ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGERIAL MATTERS

Agenda item 11

*For information**

WFP SECURITY REPORT

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for information.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal point indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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Security Focal Point:

Should you have any questions regarding availability of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact the Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645/2558).

* Field Security Division

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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This document provides an update on the threats to the security and safety of the staff and assets of WFP, partners and contractors in 2012, during which WFP continued to operate in volatile and complex security environments. The situation in the Middle East and North Africa continued to be volatile; conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic had security implications that extended to Jordan, Lebanon and other countries in the region. Political tensions remained high in Egypt, and Yemen continued to be unstable. An ethnic Tuareg uprising in northern Mali and the impact of the Libyan crisis augmented socio-political crises in West Africa. Violence in areas of the Sudan, South Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic complicated the already unstable security conditions in those countries.

The Board continues to support the security of WFP, its partners and contractors. The approved WFP budget for 2012 included a US$16.9 million advance from the Working Capital Financing Facility for security expenditure and up to US$10 million from the General Fund to cover security expenditures that could not be charged to projects. This funding included the US$9.6 million projected WFP share of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security costs for field-related security.

The Field Security Division's five-year strategic plan for 2012–2016 includes supporting security risk management so that WFP can continue to fight global hunger effectively. In this second year of the strategic plan, a more proactive and integrated approach to security risk management is being taken, which focuses on field operations when determining acceptable risk in relation to programme criticality.

The Field Security Division continues to provide operational support, technical expertise, security leadership, and risk management and analysis to enable WFP managers to respond appropriately to the risk environment. Field security officers and regional security officers provide managers with critical operational knowledge of the risks specific to each country and region; they were deployed to a large number of locations in 2012 to support WFP operations. WFP continues to evaluate whether risk mitigation measures have been implemented in field offices and if they are effective. In 2012, security assessment missions identified deficiencies in processes, practices and equipment, which the Field Security Division is working to address. Funds from the Security Special Account continued to be provided for offices that were not fully compliant with minimum operating security standards.

The division continues to provide security training, which is one of the most cost-effective ways to lower risks for WFP personnel, premises and assets and to promote WFP's security culture. It produces analyses of security threats that support strategies and decision-making regarding protection of staff and assets.

Continued support from the Board and senior management is needed to ensure that even in the face of staffing changes across WFP, all staff carry out their responsibilities regarding security and that Regional Directors, Country Directors and security focal points continue to manage security risks in accordance with the Field Security Division's accountability framework.

DRAFT DECISION*

The Board takes note of "WFP Security Report" (WFP/EB.A/2013/11-E).

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* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

REVIEW OF WFP FIELD SECURITY

1.   The Field Security Division (OMF)[1] continues to work under the policy framework and guidance of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Together with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) and the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS), OMF allows the United Nations to conduct its activities while ensuring the safety, security and well-being of its personnel and the security of its premises and assets. A tenet of WFP and the UNSMS security management approach is to determine "how to stay" as opposed to "when to leave" when establishing and maintaining operations in insecure and unstable environments.

2.   The principle of "how to stay" can be implemented with the knowledge and practice of security risk management. OMF's five-year (2012–2016) strategic plan seeks to enable security risk management so that WFP can respond effectively to fight global hunger. Therefore, OMF retains its strategic objectives:

> ➢   to institutionalize security – including planning, resource allocation and organizational processes – to reflect the significance of security in WFP;

> ➢   to develop an innovative, flexible, proactive approach to security risk management to enable WFP to achieve its objectives;

> ➢   to improve communication at all levels with a view to enhanced understanding, confidence and trust; and

> ➢   to enhance WFP's security culture.

3.   The Executive Board continues its support of security; this second year of the strategic plan is on track for a more proactive and integrated approach to security risk management, including a focus on field operations in the determination of acceptable risk and programme criticality. In view of this field-focused approach, OMF is deploying a further six field security officer (FSO) positions this year, and is including training and analysis to the regional bureaux.

4.   WFP continues to operate in volatile and complex security environments with a variety of security concerns. As risk is an inescapable part of WFP operations, support to security must remain a high priority. Those security concerns are not limited to the deliberate targeting of operations and personnel, as evidenced most recently by the carjacking and capture of four WFP staff in the Syrian Arab Republic. Security challenges extend to economically and politically motivated violence, hostage taking, operations in war zones with the significant threat of indirect attack from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and artillery, and environmental hazards. These threats are common and constitute day-to-day operational constraints. The recent escalation of instability and fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Sahel has resulted in the relocation and evacuation of staff; chronic security problems in Afghanistan, Somalia and the Sudan are constant challenges. Continued support by senior management is necessary to ensure that all staff understand and carry out their security responsibilities, and that Regional Directors, Country Directors and Security Focal Points (SFPs) continue to support the management of security risks in accordance with OMF's Framework of Accountability.

5.   OMF will continue to provide operational support, technical expertise, security leadership, and risk management and analysis to enable WFP managers to understand and respond appropriately to the risk environment. Security measures are designed to protect

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[1] The document uses acronyms effective as of 22 February 2013.

staff in order to facilitate, not limit, operations. Accordingly, OMF will ensure that security management is integrated into WFP's management of risk, and that security measures are practical and cost-effective, balancing programme goals against risks to the safety and security of staff.

6.   In addition, OMF will continue to work with UNDSS and other bodies to develop United Nations policies and standards that promote safety and security. Collaborations like these create decentralized decision-making systems that encourage flexible responses to the changing security situation.

SECURITY INCIDENTS INVOLVING WFP STAFF AND ASSETS, AND PARTNER STAFF

Overview

7.   In 2012, 899 security and safety incidents were reported involving staff and assets of WFP, as well as those of contractors and partners.[2] This number is a negligible increase from 895 incidents reported in 2011, and is 2 percent lower than the number reported in 2010. WFP staff or assets were involved in 798 incidents, including 654 cases where they were affected exclusively and 144 incidents where they were affected together with contractors and partners. The figure of 798 is consistent with the trend observed for incidents involving WFP staff exclusively over the past three years (see Figure 1).[3]

8.   Contractors or partners providing services to WFP were involved in 101 incidents. These numbers highlight the cooperation between WFP and other entities in challenging operational environments, underscoring the need to coordinate risk mitigation to safeguard and enable WFP operations. In 532 incidents, WFP employees were involved in the line of duty, which represents an 8 percent increase in work-related incidents from 2011, though a 4 percent decrease from 2010.

