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WFP SECURITY REPORT

* In accordance with the Executive Board's decisions on governance, approved at the Annual and Third Regular Sessions, 2000, items for information should not be discussed unless a Board member specifically requests it, well in advance of the meeting, and the Chair accepts the request on the grounds that it is a proper use of the Board's time.

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD



* Field Security Division



DRAFT DECISION*

The Board takes note of "WFP Security Report" (WFP/EB.A/2011/13-E/Rev.1).

^{*} This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.



FOREWORD BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

- 1. In 2010, for the first time in five years, there were no fatalities among WFP staff as a result of acts of violence when advancing our mission of fighting hunger. This was especially welcome after a particularly painful year in 2009, when nine staff members died and WFP was specifically targeted in a suicide attack in Islamabad.
- 2. This, and the fact that staff injuries as a result of acts of violence also decreased from fifteen in 2009 to six in 2010, encourages us all to continue implementing effective security risk management measures in complex security conditions such as meeting MOSS compliance requirements, installing satellite-based tracking units and improving our security education and training.
- 3. However, the absence of casualties should not be interpreted as a decrease in the level of security threats faced by WFP staff. In 2010, a total of 785 significant security incidents involving WFP staff or assets were reported, a 27 percent increase compared to the previous year and the highest number since records started to be kept in 2005.
- 4. This report analyzes the security incidents affecting WFP staff and operations as well as incidents affecting contractors and partners. Unfortunately six staff members of contractors working for WFP were killed and twenty-two were injured when delivering vital humanitarian assistance last year.
- 5. The report also provides an overview of WFP field security activities and of the improvements under the "no programme without security" and the "no security without resources" premises.
- 6. For example, by the end of 2010, 92 percent of WFP offices around the world complied with minimum operating security standards, and 950 satellite-based tracking units providing real-time monitoring along with a silent panic alarm were set up in 12 countries. In the Sudan, five vehicles were recovered as a result of this enhancement.
- 7. But we can and we will continue to do more to ensure we match our responsibility to protect frontline staff with their commitment to fight hunger worldwide.

Josette Sheeron

Josette Sheeran Executive Director



BACKGROUND

- 8. In 2010, insecurity continued to affect WFP staff and operations adversely in many locations, where they frequently face threats from extremism, armed conflict, civil unrest and crime. When conducting critical humanitarian activities, often in high-threat environments, WFP and other United Nations staff are being exposed to higher risks. In his report "Safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel" (A/65/344) submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session, the Secretary-General expressed grave concern about the long-term trend in deliberate targeting of United Nations and associated personnel. He reiterated his call on Member States to observe the internationally agreed principles for protecting such personnel.
- 9. This report supplements the Secretary-General's report, providing updates on threats to the security and safety of WFP staff and assets and the staff of partners and contractors supporting WFP operations, and on efforts by WFP field security to address the increasing security challenges that WFP faces in fulfilling its programmes. It contains a detailed analysis of the security incidents that affected WFP staff or assets and partner/contractor staff engaged in WFP operations in 2010. The analysis is based on significant incident reports received by WFP's Field Security Division (ODF).

SECURITY INCIDENTS INVOLVING WFP STAFF OR ASSETS AND PARTNER STAFF

- 10. In 2010, a total of 785 significant security incidents involving WFP staff or assets were reported. This is the highest figure since WFP first recorded and analysed security incidents in 2005, when 413 incidents were reported; it represents a 27-percent increase on 2009 (Figure 1). An additional 133 incidents involved contractors and partners supporting WFP operations in 2010. The 553 work-related incidents accounted for 70 percent of all incidents involving WFP staff or assets and represented a 24 percent increase since 2009. Generally, these data confirm the steadily increasing trend in incidents of recent years.¹
- 11. Although the overall number of significant security incidents involving WFP staff, assets and contractors or partners was higher in 2010 than in any previous year, there have been positive dynamics in the number of critical security incidents resulting in death, injury or abduction.

Security Incidents by Type

\Rightarrow Staff fatalities

12. For the first time since 2005, there were no fatalities of staff in the line of duty resulting from acts of violence. This is a significant improvement over 2009, when WFP recorded nine work-related fatalities resulting from violence – the highest number ever. Regretfully, one staff member, Administrative Assistant Bertine Laroque, lost her life in the earthquake in Haiti. Also in Haiti, Logistics Assistant François Dartilus was killed in a crime incident when he was not on duty; the case was not related to his employment with WFP. Three staff members died as a result of road traffic accidents.

