

Country Portfolio Evaluation

Somalia: An Evaluation of WFP's Portfolio

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Disclaimer

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Fact Sheet: Somalia

Timeline and funding level of Somalia portfolio 2006-2011*


Operation	Title	Time Frame	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011		
PRRO 10191.1	Food Aid for Relief and Protection of Livelihoods	Aug 06 Mar 09	Req: \$507.9 Contrib: \$367.4							
PRRO 101910	Food Aid for Relief and Recovery in Somalia	Jan 03 Mar 07	Req: \$122.0 Contrib: \$101.6							
EMOP 10812	Food Aid for Emergency Relief and Protection of Livelihoods	Apr 09 Jun 11				Req: \$639.9 Contrib: \$352.7				
SO 10801	Targeted Augmentation of Security Requirements in Somalia Vital to the Continuity of Relief Assistance	Dec 08 Apr 09			Req: \$2.9 Contrib: \$2.9					
SO 10681	Humanitarian Air Service in Support of Relief Operations in Somalia	Aug 07 Jul 11	Req: \$83.1 Contrib: \$61.1							
SO 10619	Somalia Inter-Agency Security Telecommunications	Jun 07 Jan 08		Req: \$0.9 Contrib: \$0.4						
SO 10578	Emergency Rehabilitation Works for Logistics Infrastructure in Somalia	Feb 07 Dec 11	Req: \$43.0 Contrib: \$18.1							
Food Distributed (MT)			78,089	93,952	217,539	334,569	106,726	106,397		
Direct Expenses (US\$ millions)			53.5	67.7	178.8	267.9	119.8	137.4		
% Direct Expenses: Somalia vs. World			2%	2%	5%	7%	3%	4%		
Beneficiaries (actual)			M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
			673,000	798,000	724,850	801,150	1,267,815	1,516,715	1,570,410	1,634,510
Total of Beneficiaries (actual, thousands)			1,471,000	1,526,000	2,784,530	3,204,920	2,027,972	1,342,165		

Source: last SPR available, APR 2007 - 2011

Requirements (Req.) and Contributions (Contrib.) are US\$ millions

* CPE does not cover the famine response of late 2011

Distribution of portfolio activities by beneficiaries



	Education	Nutrition	GFD	FFW/FFA/FFT	HIV
PRRO 10191.1	X	X	X	X	X
PRRO 101910	X	X	X	X	X
EMOP 10812	X	X	X	X	X
Planned % of beneficiaries	6%	15%	74%	4%	1%
Actual % of beneficiaries	5%	8%	82%	4%	1%

Source: WFP Dacota

*Education includes school meals and take-home rations; Nutrition includes targeted and supplementary feeding and MCH/supplementary feeding for pregnant and lactating women

Top 5 Donors:

USA, Private Donors, Spain, Canada, United Kingdom

Executive Summary

Introduction

Evaluation Features

1. The Somalia country portfolio evaluation (CPE) was conducted between September 2011 and May 2012 and covered the 2006–2011¹ portfolio period. It focused on three key evaluation questions: i) the alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's operations in Somalia, given the particularly challenging humanitarian situation and the complex geopolitical context, especially in south and central Somalia; ii) the factors that have driven WFP's strategic decision-making; and iii) the performance and results of WFP operations over the portfolio period. The evaluation serves the dual objectives of accountability and learning and was timed to provide lessons learned and recommendations for the development of the next WFP Somalia operation in 2013.

Context

2. Somalia is the most enduring case of the collapse of a modern state. Internal conflict has prevailed across most of southern and central Somalia for more than 20 years, exacerbated by both regional and global political agendas. A Transitional Federal Government (TFG), in place since 2004, has taken different forms and has the explicit support of neighbouring Ethiopia and the broader international community. However, the TFG lacks the capacity and resources to achieve its mandate, although it has established itself in the capital, Mogadishu, since August 2011. Much of the rest of southern Somalia remains under the control of *al-Shabaab*, a militant Islamic movement with an element of popular support. In the north, Somaliland is a self-declared independent entity and Puntland a semi-autonomous region; both regions have established governance and administrative structures that ensure relative peace and security, although border areas between the two remain contested.

3. The conflict in southern and central Somalia is the main factor in the country's positioning as one of the poorest and most food-insecure in the world. The collapse of basic services, particularly health and education, has mainly affected women and children. In recent years, multi-agency assessments have estimated that about 25 percent of the population of 7.5 million people² does not have access to sufficient food and therefore requires emergency food assistance.³

4. The situation is exacerbated by frequent and severe droughts,⁴ rising global prices for food and fuel, and a significant reduction in the humanitarian space since 2008. Escalation of the conflict has made Somalia a particularly dangerous environment for aid workers, some of whom have been killed and kidnapped, and threats have been made against some aid agencies. Some organizations have left and others have been banned by *al-Shabaab*, which is suspicious of their intentions.

¹ Up to the official declaration of famine in mid-2011.

² Population estimates vary from 7.5 million (Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), 2011) to 9.1 million people (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011); a figure of 7.5 million is used in most current United Nations documents.

³ A large percentage of these people are internally displaced persons (IDPs) with disrupted livelihoods, who rely on external assistance.

⁴ Most recently in 2005–2006, 2009 and 2011.

WFP's Portfolio in Somalia

5. WFP is a leading agency in the overall humanitarian response in Somalia and is the single largest recipient of humanitarian funding, related to the level of food assistance required across the country. During the portfolio period, WFP had direct expenses⁵ of US\$825 million;⁶ in 2009 it spent almost 60 percent of the entire United Nations budget in Somalia.⁷ Between 2008 and 2011, WFP's requests for food assistance accounted for an average of 44 percent of the total CAP for Somalia (see Table 1).

Table 1: Somalia Cap 2006–2011

Year	Principal factors	Target population	CAP total required (revised) (US\$)	WFP required (revised) (US\$)	WFP's % of total (food only)	No. of agencies
2006	Conflict; drought	2 100 000	326 718 040 ¹	73 235 000	22.4	33
2007	Conflict; and floods	1 000 000	262 354 615 ²	57 794 749	22.0	47
2008	Conflict; chronic food insecurity	1 500 000	641 097 679	247 564 995	38.6	75
2009	Conflict; rising food costs; chronic food insecurity	3 200 000	918 844 550	449 541 386	53.3	100
2010	Conflict; drought; global recession	3 640 000	596 124 332	283 307 968	47.5	89
2011	Conflict; chronic food insecurity	2 000 000	561 469 946	191 605 662	34.1	109

¹ CAP revised from US\$174,116,815; 83 percent of the increase was for additional food needs.

² CAP revised from US\$237,112,824, for additional projects.

6. Two food assistance operations dominated the evaluation period: protracted relief and recovery operation 101911 from mid-2006, with 2,164,000 beneficiaries; and emergency operation 10182 from mid-2009, which scaled up to cover 3,500,000 beneficiaries including 1 million previously covered by the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE).⁸ The scale-up served the escalating numbers of people displaced by conflict, and the urban poor affected by high food prices and hyperinflation. The portfolio's emphasis was on emergency relief; recovery and livelihood support were not prominent until 2010.

7. During the evaluation period, CARE (in 2009) and WFP (in January 2010) suspended activities in *al-Shabaab*-controlled areas for security reasons and were then subsequently banned by *al-Shabaab*. This significantly affected the delivery of food assistance to critical areas of southern and central Somalia, including those areas affected by the 2011 famine. In 2009–2010, in both the media and the UNMG report of March

⁵ These exclude Programme Support and Administrative costs.


⁶ WFP Annual Performance Reports 2006–2011. Rome.

⁷ United Nations Monitoring Group (UNMG) on Somalia. 2010. Report of the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008), March. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/91.

⁸ The CPE focused principally on food assistance operations and not the special operations.

2010, allegations of food aid diversion were made against WFP staff and partners, undermining donor confidence in WFP. These factors resulted in a drastic fall in donor cash and in-kind contributions to WFP's operations in Somalia in 2010; contributions recovered only after the declaration of famine in July 2011 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Total donor contributions 2006–2011 for WFP operations in Somalia



Source: WFP Government Donor Relations Division

Evaluation Findings

Alignment and Strategic Positioning

8. Multi-agency seasonal assessments, facilitated and reported by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia (FSNAU), provide the principal reference point for aligning WFP's operations with the humanitarian and development needs of Somalia. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is an integral tool of the assessment and identifies the different phases of food insecurity and crisis across the country. The IPC is not a response analysis, but remains the principal reference for planning humanitarian interventions. This reflects a weakness within the humanitarian coordination system for Somalia, where there is insufficient debate or analysis of the relevance of different modalities of assistance.

9. Over the evaluation period, WFP has responded effectively to the FSNAU phase classification, targeting areas of food insecurity and crisis with commensurate food assistance, mainly through general food distribution (GFD),⁹ with a more nutrition-focused approach through a targeted supplementary food (TSF) programme since 2010. However, the evaluation found limited evidence and understanding of the extent to which the food assistance delivered met the needs of the most vulnerable sectors of the target population and was relevant to the different livelihood zones of Somalia, including pastoralist households. Donated food entered the market system because beneficiaries often chose to sell part of what they received.

10. Since 2010, WFP Somalia has developed operational strategies that better support communities in transition, enabling them to recover livelihoods and household assets and thus ensuring better coping capacity in future crises. This strategy has been a positive development and WFP should place greater emphasis on this area during the next major Somalia operation.

11. Regarding WFP's alignment with international good practice in humanitarian response (see Box 1), from 2011, WFP has considerably improved its accountability to

⁹ Ninety percent of beneficiaries received GFD in 2008–2009.

donors, through regular meetings in Nairobi, and to functioning state authorities, through field-based regional allocation planning meetings. However, the evaluation found that this was not replicated to the same extent with cooperating partners and beneficiaries at the community level.

12. From 2006 to 2009, WFP played a central role in responding to increased food insecurity and assumed responsibility for CARE's area of operations after CARE's expulsion by *al-Shabaab*. However, the situation changed dramatically after WFP's own expulsion in January 2010 and release of the UNMG report in March 2010. The Somalia country office effectively became a closed shop during intense consultations between the country office and Headquarters in the first six months of 2010. WFP expected that its ban from key operational areas would be lifted, but this did not happen, and the country office demonstrated insufficient leadership to explore alternative ways

Box 1: Ten principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations

1. Take context as the starting point.
2. Do no harm.
3. Focus on state-building as the central objective.
4. Prioritize prevention.
5. Recognize the links between political security and development objectives.
6. Promote non-discrimination as the basis for inclusive and stable societies.
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts.
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms among international actors.
9. Act fast, but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion.

