

برنامج  
الأغذية  
العالمي



Programme  
Alimentaire  
Mondial

World  
Food  
Programme

Programa  
Mundial  
de Alimentos

**Executive Board  
Annual Session**

**Rome, 12–16 June 2006**

## **EVALUATION REPORTS**

**Agenda item 7**

*For consideration*



Distribution: GENERAL  
**WFP/EB.A/2006/7-A/3**  
5 May 2006  
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

## **SUMMARY REPORT OF THE EVALUATION OF PRRO SOMALIA 10191.0**

**Food Aid for Relief and Recovery**

This document is printed in a limited number of copies. Executive Board documents are available on WFP's WEB site (<http://www.wfp.org/eb>).

## NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

**This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

Director, OEDE: Mr K. Tuinenburg tel.: 066513-2252

Senior Evaluation Officer, OEDE: Ms A-M. Waeschle tel.: 066513-2358

Should you have any questions regarding matters of dispatch of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact Ms. C. Panlilio, Administrative Assistant, Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645).



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This three-year, US\$48 million protracted relief and recovery operation began in January 2003, aiming to contribute to improved food security for 2.9 million people affected by natural disasters and civil unrest that have destroyed productive resources. The evaluation found that the operation was effective in addressing humanitarian needs, but the needs far exceed the available resources. The operation has only been fully funded since the beginning of 2005, a side effect of tsunami funding for Somalia.

The acquisition of reliable data was constrained by insecurity and insufficient office staff, so the evaluation could not fully assess the extent to which the operation has achieved its objectives. Observations from the few activities the team was able to visit and interviews with stakeholders suggest that the operation has helped to improve food security among vulnerable populations.


Targeting in each region has been affected by factors outside WFP's control: conflict, insecurity and access, which are causally related to food insecurity. In all activities, redistribution on the basis of equity rather than vulnerability is widespread. Even though this results in inclusion errors, the many benefits in terms of enhanced social safety nets and social capital outweigh the disadvantages.

WFP staff have tried to avoid food-driven projects and ensure that the products of recovery activities contribute to improving or supporting livelihoods. Food for work or food for training can reduce longer-term vulnerability to shocks, but they were put in place relatively late. There is a need to recognize opportunities for early intervention to protect livelihoods during acute and deteriorating livelihood crises; problem analysis and activity design must take livelihood systems into account.

With natural disasters likely in the coming years, WFP programming needs to remain flexible in order to deliver targeted food assistance quickly in response to drought, flood and conflict even in the middle of a recovery operation.



## DRAFT DECISION\*



The Board takes note of the information and recommendations set out in “Summary Report of the Evaluation of PRRO Somalia 10191.0” (WFP/EB.A/2006/7-A/3) and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

---

\* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations (document WFP/EB.A/2006/16) issued at the end of the session.



---

## PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

1. The Office of Evaluation (OEDE) organized an evaluation<sup>1</sup> of protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 10191.0 “Food Aid for Relief and Recovery in Somalia” in June-July 2005, focusing on effectiveness – the extent to which objectives were achieved or expected to be achieved – and relevance – the extent to which objectives were consistent with needs, priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies.
2. The team held discussions with staff from WFP, donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations agencies and local authorities in Nairobi and Somalia, visited sites in WFP’s three operational areas and met beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, local authorities and community representatives.

---

## BACKGROUND TO THE EVALUATION<sup>2</sup>

3. Somalia has had no central government since the fall of President Siad Barre in 1991 and the ensuing destruction of social and economic infrastructure. In January 2004, representatives of 22 Somali groups agreed to establish a 275-member Federal Transitional Parliament in Nairobi. There is cautious optimism that negotiations between competing groups may result in wider acceptance of the transitional government – the fourteenth attempt since 1991 to resolve the crisis through political negotiations. The transitional government is unlikely to be able to change Somalia in the short term, however; the United Nations can expect to encounter chronic insecurity in the coming years.
4. WFP staff recognize that it is essential to define the main actors such as clans, militiamen, elders, warlords, civil society groups, local administrations, Islamic movements and businessmen. The existence of so many actors makes planning in a given area very difficult: even a small group can act as a spoiler.
5. Somalia is one of the most dangerous United Nations operations, but the security situation varies between locations, with pockets of stability and some means of economic recovery. Insecurity has forced many humanitarian aid organizations to downsize their operations and rely increasingly on local staff supported by international staff based outside the country. The number of WFP international staff is limited, and their movements are restricted.
6. Paradoxically, there is a vibrant market economy. Remittances estimated at up to US\$1 billion per year from Somalis abroad – for business ventures, property purchases and support for families – play a major role in the economy.
7. The location and application of humanitarian resources are subject to public scrutiny and publicity. WFP has been careful to ensure equity in allocating resources in communities and among regions, an approach that has enabled it to do so without generating animosities.