¹ All figures are found in the Annex. The table shows significant security incidents involving WFP staff and assets in 2010; Figure 5 shows the regional distribution of significant security incidents involving WFP staff and assets in 2010; and Figure 16 illustrates trends in security incidents from 2005 to 2010, by number and type.



\Rightarrow *Staff injuries*

13. There was also a notable reduction in the number of staff injured in the line of duty in acts of violence while on duty. There were 6 such incidents, compared with 15 in 2009 – a reduction of 60 percent. Eight staff members were injured in acts of violence when they were not on duty, including one Headquarters-based member.

TABLE 1: WFP STAFF MEMBERS KILLED OR INJURED IN ACTS OF VIOLENCE							
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Killed	-	_	4	4	9	-	
Injured	9	2	5	17	23	14	

\Rightarrow Contractor fatalities and injuries

14. Contractors remain vulnerable to acts of violence while supporting WFP operations in risky conditions. Six employees of companies contracted by WFP were killed through acts of violence in 2010: two in the Sudan, and one each in Afghanistan, Kenya, the Philippines and Somalia. This figure is the same as that for 2009. However, incidents of contractor and partner staff being injured during acts of violence increased by 100 percent, from 11 in 2009 to 22 in 2010.

TABLE 2: CONTRACTORS KILLED OR INJURED IN ACTS OF VIOLENCE WHILE PROVIDING SERVICES TO WFP								
	2008	2009	2010					
Killed	13	6	6					
Injured	5	11	22					

- \Rightarrow Staff relocations due to deteriorating security situations
- 15. During 2010, 19 staff relocations were initiated because of deteriorating security conditions: four in the Sudan; three in Somalia; three in Yemen; two in Afghanistan; and one each in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Myanmar, Niger and Pakistan. Generally, the number of relocations carried out in 2010 is consistent with that of 2009.

\Rightarrow Detention and harassment

16. In 2010, a total of 66 incidents of detention and harassment were registered; these affected 101 staff members, of whom 95 percent were nationally and 5 percent internationally recruited. Of the 66 incidents, 36 were work-related, affecting 38 staff members. This represents a 14-percent increase over 2009, and is consistent with the generally increasing trend since 2005. Military and law enforcement bodies were responsible for 95 percent of work-related detentions and harassments of WFP staff. The largest number of incidents involving state actors was registered in the Sudan, with 13,



followed by Ethiopia, with 8. All cases were resolved and the detained staff released within hours or days.

- \Rightarrow Banditry and criminality
- 17. Crime remained a major threat to WFP staff and assets in 2010: 287 crime incidents were reported compared with 197 in 2009 a 47-percent increase. Crime-related incidents accounted for 37 percent of all security incidents involving WFP staff and assets in 2010, indicating a proportionate consistency with 2009, when they accounted for 32 percent. In 2010, 63 percent of crime incidents 181 occurred in work contexts.
- 18. WFP staff and assets were targeted in 131 cases of robbery, 101 cases of theft and 35 burglaries. Other crime types recorded were 17 incidents of criminal assault and 7 of carjacking. Most property crime incidents in the field were armed robberies, while most in Headquarters were burglaries. The number of carjackings of WFP vehicles has declined for the past three years, owing to mitigation measures such as the installation of a special Global Positioning System for tracking vehicles. In 2008, 17 incidents of carjacking were reported, dropping to 8 in 2009, and 7 in 2010.
- \Rightarrow Seizure of WFP property and access restrictions
- 19. In 2010, 12 instances of seizure, detention or confiscation of WFP property were recorded: 4 in Somalia and 5 in the Sudan. Five incidents of denial of access in the course of WFP activities were registered.

Geographic Distribution of Security Incidents

20. The 2010 data on geographical distribution of security incidents are consistent with previous years: the overwhelming majority of all incidents involving WFP staff or assets and contractors were registered in Africa, with 549, followed by Asia, with 113. Africa accounted for 70 percent of WFP incident figures worldwide.

 \Rightarrow Africa

- 21. Three of the top five countries with security incidents in 2010 are in Africa the Sudan, with 178 incidents, Somalia with 48, and Ethiopia with 44 each showing a general increase in numbers of incidents over 2009. In 2010, there was a 150-percent increase in incidents in DRC from the previous year's 16, while a 42-percent reduction from the previous year's 33 incidents removed Liberia from the top five countries in Africa with security incidents. Across-the-board increases in the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, DRC and Kenya contributed to a 29-percent overall increase in the number of incidents registered in Africa.
- 22. Contractors and partners engaged in WFP operations also experienced a general increase in numbers of incidents, with 82 16 percent more than the 70 registered in 2009. Of the six contractor fatalities in the line of duty resulting from acts of violence, four were in Africa.