9.   Crime remains the main threat to WFP staff and assets: 65 percent of the incidents reported in 2012 were criminal in nature, followed by hazards at 22 percent. Incidents associated with armed conflict, civil unrest and extremism/terrorism accounted for 7 percent, 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively. The proportion of incidents in each threat type is consistent with trends in WFP security incident reporting observed since 2005, when WFP started to record and analyse security incidents.

10.   Based on the number of critical security incidents reported during the year, Afghanistan, Somalia, the Sudan, South Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic were the most hazardous countries for WFP operations. This list remains largely unchanged from the previous year.

11.   The geographic distribution of incidents, though, reflects a shift in the dynamics of instability and related security challenges. There was no substantial increase in incidents seen in Africa and a marked increase in incident numbers in Asia, especially in Afghanistan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

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[2] This report is based on security incident reports entered into the WFP Security Information Management and Security Analysis Support System (SIMSAS).

[3] All figures are found in the Annex; most show trends in incidents affecting WFP staff or assets exclusively, without simultaneous involvement of contractors/partners.

SECURITY INCIDENTS BY TYPE

Critical Security Incidents[4]

12. Loss of life, serious injuries and abduction remain persistent risks in WFP's operational environment, although in 2012 incidents resulting in multiple injuries or fatalities were few. These occurred in a limited number of countries, most of which were engaged in active conflicts of varying intensity.

⇒ *Staff fatalities*

13. The number of staff fatalities in the line of duty caused by violent acts dropped from four in 2011 to one in 2012. A WFP driver from the Sudan Country Office, Jamal Al Fadil Farag Allah, was killed in an ambush on a WFP vehicle in South Kordofan state of the Sudan; another staff member was seriously injured in this incident. No staff members were killed in work-related accidents in 2012. Even though overall work-related fatalities dropped in relation to the previous year, two staff members lost their lives in non-work-related road traffic accidents in Guinea and in Zimbabwe, while another two died of natural causes in Haiti and the Sudan.

⇒ *Staff injuries*

14. While staff fatalities from acts of violence decreased in 2012 compared to the previous year, the number of injuries sustained in such acts increased. Three staff members were seriously injured in acts of violence while in the line of duty; two in the Sudan and the other in Afghanistan. Another five staff members sustained injuries as a result of violence in non-work-related incidents: one each in Senegal, Somalia and the Sudan, and two members in South Sudan. Four staff members were seriously injured in work-related accidents in Liberia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda.

TABLE 1: WFP STAFF KILLED OR INJURED IN ACTS OF VIOLENCE (2005–2012)								
	2005	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Killed	-	-	4	4	9	-	4	1
Injured	9	2	5	17	23	14	7	8

⇒ *Contractor/partner staff fatalities and injuries*

15. Six employees of WFP contractors and partners lost their lives in five incidents of violence in the line of duty in 2012. Two partner employees were killed in an ambush in Somalia while a WFP partner employee was shot dead by unknown armed men in Afghanistan. A contractor worker lost his life in a violent act of food diversion in Afghanistan while another was killed in a robbery on the road in South Sudan. A WFP partner staff member was killed in mob violence at a refugee camp in Uganda. In addition to these work-related incidents of violence, three contractor/partner employees lost their lives in non-violent work-related accidents; one death occurring in each of Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda and South Sudan.

16. Seven employees **of** WFP contractors and partners were injured as a result of violence while in the line of duty in 2012. These incidents occurred in Afghanistan, Kenya, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Uganda.

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[4] Incidents resulting in death, injury, abduction or kidnapping.

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TABLE 2: PARTNER AND CONTRACTOR STAFF KILLED OR INJURED IN ACTS OF VIOLENCE WHILE PROVIDING SERVICES FOR WFP (2008–2012)					
	2008	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Killed	13	6	6	8	6
Injured	5	11	22	7	7

⇒ *Abduction/Kidnapping*

17. Kidnapping remains a prominent security concern, primarily in Darfur, the Sudan. Two WFP personnel – an international consultant and a national staff member – were kidnapped in Nyala town (South Darfur); while the national staff member was released shortly afterwards, the international consultant was held for 86 days and was released only after concerted negotiations. That kidnapping was the third involving WFP personnel since November 2010, and the first incident involving a WFP employee in the Sudan; the other two cases involved contracted United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) employees.

18. Fifteen staff members of WFP partners were abducted in four incidents last year (two in Afghanistan, and one each in Niger and Somalia); all abductions occurred while staff were off-duty. Although these incidents are not directly related to the work of WFP, they highlight the continuing prevalence of the threat. While work-related kidnapping incidents have declined significantly compared to figures recorded in 2011, the numbers of overall incidents (i.e. work-related and off-duty) and victims are even higher than those reported in 2011. In addition to the locations that have previously seen incidents of kidnapping, there is an escalating threat of kidnapping in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Significant Security Incidents

⇒ *Evacuation and relocation of staff resulting from deteriorating security situations*

19. There were four successful cases of evacuation[5] – one each in the Central African Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic, and two in Mali.[6] The overall number of evacuations is three fewer than those reported in 2011, with a marked shift in the geographic areas where they were conducted.

20. Staff members were relocated to safer areas within the same country on eight occasions in 2012. Six relocations were the result of a localized deterioration in the security environments. Two occurred in South Sudan, and one each in Kenya, Mali, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic. Two relocations took place because of elevated threat levels against specific staff members in Afghanistan and Yemen.

21. In addition to the relocations and evacuations[7] implemented in 2012, "alternative work modalities" (i.e. work from home) were temporarily introduced in response to deteriorations in the security situation in certain locations, including the Democratic

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[5] The movement of staff members and their eligible dependants from one country to another as a result of a deterioration of the security situation.

[6] Including the evacuation of a national staff member and his family due to rising ethnic hostilities in the broader context of the ethnic Tuareg uprising in northern Mali.

[7] According to the United Nations security risk management provision on risk-reduction measures, i.e. evacuation, relocation and alternative work modalities.