---

<sup>1</sup> The mission was composed of the team leader (consultant), a food security and nutrition expert (consultant), an M&E expert (consultant) and the evaluation manager from OEDE.

<sup>2</sup> See the full evaluation report (OEDE/2006/6) for more detailed analysis of the country context.



## PRRO 10191.0 Planning and Design

8. This three-year PRRO began on 1 January 2003, aiming to reach 2.9 million beneficiaries affected by natural disasters and civil unrest; the cost to WFP is US\$48 million, of which US\$11.3 million is for food. The objectives are: (i) to ensure the minimum dietary requirements for vulnerable people through food aid; (ii) to improve the nutritional status of vulnerable people, especially women and children; and (iii) to support the capacity of vulnerable populations to create productive assets and resources that enable them to improve their livelihoods.
9. The initial PRRO plan was to distribute 60 percent of food resources through relief and social-support activities and 40 percent through recovery activities. In line with recommendations made in the 2001 evaluation, the aim was to increase the quantity of food distributed through recovery by 10 percent each year as regions became more secure.

## MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10. The evaluation reviewed separately the relevance and effectiveness of intervention strategies and activities, and general issues of transition from relief to recovery, targeting, gender, protection, coordination and partnerships, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).
11. Table 1 summarizes the proportion of food used per year compared with planned amounts. Differences in planned and actual food allocations show the extent to which implementation has been affected by conflict, insecurity and access. In terms of resources, the PRRO received only 21 percent of the approved budget in 2003, but in 2004 it was funded at 68 percent.<sup>3</sup>

	2003			2004		
	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned
Relief	8 588	1 527	17.8	7 075	9 178	129.7
Social support	4 752	3 621	76.2	4 695	4 693	98.8
FFW*/FFT**	7 417	5 795	78.1	8 159	8 305	101.8
School feeding	180	90	50.0	326	305	93.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>20 937</b>	<b>11 033</b>	<b>52.7</b>	<b>20 255</b>	<b>22 481</b>	<b>111.0</b>

\* Food for work

\*\* Food for training

<sup>3</sup> The situation became significantly better in 2005 when the PRRO received 82 percent of the approved budget.



## Effectiveness

12. Lack of outcome-level data<sup>4</sup> for most activities prevented the evaluation from assessing fully the effectiveness of individual activities or the overall effectiveness of the PRRO; statements about effectiveness therefore rely on information from the few activities that the evaluation team was able to visit and from discussions with stakeholders, including beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The evaluation found the PRRO to be effective in addressing humanitarian needs and a positive contribution to improved food security among vulnerable populations.

## Relevance of Intervention Strategies

⇒ *Relief*

13. Free food distributions respond to needs identified by the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU)<sup>5</sup>, joint agency assessments and independent WFP assessments and follow-up investigations of problem areas identified by FSAU. WFP has tried to target the most vulnerable people and increase the amount of food aid that reaches households and is retained, as explained in other parts of this report. Table 2 shows the numbers of people reached in 2003 and 2004; over-achievements in general food distribution (GFD) result from the drought that started in 2003.

<b>Relief</b>	<b>2003</b>			<b>2004</b>		
<b>Beneficiary category</b>	<b>Planned</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>% actual vs planned</b>	<b>Planned</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>% actual vs planned</b>
Internally displaced people (IDPs)	40 000	19 735	49.3	40 000	10 080	25.2
Returnees	83 520	879	1.1	83 520	1 222	1.5
Beneficiaries of GFD	64 503	105 804	164.0	64 503	259 974	402.7

Source: Standard project report (SPR).

14. WFP assistance to people affected by small-scale conflict and floods in the South Central Zone (SCZ) was timely and relevant in terms of type of response, duration and transition from relief activities.
15. Food provision to drought-affected regions in Somaliland, which began in November 2003, was ongoing at the time of the evaluation. Free food distribution in Puntland, excluding the tsunami emergency operation (EMOP), includes assistance since

<sup>4</sup> See section on M&E.

