



# World Food Programme

**A Report Commissioned by the  
Office of Evaluation**



*Mid-Term Evaluation of  
the Colombia PRRO  
10366.0*

*Ref. OEDE/2008/001*



# ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The evaluation team visited from February to March 2007. This document was prepared by the mission team leader on the basis of the mission's work in the field.

On behalf of the team, the author wishes to extend thanks to all those who facilitated the team's work in the field and in Headquarters.

Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

# MISSION COMPOSITION

- Frank Sullivan.
  - Carmen Barragan.
  - Sean Loughna
  - Jorge Iván Bula Escobar.
- 
- Aurelie Larmoyer, Evaluation Officer



# ACRONYMS

AS	Acción Sociál (GOC Ministry in charge of IDP affaris
<i>Bienestarina</i>	GOC-donated fortified wheat blend
CO	Country Office
CODHES	Consultoría Para Los Derechos Humanos y El Desplazamiento Forzado
CR	Children at Risk
DNP	National Development Plan
ECHO	European Commission on Humanitarian Operations
ELN	National Liberation Army
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FFT	Food-For-Training
FFW	Food-For-Work
GOC	Government of Colombia
GTZ	German Aid Organization
HH	Household
HQ	Head Quarters
IASC	Interagency Steering Committees
ICBF	Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced People
INGO	Internation non-governmental Organization
Kcal	Kilo-Calorie
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluations
MT	Metric Ton
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
<i>Panela</i>	Block of brown sugar
PANEM	Catholic Church Relief Programme Directed to Non- Registered
PLM	Pregnant and Lactating Women
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations
RSS	Red de Solidaridad Social
SIMVA	Sistema para la Identificación y Monitoreo de Vulnerabilidad Alimentaria
SO	Strategic Objective
SUR	Sistema Único de Registro
TORs	Terms of Reference
UBN	Unmet Basic Need
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The current Colombia PRRO, 10366, was approved in February 2005 for approximately US\$40 million, with a goal of protecting livelihoods and ensuring access to adequate food for 499,000 IDPs and host communities. A mid-term evaluation was carried out in February and March 2007, to provide timely analysis of the on-going Operation to prepare for next phase, thus constituting a learning exercise for the Country Office.

The PRRO, the activities of which develop a relief-to-recovery continuum, is highly **relevant** to the needs of IDPs: for immediate assistance in the aftermath of their displacement and as a flexible response to their evolving needs in months following displacement. IDPs are an appropriate target for the programme and the inclusion of non-registered IDPs as a special target group has been an excellent innovation. Each programme component is relevant in varying degree and for different reasons. The evaluation team inclines to think that the relief support provided by the operation is of particular importance.

Food resources have generally been limited compared to the vast need evidenced by the evaluators and a significant pipeline break was an additional serious setback to programme **efficiency**. While achievement of programme targets is generally satisfactory, substantial over-accomplishment in pregnant and lactating mothers and children-at-risk—arguably the least effective programme interventions—was accomplished by diverting resources from school and preschool feeding. FFW and FFT show similar over-accomplishment but are likely more justifiable for their effectiveness as vehicles of recovery.

Regarding **effectiveness**, the relief component was judged particularly successful, offering meaningful assistance to the most-vulnerable groups without evidently creating dependency; data on the degree to which beneficiaries' full economic re-integration are not being collected. School feeding appears to be an effective intervention with outcome monitoring suggesting attendance at school is more attractive as a result of the ration; where the PRRO closes this support after only one year, longer-term benefits will, of course, be unachievable. The effectiveness of pre-school feeding depends all-but exclusively on the quality of the implementing partner. Because of small ration size and other factors, the pregnant and lactating mothers component and the children-at-risk component were judged ineffective except when run by quite strong institutional partners. FFW and FFT were judged effective programme components, in part because of the wide array of recovery activities supported by FFW and FFT and because of appropriate ration sizes.

The number of IDPs actually benefited by the PRRO in 18 months was almost double that called for in the programme proposal, an issue of some concern: it is possible food resources are being stretched too thinly.

Various **support functions** were analyzed. Needs assessment was conducted by carrying out four comprehensive nutritional/ socio-economic surveys which clearly demonstrated that IDP needs and conditions were worse than the poorest quintile of the historically poor.

A system for identifying and monitoring food vulnerability called SIMVA was developed in the PRRO which represented considerable work from many actors. Although weaknesses were identified, the evaluation found it particularly well suited to collecting baseline to evaluation data.



The current PRRO built in a certain targeting balance, dividing support between IDPs and the historically poor on a 70/30 basis respectively, which the evaluators find appropriate. The operation widened its geographical coverage through the opening of new offices and working in new departments. Beneficiary selection was generally good, as well as project selection, undertaken through both institutional and community-based quality implementing partners with good local knowledge. In particular, the evaluation found appropriate to target Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.

The CO has made great strides improving the monitoring system in the current PRRO. Monitoring, *output* measurement, and project control functions are being performed well. However, the PRRO has tracked only two *outcome* level indicators, which the evaluators found to be a relatively serious limitation. A larger question in current Colombia conditions pertains to the realism of setting out a goal focused on improved livelihoods within the somewhat narrow window of food aid, in which WFP operates.

The Colombia PRRO demonstrates a number of strengths in partnering. The programme demonstrates good complementarity with GOC counterparts as well as with NGO partners. The GOC has contributed substantial financial, in-kind and personnel resources to the operation. NGOs have contributed additional resources, as well as a holistic vision not otherwise contemplated in programme documents. Strengthened Civil Society is also certainly an indirect result of the operation.

The PRRO has a strong focus on women, with 55% of beneficiaries being women and 80% of leadership roles assumed by women in village committees, figure corroborated by vivid examples of significant women's leadership and empowerment, witnessed in the field.

Three larger-scale questions are suggested for future policy deliberations, pertaining to: the role of WFP in supporting the GOC's efforts to improve IDP lives; the degree of efficiency that can be expected from GOC contractual partners regarding rapid and timely response to IDP needs; and the appropriateness of food aid per se in the Colombian context.

At the national level, the PRRO is fully consonant with the longer term needs and problems as identified by the GOC, other international organizations, local and international NGOs, and beneficiaries.

**Recommendations** are offered.

First it is recommended that the Strategic orientation of the new PRRO be re-thought, in a way to incorporate nutrition and education as part of the overall goals. The operational design should include a logical framework identifying all appropriate outcomes and setting out a plan to track their accomplishment. The systematic contribution of cooperating partners to monitoring could be encouraged by WFP.

The evaluation recommends that the CO keeps regularly reviewing the distribution of its resources allocated to relief and to recovery activities, in a way to make the most of the PRRO category's flexibility to adjust to changing needs and bearing in mind WFP's specific value-added in emergencies.

Furthermore, WFP should work towards carrying out its planned operation fully, in particular by increasing the current ratio of budget-to-funded –approximately 42% of budget at the time of the evaluation- and by avoiding a replay of the pipeline break.



A programme tightening should take place to ensure that beneficiaries receive the full ration that has been planned. Besides, the CO is encouraged to consider *a family ration* for the two Vulnerable Group Feeding components with careful weighing of the cost implications.

The CO is also encouraged to be attentive to cost effectiveness, notably in link with geographical dispersion. Operational costs doubled to approximately \$10 million in the current PRRO; further cost increases should be avoided.

The evaluation team believes that programme size could be increased, to respond to the high needs of IDPs, without requiring a significant increase in operational costs. Such a programme expansion should be assumed jointly by WFP and the Government of Colombia and could be tackled through a handover strategy, with for instance the GoC assuming full responsibility for one or another programme component within the life of the next PRRO. An important recommendation is that sight must not be lost that WFP's role in IDP support does not relieve the GOC's of its responsibility to this population.





# 1. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

## 1.1 Programme History

As results of Colombia’s 40 years of internal turmoil, the country faces a nation-wide crisis of internal displacement affecting over the last two decades, by some estimates, over 3 million people of a population of 43 million. New displacements have averaged about 300,000 per year since 2000. Today Colombia has the second largest population of Internally Displaced People (IDP) in the world, second only to Sudan.

Since 2000, the WFP Executive Board has approved three consecutive Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) in Colombia to respond to this crisis, for a total budget of US\$89.5 million. A representation of the evolving scope of these programmes is as follows:

Table 1: Historic and Programmatic Evolution of Colombia Programme

Year	PRRO	Programme Target Populations
2/00-1/02	6139	Registered displaced populations in 11 departments: Bogotá, Cartagena, Apartado, Sincelejo, Medellin and Barrancaberma
1/03-3/05	10158	75 municipalities Registered displaced populations Non-registered with <i>aval</i> (GOC municipal recognition)
5/05-3/07 Extended. to 3/08	10366	Most recently displaced population 38% relief/ 62% recovery Registered and non-registered displaced Non registered with <i>aval</i> Non-registered via PANEM (confined, blockaded, at risk)

The current Colombia PRRO 10366, was approved in February 2005 for approximately US\$40 million, with a goal of protecting livelihoods and ensuring access to adequate food for 499,000 IDPs and host communities. A relief response (38% of resources) consisted of general food distribution and community kitchens to 160,000 newly displaced people (registered and non-registered) and beneficiaries in blockaded /confined/ at-risk-of-displacement communities. A recovery component (62% of resources) consisted of livelihood protection and asset building activities, taking the form of Food-For-Work (FFW), Food-For-Training (FFT), Vulnerable Group Feeding, and feeding of School and Pre-school children.

A one-year extension was approved to allow for developing future activities in line with the new Government programmes following the re-election of the President in August 2006. A budget revision (#6) was not subsequently approved in December 2006, increasing the total budget value to US\$ 58.1 million. In September 2006 at 75% of duration, the PRRO was funded at approximately 50% and at the time of the mission, no significant donations had been registered since the budget revision. As a consequence, the programme suffered a serious pipeline break, as of October 2006.

Contractual signatories are the Government of Colombia’s (GOC) *Acción Social* and the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF), who have jointly allocated an additional USD 30 million for complementary non-food items and programme support. Partner implementing agencies include these two GOC entities plus church organizations, international and national



NGOs, local authorities, civil societies, and community-led organizations. UN agencies are also part of the stakeholder picture. The main donors are the USA, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, the European Commission and Canada.

## **1.2 Evaluation Approach and Team Composition**

The Terms of Reference call for a Mid-Term evaluation, to assess the PRRO's Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, and possible implications for future strategic orientations. The full TORs are attached as Appendix B.

The evaluation team was composed of four external consultants, three international and one national, and a WFP support person. The team leader is an international agricultural consultant with twenty years' experience in development and food programmes and in evaluation. The second international team member is a Ph.D. economist trained at the University of Quebec who formerly worked for WFP in Bolivia. The third international team member is research officer, teacher, and editor at the Refugee Studies Center, Oxford University. The national team member is a Ph.D. professor of Sociology and Economics at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia. The team was accompanied throughout the mission by an Officer from the Office of Evaluation based in Rome.

Week One in country involved a two day Planning Meeting, introductory presentations by CO staff, and interview meetings with most UN agency heads, other partners and informed experts. A one-day visit to Ciudad Bolívar, in the outskirts of Bogotá, was undertaken in order to pilot fieldwork methodologies. Week Two involved the team traveling to three different parts of the country, respectively covered by the offices of: Cartagena and Valledupar in the north, Cali and Pasto in the South, Quibdó on the Pacific Coast and Meta in the center (See Appendix D). Fifty-three projects were visited; meetings were held with implementing partners or staff, including discussions at the field level with counterpart staff; one Regional Committee meeting was observed. Week Three was spent in the team's analyzing trip findings and preparing three briefing documents: an executive summary for senior CO staff, a "working draft" report for CO programme staff, and an official debriefing for the GoC counterparts.

Key findings, conclusions and recommendations were presented during a subsequent debriefing organized in Rome with relevant HQ. units and the Country Office, on March 26.



## **2. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OVER THE VIOLENCE AND DISPLACEMENT SITUATION AND RECENT LEGISLATION**

### **2.1 Brief historical account of the conflictual situation in Colombia**

Many scholarly works have been written on the subject, which readers are encouraged to refer to, as a several-paragraph description is bound to provide only the briefest of an overview.

Colombia has been suffering from a general situation of violence opposing the Government and its armed forces against illegal guerrillas and paramilitary groups. After over 40 years of confrontation, this situation is among the longest standing of modern history. The current armed confrontation is both a continuation of Colombian history and a new phenomenon. Long-standing socio-economic conflicts over land and resources intersect with organized crime and the presence of illegal armed groups. Its root causes are inter-related structural historical factors, a pivot of which revolved around the State's capacity to exert its functions as warrant of civil security or provider of social services to attend to its people's needs. Its negative effects are compounded by social vulnerability and inequality, corruption, violence and drug trafficking.

The Marxist-inspired Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Cuban-inspired National Liberation Army (ELN) are among the main illegal armed guerrilla groups. The lack of resolution of local conflicts in turn contributed to the rise of para-statal groups, which took advantage of the breach left uncovered at local levels and had by the 1990s increasingly taken a dominant military role against the guerrilla threat. The evolving prominence of narco-traffic since the 1980's has complicated this picture further, with drug lords becoming increasingly involved in trying to influence politics and perpetuating violence by providing massive cash and/or arms support to one or other armed group, or even acting as proxy combatants. Narco-traffic is part of the illegal armed groups financing strategy and has brought about even higher levels of corruption and crime. The situation became more complicated with the involvement of the illicit narcotics business and the rise of new participants. It now involves multiple actors, with varying multi-faceted scenarios, and is highly regionalized.

Pursuing a policy of "democratic security", the Colombian armed forces continue to follow different military offensives especially in the East and South, in order to regain full control of rural areas which have been under the influence of the guerrilla. This policy has proven to have results and the country today reports a decline in some crime indicators at many levels. Since 2003, the GOC encouraged a large demobilization of paramilitaries, in return for judicial beneficial treatment (reduced sentences) and reintegration support programmes which opened new positive prospects towards peace. New emerging bands have however risen recently, which some argue are adopting much the same tactics as the disbanded paramilitaries. However for the GoC these bands are solely of criminal origin.

Among the victims of the violence are the civilian populations who, caught in the middle of the variety of interests, are forced to flee the threats or killings, which results in displacements. Some communities in conflict zones are also deliberately blockaded and isolated by some illegal armed actors. The groups of population who primarily suffer from the on-going crime and violence are mainly children and women or afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.



## 2.2 Some Key IDP Issues in Colombia<sup>1</sup>

The following are some key issues related to IDPs in Colombia.

Armed groups have developed new ways to control population movements: confinement and blockades. Confinement implies the control over the movement, or isolation, of entire communities and contribute to creating the impression—on the outside—that isolated communities are party to the actions and objectives of armed actors. As such, civilians are increasingly viewed as military targets, thereby precipitating further insecurity and instability. In the case of blockades, the population and humanitarian agencies are not allowed to bring in food and other basic needs or only limited amounts of specific items. Blockaded communities often contain Indigenous or Afro-Colombian populations, drawn into the conflict as their homes are located in isolated areas. Women are particularly at risk, as sexual and other forms of domestic violence are common. It is estimated that six percent of the IDPs are Indigenous and 18% is Afro-Colombian—i.e., one-fourth of the displaced population.

IDP patterns of displacement are predominantly from rural to urban: rural households abandon their primary asset of food and livelihood security, their land and their agricultural skills. Significant increases in the urban population places a strain on the availability, accessibility and coverage of social services, utilities (i.e., water, sanitation, and sewage), and housing. Instead of finding safety in the cities, IDPs have been increasingly exposed to crime and violence, on occasion perpetrated by the same groups who operate in rural areas, which force them to flee again. Authorities rarely recognize inter-urban and inter-municipality displacement. Moreover, tensions exist between the IDPs and the host communities as the influx of IDPs exerts greater strain on an already resource-strapped society. IDPs vie for low-skilled jobs, mostly in the informal sector.

According to a WFP survey in 2003, the average size of an IDP household is six, with a dependency rate of almost 31%. Fifty percent of the displaced population is less than 15 years old. Of the total children who attended school once, 60% dropped out between the age of 6 and 7. Within the 10-14 yr. old cohort, 79% of children are attending school, with the highest drop out rate between the ages of 12 and 15 years, reaching over 14%.

When comparing Unmet Basic Needs(UBN)<sup>2</sup> of IDP households, 70% are deficient in two or more UBN, notably in housing and living conditions, compared to 10% of the poorest quintile with two or more UBNs. A 2003 survey of 1503 IDP households indicated that, on average, IDP households purchase 80% of their food—indicating stable and sufficient income is critical—while earning on average, only 61% of the minimum wage in Colombia.

In terms of health and nutrition, a PAHO/WFP survey of displaced and non-displaced households found 22.6% chronic and 5.5% acute malnutrition rates among IIDP children under five compared to 17.2% and 3.9% in the lowest quintile population. Among under-fives, the study indicates that children from displaced households are far more likely to suffer from diarrhea, acute respiratory infections, and skin infections.

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<sup>1</sup> Text adapted from “Identifying Food and Non-Food Needs of the Internally Displaced: A Joint Survey of Internally Displaced Populations.” WFP/ICRC joint publication. October 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Housing, access to services, more than 3 persons sleeping in one room, school enrolment, and economic dependency



CODHES<sup>3</sup> figures report 252,801 IDPs in 2005 (the last complete year of data), down from 413,000 in 2002, up from 207,600 and 287,600 in 2003 and 2004 respectively. By comparison, GOC figures for 2005 are 97,229 (see discussion below). In some areas, the situation is clearly deteriorating: in Nariño, CODHES report a 50% increase in IDPs in the first semester of 2006, seven “massive” displacements in six months involving 8,400 people.

### 2.3 Brief Summary of Legislative Action

Ten years ago, Colombia introduced a comprehensive law to address the IDP situation that defined those who are considered IDPs while giving clear directions on how to meet IDPs’ Human Rights. This law was further developed by a decree adopted in December 2000 which gave the *Red de Solidaridad Social* (now *Acción Social*) responsibility to coordinate a national system of information for people displaced by violence.

In 2004, ruling on a lawsuit brought by different IDPs regarding the GOC’s inability to fulfill these obligations, the Constitutional Court produced a sentence (T-025) ordering the Government to provide a minimum standard of assistance for the displaced, additional resources for that purpose and comprehensive reports on the progress made, including on compensation for the victims of the conflict.

In 2005, the government adopted the National Plan of Integrated Attention to Displaced People (*Decreto 250*) and emitted a policy document where goals and priorities were defined for IDPs including assigning resources for the new 2007-2010 National Development Plan. The National Plan addressed both actual displaced people and those at risk of being displaced. Among the proposed activities are: coordination and administration of informational systems on displaced people; promotion of actions or prevention for population in risk; development of actions for people returning home; development of strategies for emergency and long-term actions as well as actions related to education, health, family protection, etc; implementation and follow-up of an integrated model for stabilization and the inter-institutional coordination for attention of IDPs.<sup>4</sup>

In November 2006, the Constitutional Court again intervened, taking disciplinary action against some civil servants and suppliers responsible for the (lack of) attention being given to IDPs. It also attempted to accelerate the attention to IDPs, mandating a set of indicators to show outcomes of its policy. It also transferred to the Director of *Acción Social* all reports produced by state and NGO entities related to the follow up of the Constitutional Court’s sentence 025 concerning the public policy for IDPs.

In the new National Development Plan, the GOC has estimated that by adding money from central government and departments/municipalities, between 2007 and 2010 the budget effort will reach COL\$4.3 billions (+/- US\$2 million), 80% from central government funds, 20% from decentralized funds. The objective of the policy during these four years is to guarantee “the socio-economic integration and reintegration of displaced people,” either through return or resettlement. Public policy will be guided by the following principles: 1) realization of human rights; 2) the protection and restitution of goods and belongings; 3) and a differential approach based on gender, age and ethnic composition taking into consideration the particular territorial conditions where people come from or arrive to. (DNP, 2007).

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<sup>3</sup> Consultoría Para Los Derechos Humanos y El Desplazamiento Forzado.

<sup>4</sup> (<http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=295&conID=205&pagID=369>; 24/2/2007)



## 2.4 Implications of the Policy for IDPs

A major stumbling block concerning attention to IDPs remains how many are recognized by national data collection compared to the number of people actually displaced. GOC figures begin at about 1995 and mostly use people registered in the SUR<sup>5</sup>. This system that has been criticized for the difficulties it generates for IDPs to document their displacement and for its exclusion of people that do not know how to be registered or do not want to, due fear of reprisal or other reasons. Non-GOC figures are developed from the databases of (the Church's) Pastoral Social and CODHES, based on information collected at the municipal level —according to some, a more inclusive data set. These NGOs begin counting the IDP phenomenon much earlier than the GOC, from around the mid 1980s. Official figures from 1995 to 2005 report **1.9 million** displaced; according to Church/CODHES figures, in twenty years since 1985 there have been **3.8 million** displaced. Defining the affected population is not only important in order to understand the magnitude of the problem, but also the number has significant policy—and cost—implications in developing programme responses (CODHES, 2006).

Physical security is another problem. There are regions still under the influence or strong presence of illegal armed groups. Confounding the process of demobilization of paramilitaries, the emergence of new groups —apparently recruiting former combatants—suggests the beginnings of a slow re-taking of regions previously controlled by such groups.<sup>6</sup> This has the effect of throwing returned people *back* into the displaced category. In so far as the GOC does not recognize these (new) illegal groups as “political” actors but rather as criminal groups, so too the GOC does not recognize people displaced by these groups as bona fide IDPs.

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<sup>5</sup> Sistema Único de Registro –Unique Registering System

<sup>6</sup> During the evaluation field travel, report of the new threat of one such group, the *Aguilas Negras*, was a source of considerable concern in the focus group.