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Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya and the State of Palestine. Successive bomb attacks in an area near the WFP sub-office in Peshawar (Pakistan) necessitated the movement of staff to Islamabad for the weekend to reduce their exposure to risks. The frequency with which the United Nations has had to apply this risk-reduction strategy highlights the need to enhance preparation for such eventualities.

⇒ *Detention and harassment*

22.   There were 44 incidents of arrest/detention involving WFP staff, partners and contractors in 2012. Eleven of these incidents occurred in work-related contexts, nine of which directly involved WFP staff, with two incidents of a violent nature. State actors were responsible for 82 percent of work-related detention. South Sudan accounted for most (44 percent) of the work-related arrests/detentions perpetrated by state actors, while one incident each was registered in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Senegal, Somalia and the Sudan. In all cases, national staff members were the victims of work-related detentions.

23.   WFP staff continue to encounter acts of harassment by state actors, such as military or law enforcement personnel, and non-state actors who range from tribal militiamen to organized rebel groups. There were 36 incidents of harassment reported in 2012, 25 of which occurred in work-related circumstances. WFP staff members were directly affected in 30 of the 36 incidents while the other 6 incidents involved WFP contractors and partners.

24.   While state actors were responsible for a significant number of harassment cases, an increasing number of incidents were attributed to non-state actors; a deviation from 2011. Eighteen incidents were directed at individual staff members in the form of threats. Afghanistan topped this category with eight threats directed against individual staff members, usually through phone calls and the so-called "night letters". There were three incidents each in Afghanistan and Yemen of harassment and threats by armed non-state actors. All incidents caused minor disruption to operations, including suspension of activities and seizure of WFP assets in Afghanistan, and the relocation of a staff member in Yemen. In a worrying development this year, there were threats of violence from beneficiaries with two incidents perpetrated by refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic in Jordan, and one incident each in Pakistan and South Sudan.

⇒ *Criminality*

25.   Consistent with established trends, in 2012 crime remained the primary security threat to WFP operations. A total of 580 crime incidents were reported, 343 of which occurred in work-related contexts. Crime accounted for 65 percent of overall incidents reported during the year, a slight (1 percent) reduction compared to 2011, but still much higher than the 37 percent reported in 2010.

26.   Of the 580 crimes affecting WFP staff/assets, contractors and partners, 170 incidents (29 percent) involved the use, or threat of use, of violence. Fifteen of these incidents resulted in major injuries or death, demonstrating the impact of criminality on staff. The countries with the highest number of violent crime incidents were South Sudan (29), Afghanistan (26), the Sudan (20), the Syrian Arab Republic (12) and Yemen (12). Incidents involving crime were also noted in Somalia (9) and DRC (8). The Syrian Arab Republic (12) and Malawi (5) showed the highest increases in violent crime incidents compared to the previous year.

27.   Robbery accounted for the highest proportion of crime incidents perpetrated with the use of violence (83 of 170 violent crime incidents), followed by criminal assaults (26) and armed attacks (20). The majority of armed attacks were reported in Afghanistan

(nine incidents) while South Sudan accounted for the highest number of robberies (16 incidents). In Malawi, robberies accounted for almost all incidents of violent crime reported in 2012.

28.   Five carjacking incidents involving WFP were reported in 2012, three of which occurred in the Syrian Arab Republic and two in the Sudan. Three of these incidents targeted partner or contractor vehicles while two directly affected WFP vehicles. The vehicle carjacked in Darfur (the Sudan) was recovered using the *Satamatics* Global Positioning System for tracking vehicles.

29.   Of 580 criminal incidents affecting WFP staff and/or assets, 409 did not involve the use, or threat of use, of weapons or violence of any kind. Of these, 246 occurred in work-related contexts, with theft accounting for most incidents (109) in this category, followed by burglary/break-ins (77).

30.   Crime incidents reported at Headquarters were predominantly burglaries and thefts, with minimal use of violence, whereas those registered in the field were more diverse in type and characterized by a proportionately higher use of violence.

Other Security Incidents

$\Rightarrow$ *Seizure of WFP property and access restrictions by state and non-state actors*

31.   Nine incidents of seizure of WFP property in the line of duty were reported in 2012; significantly fewer than in 2011. Three of these incidents were reported in the Syrian Arab Republic as a result of armed conflict. There were two incidents of WFP property seized in Somalia, while one incident each was reported in Afghanistan, Haiti, Niger and Yemen. All incidents were criminally motivated.

32.   With the exception of Afghanistan and Yemen, where seizures of WFP assets were committed by non-state actors, all incidents were perpetrated by state actors, suggesting that there is an opportunity to mitigate future incidents through liaison with government authorities.

33.   In 2012, 23 incidents of access restriction were reported in five countries, a 283 percent increase over the six reported in 2011. The Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic reported the highest number of incidents at nine and eight, respectively. In both countries, the majority of incidents (six in each) were perpetrated by state actors. WFP also experienced access restriction in Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen (with two incidents each).

$\Rightarrow$ *Damage to and loss of WFP property*

34.   Thirteen malicious acts of vandalism resulting in loss of, or damage to, assets were reported in 11 countries in work-related contexts. No marked pattern is evident in these incidents.

Hazards and Other Safety-Related Incidents

⇒ *Road traffic accidents*

35.   There were 132 road traffic accidents reported in 2012, accounting for 66 percent of all hazard-related incidents that year; this was a 4 percent reduction in hazard-related incidents compared to 2011. Of the 132 traffic accidents, 106 occurred in the line of duty. There were two fatalities of WFP contractors in Rwanda and Uganda, while four accidents resulted in serious injuries in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Uganda and Yemen. Two staff members lost their lives in non-work-related road traffic accidents in Guinea and Zimbabwe. Four local residents were killed while nine suffered serious injuries as a result of road traffic accidents involving WFP operations.

⇒ *Other workplace safety incidents*

36.   Besides traffic accidents, there were significant incidents of hazardous events in the workplace in 2012: two employees of WFP-contracted companies were killed in work-related accidents – one in Côte d'Ivoire and one in South Sudan.