The Sudan

23. For the sixth consecutive year, the Sudan was the country with the highest number of incidents reported. The 2010 figure of 178 incidents involving WFP staff or assets represented a 52-percent increase over 2009. The regional incident distribution ratio in 2010 was generally consistent with that of 2009, at 1:3:7 for Central, Eastern and Three Areas (CETA), Darfur and Southern Sudan, respectively.



- 24. The Sudan also registered the most incidents involving contractors and partners, with 35. Of these, 21 incidents, or 60 percent, were in Southern Sudan; 11, or 31 percent, in Darfur; and three, or 9 percent, in CETA. Compared with 2009, contractor victimization increased marginally, by 9 percent.
- 25. Consistent with 2009, the bulk 63 percent of security incidents in the Sudan were recorded in Southern Sudan. The 112 incidents registered in 2010 represent a 81-percent increase over the 62 registered in 2009. However, although the incident counts were exceptionally high in the region, there were no deaths or injury resulting from violence.
- 26. Two factors appear to have contributed to this: i) a shift in the conflict topology; and ii) increased WFP field security coverage in the region. In 2010, there was a notable reduction in inter-tribal fighting, as the population focused on political processes leading up to the referendum. Following the Sudan general elections and later the referendum, politically motivated armed rebellions broke out in Unity and Jonglei states. Fighting associated with these rebellions was localized and tended to affect WFP staff or assets less than the inter-tribal conflicts prevalent in 2009. The main threats to WFP staff members were related to criminality or were perpetrated by state actors, as highlighted by the 12 work-related detentions of staff by state actors.
- 27. The generally weak command and control in the state security forces of Southern Sudan contribute to high levels of indiscipline and harassment by their personnel. It should be noted that the high incident numbers for Southern Sudan can largely be explained by improved reporting, which is a function of the incident redress resulting from increased security coverage. During 2010, six field security officers (FSOs) were deployed in Southern Sudan, and the number of local security assistants was increased.
- 28. Also consistent with the previous year, 28 percent of incidents in the Sudan occurred in Darfur, where the 49 incidents counted in 2010 represent an 8-percent increase over the 45 in 2009. This increase can be attributed to changing dynamics in the conflict during 2010. On a very positive note, in 2010, the governments of Chad and the Sudan normalized diplomatic relations for the first time in more than a decade, leading to the expulsion of Darfur rebels from Chad, the relocation of Chadian armed opposition groups in Darfur to the major hubs, the establishment of a joint border monitoring force, and increased military pressure on armed groups exerted by the Government of the Sudan. Among other implications, these factors limited cross-border movement by armed groups.
- 29. As a result of the reduced tempo of the conflict, tribal militia increasingly pursued economic endeavours based on banditry and kidnapping. Kidnapping for ransom has recently witnessed unprecedented growth in Darfur. Since the first occurrence in March 2009, 14 incidents targeting international employees have been registered. Eight kidnapping incidents occurred in Darfur in 2010, including for the first time victimization of the staff of a company contracted by WFP for the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS). Given the current situation in the region, and based on observed trends, there are indications that kidnapping will increase. WFP in Darfur is implementing robust security measures aimed at mitigating the risks of kidnapping and carjacking.
- 30. With 17, CETA registered the lowest number of security incidents involving WFP staff and assets in the Sudan. Although this indicates the area's relative calm in comparison with other regions of the Sudan where WFP conducts operations, the situation may change during 2011. Following Southern Sudan's vote to secede, there is potential for tensions to escalate in relation to contested areas centering on Abyei.