### 3. STRUCTURE OF THE PRRO

The goal of the PRRO is to *protect and stabilize livelihoods* of IDPs and enhance resilience to shocks, reflecting WFP’s Strategic Objective 2. Two complementary strategies are proposed: to provide access to adequate food for new IDPs through relief assistance; and to build human and physical assets to conserve and diversify the asset base of food-insecure IDPs. Proposed indicators for the two strategies follow:

Table 2: Relief and Recovery Outcomes and Indicators

<b>Relief</b>	
<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Outcome Indicators</b>
Reduced proportion of expenditure on food items (increased access)	Percentage of IDP household (HH) expenditures allocated to food
Increased diversity in diet	Percentage of IDP HHs that show an increase in the frequency and diversity of foods consumed
<b>Recovery</b>	
Retained and diversified human and physical assets	Percentage of IDP HH expenditures allocated to food Percentage of HHs able to retain or increase their assets
Increased retention of displaced children in primary school	Percentage of boys and girls completing grade Annual drop out rates Attendance rates by gender in WFP-schools

The **relief** component, making for 38% of food assistance, consists of an emergency response through a general ration for 160,000 new IDPs, people living in blockaded communities, and people at risk of displacement. The **recovery** component, 62% of assistance, consists of transition, safety-net activities.

In **relief**, targeting criteria include people who are newly displaced (six months or less), some receiving assistance from International Committee of the Red Cross/ Red de Solidaridad Social (ICRC/RSS) and others for whom the support from other institutions has ceased (months 4, 5 and 6 after displacement). Also, as about 40 percent of new IDPs do not register with the GOC and are not assisted by ICRC, WFP provides emergency rations through Catholic Pastoral Social, either as a family ration or through community kitchens.

In **recovery**, there are six categories of beneficiaries and activities:

- Primary school children are offered on-site meals prepared by community cooks (who also receive a daily ration);
- Pre-school children aged 3 to 6 receive on-site cooked lunches which allows parents, especially mothers, to pursue income-generating options or participate in NGO or Government sponsored human capital building programmes;
- Pregnant and lactating women (PLM) (and children under 2) in communities with high concentrations of IDPs receive food rations with special targeting on young women under 19 years old;
- Children at risk (CR), i.e. moderately to severely malnourished children, and under-5s at risk of malnutrition living in communities with a high concentration of IDPs are supported with food rations;



- Food For Work (FFW) activities address IDP needs of sanitation, house construction, community facilities, and schools; also short-cycle agricultural projects;
- Food For Training (FFT) or vocational education, promotes social protection and community integration and is available through government and non-governmental organization (NGO) programmes.





## 4. FINDINGS

### 4.1 Contextual Elements Revisited

Three introductory, contextual comments are in order before the analysis begins. The first is that there is great geographical variation in the programme, as well as in projects visited. Colombia has over 1.1 million sq. km, and the current PRRO operates in 21 of its 32 Departments. The programme currently supports over 1,700 projects and developing any meaningful “evaluation sample” was clearly impossible. Comments were offered to the team suggesting that programme operations have a more long-term focus in well developed departments like Medellín, Cartagena and Bogotá, as evidenced by generally advanced programme criteria and well-developed institutional partners. Much, though not all, programming in these departments is peri-urban. This contrasts enormously to programming that takes place in Quibdó where a significant number of rural indigenous and Afro-Colombians are programme beneficiaries, and implementing partners are much less institutionally developed. Cali and Pasto are new programme areas—some of them in very high conflict—and programming operations here have only recently begun; Meta is another high conflict area, but different from any of the above. Adequately describing this geographic variation and programme diversity has proven a challenge: almost any finding will be correct in some situations and incorrect in others.

Second, the evaluators attest to a huge humanitarian need. Though the dispute between GOC figures and other data sources has been noted above, it is relatively clear that the IDP population—recently displaced and displaced a few or more years ago—is in excess of three million people. Wherever the evaluators went, beneficiaries served by the PRRO were far fewer than the total need, and waiting lists were sometimes nearly as many as actual participants. Implementing partners spoke regularly of the need to exclude numerous needy and appropriate beneficiaries due to insufficient resources. Nutritional data on IDPs collected by the PAHO and WFP (reported above) demonstrate with clarity that the nutritional and caloric condition of IDPs is significantly worse than those in the bottom quintile of Colombia—that quintile which is already suffering one of the three worst income inequalities in all of Latin America<sup>7</sup>.

Third, current GOC efforts notwithstanding, there is widespread speculation among evaluation interviewees the conflict could intensify in the next few years, and that as a result the number of IDPs may get worse in the near- and mid-term. Moreover, it also seems clear the conflict is metastasizing: for some years it was a landrights-based conflict, from which it evolved into a land-grab conflict, from which it evolved into a law-and-order conflict. It now appears to have evolved into a profit-based conflict. While each of these “shorthand” descriptions is inadequate, they allude to a fundamentally different structure to the conflict. In Colombia, IDPs affected by this struggle are a “constantly changing target.”

### 4.2 PRRO Components

The next section will discuss each PRRO component: relief, school feeding, pre-school feeding, pregnant and lactating mothers, children at risk, food for work, and food for training.

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<sup>7</sup> Gini coefficient 0.57; “Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Breaking With History” World Bank, 2003.



## 4.2.1 Relief

### Relevance

The relief component provides important support to distinct groups of IDPs:

- During the first three months after displacement, it provides vitally important assistance to registered IDPs who for one reason or another do not receive Acción Social support. There are numerous reports this cohort could be tens of thousands of people.
- It provides important assistance to registered IDPs in Months 4, 5, 6 to complement the first three months of support being delivered by Acción Social. This was a new programme component in the current PRRO.
- It provides an important support for IDPs who are in the process of registering with Acción Social in Months 1 and 2 of displacement when Acción Social procedures are being completed. In fact, there were many reports of Acción Social processing taking far longer than one or two months.
- Relief is relevant for indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities who are especially affected by displacement due to armed groups acting on their ancestral lands.
- Relief is also particularly relevant for *non-registered* IDPs. Responding to the Constitutional Court's mandate that Acción Social assume responsibility for IDPs, there is a legitimate GOC push to register all IDPs: to get them into the system and eligible for other GOC assistance, and to avoid the possibility of fraudulent inscription. Thus, GOC functionaries are trying to register a large number of IDPs. On the other hand, Church and NGO authorities—and IDPs themselves—attest to a widely under-reported number of newly displaced persons, due to various factors, among which fear of retaliation and discrimination is one of the main issues, along with the slowness of the bureaucratic processes required to do so, as well as a recognition of Acción Social's backlog of cases. The issue is complicated by their number: some sources suggest it could be as high as 700,000. If not officially registered, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are denied the limited assistance offered by the state according to Law 374. The current PRRO has created a special programme called PANEM,<sup>8</sup> channelling food through the Catholic Church to deliver food to these non-registered cases. Through Pastoral Social, the Church and NGOs, the relief component gives the GOC and the international community the opportunity to reach communities that are otherwise unreachable. The PRRO reaches other non registered IDPs through other programme interventions as well: through community kitchens it reaches communities with high concentrations of IDPs; confined and blockaded communities as well as those at risk of displacement.

There is yet an additional class of beneficiaries: “*communities in risk*.” There is a significant, recent increase in the number of communities that have been “blockaded,” from 20 at the start of the PRRO to over 200 now. Other communities are “confined,” forbidden to leave their land, by guerilla action and other armed groups. Many communities in the South are recent indirect victims of fumigation, and driven off their land, at least temporarily. Communities in risk also include groups who as a community have decided to return to their homes in spite of the danger. In these cases, the community declares itself “in resistance” or “a community of peace” and refuses to have any dealings with the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, the GOC, or with the Army. Several groups were visited during the field trip and the relief component is particularly relevant

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<sup>8</sup> Field travel did not take place to departments where PANEM is proposed due to scheduling limitations as well as no activities as a result of the pipeline break. Instead a meeting was held with Pastoral Social to discuss the programme in depth.



to these people because it allows them to return to their land and their farming, which, without PRRO support, would be impossible.

The nature of displacement over the last several years has mostly been family-by-family, rather than “massive” displacement as in Nariño, and the evaluation team was able to see only a few on-going relief operations. From the descriptions above, it is clear that a protracted *relief* operation directed to these people is a highly needed intervention. The IDPs frequently flee from their homes with nothing but the clothes they are wearing; they are economically and nutritionally among the most vulnerable in the country; they are expelled as victims of violence; and they are eligible for constitutionally protected rights. The PRRO’s relief activity was universally endorsed by participants and by colleague interviewees as highly relevant and responding to a great need, a finding with which the evaluation team concurs.

### Efficiency

It will be remembered this is the largest single programme component, planned for **38%** of resources and a total of 160,000 beneficiaries per year, **240,000** for 18 months, June 2005 to December 2006. Actual coverage was **293,625** beneficiaries, 122% of target for the 18 months<sup>9</sup>. Total tonnage distributed in the 18 month period was 8,672 MT, 57% of target of 15,093MT. Component tonnage was **34.6%** of total MT distributed in the period.

Targeting criteria in this component are clear: recently displaced, less than 18 months, in the categories discussed above, and those in high risk of displacement including communities-at-risk. Given the current political situation in Colombia, identifying appropriate IDP beneficiaries has not been an issue.

The ration is relatively large compared to other programme components—12 kg rice, 3 kg legumes, 1 liter oil, 1 kg sugar, and 0.5 kg salt per member of the household for four to six months.

Beyond the dry ration distribution described above, another programme component is a “wet” ration, provision of food through community kitchens (*olla comunitaria*). Some communities in highest risk cook together for more protection. There were credible evidence this was an important way to improve community cohesion while providing more transparent, and thus potentially more effective, food distribution; it was also seen to provide special support to female headed households.

### Effectiveness

Compared to some other programme components, the relief ration is meaningful: 1,644 kcal/day for up to 150 days. There was discussion with various interviewees whether the ration provided an appropriate coverage between being “too short” (not enough benefit to be meaningful in light of high IDP vulnerability), or too long (thus creating dependency.) In the judgment of most, and the evaluation team also, for this category of beneficiary this seems an effective ration. It appears to provide meaningful food support for a sufficiently long period of time to enable the IDP family to begin to get back on its feet.

Note, however, in many places, WFP staff and/or local implementing partners took a decision to *reduce* the relief ration to compensate for the pipeline break— reducing the period of support

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<sup>9</sup> This includes 49,827 “carry in” beneficiaries from the previous PRRO.



(two months instead of three) or reducing the number in the family receiving the full ration (family of five receives only three full rations instead of five)—decisions the evaluation team would significantly oppose.

In fact, in cases where armed actors are still actively present, such as communities in resistance described above, it may be appropriate for the programme to allow the 150 day maximum to be exceeded. These communities are attempting to re-establish their livelihoods in a way few dare to; providing extra support may be appropriate in such cases. One interviewee suggestion would be for the PRRO to consider expanding the period of eligibility beyond the current criterion, somewhat strictly enforced, of working with IDPs only in the first 18 months of displacement. Another idea (on which evaluators take no opinion), that, resources permitting, there may be value to consider certain IDPs for re-eligibility at 16-18 months when many of them appear to face a new crisis point in their adaptation.

### Sustainability and Connectedness

One purpose of the PRRO is to give relief beneficiaries the opportunity to move into a recovery stage. At the beneficiary level, there are various ways this could happen.

For those who received relief assistance that enabled them to integrate themselves into a new life, sustainability and connectedness would be a significant achievement. Though at the programme level this linkage is well conceptualized, during the field travel there was no evidence these links were being looked at *at the beneficiary level*—that is, there is no evidence the programme collects data on the transition of individual beneficiaries from relief to recovery.

For those who received relief assistance and continue on with other PRRO components (recovery), connectedness could be evaluated as “in process.” That is, those who were originally assisted to cope with being expelled from their homes continue to receive programme support in other areas of their lives. Among these would be children in the school feeding and pre-school feeding projects. The PRRO does not track this information but some of it can be inferred, as will be discussed.

Beneficiaries who build new FFW-assisted housing and beneficiaries who learn new FFT-assisted occupational skills would also demonstrate such sustainability and connectedness. This appears to be happening for some beneficiaries, to be discussed in the relevant section below.

#### **4.2.2 School feeding**

In Colombia, there are several classes of schools and school attendance by IDP children depends largely on the kind of school one is discussing. Among them are the following: formal, GOC-run schools; other-entity/GOC-supported schools; private (Church and other) schools; and informal, non-GOC supported schools. In formal schools, there appears to be little attendance of *non-registered* IDP children because of the children’s lack of papers, somewhat an “exclusion” issue. Offsetting this, in other schools, it appears non-registered IDP children are well represented. The PRRO supports a number of these, including a significant number of “informal” schools that serve a large number of IDP children or that grew up out of an acute need to provide education to children who could not get in to GOC schools. Of the 113,000 children who received PRRO school feeding last year, programme records suggest 76% were IDP children, a credible accomplishment.



### Relevance and appropriateness

School feeding is usually implemented as a recovery activity, rather than a relief one: going to school is one of the children's first steps in a return to a normal life, by enhancing the attractiveness of going to school thus sustaining enrollment and attendance, and by increasing attention at school by improving children's nutritional intake. Some implementing partners, especially NGOs, use the school children as a focal point for more broadly focused psycho-social and community development interventions.

Unlike usual school feeding interventions, the modality chosen in Colombia follows the pattern of other activities in that it is submitted to an annual re-targeting exercise, in view of ensuring that each year, the PRRO would keep a focus on most needy populations. This "emergency school feeding" implementation entails that some schools may only be supported for one year, being dropped off the "map" of most needy areas. The appropriateness of such programmatic choice could not be assessed adequately during the short time-span of this evaluation but does raise questions which the Country Office may wish to look into, so as to confirm or re-direct its orientations for the years to come.

Initial evaluator questions whether this was a relevant intervention were laid to rest when house visits showed numerous school children living in IDP conditions, temporary shelters of plastic, shacks of discarded wood, scavenged tin roofs, frequently squalid sanitation: this was seen to be a relevant intervention to re-integrate IDPs back into society. It also seems a relevant follow-on activity on the relief-to-recovery continuum.

### Efficiency

Total programme component was planned for **226,000** children for two years. Actual coverage is **224,195**, virtually 100% of target. Many of these children are counted as beneficiaries in 2005 and again in 2006. Total tonnage distributed in the 18 month period was 3,713 MT, 88% of target of 4,221 MT. Component tonnage was **14.8%** of total PRRO MT distributed in the period.

Targeting criteria in this component are: children 6 to 14 years old in primary schools where high percentages of IDP children can be found. Assistance takes place for one year, with a school's inclusion being reviewed at the start of every school year. The appropriateness of such a programmatic choice could likely only be appraised through a specific study, looking into the actual long-term effects of such short-term support, including visits to schools that were dropped. Given the current situation in Colombia, identifying appropriate schools with high IDP concentration has not been an issue.

The school feeding ration is not overly large: 677 kcal/day X 180 days.<sup>10</sup> As a supplement in the school to stimulate attention, the ration seems adequate. As a complement to food provided in the home, it is not adequate because many IDP mothers report the school ration is frequently the child's only food for the day.

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<sup>10</sup> In some schools, women who cook the lunch are eligible for a Food For Work ration. In some other large schools, the ration was (mildly) diluted to provide them a FFW wage, something that happens in other parts of the WFP world also.



Other institutionally supported activities were 125-150 children kitchens run by Pastoral Social or NGO volunteers who were clearly seen to be providing an excellent school lunch. All schools reliably reported all-but the entire school population as IDP children.

Acción Social has invested considerable resources in providing school kits, pencils, notebooks, etc., in order to enhance the school experience for many IDP children and reduce the cost of schooling for their parents, as well as cooking facilities in the school kitchens. Such an integrated approach to school support is likely to enhance the positive results of each intervention.

Effectiveness

Most children observed during the field travel were relatively well dressed and well fed; they showed a lot of energy; and activity levels were high. Numerous interviewees provided anecdotal reports of improved school performance in intellectual terms; and the evaluation team observed high energy levels in the school children and can infer improved attention span, et. al. Virtually every interviewee saw benefits from school feeding, some of them even attributing improved *nutritional* benefits to the activity. Quantitative nutritional improvement in school children appears to be measured by some implementing partners, including one report of ICBF doing so, but is not an expected programme output.

Outcome indicators of increased attendance and reduced desertion called for in the programme LogFrame were reported in the last three Quarterly reports as follows:

*Table 3: 2006 Outcome Results in School Feeding*

<b>2006</b>	<b>Attendance%</b>	<b>Desertion%</b>
<i>National figure</i>	<b>92.0</b>	<b>7.0</b>
Jan.-May	96.98	3.1
June-August	96.04	2.58*
Sept-Dec.	91.7	1.98

\* Note, however, a huge standard deviation, 2.24.

Attendance from Jan. to August was high, but seems to be reverting to national trends late in the year. While desertion appears to be less than the national norm, there is considerable variation in these figures from department to department. Quarterly Reports discuss the difficulty of collecting this information. WFP is in the process of providing technical and financial support to a recently initiated national School Feeding evaluation that hopefully will study these effects more thoroughly. Another “impact” finding is that several informal schools supported by WFP were able to get formal status, paid teachers, budget, etc., in part due to the functioning of the school kitchens supported by the PRRO. Also, a number of institutionally supported schools were visited that had been PRRO food recipients in past years which had “graduated” to permanent GOC support in 2007, a good example of connectedness and sustainability.

Sustainability and connectedness

Data provided by the CO suggest that approximately 60% of 2006 schools will continue to receive PRRO support in 2007 and that most of the 40% that were dropped appear to be picked up by other donor programmes, either the GOC, the Church, or others. This would represent a highly desirable “connectedness” outcome (see discussion below.) The CO does not collect this



information routinely, however, and specific information on how many are picked up or not picked up is not currently available.

It is also useful to reflect on the programme criterion that schools participating in the school feed are approved one year at a time. One is sympathetic to the CO point of view that emergency school feeding should not be held accountable to development criteria when a multi-year relationship with a given school would provide more sustainable results in improving educational performance and—or—improving school children’s nutritional status. It is also recognized that yearly targeting fosters that beneficiaries are largely children of the most recently displaced IDPs and —or— most vulnerable communities. At the same time, a school canteen (the modality which applies to needs in Colombia) requires considerable institutional commitment and forward planning: forming food oversight committees, identifying groups of women who will cook the food, creating school conditions to store the food and prepare it in adequately sanitary conditions, and more. Moreover, unlike other programme components directed to individual beneficiaries, school feeding is channeled institutionally—thus a certain “momentum” results to continue the activity more than just as a one-off, one year event. In the end, one asks what sustainability of results on improved attendance, enrolment, cognitive functioning, or nutrition could legitimately be expected in this component if the ration is provided to school children for one nine-month school year.

During the travel, the evaluation team visited several schools that in previous years had received PRRO support that had now “graduated” to full ration support from the GOC. There were other schools that began organizing themselves as informal schools in order to receive PRRO school feeding that had now become officially recognized by the Ministry of Education, whose teachers were now receiving GOC salaries, textbooks, etc. These are both quite positive trends and represent full “connectedness”—as does however many of the 40% dropped school are picked up by other donors, an issue that could be better tracked. Perhaps another way to expand this impact is also by working toward “partial connectedness:” that is, establishing GOC/WFP cost-sharing of ration support in other schools with large IDP populations. This was reported by the CO as happening in some cases.

### **4.2.3 Preschool feeding**

#### Relevance

Pre-school feeding is another recovery activity, a continuation of support as the IDP child moves beyond immediate post-displacement status. GOC-support to preschools is reported quite low in Colombia. Ideally, one could posit preschool feeding in terms of educational goals—preparing the pre-schooler for enhanced integration to the school system—or in terms of nutritional improvement—or both. The PRRO Operating Manual is not specifically directed to either of these, but rather to “improved access to basic foods in order to lessen risk and levels of malnutrition and food insecurity.”<sup>11</sup>

Both institutionally supported and community supported pre-schools were visited. There was a big variation in preschool feeding centers encountered during the field travel. Some centers were community-driven and mostly offered a place to leave the child for the day while the mother searched for employment. That is: day-care feeding without much, if any,

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<sup>11</sup> “Mejorar el acceso a los alimentos básicos que contribuyan a disminuir el riesgo y los niveles de malnutrición y de inseguridad alimentaria para niños y niñas de 3 a 5 años de edad. OPSR 10366 Manual de Procedimientos, p. 33



complementary child development enrichment. In these cases, it was hard to see a difference between this activity and a more generalized under-five feeding program.

Other preschool feeding centers were supported by national and sometimes international child development organizations and engaged in a great deal of child development nurturing. Depending on the center, children showed lot of energy; and in general the level of activity in these centers was high. Child development interventions being carried out by some of these institutional partners was seen to be strongly complementary to the PRRO food resource.

In all cases, were it not for the PRRO, there would be little or no external support in these communities ; PRRO support allows these pre-schools to function and is therefore a highly valued intervention to the beneficiaries. In some area, this was the only way the children were eating during the day. This was true in overall terms but was even more apparent in areas underserved by the GOC such as marginalized communities and *barrios*.

### Efficiency

Total programme component was planned for **52,500** children for 18 months. Actual coverage was **59,526**, 113% of target.<sup>12</sup> Many of these children are counted as beneficiaries in 2005 and again in 2006. Total tonnage distributed in the 18 month period was 1,321 MT, 76% of target of 1,743 MT. Component tonnage was **5.3%** of total MT distributed in the period.

The ration seems acceptable based on caloric needs for youngsters at this age: 677 kcal/day, X 240 days.

Targeting criteria in this component do not seem as clear as in some other components, according to the Procedure Manual, “children 3-to-5 years old who belong to displaced and receptor communities with a high IDP population who do not receive other food assistance.” The criteria do not, for instance, include any explicit link to a functioning school system, an important consideration, one would think, in a pre-school component

<sup>12</sup> Includes carry in beneficiaries of 36,485.





In addition, there is no mention of targeting criteria related to complementary educational activities. (See effectiveness below.) The distinction between this component and, say, a generalized under-five feeding was not clear to the evaluation team.