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITY INCIDENTS

37.   The number of incidents in Africa remained consistent, accounting for 62 percent (565) of all incidents in 2012, a slight reduction from 64 percent (569) in 2011, and 60 percent (549) incidents in 2010. Asia reported 228 incidents, accounting for 25 percent of all incidents and constituting a 15 percent increase from 2011 and an increase of 102 percent from 2010.

38.   This distribution is largely a function of WFP's exposure in these areas and prevailing security conditions. Of the five countries with the highest number of incidents affecting WFP staff/assets in 2012, two were in Africa (see Figures 2 and 3).

Africa

39.   For the first time since 2005, only two countries in Africa – South Sudan and the Sudan – were among the five countries with the largest numbers of incidents. This result reflects the shift in global dynamics with an escalation of conflicts in parts of Asia, especially the Middle East. However, both countries registered significant increases in the number of incidents reported compared to 2011.

40.   Insecurity remains rooted in the operational environment of the continent: residual instability from socio-political crises in some countries of West Africa in the past year, coupled with the impact of the Libyan crisis, was augmented by a Tuareg uprising in northern Mali. This conflict resulted in the rapid collapse of government control in several northern towns, which triggered a coup d'état in Bamako and led to the eventual capture of the north by radical Islamist militants, who continue to pose security threats in the wider Sahel region. Outbreaks of organized violence in areas of the Central African Republic, eastern DRC, South Sudan and the Sudan have complicated the already volatile security conditions in these countries. Direct fighting between forces in South Sudan and the Sudan flared briefly, only to be replaced by an escalation of proxy rebel activities on either side of their common border. Tensions between the African Union Mission in Somalia and other players who have wrestled territory from *al-Shabaab*, have created security concerns throughout the region, particularly in Kenya.

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⇒ *South Sudan*

41.   In 2012, there were 899 security incidents involving WFP and its contractors and partners. Of the 798 security incidents directly affecting WFP staff and operations in 2012, 125 were recorded in South Sudan; a further 26 incidents in the country involved contractors and partners. Of those 151 incidents, 111 – 74 percent – were work–related; however, only 27 of these involved the use of violence. The majority – 106 – were related to crime; 36 to hazards; 6 to armed conflict; and 3 to civil unrest. Consistent with past trends, no terrorism/extremism-related incidents were reported in South Sudan, though they are an assumed threat.

42.   The crime incidents in South Sudan tend to be motivated by profit. There were 37 burglaries, largely at warehouses, and 20 thefts. Violence was also involved in a further six robberies and five assaults, underscoring the need to enhance physical security measures, especially at warehouses.

43.   One on-duty employee of a WFP contracted company was killed during a robbery in South Sudan; an employee of a WFP partner was shot and seriously injured in an ambush. Two other WFP staff members sustained serious injuries in non-work-related crime incidents.

44.   South Sudan's security challenges are numerous and complex. Hostilities with the Sudan, hinging on unresolved post-secession issues and internal armed conflicts, remain the primary drivers of socio-political risks in the country and continue to amplify challenges to governance. While hostilities between South Sudan and the Sudan have diminished, inter-communal conflicts are rising. Operational security challenges for WFP will remain protracted, especially as the conflict, deteriorating socio-economic environment, circulation of illegal weapons and limited law enforcement fuel ongoing criminality.

⇒ *The Sudan*

45.   There were 98 security and safety incidents reported in the Sudan in 2012. Of those, 85 affected WFP staff and/or assets, which represents an increase of 52 percent from 2011. The remaining 13 incidents affected contractors and partners engaged in support to WFP programmes.

46.   While the number of incidents reported increased substantially, geographic and typological patterns remained unchanged: the majority (82 percent) of all 98 incidents were reported in Darfur region, while crime continues to account for the highest proportion of all incidents (77 percent or 75 incidents). There were 11 incidents of armed conflict, five incidents of civil unrest and six involving hazards. Crime remains a significant threat, accounting for 79 percent of those incidents directly affecting WFP staff and/or assets. Violence, often including the use of firearms, occurred in 19 percent of those criminal incidents. Firearms resulted in the death of a WFP staff member in the line of duty during an ambush in North Kordofan, the kidnapping of a WFP international consultant and two serious injuries. Similarly, 69 percent of incidents affecting contractors and partners while in the line of duty in the Sudan were criminal in nature; 78 percent of these involved the use of violence. WFP operations continue to be vulnerable to criminal incidents occurring on roads given that they are the primary mode of programme delivery. Compounds and fixed assets are also at risk of collateral violence.

47.   The factors contributing to operational security challenges to WFP in the Sudan include armed conflict in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. This conflict has enabled criminality by constraining law enforcement and increasing the proliferation of weapons in

an environment characterized by socio-economic hardship and limited opportunities for advancement. With no foreseeable resolution to the several conflicts in the country, this dynamic is expected to prevail in the coming years.

Asia

⇒ *Afghanistan*

48.   The operational environment in Afghanistan remains one of the most difficult and is characterized by high levels of risk across all threat categories. Underscoring this variety of threats, incidents in Afghanistan accounted for 69 percent (11 incidents) of all 16 terrorism/extremism-related cases reported in 2012; 16 percent of all 71 incidents reported in Afghanistan. Conforming to the global trend, criminality contributed the majority (42 incidents or 59 percent) of all incidents affecting WFP staff and/or assets, as well as contractors and partners. Twenty-six of these crime incidents (62 percent) involved the use of violence.

49.   Anti-government elements have expanded the scope and frequency of their targeting of food transported by contractors, observed in previous years. In 2011, incidents occurred in Ghor and Heart provinces, but in 2012 there were also incidents in Parwan, Helmand, Wardak, Nangahar and Kunar provinces. The threat posed by this targeting is severe, as one employee of a WFP contracted company was killed during a violent diversion of a convoy of contracted trucks with WFP food commodities. While employees of contractors are generally released after capture of the trucks, the threat of kidnapping for ransom, though rare, is real as two employees of a contracted company in 2012 were detained in one case, with their release reportedly resulting from the payment of a ransom. The confiscation or diversion of food and, in some cases, distribution of food to residents of particular villages, ostensibly controlled or influenced by commanders of anti-government elements, suggests that these elements are attempting to increase their popularity and writ in those areas. Such tactics are not unusual given the organizational dynamics of Afghan militia groups, which are usually mobilized around communal elders.