<sup>5</sup> FSAU is a project funded by the European Commission and USAID, and implemented by FAO. The FSAU receives technical support from a number of core technical partners and services a wide range of clients/users, including the international development community and Somali people.



December 2003 for IDP settlements in Bossaso and regions affected by drought in the Sool Plateau. Assistance extended to other pastoralist groups during 2004 was ongoing at the time of evaluation.

16. By contrast, lack of responsiveness on the part of WFP and other agencies to the slow-onset livelihood crises identified by FSAU in 2001 among drought-affected populations in Somaliland and Puntland represents a missed opportunity to protect livelihoods in an acute livelihood crisis (see also *Transition from Relief to Recovery*, paragraphs 33–38).
17. The current range of WFP activities in Somalia aims at post-crisis recovery and so is not ideal for protecting livelihoods in times of crisis. For example, panic selling of livestock – a last effort to recover value from weakened animals that are likely to die – leads to flooded markets, reducing prices even further. The result is that pastoralists sell off livestock at extremely low prices and on poor terms of trade with grain. Subsequently, many cannot restock when the situation improves. WFP's current range of activities in Somalia does little to address this critical issue; new approaches are needed.<sup>6</sup>

⇒ *Recovery*

### Social Support

18. Among social support activities are targeted feeding programmes for malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women managed through mother-and-child health (MCH) activities, and targeted feeding for tuberculosis (TB) patients. The remainder of social-support food is distributed through orphanages, mental institutions and centres for street children.
19. In 2003, 1,104 children received a family ration through therapeutic feeding and 8,381 through supplementary feeding; in 2004, the figures were 1,500, and 30,660.<sup>7</sup> The sharp increase resulted from expansion of the WFP/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) implementing partner programme. With regard to the number of people who have improved their nutrition situation, the SPR for 2003 only gives figures for therapeutic recovery – 72 percent. Given the operational constraints in Somalia, this recovery rate is very good.
20. WFP works with UNICEF to provide a three-month ration for families with a malnourished child or malnourished pregnant or lactating woman; UNICEF provides a supplementary ration. Distribution of monthly and supplementary rations and screening, weighing and measuring beneficiaries may take two days, during which beneficiaries also receive health and nutrition information.
21. WFP cooperates with UNICEF in assisting households with malnourished children or pregnant or lactating women through mother-and-child health (MCH) centres. The selection criterion is well defined – less than 80 percent of median weight/height – and usually understood by beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. WFP has an exit strategy; internationally agreed standards developed by the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum

---

<sup>6</sup> To address this issue, in the second semester of 2005 the East and Central Africa regional bureau (ODK) reviewed the current and long term trends of food security in the greater Horn of Africa, focusing on pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. The study was published in December 2005 in Kampala.

<sup>7</sup> See SPRs for 2003 and 2004.





Standards in Disaster Response (Sphere) are used to monitor the outcome of targeted feeding programmes.

22. In drought-affected areas of Somaliland, mobile nutrition teams follow pastoralists to implement the targeted feeding activities; distribution and screening sites are established in accessible places.
23. TB patients receive individual rations, which are distributed through NGOs treating them or the Ministry of Health. No data are available on recovery, default rates and weight gain. The Somalia Assistance Coordinating Body (SACB) recently decided that WFP should discontinue the TB outpatient food programme because of tensions among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries and WFP's occasional inability to provide food consistently.
24. Orphanages, mental institutions and centres for street children receive a set number of rations to guarantee the minimum dietary requirements of vulnerable people. Receiving organizations report the number of beneficiaries and the quantity of food received.

### Food for Work and Food for Training

25. Providing beneficiaries with food as incentives or payments for work reduces dependency on free food distributions; for such workers, FFW is essentially "as if" <sup>8</sup>relief. For other food-insecure groups closer to recovery, the benefit of individual or community-owned assets is a stimulus to reducing vulnerability; food aid contributes as a means of payment for labour. The food security of both categories must be kept in mind to prevent the inclusion of too many food-secure households to the detriment of intended beneficiaries.