Somalia

- 31. Security challenges to WFP operations in Somalia continued to be driven by the ongoing conflict. Although the overall number of security incidents remained similar to 2009 levels, there were notable changes in the regional pattern of incidents. The number of incidents affecting staff or assets in southern Somalia dropped from 44 in 2009 to 20 in 2010. On the other hand, incidents in Puntland and Somaliland increased from 3 in 2009 to 28 in 2010.
- 32. Escalating threats, attacks and extortion by armed groups compelled suspension of WFP operations in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas of southern Somalia in early 2010 and relocation of staff, resulting in a significant reduction of staff exposure to security risks. All incidents in the southern region occurred in the areas of Mogadishu controlled by Somalia's Transitional Federal Government, supported by the African Union Mission in Somalia, or involved Al-Shabaab actions on immovable WFP assets in the areas under Al-Shabaab control. In 2010, there were seven incidents of infringement of WFP assets perpetrated by Al-Shabaab.
- 33. The significant increase in the number of security incidents affecting WFP in northern Somalia is attributed to WFP's increased operations in the region and a general deterioration in the security situation there. Following the suspension of operations in southern areas and WFP's relocation of staff and assets to the northern region, delivery networks were re-mapped to deliver food to the central region via Bossaso, while additional contractors and partners were engaged in Puntland and Somaliland. These factors increased staff exposure in northern Somalia, the effects of which have been curtailed by robust risk mitigation measures and security procedures, enforced by the WFP security team in Somalia.
- 34. Somalia's ongoing conflict continues to affect neighbouring countries and threaten stability in East Africa. Al-Shabaab has threatened to attack Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. These threats warrant serious consideration and further risk mitigation measures.

Ethiopia

- 35. The number of security incidents involving WFP staff or assets in Ethiopia continued to increase. The 44 incidents registered in 2010 represent a 7-percent increase over 2009, moving Ethiopia from fourth place among the countries with the highest WFP incident rates in 2009 to third place in 2010. The geographic pattern of incidents remained consistent with that of 2009. The 29 incidents registered in the Somali region constituted 66 percent of the total. Of incidents affecting WFP contractors and partners, 89 percent occurred in the Somali region.
- 36. The security situation in the Somali region remains volatile owing to continuing military operations against rebels, and spill-over effects from the conflict in Somalia. Detention and harassment of WFP staff by state actors remains a primary concern. WFP and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) continue to engage government authorities in this regard.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

37. WFP in DRC experienced a 150-percent increase in security incidents involving staff or assets in 2010. Forty incidents were reported, compared with 16 in 2009. Most incidents were related to detention of staff, robberies and thefts, and generally occurred in the east of the country. Eastern DRC has been the theatre for protracted armed conflicts, and the presence of numerous armed groups increases security risks.



\Rightarrow Asia

38. As in previous years, the second largest number of security incidents – 113 – was registered in the Asia region. Of these, 73 percent were in Afghanistan and Pakistan, each registering 41 incidents involving WFP staff and assets in 2010 (Figure 2).

Afghanistan

39. The number of security incidents involving WFP staff and assets in Afghanistan decreased by 16 percent from 2009. Incidents involving contractors and partners also dropped, by 35 percent, from 26 in 2009. Both categories were in line with the decreasing trends observed since 2008, but this does not signal an improvement in the security situation. Unprecedented levels of violence continued, with 2010 described as the most violent year since 2001, surpassing the violence in 2009. As the security environment deteriorated further, staff were more frequently compelled to restrict movement and remain confined to the compounds. Afghanistan is one of the most complex and risky security environments in which the United Nations operates. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban continue to label the United Nations as a legitimate target, as underscored by a complex attack on the United Nations compound in Herat on 23 October 2010.

Pakistan

- 40. With 41 incidents recorded in 2010, WFP witnessed a 32-percent increase from the 31 of 2009. Of these 41 incidents, 46 percent occurred in Sindh province, 34 percent in Punjab province, 15 percent in Balochistan, and only 5 percent in Islamabad Capital Territories. The number of incidents involving contractors and partners also increased, from two in 2009 to nine in 2010.
- 41. A prominent feature in 2010 is the absence of incidents resulting in death, injury or abduction. In 2009, an attack on the WFP country office in Islamabad left five staff members killed and four injured, the highest critical impact for one country. The subsequent improvement of mitigation measures contributed to much lower vulnerability of staff in Islamabad during 2010. However, it must be remembered that extremist militant groups in Pakistan have demonstrated the capacity to attack well-guarded international targets.

Security Incidents by Regional Bureau

42. The Regional Bureau for Southern, Eastern and Central Africa (ODJ) and the Regional Bureau in the Sudan (ODS) reported the largest numbers of incidents involving staff or assets in 2010, with 258 and 178 respectively. They were followed by the Regional Bureau for Asia (ODB) with 113, and the Regional Bureau for West Africa (ODD) with 111. The 80 incidents registered by the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (ODPC) represent an increase of 86 percent over 2009 (Figure 7), but were considerably fewer than the 144 registered in 2008. As in previous years, the smallest number of security incidents – 27 – was reported by the Regional Bureau for the Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe (ODC) (Figures 5 and 6).