50.   Violence extends beyond WFP commodities to the staff of WFP, as well as their contractors and partners. A WFP staff member and an employee of a partner organization sustained serious injuries in a roadside bomb attack on a WFP armoured vehicle in the country's Balkh province. In that incident, the structural integrity of the vehicle ensured the survival of the staff, but in another incident an employee of a WFP partner returning from implementing a WFP project was attacked and killed. Given that attacks on humanitarian aid workers in Afghanistan can be understood as an attempt by anti-government elements to hamper the ability of the Government to function, humanitarian agencies are likely to remain targets. Harassment of employees of humanitarian aid agencies, including WFP, allegedly from anti-government elements, constitutes 25 percent (18 incidents) of all 71 incidents reported in Afghanistan in 2012.

51.   Violence in Afghanistan escalated with the drawdown of international forces and hand-over of security responsibilities to Afghan forces. The phased hand-over of security responsibilities from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan security forces has been accompanied by increased attacks by anti-government elements that have expanded their presence into areas previously believed to be free of insurgency. Even if this shift has not directly affected WFP, it has influenced its operational environment.

Middle East

⇒ *Syrian Arab Republic*

52.   In 2012, the Syrian Arab Republic recorded the largest increase (261 percent) in the number of incidents affecting WFP operations, reflecting the scale of deterioration in the security situation in the country. With 52 security incidents affecting WFP staff and/or assets, as well as contractors and partners engaged in support of WFP operations, the country was ranked fourth in terms of numbers of incidents, a dramatic shift from the sixteenth position it held in 2011. The Syrian Arab Republic is now one of the most hazardous places for humanitarian aid workers as 32 of these incidents (62 percent) involved the use of violence. Forty-seven of the 52 incidents directly affected WFP staff and/or assets either in isolation or together with its partners and contractors.

53.   There were nine incidents of armed attacks, including one explosion, in which WFP and contractor vehicles were targeted. The number of such incidents in the Syrian Arab Republic is higher than in any other country in 2012. Similarly, ten incidents of armed robberies affecting WFP staff and partners were reported, in addition to three carjackings.

54.   As the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic continues to intensify and expand, the threats to which WFP operations are exposed are also increasing. Access continues to become more difficult while incidents of access restriction, arrest/detention of staff members, armed attacks on vehicles and collateral risks from indirect fire continue to be reported with disturbing regularity. Similarly, kidnapping has become one of a number of critical threats in a fluid and very dangerous operational environment.

55.   Security challenges for WFP operations are also transcending borders, with an influx of refugees to the Syrian Arab Republic's neighbours – mainly Jordan – necessitating the organization's response. Tensions in the camps where WFP implements its programmes resulted in 14 reported security incidents affecting WFP operations in Jordan in 2012, half of which were related to demonstrations by discontented refugees, and some of which involved harassment of WFP staff and/or its partners.

Latin America and the Caribbean

⇒ *Haiti*

56.   There were 41 incidents registered in Haiti in 2012, a slight reduction compared to 49 incidents reported in 2011. However, Haiti retained its position in the list of five countries with the largest number of incidents affecting WFP operations.

57.   Crime constitutes the highest proportion of incidents in Haiti at 76 percent (31 incidents), distantly followed by hazards at 22 percent. Eighty-five percent (33 incidents) occurred in the Ouest region, where Port-Au-Prince is located. Of note is a marked reduction in incidents related to civil unrest, compared to the previous year when several demonstrations over alleged delays in payment by WFP partners presented significant operational and security challenges. In 2012, only one incident of civil unrest affecting WFP operations was reported. All six incidents of violence in Haiti during the year affected staff while they were off duty; these were mostly burglaries and robberies.

Security Incidents by Regional Bureau[8]

58.   In 2012, the Regional Bureau for East and Central Africa (OMN) reported 332 security incidents affecting WFP staff and/or assets, as well as its partners and contractors; 45 percent of these occurred in South Sudan. The Regional Bureau for Asia (OMB) reported 121 incidents, a slight increase over 114 incidents reported in 2011. The Regional Bureau for the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (OMC) registered the largest increase, continuing a trend from the previous year. A total of 109 incidents were recorded in OMC, constituting an 82-percent increase from 60 incidents in 2011, which itself saw a 122-percent increase over 2010 data. The Regional Bureau for Southern Africa (OMJ) reported 71 incidents, while the Regional Bureau for West Africa (OMD) reported 59 incidents, the lowest number among the WFP regional bureaux. The Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (OMP) reported 74 incidents, a reduction of 20 percent compared to 2011. The Sudan Office reported 98 incidents in 2012.

Security Incidents Affecting Contractors and Partners

59.   WFP partners and contractors providing services to WFP were involved in a total of 245 security incidents during the year – 101 incidents involved contractors and partners exclusively while 144 of these incidents affected both contractors/partners and WFP staff or assets.

60.   Consistent with the patterns of incidents affecting WFP staff and operations, crime accounted for most incidents (153 incidents or 62 percent), followed by hazard-related incidents (40 incidents or 16 percent). Incidents related to armed conflict and civil unrest accounted for 9 and 8 percent, respectively. Incidents related to extremism/terrorism accounted for 5 percent (10 incidents), yet this figure represents 63 percent of all such incidents reported in 2012, thus indicating the significance of this threat to partners and contractors. The majority of incidents in this category (seven) were reported in Afghanistan, with Kenya, Niger and the Syrian Arab Republic reporting one incident each.

61.   Six partner and contractor employees were killed in acts of violence while providing services for WFP in 2012, two fewer than in 2011 (see Table 2 above). The most hazardous location for contractors and partners was Afghanistan, where one contractor employee and one partner staff member were killed in two separate incidents. Two fatalities among partner staff were reported in Somalia and one in South Sudan.

62.   Armed attacks, often targeting contractor or partner trucks transporting WFP commodities, were the most frequent type of incidents affecting companies contracted by WFP, consistent with the trend over the past three years. Overall, the number of such attacks reduced from 37 in 2011 to 20 in 2012; however, the impact of these incidents was comparatively higher, as all resulted in fatalities. The largest number of armed attacks (12 incidents) on contractor trucks was reported in Afghanistan followed by the Syrian Arab Republic with four incidents, while Pakistan and South Sudan recorded one each. There were also two armed attacks on partner trucks in Somalia.

