting inputs from all relevant stakeholders, including governments. | **PDPT** | The 2006 PDPT policy on targeting in relief situations will reconfirm the importance of WFP participation, where feasible, in multi-stakeholder approaches to needs assessment and targeting. |
| | **ODAN, ODAV** | WFP has established a corporate target for 2005 that 60 percent of its needs assessments will be carried out with partners – governments, local and international NGOs or regional entities; the target for 2006 is 75 percent. |
| | | ODAN and ODAV will review normative and operational guidance relative to participation in multi-stakeholder assessment and targeting structures, and revise such guidance to include good practices highlighted in this review. |
| b) WFP's experience in coordinated multi-stakeholder assessment and targeting should be recorded and periodically examined to inform refinements of guidance and practice. | **OD, ODAN, ODAV** | OD, ODAN and ODAV will continue to review their collective experience in multi-stakeholder assessment and targeting, and propose strategies to ensure the quality and consistency of such efforts; the strategy will address issues of knowledge capture and capacity-building. |

| **ANNEX: REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY—<br>THEMATIC REVIEW OF TARGETING IN RELIEF OPERATIONS** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **OEDE recommendations** | **Action by** | **Management response and action taken** |
| **3. Geographical targeting (paras 20–32)** | | |
| a) Geographical targeting in WFP operations should be based on practical and transparent analytical frameworks that employ qualitative and quantitative analysis; ideally, these frameworks should be developed jointly by key stakeholders. | **ODAV, ODAN** | Current ENA and VAM guidance promotes collection of primary data, for example through household surveys or interviews with key informants, to fill gaps in secondary data. ODAN and ODAV will continue to refine this guidance through ongoing learning processes and targeted operational research such as the SENAC project review of EFSA and VAM guidelines; ODAN and ODAV will adopt minimum management standards for ENA and VAM documents to guarantee the quality and consistency of geographic targeting in EMOPs. |
| b) Minimum data requirements for targeting should be established and respected for each situation; the main data, assumptions and analytical outputs should be routinely verified through some form of ground-truthing. | **ODAV, ODAN** | (See above) |
| c) In all EMOPs, WFP should make reasonable efforts to assess and monitor the condition of pockets of food-insecure or vulnerable people in otherwise food-secure and hence non-operational areas. | **PDPT**<br><br>**ODAN, ODAV** | The 2006 targeting policy will address the importance of assessing all food-insecure populations in a given country, not just those that WFP is most easily able to identify and reach.<br><br>Current ENA and VAM guidance emphasises the use of appropriate systematic sampling methods to ensure that all food-insecure or vulnerable groups are identified. Under the SENAC project, ODAN and ODAV will review this guidance to ensure that the practical methods do not exclude substantial pockets of food-insecure households. |
| d) WFP should develop indicative costing guidelines and tools for geographic and other targeting approaches and their data collection needs to enable managers to understand the resource implications of each. | **PDPT** | These issues will be addressed as part of the normative guidance development exercise covered under the management response to recommendation 9. |
| **4. Coverage (paras 29–31 )** | | |
| Case-by-case decisions should be made with governments and donors as to whether to extend WFP coverage to chronically food-insecure people as well as acutely food-insecure people. Due consideration should be given to the likely effects of the decision on targeting effectiveness. | **PDPT, ODAN, ODAV** | The SENAC project will identify ways to distinguish between chronic and transitory food insecurity. ODAN and ODAV will review normative and operational guidance to address this and highlight the implications for targeting of attempting to distinguish one need from the other. |

| | ANNEX: REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY—<br>THEMATIC REVIEW OF TARGETING IN RELIEF OPERATIONS | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **OEDE recommendations** | **Action by** | **Management response and action taken** |

| **5. IDPs/Refugees (para 31)** | | |
|---|---|---|
| WFP should develop a consistent approach to determining when resident populations are to be supported in the context of hosting, or being in proximity to, large displaced populations. Unless otherwise indicated, for example for political or peace-building objectives, such decisions should be based on an objective assessment of food needs. | **PDPT** | As part of regular guidance development, PDPT will examine WFP's experience in targeting food aid to IDPs living among resident populations to determine whether the Sudan case study reflects a more general problem in WFP emergency programming. |

| **6. Community-Based Targeting and Distribution (paras 33–50)** | | |
|---|---|---|
| a) CBTD should be used in appropriate circumstances to empower beneficiary communities, use their superior local targeting knowledge and minimize costs. | **PDPT** | New targeting policy for presentation at EB.1/2006 will reconfirm the importance of participatory techniques, including CBTD. |
| b) WFP should develop guidance material to help staff to identify appropriate operational contexts for CBTD. This should be based on the substantial body of recorded experience with CBTD. | **PDPT** | PDPT will address this through ongoing processes of guidance development once a new targeting policy is completed and approved. |
| c) In particularly food-insecure, disaster-prone countries that have frequent EMOPs, WFP should be prepared to maintain CBTD capacity by training partner staff, even when there are no EMOPs planned or ongoing. | **OD** | There are obvious advantages in having trained cooperating partners in place in expectation of renewed emergency situations, but it is difficult to achieve this in a sustainable way. Many CPs are present only during an emergency and move out when the situation returns to normal; they may or may not return if there is a new disaster. Like WFP and all other agencies, CPs have staff turnover. WFP faces funding constraints resulting from the reduction of donor resources for development activities worldwide. In disaster-prone countries this is particularly problematic, because it is sometimes impossible to maintain the desirable standby emergency-response capacity. |
| d) WFP guidelines should encourage selection for CBDT of cooperating partners with strong mandates and proven capacities, for example in community development, and whose presence in the community is sufficient to allow the attainment of their goals. | **PDPT** | This issue will be addressed as part of the normative guidance development exercise covered under the management response to recommendation 9. |