Security Incidents by Security Phase

- 43. As in previous years, the highest number of security incidents involving WFP staff and assets in 2010 occurred at locations in Phase Three of the United Nations security plan 382 incidents. Locations in Phase Four had the second highest number of security incidents, with 114. This indicates that staff operating in Phases Three and Four were more exposed to significant security incidents.
- 44. In 2010, areas with no security phase designation witnessed the sharpest increase in security incidents, by 59 percent. Incidents in Phase Two areas increased by 34 percent, and those in Phases Three and Four by 17 and 8 percent respectively. Phase Five areas had the lowest number of incidents, with six (Figure 8).

Security Incidents Affecting Nationally/Internationally Recruited Staff

45. Nationally recruited WFP staff members remain especially vulnerable to security threats, and accounted for the majority of casualties. In offices away from Headquarters, 383 incidents directly affected nationally recruited staff members, compared with 90 affecting internationally recruited staff. Since 2005, the number of security incidents directly affecting nationally recruited WFP staff has increased by 121 percent (Figure 11), while incidents directly affecting international staff members have increased by 55 percent.

Security Incidents Affecting Contractors, Cooperating and Stand-By Partners

- 46. WFP continues to monitor security incidents involving the staff of contractors and cooperating and stand-by partners supporting WFP. A total of 133 such incidents were recorded in 2010: 109 targeted contractors, and 24 partners. This represents a 20-percent increase over 2009, and marks a return to the significantly higher numbers recorded in 2008.
- 47. As already indicated, six employees of contracted companies were killed by acts of violence while working on WFP operations in 2010. The most prevalent form of hostile action affecting contractors remains attacks on trucks engaged in transporting WFP commodities, which increased by 40 percent over 2009. Of the 63 attacks on trucks recorded in 2010, the highest count was registered in the Sudan, with 19, up from 16 in 2009. There were also attacks on contracted trucks in eight countries that did not witness such incidents in 2009: Colombia, the Dominican Republic, DRC, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Pakistan and the Philippines.
- 48. The steepest decline in attacks on contracted trucks in 2010 was registered in Afghanistan, with 42 percent fewer than in 2009. Factors contributing to this positive trend included cooperation between the WFP security team in Afghanistan and the national authorities providing police escorts for food convoys.
- 49. There were two cases of employees of WFP-contracted companies being abducted or kidnapped in 2010: in one, two employees were abducted in Afghanistan; and in the other, a three-member UNHAS crew was kidnapped in South Darfur, the Sudan. In both cases the victims were released unharmed, but the emergence of this threat to WFP contractors poses serious concerns. No kidnaps of contracted staff had been registered since WFP started recording security incidents involving non-WFP workers engaged in its operations in 2007.



Security Incidents Categorized as "Other"

- 50. Consistent with 2009, road traffic accidents constituted the bulk of incidents categorized as "other" in 2010. Of the 140 road traffic incidents registered, 111 were work-related, representing a 16-percent increase over the 95 recorded in 2009. This demonstrates steady growth from a baseline of 56 road traffic incidents recorded in 2005 (Figure 14). In 2010, 3 staff lost their lives in road traffic accidents, while 25 sustained injuries of varying degrees. In addition, 7 local citizens were killed and 26 others injured in traffic accidents involving WFP staff members or assets. The Regional Bureau for Southern, Eastern and Central Africa accounted for the highest number of road traffic accidents, with 58 (Figure 15). The Sudan had the highest number of accidents for a single country, with 19, closely followed by Ethiopia, with 14.
- 51. The increasing number of road traffic accidents underlines the continuing need for training in driving skills. WFP has launched a driver-skills training programme combined with the global roll-out of a satellite-based vehicle tracking system. The training is conducted through partnership with the Global Vehicle Leasing Programme (GVLP).

Conclusions

- 52. The continuous increase in the number of security incidents registered underscores that insecurity adversely affects WFP staff and operations in many locations. However, mitigation measures implemented by WFP in the aftermath of the October 2009 attack on its office in Islamabad, the resumption of security awareness training for staff, and other security-related activities based on a revised security strategy and security management policy contributed to positive trends in the number of critical incidents in 2010.
- 53. It should also be remembered that part of the increase in numbers of registered incidents can be explained by the improved reporting that has resulted from WFP field security's efforts to develop internal security reporting. The collection and analysis of information on security incidents are necessary first steps towards evidence-based decisions on how to reduce the risks to staff or assets.