Source: OECD. 2007. Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

of working or to advocate for other organizations to assume WFP's role in providing food assistance. Since late 2010, WFP has demonstrated strong institutional commitment to broader planning mechanisms such as the United Nations Somalia Assistance Strategy (UNSAS) 2011–2015 and the Horn of Africa Plan of Action.

13. The evaluation found that the Somalia Food Assistance Cluster was dominated by WFP and its close partners, with insufficient debate on the relevance of different modalities of food assistance or an overall strategy for Somalia. At the start of 2010, there was no discussion of the implications of WFP's withdrawal from *al-Shabaab*-controlled areas. Since the famine declaration in July 2011, the Food Assistance Cluster has assumed a more strategic role, embracing the full range of humanitarian response options and considering the most appropriate role of food aid, vouchers, cash transfers and other interventions in ensuring an effective response.

14. WFP's operational base depends on working through international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs),¹⁰ but WFP Somalia's consultation and communication with cooperating partners regarding programme planning and operational decisions have been poor. The evaluation fieldwork revealed that this weakness has had many practical and political implications for NGOs delivering projects at the field level, leading to tensions between WFP and some major partners as recently as the 2011 famine response. WFP has recently introduced a closer liaison process with NGO partners at the field level.

15. A main challenge for WFP was the blurring of boundaries between the United Nations political and humanitarian agendas. There was explicit United Nations political backing for the TFG during this period, but the principal humanitarian response was needed in areas outside the TFG's control. This situation made it very important to ensure alignment with international good practices in conflict and fragile states, particularly given

¹⁰ At the end of 2009, WFP Somalia had field-level agreements with 181 NGOs.

the scale of WFP operations. The evaluation noted that WFP's neutrality was brought into question over the selection of contractors⁷ and that WFP gave inadequate consideration to the implications of delivering food aid in areas controlled by *al-Shabaab*, which was openly challenging such interventions in 2009.

16. In responding to humanitarian emergencies, WFP had very few opportunities to engage and align strategies with state actors, because the actors had limited capacity and had themselves been engaged in the conflict, such as the TFG in the south. There was some alignment in more stable northern areas, where WFP engaged with the health and education ministries. WFP's contribution to the Somali Nutrition Strategy 2011–2013 is an excellent example of inter-agency collaboration in support of the principal state authorities in Somalia.

17. The most strategic initiative with local authorities has been the decentralization of WFP's six-monthly allocation planning for food assistance – in Somaliland, Puntland and Central regions – since early 2011. This has facilitated the participation of government staff and ensured that interventions comply with local authorities' priorities and plans. The evaluation found this area-based approach to allocation planning and capacity development to be an important component of increasing WFP's responsiveness to local contexts. The evaluation suggests that developing area-based strategies will be crucial to continuing this work in the future.

18. In the absence of government-driven coordination mechanisms at the national level, it is particularly important that WFP – as a major humanitarian actor in Somalia – ensures coherence with its humanitarian partners. This has mainly been achieved through the sharing of information and planning undertaken by the Food Assistance Cluster and the multi-sectoral CAP, which focuses on the emergency response in a given year. The United Nations Transition Plan 2008–2010 and the UNSAS 2011–2015, with which WFP is engaged, provide the framework for prioritizing recovery and development programmes across the United Nations system.

19. WFP's relationship with other actors in the United Nations country team was problematic until 2010. This was partly because WFP was concerned with how the United Nations political agenda influenced humanitarian priorities in Somalia, while others in the United Nations perceived WFP as unilaterally determining its own plans and strategies to suit its food aid agenda. This conflict of views worsened when WFP withdrew from *al-Shabaab*-controlled areas without the prior knowledge of the United Nations country team. Since then, WFP has worked to improve these relations: WFP and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) signed a Joint Plan of Action with better definitions of roles and responsibilities in nutrition interventions; and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), UNICEF and WFP have started work on a joint strategy for building resilience to shocks in the Somalia context.

Factors Driving WFP's Strategic Decision-Making

20. WFP Somalia's vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) unit is responsible for analysing national hunger, food security and nutrition issues. The unit is small for the scale and complexity of WFP operations in Somalia and relies considerably on FSNAU data and analysis. The VAM unit participates in fieldwork and analysis for FSNAU's biannual assessments and undertakes its own mapping, assessments, analysis and allocation planning. This level of collaboration and consensus on needs assessments is unique. The food security and vulnerability assessments allow a more accurate understanding of the underlying causes of food insecurity. However, the evaluation found insufficient analysis of the impact of food aid on local agricultural production and markets, and analysis undertaken by WFP's VAM unit was not widely shared with other agencies.

21. A review of how well WFP's analysis, based on FSNAU's figures for populations in crisis, translated into operations during the evaluation period indicated that actual beneficiary figures partially exceeded planned – which were consistent with FSNAU figures – until WFP's withdrawal from *al-Shabaab*-controlled areas in south-central Somalia, resulting in significant disparities from mid-2009. The analysis used by WFP appeared to correlate reasonably well with delivery on the ground; beneficiary numbers matched needs assessments unless external factors such as access issues and significant reductions in donor funding, as occurred later in 2009, constrained operational implementation.

22. Principal issues in the analysis relate to outdated and unreliable population figures, which are a concern across the humanitarian community, limited understanding of power relations and clan issues within target communities, and the need for more attention to urban poverty rather than just IDPs. The evaluation found gaps in WFP's response analysis and suggests that WFP do more to promote appropriate response analysis at the inter-agency level.

23. Since 2008, the country office has developed a more rigorous approach to monitoring and evaluation (M&E), with the requisite capacity at the field and country office levels to generate monthly reporting. Monthly reports provide updates on implementation quality, compliance and issues raised by beneficiaries or partners. The rigour of the reporting is considered a best practice within WFP. The target coverage for site monitoring by each area office is between 30 and 40 percent of all active food distribution points, which is well above monitoring targets for WFP elsewhere.

24. The M&E system is principally designed to capture diversion and non-compliance issues. It is strong on process and output indicators, but weak on outcomes, so does not provide a measure of the impact of food assistance on targeted individuals, communities and local markets. A consistent finding from the evaluation fieldwork was that beneficiaries felt they had inadequate direct consultation with WFP and insufficient feedback on what little consultation occurred. Their principal point of contact with WFP was through the field monitor visits. An issue-tracking database and beneficiary hotline were introduced in 2010. In 2011, 587 issues were recorded by the tracking system, but follow-up was cumbersome and slow; very few beneficiaries used the hotline.¹¹

25. The contextual, programmatic and operational risks in Somalia have made it particularly challenging for WFP to ensure appropriate risk management. With respect to context, the evaluation concluded that WFP adopted a high-risk strategy from early 2009, when it became the only major food aid operator in *al-Shabaab*-controlled areas and significantly scaled up levels of food aid, in conflict with *al-Shabaab's* agenda of agricultural self-sufficiency. There was no contingency planning for possible withdrawal, and insufficient consideration of the consequences of donor policy changes¹² and the increased risks to vulnerable populations from the withdrawal of WFP food aid in southern Somalia in early 2010.

26. Insufficient measures were taken to avoid reputational risk. During the 2007–2010 period, WFP adopted unilateral and internal working methods – engaging only with partners with which it was closely associated – and had a poor record on communications. This was exacerbated by WFP's corporate silence following the various allegations in 2009, and the lack of consultation with partners prior to its withdrawal from *al-Shabaab*-controlled areas in January 2010. The evaluation found a notable absence of a pro-active role on the part of the regional bureau and Headquarters, in limiting institutional risk during this period.

¹¹ With an average of only 2.5 calls per month between July 2011 and 2012, probably owing to lack of awareness.


¹² Until 2010, 60 percent of WFP Somalia's funding came from United States government sources.

27. The operational risks in south-central Somalia have been very high. WFP was very exposed to these risks and has lost 14 staff members and contractors since 2006. National staff members, especially field monitors, spend long periods in the field and are the main interface between the beneficiaries and WFP. The evaluation suggests increasing staff capacity at the field level¹³ as the existing situation presented a significant risk factor for monitoring, oversight and beneficiary engagement.

Portfolio Performance and Results

28. WFP’s operations grew substantially during the evaluation period, from 1.47 million beneficiaries in 2006, to 3.20 million – nearly half the population of Somalia – in 2009 (see Figure 2). This increase was driven by deterioration in the security situation in south-central Somalia, successive droughts and high food prices. Emergency relief, particularly GFD, predominated, with more than 300,000 mt distributed in 2009 (see Figure 2). From late 2010, TSF was introduced in preference to GFD, to reduce high inclusion errors. The proportion of nutrition interventions in total WFP activities consequently increased. Other elements of the new strategy were ceasing the provision of special assistance to long-standing IDPs and increasing the use of food for work (FFW) in emergencies, as a targeted alternative to GFD. These have been positive developments that should reduce the food aid dependency associated with certain areas of southern Somalia. Wet feeding is a self-targeting approach that has been operating in urban areas of Mogadishu since 2007.

Figure 2: Total beneficiaries and tonnage, WFP Somalia 2006–2011



Source: WFP Somalia Country Office records.

29. In the framework of WFP Somalia’s new emergency response strategy, the evaluation found particular groups that may be excluded from TSF: families with no children, the elderly, the disabled and the urban poor. In addition, there are opportunities for introducing other modalities such as food vouchers¹⁴ – already being piloted in Burao in February 2012 – and conditional or unconditional cash transfers, which have logistic and access advantages over food assistance.

¹³ WFP uses third-party programme assistance teams, but many stakeholders felt that although sometimes necessary in insecure locations, these were not a good replacement for field staff.

¹⁴ In collaboration with the Democratic Republic of the Congo country office, the Somalia country office began piloting food vouchers as a household ration under TSF, in Burao, Somaliland from February 2012.

30. Based on improved analysis of the food and nutrition security situation, the nutrition component of WFP's portfolio was significantly scaled up from 2010, with a range of activities including blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) for children in vulnerable situations, TSF for acutely malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women, and take-home rations for all children and mothers attending mother-and-child health (MCH) centres. Stakeholders, including state authorities, saw this nutrition focus as an appropriate response in preventing malnutrition and promoting MCH care. The approach is flexible and can be scaled up or down in response to needs and seasons.

31. While attendance at MCH centres increased significantly as a result of the interventions, there remains concern that the TSF programme's dependence on static centres could exclude some children in remote areas; there is therefore need for WFP to scale up a mobile programme in conjunction with UNICEF's Outpatient Therapeutic Programme (OTP), to ensure continuity of treatment and improved outreach. There is evidence that aligning the family ration with TSF has increased recovery rates, but also evidence that in some cases beneficiaries might maintain a child's low weight to ensure continuation of the ration. There is also potential for overlap between TSF and MCH.