Conclusion

63.   Current trends and dynamics of socio-political instability and security challenges suggest the emergence of new areas of high-level security risks. The crisis in Mali continues to shift towards a low-level insurgency, with militants resorting to terror tactics and

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[8] This information is based on the WFP Organigram of 2012.

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threatening the whole of the Sahel region. Instability in the Central African Republic, eastern DRC, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan are far from being resolved. In addition, the residual effects of the Arab Spring remain, as the widening and deepening conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic is affecting its neighbours and is threatening regional stability. These fluid and complex developments are expected to expose WFP to more challenges in the coming year, necessitating a deeper and more robust operational security engagement and support to enable WFP programme implementation while at the same time ensuring the safety and security of staff and operations.

WFP FIELD SECURITY ACTIVITIES

Security Risk Management

64.   WFP continued to make efforts towards institutionalizing risk management in 2012, with security personnel in the field actively supporting these endeavours. WFP is beginning to apply the concept of risk appetite, and OMF will continue to support the Board in its engagement with risk management practices. In particular, OMF will continue the development of WFP's security-risk culture to ensure that managers understand mitigation procedures and that staff are educated about the levels of risk to which they are exposed or may be permitted to assume. A new Executive Director's circular, "Security Risk Management Escalation and Decision Making Structure" (OED2013/001), dated 23 January 2013, is an important document in this development.

65.   In addition, OMF is assisting the Performance Management and Monitoring Division (RMP) to ensure that risk management is practised across all humanitarian agencies, using a common lexicon; that this is communicated between humanitarian agencies, and that risk management is used in such a way as to ensure that the notion of sharing or transferring risks is based on systematic analysis. Accordingly, the two divisions are working with partners to identify a suitable case study/pilot country in which WFP and its partners have a well-developed joint operation and existing risk management processes. Once identified, a coordinated risk assessment can be conducted to understand the benefits and impediments to sharing risks and implementing joint-risk mitigation actions.

WFP Field Security Capacity

66.   As of 31 December 2012, there were 42 FSOs (compared to 48 FSOs in 2011) and six regional security officers (RSOs). This field presence is critical in order to provide security officers with the specific operational knowledge of the threats in their country and/or region, enabling them to effectively manage security risks that occur as a result of programme implementation. By monitoring and evaluating local security situations and recommending improvements for physical safety and operational security, they ensure that robust measures are in place to protect staff and assets, directly facilitating WFP's access to beneficiaries. Their skills are constantly developed through training in collaboration with UNDSS and other United Nations bodies, with a view to improving the implementation of security policy and standards.

67.   In response to security challenges in 2012, FSOs and RSOs were deployed to support WFP operations in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, DRC, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Zimbabwe.

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68.   The FSOs and RSOs are supported by local security assistants and WFP SFPs, who help to manage security risks in countries where there is no WFP security officer, as well as by 12 professionals at Headquarters who advise and provide technical assistance. The Chief of Field Security Operations manages resources to assist field offices and advises senior management on security issues. Headquarters staff also provide training to develop security awareness and analysis of security threats in order to assist stakeholders in formulating mitigation strategies.

Premises Security and Blast Mitigation

69.   Since the last report to the Board, WFP has successfully initiated a reformation of the Blast Assessment Working Group, which it currently chairs. This working group will continue to develop a holistic approach to the matter of safer selection and occupation of United Nations premises and facilities, supporting the United Nations Premises Security Policy Working Group.

70.   OMF carried out blast vulnerability assessments with a view to recommending enhancements to the physical security of WFP premises for the Somalia United Nations Compensation Commission   in Mogadishu, a multi-agency compound, and the UNDSS in Bangladesh by request of the Designated Official.

Training

71.   Security-related training represents one of the most cost-effective ways to lower risks to WFP personnel, premises and assets,[9] fulfils security-related responsibilities as detailed in the Framework of Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System, and promotes WFP's security culture by improving staff understanding of their role regarding their own safety and security, and that of their colleagues, partners and beneficiaries. Accordingly, OMF delivered and/or coordinated the following training in 2012, in consultation with UNDSS and the UNSMS.

⇒ *Security awareness training*

72.   WFP's security awareness training supplements the compulsory online Basic Security in the Field course, which was updated and re-released to all United Nations staff in 2012. Although OMF only provided security awareness training in Guinea in 2012, a standard training package has now been developed and was used in Afghanistan, Niger, Pakistan and the Syrian Arab Republic. This training helped to develop and enhance the competencies, skills, knowledge, values and behaviour of personnel to act in a safe and secure manner.

⇒ *Country SFP training*

73.   During the first quarter of 2012, OMF provided training for 23 country SFPs in OMB and OMC, completing SFP training for all regions over the intended two-year period. Training enabled SFPs to improve their compliance with WFP security reporting requirements (e.g. regarding security incidents) as well as their understanding of security risk management documentation, budgeting and their implementation of risk mitigation measures.

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[9] UNDSS training policy.

⇒ *Safe and secure awareness in field environments*

74.   In 2012, Safe and Secure Awareness in Field Environments (SSAFE) training was delivered to 253 staff in Bolivia, Honduras, Kabul, Rome and the Syrian Arab Republic. By simulating scenarios such as illegal checkpoints, hostage-taking and IED attacks, this training equipped staff to operate in hostile environments and to respond to threats safely. SSAFE training will continue in 2013 in Rome and wherever UNDSS is unable to meet its requirement to deliver the training.

⇒ *Driver training*

75.   In view of the number of traffic accidents involving WFP staff and assets, OMF coordinates training for drivers with the Global Vehicle Leasing Pool and has implemented a satellite-based tracking system. In 2012, driver and vehicle tracking system training was delivered in Mali, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan and Yemen to assist staff in adopting safe practices while driving. Further tracking system training is not anticipated until more vehicle units are installed, following completion of a request for proposal process and the potential implementation of a new technology platform to integrate other tracking tools within WFP.