Criteria of inclusion of preschool participants did not always seem rigorously enforced. Some mothers' groups were reported to know what the programme criteria were and could recite them well; others were much less articulate. Notwithstanding this observation, community members seem well placed to identify needy preschool participants and many of the preschools visited were a delight to see.

### Effectiveness

In all pre-schools, there were reliable reports that the entire beneficiary population was IDP children, thus those who are substantially worse off economically and nutritionally compared to the poorest quintile of the population.

There were cases of good—participative, caring, well-kept—community-based preschool projects (see pictures); there were also cases of quite problematic—unhygienic, poor record keeping, poor food storage—community-based preschools.

The effectiveness of pre-school attention varied depending on the “institutionality” of the implementing partner, whether it be a community group, a small national NGO or a large international NGO. In a number of cases, local NGOs had received support from foundations or international NGOs and the quality of the educational activities seemed high. In these cases, the evaluation team has little doubt that important learning objectives are being achieved. In other cases, a group of mothers had gotten together and did not receive much external support. Sometimes the village women were creative and energetic, and educational activities were being carried out in spite of lack of resources. Other times, the level of attention during the day seemed more like baby-sitting.

PRRO support to preschools was widely reported by interviewees to result in *nutritional* improvement. Corroboration for this statement was lacking since PRRO tracking of nutritional improvement in pre-school feeding is not taking place. Notwithstanding, some implementing partners are tracking this. Church (and international NGO)-based preschool feeding projects were impressive—sound infrastructure, quite clean, well resourced. They were directed to integrated attention, psycho-social, health, education, nutrition, children's rights.



Another much commented on, and sometimes observed, indirect result of preschool feeding is that it allows female headed households to search for employment. A woman's finding employment can, of course, have a major impact on the life of the IDP family.

### Sustainability

The supposed link from pre-school to school was seen in some cases, but not in most. Some institutional partners had tie-ins to a nearby elementary school and the complementary educational literacy and other head start activities were clearly appropriate to prepare the children for school. But there were a number of pre-school visited where this was not true. In these cases, the concept of food support to allow the child to move into a school situation seemed to be overtaken by (mere) support to children <5s. In such cases, it was hard to discern a programmatic difference between the other PRRO component directed at children at risk and pre-school feeding.

In the case of strong NGO implementing partners, sustainability of the child enrichment part of the intervention could perhaps continue even without WFP support—though probably the number of children attending would be much less—depending on the continuation of other donor involvement. And for those youngsters currently benefiting from the component, it is likely improved cognitive functioning will be a sustainable benefit. Neither of these outcomes seems likely in the case of the less strongly led community partner projects.

## **4.2.4 Support to Pregnant and Lactating Mothers (PLM)**

### Relevance

Studies that form the conceptual underpinning of the PRRO demonstrate that maternal nutrition is substantially worse for IDPs than for the lowest quintile: 23% compared to 5.5%, thus supplementary feeding is an important programme component directed to a clear need. The goal of this activity according to the Procedures Manual is “improved access to basic foods in order to lessen risk and levels of malnutrition and food insecurity.”<sup>13</sup> In Colombia IDPs, high rates of adolescent pregnancy and of female-headed households make this programme component of high potential relevance.

### Efficiency

The total component was planned for **42,000** beneficiaries, 18,000 women, and 10,000 children for eighteen months. Actual coverage was **56,513**, 135% of target. As will be discussed, a number of these women are counted as beneficiaries in 2005 and again in 2006. Total tonnage distributed in the 18 month period was 2,086 MT, 84% of target of 2,495 MT. Component tonnage was **8.3%** of total MT distributed in the period.

In most areas the ration is 4 kg of rice, 1 kg of lentils, 1 liter of oil, 1 kg of sugar, 2 kg of *bienestarina*<sup>14</sup> and 0.5 kg of salt, a quite small ration. Note this is a take-home (“dry”) ration. Inclusion results in eight deliveries every 40 days, total: 320 days support.

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<sup>13</sup> “Mejorar el acceso a los alimentos básicos que contribuyan a disminuir el riesgo y los niveles de malnutrición y de inseguridad alimentaria para mujeres gestantes y lactantes y para niños y niñas menores de 2 años.” OPSR 10366 Manual de Procedimientos, p. 31

<sup>14</sup> A Government of Colombia-provided mix of fortified wheat, soy, and milk powder fortified with minerals and vitamins that provides 350 kcals of energy and 25 gm of protein/100 gm.



Targeting criteria in this component are the following: “pregnant and lactating women and children-under-2 who belong to displaced and receptor communities of high IDP concentration not inscribed in other food assistance programmes.” Criteria for selection include a minimum of 23% teenage mothers and some implementing partners target this activity exclusively to teenage expectant mothers. In general, field visits suggest these targeting criteria are being respected. Special priority was to be given to pregnant/lactating women 14 to 19 years old, and to those affected by HIV/AIDS, but this was not investigated.

### Effectiveness

Numerous PLM projects were reported during the field travel, but scheduling only allowed a few distributions to be observed. It was not possible to see any sessions where complementary nutritional talks were given, though these were planned to be an important complementary activity. Several disorganized food distributions were observed. Though generally PLM projects are favorably reported on by mothers, it was difficult to understand why waiting in line for an hour for a 4 kg. bag of rice and 1 kg. of lentils would be an appropriate use of women’s time. ICBF is cited in the Procedures Manual as exercising an important role in this component, but it was difficult to discern any effect in the sessions visited.

Targeting criteria for the PLM are clear in WFP staff minds, perhaps less so in the minds of community-based implementing partners. In a number of areas visited, incorporation of PLMs seemed for any pregnant or lactating women rather than a more targeted response, resulting in the de-facto exclusion of other highly vulnerable women. In some areas, the team observed PLM women staying in the programme for years at a time. This fact does not represent, necessarily, a diversion of resources to an inappropriate beneficiary, but sometimes the fact that the woman become pregnant (again) and was re-inscribed in the PLM roster. Other cases were seen where one <2 yr. old would be replaced by the next in line in the family.

Nutritional measurement of improvement in PLMs was not called for in the programme design, is not usually taking place, and is not tracked in the PRRO. However—as in pre-school and school feeding—some implementing partners are collecting these data.

The evaluation nevertheless found that the PLM ration is presumably having no nutritional effect for numerous reasons. The ration is quite small—a mere 929 kcal/day (for 320 days)—as narrated by many women interviewees, inevitably divided up at home among 8, 9, 10, and 11 family members. It usually lasts no more than fifteen days, sometimes only 10. It was reported as usual practice (though only occasionally observed) to double the lactating mother’s ration by allocating an extra ration for the recently born child, a creative decision that at least made the food quantity received by the mother more substantial. In fact, one ‘sub-text’ of this component is not nutritional at all, but rather to use the ration to encourage women to enroll in health clinic activities.<sup>15</sup> Also, the PLM ration appears to have been based on the supposition of the family’s having other food resources; in practice, this was seen to be rarely the case.

### Sustainability

Given the lack of discernable impact in this component, it is difficult to infer sustainability. In some areas, PLM appears to be related to Health Post involvement, resulting in potential

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<sup>15</sup> “que la asistencia alimentaria sea complementada con otras acciones, especialmente de salud y sesiones educativas, para tener una mayor incidencia sobre el problema de inseguridad alimentaria.”



improvement in pre- and post-natal care<sup>16</sup> which would be a sustainable result if it were happening; but data are not collected in this area.

#### 4.2.5 Children at Risk (CR)

##### Relevance

Though almost universally the visitors did not see children as obviously malnourished as elsewhere in many WFP countries of intervention, implementing partners were assertive on the fact that the project responds to real needs, a finding the evaluation team corroborates. Chronic and global malnutrition are substantially worse for IDP children than for the poorest quintile of the population: 22.6% vs.15.9%, and 15.1% vs. 11.8% respectively. Thus an activity directed at malnourished IDP children is a relevant and important programme component.

The food is meant to be complemented by other health activities, basic sanitation, environmental improvement, and family health education. The component provides supplementary feeding, a take-home ration, rather than therapeutic “wet” feeding.

This activity is supposed to reduce the risk of moderate or acute malnutrition; however the goal statement in the Procedures Manual leaves much to be desired:

*Improve the access to basic foods which contribute to lessening nutritional risk and levels of moderate or acute malnutrition...*<sup>17</sup>

Surely “contribute to lessening nutritional risk” is a poor substitute for a vigorous goal statement such as “X % reduction in acute/moderate malnutrition,” as in many WFP programmes worldwide.

The team also confesses to some “cognitive dissonance” with this formulation. The Procedures Manual titles the activity “Under-Five Boys and Girls in the situation of *nutritional risk*” [italics added], and one eligibility criterion apparently requires a nutritional assessment for inclusion and speaks of children with Z scores of -1SD or -2SD. However, there appears to be no reporting on how many -1SD and -2SD children are being served in the component, nor whether normal-range children are receiving a ration too. Is this component directed to -1 and -2SD children or a disguised general child feeding project? The team was unable to discern.

##### Efficiency

Total programme component was planned for **75,000** children. Actual coverage was **70,532**, 94% of target. An unknown number of these children are counted as beneficiaries in 2005 and again in 2006. Total tonnage distributed in the 18 month period was 1,893 MT, 78% of target of 2,430 MT. Component tonnage was **7.5%** of total MT distributed in the period. In most departments, the ration is the same as for mothers and is a take-home one; the period of inclusion is 6 months instead of PLM’s 12 months.

The target group for this component seems overly expansive for some implementing partners. As found frequently during field travel, institutional implementers have good focus and report knowledgeably on results. Community implementers speak vaguely how difficult it is to turn

<sup>16</sup> But this potential was seen to be much less likely in some indigenous populations given their cultural reluctance to become involved with “Western” medical customs and procedures.

<sup>17</sup> Mejorar el acceso a los alimentos básicos, que contribuyan a disminuir el riesgo y los niveles de malnutrición moderada o aguda en niños y niñas menores de 5 años de edad...”



down a hungry child—whether there is evidence of malnutrition or not. Some sub-offices were more rigorous in this area than others, it should be noted.

### Effectiveness

Almost every site visited had a CR component, though not all were functioning at time of the visit. Many of the sites were run by strong institutional counterparts; some were run by community groups.

As in the PLM discussion, generally the CR ration is having no nutritional effect. The take-home ration is quite small—929 kcal./day (x 200 days) diluted throughout the family; virtually all mothers report it lasts 15 days or less; and the ration was calculated based on the family's having other food resources, rarely the case. The overall strategy is to use the food as an incentive to involve mothers with the health system.

Also, in spite of the fact that the nutritional risk checklist of the Procedures Manual calls for monitoring the percentage of boys and girls with global, chronic and acute malnutrition, the PRRO information system does not track nutritional improvement for these children—nor reporting on it.

Confounding the finding however, there is solid evidence from some institutional partners, via three-month growth monitoring, that the caloric benefit of the ration results in substantial nutritional improvement *when coupled with integrated health care messages*—nutritional counseling, hygiene promotion, access to health services, improved food habits, etc. Some of these institutional partners report approximately a 70% recovery rate: i.e., seven out of ten nutritionally at-risk children improve. The other 30% are enrolled a second time for another six months of food support. Thus the component could become more effective if it were structured to maximize these complementary activities.

### Sustainability and connectedness

In the case of strong implementing partners described above, one can expect that some sustainability of benefits could be achieved. To ensure this is taking place, it would be necessary to develop tracking or reporting mechanisms to verify that the recovered child does not fall again into malnutrition two or three months later—a next step once nutritional outcomes begin to be looked at. In the absence of such tracking, it is hard to infer sustainability. Where implementing partners couple the food with nutrition and health education, the activity demonstrates some connectedness which infers potentially sustained, improved nutritional status for the children.

Regarding ICBF's role, though it was reported that ICBF has made considerable effort to address improvements in nutrition in hiring of two staff per department and the creation of interdisciplinary teams, nutritionists, social workers, etc. (*unidades móviles*)—developments the evaluation team strongly endorses—in some departments visited during the evaluation, ICBF staff does not seem to be always providing meaningful nutritional monitoring and follow-up. In other departments where well performing ICBF staff were observed, several were about to be released. In some cases, necessary complementary equipment such as infant scales was not in evidence to provide such surveillance either. These anecdotes clearly mitigate achieving sustainability.



Overall, while judged relevant interventions in view of needs, PLM and CR are unlikely to be effective due to the dilution of rations within families and a generalized lack of nutritional follow-up. Nonetheless, as obliquely called for in the Procedures Manual, there appears to be potential benefit in terms improved access to healthcare, yet untracked and largely unknown. Institutional partners clearly have more capacity to achieve this potential impact than community partners.

## 4.2.6 FFW and FFT

### Relevance

FFW and FFT provide a good response to evolving IDP needs in a number of “recovery” activities. In Colombia, income generating activities are highly relevant to IDP populations, and can be effective when they build on the skills of the target population and when incorporated into a wider strategy aimed at sustainability. FFW support to IDP housing construction is a good fit (see pictures.) FFW support to land improvement (terracing, introduction of new or improved crops, etc.) can be another important activity for FFW support, reported by the project to comprise 74% of support in this component. FFW support for community volunteer nutritional workers continues as a highly appropriate intervention in some departments and in some institutional partners. FFW support to growth-monitoring volunteers was seen in several projects and is an excellent fit. As being implemented in the current PRRO, FFW as a follow-up to relief may be a particularly useful intervention in high conflict zones or as an emergency response, (e.g., the discussion above regarding “communities in risk.”)



### Efficiency

In FFW, the total programme component was planned for **84,750** participants in 18 months of activities. Actual coverage was **131,095**, 155% of target. Total tonnage distributed in the 18 month period was 3,328 MT, 51% of target of 6,560 MT. Component tonnage was **13.3 %** of total MT distributed in the period.

In FFT, total programme component was planned for **84,750** and actual coverage was **132,110**, 156% of target. Total tonnage distributed in the 18 month period was 4,064 MT, 93% of target of 4,373 MT. Component tonnage was **16.2%** of total MT distributed in the period.

The ration was designed relatively large compared to other programme components—12 kg rice, 3 kg legumes, 1 liter oil, 1 kg sugar, and 0.5 kg salt X per member of the household every 40 days of FFW activity, 1,644 kcal/day for up to 120 days. However, in some regions fewer person-days received rations than planned for while in other regions, the ration was reduced; both findings indirectly suggest the ration may be more than strictly needed. With both these “savings,” freed-up rations were then programmed to support additional beneficiaries.





Targeting criteria in this component are the following: “[people in] zones that have high IDP populations, peri-urban and rural areas in the transition phase from relief to recovery, those in a high risk of displacement, and communities returning to their homes.” Other criteria are: people with food deficiency, those who have not received other food assistance, and those who have no steady source of employment. This component also states the broadest goal: “contribute to improve and strengthen human resource capacities and basic conditions necessary for a dignified life.”<sup>18</sup> This is a rather broad category of beneficiaries. Also see Table 5 for a list of activities supported herein.

### Effectiveness

Most FFW and FFT activities were suspended during a serious pipeline break in the Autumn of 2006 (discussed below) and had not yet restarted at time of the evaluation. As a result, there were few FFW/FFT projects to visit during the evaluation travel except FFW-supported IDP housing efforts supported by the Church with other donor funding



It is apparent to the evaluation team that FFW and FFT support a wide menu of activities that contribute meaningfully to IDPs’ recovery. FFW & FFT were reported as follows: in FFW, 56% men beneficiaries: 71% for agricultural activities, planting, gardening, forestry, animal coops, etc.; 16% for water and sanitation activities, and 11% for housing and road construction. In FFT, 62% women beneficiaries: 61% for technical training and capacity building, 16% to functional literacy, and 23% to training in community health promotion.

Based on projects visited and discussions with stakeholders, the team infers that FFW has been effective for asset creation. It is harder to assess effectiveness for protecting livelihoods since so few livelihood projects were visited. In FFT, it seems that some effective livelihood creation has taken place for women. In overall terms, these seem to be effective use of the food resource.

<sup>18</sup> Procedures Manual, p. 37.



Notwithstanding this overall positive comment, on a more theoretical level, some FFW activities visited seemed designed more as support to vulnerable groups, i.e., food being given more as an end in itself, than as a means to support the accomplishment of an activity.

In addition, for some activities, soil conservation engineering, water system construction, some agricultural proposals, the CO does not appear to have in-house staff capacity to evaluate the technical quality of the proposal. This suggests the need for technical assistance for project review to be supplied by non-WFP actors, either from the GOC, regional advisory bodies, or from other technical assistance agencies.

The evaluation team did not see any livelihood improvement tracking taking place: admittedly, tracking the performance (outcome) of this component would be a challenge. As currently implemented, the information system counts the activity as accomplished when food is delivered rather than assessing whatever the outcome effect. (One example was an ill-designed terracing project that may, in fact, contribute to environmental damage.) On the other hand, in a PRRO that implements hundreds of FFW/FFT projects, it is hard to imagine an information system that could provide meaningful outcome tracking. While FFW support to housing projects were clearly seen to be contributing to long-term improvement in IDP lives; household gardens are a notoriously low-effect intervention. Meanwhile, FFT support to community health volunteers clearly brings complementary benefit to the community and to the woman but would be quite hard to measure. The evaluation team did not see significant effort to track FFT outcomes either; for instance, the monitoring form that includes this topic requires only a perfunctory tick mark.

### Sustainability

FFW-assisted housing activities by nature offer sustainable support to beneficiaries. In FFT employment generation, some participants are likely to have received know-how or skills to help them search for gainful employment. The number of businesses actually created, or employment actually secured, is naturally less than 100% given low employment opportunities for Colombia's under-privileged. The team lacks data on which to evaluate the sustainability of the wide array of other FFW/FFT activities supported by the PRRO, but notes that the connectedness of FFW and FFT activities seems high due to their nature—helping IDPs in their recovery.





#### 4.2.7 Summary of PRRO Outputs from June 2005 to December 2006

The following quantitative accomplishments are summarized from the narrative above.

Table 4: Summary of PRRO Quantitative Outputs: June 2005-Dec. '06

Component	18 mo. Target in 000s	Actual Bens. in 000	Ben %/ Total Bens	MT %/ Total MT	MT actually distributed	Actual MT/% planned
Relief	240	293.6	30.3%	34.6%	8,672	57.4%
School F.	226*	224.2	23.2%	14.8%	3,713	88.0%
Pre-school F.	52.5	59.5	6.2%	5.3%	1,321	75.8%
PLM	42	56.5	5.8%	8.3	2,086	83.6%
RN	75	70.5	7.3%	7.5%	1,893	77.9%
FFW	84.75	131.1	13.5%	13.3	3,328	50.7%
FFT	84.75	132.1	13.7%	16.2%	4,064	92.9%

\* = 24 month target, i.e: two full school years

Summarizing one-and-a-half years of programme activity (June 2005-December 2006):

- Relief represented 30.3% of beneficiaries and received 34.6% of the food, compared to the 38% called for in the proposal. It distributed to 122% of beneficiary target with only 57% of planned tonnage.
- School feeding represented 23% of beneficiaries but received 15% of the food. It distributed to 100% of beneficiary target with 88% of targeted tonnage.
- Pre-school feeding represented 6.2% of beneficiaries and received 5.3% of food. It distributed to 85% of targeted beneficiaries with 76% of targeted tonnage.
- Pregnant and lactating mothers represented 5.8% of beneficiaries and received 8.3% of the food. It distributed to 100% of beneficiary target with 84% of targeted tonnage.
- Children at risk received a share of food balanced with its percentage of beneficiaries. It distributed to 94% of beneficiary target with 78% of targeted tonnage.
- FFW represented 13.5% of beneficiaries and received a share of food balanced with its percentage of beneficiaries. It distributed to 155% of beneficiary target with 51% of targeted tonnage in spite of being shut down for several months.
- FFT represented 13.7% of beneficiaries and received 16.2% of the food. It reached 156% of the beneficiary target and distributed 93% of the targeted tonnage in spite of being shut down for several months.
- In terms of racial targeting, programme data show mestizos represent 88% of the population and 86% of beneficiaries. AfroColombians represent 10.5% of the population and 8.1% of beneficiaries. The indigenous population represents 3.4% of the population and 6% of beneficiaries.

Overall, from June 2005 to December 2006, 78% of resources were directed to the displaced population, 10% was directed to communities-in-risk, and 12% was directed to vulnerable groups, the historically poor.

The number of IDPs actually benefited by the PRRO during the year 2006 was 658,097, i.e. **32% more** than called for in the programme proposal<sup>19</sup>, with numbers planned to increase in 2007. On this point, the evaluation found an issue of concern: in an attempt to reach as many beneficiaries as possible, it is possible food resources are being stretched too thinly. Thus, the

<sup>19</sup> 499,000 per year.



evaluators’ assessment regarding the small rations in PLM and CR may have an echo in other programme components. In both Relief and FFW, there were reports the ration had been reduced compared to original plans, in order to reach more people or, perhaps, to compensate for the pipeline break. While decentralized decision-making and flexible implementation should continue, it is possible that sometimes too much may have been cut from one component or other in an attempt to channel resources to a maximized number of needy IDPs.

A wide variety of activities carried out under PRRO auspices is demonstrated by the below table (2006 SPR):

Table 5: PRRO 2006 Outputs

Output	Unit	Planned	Actual	% of Target
Schools assisted	#	393	393	100%
Livestock bred	#	55,353	56,179	102%
Land preparation	Ha.	11,298	10,398	92%
Vegetable gardens cultivated	#	3,265	2,776	85%
Fish cultivated	#	162,000	162,000	100%
Public amenities constructed/restored	#	19	14	74%
Houses built/rehabilitated	#	4,319	2,982	69%
Km roads constructed	Km	254	191	75%
Water/sewer built/rehabilitated	#	8,942	6,742	75%
Livestock facilities built/rehabbed	#	2,341	1,196	51%
Basic sanitation installed/rehabbed	#	1,306	488	37%
Literacy training	Partic.	2,033	1,560	77%
Technical skills training	Partic.	20,153	19,155	95%
Health & Nutrition training	Partic.	10,044	9,838	98%

A number of other effects were reported upon, which were not reflected in the project document:

**Enhanced Protection.** Several communities visited in the most dangerous areas spoke meaningfully of the importance WFP presence affords in terms of enhancing physical protection. This was especially the case in two “communities in risk,” Tangui in Chocó and “Civipaz” in Meta. Armed actors are less likely to target populations when WFP is present, as reported by the populations themselves. In at least one of the cases, the community valued this effect with equal importance to the arrival of the food. UN agency heads reported their perception of the same effect, as did several international donors.