32. Blanket supplementary feeding can provide only a temporary solution, especially in pastoralist areas of the north, as it does not address underlying causes of food insecurity. Food support to tuberculosis (TB) and HIV patients has proven highly effective in attracting people for screening and ensuring compliance with treatment regimes, leading to a high cure rate for TB. However, as in several nutrition interventions, the supply of food has not always been consistent.

33. Activities under food security response included FFW, food for assets (FFA) and food for training (FFT). These represented only a very small fraction of the portfolio;¹⁵ it took time for WFP Somalia to develop an institutional commitment to FFA. The projects require significant preparation, have been implemented in a piecemeal fashion and achieved relatively small gains. They have been particularly affected by pipeline breaks and their short-term nature is not compatible with training needs. The limited reach and technical competence of local NGO partners has been a major challenge. More strategic partnerships are needed for FFA to be implemented on a larger scale and to achieve greater impact.

34. The number of primary schools assisted through emergency school feeding increased from 118 in 2006 to 319 in 2009, when it peaked prior to WFP's withdrawal from south central Somalia. WFP supports about 10 percent of operational schools in areas where it has access. Recent results from an internal evaluation show that schools assisted by WFP attained the target 10 percent annual increase in enrolment in Somaliland, but not Puntland. Both areas demonstrated improvements in the proportion of girls enrolled.

35. Neither Somaliland nor Puntland has a central database for schools, so WFP depended on information generated by other United Nations agencies, which may have been at odds with regional education authorities. Attempts to engage ministries in assuming partial responsibility for monitoring have not been very successful, and are still principally driven by WFP. The emergency school feeding programme is still concentrated around major urban centres, with insufficient attention accorded to the far more food-insecure areas across the north.

¹⁵ Accounting for less than 1 percent of WFP food resource allocations in 2009 and 2010.

Conclusions

36. Some hard lessons have been learned from WFP's experience in Somalia from 2006 to 2010, the point at which WFP lost much of its credibility in the international humanitarian community. Since 2010, much has been achieved to restore WFP's reputation in Somalia and to make the operational priorities more relevant to the challenging context. However, although WFP draws upon the broad base of food and nutrition security analysis in Somalia, there is still insufficient understanding in the field of important clan dynamics and the appropriateness of alternative response options in different livelihood zones. WFP's weak coherence with state authorities and other humanitarian actors contributed to its loss of credibility during 2009–2010; now WFP is demonstrating greater inclusion of principal stakeholders in its planning processes, but needs to take better account of their complementary strategies with which it can engage.

37. Until 2010, WFP and CARE ensured sufficient coverage of food assistance interventions in Somalia; a lack of adequate planning meant that WFP's withdrawal from significant parts of southern and central Somalia had major implications because no alternative arrangements were sufficiently considered, even within the appropriate coordination mechanism. The issue was forced by the build-up to the declaration of famine in July 2011. The connectedness between emergency and transition in programme operations received more attention from 2010–2011, as WFP focused on more stable areas where there are opportunities to improve resilience in households and communities.

38. From 2006 to 2009, WFP Somalia demonstrated that it has the requisite capacity and skills to deliver emergency food aid efficiently, by exceeding planned outputs in a very challenging environment. The 2009–2010 allegations of diversions completely undermined both internal and external confidence in WFP, which justifiably focused its attention on strengthening compliance measures. Since 2010, WFP has made significant progress in improving effectiveness by focusing on nutrition in emergency response. Better use is being made of limited resources, and WFP has engaged more strategically with some principal humanitarian partners. There are, however, still important areas to be addressed, especially improved accountability to beneficiaries, better evidence of the impacts that different food assistance interventions have on food and nutrition-insecure households, and – for future sustainability – the need to build more effective capacity in viable state institutions concerned with disaster risk management and sector planning for education and health.

Recommendations

Food Security Analysis

39. **Main recommendation 1:** WFP's VAM Unit for Somalia should be strengthened to provide food and nutrition security information that complements the assessments and analysis undertaken by FSNAU, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) and other contributors. The information should mainly support WFP's capacity to make relevant and decisive strategic programme decisions, but should also contribute to improving the knowledge of both state actors and other humanitarian partners in planning and responding effectively. Specifically:

- 1a. Carry out independent studies with technical support from the regional bureau and Headquarters, to determine: i) the benefits that households of different compositions, wealth groups and livelihood zones derive from food assistance; ii) the impacts of food assistance on local agricultural and pastoralist economies, including the effect on labour markets within Somalia; and iii) the situation of the urban poor,

as opposed to traditional IDP communities, with particular reference to gender and clan affiliation, to inform WFP's future targeting strategy. *(by mid-2013)*

1b. Improve the collection and analysis of data on food market economics in Somalia with technical support from the regional bureau and Headquarters, focusing on markets' capacity to respond to changes in demand through market-based responses, such as cash and vouchers, and the implications of cross-border trade flows on household access to essential food commodities, in collaboration with FEWS NET and FSNAU. *(by end 2013)*

Strategy Development

40. **Main recommendation 2:** WFP should base the country strategy – developed within the framework of the overarching UNSAS strategy – on area-level strategies that take into account: i) the different political and security contexts of each area; ii) the diversity of livelihood zones; iii) the different emphases across the relief-development continuum, including contingency planning, emergency preparedness and response, recovery and transition; iv) alternative transfer modalities for food assistance – food-based, voucher-based and cash-based – that can be applied in different rural and urban situations; and v) the variable capacities of state authorities, institutions and humanitarian partners. Specifically:

2a. Where feasible, WFP area-level strategies should concentrate more on addressing the underlying causes of malnutrition through collaboration with principal partners – FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and UNICEF – that offer different and complementary expertise and competencies, thus ensuring: i) a concerted approach to building household and community resilience to shocks in the most vulnerable areas of Somalia; ii) better programming synergies and more effective use of resources, such as by integrating FFA into broader agricultural and pastoral development projects, and integrating TSF into the OTP; and iii) prioritizing interventions such as school feeding in areas of higher food and nutrition-insecurity where coverage is low. *(by end 2013)*

Monitoring and Evaluation

41. **Main recommendation 3:** There should be a paradigm shift within WFP, increasing the emphasis on and incentives for measuring results. Information and analysis generated by WFP's M&E Unit should be more than a compliance tool; it should more effectively inform and support WFP programming by providing first-hand information on the relevance and impacts of different interventions on different socio-economic groups, and should rely less on relatively weak secondary data. Specifically:

3a. Realistic and measurable outcome indicators should be developed with technical support from the regional bureau and Headquarters. The indicators should be directly attributable to different WFP programme interventions – especially innovative approaches such as TSF – incorporated into the M&E system and reported in Standardized Project Reports (SPRs) in addition to output data. *(for incorporation into the SPR 2013)*

3b. An outreach strategy must be developed that articulates how issues and concerns raised by beneficiaries and their communities, through field monitoring, will be taken into account and inform programme planning and design. *(by mid-2013)*

Capacity Development

42. **Main recommendation 4:** WFP must have the requisite skills and resources for enhanced field monitoring and more effective capacity development of state authorities and cooperating partners in supporting assessments and implementing and reporting on WFP programme interventions, with close reference to other capacity development efforts of the United Nations system. Specifically:

4a. WFP should develop area offices' capacity to generate and analyse output and outcome information within their zones, supported by more trained field monitors with better understanding of the nutrition and food security objectives incorporated in WFP programming. *(by mid-2013)*

4b. WFP should support capacity development objectives in the area-level strategies more effectively, focusing on the requisite capacity of government institutions mandated to fulfil emergency preparedness and disaster risk management – such as the National Environment Research and Disaster Preparedness and Management Authority in Somaliland and the Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency in Puntland – and on planning departments in the education and health sectors. Capacity development should allow government offices to assume increased responsibility for information collection, monitoring and technical support to training, school feeding and nutrition interventions. *(by end-2013)*

Communications and Coordination

43. **Main recommendation 5:** WFP must considerably improve its external consultations on and communication of analysis, programme planning and decision-making to ensure better transparency and greater accountability to its principal stakeholders. Specifically:

5a. WFP should build on recent initiatives in liaising regularly with donors and cooperating partners, at the country and area office levels respectively, by defining a communications and partnership strategy that identifies activities through which partners are regularly informed of programme developments and related issues, with technical support from the regional bureau and Headquarters. *(by mid-2013)*

5b. As co-lead – with FAO – of the newly established food security cluster in Nairobi and at the field level, WFP should: i) facilitate consideration of a range of short- to long-term response options based on the food and nutrition security analysis available from FSNAU, FEWS NET and WFP; ii) define the roles that WFP, FAO and other partners can play in these responses; iii) share analysis, implementation plans, progress reports and M&E related to its food assistance programme with other principal actors; and iv) use the cluster as a forum for advocacy on alternative strategies in the event that a principal actor such as WFP cannot gain access to specific areas. *(by mid-2013)*

Map

SOMALIA - Reference Map



Disclaimer: The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Map data sources: CGIAR, United Nations Cartographic Section, ESRI, Europa Technologies, UN OCHA.

1. Introduction

1.1. Evaluation Features

1. Country Portfolio Evaluations (CPE) encompass the entirety of World Food Programme (WFP) activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to make evidence-based decisions about positioning WFP in a country and about strategic partnerships, programme design, and implementation.

2. In the case of Somalia, the parameters of a typical CPE have been adjusted to reflect the lack of a fully functioning central government, the existence of other state “authorities” such as Somaliland, which are yet to be granted international recognition, and the different approaches to humanitarian and recovery interventions in different regions of the country. Furthermore, there are non-state actors engaged in the conflict, which control areas within Somalia where WFP has to negotiate access to comply with its humanitarian mandate. In this context, little has been developed in terms of clear and consistent government policies and strategies, but there are humanitarian principles set by the international aid community (United Nations, NGOs and donors) to which actors voluntarily comply.

3. The **rationale** for the CPE is to review the comparative advantage and positioning of WFP Somalia operations vis-à-vis the situation on the ground, good practices in humanitarian response, and in view of the long-term stability and governance of Somalia. In addition, the CPE evaluates the internal/external factors that have driven WFP strategic decision-making and the relative performance of the operations against expectations to determine the lessons learned from 2006 to 2010 (as well as operational implementation in 2011 with the exception of the famine response, to understand the recent shift in WFP programming). Importantly, this CPE was timed to provide results and recommendations for the design of the new WFP Somalia operation (which will be a PRRO) later in 2012 and any future country strategy.

4. The **focus** of the evaluation is upon the country portfolio as a whole, rather than individual operations or sub-components of the operations. This evaluation serves the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such the evaluation:

- Assesses and reports on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian challenges in Somalia (accountability); and
- Determines the reasons for observed success/failure and draws lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the Country Office (CO) to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in Somalia, form strategic partnerships, and improve operations design and implementation whenever possible (learning).