TABLE 3. BENEFICIARIES REACHED IN 2003 AND 2004						
Recovery	2003			2004		
Beneficiary category	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned
FFW participants	51 998	60 237	115.8	51 998	85 090	163.6
FFT participants	13 327	9 964	74.8	13 327	9 110	68.74

Source: SPR

26. WFP programme staff have tried to avoid food-driven projects and to ensure that rehabilitation activities help to improve or support livelihoods. The selection process described by field staff, however, seems to focus on whether a proposed project falls within WFP's usual activities rather than on problem analysis with communities to maximize the achievement of recovery objectives; hence many activities appear to be replications of previous WFP projects rather than the result of analysis. This focus on type of activities rather than on maximizing achievement of objectives has probably constrained the development of innovative approaches.

<sup>8</sup> Food-supported activities do not contribute to supporting livelihoods.



27. Problem analysis and activity design among any livelihood group must take into account the livelihood system. Understanding the pastoral livelihood system is critical for problem analysis and relevant intervention design as WFP transitions to rehabilitation activities in the drought-affected northern regions.
28. Several innovative activities deserve mention, however. The Community Cereal Reserves (CCR) pilot project is an innovative attempt to address indebtedness brought about by food-insecure households having to repay food borrowed from the market during the lean season with three times the quantity during the low-price post harvest season; the modalities still need to be refined. Support for salt production in Berbera and informal training in marketable skills in Garowe are other examples. Given the likelihood of a transition from relief to rehabilitation activities among drought-affected pastoralists in the north during the coming months, it is essential to link sound problem analysis, activity design and objectives in the next PRRO.
29. During debriefing with WFP staff in Nairobi, it was explained that the country office is continuing the transition from a large number of community-level projects to a small number of larger livelihood projects; the number of projects in January–June 2005 is 25 percent of the 2003 figure. This is advantageous in terms of programme management and of maximizing WFP's support for the livelihoods of food-insecure households; it also highlights the effectiveness of partnering with other agencies.

### **School Feeding**

30. In August 2003, WFP initiated a pilot school feeding programme in 21 schools in Somaliland; in June 2005, seven schools in Merka commenced the programme, and there are plans to expand it to 15 more schools in Somaliland, 17 in Puntland and 6 in Wajid by August 2005. According to the SPRs, 5,465 children received school meals in 2003 – 102 percent of the target – and 7,220 in 2004 – 50 percent of the target.
31. WFP and the Ministry of Education reviewed the pilot programme at the end of the school year in May/June 2004, noting that school feeding had contributed significantly to increased enrolment rates and more regular attendance. In the eight schools covered by the review, the increase was approximately 50 percent rather than the expected 15 percent. On average, girls' enrolment increased by 70 percent. Some unintended positive outcomes were noted, including:
  - positive change in parental attitudes towards girls' education, which contributed to increased enrolment/attendance;
  - improved nutrition status of the children, as stated by parents and teachers;
  - improved learning performance and higher scores in examinations; and
  - no interruptions during the school year.
32. The review acknowledged constraints in the education system such as lack of qualified teachers, materials and an agreed curriculum, absence of government funding and low pay for teachers, and noted that school feeding on its own would have limited impact on these constraints. WFP concluded that partnering with implementing agencies was essential to maximize the impact of school feeding.



## Transition from Relief to Recovery

33. The drought in Somaliland and Puntland that started in 2003 affected the transition goals. Given that similar events will recur in the coming years, WFP programming must remain flexible so that targeted food assistance can be delivered rapidly in response to drought, flood or conflict, even during a recovery operation.
34. It is clear in hindsight that the lack of responsiveness of WFP and other agencies to the slow-onset livelihood crisis that FSAU identified as early as 2001 among drought-affected populations in Somaliland and Puntland was a missed opportunity to protect livelihoods. It should be noted that this is a contested region with significant access problems. An inter-agency assessment<sup>9</sup> of the crisis to decide on intervention strategies – which did not take place until October 2003 even though the issue had been highlighted in monthly bulletins, seasonal technical reports and SACB meetings – recommended against the use of food aid. As a result of the delay, what began as a livelihood crisis deteriorated into a humanitarian emergency with long-term repercussions in terms of livelihood recovery prior to any significant intervention.
35. Following the inter-agency assessment of the large-scale need for assistance, WFP responded in November–December 2003 and continues to provide life-saving relief assistance to drought-affected populations in the region. The evaluation team was unable to ascertain the effect of logistics and pipeline-driven reductions in the frequency and scale of relief distributions.
36. Factors outside WFP's control did, however, limit its ability to respond to early-warning information with livelihood-protection activities on an adequate scale: the areas in question – Sool and Sanag – have been involved in recurrent territorial disputes that have hindered humanitarian access.
37. WFP sub-offices and programmes recognize the roles of ministries in the north and local authorities in the SCZ and work with them. Transition activities are carried out as WFP projects and in partnership with NGOs and United Nations agencies. Outcomes vary from food-driven projects to projects with real impact through the establishment of sustainable livelihoods that can withstand drought, flood or conflict. The country office recognizes the need to meet Somali expectations that people should work for relief, and designs programmes that include exchange-based mechanisms. WFP anticipates numerous local emergencies requiring relief responses. Opportunities exist in other areas, however, to develop livelihood capacities through recovery projects – for example the Sustainable Livelihood and Drought Mitigation programme developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in partnership with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and WFP. WFP will determine where, when and for how long food inputs should supplement inputs by other partners to ensure livelihood outcomes and to carry out M&E.
38. Recovery activities appear to be reserved mainly for people in transition from relief or for more food-secure populations in need of such assistance. This approach does not fully exploit activities aimed at protecting livelihoods in times of crisis, however: all recovery