WFP FIELD SECURITY ACTIVITIES AND IMPROVEMENTS

- 54. As the United Nations approach undergoes a fundamental shift from "when to leave" to "how to stay", the overall objective for WFP field security is to maintain a robust and cohesive field security management system and adhere to three overarching objectives:
 - enabling the effective operation of WFP activities by ensuring a coherent and timely response to all security-related threats and other emergencies/crises;
 - ensuring an effective security risk management process and timely and appropriate implementation of mitigating measures for all operations, and determining levels of acceptable risk; and
 - developing and implementing relevant high-quality internal security policies and operational procedures.
- 55. In line with these objectives, WFP's security management activities focus on:
 - ensuring a clear security management structure, clear lines of communication and chains of command, clear understanding of security responsibilities, and their effective implementation by relevant officers;



- implementing rigorously the minimum operating security standards (MOSS), security assessment missions and associated blast vulnerability assessments, and upgrades of buildings;
- implementing sustained security training programmes for senior management, security managers, security officers and all WFP staff;
- enhancing WFP's capacity to collect, collate, analyse and disseminate information related to security threats and risks, for identifying developing trends of future threats to support decision-making and for assisting operational and contingency planning.

WFP Field Security Capacity

- 56. To address the increasing security challenges, WFP needs a strong field security team commensurate with the necessary tasks and responsibilities. WFP's field security capacity comprises FSOs supported by the ODF, and local security assistants at some WFP locations. As of 31 December 2010, there were 17 professional staff at WFP Headquarters and 54 FSOs supporting WFP operations in the field, in cooperation with UNDSS staff. Five regional security officers (RSOs) two at Headquarters and one each at ODPC, ODJ and ODC enhance surge capacity and operational support at the regional level. During 2010, FSOs and RSOs were deployed to provide additional security assistance in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Guinea, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Uganda and Yemen.
- 57. WFP field security continued to carry out WFP-specific security assessments to assist country offices in identifying physical and procedural security measures. During 2010, consultants from WFP's stand-by roster conducted security assessment missions in 8 countries, while RSOs conducted 18. More security assessments are planned for 2011, as more than 40 country offices have not had a security assessment mission for the past two years.
- 58. ODF staffing levels were reviewed during 2010, and additional staff were hired for training and security information analysis. ODF's current structure comprises operations, policy and training, and security analysis, which ensures it meets WFP's security needs.

Field Security Officers

59. FSOs continue to play a crucial role in ensuring implementation of WFP's mandate in hazardous environments. FSOs are supported by ODF to ensure that robust security measures are taken to counter threats and address security challenges and to advise country directors on day-to-day security activities in support of country office operations. Without the risk mitigation measures implemented by WFP field security, there would probably have been far more security incidents. WFP field security has been widely recognized as a necessary component of WFP operations.

The New Security Level System

60. Significant developments in the United Nations security management system focus on enabling programme delivery by finding ways to keep the required personnel where they are needed and as safe as possible. A new security level system replaced the security phase system on 1 January 2011. The new system is based on a structured threat assessment,



serves the United Nations more effectively, and is transparent, consistent and rigorous. Its introduction has a fundamental impact on the way security risks are assessed and mitigation measures assigned.

61. ODF has conducted several briefings on the security level system, including a WFP-wide webcast and a briefing to Board members. Guidelines, policy and frequently asked questions in connection with the system have been posted on the WFP staff safety and security webpage.

Blast Mitigation

- 62. WFP continued to equip its security managers with guidelines, procedures and tools for implementing measures to mitigate the effects of attacks using improvised explosive devices. In 2010, ODF conducted blast vulnerability assessments at WFP locations in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Pakistan, Somalia and Uganda. Following these assessments, recommendations were made regarding the relocation of certain offices; for others, upgraded perimeter protection and access control procedures were suggested.
- 63. In response to country-specific threats and risks, additional equipment for security and safety was provided in 2010 to ensure that all WFP country offices complied with MOSS, reaching a 92 percent compliance rate.

Premises Security Committee

- 64. ODF continued to assist the WFP Premises Security Committee (PSC), which was established to allocate funds provided through the Board for office relocations and investments in blast mitigation. The PSC advises the Chief Operating Officer, oversees the security of facilities used by WFP staff, and authorizes Security Emergency Fund expenditures related to WFP office relocations resulting from security risk; significant security-related infrastructure improvements that go beyond MOSS requirements; and the design and construction of blast and other security mitigation works for new facilities. The prioritization of security requirements for the competing needs of country offices and regional bureaux rests with ODF.
- 65. Administrative support is provided by the PSC Task Force, drawn from ODF and the Facilities Management Division. In 2010, its field engineering team supported 26 country office teams conducting office relocation and mitigation work.