5. The Somalia CPE has been guided both by the original Terms of Reference (TOR) developed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OE) in Rome, which are attached as Annex 1, and by the Inception Report which further defines the scope and approach of the evaluation, and represents the understanding between the OE and the independent evaluation team of how the exercise will be conducted.

6. Central to the Inception Report is the Evaluation Matrix, which is structured around the principal line of questioning established by WFP in the TOR. The major

emphasis of this evaluation is on the learning objectives relating to WFP's strategic alignment in Somalia and the factors driving WFP's strategic decision-making along with the performance and results it has achieved during the evaluation period. The Evaluation Matrix is attached as Annex 2 and also guides the structure of this Somalia CPE Report.

7. The **inception phase** of the evaluation included: a team briefing at WFP in Rome from 19–23 September 2011 (including interviews with Headquarters' and Regional Bureau staff) which was managed by the OE; the development of the evaluation logic and the evaluation matrix; a review by the team of all datasets, project documentation and contextual information pertaining to WFP operations 2006–2010; and an inception mission to Nairobi from 12–15 December 2011 to determine the scope and approach of the evaluation through discussions with the WFP country team and principal stakeholders.

8. The substantive **field phase** of the evaluation was conducted from 16 January to 12 February 2012 and included interviews with WFP staff principally at Country and Area Office levels to generate additional insights and information; as well as structured interviews with a broad range of respondents both in Somalia (Hargeisa, Berbera, Burao, Erigavo, Bosasso, Garowe and Galkaiyo) and in Kenya (Nairobi and Wajir) based upon a stakeholder analysis undertaken in the inception phase. In addition, focus group discussions were conducted with beneficiaries of different gender and age and their communities in areas where WFP is currently operational. A full list of respondents to this evaluation is provided in Annex 3 and the principal reference documents consulted by the evaluation are presented in Annex 4.

9. **Debriefings** of the initial evaluation findings and recommendations were conducted by the evaluation team in Nairobi on 13 February (internal to WFP) and 14 February (WFP and stakeholders) and at WFP Rome on 9 March 2012. These debriefings were an important aspect of the process of finalizing the substantive findings of the exercise.

10. The **evaluation team** comprised four independent international consultants with expertise in nutrition, food security and livelihoods, humanitarian response and coordination as well as knowledge of the Somalia context. They were assisted by a team of four Somali national consultants in conducting the field work. The evaluation has also been supported by a Panel of Experts who are very knowledgeable of the humanitarian and development issues in Somalia from different perspectives and familiar with the role of WFP within the United Nations system. The panel provided critical feedback to OE and the team at key stages in the development of this report.

11. The exercise to undertake the CPE Somalia also faced some unique **challenges** in view of the very insecure and evolving political and military context of south-central Somalia, which prevented the evaluation gaining direct access to significant operational areas for WFP until 2010. Furthermore, during such a critical and unprecedented period in WFP's history in Somalia, key decisions which impacted on the programme were taken at all levels of the organization (Country Office, Regional Bureau and Headquarters), which requires more of an institutional analysis than this evaluation can provide. These are noted in a special record attached as Annex 5.

1.2. Context

12. Somalia is the most enduring case of modern state collapse. Consequently, reliable statistics on a range of social and demographic indicators are difficult to obtain, and therefore the country does not feature on the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI). Those social indicators that are measured point to one of the worst humanitarian situations worldwide especially for women and children. Of a total population of approximately 7.5 million people¹⁶, over 43 percent live on less than US\$1 per day, under-five mortality is at 142 per 1,000, maternal mortality at 1,400 per 100,000 and under-five acute malnutrition is consistently above 19 percent¹⁷.

13. Somalia has one of the world's lowest school enrolment and literacy rates, especially for girls. Only 28 percent of school-age children (6–12 years) are enrolled in primary school¹⁸. South-central Somalia records the lowest enrolment rates at 22 percent, Puntland and Somaliland are slightly higher at 36 percent and 39 percent respectively. Equal access to education for boys and girls remains a challenge. An estimated 62 percent of students in primary schools are boys and 38 percent girls¹⁹.

14. Health and education indicators are both lower for women than men. Women are also particularly vulnerable to food insecurity²⁰. The escalating conflict has increased the incidence of sexual and gender-based violence and there is very little support for victims (counselling, medical treatment or obstetric care) or law enforcement mechanisms for women who have been raped. Children also face a wide range of protection issues, including recruitment as child soldiers by all parties to the conflict, landmines and child labour.

15. Somalia is known to be among the poorest and most food insecure countries in the world. Good harvests, when available, provide only 40–50 percent of per capita cereal needs²¹ and consequently food imports through the commercial sector play an important part in meeting the food requirements of those who can afford to purchase such commodities. In recent years, assessments have estimated that approximately 25 percent of the population have not had access to sufficient food and have been regularly in need of emergency food assistance²². For the past decade Somalia has been among the world's highest per capita recipients of humanitarian assistance.

16. The livelihoods for the majority of Somalia's people depend on pastoralism and agro-pastoralism. Only a small proportion of the population is dependent solely upon settled agriculture, which is undertaken principally along the valleys of the Shabelle and Juba rivers and in areas with more consistent rainfall such as Bay and Bakool, traditionally the bread-basket of Somalia in better times. Somalia has one of the longest coastlines in Africa, so fishing is an important potential resource, but it is not

¹⁶ Population estimates vary from 7.5 million people (CAP 2011) to 9.1 million (EIU 2011); generally a figure of 7.5 million is used in current United Nations agency documents.

¹⁷ Source: UNOCHA CAP 2011.

¹⁸ UNICEF Primary School Survey Somalia 2005–2006.

¹⁹ UNICEF Primary School Survey Somalia 2006–2007.


²⁰ Penny, A. (2008). Identification of a Livelihood Strategy and Programme to address Underlying Causes of Food Insecurity in Somalia.

²¹ WFP Standard Project Report 108120 2010.

²² A large percentage of this population are internally displaced people with disrupted livelihoods and are reliant upon external assistance.

currently a principal livelihood for many. The seasonal calendar in Somalia is important to all livelihood groups. There is considerable reliance upon the long *Gu* rains and the shorter, but important *Deyr* rains, at the end of the year for cereal and vegetable crops, but of equal importance for the regeneration of pastures and replenishment of rivers, dams and ground water supply. Figure 1 shows the associated seasonal events in Somalia.

Figure 1: Somalia Seasonal and Critical Events Calendar²³



17. Lack of government regulation and taxation has been conducive to a very vibrant business community in Somalia, which is very evident in most urban areas. It is estimated that private remittances from the Somali diaspora overseas amount to between US\$1.3 and US\$2 billion annually²⁴, considerably more than the annual international aid budget for Somalia between 2006–2010, and contribute significantly to support the monthly consumption and subsistence needs of Somali households as well as the transport, telecommunications, education, health and hotel sectors. The **economy** is also very dependent upon the export of live animals to the Gulf States and Kenya, which accounts for approximately 80 percent of export earnings annually²⁵. The dollarization of the economy has happened in reaction to the non-functioning of public banking, counterfeiting of the Somali shilling, and inflation. The distribution of economic gains is also highly inequitable, although very little data is reliable enough to make accurate analyses.

18. Somalia has not had a functioning central system of government since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991 following a prolonged and bitter civil war. In the north-west of the country, **Somaliland** has declared itself an independent entity (the Somaliland Republic) and has effectively established governance and administrative structures within its boundaries. Somaliland has not been accorded international recognition, principally because the African Union considers this might be detrimental to a longer-term political solution for Somalia as a whole. Somaliland deeply resents the fact that its hard-fought status and achievements are undermined by the political and military turmoil to the south.

²³ Source: FEWSNet.

²⁴ *Cash and Compassion: the Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peace-building* by Laura Hammond, Mustafa Awad, Ali Ibrahim Dagane, Peter Hansen, Cindy Horst, Ken Menkhaus, Lynette Obare, (UNDP) January 2011.

²⁵ Source: FSNAU.

19. **Puntland**, in the north-east of the country, is a semi-autonomous region of the country which has not sought independence from Somalia, but has established its own political and administrative systems. These systems have been closely aligned to the government in the south. There is an on-going border dispute with Somaliland over contested areas in Sool and Sanaag, which has been the cause of tensions between the two administrations over the past 12 years.

20. However, it is the **southern and central** areas of **Somalia** where the political and military crisis have been most extreme. The current Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was initially established in 2004 following national reconciliation talks in Djibouti. The first President of the TFG, Abdullahi Yusuf, had headed the administration in Puntland from the time it declared itself semi-autonomous in 1998. The TFG initially opposed all forms of political Islam and was derided by critics as being a puppet of neighbouring Ethiopia. The TFG faced opposition from influential groups in Mogadishu and was initially unable to establish its seat of government there, resorting to establishing a parliament in the provincial town of Baidoa instead.

21. Key elements of opposition led to the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which during 2006 controlled much of Mogadishu and most of southern and central Somalia, gaining ground on the weaker and more dysfunctional TFG. The ICU quickly delivered law and order to these areas, reopened key transport facilities and provided basic services. The ICU gained remarkable popular momentum, but the turning point was when hardliners within the organization provoked war with Ethiopia. In late December 2006, the Ethiopian military with superior capacity took Mogadishu facing little armed resistance, the ICU disbanded and the TFG was relocated to the capital.

22. Within a very short time, the *al-Shabaab* movement emerged as an off-shoot of the ICU representing the more hard-line, militant elements of the union. In addition other elements of the ICU and clan militias began attacks, both coordinated and separate, against the TFG and the Ethiopian military starting a period of complex and sustained insurgency from early 2007. The Ethiopian and TFG response was forceful and often indiscriminate. The conflict contributed directly to a massive displacement from Mogadishu in 2007 when more than half of the city's population of 1.3 million were forced to flee their homes.

23. By June 2008, a United Nations-brokered peace accord was reached in Djibouti between the TFG and moderate leaders in the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) made up of exiled ICU leaders and non-Islamist Somalis which had broken away from *al-Shabaab*. The Djibouti agreement called for the cessation of hostilities, a joint security force, deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force, a two-year extension of a broader-based TFG featuring moderate Islamist elements led by Sheikh Sharif, and a new, expanded parliament. It paved the way for the withdrawal of the much-resented Ethiopian forces who left by early 2009.

24. However, efforts to marginalize the radical insurgents in *al-Shabaab* were not as effective as hoped for. *Al-Shabaab* and Hizbul Islamiyya, a rejectionist militia headed up by ex-ICU leader Hassan Dahir Aweys, have controlled much of Mogadishu (until August 2011) and still retain authority across a lot of the south-central areas of the country²⁶. This is as much a reflection of the very weak

²⁶ In early 2010 Hizbul Islamiyya was subsumed under *al-Shabaab*.

capacity of the TFG military and the peace-keeping forces (AMISOM) as the strength of the opposition. The recent commitment to strengthen the AMISOM mission and the military offensive by first the Kenyan, and later the Ethiopian forces, towards the end of 2011, is for the time being assisting the TFG to gain greater control.