---

<sup>9</sup> The inter-agency mission, composed of representatives of UNICEF, WFP, OCHA, FSAU, the Famine Early-Warning System Network (FEWS-NET), Horn Relief, *Vétérinaires sans frontières* (VSF) and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), took place from 9 to 13 October 2003. Team leaders were from FSAU and OCHA.



activities aim to reduce longer-term vulnerability, but there is a need to recognize the usefulness of intervening early in acute and deteriorating livelihood crises. The evaluation team recognizes that this will be difficult to implement in Somalia.

## Targeting

39. WFP has tried to target the most vulnerable people and to maximize the amount of food aid that reaches households and is retained. This is achieved through community-based targeting that involves recipient households and community leaders, and distribution to women.
40. Targeting rehabilitation activities to the most vulnerable and most food-insecure areas is hampered by conflict and insecurity and consequent lack of access, which are causally related to food insecurity; conflict and insecurity, for example, often result in the displacement of populations. WFP's ability to reach these populations largely depends on their ability to reach areas accessible to WFP.
41. As a result, rehabilitation interventions by various agencies are concentrated in accessible and secure areas. This means that the areas of coverage are limited, although multiple projects in communities are likely to be synergistic in terms of improving food security. But total humanitarian capacity in Somalia falls far short of humanitarian need.
42. Identification of beneficiaries for rehabilitation activities in food-insecure areas varies significantly by region. In the SCZ, activities are targeted to communities on the basis of combined FSAU and WFP assessments; communities occasionally approach WFP for assistance. In Somaliland, the process is similar, with project proposals provided through the Ministry of Planning; the ministry's priorities are often inconsistent with WFP's objectives, however. In Puntland, lack of staff means that WFP depends on ministries and communities to identify potential projects; communities may approach WFP directly or through local authorities.
43. The danger of relying on community proposals rather than on targeting food-insecure communities identified by WFP and FSAU is the probable negative correlation between a community's ability to organize itself and approach WFP or local authorities and its level of food insecurity. Reliance on a proposal-driven process for identifying projects is likely to be biased in favour of less vulnerable, more food-secure communities and will reduce WFP's ability to reach the most vulnerable.
44. The issue of redistribution of WFP relief food has raised concerns about inclusion errors. Redistribution of food by beneficiaries represents a repayment to those who supported them in the past; it ensures that these sources of support remain open in the future, which reduces vulnerability, increases social capital and enhances safety nets. Redistribution reduces tensions among recipients and non-recipients and is an important, although unacknowledged, means of protection for beneficiaries, which is particularly important in the context of Somalia, where peaceful means of resolving tensions are threatened by violence. Beneficiaries consume less food than they receive when redistribution takes place, but the most vulnerable people seem to retain most of the food aid received; redistribution to better-off relatives is partly a symbolic means of maintaining equity.
45. Evidence suggests that redistribution on the basis of equity rather than vulnerability is widespread, regardless of the type of activity. This does result in inclusion errors, but the benefits of redistribution in terms of enhanced social safety nets and social capital outweigh any negative connotation.



## Gender

46. Women in Somalia are considered incapable of making decisions at a leadership level, yet they participate in all other aspects of life from home to work and business and mix and communicate with men inside and outside the family at all times.
47. WFP relief and recovery strategies are different: in relief settings the goal is to ensure that food goes directly to households; in recovery projects the aim is to promote the participation of women and to give them a leading role in management committees for food and activities. In the past, programming has not focused on gender awareness, analysis and strategy at the country office and field levels. The evaluation recognized the efforts of individual programme staff to reflect Somali cultural norms of respect, care and concern for women.