**Improved cohesion.** PRRO-supported, community-based activities have likely created and enhanced social cohesion—a result especially noteworthy after the disintegration caused by displacement. This was a clear output of the community kitchens, but was also noted in other areas as well.

**Psycho-social.** There were reports of unanticipated psychological benefits accruing to programme beneficiaries due to implementing partners’ integrated, holistic programming. In similar fashion, WFP staff interaction with communities, partners, and others has resulted in enhanced self-esteem and sense of being supported in some beneficiaries.

**Advocacy.** There is widespread recognition that WFP efforts have contributed to a significant raising of awareness of IDP issues in Colombia at the national level. This is an even more important finding than at first glance, because it was reported by a number of interviewees that a desire exists in certain quarters of the GOC to downplay the IDP crisis, and to “reframe” the



issue to one of simple under-development. This is clearly at odds with the thrust of the PRRO, and with virtually all outside observer opinion.

At the local level, key informants noted an indirect effect of the PRRO has been “the creation of a **Humanitarian space** ceded by the armed groups” that did not exist prior to WFP’s arrival in the zone, a comment quite in line with those above on enhanced protection. Greater frequency of WFP field monitoring in the PRRO has added to this effect. Enhanced communication and information sharing with GOC and other UN partners would be a way to continue to influence in both these dimensions.

### 4.3 Cross-cutting Elements

This section will discuss cross-cutting elements: needs assessment; SIMVA; targeting; monitoring, evaluation and control; partnership; operational issues; gender; and the programme split between Relief and Recovery.

#### 4.3.1 Needs Assessment

Needs assessment was conducted by carrying out four well-designed and comprehensive nutritional/ socio-economic surveys. They are as follows:

**June 2003.** The first was a WFP-published survey titled “Vulnerability to Food Insecurity of The Population Displaced by Violence in Colombia” to study food security conditions, food acquisition, and coping mechanisms for the IDP population. The study analyzed calorie deficits, protein and micronutrients consumption, low prevalence of breastfeeding, food use, basic sanitary conditions, schooling and morbidity, the provision of food, and survival strategies. It clearly showed the difficulties for displaced people given their economic situation after displacement. Based on a food insecurity indicator and a food gap indicator, the survey concluded that “[H]ouseholds displaced by violence in Colombia, [are] classified under high vulnerability.”

**September 2004.** The second study was an innovative joint WFP/ICRC document titled: “Identifying Food and Non-Food Needs of the Internally Displaced: A Joint Assessment of Internally Displaced Populations in Six Departments of Colombia.” Conducted in the departments of Antioquia, Cundinamarca (Bogotá and Soacha), Caquetá, Cesar/Guajira, Chocó and Norte de Santander using both secondary and primary data, its purpose was to provide a screening and targeting system to improve the effectiveness of ICRC/WFP operations. The survey studied education, health, and food access for IDPs. Though the findings cannot be generalized, the study shows that given that most displaced people move from rural areas to urban areas, and their ability to grow and sell agricultural commodities is no longer a viable alternative to achieve food security. As a result, only a little more than a third of IDPs from the sample had acceptable food consumption; nearly half had very low consumption levels. Livelihood for almost half these people comes from non skilled labor, and more than 50% of earnings were spent on food. In some departments, some IDP children abandon school either because of economic costs or because of a need to enter the labor market. The study suggested some conditions improve over time; it also showed that newly displaced people require special assistance given the lack of social support networks.

**December 2005.** The third effort was a joint WFP/Pan American Health Organization study titled: “Estado nutricional, de alimentación y condiciones de salud de la población desplazada por la violencia en seis subregiones de Colombia.” The purpose of this survey was to evaluate



the health and nutritional conditions of displaced households with children under five in six sub-regions in Colombia. Analysis included socio-demographic characteristics, morbidity, demand for health services, food security based on anemia, micronutrients, anthropometric measurement and body mass index, and food consumption. Results showed that displaced people were worse off than the national average of poverty and extreme poverty. A total of 93% of IDPs fell under the GOC poverty line, and 85.4% fell below the line of extreme poverty as measured by unmet basic needs. More than half of women suffered anemia; micronutrients consumption was very low; exclusive breastfeeding was practically non-existent. In general, lack of access to food due to insufficient incomes led to poor nutrition in both children and mothers in this population.

**March and June 2006.** The fourth effort was a joint WFP/GTZ double study titled: “La vulnerabilidad alimentaria de hogares desplazados y no desplazados: un estudio de caso en ocho departamentos de Colombia” and a similarly titled Bogotá case study. Both studies look at food vulnerability and factors affecting food vulnerability and their weight in explaining such vulnerability based on partner-collected SIMVA data. Bogotá findings showed that in food availability, access, and use, displaced households show a higher level of vulnerability than non-displaced households in all dimensions. In addition, strong differences were seen in relation to gender, numbers of pregnant and lactating women, work availability, education, handicapped condition, and ethnic origin. Similar findings were reached in the 52-city survey of eight Departments. However when comparing differences between departments, consistent patterns affecting food vulnerability were not universal. Chocó which is usually considered one of the poorest departments in Colombia and was expected to have the worst indicators, showed a lower level of handicapped people. As expected however, food availability in Chocó was less than the average of the eight departments. Chocó also shows the worst income level and highest level of diarrhea disease in the survey.

Another recent collaboration between WFP/ICRC: “Displaced population in eight cities: local institutional response, living conditions and recommendations for assistance” was not reviewed by the evaluation team.

These documents formed the conceptual underpinning for the design of, and innovations incorporated into, the current PRRO.

### 4.3.2 SIMVA

As part of the PRRO, the CO developed a system for identifying and monitoring food vulnerability called SIMVA (Sistema para la Identificación y Monitoreo de Vulnerabilidad Alimentaria). This activity represented considerable work from many actors, including great CO investment of time and energy, numerous consultations between Bogotá and Rome, and considerable local experimentation and innovation.

SIMVA is based on the WFP definition of food security and provides various tools to quantify that concept. It is a well-designed, comprehensive package and has good manuals and training tools. It has been offered to numerous partner institutions working with nutrition, food aid, or humanitarian issues, among them: ICBF staff in eight regions; departmental authorities in Antioquia, Meta and Norte de Santander; implementing partners in the district capital; various municipal authorities; and other NGO or UN partners. In all, 19 workshops were organised to train 760 participants in its use. The CO also published a comprehensive manual for the application of this system.

One knowledgeable informant suggested there may be confusion whether SIMVA is being thought of as a programme and project monitoring tool, or as an instrument to assess food



insecurity among IDPs over time. To the evaluators, this appears an important observation, as SIMVA was apparently originally conceived for both purposes. In fact because of its comprehensiveness, carrying out a SIMVA assessment is time-consuming and costly. With support from Rome and experimentation in one sub-office, the CO has been working on a lighter version of SIMVA—that reportedly has scaled down the original design; it was not observed in use by the evaluation team. The impression of the evaluation team is that SIMVA has more relevance as a baseline food security data collection system than as a semester-by-semester monitoring tool, perhaps serving also during a Final Evaluation to look at food security changes over time. Other CO-developed systems are more effective at day-to-day monitoring.

Two institutional partners of five said they were pleased with SIMVA. One of them, PLAN International, has carried a SIMVA diagnosis to establish baseline conditions and has incorporated the entire system into its programming. It is using SIMVA to track how an integrated programme has positive effects in regards to children’s nutrition, together with other effects within the family and the community.

Beyond these five institutions, SIMVA is not widely used because of expense and complexity. The Church’s Pastoral Social, another major institutional partner, does not use SIMVA because it hasn’t needed to, availing of another good information system for characterizing the situation of people they assist, and developed with external assistance.

### 4.3.3 Targeting

Targeting is a complicated topic in Colombia’s constantly evolving conditions. Among the many issues are the following: whether target groups should be only those who have been driven from their land or should also include “blockaded,” “confined,” and “fumigated” communities; what time-frame defines an IDP; how much of a rural vs. peri-urban focus is appropriate; how much programme resources should be channeled to intermediate towns as IDPs’ first destination; what amount of resources should be channeled to the “historically poor” in receptor communities who are almost as bad off as IDPs. These and other issues bedevil the appropriate selection of beneficiaries.

Responding to this complexity, the current PRRO built in a certain targeting balance, a 70/30 split between the recently displaced (18 months or less) and the historically poor.<sup>20</sup> This innovation, which grew out of identification visit recommendations in 2004, allows implementing partner proposals to include 30% of the historically poor as long as 70% of programme beneficiaries are recently displaced IDPs. Some other international donors use this same split. The evaluation team recognizes a real dilemma between targeting based on displacement vs. targeting based vulnerability: in many locations, receptor populations, the historically poor, can be equally as vulnerable as many IDPs. The evaluators find the 70/30 split appropriate, based as it was on a comprehensive analysis of vulnerabilities among each group. Receptor populations (as long as they too are vulnerable) can be supported by the PRRO in order not to raise tensions between both groups.

The current programme has opened new offices in three areas and six new Departments where the IDP population is growing, and closed one after displacement in nearby areas decreased. This presumably explains some of the higher operational cost of this operation compared to the previous PRRO: the share of “Other Direct Costs” vis-a-vis total costs has increased by 15% and in absolute terms has increased by 179% for a 33% increase of beneficiaries. Nonetheless, the

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<sup>20</sup> (Not to be confused with the 38/62 Relief/Recovery split addressed elsewhere.)



team finds this an appropriate decision. Not only does it put PRRO activities closer to areas of growing IDP need, it also provides more “visibility” to IDP issue in these previously under-emphasized and under-served areas.

PRRO targeting has also resulted in the identification of a large number of appropriate implementing partners, both institutional and community. In many cases, the evaluation team was impressed with the quality of these entities. Through them, the PRRO has also contributed to strengthening local capacity and synergism.

In the field, selection of projects is based on local knowledge of the members of Regional Committee (Acción Social, ICBF, CO staff); this is to the good. Selection of beneficiaries is based on the comprehensive knowledge of community leaders and implementing partners. While beneficiary selection in most cases is quite good, some implementing partners do not always seem to be clear on, or aware of, PRRO targeting criteria: there were numerous community partners who commented on “how difficult it is to turn away a needy family...” suggesting that the risk of charity-based selection should not be underestimated.

Targeting Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities is appropriate because the separation of these groups from their historic and cultural livelihoods is apparently more profound than other racial groups. Also, recent armed conflict had tended to occur on indigenous land, meaning that indigenous and Afro-Colombians are proportionally over-represented among IDPs in recent years. The non-registered displaced are also a highly appropriate target group.

There were occasional reports that projects run by district and town officials were “more complicated” than some others, suggesting political influences?, and that this cadre of GOC officialdom could benefit from more clarity on targeting criteria.<sup>21</sup>

Most projects visited during the evaluation field travel were in peri-urban settings. Anecdotal reports suggested an 80/20 urban-rural split is the de-facto division of resources, but the CO does not separate projects this way. This is a topic to which more thought could be given—i.e., what would be an appropriate rural/urban resource split.

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<sup>21</sup> Is it possible this will become a bigger problem in 2007, a year during which local elections will take place?



#### 4.3.4 Monitoring, Goal Focus, Evaluation, and Control Systems

##### Output and process monitoring

In the PRRO, the M&E function has been considerably strengthened and has achieved the following:

- One international manager and five sub-office M&E assistants have been hired to bolster programme monitoring.
- CO manages three tracking databases, i.e. M&E Database, food logistics, and project profiles.
- Field visits are planned each month using predefined criteria.
- Emergency visits are conducted when a project is reported to be struggling.
- Five post-distribution monitoring questionnaires were reported developed but their use was not evaluated.
- Monthly and quarterly reports are prepared. These provided information on the projects and their processes: beneficiaries, food distribution, quantity and quality of food, losses, implementing partners, planned vs. actual beneficiaries, complementary activities, and others. In addition, the reports discuss generalized problems and lessons learned. There is also a brief section to assess the effects of FFW and FFT projects from the beneficiary's perspective, and reporting on school assistance and desertion rates.
- The Quarterly Reports prepared by Sub-Offices are comprehensive and thorough.
- The Bogotá office prepares consolidated Quarterly reports based on this information. As noted, quarterly reports include a section on "corrective action," and lessons learned.
- Almost 50% of on-going projects have received monitoring, 1,580 visits of 3,394 projects. This is a considerable achievement.
- Also impressive is the fact that 38% of these visits were chosen by random selection.
- Greater visibility of WFP in the field has come about through increased monitoring visits.
- A database was reported as developed to improve accountability and follow-up to national meetings but was not seen.

For all these reasons, the monitoring function is being performed well.

##### Goal orientation

But a larger question arises whether the PRRO is headed in the right direction.

With concurrence from Rome, the Logical Framework for this PRRO was developed only under Strategic Objective 2, *to protect and stabilize livelihoods*. Given Colombia conditions, it appears to the evaluation team this may have been an overly ambitious goal, and/or a handicapped conceptual framework. There is, for instance, the perception among many interviewees that until peace comes, tens of thousands of farmers can't return to their fields, and until then it will be physically impossible for them to stabilize their livelihoods. Thus in the strict sense, SO 2 may be unachievable.

An Oxfam paper addresses issues of food distribution with a livelihood goal, one of the case studies cited being a needs assessment carried in a region of Colombia in November 1999.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Humanitarian Practice Network: HPN Network Paper. "Food-security assessments in emergencies: a livelihoods approach" by Helen Young, S. Jaspars, R. Brown, J. Frize and . Khogali. June 2001. Available at <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2301>



Although one recognized the regional and time-bound specificities of the case-study findings, various points made are worth mentioning:

- A livelihoods approach to emergency food distributions requires larger quantities of food aid than when only meeting immediate needs since target groups include people who still have assets, as well as the malnourished and the destitute.
- A livelihoods focus needs to distinguish between strategies based on a needs assessment, and strategies adopted because resources are in short supply.
- Key issues for a livelihoods approach include how the need for different interventions is determined, and what are the most appropriate ways of addressing the food crisis.
- Important determinants are the scale and stage of the emergency, the availability of resources, government response, and management requirements of different components.
- In chronic conflicts, self-reliance or even food self-sufficiency will be difficult to achieve. The Colombia experience showed that while IDPs nearly reached food self-sufficiency by the end of 1999, their food security was again threatened by an escalation in violence by 2000.
- In addition, the long-term displaced may not *ever* be able to rebuild their livelihoods.
- A livelihoods approach recognizes different risks, and the need for addressing life-threatening risks as well as the erosion of livelihoods in the longer term.

Would adding another SO have created a more appropriate framework? Would a more conceptually relevant Strategic Objective have been SO 3: “improved nutrition and health status of children, mothers and other vulnerable people?” SO 4 would seem relevant also: “support access to education and reduce gender disparity.” The decision to choose only SO 2 may have been a conceptual error.

The LogFrame also does not show a link between proposed outputs, outcomes and activities. In addition, LogFrame indicators do not seem rigorously chosen, and do not much measure effectiveness. As noted, there is an absence of nutritional indicators in PLM and CR when logically they should be an intrinsic part of those activities.

### Outcome monitoring

Current PRRO monitoring mostly tracks *output* and process level activities, with few *outcome* level measurements. In the programme document, four outcome indicators are proposed. Tracking them has taken place as follows:

#### 1. Percentage of IDP household expenditure allocated to food [reduced].

This indicator is being measured by a Mid-term survey recently conducted by a Colombia consulting firm with support from country office staff and the VAM department in Rome: a 760 household “case study,” which required considerable investment of field staff time and energy. This was not a planned-from-the-start PRRO activity but carried out in response to a corporate initiative.

While the evaluation team is appreciative the Country Office has tried to measure outcome results, methodological weaknesses in the data analysis and reporting do not





allow the evaluation team to infer causal improvements between Baseline and study results.<sup>23</sup>

2. Percentage of IDP households that show increase in the frequency and diversity of food consumed.

Also addressed by the same 760 HH case study. This study has produced useful results in terms of taking a snapshot of *current* food consumption; because of the sample size the data have strong descriptive value. As above, however, due to methodological limitations, the information cannot be used to infer change brought about by programme activities from Baseline to now.

3. Percentage of HHs able to retain or increase assets is not being measured as far as the evaluators can tell.
4. Percentage of children complete grades/ drop out rates/ attendance rates by gender.

Inconclusive data on this topic are being collected and reported on, as noted previously. The WFP-supported national school feeding evaluation which is about to start will hopefully further address achievement of indicators in PRRO-supported schools.

Regarding outcome measurement, a number of institutional partners are tracking *nutritional* gains as a result of the food ration. Not only does this improve beneficiary lives in a more meaningful fashion, it also helps the institutional partner evaluate the true effectiveness of the intervention. There is space here for WFP to learn from partner example.

#### Control systems

On a more operational level, evaluation travel showed “individually owned” projects require closer supervision than “institutionally owned” ones. In the field travel, there were projects where one person was clearly the driving force and who “owned” the project as “his/hers.” The problem is not that enthusiastic activism is unwelcome, but that the potential for misuse of resources or abuse of authority can arise in unbalanced relationships.<sup>24</sup> Some projects visited during the travel seemed like the “fiefdom” of the implementer more than a shared community initiative. It is unclear whether WFP field staff has recognized the risks of this sort of overly-personalized ownership and *are willing to suspend the project* if it gets out of hand, as terminating a project often raises questions as to how else needy people will be able to get support—not an especially satisfactory reason to maintain a project going<sup>25</sup>. In like fashion, some questionable projects, for instance a preschool kitchen near an open sewer, may require better decision-making regarding risks and benefits—and/or a detailed, time-bound compliance plan to improve when unacceptable conditions are present. The CO reports 3.3% of 2006 projects were cancelled due to non-compliance with standards, indicating that some of this decision-making is taking place. Perhaps more can be done.

It should however be recognized that regularly scheduled monitoring visits do provide a means for ensuring a certain amount of oversight. The evaluation team also attests to strong analytic

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<sup>23</sup> While the Baseline and the case study used statistically valid sampling methodologies, the two “universes” were not the same, thus it is not valid to compare the two results. Moreover, in the case study, the probability of selection in cells that contained more than one response was miscalculated as was their subsequent weighting, thereby distorting the data analysis.

<sup>24</sup> Is it too pessimistic to wonder whether other kinds of exploitation are also a potential risk?

<sup>25</sup> One should recall in any case that any project termination would be decided not only by WFP staff but in accordance with Regional committees as well.



capacities and performance in sub-office staff who are the backbone of the monitoring system. In some areas, potentially problematic projects were seen to receive particular attention, though this was not an overall finding.

Some FFW proposals include a narrative which describes clear targets and objectives. Including a similar brief narrative description for *all* projects, even PLM and CR ones, would foster better results-based management by getting the implementing partner to focus beyond the (mere) delivery of food.

Current control systems may yet have a somewhat one-off “tone.” Copies of monitoring reports are not left behind by field staff to help the implementing partner understand what deficiencies have been observed and to serve as comparison in subsequent monitoring visits. One implementing partner did not even have on hand a copy of its final report to WFP on the predecessor project. The next step in strengthening PRRO control systems could be to begin to create a culture of “continuous quality improvement” through such a simple innovation as leaving a carbon copy the field trip report behind.

#### **4.3.5 Partnerships**

Working in partnership is a key WFP organizational principle, and the Colombia PRRO demonstrates a number of strengths.

##### Government of Colombia partners

There are numerous positive elements to the PRRO’s tri-partite relationship with Acción Social and ICBF. The PRRO strengthens the GOC’s awareness of, and responsibility for, IDP issues. This is especially true for Acción Social which is under the Constitutional Court’s mandate to meet IDP needs, but it also applies to senior representatives in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Health and elsewhere. ICBF’s mandate to work with families receives important support from the PRRO—and the PRRO, important support from ICBF. Acción Social is primarily interested in registered displaced people while ICBF is concerned with families whether registered or not. Satisfying these two interests requires the PRRO to respond to both—an appropriate line to walk.

Acción Social has contributed significant additional resources to the programme for purchases such as school stoves, school kitchen utensils, chairs and tables, IDP housing fixtures, replacement cribs, agricultural tools, and more. ICBF has contributed 3,500 MT of *bienestarina*, as well as over \$2 million in emergency complementary funding. Mention will shortly be made of the relatively effective partner relationships in the Regional Committees. Perhaps most importantly, the PRRO is seen by each of the three as a programme of joint ownership.

It must also be noted that collaboration and cooperation is better in some departments than in others. During the travel, there were departments where the WFP/AS/ICBF relationship was clearly collegial, energetic, and effective. There were other departments where participation in the Regional Committees was delegated to junior staff and where WFP regional staff felt it was carrying most of the burden.

The one (non-government) PRRO contractual partner is the Church’s Pastoral Social, in support of the PANEM component. Contractual and working relationships were reported generally positively by Pastoral Social, though, of course, the 2006 pipeline break was a substantial setback to the contract and to effective, collegial relationships.



### Implementing partners

Another aspect of the PRRO has been mentioned earlier, the number of implementing partners, over 1,700, which would seem to represent a substantial managerial burden, although it should be noted this number is the total number of partners throughout the year not necessarily those being managed at one point in time. Because one partner frequently implements various projects running at the same time, the number of *different* implementing partners is a more manageable number, though still large by any measure. Whether WFP-Colombia is geared up to handle this number is an open question. There does not appear to be PRRO thinking regarding a manageable “span of control” of implementing partners.