25. There are a number of factors that make the **humanitarian situation** uniquely complex in Somalia: the lack of effective governance, security, law and order exacerbated by insurgencies and conflict are the principal drivers of the humanitarian crisis in south-central Somalia. By 2008 the level of violence increased to levels only previously experienced during the civil war of the early 1990s. The destruction of public infrastructure, the disintegration of basic health and social services and the abuse of human rights were widespread in south-central Somalia.

26. Furthermore, there is increasing evidence of droughts becoming more severe and frequent as a result of climate change. The drought in 2005–2006 following a series of failed rains was considered the worst in ten years; this was followed by a further period of “deepening” drought in 2009–2010 (including in the north). The subsequent lack of rain was one of a number of factors that led to the declaration of famine during 2011 in parts of Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Lower and Middle Shabelle, Lower and Middle Juba, in addition to IDP settlements in Mogadishu and the Afgoye corridor leaving a total of 4 million people in “crisis” representing over 50 percent of the Somalia population²⁷. Often periods of drought in Somalia are punctuated by severe flooding along the Shabelle and Juba rivers, which was the case at the end of the 2006 Deyr rains running through into 2007.

27. There has also been a significant rise in food prices since 2008–2009 due to global spikes in the cost of grain and fuel, which has increased the cost of all essential household commodities²⁸. In turn this has also increased commodity and delivery costs for humanitarian operators like WFP in Somalia. Added to this has been the impact of the global recession on remittances from the diaspora, a vital resource for poor households in Somalia, which were estimated by one source²⁹ to have reduced by as much as 25 percent in 2009 (but this has been challenged by others). Widespread counterfeiting of the Somali shilling has also led to hyperinflation and reduced the purchasing power of Somali households.

28. Then in recent years there has been a significant reduction of the **humanitarian space** in which aid organizations have been able to operate effectively and safely. The military conflict within Somalia has been the principal cause, but some have argued that this has been exacerbated by the fact that some donor governments are belligerent in the war and the United Nations’ political agenda (in support of the TFG) has compromised the neutrality of its humanitarian agenda³⁰. The movement of food aid has always been particularly sensitive and attracted the attention of principal actors in the conflict. Often obstacles have been set up by uncontrolled and predatory security forces to prevent or “tax” food aid

²⁷ The population in crisis include: 750,000 experiencing “famine/humanitarian catastrophe” in south-central areas; 1,800,000 who are in “humanitarian emergency”; 830,000 in “acute food and livelihood crisis” in urban and rural areas; and 910,000 IDPs (FSNAU Technical Series Report VI 42 October 2011).

²⁸ The prices of imported rice and local cereals increased between 200-400 percent in the first six months of 2008 (FSNAU) and there were further price spikes in 2011 contributing to the famine situation.

²⁹ UNOCHA CAP 2010.

³⁰ Menkhaus, K. They Created a Desert and Called it Peace Building, Review of African Political Economy (June 2009); and Stabilisation and Humanitarian Access in a Collapsed State: the Somali Case (2010).

movements and jihadist cells within *al-Shabaab* threaten Somalis working for Western aid agencies or collaborating with the United Nations and Western NGOs. *Al-Shabaab* has also been responsible for the expulsion of the two principal food aid agencies from south-central Somalia. In January 2009, CARE was forced to leave areas under its control, and at the beginning of January 2010 *al-Shabaab* then barred WFP from these areas stating that food distributed by the agency undermined local farmers and accused it of acting with a political agenda. Furthermore, the escalation in piracy along the Somali coastline has been very disruptive to the supply chain of humanitarian assistance until NATO provided naval escorts.

29. The complex political context in south-central Somalia has made the country one of the most dangerous places in the world for humanitarian workers.³¹ Since March 2010 there are very few international aid workers based in south-central Somalia and all aid operations have been managed remotely from Kenya. Furthermore, eight humanitarian organizations, including WFP, were banned in 2010 by different “authorities” because of their perceived partiality. Another sixteen (including the FSNAU) were very recently banned by *al-Shabaab* in November 2011 and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in January 2012. Both local and international aid agencies are now either unable to conduct operations at all or are operating at an extremely limited capacity. Many agencies have adopted systems of remote management, including cash transfer to vulnerable households through the established *hawala* system³².

30. A significant amount of humanitarian funding has gone into Somalia since 2006. The annual Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) prioritizes funding across the humanitarian sectors and is complemented by the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), the Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF) and the new Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). According to the UNOCHA financial tracking service, funding requests under the CAP averaged about US\$500 million per year between 2006–2010 (peaking during the emergency in 2009) with anywhere from 30 to 110 different humanitarian agencies requesting funding each year.

³¹ In the 16 months from July 2007, 30 aid workers were killed in Somalia including the assassination of the top national officer for UNDP in Somalia (June 2008) and several United Nations staff in synchronized suicide bombings by *al-Shabaab* of targets in Puntland and Somaliland (October 2008).

³² *Hawala* (Arabic: حوالة, meaning *transfer*) is an [informal value transfer system](#) based on the performance and honour of a huge network of money brokers.

Table 1: Somalia Consolidated Appeal (CAP) 2006–2011

	Principal factors	Target population	Total required by CAP US\$ (revised)	WFP required in US\$ (revised)	WFP as % of total (food only)	No. of agencies
2006 ³³	Conflict and drought	2,100,000 incl. 400,000 IDPs	326,718,040	73,235,000	22.4	33
2007 ³⁴	Conflict and floods	1,000,000 incl. 400,000 IDPs	262,354,615	57,794,749	22.0	47
2008	Conflict; Chronic food insecurity	1,500,000 incl. 850,000 IDPs	641,097,679	247,564,995	38.6	75
2009	Conflict; Rising food costs; Chronic food insecurity	3,200,000	918,844,550	449,541,386	53.3	100
2010	Conflict; Drought; Global recession	3,640,000 incl. 910,000 (HE) 1,180,000 (AFLC) 1,550,000 (IDPs)	596,124,332	283,307,968	47.5	89
2011	Conflict; Chronic food insecurity	2,000,000 incl. 1,460,000 IDPs	561,469,946	191,605,662	34.1	109

31. WFP, as a leading agency in the overall humanitarian response in Somalia, is a major recipient of humanitarian funding in Somalia (indeed is the largest single recipient) concomitant with the scale of need for food aid throughout the country. Table 1 above outlines the proportion of CAP funding requested by WFP Somalia over the evaluation period. WFP had direct expenses³⁵ of US\$825 million during this period³⁶, with funding sourced from a variety of multilateral, bilateral and private donors as well as United Nations common funds. The level of contributions to WFP in both cash funding and in-kind (food aid) for the food assistance programme in Somalia is illustrated in Figure 2 below.


³³ The CAP 2006 was revised upwards from US\$174,116,815 to US\$326,718,040 (83 percent of the increase due to additional food needs).

³⁴ The CAP 2007 was revised upwards from US\$237,112,824 to US\$262,354,615 due to additional projects being added.

³⁵ Direct expenses exclude Programme Support and Administrative costs.

³⁶ Source: WFP Annual Performance Reports 2006–2011.

Figure 2: Cash vs. In-kind Contributions to WFP Somalia 2006–2011



1.3. WFP’s Portfolio in Somalia

32. The evaluation principally covers WFP operations during the period 2006–2010 which represents a major part of WFP’s humanitarian efforts globally, since over this period the Somalia programme has provided humanitarian assistance to over two million people each year (see Table 3 of the TOR for the Somalia CPE in Annex 1). However, as indicated in paragraph 3 of this report, the evaluation is also taking account of the recent shift in its programme strategy between 2010 to 2011.

33. Since 2003, there have been three large operations (aside from the supporting Special Operations, which can constitute large investments themselves³⁷) that cover a range of humanitarian activities. The timing of these operations is illustrated in Table 2 with reference to the changing food security situation and principal events within Somalia.

³⁷ Special Operations are covered by the evaluation only insofar as they contribute to the implementation of the food assistance operations and are considered support functions in the overall context of the evaluation.

Table 2: Timeline of the Somalia Portfolio 2006–2011

WFP Somalia Country Portfolio Evaluation 2006 - 2011							
WFP Operations	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	
	<p>PRRO 10191.1</p> <p>EMOP 10191</p> <p>EMOP 10812</p> <p>SO 10801</p> <p>SO 10681</p> <p>SO 10619</p> <p>SO 10587</p> <p>EMOP 200281</p>						
<p>Jan 09 : CARE is forced to leave areas in south-central under Al Shabaab's control</p> <p>Jan 10 : WFP is forced to suspend its operations in south-central because of the banning from al-Shabaab</p>							
Food Security Analysis		<p>Oct 07: Food price increases throughout the country. Deepening humanitarian crisis in Shabelle and Central Regions</p>	<p>Apr 08: below normal Gu rains. Deepening drought in Hiran, Bakool and central regions. Emerging pastoral crisis in the north</p> <p>May 08: 3.25 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, 1 in 5<5 years is acutely malnourished. Hyperinflation (340-700%)</p>	<p>Jan 09: Extended harsh Jilal dry season. Worsening drought in central. Continuing decline prices</p> <p>Apr 09: increasing number of IDPs; deteriorating Humanitarian Emergency in central</p>	<p>Apr 10: favourable seasonal rain performance; Improved food security situation. However 2 million people still in crisis</p> <p>Dec 10: below average Deyr rainfall in most of the country. Bleak outlook for crop producers and pastoralists</p>	<p>Jul 10: increase of population in crises in post Gu 2011. FSNAU declares famine in six regions of south-central Somalia</p> <p>Oct 11: Good off-season crop harvest in the riverine of Lower Shabelle;; Good onset of Deyr rains in most parts of the country</p>	
Historical Information	<p>Jan 06: Ethiopian military forces launch an offensive pushing the Islamic Courts Union out of Mogadishu southern Somalia</p>	<p>Early 07: al-Shabaab, other elements of the ICU and clan militias began attacks on the TFG and Ethiopian military</p> <p>Mid 07: massive displacement from Mogadishu</p>	<p>June 08: peace agreement TFG and ARS reached in Djibouti</p>	<p>Jan 09: Ethiopian troops withdraw from Somalia: loss of territory and effectiveness of the TFG</p> <p>al-Shabaab takes control of much of Mogadishu and retains authority across a lot of the country.</p>			

Source:WFP Project Documents, Somalia Inception Report, FSNAU


34. The first major operation (PRRO 10191.0) covered the 2003–2006 period and was focused on saving lives and improving the nutritional status of vulnerable populations in a more stable livelihood context. The subsequent operation (**PRRO 10191.1**) came on the back of successive droughts between 2001 to 2005, when an estimated 60–80 percent of the livestock holdings of pastoralist communities were lost or sold³⁸; the harvest in early 2006 was the worst in ten years. Forecasts for 2006 anticipated low rainfall including the breadbasket regions in the south of the country. The beneficiary caseload was originally planned at 2,164,000 and the total commodity requirements amounted to 170,686 mt over two years from July 2006.