⇒ *Security professionals certification programme*

76.   A total of 11 security professionals successfully completed UNSMS certification programmes in 2012. This core security training is essential for equipping security personnel with the appropriate knowledge, skills and attitudes to fulfil their assigned functions to an agreed standard of competency. It also enhances inter-operability between UNSMS organizations and facilitates career development. The process of certification of professionals will continue throughout the coming years, to ensure that existing and newly recruited professionals achieve consistent standards.

⇒ *Workshops for WFP security officers*

77.   An RSO workshop was held in 2012 for 16 staff to discuss best practice in security management, to review the application of policies and the development of procedures, and to consider the strategic direction of the division. Although in 2012 an FSO workshop was not held due to ongoing crises preventing staff from being released to attend, along with budgetary constraints, a global survey was conducted with RSOs and FSOs to evaluate the service field security provides. The survey was designed to attain an improved understanding of the attitude, motivation and satisfaction of FSOs/RSOs in relation to their roles in order to determine how the division could best support them in ensuring the safety and security of WFP's personnel and security of its operations, premises and assets. Field security staff in Rome had a strategic retreat and a mid-year review meeting in 2012, during which the survey results were reviewed.

⇒ *Emergency trauma bag training*

78.   OMF conducted one emergency trauma bag (ETB) training session in 2012, which certified 15 staff and security professionals. Given recent concerns about the cost-benefit of this training, particularly as the training needs to be regularly repeated, the UNSMS is currently reviewing the requirement for ETB and considering alternative means of managing the risk of injuries to staff.

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⇒ *Hostage incident management training*

79.   In line with United Nations policy, WFP has pledged to make every effort to secure the quick and safe release of hostages. During 2012, WFP continued these efforts and trained nine staff on hostage incident management, helping participants to manage crisis situations and evaluate the progress of negotiations to ensure the safest and most effective resolution. Training also involved a focus on coordination with host governments, family liaison and media management. Practical exercises helped to assess individual strengths and weaknesses, enabling the deployment of appropriate staff to assist with hostage incidents, such as that of Patrick Noonan.

⇒ *Security analysis process and practice course*

80.   The UNDSS security analysis process and practice (SAPP) course enables personnel to assess security threat information with regard to reliability, relevance, value, urgency and importance and advises on practical applications in relation to security risk management. In 2012, 40 WFP staff attended the course, resulting in visible improvements in the quality of security assessments to inform operational and programmatic decisions. Nineteen staff, who required less detailed knowledge, also attended a shorter introduction course.

Security Information Management and Security Analysis Support System

81.   The Security Information Management and Security Analysis Support System (SIMSAS) is fully operational and provides a streamlined and standardized portal for the reporting of security incidents affecting WFP staff, cooperating partners and assets. It also forms the basis of the new weekly security incident report produced by the OMF Operations Team. Analysis by OMF supports planning and decision-making with regard to strategies to protect staff and assets.

Security Assessment Missions

82.   WFP continues to conduct security assessment missions to WFP offices globally to evaluate whether risk mitigation measures have been established, implemented and are effective. Security assessment missions further identify physical vulnerabilities that may have developed since previous missions or due to changes in the security environment. Security assessment missions provide specific recommendations to Regional Directors and Country Directors to assist in enhancing WFP safety and security, and indicate the progress of implementation of agreed measures and recommendations.

83.   During 2012, external consultants from the WFP stand-by roster carried out assessments of 33 countries. Directors of regional bureaux, country offices and liaison office received copies of their reports. A total of 2,084 recommendations for improvement in staff safety were identified. Last year witnessed a shift in recommendation type, as only 35 percent of recommendations directly related to replacement or repair of security equipment; a significant decrease from 57 percent of previous years. During 2012, 51 percent of recommendations have been closed; and WFP field security staff will continue to address all security deficiencies during 2013.

TABLE 3: MAIN SECURITY DEFICIENCIES	
Processes and practices (37%)	Security training Access control procedures Communication procedures
Equipment (35%)	Construction and enforcement of doors/walls Fencing Medical kits Communication equipment
Documentation (13%)	Evacuation plans Standard operating procedures Warden maps
Contingency and emergency planning (11%)	Contingency or emergency plans Safe havens Evacuation exercises
Roles and responsibilities (4%)	Improvement of the warden system Improvement of the country SFP system

84. During 2012, facility security enhancements, telecommunications equipment, shatter-resistant film, body armour, access control equipment and systems, and armoured vehicles were provided at 28 country offices and at Headquarters. Other equipment required for minimum operating security standards (MOSS) such as fire-fighting and alarm systems and medical equipment was provided in 16 country offices and Headquarters. OMF also continues to build up stocks at the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depots (UNHRD) for emergency deployment. A country self-assessment in combination with results from the UNDSS compliance mission reports indicated that WFP premises are 85 percent MOSS compliant – an increase from 2011, which had a 60 percent MOSS compliancy rate. During 2012, OMF has continued to work with regional bureaux and country offices to ensure that security measures are in place and that their implementation has been monitored through an online system in SharePoint at Headquarters. Funds continued to be provided in 2012 from the Security Special Account for offices that are not fully MOSS compliant.

REPORT ON THE WFP SECURITY EMERGENCY FUND

85. With the approval of the Management Plan (2010–2011) at its 2009 Second Regular Session, the Board supported the establishment of a Security Special Account that includes the WFP UNDSS costs as well as a Security Emergency Fund. This fund supplements the costs of security requirements not covered by country projects for implementing improvements in physical safety and operational security. The 2012–2014 Management Plan approved a US$16.9 million advance from the Working Capital Facility, and up to US$10 million from the General Fund to cover amounts that cannot be charged to projects.

86. In 2012, the Security Emergency Fund provided for blast mitigations, blast and security assessment missions, security equipment including facility protection measures, training and security staffing.

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TABLE 4: SECURITY EMERGENCY FUND 2012 *(US$)*		
	Allocations	**Commitments**
Security management and MOSS		
Staffing	3 931 876.77	3 704 698.54
Equipment and facility enhancements	1 078 949.23	936 126.63
Training	543 206.34	538 108.13
Assessments	370 466.00	324 152.29
Substantial infrastructure works		
Office relocation and blast mitigation	510 851.00	510 851.00
TOTAL	**6 435 349.34**	**6 013 936.59**

87.   Substantial infrastructure work was completed in Afghanistan in 2012 to enhance physical protection of WFP offices in Kandahar and Herat. In 2012, WFP field security staff continued to advocate for substantial infrastructure work to be funded by the respective country projects.