It should also be noted that many PRRO partners in Colombia are actually closer to community-based *beneficiaries* than true programme partners, in the sense that the partnership is not subject to the signing of any formal agreement. Also, community leaders managing these projects have few obligation to report on their small project’s outcomes except in a close-out, output-focused report. It may be useful for WFP Colombia to distinguish between implementing partners (handling a number of projects, sometimes in various regions, with good management skills, etc.) and small community-based beneficiary groups that, likely, require a higher level of direct oversight by PRRO staff.

As noted earlier, there are big differences—in implementation capacity, in systematic approach, in complementarity, in intellectual rigor—between institutional partners and community partners. Overall the more established partners were seen to be efficient and effective, but also some community partners were well run and could have large impact on community empowerment and sustainability. Some other community-based partners are, indeed, one-project entities serving a widely dispersed population and a quite small number of beneficiaries. Working through such partners is sometimes the only way to reach certain populations, bringing strengths and weaknesses. Beyond the fact that many partners bring additional resources to complement WFP resources—as well as important, integrated focus to some projects—working with so many partners appears to have direct and indirect effects of strengthening Civil Society.

There was evidence of capacity building of community women taking place as an indirect result of the leadership they assume in food oversight committees.

### UN partners

By general consensus, it appears in Colombia that the UN mechanism of Interagency Steering Committees (IASC) is still in the developing stage. WFP is participating fully in the process. Beyond that, there may be potential for WFP to enhance the U.N. agency/community interface that could be further strengthened.

The PRRO staff’s relationship with partners was evaluated positively by virtually all interviewees in terms of communication, transparency, collegiality, field presence: GOC, international, institutional-national, small national, etc.

#### **4.3.6 Operational issues**

The current PRRO has designed a number of important operational improvements from the previous programme which needs to be noted. First, however, the biggest weakness.

The principle observation in terms of operational efficiency is that the programme suffered a sustained pipeline break since October 2006 resulting in serious setback for some partners, some



sub-offices delivering at 52% of target, and virtually halting FFW, FFT and other programme components.<sup>26</sup> Though there is no one to criticize in this pipeline break—it represented a late-minute decision of a different programme strategy by a major donor—it had a quite negative effect on the credibility of some implementing partners, and also on the CO’s credibility in new geographic areas. PANEM, for instance, which has been evaluated in favorable terms in this text, has been virtually shut down from November 2006 as a result of this break and has yet to start back up at this writing.

### Logistics

The entire Logistics operation seems to be running efficiently. Regional warehouse management has been subcontracted to specialized companies supervised by WFP directly. Three of the five regional warehouses were visited and demonstrate good logistics management. Two logistics staff are placed per office to oversee this operation. Bagging operations have been re-tooled saving several hundred thousand dollars.

Many programme areas are characterized by quite high conflict, and threats to physical security of staff and to fiscal integrity of the food are high. Food losses have been all-but non-existent, and the CO has done an admirable job in keeping the food arriving to beneficiaries in spite of the danger. These paragraphs consist of simple sentences that represent a great deal of work. Food is getting sent generally on time, in the right amounts, and in good condition.

Local food purchases are an important programme innovation. Recently, brown sugar (*panela*) has been suspended because of a cost increase, with no ready substitute being provided at the time the evaluation was carried, according to participant interviews. While there are almost universal reports of high quality food being consumed rather than sold, in some Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities, there were questions regarding the cultural appropriateness of green peas. The CO is aware of this issue and tries to send different commodities, without complete success, it appears. There were also complaints in other areas regarding two day’s cooking time required for green peas that may represent a local supplier issue. Note that this was a somewhat widely heard complaint in the center of the country.

### Management

All senior staff demonstrate high levels of analysis, competence, and commitment, and are well informed of context and the specifics of most projects. Field staff are hard working and seem significantly “stretched,” but are doing a good job. While morale is high, one-year contracts mean uncertainty is also high as regards one’s permanence in WFP and career pathing. There were reports of somewhat frequent staff turnover in WFP-Colombia and one way to address this issue is for the CO to improve its staff training—focused on career enrichment as well as improved performance. One staff person requested training on growth card monitoring, implying it had not been offered, clearly a good mixture of both those concepts.

The CO reports that strategic and operational planning at the national level is a joint effort between WFP and the two GOC partners. Decision-making reportedly takes place in a National Technical Committee but no aide memoirs or minutes of such meetings were reviewed.

The creation of Regional Committees to vet project proposals was an innovation in this PRRO; (final approval resides in Bogotá.) One committee meeting was observed and functioned well.

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<sup>26</sup> One illustrative figure: PRRO average MTs are approximately 1400 /mo; in January '07 it was 550, in February, 880.



There were reports that some regional committees are less effective than others (not unexpectedly), including reports of some projects taking months to receive approval. Nevertheless the creation of this structure—and the devolved authority vested in it—was an excellent programme innovation.

At the same time, there may be an as-yet unrecognized risk here. Several projects observed during the travel were not of high quality, and when the question was put to regional staff whether the projects should be suspended, the answers were less than clear-cut. Thinking primarily of needy beneficiaries, it is possible regional staff may tend toward more leniency in project approval and continuation than they could.

Opening three new offices and embarking in six new departments brought a substantial increase in operational costs. While this is judged an appropriate investment, perhaps more could have been done to streamline costs elsewhere. In spite of these offices being recently opened, operations are reported functioning smoothly.

There is some concern, noted earlier, regarding the number of implementing partners, over 1,700. During the travel, evaluators heard notes that political interference was taking place in some projects, a result of CO supervision being “stretched” among so many projects.

The Procedures Manual is a solid document and is widely available to potential implementing partners, a good operational base. An End-of-Year Workshop was held with all programme partners to evaluate strengths and areas of improvement, a good use of resources.

In almost all projects, there was some form of WFP visibility. These were monochromatic, relatively “bland” posters (see side of house in photo on p.25), less visually interesting, and less colorful than other donor identification. There were several observations from GOC partners that programme visibility tends to credit WFP more than the consortium though this may be inevitable in high-conflict areas.

In most projects, entitlement notices were clearly visible, thus contributing to a certain “empowering” of beneficiaries.

In some conflict areas, the USAID emblem is reported by villagers and by NGO and WFP staff to cause security problems. The donor was reported open to the possibility of a waiver request, which appears never to have been requested because, the team infers, field staff were not aware of this possibility and did not request it.

Described above was the fact that decisions on which schools will participate in school feeding are taken on a yearly basis. The team has noted its concern with this concept and the importance of the CO tracking those who “graduate” to other donor support.

#### **4.3.7 Gender/ Enhanced Commitment to Women**

There is a satisfactorily high number of women supervisors (*coordinadoras*) and sub-office staff in the field. Similarly, there are a number of high-powered women in senior Bogotá positions.

Much of the programme gives prominent attention to women’s issues. The PRRO gives good importance to adolescent pregnancies, among other ways, by requiring a minimum of 23% of this cohort as beneficiaries in the PLM component. The percentage of women/men beneficiaries is 55/45 and the percentage of women assuming leadership roles in village food oversight committees is reported at 80% which corroborates the vivid examples of significant women’s leadership and empowerment seen during the field visits.



#### 4.4. Strategic Considerations

Several "macro" questions are not addressed in a component-by-component analysis such as the one just conducted, but are worth at least brief mention. In fact, they seem more policy issues than operational and programme questions that have been the focus of this mid-term event. They may provide useful discussion points however.

The first question pertains to the role of WFP in supporting the GOC's efforts to improve IDP lives. Ratifying the relevance of the current PRRO, the issues arises whether the programme should be assumed by the Government of Colombia, or if not completely taken over, how much of it should be assumed by the GOC. What, for instance, is the appropriate interrelationship between WFP's humanitarian mandate and the Constitutional Court's demand that the GOC satisfy the constitutional rights of IDPs? If, for instance, WFP were to implement a smaller programme, is it clear the GOC would be ready or able to assume a higher role? Note that the National Plan (p.6) currently calls for a four-year investment of \$2.4 million, that is, well under US\$1.00 for each of 3+ million IDPs. Is a more meaningful allocation of resources politically and economically possible given other Colombia needs, including the need to resolve the underlying causes of the violence?

As another example, if the PRRO were structured so that WFO implement only selected components (say, for example, the Relief component only) would the GOC be able to run the other components? Does the PRRO step into areas that a middle-income country like Colombia should be capable of addressing on its own? Or could/should one plan for a meaningful transfer of responsibilities between humanitarian actors and the GOC whereby the GOC could gradually assume more WFP responsibilities over several PRROs?.

A second set of issues relates to how much efficiency can be expected—can be required of—Acción Social regarding a rapid, timely response to IDPs. Mention was made in the text of some observers' perceptions that IDPs who have not been adequately attended to by Acción Social over the years could be as many as 700,000. Could a follow-on PRRO specifically assists the GOC in cleaning up such a backlog? Or, could the PRRO respond (only) to new IDPs while Acción Social cleans up the backlog itself? Should WFP allow the GOC to take the lead role in all IDP activities and only provide complementary funding, rather than, as now, WFP taking the lead in many components? Does WFP's high involvement in IDP programmes reduce the pressure on Acción Social to become more efficient quickly?

A third set of issues relates to the perennial problem of the appropriateness of food aid per se. There is a well-recognized risk in food assisted programmes to accentuate a reliance on a non-sustainable resource. For instance, might a cash outlay be more efficient, or—in the judgment of some food critics—less prone to create dependency? Some donor programs in Colombia use a cash transfer (admittedly not without some difficulties), judging that disposable income is the most appropriate intervention in an IDP's life. Does the existence of a food-focused PRRO give the GOC an opportunity to couch its response in food terms when a more appropriate response could be in non-food terms—or when a better balance between food transfers and cash transfers might be possible?

Answers to these questions involve complicated policy discussion and issues that need to be carefully thought through as WFP and the GOC begin preparing the next PRRO.



## 5 CONCLUSIONS

Summarizing findings, the evaluation reaches the following conclusions:

### 5.1 Relevance

Interventions conceptualized in this PRRO as responses on the *relief-to-recovery continuum* are highly relevant to the needs of IDPs: for immediate assistance in the aftermath of their displacement, and as a flexible response to their evolving needs in months following displacement. IDPs are a completely appropriate target for the programme. The programme is relevant to the rapidly changing Colombian context because of the range of responses it offers. It responds to acute needs in the target population through a menu of programme interventions—assuaging a wide variety of needs in different clientele groups—that are designed and generally carried out appropriately.

As mentioned, the PRRO proposes a 38/62 split between Relief and Recovery, and 2006 reports confirm this division of resources. In current Colombian conditions, the evaluation team judges it is important to *fulfill relief programming needs first*. The evaluators have taken a position that the Relief component is a highly relevant intervention. Thought may be given in the new PRRO to monitor this split continually and adjust it based on assessed needs, say once a year. It may well also vary from region to region.

Newly targeted in this PRRO, the inclusion of non-registered IDPs as a special target group was an excellent innovation. Additionally, the PRRO offers to the GOC and to international donors an important mechanism directed to *at-risk communities*, (blockaded, confined, in resistance, fumigated), almost the only assistance getting to these groups. Additionally, the Afro-Colombian and the indigenous populations are a particularly relevant beneficiary group for the PRRO. The GOC, UN colleague agencies, and the wider international and national NGO community are universally supportive of the programme; and WFP's management of the operation is well respected throughout Colombia.

Each of the programme components were seen to be relevant in varying degrees and for different reasons.

- Relief is relevant because it has numerous programme modalities to addresses IDP needs at a time of highest vulnerability.
- School feeding is relevant because it meaningfully helps IDP children re-integrate into society; it also seems a relevant follow-on in the relief-to-recovery continuum.
- Preschool feeding is relevant as a continuation of support as the IDP child moves beyond immediate post-displacement; however it is handicapped by a lack of clarity whether objectives are educational or nutritional, or both.
- Pregnant and Lactating Mothers and Children at risk were judged relevant compared to need but limited due to ration dilution and a lack of nutritional follow-up.
- FFW and FFT provide are relevant response to evolving IDP needs in a number of livelihood recovery activities.

There can be legitimate debate which of the PRRO's many successful interventions is the most relevant. Given WFP's corporate mandate to reach the world's neediest people in emergencies, the evaluation team inclines toward thinking the Relief side of the programme is worthy of additional budgetary support.



## 5.2 Efficiency

A significant pipeline break was a serious setback to programme efficiency—and caused huge disruption to some implementing partners, to some programme components, and to many sub-office operations. Additionally, food resources have been limited compared to the vast need, attested to by the evaluation team.

Targeting criteria varied by component, and some criteria were more widely understood and respected from component to another. Efficiency of component activities varied:

- Relief was accomplished at 100% of target using 34.6% of food resources.
- School feeding was accomplished at 84% of target using 14.8% of food resources.
- Preschool feeding was accomplished at 85% of target using 5.3% of food resources.
- Pregnant/lactating was accomplished at 185% of target using 8.3% of food resources.
- Children at risk was accomplished 120% of target using 7.5% of total food resources.
- Food For Work was accomplished at 125% of target using 13.3% of food resources.
- Food For Training was accomplished at 119% of target using 16.2% of food resources.

While achievement of these programme targets is generally satisfactory, substantial over-accomplishment in pregnant and lactating mothers and children-at-risk—arguably the least effective programme interventions—was accomplished by using resources from other components. FFW and FFT show similar over-accomplishment but are likely more justifiable for their effectiveness as vehicles of recovery.

Programme efficiency has improved significantly from the previous project but there are areas where further improvement could take place.

- The current Strategic Objective base, “stabilizing livelihoods and enhancing resilience,” does not seem the best choice on which to base this PRRO, nor the most efficient descriptor of what the PRRO can legitimately hope to achieve in current Colombia conditions.
- The PRRO’s Logical Framework, elaborated before the corporate Strategic Plan that emphasizes goal indicator tracking, is not a strong document and as such has not helped the CO to recognize where its operations should be strengthened.
- The sub-office structure has been strengthened and is performing well. The creation of one new sub-office and several new satellite offices was a good—if expensive—decision. Further expansion should be avoided unless accompanied by administrative streamlining elsewhere in the Country Office
- The functioning of the WFP/AS/ICBF Regional Committees is generally strong and represents a considerable advance from the previous programme in taking well-informed, decentralized project decisions.
- The Logistics department in the PRRO has been strengthened and seems to be performing to full satisfaction.
- Targeting mechanisms have been refined and, even if not universally applied, are ensuring that needy beneficiaries are incorporated into the programme.
- The Procedures Manual serves as a comprehensive, coherent guideline for implementing partners.
- SIMVA is a useful tool to evaluate food vulnerability, to establish baseline conditions, and perhaps to evaluate Final accomplishments. For its cost and complexity, it is a less efficient tool to monitor ongoing accomplishment.





- The M&E department has been considerably strengthened and is performing largely to satisfaction. Output monitoring is taking place in a generally satisfactory manner and a large number of projects are visited. Outcome measurement is an area of future growth. A number of the stronger implementing partners are, indeed, tracking outcome events, information that WFP could make better use of.
- The recent Mid-term qualitative case study of 760 households offers a good snapshot of current IDP household conditions on two dimensions of impact, but causality cannot be inferred.

### 5.3 Effectiveness

Some may argue the nature of a protracted relief operation militates against a rigorous evaluation of effectiveness. Indeed it may be partly for this reason the CO has focused in the first 18 months of the current PRRO on output measurement less than outcome measurement, perhaps sustaining that many programme interventions that last a few months will have limited effect in changing people's lives. Nevertheless, however difficult such measurement may be, corporate policy, as well as good development practice, suggest meaningful measurement of effectiveness is an essential programme obligation.

- The Relief component was judged particularly effective. It responds to a large IDP population each year and offers meaningful assistance to these most-vulnerable groups without, apparently, creating dependency. It is directed to a number of different IDP group—meeting them “where they are,” whether in blockaded, confined or fumigated communities, in small towns, or in per-urban neighborhoods. Data on *how much* effectiveness the component has achieved, that is, the degree to which beneficiaries' full economic re-integration has taken place, are not being collected. Nevertheless, this component was judged by the evaluation team as a most important programme component.
- School feeding appears to be an effective intervention. Beneficiary children exhibiting high energy levels and improved attention span are widely reported and can be easily observed. Some outcome monitoring suggest attendance at school is more attractive with school feeding than without it, and highly needy IDP children are being well fed at least once a day as a result of the activity. In cases where the PRRO closes out this support after only one year of support, longer-term benefits will, of course, be unachievable.
- The effectiveness of pre-school feeding appears to depend in large measure on the quality of the implementing partner. Where the partner is institutionally strong, not only are additional resources leveraged, but also educational objectives are achieved along with the likelihood of some hard-to-achieve nutritional outcomes as well. Where the implementing partner is an ad-hoc community group, or where community leadership is less holistically focused, it is difficult to distinguish preschool support from a generalized under-five feeding.
- Because of small ration size, dilution throughout the family, lack of focus on nutritional objectives and other factors, the pregnant and lactating mothers component and the children-at-risk components were judged ineffective except when run by quite strong institutional partners.
- FFW and FFT were judged effective programme components, especially when embedded in wider developmental initiatives, in part because of the wide array of recovery activities that are supported by FFW and FFT, and in part because of their potential to restore livelihoods, to build human capital or to create assets. Agriculture, housing, water and sanitation, and employment skills creation seem areas of particular synergy.



Female leadership in the programme is high in CO staff. Numerous interventions are aimed specifically at women, and female beneficiaries are 55% of total. Some interventions specifically target the most vulnerable—i.e. teenage expectant mothers. Numerous examples of women’s empowerment were evident during the evaluation travel.

The programme demonstrates good complementarity between WFP and GOC actors, and between WFP and NGOs. The GOC has contributed substantial financial, in-kind, and personnel resources to the programme. NGOs have contributed additional resources, as well as a holistic vision not otherwise contemplated in programme documents. Strengthened Civil Society is surely an indirect result of the programme.

At more conceptual, less operative levels, WFP’s relationship with other UN agencies was rated high by virtually all interviewees. There yet remains an important space for WFP to strengthen the links between *communities* and other UN actors; enhancing the flow of information on IDP conditions to other UN agencies could be a way to do so.

The PRRO has achieved important secondary effects. Wide-scale WFP presence in the field contributes to improved security for at-risk IDPs, a widely reported effect. Programme activities have helped strengthen community cohesion. Improved self-esteem and other psycho-social benefits can also be inferred, and sometimes observed directly.

## 5.4 Connectedness

It became clear during the evaluation that looking into the potential for connectedness regarding an operation largely set up within a short time frame was more appropriate than judging its sustainability per se.

### Consonance with national priorities

At the national level, the PRRO is fully consonant with the longer term needs and problems as identified by the GOC, other international organizations, local and international NGOs, and beneficiaries. It has created a flexible response to a large IDP situation, while also creating a strong partnership between WFP, Acción Social and ICBF to address IDP needs. It helps Acción Social respond to the Constitutional Court’s demands—directing attention at registered IDPs—while at the same time creating a special window of attention, recommended by all other knowledgeable actors, for non-registered IDPs.

### Benefits of the Assistance Continue

The likelihood that benefits from the assistance will continue after WFP has completed the programme depends on the nature of the intervention and varies from component to component.

- An overall goal of the PRRO is to move people from relief to recovery. Thus, there is an obvious connection to improved livelihoods for those who receive Relief assistance which enables them to begin a new life. As noted in the text, however, the CO does not currently track information on this topic.
- For those who are able to avail of recovery facets of the programme, there is a clear connection between Relief and Recovery, and the evaluation team infers that this is happening especially in FFW, FFT, in School feeding, and in Pre-school feeding with strong institutional partners. In these components, needy IDPs continue to receive support to make the transition to their new lives.



- The connection between Relief and Recovery is harder to discern in preschool feeding with weak institutional partners, and in the PLM and CR components. This is because in these three areas, the overall *purpose* of each activity seems not clear in programme documents.

#### Continuing on after a WFP Departure

The question: “What is the likelihood that programs supported by WFP will continue to operate if WFP moves from one geographic area to another” is a bit un-answerable. Strong links have been developed in the current PRRO to Acción Social and to ICBF—both conceptual and operational—that foster these two counterparts’ taking on larger roles in responding to the IDP crisis. There are reports, too, that both entities have become institutionally more professional and efficient in the last several years, though it must also be said that most interviewees think there is a long way to go yet before either entity could be said to be prepared to assume full responsibility for such a programme. Even if one makes the—debatable—assumption that the GOC can assume full financial responsibility for a \$50 million IDP programme, political realities mean there are large parts of the IDP population that it would be unreachable except through implementing partners, a methodology with which the GOC is likely not experienced. Perhaps one of the meta-objectives of the next PRRO could be to look at creating systems that could potentially be taken over by the GOC to run a Colombia-only PRRO. (Also see final recommendation.)

#### Strengthened GOC Response to IDPs

Regarding the question: “Does the intervention effectively contribute to strengthening the GOC’s actions towards IDPs,” the answer is a definitive “yes:” for its support to the GOC in keeping the IDP issue in the forefront of national and international consciousness; for the special “window” that reaches non-registered IDPs in a way no one else can; and for its overall support to IDPs at a time of crisis in their lives.

#### Feasible Exit Strategy

A time-bound, feasible exit strategy does not yet exist and is not relevant in Colombia conditions where the IDP situation is likely to deteriorate over the foreseeable future.

## **5.5 Future Operations**

The WFP strategy has evolved substantially since 2000, and the current PRRO is fully appropriate in the context of the humanitarian situation in Colombia. The IDP focus is still as valid as ever—and according to most interviewees will likely remain valid for the foreseeable future (5-10 years.)