35. A major shift in focus through this operation was the emergency school feeding (ESF) in particular to promote girls' school attendance as well as food-for-work (FFW) and food-for-training (FFT) activities in drought and flood-prone areas. However, despite the recovery and transition objectives of these operations, a significant percentage of the expenditures was on GFD. WFP expanded its relief component of this operation from 67 percent in 2006 to over 95 percent in 2008 and the PRRO was extended by an additional year to June 2009 (see Table 2).

36. In 2009 WFP then opted for an emergency operation (EMOP) to respond to the increasingly insecure and fragile humanitarian situation in Somalia. The **EMOP 10182.0** again scaled up the planned budget and number of beneficiaries from the previous operation. It was based on a total of 3.5 million beneficiaries, including one million previously covered by CARE International. It took account of the escalating number of IDPs and urban poor affected by high food prices and hyperinflation. GFD targeted 80 percent of the total beneficiaries mostly in south-central Somalia. The scale of the respective operations by year is illustrated in Figure 3.

³⁸ Post Gu Analysis, FSAU, September 2005.

Figure 3: Food Distribution through different operations by WFP Somalia 2006–2011



Sources: WFP (2006–2009) SPRs for PRROs 10191.0 and 10191.1; WFP (2009–2011) SPRs for EMOP 10812.0 and 200281.

37. The emphasis of the portfolio during much of the evaluation period has principally been on GFD, support to IDPs and supplementary feeding. These have been more related to the emergency relief and the level of activities associated with recovery and livelihood support has been marginal. However, as from the second half of 2009, while implementing the EMOP 10182.0, WFP Somalia adopted a strategic shift from general distributions to more conditional approaches to its emergency relief to reduce the “inclusion” error of its operations. The revised strategy was based on a nutrition targeting mechanism which introduced a selection criteria based upon malnourished children in the household and an expansion of its FFW which remunerated households in food-for-labour activities conducted. The new strategy was designed to more effectively meet the seasonal food requirements of vulnerable households and to lay the ground for more emphasis on recovery activities³⁹.

38. Some mention has to be made here of external factors that impacted on WFP’s operations during the evaluation period (although they are addressed in section 2.2 of the report) because of the considerable consequences they had on the Somalia portfolio. There were four such notable events during this period: i) the adverse publicity the programme received by a United Kingdom television channel in June 2009 and further allegations of food aid diversion by the United Nations Monitoring Group in March 2010 which led to a detailed review of WFP Somalia operations by external auditors⁴⁰; ii) the closure of CARE’s food assistance

³⁹ Strengthening WFP Food Assistance in Somalia: Concept Note (versions 3 and 4 February 2010 and 2011).

⁴⁰ Report of the External Auditor on WFP Operations in Somalia presented to the Executive Board in February 2011.

programme at the start of 2009 (for which WFP then assumed responsibility); iii) WFP's withdrawal from the south followed immediately by a ban from areas under *al-Shabaab* control in south-central Somalia with effect from January 2010; and iv) the declaration of famine in six regions of Somalia in July 2011.

39. The consequence of the first event was that WFP lost donor confidence and the ban limited WFP's access to key areas of south-central Somalia. Funding commitments and food assistance actually delivered in 2010 reduced below or approximate to levels of 2006 and 2007 (see Figures 2 and 3). A set of graphs presented in Annex 6 of this report demonstrates how the situation affected commitments from the principal donors⁴¹. At this time WFP relied significantly on less traditional donors and central funding mechanisms (such as CERF, see Figure 4). From January 2010 WFP was only able to operate in the north-west (Somaliland) and north-east (Puntland) of the country, Mogadishu and central Somalia where *al-Shabaab* was not in control. The programme also became very focused on the introduction of control mechanisms and compliance recommended by the Inspector General, the Oversight Office (December 2009) and the subsequent external audit conducted towards the end of 2010.

40. The declaration of famine in six regions of Somalia between July and September 2011 and the subsequent emergency appeal and response has seen the scale of WFP operations escalate during the course of 2011–12 to meet identified needs (but still without access to most of southern Somalia).

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1. Alignment and Strategic Positioning

41. In accordance with the TOR and the evaluation matrix of the Somalia CPE, this section of the report focuses on the evaluation findings with respect to the strategic alignment of the WFP portfolio, including the extent to which:

- its main objectives and related activities have been in line with Somalia's humanitarian and development needs;
- its objectives and strategies have been aligned with international good practice in humanitarian response;
- its objectives have been aligned with and supportive of state actors and international good practices for non-state providers working in conflict and fragile states; and
- its objectives and strategies have been coherent with those of relevant humanitarian partners operating in Somalia.

2.1.1 Alignment with Somalia's humanitarian and development needs

42. The complex humanitarian situation in Somalia is best reflected within the seasonal Food Security and Nutrition Analyses undertaken by the Food Security and

⁴¹ The United States government as the principal donor to the WFP portfolio 2006–2010 (averaging 32.8 percent of annual contributions) was particularly concerned about non-compliance with OFAC regulations.

Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU)⁴² and collaborating partners (including WFP) post *Gu* and post *Deyr* each year⁴³. The seasonal assessments (which incorporate sector analysis on climate and rainfall, civil insecurity, agriculture, livestock, markets/trade and nutrition) incorporate an analysis of food security and nutrition based upon different livelihood zones across Somalia. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is an integral tool, which identifies different current or imminent phases of food insecurity and crisis across the country and strategic response framework against each phase. The series of IPC and Nutrition Maps for Somalia from 2006–2011 are provided in Annex 11 to this report. This analysis is central to humanitarian decision-making in Somalia.

43. However, it is not a needs assessment mechanism, but in the absence of any other process, it is the most comprehensive reference point for humanitarian and development agencies to plan and target their response, albeit with a strong perspective on food security and nutrition. Consequently, there remains considerable debate among humanitarian and development agencies on the most relevant and effective response to this analysis. There is no “master plan” to which humanitarian actors align themselves beyond the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) and the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) although the cluster mechanism, introduced under the auspices of OCHA since 2006, has done much to develop sector strategies which are essentially based upon the sum of plans from different member organizations. Many organizations in Somalia (and WFP is no exception to this), have tended to respond in a way that they know best and for which they have the capacity to deliver. In-kind food aid (and in particular GFD) have for much of the evaluation period been the default option to which WFP employs in addressing “populations in crisis”⁴⁴. So WFP has aligned itself to humanitarian needs as far as they are known, but open debate on alternatives to food aid have not been encouraged or widely discussed until very recently⁴⁵.

44. The evaluation repeatedly heard concerns from respondents representing donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs of where food aid actually goes and to what extent it is addressing humanitarian needs. What is not well understood is to what extent food aid adequately meets the needs of the most vulnerable sectors of the target population and to what extent GFD (including the nature of food provided) was relevant to different livelihood zones of Somalia (including pastoralist households). It is widely reported that donated food does enter the market systems (the option to sell being chosen by recipients)⁴⁶.

45. Furthermore, there is very little understanding of the degree to which populations in different contexts have become dependent upon food aid to the extent that it might have provided disincentives to both the local agriculture and livestock economies⁴⁷. This was a particular issue early in the portfolio period when blanket food aid was “diminishing the production capacity of local farmers due to market

⁴² The FSNAU is managed by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

⁴³ FSNAU Technical Series Reports www.fsnau.org

⁴⁴ Populations in acute food and livelihood crisis (AFLC), humanitarian emergency and humanitarian catastrophe are classified broadly by FSNAU as “populations in crisis”.

⁴⁵ Interviews with respondents and minutes of the Food Assistance Cluster 2006–2011.

⁴⁶ UNMG Reports 2010 and 2011.

⁴⁷ Interviews with respondents (donors and NGOs) with particular reference to Gedo region.

distortions and rising production costs”⁴⁸. Respondents to the evaluation in the border areas of southern Somalia reiterated this to be the case until 2009.

46. Since mid-2009 WFP has adopted a more conditional approach to food aid that incorporates a stronger focus on nutrition in an emergency context through targeted supplementary feeding programme (TSFP). In this respect WFP feels more confident that it has addressed the “inclusion” error by adopting a more targeted approach. However there is as yet insufficient evidence to back up this confidence and there are now vulnerable groups who are not covered by TSFP activities with no other means of food income, as discussed later in the report (see section 2.3.3).

47. In the latter part of 2010, the Programme Unit of WFP Somalia worked on developing operational strategies, which better address communities in “transition” enabling them to recover livelihoods and household assets, thus ensuring better coping capacity in future crises. This strategy has been a positive development and has resulted in WFP strengthening its technical skills set in support of programming.

48. Finally, WFP Somalia is now working towards developing a country strategy for the first time (to which this evaluation will contribute), which will provide a real opportunity for the country team to consider different sets of interventions relevant to the humanitarian and development needs of different livelihood zones within different areas of Somalia. The strategy will be set within the framework of WFP’s Medium Term Regional Strategy for East and Central Africa 2012–2015 (also still in draft) itself derived from the global WFP Strategic Plan 2008–2013.

2.1.2 Alignment with international good practice in humanitarian response

49. The 2005 Humanitarian Reform Agenda set out to enhance humanitarian response capacity, predictability, accountability and partnership, as a strategy between the wider humanitarian community to reach more beneficiaries more effectively. It aimed to be more comprehensive and deliver needs-based relief and protection in a more effective and timely manner. The main objectives of this reform included more **accountability**, greater **leadership** capacity, enhanced **coordination**, better **financing**, and more effective **partnerships** between United Nations and non-United Nations humanitarian actors.

50. In terms of **accountability** the CO has been working closely with credible state authorities⁴⁹ where feasible since 2011 to decide the regional allocation planning. This is seen as a very positive move to engage properly with the authorities and to support their policies and strategies for food interventions in their areas (further described in section 2.1.4). However, the majority of informants to this evaluation perceive WFP to be a very top-down organization, indicating that insufficient effort was made to elicit inputs from beneficiaries, communities or humanitarian partners at field level into the programme planning mechanism⁵⁰.

⁴⁸ Food Aid in northern Gedo: A Critical Review (ASEP January 2006).

⁴⁹ This includes the Governments of Somaliland and Puntland as well as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and three authorities within Central region including Galmadug State, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaaca and Himaan-Heb Clan.