## Protection

48. Protection has traditionally been the mandate of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Given the magnitude of protection gaps in conflict and emergency situations, however, humanitarian agencies recognize that they can help to ensure the dignity and rights of individuals.
49. Simple decisions as to where to locate a well or to distribute food directly to women and children will reduce vulnerability; there is often a link between gender and protection. WFP's commitment is to consider both as cross-cutting issues in planning and implementation.
50. The country office distributes high-value commodities desirable to communities of varying vulnerability that are often divided by clan boundaries; news of an intervention is spread by radio broadcasts. The country office practices risk mitigation and is transparent and equitable in decision-making and implementation:
  - Food storage in warehouses is limited to reduce thefts and attacks; distributions are limited to monthly rations to limit insecurity.
  - FSAU and WFP nutritional data are widely available to stakeholders through information-sharing networks.
  - The presence of international staff decision-makers at the regional level protects national staff from the pressures of clan and sub-clan demands.
  - WFP's equitable practices in communities and among regions enhance its ability to implement activities without generating animosities.
  - WFP distribution monitoring includes staff, community representatives and beneficiaries to ensure that food rations are delivered to the targeted populations.

## Coordination and Partnerships

51. There has been a significant expansion of NGO and United Nations activity since 2004. WFP, which has taken advantage of these increasing opportunities, is known to look for partnerships.
52. OCHA has expanded operations since the tsunami and now takes the lead in coordinating humanitarian response and ensuring access. WFP and UNICEF are well



coordinated: at the start of targeted feeding programmes, they met regularly to ensure smooth implementation. The Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) is a major WFP partner; the agencies support each other during pipeline constraints, have an operational agreement that prevents overlap and take common positions with authorities to ensure staff security and access.

53. International NGOs now focus on developing local implementing capacity, especially in the north. The United Nations inter-agency focus is on development of civil society capacities, supported by major donors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and *Cooperazione Italiana*, which promote capacity-building and are committed to meeting emerging food insecurity. For WFP, this means increased opportunity to engage in recovery activities.
54. WFP and FSAU have a productive field relationship, even though FSAU does not focus on the community-level data required by WFP; at the sub-office level they collaborate in sharing resources and conducting food-security assessments and analysis.<sup>10</sup> There are exceptions, however, such as the recent disagreement over the interpretation of estimates of the prevalence of high malnutrition and the appropriateness of WFP food interventions in Somaliland.<sup>11</sup> The hiring of an ex-FSAU nutrition team member as the WFP VAM officer should strengthen the relationship.
55. The Ministry of Planning appears to coordinate and support implementing agencies in Somaliland, but the agencies noted that ministries are poorly informed about activities, which leads to frustration because activities are not effectively coordinated.
56. WFP's main office in Puntland is in Bossaso, but most implementing organizations are further south in Garrowe, where coordination takes place; WFP has a food monitor based in Garrowe who frequently attends coordination meetings but whose decision-making authority is limited. UNICEF and WFP in Bossaso occasionally have coordination meetings that feed into the meetings in Garrowe, an arrangement that limits WFP's opportunities to engage in coordination.
57. Inter-agency coordination is not a regular feature in the SCZ. The WFP compound adjoins two international NGOs involved in food-security activities in areas where WFP also operates, but their activities are limited and the region lacks groups that could partner with WFP. There is, however, limited coordination between WFP and the two international NGOs.

---

## MONITORING AND EVALUATION

58. The aim of the M&E system<sup>12</sup> is to assess performance with a view to maximizing strengths and identifying areas for improvement. The country office performed well in collecting data for monitoring inputs, activities and outputs through sub-offices for

---

<sup>10</sup> WFP staff are involved in planning, data collection and data analysis of FSAU food-needs assessments at the regional level before consolidation in Nairobi.

<sup>11</sup> There is disagreement over whether this outcome is primarily driven by food insecurity, health or a combination of these.

<sup>12</sup> In 2001, there was a consultation at the country office that aimed to set up an M&E system and project/PRRO design framework using the logical framework approach.



reporting and planning purposes in Nairobi; the sub-offices use the data to plan follow-up activities and field visits. There is little evidence, however, that country-wide monitoring data are analysed or that they inform programme decision-making.