2012 WFP SHARE OF UNITED NATIONS FIELD-RELATED SECURITY COSTS

88.   At its 2005 First Regular Session, the Board agreed on financial support for the Secretary-General to implement a unified security management system. This system comprises working with UNDSS and other United Nations bodies to develop security policies and standards.

89.   WFP's projected share of UNDSS costs for 2012 was US$9.6 million, as per the initially approved budget for jointly-financed UNDSS field-related security costs 2012–2013 (A/66/6(Sect. 36). This cost is based on the number of WFP staff in the field, as per methodology outlined in the Chief Executives Board document "Cost-Sharing Arrangements for Jointly Financed Activities" (CEB/2010/HLCM/FB/8/Rev.2). The cost-shared budget was later revised with a WFP cost-share of US$24.1 million (CEB/2012/HLCM/FB/7). WFP has contributed a total of US$11.3 million to UNDSS during 2012.

TABLE 5: UNITED NATIONS FIELD-RELATED SECURITY COSTS *(US$ million)*		
	UNDSS total	**WFP's share**
2002–2003	42.9	6.5
2004–2005	113.1	13.2
2006–2007	172.3	20.2*
2008–2009	174.4	17.3
2010–2011	209.9	24.4**
2012–2013	218.6***	24.1

*   Credit of US$3.2 million received in 2006
** Credit of US$1.4 million received in 2010
*** As per the proposed 2012–2013 UNDSS

90.   As a member of the IASMN, WFP supports UNDSS in enhancing the transparency of the Jointly Funded Account budget, now a permanent item on the agenda. UNDSS is working to improve the transparency of local cost-shared expenditures in terms of identifying overspending and reflecting more accurately the actual costs of security for programmes.

91.   WFP will continue to urge UNDSS to regularly report on its structure, distribution and function of jointly financed positions and activities. The United Nations Secretariat performance report will detail contributions for the financing of security-related expenditure for the field operations of participating organizations along with actual expenditure.

The Way Forward

92.   In increasingly challenging environments, WFP's field security personnel work to ensure the safety and security of WFP staff, assets and operations, so that WFP staff can maintain proximity to beneficiaries. Accordingly, in 2013, OMF will retain its core functions of security operations, training and analysis, managing security risks and enhancing security through the provision of experienced staff; assessment and advice to enhance processes and practices; equipment and premises improvements; incident reporting; analysis of security threat information and security training.

93.   Meanwhile, to support the 'fit-for-purpose' priority of empowering country offices and promoting a field-oriented global Headquarters, OMF's increased presence in the field will provide benefits to WFP operations and facilitate more effective coordination between it, and UNDSS, and with other risk-management functions. Global Headquarters positions will ensure that there is consistent, cohesive and coordinated security risk management.

94.   To maintain effective security risk management in extreme and complex security conditions, WFP has to ensure appropriate and sustainable funding for security and must identify suitable security staff, providing organizational sponsorship of security promotions and career development. WFP needs to continue to acknowledge that there should be "no programme without security" and "no security without resources". Furthermore, continued support by the Executive Board and WFP senior management is necessary to ensure that, regardless of staffing changes across WFP, all staff understand and carry out their security responsibilities, and that, in accordance with ODF's Framework of Accountability, Regional Directors, Country Directors and SFPs continue to support the management of security risks.

Figure 1: Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2005-2012

Figure 2: Countries with Highest Rates of Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2012


South Sudan 21%
Sudan 14%
Afghanistan 10%
Syria 8%
Haiti 6%
Democratic Republic of the Congo 6%
Uganda 6%
Ethiopia 5%
Yemen 4%
Kenya 4%
Zimbabwe 4%
Somalia 3%
Pakistan 3%
Madagascar 2%
Malawi 3%
Mozambique 2%
Honduras 2%

Figure 3: Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2012, by Regional Bureau

HQ: 35, 4%

OMJ: 71, 9%

OMC: 97, 12%

OMN: 282, 35%

Sudan Office: 85, 11%

OMB: 103, 13%

OMP: 71, 9%

OMD: 54, 7%

Figure 4: Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2008-2012, by Regional Bureau

Regional Bureau	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
OMC	17	19	27	60	97
OMP	44	43	80	93	71
OMN	0		277		282
OMD	127	129	111	100	54
OMB	135	132	113	114	103
Sudan Office	167	117	178	56	85
OMJ	167	180	258	56	71

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
Figure 5: Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in OMC in 2008-2012

# Figure 6: Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/ Assets in 2012: Property Crime

Carjacking
2%

Robbery
19%

Theft
41%

Burglary
38%

Figure 7: Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2005-2012: Property Crime

# Figure 8: Countries with Highest Numbers of Attacks on Contracted Trucks in 2012

Pakistan 7%

South Sudan 8%

Syrian Arab Republic 31%

Afghanistan 54%

Figure 9: Road Traffic Accidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2006-2012

Figure 10: Road Traffic Accidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2008-2012, by Regional Bureau

Figure 11: Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets: 2005-2012, by Type of Incidents

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

ETB	emergency trauma bag
FSO	field security officer
IASMN	Inter-Agency Security Management Network
IED	improvised explosive device
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MOSS	minimum operating security standards
OMB	Regional Bureau Bangkok (Asia)
OMC	Regional Bureau Cairo (Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia)
OMD	Regional Bureau Dakar (West Africa)
OMF	Field Security Division
OMJ	Regional Bureau Johannesburg (Southern Africa)
OMN	Regional Bureau Nairobi (East and Central Africa)
OMP	Regional Bureau Panama (Latin America and the Caribbean)
RMP	Resource Management and Monitoring Division
RSO	regional security officer
SAPP	security analysis process and practice
SFP	security focal point
SIMSAS	Security Information Management and Security Analysis Support System
SSAFE	Safe and Secure Awareness in Field Environments
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHRD	United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot
UNSMS	United Nations Security Management System

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