⁵⁰ As informed by Focus Group Discussions during the CPE at community level.

51. WFP's field staff, particularly the monitors, are the 'face' of the agency at the community level and while distribution monitoring and compliance are their priorities, the community groups and CPs indicated that the operation would benefit significantly from a deeper involvement from them in a range of areas. This would include programming discussions with the affected communities, prioritization of vulnerable groups, food usage and storage advice among other areas. Currently some of the interventions are often poorly understood at this level.

52. Other issues around accountability to beneficiaries concern the variable quantity of foodstuffs provided. Because of the necessity to prioritize the emergency activities in the country, coupled with the uncertainty of the pipeline and the lack of continuity of donor support, frequent commodity breaks have occurred in recent years. While the evaluation team noted and verified that the beneficiaries were informed about what they would be receiving at the actual distributions, feedback from all the focus groups and the CPs indicated that ration variations due to pipeline breaks were frequent and significant, and seldom advised in advance of the distributions themselves.

53. Food quality and appropriateness was another constant issue raised at the CPE focus group discussions. Food choices vary across the country and it appeared that little account was taken for these variations in acceptable diet, resulting in WFP food commodities being exchanged for preferred items, or in some isolated cases used as animal feed⁵¹.

54. WFP has demonstrated much clearer accountability to donors than it has to other groups and this has been strengthened significantly in the past eighteen months. There have been regular monthly meetings with donors to brief them on operations within Somalia and the funding status. This liaison is very much appreciated by the donors, but does not include other stakeholders.

55. WFP has been poor at communicating on its Somalia operations both externally and internally for much of the evaluation period although there have been notable improvements in 2011. Constantly the evaluation was informed of occasions through to 2010 when WFP had made programming decisions without sufficient consultation with other principal actors (either United Nations or NGOs). The NGOs in particular did not think they were considered as real **partners**, but more as implementers or sub-contractors — the means by which food was distributed based upon WFP's unilateral planning. Several international NGOs have intentionally distanced themselves from WFP, and Somali NGOs in particular indicated that WFP had been quite dismissive of organizations without sufficient international staff representation.

56. Since early 2011, WFP has invested more in the training and capacity-building of NGOs, providing greater financial support to ensure they have the staff and materials to undertake their role more effectively. A series of workshops was also convened by WFP in Nairobi in August and September 2011 for the NGO community to discuss issues of concern and consider ways in which WFP could engage with the NGOs in a more constructive and collaborative way. The experience was reported by

⁵¹ This issue was raised in more than one of the FGDs conducted by the evaluation, one example being that maize grain took too much fuel to cook sufficiently, so it was given to animals instead.

all participants to have been very beneficial, much appreciated, and marked the beginning of a more open and inclusive relationship between the parties⁵².

57. From 2006–2009 WFP demonstrated strong **leadership** with respect to its principal objective of providing food assistance to vulnerable and food insecure areas of Somalia⁵³ including assuming the responsibility for CARE International’s areas of operation, after their suspension at the beginning of 2009. However, the situation changed dramatically following WFP’s own suspension from *al-Shabaab* controlled areas at the start of 2010. WFP Somalia became almost a “closed shop” during the first six months of that year as intensive consultations took place between Headquarters and the CO on the implications of the allegations raised during the course of 2009 and over the ban on operating in those areas most in need of support⁵⁴.

58. WFP had expected that its operational suspension would be withdrawn after a few months; when this did not happen, the CO appears to have done little to explore alternative ways of working or advocate for other organizations to assume WFP’s role in providing food assistance. The absence of a Country Director at this critical time to take a strong lead in these areas did not help.

59. To improve **coordination**, the Cluster Process was introduced in Somalia in 2006 and since that time the Food Assistance Cluster (FAC) has been led by WFP. Since 2009, the meetings have become irregular⁵⁵ and some observers have commented that until the famine declaration in July 2011, meetings were very WFP-centric and the participation consisted largely of WFP’s partners. The minutes indicate that the meetings were principally used to share information on implementation and to prepare funding requests through the CAP (including access to CHF and HRF resources). There has been little discussion about planning or accountability and remarkably no discussion late in 2009 or early 2010 on the implications of WFP’s withdrawal and suspension from *al-Shabaab* controlled areas of south-central Somalia.

Principles of Cluster Coordination

- Complementarity of different agencies’ comparative advantages is recognized
- Agency actions are accountable to the beneficiaries they serve, to their peers, to their donors, to their Boards, and to the Humanitarian Coordinator
- Relevant information is shared in a timely manner through Cluster mechanisms
- Individual agencies will cooperate in adjusting programmes to reflect strategic priorities agreed by the Cluster and the actions of others
- Bridges to transition and early recovery are built early
- Particular needs of the most vulnerable are prioritized
- Suitable separation from military and political operations is maintained
- All Cluster partners are equal and have an equal voice

Source: <http://www.clustercoordination.org/faq>

⁵² There is no record of these meetings since it was agreed that they be conducted under Chatham House Rules.

⁵³ As evidenced earlier in section 1.2 of this report in successfully advocating for resources in support of food aid through the Somalia CAP mechanism.

⁵⁴ During this period there was no Country Director for Somalia and the CO consulted with Headquarters on virtually a daily basis through video conference calls.


⁵⁵ The OCHA website <http://ochaonline.un.org/somalia/Clusters/FoodAid/tabid/2830/language/en-US/Default.aspx> indicates that there were five meetings of FAC in 2010 (all during the first seven months) and in 2011 two meetings in January and February with no further meetings until shortly before the declaration of the famine in July 2011.

60. After the famine declaration in July 2011, FAC held regular meetings (as frequently as fortnightly), the participation grew significantly and a new Cluster Chair was appointed at the end of August 2011. At this point the Cluster really began to embrace its mandate, was more inclusive of non-traditional WFP partners and looked much more strategically at different response options including cash transfer. The Cluster is now, for the first time, operating at decentralized locations through the engagement of WFP Area Offices, which is a very positive development.

61. WFP CO has continued to lead the Logistics Cluster and offer its logistics service capacity to other agencies, and has also engaged regularly with the Education and Nutrition Clusters. The merger of the FAC and the Agriculture and Livelihoods Cluster into a combined Food Security Cluster (from early 2012, with WFP and FAO co-chairs) is seen by all the principal participants as a very positive development. It provides a forum that can look at food security in Somalia from a holistic perspective and consider the respective roles of food aid, vouchers, unconditional cash transfers and other interventions ensuring both complementarity in response and avoidance of overlaps and gaps.

62. Agencies operating in Somalia have access to a number of **joint funding mechanisms** for additional financing, as listed earlier in section 1.2 of this report. Several other international humanitarian agencies stated their view to the evaluation team that WFP had requested the majority of the share from the CAP (see Table 1 earlier in the report) and taken too much from the common humanitarian funding mechanisms (see Figure 4 below concerning WFP contributions from CERF)⁵⁶. On further analysis, the evaluation would not consider the funding excessive considering the scale of the operation and the relative cost of the food aid component. However, the allocation of US\$25 million to WFP for urgent food purchases at the point of WFP’s suspension of operations from southern Somalia was a sensitive issue with other humanitarian actors even though the grant had been negotiated months before⁵⁷.

Figure4: Percentages of CERF funding for Somalia allocated to WFP



⁵⁶ WFP also received much less significant levels of funding from the HRF and the CHF.

⁵⁷ The application to CERF was made in August 2009, but it took three months to process and by the time the funds were finally released (in January 2010, but allocated to financial year 2009), WFP was at the point of suspending its operations in *al-Shabaab* controlled areas. The WFP CO has acknowledged that it was an error to not return this money. WFP eventually agreed to provide 1,000 mt of CSB with associated costs to UNICEF.

2.1.3 Alignment with international good practices in conflict and fragile states

63. The ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations’ (FSPs) (OECD, 2007) were drawn up to provide a framework to guide international actors in achieving better results in the most challenging contexts. Operating in such situations, international partners can affect outcomes in these states in both positive and negative ways and it is vital to take account of and adhere to the ten principles in their activities.

Ten Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations:

1. Take context as the starting point
2. Do no harm
3. Focus on state building as the central objective
4. Prioritize prevention
5. Recognize the links between political security and development objectives
6. Promote non-discrimination as the basis for inclusive and stable societies
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors
9. Act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion

64. In the most recent survey of progress (OECD, 2011) the finding for Somalia indicated that overall the application of the FSPs is still significantly off-track. While this is not the sole responsibility of any one entity, the scale and duration of WFP’s commitment to Somalia clearly means there has been a strong obligation for the agency to consider such principles in its planning and interaction in the country⁵⁸.

65. However, the evaluation finds that WFP in Somalia could have more actively considered some of the implications of its actions and work practices in the country (FSP 1). WFP did not fully acknowledge and adjust to the political operating environment, nor their relationship with *al-Shabaab*. WFP’s *raison d’être* remained very traditional – to transport and deliver bulk food commodities to assist “populations in crisis” – but the distribution of food aid was against the wishes of *al-Shabaab*, then controlling much of southern Somalia.

66. Another potential resource, the ‘Do No Harm Project’ (Anderson, 1999), with a history of involvement in the Somalia context (Englestad and Otieno, 2008), was drawn up specifically to draw agencies’ attention to the risks and opportunities created in such fragile environments, to offer lessons regarding engagement, and to identify programming options when things go wrong.

67. The evaluation’s authors found no evidence to suggest that either of these recognized resources had been used to inform any WFP programming in Somalia. This is not unique to WFP in that country. While a number of NGOs, including some of WFP’s partners, have been proponents of the Do No Harm approach since 2002, the authors acknowledged that many of the NGOs and United Nations agencies

⁵⁸ WFP’s own Strategic Plan 2008–2013 (p. 10) states: “WFP will ensure that its activities support overall United Nations aims and multilateral efforts on behalf of conflict prevention, peace building, development, humanitarian assistance, human rights and the United Nations Charter.”

working in Somalia, while often supporting the DNH principles⁵⁹, did not have the structure or organizational capacity to translate them into action. Nevertheless, a range of experience from the Somali context could have been drawn upon to assist WFP's programming thinking and engagement with partners and authorities.

68. WFP (like others in the United Nations system) got caught up in the attempts to co-opt the humanitarian programme in support of the United Nations' political agenda. WFP to its credit fought to ensure their independence as far as it could. WFP recognized the geo-political context, but was not able to avoid its complications. By 2010 large areas of the country were not accessible (FSP 10) although by this time WFP could do little to change that situation. WFP has since concentrated on moving food aid into those areas it could access, and in exploring access into the areas that were gradually opening up again (i.e. no longer under *al-Shabaab* control). One principal respondent to the CPE from the donor community however expressed concern that by adopting this strategy, WFP was now demonstrating a political partiality, which they (and the broader United Nations) should be cautious of displaying so blatantly.