59. The country office was less successful in collecting project-level data on immediate and longer-term outcomes: such data were only collected for school feeding. There was a lack of documentation and analysis of outcome-level data for projects such as MCH, for which the data are readily available through partners. In the absence of outcome-level data at the project level, no attempt could be made to analyse PRRO impact. This raises concerns about project and PRRO management decision-making, given that the PRRO states that outcome-level data is critical for “demonstrating the validity of project design and the value of project replication and expansion, enabling continuous modification of intervention strategies”.
60. The failure to implement the M&E system designed in 2001–2002 is related to insufficient funding in the past, but has little to do with lack of forms or databases or with any lack of understanding of the logframe approach among national staff. The primary cause of this failure is attributable to (i) lack of field-staff time allocated to outcome-level data collection, (ii) lack of technical staff in Nairobi to advise on analysis of project-level data to assess PRRO performance and (iii) low priority for collecting and analysing outcome data.
61. The main evaluation recommendations and actions envisaged or taken by WFP are summarized in the Annex.



**ANNEX: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE MATRIX—PRRO SOMALIA 10191.0**

OEDE Recommendations (July 2005)	Action by	Management response and action taken as of March 2006
<p><b>Recommendations 1 and 2: Social support</b></p> <p>1. Ensure the development and maintenance of staff technical capacity to interpret and use nutritional data.</p> <p>2. Generate with UNICEF improved beneficiary profile information in order to improve understanding of the causes of malnutrition.</p>	<p>Nutrition Service (PDPN)</p> <p>Country office</p>	<p>As in 2005, PDPN plans to train staff in 2006 on measurement and interpretation of malnutrition and mortality; Somalia will be included. The country office has recently recruited a trained nutritionist VAM officer.</p> <p>The country office cooperates with UNICEF; this may be extended to include improved beneficiary profiling.</p>
<p><b>Recommendations 3 and 4: Rehabilitation activities</b></p> <p>3. Modify the project approval process for existing and future rehabilitation activities to assess projects in terms of specific contribution to PRRO objectives, in addition to local problem analysis. This will serve to refocus activity design on PRRO objectives rather than activities, and eliminate projects that do not contribute to these objectives.</p> <p>4. Review the CCR pilot project design to ensure that the initial capital outlay and sustainability of the project are consistent, either by reducing the initial capital input or improving the sustainability mechanism.</p>	<p>Country office</p> <p>Country office</p>	<p>A new logframe has been developed for the new PRRO starting in August 2006. The project-approval process has been modified. The country office has developed guidelines for project preparation and M&amp;E and for project review panels at the sub-office and country office levels. Staffing has been budgeted in the new PRRO.</p> <p>The CCR pilot project design will be reviewed as recommended.</p>
<p><b>Recommendation 5: School feeding</b></p> <p>5. WFP commitment to individual schools to be for a 3-year minimum, unless a suitable agency is found to take on the management and support of school feeding.</p>	<p>Country office</p>	<p>The country office is committed to supporting school feeding on a longer-term basis. It is also included in the new PRRO.</p>
<p><b>Recommendation 6: Transition to relief and recovery (or vice versa)</b></p> <p>6. Transition to be based on a formal decision-making process, which includes reference to the logframe and assessment of minimum institutional demands.</p>	<p>Country office</p>	<p>The country office will design an assessment tool to signal the transition from relief to recovery or vice versa. It will use the findings of the assessment tool for decision-making.</p>
<p><b>Recommendations 7: Defining target populations</b></p> <p>7. Identify a typology of target groups, focusing on factors relevant to project design and decision making. At a minimum this includes sources of livelihood and a more refined definition of status giving indication of social capital, social networks and social position in their current location as they relate to their ability to access market credit and community support mechanisms in times of crisis.</p>	<p>Country office</p>	<p>Most beneficiaries have been targeted on the basis of source of livelihood, using information provided by FAO. The country office VAM unit has recently been strengthened, so a more refined typology may be possible.</p>