Security Training

- 66. In line with WFP's security training strategy for 2010–2011, the main focus has been the global roll-out of revised and renewed security awareness training (SAT) to WFP staff worldwide. Initially, SAT was conducted regionally, but the roll-out prioritized specific WFP offices based on assessment of locations at the highest risk of sudden-onset disasters or change of situation. In 2010 and early 2011, the four ODF trainers provided SAT at all regional bureaux except ODS. By the end of 2010, approximately 500 national and international staff had undergone the new SAT. It is planned to extend SAT to the top 15 low- to medium-risk countries by the end of 2011, targeting 1,500 staff members.
- 67. WFP field security continued to provide specialized training for security professionals, including training on trauma, hostage incident management, security information analysis, and reporting. The annual workshop for WFP FSOs has become a forum for discussing vital problems and best practices related to security management, application of new



policies, development of security procedures, security information management, reporting and analysis.

- 68. In response to the increasing number of road accidents involving WFP staff and assets, ODF has launched driver skills training through partnership with GVLP, combined with the global roll-out of a satellite-based vehicle tracking system. By the end of 2010, 503 drivers had been trained and 950 satellite-based tracking units were set up in 12 countries, providing real-time monitoring along with a silent panic alarm to be activated in case of emergency. In the Sudan, five vehicles were recovered in 2010 as a result. By the end of 2011, approximately 1,500 vehicles will be fitted with satellite trackers and 75 percent of all drivers will have been trained.
- 69. WFP also facilitated certification of 35 security officers in the use of trauma bags, in line with United Nations requirements, and identified local qualified providers of basic first aid training.
- 70. Staff members in Southern Sudan received Safe and Secure Awareness in Field Environments (SSAFE) training in skills for hostile environments and basic first aid following an assessment of the risk associated with the January 2011 referendum.
- 71. With a fully-staffed team of trainers, ODF is now better placed to train managers with security responsibilities, security focal points and local security personnel.

Security Information Management and Analysis

- 72. ODF has developed the Security Information Management and Security Analysis System (SIMSAS) based on WFP's logistics geoportal,² enabling security staff and focal points to collect, store, analyse and present information related to the security and safety of WFP staff, assets and operations. As of 1 January 2011, SIMSAS had been rolled out to those country offices that had FSOs; roll-out to all remaining country offices is scheduled for the end of 2011. It has been suggested that elements of this system and baseline information should be made available to other United Nations agencies, UNDSS and cooperating partners within the Saving Lives Together framework; this would advance security collaboration among the United Nations and non-governmental, international and intergovernmental organizations.
- 73. ODF has also upgraded the staff safety and security webpage on WFPgo, following the new design and structure of WFP's global intranet. In restructuring the site, WFP field security aimed to ensure that staff can easily find security information relevant to their work, travel and training. More security flashes and advice are now posted on the first page of WFPgo. The internal ODF database, containing all security policies and other security-related documents for easy reference and use by ODF staff, has also been upgraded.
- 74. ODF's analysis section has been expanded to ensure enhanced capability for collecting, analysing and disseminating security information to support decision-making, operational and contingency planning, and to provide more focused analytical support to regional bureaux and country offices. WFP's best practices in this regard, including comprehensive analysis of security incidents experienced by WFP, have been recognized by UNDSS and WFP counterparts within the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. In response to the need for timely identification of developing threats that may affect staff, assets and

² A geoportal is a type of Web portal used to access geographic information and services.



operations of the United Nations system, WFP has proposed the creation of a coordination mechanism involving all the analytical components of United Nations agencies and the Threat and Risk Assessment Unit of UNDSS. This would allow the creation of synergies in cross-departmental information collection and analysis, the development of information sharing partnerships, and the utilization of enhanced analytical capabilities approved by the General Assembly for UNDSS, including security information and operations centres and stand-alone analysts in the field.