| ANNEX: REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY—<br>THEMATIC REVIEW OF TARGETING IN RELIEF OPERATIONS | | |
|---|---|---|
| **OEDE recommendations** | **Action by** | **Management response and action taken** |
| **7. Modalities (paras 51–56)** | | |
| a) WFP must revisit efforts to ensure that food aid modalities are selected strategically on the basis of programming objectives and situation analyses, with due attention to effectiveness and efficiency concerns. | **PDPT**<br><br>**PRC** | As part of normal guidance development, PDPT will review normative guidance relative to strategic modality selection and augment such guidance as required to address gaps such as those identified in this review.<br><br>On the basis of the additional guidance to be developed (see above), the PRC will be involved in an advisory capacity to ensure compliance with programme guidance and best programming practices. |
| b) To help achieve (a), WFP guidance materials should include assistance in selecting food aid modalities to (i) meet the priority objectives of the operation, (ii) provide the best coverage of the target groups and (iii) have the greatest impact in terms of the human, financial and material resources available. | **PDPT** | (See item a. above) |
| **8. Monitoring (paras 57–71)** | | |
| a) WFP should include monitoring of targeting in on-going efforts to improve monitoring in general; such activities should be statistically rigorous, light and flexible, and aimed at identifying and informing critical changes to ongoing targeting strategy and tactics. | **PDPT**<br><br>**OEDP/CMEA** | New policy guidance for presentation to EB.1/2006 will reconfirm the importance of monitoring in emergency programming, including monitoring of targeting outcomes.<br><br>OEDP will review normative and operational guidance relative to monitoring of targeting outcomes, and revise such guidance to reflect lessons learned in this review. |
| b) Monitoring of targeting should sample the food-security status of populations in non-programme areas as well as populations in intervention areas. | **OEDE** | (See above) |
| c) WFP should adopt a single, practical method for determining targeting error and efficiency and document it in guidance materials. WFP country offices should collect and report these statistics in regular monitoring reports. | **PDPT**<br><br>**OEDP/CMEA** | PDPT will address this through ongoing processes of guidance development once new targeting policy is completed and approved.<br><br>OEDP/ Common Monitoring and Evaluation Approach (CMEA) will ensure implementation through common corporate monitoring activities. |

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3" align="center">**ANNEX: REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY—<br>THEMATIC REVIEW OF TARGETING IN RELIEF OPERATIONS**</td></tr>
<tr><td>**OEDE recommendations**</td><td>**Action by**</td><td>**Management response and action taken**</td></tr>
<tr>
<td>d) WFP should ensure that coverage and enrolment data for selective and school feeding programmes are compiled by CPs and systematically examine these data in assessing targeting performance.</td>
<td>**PDPF**</td>
<td>PDPF will review and revise the *Guidelines for School Feeding* to include guidance on the best use of school feeding in emergency interventions.<br><br>PDPF will establish an enhanced dialogue with ODAN and OEDP/CMEA to improve targeting criteria and monitoring with regard to school feeding in emergencies; PDPF is already considering pilot efforts involving modification of HHE and coping strategy index methods.<br><br>PDPF will continue to build improved partnerships with governments and other United Nations and NGO partners to strengthen information flows critical to targeting.</td>
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<tr><td colspan="3">**9. Guidance (paras 72–74)**</td></tr>
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<td>Existing guidance on targeting needs to be brought together, for example in the *Programme Guidance Manual*, and augmented with the additional guidance recommended by the targeting review and maintained through continuous updating.</td>
<td>**PDPT**<br><br>**ODO**</td>
<td>As part of normal guidance development, PDPT will augment guidance as necessary.<br><br>ODO will continue to supervise efforts under the PGM process to see that programme guidance, including that related to targeting, is consolidated; this process should continue to have high priority in WFP.</td>
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## ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

| | |
|---|---|
| EMOP | emergency operation |
| CBT | community-based targeting |
| CBTD | community-based targeting and distribution |
| CBO | community-based organization |
| CMEA | Common Monitoring and Evaluation Approach |
| CP | collaborating partner |
| DSC | direct support costs |
| EFSA | Emergency Food Security Assessment |
| ENA | Emergency needs assessment |
| FFA | food for assets |
| FFT | food for training |
| FFW | food for work |
| GFD | general food distribution |
| HEA | household economy analysis |
| HHE | household economy |
| HIV/AIDS | human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome |
| IDP | internally displaced person |
| MCH | mother-and-child health centre |
| M&E | monitoring and evaluation |
| MOU | memorandum of understanding |
| NGO | non-governmental organization |
| OD | Operations Department |
| ODAN | Emergency Needs Assessment Branch |
| ODAV | Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Branch |
| ODO | Office of Director of Operations |
| ODOC | other direct operational costs |
| OEDE | Office of Evaluation |
| PDPF | School Feeding Unit |
| PDM | post-distribution monitoring |
| PDPT | Emergencies and Transition Unit |
| PLWHA | people living with HIV/AIDS |
| PRC | Programme Review Committee |
| PRRO | protracted relief and recovery operation |

| | |
|---|---|
| SENAC | Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity |
| VAC | vulnerability analysis committee |
| VAM | Vulnerability analysis and mapping |
| VGF | vulnerable group feeding |