Regarding, the TOR questions: “Does WFP have a role in increasing Access” and “Can /should WFP have a role beyond the delivery of assistance,” the evaluation team, in country for only three weeks, does not take a definitive position, but only notes some of the issues.

There are real trade-offs that must be carefully weighed between increased Advocacy and Access, i.e., more push to the GOC, vs. armed groups’ current recognition of WFP as a neutral party.

There may be trade-offs between politicized discourse at the national level and the highly collaborative relationship seen in the field, currently a characteristic of the programme.



Could a higher WFP Advocacy profile backfire by stiffening resistance (in some quarters at least) to recognizing the needs of non-registered IDPs?

Finally as seems likely, if the prospects for lasting peace are not good in the near- and mid-term, there are only a limited number of (new, additional) PRRO activities that can be taken on *without overly burdening* the current effective programme operations.

These issues must be carefully weighed before a decision is taken to embark on an enhanced Advocacy campaign.



## 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.1 Strengthen Strategic Objective Formulation, Design a Consistent Outcome-focused Logical Framework, and Measure Outcomes

The evaluators recommend that the Strategic Objective formulation of the new PRRO should be re-thought. A review of corporate guidance regarding SO2<sup>27</sup> suggests that indicators to track SO 2 do not represent completely feasible goals in Colombia; thus SO 2 should not continue to be the *only* conceptual underpinning of the programme. SO3 (nutrition) and SO4 (education) should be incorporated into the Goal formulation of the new PRRO where appropriate.

As part of this reformulation, the new PRRO should develop a Logical Framework that incorporates nutritional goals—particularly in PLM and CR, perhaps also in School and Pre-school feeding. The team recognizes that as written the current PRRO did not call for this, and as such, it is not appropriate to fault it for not doing so. Having said that, it is now time to begin positing and tracking nutritional outcomes.

The new PRRO should also track outcomes in all other project components. Setting up a system for tracking outcome results will align the new PRRO with corporate policy and is the logical next step in the evolution of a fully functioning M&E department in the Country Office. It will allow the CO to determine whether ineffective programme components should be reduced or eliminated, e.g. PLM and CR, and it will ultimately help meaningfully improve the lives of PRRO beneficiaries. It may also provide criteria to determine whether some (small/ ineffective) community partners should be suspended or how they can be strengthened.

The new PRRO should develop criteria to determine whether some geographic areas of high IDP concentration are more nutritionally needy and should receive a higher percentage of resources. An 8.8% level of acute malnutrition compared to 1.4% nationally and 21.9% global malnutrition compared to 7% nationally suggest Tumaco, but similar figures could likely be cited for areas of Cali, Valledupar, and Chocó and perhaps elsewhere. The team recognizes this is a complicated topic.

The team recommends that capable institutional partners be required to begin tracking outcome measurement—many are already doing so. Doing so will improve results, as well as the implementing partners themselves. Some of such tracking may be do-able routinely as part of monitoring visits already taking place.

The new PRRO should also develop the LogFrame that specifies more livelihood indicators, particularly in FFW and FFT. Among the potential outcomes to track are the following:

- Asset creation brought about by housing improvements.
- Livelihood restoration brought about by agricultural projects.
- Improved health brought about by water and sanitation projects.
- Employment created brought about by skill development projects.

Given that the current PRRO posits improved linkages with health posts, it may be useful to develop indicators to measure this outcome in the new proposal.

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<sup>27</sup> Thematic Guidance: Results-Based Management: “Designing and Implementing SO2 Project Baselines: A Guide for WFP Country Offices”



A summarized recommendation is that the new PRRO should look more beyond the (mere) delivery of food to how it is that IDP lives are changed as a result of participation in the programme.

## 6.2 Redistribute Some Resources

The team believes the basic PRRO components are valid and should stay the same: Relief, School and Pre-school feeding, Food for Work, Food for Training, and—assuming improved outcome measurement—Pregnant and Lactating Mothers and Children at Risk.

The team recommends, perhaps, some redistribution of budget ceilings. More resources should be directed to Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations as the neediest of the needy and as those groups most affected by the current violence. Also, the current PRRO has appropriately identified groups of special needs: non-registered IDPs supported via PANEM; “communities in risk;” and blockaded, confined, and fumigated communities. These components should continue to receive budgetary support in the next PRRO. Reportedly, the original budget in the current PRRO planned to channel approximately 10,000 MT to non-registered IDPs through PANEM and eventually did allocate 5,600 MT, i.e. about 10% of overall tonnage available. It is in this order of magnitude that the evaluation team would encourage the CO to maintain its support to PANEM. The recommendation is that these components be budgeted as was planned in the current PRRO and then *ensure they are funded* at 100% of budget.

The team also suggests a careful weighing of the cost implications for considering *a family ration* for PLM and CR in order to increase meaningfully the current quite small and ineffective ration in these activities.

A programme tightening should take place to ensure that beneficiaries receive the full ration that has been planned. The new PRRO should minimize the tendency to reduce the ration in specific components in order to channel the “food saved” to more beneficiaries. Whatever the new PRRO’s numeric goal, it should not reach double the planned number through effectively delivering half of what was originally planned.

## 6.3 Operational Improvements

The evaluators do not see a follow-on PRRO operationally much different from the current one. Among the many operational issues highlighted in Chapter 4, the evaluation team does not see need for anything (much) different in the Logistics department, the M&E department structure, the sub-office structure, functioning of regional committees, the tri-partite contract with the GOC, gender awareness, relations with institutional and community NGOs, and relations with other UN agencies. These are areas of programme strength.

However, several small operational improvements are suggested in the new programme. First, more attention could be given to ensuring that implementing partners understand and interiorize WFP targeting criteria. The evaluation team recognizes that much has gone right on this subject in the current PRRO but an occasional refresher workshop on the topic might be appropriate for some community-based implementing partners. The team suggests including a line-item in the budget for such events.

The CO could also contract the services of a nutrition consultant who can help to move the nutrition agenda forward. The evaluation team also thinks there could be some funds set aside



for weighing scales and height-boards—perhaps a 50/50 matching grant?—for community implementing partners.

In like fashion, the evaluators recommend that programme resources be set aside for staff training (CO employees) in nutritional and other key programme topics. Overall, it may be that career staff development has been neglected in WFP-Colombia due to the current PRRO's budget constraints.

#### **6.4 Evaluate Relief/Recovery Balance**

The team encourages the CO to continue to reflect on the relief/recovery distribution, bearing in mind WFP's corporate mandate to maximize its effectiveness towards people in emergencies and adjust its programming as appropriate. In the new PRRO, the team is of the opinion that the Relief/Recovery split could be adjusted more frequently, perhaps annually. Perhaps a 45/55 or 50/50 balance would respond more effectively to WFP principles, to the current needs of Colombia IDPs and to the inherent strength of the PRRO mechanism.

#### **6.5 Measure Cost Effectiveness**

At the same time, the evaluation team thinks it is appropriate to study the issues of cost effectiveness and current geographical dispersion. Operational costs approximately doubled compared to the previous PRRO. Further operational cost increases should not take place unless accompanied by reductions elsewhere.

#### **6.6 Resource Acquisition**

Though it is hard to prepare action plans against completely external events, senior WFP leadership in Rome and in Bogotá must do everything in its power to avoid a replay of the pipeline break in October, 2006. At the same time senior leaders must do everything they can to boost the current ratio of budget-to-funded which is now 29,000 MT of a budget of 70,000 MT. No programme can run successfully at 42% of budget.

#### **6.7 Maintain WFP's Role in the Context of Overall GOC Responsibility**

A somewhat "theoretical" but nonetheless important recommendation is that the new proposal must not lose sight that WFP's role in IDP support does not relieve the GOC of its responsibility to this population. The GOC is making a substantial effort to strengthen its response to the IDP crisis: in responding to the Constitutional Court's mandate; in assigning new staff and substantial new budget to IDP issues; in streamlining operations; in other areas. WFP is an important collaborator in these activities, but can only act as the GOC's agent, not as the GOG itself. One way to operationalize this idea could be developing a meaningful Transfer of Responsibility Plan for one or another component; (also see the final paragraph, below.)

#### **6.8 Consider a Possible Increase in Volume of Support to IDPs**

Finally, the evaluators note that a recent budget revision has taken the current PRRO from 50,000 to 70,000MTs, an important step in responding to current needs. Even 70,000 MT may not be enough. The evaluation team attests to thousands of appropriately targeted beneficiaries on waiting lists in each programme component, and the evaluation has noted the "stretching" of many rations to reach more beneficiaries. Current coverage of registered IDPs in some departments is only one-third of the total; reliable interviewees suggest for every registered IDP



there is at least one non-registered one; the team is recommending an increase in ration size to improve effectiveness. These will require substantial additional food resources.

The evaluation team believes the appropriate programme size to respond to the Colombia IDP situation could be in the order of **100,000 MT**. Of course this is a “notional” figure and needs to be studied carefully by analyzing food security profiles of various populations —taking into account those who are currently on PRRO waiting lists and the desirability of family rations where appropriate—and developed within a comprehensive food security analysis, such as the one that preceded the current PRRO. If such analyses support an expansion in scope, the evaluators recommend the new PRRO be expanded without a significant increase in operational costs.

Such a programme expansion should, naturally, not be assumed by WFP alone. Ways must be found to increase the Government of Colombia’s participation in, and contribution to, an expanded programme, perhaps by creating a significant Turnover Plan, say, the GOG assuming full implementation responsibility for one or another programme component within the life of the next PRRO. Another way to do so could be, perhaps, the addition of complementary cash resources delivered to IDPs by GOG. Perhaps a Turnover Plan would reflect some mixture of the two. This strategy would also contribute to improved Sustainability and Connectedness.





# Annexes



*Mid-Term Evaluation of Colombia PRRO 10366.0*

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## **APPENDIX A: AIDE-MEMOIRE**

### **Colombia PRRO 10366.0 Evaluation Evaluation mission in Colombia : February 12<sup>th</sup> to March 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2007**

#### **BACKGROUND ON EVALUATION APPROACH**

The evaluation team visited Colombia from February 12, to March 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2007.

Week One in-country involved a evaluation team planning; introductory presentations by WFP programme staff and interviews in Bogotá, with most UN agency heads, as well as a number of other partner and informed experts. The week ended with a field day, testing the evaluation questionnaire developed during the first two days of planning.

The team split up during Week Two, travelling to cover three different Sub and Satellite offices of the country: Cartagena and Valledupar in the north, Cali and Pasto in the South, and Quibdó and Meta in the center. Fifty-three projects were visited; ten meetings were held with implementing partners or staff, including discussions at the field level with counterpart staff; one Regional Committee meeting was observed. Semi-structured interviews were conducted at various sites.

Week Three was spent on the team's discussing and analyzing trip findings and eventually preparing debriefing presentations to WFP staff and the Government of Colombia. This Aide-Memoire presents main points developed during these meetings.

Team composition:

The team leader is an international agricultural consultant with twenty years' experience in development and food programmes and in evaluation. The second international team member is a Ph.D. economist from the University of Quebec who worked for WFP in Bolivia for some years before turning to consulting. The third international team member is research officer, teacher, and editor at the Refugee Studies Center, Oxford University. The national team member is a Ph.D. professor of Sociology and Economics at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia. The entire mission was backstopped by a WFP evaluation officer.

#### **FINDINGS**

##### **Contextual elements**

Hugely needy population

Creation of a "Humanitarian space"

Widespread consensus that displacement may get worse in the near and mid-term

IDPs in Colombia are a "constantly moving target"



## Activities

### School feeding

- Every interviewee sees benefits from school feeding, including nutritional benefits. For the children, going to school is the first step in a return to a normal life; WFP's support to school feeding enhances the attractiveness going to school. WFP support appears to help increase and sustain attendance.
- There were many reports of improved school performance (in intellectual terms), and we observed high energy levels and can infer improved attention span et. Al. We did not see meaningful monitoring of improved school performance.<sup>28</sup>
- Some partners use the school children as a target group for (more) broadly focused psycho-social and community development interventions.
- But there is little or no attendance of *non-registered* IDPs in formal schools.
- Non-state (sometimes also known as “informal”) schools that serve a big IDP clientele receive WFP support; but there may not be functioning schools in zones of high IDP needs.
- There are several cases of (good) turnover of responsibility of some WFP-supported schools to the Ministry of Education, ICBF and other GOC support. Some informal schools supported by WFP were able to get formal status (paid teachers, budget allocation, etc.) in part due to the functioning of the school canteen supported by WFP.

School feeding appears to be a relevant and effective intervention. However, focusing on educational objectives contributes to a dispersion of goals at the country-office level.

### Preschool feeding

1. Nutritional improvement in preschools was widely reported. Quantitative tracking of nutritional improvement in pre-school feeding is not taking place to any significant degree.
2. WFP's support allows these pre-schools to function; if WFP were not there, there would be no external support in these barrios. In GOC- neglected regions, WFP support to schools and preschools is a highly valued intervention. In some communities, preschool feeding was the only way the children were eating.
3. Criteria of inclusion of preschool participants are not clear nor rigorously enforced in some regions. Notwithstanding, community members seem well placed and identify needy preschool participants.
4. There were cases of good (participative, caring, well-kept) community-based preschool projects. There were also cases of bad (un-hygienic, poor record keeping, poor food storage) community-based preschool projects.
5. Church (and INGO)-based preschool feeding projects were very impressive (sound infrastructure, very clean, well resourced). They were directed to

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<sup>28</sup> Quantitative *nutritional* improvement in school feeding appears to be occurring in some IPs' projects—but it is not an expected program output.



integrated (psycho-social, health, education, nutrition, children's rights) attention. These are very good partners.

6. Preschool feeding allows female headed households a space to search for employment.

Preschool feeding is another way of supporting vulnerable groups, and could conceivably be folded into that activity without loss of focus.

#### Pregnant and Lactating Mothers (MGL)

1. High rates of adolescent pregnancy and of female-headed households make this project intervention highly relevant.
2. However, the MGL ration is not nutritionally effective as it is diluted through the entire family. In at least one area, the MGL ration was doubled, strongly suggesting the ration in the other regions is inadequate to achieve project goals. Additionally, the MGL ration-design was based on the supposition of the family's having other food resources. In practice, this was rarely the case.
3. It was unclear if targeting criteria for inclusion in MGL are being followed:
4. In some cases, incorporation of MGL is "for everyone" rather than a more targeted response, resulting in the "Exclusion" of highly vulnerable women.
5. In some areas, we observed MGL women staying in the project for long periods of time.
6. Nutritional measurement of improvement in MGL is not included in the project LogFrame and usually is not taking place—and not tracked by WFP.
7. In some areas, MGL is tightly related to Health Post involvement, resulting in the potential improvement in pre- and post-natal care.<sup>29</sup>

#### Malnourished Children (NR)

1. This component is intended to reduce the risk of moderate or acute malnutrition. The target group for this component is not well defined, and overly expansive.
2. As in MGL, the ration is not nutritionally effective as it is diluted through the entire family. The ration is based on the supposition of the family's having other food resources. In practice, this was rarely the case.
3. As a result, this activity is not effective.
4. However, when coupled with integrated health care messages (nutritional counselling, hygiene, access to health services, food habits, etc.), there is growth monitoring evidence in some partner programs that the caloric benefit of the ration results in substantial nutritional improvement.
5. WFP provides no systematic nutritional surveillance or follow-up in this component. In some cases, necessary complementary equipment (infant scales) were not in evidence to provide such surveillance. In some areas visited, ICBF staff does not seem to be fulfilling their institutional responsibilities, quality nutritional monitoring and follow-up.

#### Food for Work(FFW)/Food for Training (FFT)

1. Many FFW activities seem designed as support to vulnerable groups: i.e. FFW as an end in itself, not as a means to something else.

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<sup>29</sup> But this issue was seen to be much more complicated in indigenous populations.



2. Despite the pipeline break, some FFW and FFT activities did not stop, suggesting that FFW/FFT is an add-on that may not have been essential to project success.
3. Appropriately, FFW support for salaried teachers has ceased; FFW for volunteer nutritional workers continues in some Departments.
4. Income generating activities are highly relevant to the IDP population. IGA activities are more effective if technical assistance and technical review is provided and activities take into account the skills of the target population. FFW support for Income Generating Activities could be highly effective when incorporated into a wider strategy aimed at sustainability.
5. Land cultivation is another important activity for FFW support, but was not much in evidence throughout the field travel.
6. WFP does not have in-house capacity to evaluate the technical quality of some FFW proposals, and at least one significant failure was seen.
7. In at least one region, the FFW ration was reduced in order to provide more food to other components, indirectly suggesting the ration may be overly generous.
8. We did not see any significant WFP interest in the outcome of FFT training events.

### Relief

This is a highly important and effective project component and responds to a great need.

1. This component is particularly relevant for non-registered IDPs. Notably, PANEM provides a special opportunity to reach the non registered.
2. Also: a.) it is vitally important to registered IDPs who do not receive Acción Social support; b.) it is important assistance to registered IDPs receiving support from Acción Social in Months 4,5,6; c.) and it is important in Months 1,2 when Acción Social support is still being processed. There were many reports of Acción Social's response far slower than one or two months.
3. Through Pastoral Social, the Church and NGOs, the component gives international community and the GOC the opportunity to reach communities that are otherwise unreachable.
4. This component is particularly relevant for "*Communities in Resistance*," because it allows people to return to their land who would otherwise be incapable of doing so. In cases where there are great security concerns, some flexibility in the 6-month ration may be appropriate.
5. The *olla comunitaria* was seen as an important element to improve community cohesions. It also provides more transparent and potentially more effective food distribution. It also was seen to provide special support to female headed households.

Overall: Each project component showed strong justification for its inclusion based on one or other of the four criteria. The evaluation team judges Relief as the most appropriate intervention.



## **Cross cutting elements**

### Needs Assessment and SIMVA

1. WFP conducted four high-quality studies (“*Vulnerability to Food Insecurity...*, et. al.) that have been well used in the design of the current program. The collaboration between ICRC and WFP in carrying out one study was unusual for both organizations and highly effective.
2. SIMVA is an impressive system and represents considerable work, including numerous consultations between WFP Colombia and WFP Rome. It is well-designed, comprehensive, complete package and has good training tools.
3. It is not being used by WFP sub-offices either for baseline or for monitoring. (for its complexity, expense and time requirements.) One sub-office adapted it to create a “SIMVA-light.”
4. There are several exceptions among partners to widespread non-use of SIMVA. At least two partner were quite pleased with the system and the results.
5. The Church is not using SIMVA because it has another good system and hasn’t needed to adapt it.
6. There is no evidence of a link among SIMVA, monitoring, and evaluation.

### Targeting

1. Geographical targeting is appropriate as it has identified important areas of IDP need. Targeting has also contributed to the identification of appropriate implementing partners, strengthening synergism and local capacity.
2. Project selection is based on local knowledge of Regional Committee members (Acción, ICBF, PMA); beneficiary selection is based on the comprehensive knowledge of community leaders and partners. I.E. Partners are not always clear on, or aware of, WFP’s targeting criteria.
3. Target selection in many cases is very good, however the risk of discretionary selection of beneficiaries should not be underestimated..
4. Targeting to Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities is appropriate because they are separated from their historic and cultural livelihoods. (Recent armed conflict had tended to occur on indigenous land, exacerbating this trend.)
5. Non registered IDPs are a highly appropriate target group.
6. Most projects visited were in peri-urban settings.
7. There is a real dilemma between targeting based on displacement vs. vulnerability: in many locations host populations or ‘historically poor’ can be equally as vulnerable as many IDPs. The 70/30 programming flexibility addresses this issue. It is good that host populations (as long as they are vulnerable) are also supported in order not to raise tensions between both groups.

### Monitoring, Evaluation and Control systems

1. A re-invigorated M&E department has achieved almost 50% project monitoring, 30% of it selected randomly. These reports are consolidated monthly, quarterly and annually. With over 4,000 projects, this represents substantial achievement.
2. However, this monitoring measure *output* and process level accomplishments, not *outcome* level ones—a serious weakness.



3. The LogFrame does not show a link between proposed outputs, outcomes and activities. In addition, it is not consistent with the project document. “Improved livelihoods” is not well described and is not supported by defined outcomes. LogFrame indicators do not seem rigorously chosen, and do not in any way measure effectiveness (e.g. absence of nutritional indicators for MGL and RN.)
4. “Individually owned” projects require more supervision and closer monitoring than “institutionally owned” ones.
5. Strong capacities of analysis and sub-office performance are the pillars of the monitoring system whereby each project get a tailored attention, problematic projects visited regularly, others less so.
6. While great field staff effort was invested in a mid-term survey (760 households) that purports to show improvements in food access, the sampling methodology used precludes forming statistically valid conclusions. There may be qualitative value to the data collected.
7. Some “questionable” projects may require better decision-making regarding risks and benefits—and a plan of action to respond when unacceptable conditions are present.
8. Some FFW projects include a project narrative which describes clear targets and objectives. Including a similar (brief) narrative description for all projects would contribute to results-based management.

#### Partnerships

1. The tri-partite contract strengthens the GOC’s awareness of, and responsibility for, IDP issues. Nevertheless, both Acción Social and ICBF field staff sometimes demonstrate substantial deficiencies.
2. The number of implementing partners is high, sometimes serving a small number of beneficiaries, often carrying only one project. Working with 1,700 IPs contributes directly and indirectly to Civil Society strengthening. Many partners brings an important, integrated focus as well as additional resources to complement WFP resources.
3. There are big differences (in implementation modes, in systematic approach, in complementary) between institutional partners and community partners. In general the more established partners proved more efficient and effective. However some community partners were well run, and could have potentially large impact on community empowerment and subsequent sustainability. Sometimes they are the only way to reach certain populations.
4. Partner relationship with WFP was seen quite positively (communication, transparency, collegiality, field presence) by virtually all partners interviewed for this study, international, institutional-national, small national, GOC, etc.
5. There is potential for WFP to enhance the U.N. agency/community interface that does not seem to have been recognized.