Security Funding

75. Managing security risks requires investments. WFP acknowledges that there should be "no programme without security" and "no security without resources". To maintain effective security risk management in extreme and complex security conditions, WFP has to ensure appropriate and sustainable funding. At its 2011 First Regular Session , the Board approved an additional US\$10.2 million to supplement country offices with low contributions from the direct support costs (DSC) budget, and for countries where the security situation has changed rapidly and financial resources are needed quickly. ODF financial contributions will continue to ensure that appropriate mitigation measures are implemented to reach MOSS compliance; security training is conducted for staff, managers with security responsibilities and security professionals; security assessment and blast vulnerability assessment missions are conducted frequently; and blast mitigation is implemented in high-risk countries. Through RSOs supported by ODF, WFP field security has enhanced its capacity to assist regional bureaux and country offices in advocating for adequate funding for security mitigation measures in DSC budgets.

Inter-Agency Security Activities

- 76. WFP continues to participate in the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN), which develops policies and procedures guiding activities related to the United Nations security management system. In 2010, WFP was engaged in various IASMN working groups. These included the working group on programme criticality the concept that the risks taken by the United Nations are proportionate to the importance of the programme concerned and the working group on likelihood, which aims to enhance the threat and risk assessment model and ensure a coherent approach to the likelihood of events in managing threats and risks. These working groups are expected to present initial findings at the spring 2011 session of the IASMN Steering Group.
- 77. In the working group on security training for women, WFP developed a training programme that was shared with all IASMN members. Based on its experience, WFP proposes to take the lead in a working group on satellite-based tracking of assets and personnel, and to assist in developing SIMSAS into a global, United Nations system-wide incident reporting system.
- 78. WFP continued to promote the Saving Lives Together framework, which focuses on developing a network of security-conscious organizations committed to information exchange and the sharing of best practices in security management. The framework has recently been revised to ensure its enhanced and staged implementation.



ANNEX

2010 SIGNIFICANT SECURITY INCIDENTS INVOLVING WFP STAFF AND ASSETS: ALL TYPES												
Type of incident	Total 2005	Total 2006	Total 2007	Total 2008	Total 2009	Total 2010	Total work- related 2005	Total work- related 2006	Total work- related 2007	Total work- related 2008	Total work- related 2009	Total work - related 2010
Deaths	16	13	17	11	17	15	3	0	4	3	5	1
Injuries	20	14	8	20	23	23	9	2	4	7	13	10
Detentions	30	25	26	45	48	56	17	18	12	20	29	30
Subtotal	66	52	51	76	88	94	29	20	20	30	47	41
Evacuations	4	1	2	4	0	0	4	1	2	4	0	0
Relocations	23	28	16	19	22	22	23	28	16	19	22	22
Medical evacuations	23	8	19	11	21	29	23	8	19	11	21	29
Subtotal	50	37	37	34	43	51	50	37	37	34	43	51
Thefts	85	91	89	104	74	101	63	64	80	75	62	77
Robberies	34	21	80	121	92	131	22	2	68	94	59	87
Assaults	14	9	29	30	8	17	11	5	21	14	3	8
Carjackings	14	4	5	17	8	7	13	4	5	15	5	4
Food rebaggings	10	1	0	0	0	0	10	1	0	0	0	0
Burglaries	9	13	10	17	23	35	5	6	4	5	5	2
Damage of WFP property	2	8	15	19	21	30	2	8	15	19	21	30
Threats	25	12	22	29	24	34	20	9	18	18	18	23
Harassment	2	5	8	17	15	9	2	3	4	11	8	6
Road traffic accidents	56	52	64	86	121	140	38	40	49	69	95	111
Air incidents	8	6	5	2	1	5	8	6	5	2	1	5
Others	38	59	69	105	102	131	37	47	52	87	78	108
Subtotal	297	281	396	547	489	640	231	195	321	409	355	461
TOTAL	413	370	484	657	620	785	310	252	378	473	445	553









Figure 3: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets

Figure 4: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in the Sudan in 2008–2010







Figure 6: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2008–2010, by Regional Bureau































ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

- CETA Central, Eastern and Three Areas
- DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
- DSC direct support costs
- FSO field security officer
- GVLP Global Vehicle Leasing Programme
- IASMN Inter-Agency Security Management Network
- MOSS minimum operating security standards
- ODB Regional Bureau Bangkok (Asia)
- ODF Field Security Division
- ODJ Regional Bureau Johannesburg (Southern, Eastern and Central Africa)
- ODPC Regional Bureau Panama City (Latin America and the Caribbean)
- ODS Regional Bureau Sudan
- PSC Premises Security Committee
- RSO regional security officer
- SAT security awareness training
- SIMSAS Security Information Management and Security Analysis System
- SSAFE Safe and Secure Awareness in Field Environments
- UNDSS United Nations Department of Safety and Security
- UNHAS United Nations Humanitarian Air Service