**ANNEX: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE MATRIX—PRRO SOMALIA 10191.0**

OEDE Recommendations (July 2005)	Action by	Management response and action taken as of March 2006
<p><b>Recommendations 8 – 10: Protection</b></p> <p>8. Formalize and systematize the collection of protection information such as challenges to safety and security of beneficiaries, impediments to access or security of WFP staff in monitoring and evaluation. .</p> <p>9. Include protection issues in post-distribution monitoring (PDM) such as impact of food aid on safety of beneficiaries.</p> <p>10. Ensure that agreements with local partners include specific reference to secure and safe delivery to the most vulnerable and helping ensure that their safety, security and dignity are not placed at risk as a result of food aid.</p>	<p>Emergencies and Transition Unit (PDPT)</p> <p>Country office</p> <p>Country office</p>	<p>PDPT is working on this issue; guidance will be provided in due course.</p> <p>The country office looks forward to corporate advice on the issue of protection.</p> <p>The country office is implementing the WFP field level agreement (FLA) with cooperating partners. FLAs are signed with implementing partners on the basis of WFP/FSAU assessment figures. The country office plans PDM after the food distribution on a sample basis to evaluate effectiveness and efficiency.</p>
<p><b>Recommendations 12–14: Coordination and partnerships</b></p> <p>11. Country office management to take advantage of opportunities to participate in the FSAU steering committee and core technical partner meeting (review of findings before publication). Identify mechanisms for FSAU to provide support to meet specific programme information needs (e.g. as with CARE-FSAU).</p> <p>12. Strategic engagement (discussion/promotion of programme) with line ministries, other agencies and/or local authorities to increase their understanding of WFP mandate and strategies with a view of strengthening food security for identified communities.</p> <p>13. Puntland Garowe office: assign senior staff with decision-making authority to strengthen existing and emerging coordination opportunities.</p>	<p>Country office</p> <p>Country office</p> <p>Country office</p>	<p>The country office is working with FSAU: for example, core technical review meetings have been set up at WFP's request.</p> <p>The country office is developing a programme planning and implementation strategy in coordination with ministries in Somaliland and Puntland in North Somalia and with United Nations agencies in line with WFP requirements. A workshop is planned for July 2006 to finalize the strategy with ministries.</p> <p>At least one international staff member will be regularly based in WFP's office in Garowe, which is being enlarged and strengthened.</p>



**ANNEX: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE MATRIX—PRRO SOMALIA 10191.0**

OEDE Recommendations (July 2005)	Action by	Management response and action taken as of March 2006
<p><b>Recommendation 15–16: M&amp;E</b></p> <p>14. Create management mandate and allocate staff for collection of project outcome data (requires re-visiting project sites after output delivery) on a sample of projects by type (Collins, 2001).</p>	Country office	The country office sees implementation of a proper M&E system as a management mandate. Surveys have begun and data collected to start the process. As a start-up, the school feeding baseline survey was conducted in January 2006. The other activity – collection of baseline and outcome information – is planned for 2006.
<p>15. Develop long-term staff capacities. The approach to date of using consultants and relying on short-term junior professional officers (JPOs) and focal points whose time dedicated to other tasks prevents adequate engagement with the M&amp;E system, has failed and should not be replicated. Allocation of dedicated technical staff at Nairobi to advise on data collection/analysis and to evaluate impact (e.g. VAM officer - 50% FTE). Training of staff in use of the logframe for design and M&amp;E.</p>	Country office	<p>The M&amp;E upgrade with assistance from a dedicated technical consultant since January 2005 has been successful and acknowledged by Headquarters; the JPO's assistance has been welcomed. The developed M&amp;E system has been handed over to the country office and offices in the field. Dedicated national staff for M&amp;E at the country office are in place; M&amp;E focal points at sub-offices are functional as of January 2006. An M&amp;E database has been developed to support reporting requirements; it is shared with the Common Monitoring and Evaluation Approach (CMEA) in Rome.</p> <p>Training on the logframe and M&amp;E for field staff and country office staff is planned for June-August 2006 with GTZ technical support.</p>



## ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CCR	community cereal reserves
CMEA	Common Monitoring and Evaluation Approach
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EMOP	emergency operation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEWS-NET	Famine Early-Warning System Network
FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
FLA	field-level agreement
FSAU	Food Security Assessment Unit
GFD	general food distribution
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
JPO	junior professional officer
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MCH	mother-and-child health
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODK	East and Central Africa Regional Bureau
OEDE	Office of Evaluation
PDM	post-distribution monitoring
PDPT	Emergencies and Transition Unit
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
SACB	Somalia Assistance Coordinating Body
SCZ	South Central Zone
TB	tuberculosis
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSECOORD	Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VSF	<i>Vétérinaires sans frontières</i>