#### Operational issues

1. The project suffered a substantial pipeline break in 2006 which resulted in serious credibility implications for some partners, as well as producing a virtual halt to some program components.





2. The entire Logistics operation seems to be running smoothly and efficiently. Local food purchases are a good program intervention.
3. Opening the new office was a good idea but brought additional costs. In spite of this office's being recently opened, things are running well.
4. All staff demonstrate high levels of analysis, competence, commitment, and are well informed of context and specific projects. Field staff are very hard working in physically demanding and dangerous conditions and seem significantly "stretched" (but are doing a good job.) While morale seems high, current contracting mechanisms mean staff uncertainty is high as regards their permanence in WFP and their career paths.
5. In specific areas, the USAID emblem is reported to cause security problems sometimes. A waiver was reported as possible but appears not to have been requested.
6. In some cases there is high probability of duplication of beneficiaries. In several cases, WFP staff may not have been fully aware of the risks.
7. In almost all project, there was some form of WFP visibility (posters). This was less prominent than some other donor identification, however. In most project, beneficiary entitlement notices were clearly visible, thus empowering beneficiaries.
8. In one area, improper commodities were discovered; the risk is that the size of the damage is unknown representing a failure of reporting.
9. While there are almost universal reports of high quality food being consumed (not sold), in some areas there were important questions raised regarding the cultural appropriateness of the ration. There were also a number of complaints against green peas.
10. Given high national staff competencies in Colombia, the current number of international positions could be thoughtfully reviewed.

#### Gender/ Enhanced commitment to women

1. There is a satisfactorily high number of women supervisors (*coordinadoras*) in the field—also in Bogotá.
2. Much of the program gives prominent attention to women's issues.
3. The project gives good importance to adolescent pregnancies.
4. The percentage of women/men beneficiaries is 55/45.
5. There were some vivid examples of significant women's leadership and empowerment.

#### Balance between Relief and Recovery

1. The current project proposes a 70/30 split between Relief and Recovery. In actuality, resources are being expended about 50/50.
2. While some of this flexibility seems appropriate, in current Colombian conditions and given WFP's competitive advantage in food, the team judges it is important to adequately fulfil relief programming needs. With recent increased displacement, WFP can look at reviewing this 50/50 split.
3. Based on different conditions in each region, there are similar questions regarding the relief-recovery split.



4. It is not clear whether WFP has developed clear program criteria to move beneficiaries from Relief to Recovery.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

### **Design**

- The PRRO is a generally successful project and demonstrates many improvements from its predecessor. It is highly relevant, while filling a huge need within the target population.
- The operation is ambitious and responds to a complex situation and dynamic context.
- The UN agencies and international community interviewed have shown enthusiasm towards the WFP activities as implemented in Colombia.
- The PRRO offers an interesting opportunity to attend people, in particular the IDPs who are not registered, who would otherwise not be supported.

### **Monitoring and evaluation**

- With respect to the previous operation, this PRRO has substantially improved its M&E systems, being now able to follow-up to a very respectable level on the outputs. A findings which is all the more important that WFP is working with 1400 partners in Colombia.
- The M&E system however presents a limit in that it does not look into measuring outcome level results –probably a limitation which does not lie necessarily only at the CO level, but also involves the responsibility of the organisation corporately. It is important to focus on developing outcome indicators, in coordination with ICBF, Accion Social and other Government actors. Some of WFP’s partners are already taking interesting steps in that respect, which the operation could build on.
- The operation’s logical framework should be improved in that light
- When the conditions of a project do not respond to the standards set by WFP, support should be stopped.

### **Resources and logistics**

- The resources have been much limited in comparison to the needs.
- The pipeline break has represented an important obstacle for the implementation, and particularly impacted on some projects.
- The logistical mechanisms, for follow-up of goods and distribution has been observed to be effective and efficient
- The quality of food distributed and food storage was good in most places visited.
- The creation of Regional committees where WFP / ICBF / Accion Social can jointly discuss the projects has been an excellent innovation and runs well.

### **Activities**

- School feeding appears to be a relevant and effective intervention. However, focusing on educational objectives contributes to a dispersion of goals at the



country-office level. Once started, school feeding programs are hard to stop if resources need to be channelled back into Relief.

- As currently implemented, preschool feeding is another way of supporting vulnerable groups, and could conceivably be folded into that component without loss of focus.
- MCH and RN are not effective components in nutritional terms though they may be effective in improved access to health services.
- FFW and FFT were judged appropriate when embedded in wider developmental initiatives. However, some projects visited were deemed no longer a high priority for continued FFW assistance. In other communities, the potential for new FFW/FFT projects was identified—perhaps as follow-on when relief projects end.
- The evaluation team judges Relief as the most appropriate program intervention.
- PANEM seems an excellent program initiative and should be maintained
- The current flexibility between Relief and Recovery is appropriate for the Colombian context. The current 50/50 ratio between the two should not be eroded further, and should be regularly reviewed and possibly revised as appropriate. The needs of actual new IDPs in terms of relief support should be the first determining factor for adjusting the ratio between relief and recovery, considering that WFP's mandate has a specific focus on emergency assistance.
- The operation has yielded important indirect effects as well:
  - WFP's wide presence is contributing to improved physical protection in the beneficiary population.
  - WFP supported community-based activities have created and enhanced social cohesion.
  - WFP staff's interaction with communities, partners and others has resulted in enhanced self-esteem (and sense of support) in many beneficiaries
  - There is a general recognition that WFP efforts have contributed to a significant raising of awareness of IDP issues in Colombia.

### **Management and programming mechanisms**

- SIMVA is an important tool for evaluating vulnerabilities in Colombia and for monitoring their evolution. It is the result of a tremendous effort from the Country Office, its partners and WFP Hq. however, it is not being used at its fullest due to its complexity and the resources –human, financial and in training- required to implement it, notably at field level.
- Continue to focus program priority on IDPs while remaining flexible to vulnerabilities of the host population. The (new) geographic targeting is appropriate and the change in structure responded to a real need.
- Indigenous communities, Blockaded communities, or non-registered IDPs are particularly relevant groups to target, due to highest needs.
- The high quality of staff ( competent, committed, hard-working) and inter-linked field performance is impressive.



## Partnerships

- The evaluation found good complementarity between WFP, ICBF and Accion Social.
- The Government of Colombia provided important resources to the operation:
  - Provision of special financial grant, during the pipeline break, allowing some activities to continue;
  - Distribution of complementary non-food items (school kits, school kitchen utensils ...)
  - Provision of Bienestarina as a complementary food item to children
  - Human resources specifically assigned to the operation (two professionals per region)
- There is a good potential for WFP to improve its interface role between the population it serves and the UN system. Strengthening the interchange of information is a good means for ensuring the visibility of the IDPs problematic.
- Many partners are community-based small entities and have little means to implement their activities.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

**One Big Change/ Few Others:** The evaluation team does not see a follow-on PRRO much different from the current one in terms of programme shape and structure. Strategic Objective formulation should be re-thought as SO2 is not believed to be appropriate as the *only* conceptual underpinning of the programme; SO3 and SO4 should be incorporated into the Goal formulation of the new PRRO where appropriate.

The team would also argue for more resources directed to Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations. We suggest a careful weighing of the cost implications of considering *a family ration* for PLM and NR components in order to increase in a meaningful way the current quite small ration in these components. The flexibility to reallocate resources among these competing demands may require adjustments based on evolving country conditions; by-and-large, we leave those judgments in the hands of the programme designers and the CO team.

**Regularly review the Relief/Recovery Split:** The evaluation team is not offering a different allocation; but does encourage the CO to reflect regularly on whether the operation's balance between Relief and Recovery.

**Evaluate Cost-effectiveness:** In the new programme, we think it is appropriate to study the issues of cost effectiveness and current geographical dispersion.

**Outcome Monitoring:** A log Frame should be developed that challenges the CO to measure outcome monitoring and evaluation in a more systematic and program-wide fashion

**Continue Special Support to Communities at Risk and PANEM:** budget these two components as was planned in the current PRRO and then fund at 100% of budget.

**Continue Attention to Partner Targeting:** More attention could be given to ensuring that implementing partners understand and interiorize WFP targeting criteria.



**Avoid Future Pipeline Breaks:** WFP leadership must do everything in its power to avoid any replay of the disastrous programme cuts that took place in October, '06. No programme can run successfully at 42% of budget.

**Maintain and Strengthen Appropriate WFP Roles:** Sight must not be lost that WFP's role in IDP support does not replace the GOC's responsibility to this population.

**Increase Programme, perhaps to as much as 100,000 MTs:** The evaluation team believes the appropriate programme size to respond to the Colombia IDP situation could be in the order of **100,000 MTs**.



*Mid-Term Evaluation of Colombia PRRO 10366.0*

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## **APPENDIX B: TERMS OF REFERENCE**

### **WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME**

#### **Evaluation of PRRO Colombia 10366.0**

#### **Terms of Reference - final pre-mission draft**

### **Background**

#### **Presentation of the Colombian context**

After more than 40 years of conflict, Colombia faces a humanitarian crisis, manifesting through a nation-wide phenomenon of internal displacement. This has affected an estimated 2-3 million people out of a population of 43 million during the last two decades, although numbers are disputed<sup>30</sup>. New displacements have averaged about 300,000 per year since 2000, increasing to 586,000 people in 2002 alone<sup>31</sup> and subsequently Colombia hosts today the second largest population of Internally Displaced People (IDP) worldwide.

Internal migrations are often the result of combined causes which reflect the complexity of stakes coming into play in the context of the Colombian conflict. Tackling displacement from its source hence implies engaging into activities related to peace building. Internal displacement can also be addressed from the point of view of its direct consequences on people's livelihoods. IDPs indeed suffer psychologically and socio-economically from the total forced abandonment of all property as well as the lack of livelihood strategies. Research shows that IDPs most often end up living in peri-urban settings which do not permit them to reproduce their only-known ways of living. The loss of economic means of subsistence in turn hurls affected households into the vicious circle of poverty. Beyond the household level, displacement also creates a strain within the settlement areas, the city suburbs being ill-prepared to receive such afflux of people, notably in light of the available access to social services.

Problems of conflict, violence and displacement are being experienced throughout the country. CODHES figures show that between January 2003 and June 2005, at least 275 municipalities in 30 departments of Colombia were affected by confinement or blockades<sup>32</sup>.

To respond to the issues caused by the internal conflict, WFP's governing body, the Executive Board has since 2000 approved three consecutive PRROs<sup>33</sup>, for a total budget of US\$89.5 million<sup>34</sup>. The trend since 2000 shows an expansion of coverage

<sup>30</sup> Numbers range from 1.8 million from official sources, to over 3,5 million from CODHES, and a non-governmental organization specialized on issues of displacement in Colombia.

<sup>31</sup> See [http://www.wfp.org/country\\_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=170&region=4&section=9&sub\\_section=4](http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=170&region=4&section=9&sub_section=4)

<sup>32</sup> CODHES "Confinamiento de Población civil: Una aproximación conceptual para la caracterización de este fenómeno en Colombia".

<sup>33</sup> PRRO 6139 (Feb 2000-Jan 2002), PRRO 10158 (Jan. 2003-Dec 2005, later revised to 30 April 2005), and PRRO 10366 (May 2005-March 2007)

<sup>34</sup> This figure does not reflect actual expenditures, yet to be ascertained.



and beneficiary numbers, reflecting WFP's decision to include in addition to IDPs (registered and non-registered), host communities and other populations affected by the conflict.

### **Description of PRRO 10366.0**

The present PRRO 10366.0 was approved by the Executive Board in February 2005 for a total budget of approximately US\$40 million and first distributions started in June 2005<sup>35</sup>. In comparison to the previous operations, the on-going PRRO takes into account changes in the conflict dynamics through a revised implementation strategy, extending the time and outreach of its coverage, in order to reach all new IDPs (registered or not) as well as “blockaded communities”<sup>36</sup>, whenever possible.

The PRRO was initially designed to end in March 2007. In October 2006, an extension-in-time of one year was approved by the Executive Director to allow adequate time for developing the future activities (over and above the current PRRO) in line with the new Government programmes, following the re-election of the President of Colombia who took office in August 2006. A budget revision (n<sup>#</sup>6) was subsequently approved in December 2006, increasing the total budget value to US\$ 58.1million.

The PRRO aims at protecting livelihoods and ensuring access to adequate food for 499,000 IDPs and host communities for a period of three years, with a food commodity commitment of 70,133 MT<sup>37</sup>. The intervention approach encompasses on one hand a relief response (41% of resources) consisting of General Food Distribution (GFD) and community kitchens to 160,000 newly displaced people (officially registered and non-registered) and beneficiaries in blockaded /confined and at risk of displacement communities in rural areas. Secondly, a recovery component (59% of resources) consists of activities aiming at livelihood protection and longer-term assets building, through Food-For-Work (FFW), Food-For-Training (FFT), Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) and School Feeding (SF).

The PRRO includes a new logistics set-up; strengthened sub-offices with more field staff; the opening of two additional sub-offices to cover the south and south-eastern part of the country; streamlined approval mechanisms for projects (activities) to be supported; and a consolidated monitoring scheme.

In September 2006 (at 75% of its duration), the PRRO was funded at approximately 50% (42% since budget increase). With a view to cater for essential operational expenses, the country office (CO) was granted US\$500,000 from the Immediate Response Account (IRA) funds.

WFP's government counterpart is the Colombian Agency for International Cooperation (ACCI). Main partners for implementation are the Government's RSS (Red de Solidaridad Social- now Acción Social) and Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar; church organizations; and international and national NGOs. As

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<sup>35</sup> To date 5,926 Mt have been distributed to 405,000 beneficiaries

<sup>36</sup> Communities which have seen their freedom of movement restricted by armed groups and reported to face similar conditions to IDPs (IDMC report, p.142)

<sup>37</sup> Initially designed for two years and with a food component of 49,220 MT, i.e. before BR.





co-signers of the Humanitarian Action Plan (“HAP2”), other UN agencies are also part of the stakeholder picture. The main donors are USA, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and ECHO (European Commission).

The Government counterpart organizations for the PRRO are the “Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF)” and “Social Action (Acción Social)”, the latter depending on the Presidency, in charge of IDP assistance. They participate actively in targeting and monitoring at the project level. Also, they have jointly allocated USD 30 million (additional to the USD 40 million PRRO value) for complementary non-food items and project support, as expressed in the LOU. So far USD 3.93 million of the USD 9.6 million to be administered by WFP through trust fund agreements has been made available<sup>38</sup>.

The current PRRO includes a new logistics set-up; strengthened sub-offices with more field staff; the opening of two additional sub-offices to cover the south and south-eastern part of the country; streamlined approval mechanisms for projects (activities) to be supported; and a consolidated monitoring scheme.

### **Evaluation purpose, scope and objective**

According to WFP’s evaluation policy all programmes have to be evaluated once in their life cycle<sup>39</sup>. Evaluations are meant both for enabling WFP and its partners to learn from experience and for rendering accountability to the Executive Board.

This particular evaluation was requested by the CO to be undertaken at mid-term so that the findings could inform the design of a new PRRO starting in early 2008. The Country Director has also asked that the mission examines WFP’s strategic position in Colombia and provides recommendations with regard to the need to redefine its role in the framework of the changing humanitarian situation and specially related to the on-going peace process.

The findings and recommendations of this evaluation will refer to the current PRRO 10366.0 approved in February 2005 and extended until March 2008. WFP is currently operating in 21 departments<sup>40</sup> (of which 13 have been the same since 2000) in the north, centre, south and western parts of the country, through ten sub-offices (five main and six satellite)<sup>41</sup> The PRRO has supported more than 4,718 projects with 1,778 partners - informal partnerships in project support, technical assistance and implementation ranging from schools (16%) and Community-Based Organization

<sup>38</sup> Government Resources in Trust Fund are being used to purchase non food items (school and community kitchen kits) and to pay for the local transport of Bienestarina: a local fortified soy/wheat blend), which is contributed by ICBF to the PRRO components of school, pre-school, nutritional risk and MCH.

<sup>39</sup> WFP/EB3/2003/4C

<sup>40</sup> Antioquia, Choco, Cordoba, Sucre, Bolivar, Atlantico, Magdalena, Guajira, Cesar, N. de Santander, Santander, Cundinamarca, Bogotá, Meta, Huila, Caqueta, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Putumayo, Nariño y Tolima.

<sup>41</sup> Main suboffice: In Bogota, Cartagena, Cali, Bucaramanga and Medellin (consisting of one coordinator, one field monitor, one national volunteer, one M&E assistant, one admin assistant and one or two drivers); and additionally a WFP warehouse with a COMPAS and one logistics clerk.

Satellite Offices: In Quibdó, Cucuta, Pasto, Valledupar and Neiva. (Consists of one coordinator, one volunteer and one driver).



(CBO) (39%) to municipalities and other Government institutions at the local level (28%), the church (11%) and local and international NGOs (6%).

In view of the limited resources and time available for the evaluation, the team will only be able to visit a few selected departments based on criteria to be determined jointly between the Office of Evaluation and the Country Office. All PRRO activities will be examined, i.e. GFD, FFW, FFT, vulnerable group feeding and school feeding.

The objective of the evaluation is to present an objective analysis of WFP's strategic role and activities in Colombia, based on WFP's standard evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and connectedness/ sustainability, and confronting actual achievements to the project plan.

## Evaluation focus and approach

### Key issues and questions:

#### **1. Have the PRRO objectives been relevant to the needs and context prevailing in Colombia throughout the operation?**

- At the time of project design, were the set goal and intended outcomes relevant to needs as identified by the assessments? Were they relevant to the context, in particular to the GoC's development framework or the actions of other partners?
- To what extent have objectives ensured their continued relevance to needs and to other development-related contextual elements, including the peace process?

#### **2. Are the activities implemented in the most efficient manner?**

- Are the interventions approaches<sup>42</sup> appropriate considering the overall goal of protecting and stabilizing livelihoods and enhancing resilience to shocks? Which activities are the most efficient? Are the food rations adequate?
- Is the (sub-)office structure efficient in supporting the intervention? Is this the best approach given the context, compared to others? Does the sub office structure allow efficient use of staff resources?
  - Have new logistics arrangements contributed to an improved efficiency?<sup>43</sup>
- To what extent have resource mobilization constraints and subsequent pipeline breaks adversely affected the effective implementation of the PRRO?
- Do the targeting mechanisms allow for an efficient coverage of needs in Colombia?
  - To what extent are IDP the most appropriate target population?
  - Does WFP effectively reach its intended targets? How does WFP tackle the risk of excluding non-registered IDPs?<sup>44</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Targeted general rations; Food for Training / Work; Vulnerable group feeding or school feeding.

<sup>43</sup> Please see Logistics Matrix and Logistics mission reports by Riaz Lodhi dated 2004)

<sup>44</sup> See Partner agreement signed in 2006 with Pastoral Social and CRS, to assist non-registered IDPs.



- How equitable is the access to WFP assistance (type / volume) according to the target groups (registered / non-registered; blockaded communities, recipient communities, groups unassisted due to mandate reasons...)
- How cost-efficient are current beneficiary identification mechanisms and what could be potential benefits of using existing networks (NGOs, CBOs, municipalities, etc)? Should more / less / different people be targeted with respect to cost-efficiency purposes? What is the relevance of the family unit in view of costs?
- Are systems in place to identify needs and vulnerabilities contributing to an efficient targeting?
  - Is the SIMVA<sup>45</sup> the most adequate mechanism to assess vulnerabilities the Colombian context? What methodology was used to decide upon the numbers of beneficiaries to be assisted through relief or recovery assistance?<sup>46</sup>
  - Has it allowed better understanding the livelihoods of vulnerable people?<sup>47</sup> Does the intervention take into account the reason for displacement (Military actions to controlled land / intimidation; Drug traffic /aerial fumigation ; Guerrilla /paramilitary)? Should it been used to design tailor-made responses to each particular need?
  - Does the SIMVA confer to WFP a role of as information source for other actors in Colombia? Do SIMVA, needs assessment and monitoring processes carried in Colombia inform each other and what are the links between these three data sets?
  - Would more in-depth local level assessments, before project approval, be recommended, taking into account available human and financial resources and requirements in terms of timeliness?

### **3. Does WFP demonstrate effective results with the strategy followed?**

- What evidence is there to show that the intended outcomes<sup>48</sup> have been achieved and effectively lead to protecting and stabilizing livelihoods and enhancing resilience to shocks<sup>49</sup>?
  - Has the assistance been provided on a timely basis
  - To what extent is the intervention reaching the assessed needs and planned coverage? How effectively is the project ensuring female participation in sub-project/activity selection and in programming?
- How do WFP's partnerships (formal or informal) with Government and other partners such as UN, bilateral donors, ICRC and NGOs contribute to more effective implementation<sup>50</sup>?
  - How does WFP collaborate with other UN agencies? (IASC, CCA, UNDAF, results?)

<sup>45</sup> Sistema de Identificación y Monitoreo de la Vulnerabilidad Alimentaria / System for the identification and monitoring of food vulnerability.

<sup>46</sup> ICRC/WFP rapid needs assessment, 2004.

<sup>47</sup> See SIMVA reports for Bogota and other eight cities.

<sup>48</sup> Reduced proportion of expenditure on food items; increase diversity in diet; retained and diversified human and physical assets; and increased retention of displaced children in primary school –see project document p. 8.

<sup>49</sup> See project document p. 9.

<sup>50</sup> Sara Laughton PED, Targeting in Emergencies, case study Colombia



- Definition of roles of each agency over IDPs assistance (ICRC, UNHCR, UNICEF) and advocacy?
- To what extent have the contributions (including Government and other partner's inputs) added to the effectiveness of the operation?
- Are the Implementing Partners' capacities hindering effectiveness?
- Is there room for more coordination to enhance programme effectiveness?
- Interaction with the entire humanitarian system? (CO)

**4. To what extent is the operation connected to future needs and attentive to the sustainability of its results?**

- To what extent is the operation taking into account longer term needs and problems as identified by national stakeholders (Government, other international organizations, local NGOs, beneficiaries)?
- What is the likelihood that the benefits from the assistance will continue after WFP has completed the programme?
  - What is the likelihood that programs supported by WFP will continue to operate if and when WFP moves from one geographic area to another? Have links to national instance been developed for a potential hand over?
- Does the intervention effectively contribute to strengthening the GoC's actions towards IDPs?
- Is a time bound and feasible exit strategy in place?

**5. What is/ could be WFP's niche in the Colombian context; now and in the future?**

- How has the WFP strategy developed since 2000 in the context of the humanitarian situation in Colombia?
- To what extent is the IDP focus still valid and for how long more is it likely to be?
- What is/should be WFP's role related to the questions of humanitarian access, assistance, protection and advocacy, considering WFP's policies and mandate?
  - Does WFP act as a catalyst for other types of assistance? Does WFP have a role in increasing access?
  - Can /should WFP stand up for having a role beyond the delivery of its assistance? How could WFP make a difference? What type of protection? What drawback could be expected?
- How could WFP contribute to peace efforts in Colombia?
  - Can Colombia be considered to be in a peace building / peace process context?
  - What are WFP's other options in contributing to the solution of the conflict within its mandate? And to what extent is WFP already pursuing them? (E.g. offering alternative activity to enrolment in paramilitary groups who recruit from destitute environments.)
  - How does WFP insert its action within other international agencies working on peace building?
- What could be WFP's role on advocacy for food security within the IDPs thematic?
- What would be the implications, for WFP's intervention strategy, of the adoption of the cluster approach in Colombia?



### **Evaluation approach**

The evaluation of the PRRO was first planned for 2006. The extension of the PRRO, to align future programming onto the new Government's priorities, implied delaying the evaluation to remain a mid-term exercise. In the meantime, the OEDE manager for this exercise has changed.

**A preparatory mission** was carried out from 27 to 31 March 2006, with the initial OEDE manager and the selected team leader at the time (who has not been retained for the main mission).

**An inception paper** captured the main findings of this preparatory mission and outlined key issues to be covered. The inception paper will be available to the evaluation team, as background reading.

As usual, the evaluation mission will be preceded by a desk research, based on a review of documents from internal and external sources, including both quantitative and qualitative data from WFP databases. A briefing file will be provided by the evaluation manager to that effect.

To the extent possible data will be collected prior to the mission by OEDE and CO (background documentation, food distribution and M&E data), in order to ensure that the team can spend the time in-country analyzing and validating data with CO, sub offices, beneficiaries and partners.

The evaluation will be founded primarily on a **field mission** scheduled for February 12<sup>th</sup> to March 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2007, all inclusive. A specific programme and itinerary will be identified in collaboration with CO and team leader prior to the evaluation.

### **Evaluation methodology**

The evaluation methodology to be used during the field mission will be further developed by the team leader on the basis of the Terms of Reference and the evaluation focus.

The evaluation is expected to combine the use of quantitative and qualitative methods, to rely on various data collection tools ranging from direct observation to informal and semi-structured interviews and focus groups, as relevant. Consulted stakeholders should include beneficiaries, representatives of the government counterparts, partners (UN agencies, other international organizations, local NGOs or CBOs, church organizations); non-partner agencies as well as WFP staff in Colombia, in the Regional Bureau and in the head office in Rome. Getting the CO's active participation into the process of this exercise would appear relevant in view of the lesson-drawing purpose for this evaluation.

The evaluation team will be required to use WFP's evaluation guidelines and standards, as per documentation which will be made available to them as part of a briefing package. WFP's evaluation standards refer to ALNAP, DAC, UNEG or Sphere, and will be used as a basis for monitoring the quality of the evaluation process.



If the team leader should find it a useful tool, a matrix drawing all questions to be answered and summarizing all data collection aspects to be tackled in the process will be designed before the mission starts, based on the proposed following standard WFP template:

<b>Evaluation question 1</b>		
<b>Sub questions 1.1.</b>		
	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Data collection methods and sources</b>
<b>1.1.1.</b>	▪	▪
<b>1.1.2.</b>	▪	▪

### Reporting arrangements

After the main field mission, two reports shall be drafted: a full “technical” report and a summary report, which will be presented to the WFP Executive Board.

Both reports shall adequately cover all areas specified in the ToR, and additional factors that affected the performance of the PRRO. They shall be presented in clear and concise language with appropriate visual aids and according to the format presented in the ToRs.

An executive summary shall reflect the format of the main text, and clearly outline key evaluation conclusions and recommendations. The report’s conclusions shall flow logically from, and reflect, the report’s central findings. All value judgements shall be supported by clear and defensible evidence. The recommendations must: (a) be clear, relevant and implementable (b) emerge from the main conclusions and reflect consultation with key stakeholders (c) suggest a timeframe for implementation and a responsibility for follow-up and (d) be presented in order to reflect priorities.

The full report, of a maximum of 60 pages, shall include:

- A list of acronyms
- An executive summary
- An introduction on country and operational contexts
- A presentation of the evaluated programme
- An explanation on the methodology followed
- Main findings, conclusions and recommendations
- Annexes: Terms of reference, bibliography, list of persons met, maps, programme/itinerary and any other visit specific and/or relevant documents.

The summary report, not exceeding 7000 words<sup>51</sup>, shall include:

- A list of acronym
- An executive summary
- An introduction on country, operational contexts and evaluated programme
- An explanation on the methodology followed
- Main findings and conclusions and recommendations.

<sup>51</sup> Including the main text, tables and footnotes, as well as the management response matrix.



Recommendations shall be presented in an attached matrix which shall not exceed 2000 words, including the management responses.

## Evaluation process details

### Key stakeholders of the evaluation

Though the exercise will be managed by the Office of Evaluation; the evaluation work itself will be conducted by an external team composed of independent consultants.

Overall, the team should ideally bring together: (i) familiarity with displacement issues in the context of Colombia, notably with regards to matters of livelihoods conservation or recovery; and (ii) a good knowledge of food security or food aid programming issues, ideally in WFP's operational context and in an IDP context.

**The team leader** will be particularly responsible for the evaluative process and should thus be an expert in evaluation of humanitarian assistance programmes, preferably food aid-related. His/her main responsibilities comprise: (i) drafting an evaluation framework which will serve as basis for the field work and subsequent analysis; (ii) supervising the data collection process and potential adjustment of tools, if necessary; (iii) organizing the team's work in the field; (iv) conveying the mission main findings during both the in-country and headquarters-based debriefings, and (v) writing both full and summary reports, on the basis of each team member's written contributions.

**Two additional team members (international consultants)** will be recruited by OEDE to bring specific technical expertise on two main critical aspects to this operation: livelihoods analysis and food security / nutrition.

**A third national team member** (consultant) will provide solid insider's knowledge to the exercise, notably with respect to his sound understanding of the complex juridical issues prevailing in Colombia. His/her expertise with data-based management will also be used. As well as his /her knowledge of Colombian Government institutional capacity and social programmes at all levels.

**All team members shall be** expected to contribute to the evaluation process as per assigned responsibilities; following the approach developed by the team leader and they shall fully participate in meetings as scheduled. They shall also deliver a written technical report covering their area of focus and structured according to a format agreed before with the Team leader.

**The evaluation manager** will support the overall evaluation exercise, preparing the Terms of Reference and a thorough briefing file for the evaluation team; liaising between team members, relevant WFP headquarters staff and country and selected sub-offices; preparing and participating in the field missions to assist the team leader with logistical arrangements and possibly with the data collection work. The manager will also ensure that the evaluation keeps on intended tracks.

**The programme advisor for the WFP Panama Regional Bureau** will also join the team and take part in the final discussions over main findings, so as to ensure their



appropriate contextualisation and favour smooth information sharing at the regional level.

As this evaluation is meant to be formative<sup>52</sup>, **Country Office staff** involved in the implementation of the PRRO should be actively implicated in the preparation and conduct of this evaluation. They would also be asked to support this evaluation, first by advising on main issues at stake, timing and itinerary considerations prior to the visits. Secondly, they shall facilitate the team’s field work by ensuring that necessary in-country material is timely prepared; providing logistical support and adequate working space and assisting in the organization briefing/debriefing sessions. They will eventually be asked to provide their written comments on the reports.

**Key stakeholders** internal or external to WFP will be consulted at strategic stages in the process, mainly to comment on ToRs, for the post-mission debriefing, and to review the drafts reports.

It is also proposed to involve an **external peer review group** of internationally recognized authorities on the topic, to capitalize on the already existing experience in the field. The group would be called upon to discuss the ToRs and the first draft of the report. The members of the group would participate in their individual capacity. Details are still to be defined.

### **Tentative schedule**

The field mission will extend over 3 weeks, from February 12 to March 2, 2007. Details regarding the timing of various steps are captured in the table below:

<b>Timing</b>	<b>Evaluation task</b>
<i>Already achieved</i>	
January 2006	Inception paper drafted by OEDE evaluation manager
March 2006	Preparatory mission in Colombia
April –May 2006	Inception report drafting
June 2006	Hand over to new evaluation manager and postponing of evaluation
<i>Tentative schedule</i>	
November 2006	ToRs circulated and team identified
January 2007	ToRs finalized with team leader and methodology developed
February 2007	Main mission from 12/02/07 to 02/03/07- Short Aide Mémoire with initial findings and recommendations from the field mission presented to CO and stakeholders before leaving Colombia
March 2007	Reports (full and summary) writing
April 2007	Reports circulated to all stakeholders
May – June 2007	Reports finalized and submitted for editing, translation and distribution

<sup>52</sup> See p. 2: purpose.





November 2007	Presentation to EB2-2007 for consideration
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OEDE / A. Larmoyer / 29/01/ 07

Final pre-mission TORs Colombia PRRO evaluation



*Mid-Term Evaluation of Colombia PRRO 10366.0*

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## APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

### PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES

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#### **School feeding / pre-school:**

##### What?

How many kids, What grades?  
How many months received? Do they follow guidance?  
Cooking in AM or PAM  
Who does cooking? how are paid for?  
Complementary condiments added? Utensils?  
Minimum requirements in place?  
Pre-school: psychosocial / integral complementary activities / material they have to stimulate.  
OBS: place of cooking / store  
How do they monitor the project?

##### Results?

Attention, attendance, pass grades, retention, drop out?  
Is food enough: what difference does it make?  
Negative effects (environment?)  
Income transfer effect?

##### Connectedness?

How to think about taking over from other instances?

### **MCHN**

##### What:

How children & mothers selected?  
What tools for measurement of weight / height etc (M&C)  
Record keeping of nutritional follow-up / pre-natal  
How much / for how long do they each receive? Is it sufficient to respond to needs?  
(M&C)  
OBS: Weight a child?  
OBS: Is food fortified with micronutrients?  
OBS: regularity of distributions to children  
Is there a HC nearby in case of need?  
What complementary activities are given? Do mothers follow H / N education?  
How do they monitor the project?



Results:

Did children improve their nutritional status (have children increase in weight...),  
how many defaulters?  
Improvement of health? (less sickness)  
Effects of pipeline breaks ?  
Mothers: How many pre-natal visits? (evidence it is food related)

Connectedness:

What relationship between programme and ICBF?

**Food-for-work**

What:

Number of beneficiaries? MT distributed?  
Women participation?  
What activities?  
How long did the project go on for?  
How many person days per month did they involve?  
How have they selected the projects? Participatory process? Criteria for selection?  
Are projects usually stand alone or do they fit into bigger picture?  
Does it involve agric. ? Housing? Reforestation?  
What standards are used? (Sphere?)  
How do they monitor the project?  
How do they evaluate the project  
Does the project take other complementary activities into account? (e.g. in case of reforestation: watering of trees)

Results:

What was produced (be specific)? What outcome did it generate? (e.g. increased variety of food consumption)  
Does it correspond to a real need? I.e. Work a real work or just pretext for distributing food?  
OBS: quality of products  
Negative effect on more burden on women?  
Negative effects on environment?

Connectedness:

Do projects they fit into bigger picture?  
What use for the community?  
Consideration to long-term maintenance?

**Food-For-Training**

What:

How was the project identified?



Who benefits? is gender balance appropriate?  
Who takes care of family when the adults (women) are on training?  
Length of projects?  
How do they monitor?  
How do they evaluate the project ('s quality)?

Results:

What are the products are produced?  
How many use their training into an activity?  
Negative effect on family care practises?  
Negative effect: undermining value of training in itself?  
Impact of pipeline break?  
Popularity of FFT vs. FFW?

Connectedness:

How does it connect to a longer term activity?

**Relief food / VGF:**

What:

Situation of HH: assets they have, working, etc?  
How many people benefited?  
For how long? Is it enough (3 / 6 months)?  
How much do they receive and is it sufficient? (how long did it last?)  
Pipeline breaks? How are they handled/ How long before did they know/ Could they have planned ahead?  
Is the food appropriate (composition and quality), do children eat it?

Results:

Did they eat or sell the food? Which did they eat / sell?  
Did they sell any asset since they got the food?  
Have situation improved?  
Protection effect of WFP presence?  
Negative effects: conflict between IDPs and host population?  
Security threat from getting the food? from logo?

Connectedness:

Dependency issue /What next for beneficiaries?

**CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES:**

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**Needs & vulnerability assessments:**

Did they do NA? How did they use it?



Participation to SIMVA by the sub offices?  
Other data collected by IPs and what are their vulnerability criteria ?

**Targeting:**

How do they determine targets / on what basis do they determine needs? Do they ask any more question beyond the IDP criteria?  
Exclusion error: What population should be receiving and does not : why?  
Inclusion error: who receives and should not and why?  
Are there any duplications between activities / are beneficiaries receiving twice?  
Is PRRO targeting reflecting urban share of IDPs (80%)?  
Would it be more relevant (ie WFP value added) and cost-efficient to focus on urban areas?

**M&E:**

Do they monitor? What system is in place? How do they control the distribution?  
Do they evaluate they projects? How?  
How do they control that intended targets only are reached? What percentage is rejected?  
Does the IP monitor beyond the WFP output level? How could WFP hold the IP accountable for such information?

**Partnerships:**

How did you choose the IP / how did the partnership come about?  
How often does the IP hear about / communicate with WFP?  
Pipeline breaks: how long before were you informed about it?  
Working relationships. When you have a problem, can you go to WFP and how can they help? Has WFP suggested to you some ways to resolve your problem?  
How you attempted / needed to suggest changes in the WFP / the IP's programming framework and how did it go?  
Have you attended any shared events with WFP and other organizations related to programme design?  
Cap building opportunities for IPs (on vulnerabilities, data management etc)?

**Operational issues:**

▪ **Structure:**

Appropriateness of structure?  
Ask WFP office: How costly (more or less) is the structure: what info can get on previous / current?  
Do you need this structure to FU so many IPs?  
Why not present in neediest areas?  
Ask Church: where are the beneficiaries whom you would wish to assist and actually are excluded?  
Ask HCR/ ICRC: what food needs in IDP-concentrated areas?  
What efficiency of S/O to satellite office structure?  
Protection through presence?

▪ **Re-bagging / bag logo challenges?**



- **Logistics** mechanisms effective?
- How is **planning of activities** handled?
- **Are food rations** sufficient?
- **Gender**: What male / female beneficiary ratio? Per activity
- Is the **mix of activities** appropriate ?
- How many MT managed directly by / beneficiaries reached through **Gvt / NGOs**?

**Targeting of IDPs sub-groups:**

- Is the division of resources towards non-registered IDPs appropriately reflecting their weight?
  - E.g.: Is the 10% of resources directed at pastoral social and partly benefiting non registered IDPs appropriate when the non registered supposedly represent at least than 50% of IDPs?
- Is 18 months the appropriate cut off to be considered as “**recent IDP**” and thus **eligible** beneficiaries?
- What share do **non registered IDP / blockaded / confined communities / fumigation or paramil –related IDPs** represent ? Are they likely to be more or equally vulnerable that registered ones?
- Is assistance directed at non registered in each area?



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## APPENDIX D : EVALUATION TRAVEL SCHEDULE

### Week One: Feb. 12-16

Bogotá Meetings

Feb. 17: Field trip to Soacha

### Week Two: Feb. 19-24

The South	The North Coast	The Center
<b>Cali</b>	<b>Cartagena</b>	<b>Quibdo:</b>
Buena Ventura	Barrio Nelson Mandela	Barrio El Futuro
FUNDEMUIJER	NINEMA	Casa Hogar Nuestro Sueño
Jarillamillo	Minuto a Diós	Escuela San Francisco de
Tumaco	Fundación Tierra de	Caraño
Población AWA	Hombres	Casa Misión USEMI
Pasto	Barrio Olaya Herrera-	Grupo Mujeres
Población Indígena	Ciénaga de la Virgen	Tangui
	Barrio Villa Hermosa	Los Alamos
	<b>Barranquilla, Atlántico</b>	Regional Committee meeting
	FUNPROMAT	Office meetings
	<b>La Guajira</b>	<b>Granada- El Meta</b>
	Wapiapa, Dibulla,	Pastoral Social Granada
	Riohacha	Escuela Granada
	<b>Cesar</b>	San Juan de Arana
	Codazzi, "Asomadeco"	Vista Hermosa
	Manaure	NGO ASEDIN
	Winatukwa, Puebla Bello	Casas FFW
		El Castillo
		CIVIPAZ

### Week Three: Feb. 26-March 2

Feb. 26-28: Continued interviews with Bogotá functionaries

Feb. 26-28: Preparation of de-briefing reports

Mar. 2: Presentations to senior WFP staff, to CO programme staff, and to GOC



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## APPENDIX E: PARTIAL INTERVIEW LIST

### Government of Colombia

Jorge Enrique Maruri	Cooperación Internacional, Min. de Relaciones Exteriores
René Correa	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
Adda Borda	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
Sandra Milena	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
Jaime Matute Hernández	ICBF
Ana Isabel Correa	ICBF
Alba Lucía López	ICBF
Alba Cristina Velásquez	ICBF
Luz María Cardona A.	ICBF
Luz María Salazar	Accion Social
Ligia Margarita Borrero Z.	Acción Social
Juliana Amaya Galliano	Accion Social
Olga Lucía Velasco	Acción Social
Jorge Enrique Prieto	ACCI

### United Nations Colleagues

Raúl Rosende	OCHA
Claudia Marín	OCHA
Gianni Merelli	OCHA
Roberto Meier	ACNUR
Bruno Moro	UNDP (Resident Coordinator)
María Jose de Oliveira	FAO
Pier Paolo Balladelli	PAHO/WHO
Paul Martin	UNICEF
Diego Beltrand	OIM
Liliana Valiña	DDHH
Paula Bernetti	DDHH
Sandra Castaña	OIM

### Pastoral Social

Rosa Inés Floriano Carrera	Gerente Proyecto Respuesta Hum.
Holly Inurreta	Asesora Regional CRS para emergencias
Martha Inés Romero M	Gerente de País: CRS/Colombia
Nidia Montoya F.	Asistente Regional Antioquia-Urocó
Juan Ignacio Cardena Orozco	Subdirector-SNPS
Boris Martínez M	Asistente PANEM/SNPS

### Other Bogotá Interviewees

Christine Oberli	ICRC
Marie Zazvorkova	Comisión Europea
José María Echevarría	Comisión Europea
Rudy Krebs	COSUDE
Cara Thanassi	USAID
Hernando Villamizar	USAID
Bryan Winston	CHF International
Neila Rubio	CHF International



Marco Romero  
José Luis Barrero  
Alejandro Zuritta  
Dora Hilda Aya  
Ma. Elvira Torres

CODHES  
OXFAM  
Acción Contra el Hambre  
PLAN Internacional  
Médicos sin Frontera

### **WFP Colombia**

Praveen Agrawal  
Jorge Fanlo-Martin  
Manuela Angel  
Jacqueline Flentge  
María Cecilia Cuartas  
Yolanda Benavides  
Liana Patricia Martán  
María Lucía Osorio  
Mauricio Moreno  
Blanca Nohemi Florian  
Manuel Varas  
Gonzalo Jiménez  
Luis Fernando Amaya  
Fernando Henao  
Romain Sirois

Representative  
Deputy Country Director  
Programme Officer  
Monitoring and Evaluation Officer  
Monitoring and Evaluation Assistant  
Suboffice Coordinator- Cali  
Suboffice Coordinator- Medellin  
Suboffice Coordinator- Bogotá  
Suboffice Coordinator- Bucaramanga  
Suboffice Coordinator- Cartagena  
Programme Clerk  
Programme Assistant  
Programme Assistant  
Logistics and Procurement Officer  
Regional Office: Panamá

### **Bogota/Soacha**

Teresa Díaz  
Yahir Aristizábal  
Nelso Pájaro  
Juliana Fernández

Albergue Nuestros Sueños  
Fundación Disparando  
Corporación Fé y Esperanza  
CIDESCOC

### **Quibdó**

Magdalena \_\_\_\_\_  
Patricia \_\_\_\_\_  
Santiago \_\_\_\_\_  
Plácido Vallegrande  
Cristina Bejarano  
Padre Albevro  
Adriana Guerra  
Jessie \_\_\_\_\_  
Harold Cadena  
Mario Gamboa

USEMI  
USEMI  
COCOMACIA  
OREWA  
ICBF: Quibdó  
Pastoral Social: Quibdó  
UNICEF: Quibdó  
Red Cross: Quibdó  
Accion Social: Quibdó

### **Granada**

Padre Alirio Obando  
Padre Leonard Santa María  
Óscar Rincón  
Luz Marina \_\_\_\_\_  
Bertilda Ariza  
Blanca Alzate  
Arturo Givaldo  
Adriana Duque

Pastoral Social: Granada  
Pastoral Social: Granada  
Pastoral Social: Granada  
Pastoral Social: El Meta  
San Juan de Arana  
Vista Hermosa  
NGO ASEDIN  
Pastoral Social: El Castillo



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