69. There still remains a certain constraint on the independent decision-making authority of the CO. There was pressure brought to bear by at least one major donor who insisted its food aid contribution could only be used in one particular area of the country. In some cases policy decisions on food aid donations were made at the global rather than the country level. The withdrawal of much of the support from a number of key donors after the publication of the UNMG report – despite the humanitarian imperative of the needs on the ground – had a very significant effect on the programme.

2.1.4 Alignment with Somalia's state actors

70. Opportunities to engage and align strategies with state actors in response to famine, humanitarian emergencies and acute food and livelihood crisis have been very limited, because these categories of food insecurity are exacerbated as much by the conflict between different factions as they are by natural causes. Opportunities to engage with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the south were limited in part due to the lack of capacity and resources available to this state authority, but also as a party to the conflict, close engagement with the TFG could potentially compromise the organization's neutrality in the view of other actors within Somalia (further elaborated in section 2.2.3 of this report).

71. There has however been some degree of alignment with government authorities and state building (FSP 3) in the latter part of the evaluation period in the more politically stable areas to the north, where WFP is less focused on emergency response and working towards rebuilding livelihoods and recovery.

72. This has been demonstrated through the signing of Letters of Understanding (LOU) with both the education and health ministries in Somaliland and Puntland. WFP has supported the establishment of school feeding units (SFU) within the two education ministries (in 2008 and 2009 respectively) and since 2010 has helped build the capacity of nutrition units in both the health ministries. Furthermore in

⁵⁹ The Do No Harm "Analytical Framework" provides a tool for mapping the interactions of assistance and conflict and can be used to plan, monitor and evaluate both humanitarian and development assistance programmes. Further details available at: www.cdainc.com

2010 WFP established and institutionalized the Food Assistance Coordination Agency (FACA) within the Government of Somaliland. The purpose of establishing the SFUs was to ensure greater government “ownership” of the emergency school feeding (ESF) programme in terms of identifying beneficiary schools and monitoring implementation. This has been partially successful, but is undermined by capacity limitations to collect and analyse basic education statistics (and discussed further in section 2.3.5 of this report).

73. The FACA was set up by Presidential decree to “facilitate WFP interventions” in Somaliland and “establish a platform for discussions on project implementation and provide overall guidance on operational and technical issues related to the implementation of food security and food assistance programmes”⁶⁰. It assumed a liaison function across all relevant line ministries and provided a principal focal point for WFP within the government system. However, it has become marginalized within the government system since line ministries (such as health and education) did not want to be represented by the agency, and furthermore, the Ministry of Planning was no longer prepared to host FACA because of its association with food aid which is a contentious issue within Somaliland⁶¹. As such, FACA no longer fulfils its broad mandate; it now acts as the focal point in government for receiving and reviewing FFW and FFA project proposals which are limited.

74. WFP has had little engagement with the National Environmental Research and Disaster Preparedness Commission (NERAD) of Somaliland, nor the Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency (HADMA) of Puntland, other than through formal planning meetings. Their capacity is very limited, but they have been established now for a number of years, and both would be obvious counterpart organizations within the respective government systems for WFP to work with. NERAD has recently been at the core of a Disaster Risk Management (DRM) proposal, which principally involved Oxfam, UNOCHA, FAO (including FSNAU) and UNICEF at the early stages, but for which WFP has logically been allocated a lead role in the area of contingency funding and warehousing⁶².

75. WFP’s most strategic initiative to align with state authorities has been through the decentralization of the six-monthly allocation planning for food assistance since early 2011 and the inclusion of relevant Cluster leads and NGOs in the process since early in 2012. This aims to ensure that, within the resources available to WFP, the targeting of food commodities and the interventions comply with the priorities and plans of local authorities and other development partners. This initiative has been welcomed by state authorities in Central region, Puntland and Somaliland, although in the latter, the Ministry of Planning has made it clear that the planning cycle should be longer term in support of the Somaliland National Development Plan 2012–2016.

76. WFP’s lead role in the process of working with government authorities, members of the Nutrition Cluster and a range of stakeholders to develop the national Somali Nutrition Strategy 2011–2013 has been widely acknowledged by a broad

⁶⁰ Memorandum of Understanding on Collaborative Working Arrangements between WFP and FACA (May 2011).

⁶¹ Interviews during the CPE with officials of the Ministry of Planning in Somaliland and WFP AO staff backed this assertion.

⁶² The DRM has been designed “to reduce loss of life and assets from disasters and improve the resilience of agricultural and livestock-based livelihoods against selected hazards”; it could potentially benefit from assessments and analysis undertaken by FSNAU, WFP/VAM and community-based information systems supported by Oxfam.

range of respondents to the evaluation. This is an excellent example of inter-agency collaboration across both the United Nations and NGO systems with the commitment of principal state authorities. In Somaliland the Ministry of Planning has initiated the process of developing a Food Security Strategy with the support of principal development actors. So far WFP's engagement with this and the Somaliland National Development Plan has principally been financial rather than technical due to limited capacity, but it provides a real opportunity for closer collaboration with government and normative partners like FAO at a strategic level.

2.1.5 Coherence with other relevant humanitarian partners

77. There are two sets of humanitarian actors with whom WFP partners through its operations in Somalia: i) those categorized as Cooperating Partners (CPs) which are principally international and national (Somali) NGOs; and ii) other United Nations organizations and agencies working to similar objectives as WFP. In addition WFP engages in coordinating mechanisms, which include at some levels both state actors and international donors. The most comprehensive planning framework introduced during the evaluation period was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 2008–2012 (based upon a Joint Needs Assessment conducted 2005–2006 across the country which included consultations with all principal stakeholders). This formed the basis for the United Nations Transition Plan (UNTP) 2008–2010 and more recently the United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy (UNSAS) 2011–2015⁶³. The UNSAS provides a basis for transitional, recovery and development programmes building upon the humanitarian response, which is very much determined by the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP).

78. WFP has a long history of working in collaboration with NGOs in Somalia. In 2006 WFP worked with 45 local **NGO partners** and 21 international NGOs; by 2010 it had 169 local NGO partners and 12 international NGO partners, thereby increasing its dependence on smaller Somali NGOs with very limited capacity. Annex 7 provides a list of principal Cooperating Partners (CP).

79. However, while this partnership with NGOs has formed a strong basis for operational response over the evaluation period, respondents to the CPE cited a number of reasons why the working relationship between some NGOs and WFP became fractious until the reduction in WFP operations in 2010. Principally they included: i) a lack of consultation with CPs in the design of interventions; ii) irregular pipelines especially between 2008–2010, which undermined efforts to mobilize communities; iii) WFP's loss of reputation through adverse publicity in the media 2009–2010; iv) political liability of working in collaboration with WFP following its suspension from *al-Shabaab* controlled areas of south-central Somalia; and v) communication issues (referred to in the earlier section 2.1.2 of this report).

80. Furthermore, there have been long-standing tensions with NGOs not working in partnership over WFP's determination to push ahead with its food aid agenda without open discussion on the strategy (within the Food Assistance Cluster or other such forums) and without due consideration to other options. To some extent traditional donors to WFP have also been complicit in this, since WFP has always had the credibility and leverage to secure a very significant proportion of the CAP

⁶³ The three UNSAS outcomes link to the MDGs and mirror the RDP pillars: i) social services; ii) poverty reduction and livelihoods; and iii) good governance and human security.

funding for food aid (see Table 1 earlier in this report). Many NGOs (as well as other United Nations agencies) have argued that in the long-term this would better be applied to addressing underlying structural causes of food and nutrition insecurity for which resources have been scarce⁶⁴. This also suggests some failure in the consultative process contributing to the CAP before the recent merger of the Food Assistance and the Agriculture and Livelihoods Clusters described in section 2.1.2 of this report.

81. These tensions were very evident during the first half of 2011 when a number of prominent NGOs were exploring the potential of cash and vouchers as a transfer modality for areas of southern and central Somalia, where humanitarian access was now very limited and food aid on a large scale was no longer feasible. WFP was engaged in the debate, but was considered by many agencies outside the Food Assistance Cluster to be unsupportive and unprepared to take into account any market analysis other than its own⁶⁵. WFP's analysis was finally undertaken later in the year (Sanogo, 2011a), well after the declaration of famine, and despite two versions of the presentation, the findings were controversial⁶⁶. Many observers had expected WFP to be considerably more flexible and pro-active in view of the urgency of the situation, which offered limited response options.

82. WFP has recognized many of the short-comings outlined above and not least the need to plan and liaise with NGOs in a more consultative manner. WFP does now conduct regular meetings with CPs at field level (in Somaliland, Puntland, Central region and Mogadishu) so that practical issues relating to planning, payments, communications, monitoring, etc. are discussed openly and collectively. It is the view of the evaluation that this level of engagement will make it more conducive for NGO partners to collaborate with WFP.

83. WFP's association with the **United Nations Country Team (UNCT)** has also been difficult, although similarly this has significantly improved in the past eighteen months. There were clearly tensions between 2006–2009 over the United Nations' political agenda and the implications this had for the humanitarian programme⁶⁷ of which WFP was the lead player and providing logistical support across the United Nations system within Somalia as referred to in section 2.1.3 of this report. WFP was reluctant to compromise their operational independence within Somalia to the rest of the United Nations system⁶⁸ and their engagement with processes such as the RDP and UNTP was very limited⁶⁹.

⁶⁴ Views expressed consistently by NGO respondents to the CPE.

⁶⁵ Both FSAU and FEWSNET had undertaken market analyses in March and July 2011 which indicated that markets were sufficiently well integrated – even under *al-Shabaab* control – to be able to respond to increased demand from cash transfer to vulnerable households.

⁶⁶ The WFP analysis of market functioning indicated that there were persistent supply gaps of cereals and that commercial actors had low to little capacity to increase staple food in support of vulnerable households which was discordant with the earlier findings of the FSNAU; based on this analysis, USAID/WFP did launch a monetization programme to increase the supply of sorghum to Somalia through IOM, but this could not be delivered through Mogadishu until early 2012.

⁶⁷ Menkhaus, K., *They Created a Desert and Called it Peace Building*, Review of African Political Economy (June 2009); and *Stabilisation and Humanitarian Access in a Collapsed State: the Somali Case* (2010).

⁶⁸ Interviews with both United Nations and NGO respondents to the CPE.

⁶⁹ Interviews with UNCT respondents (past and present) to the CPE.

84. In response to the food security crisis of 2008–2009, WFP determined unilaterally the level of food assistance required for Somalia⁷⁰ (based upon the FSNAU assessments), which generated resentment within the United Nations system that WFP made its own plans and strategies⁷¹. It also potentially led to both duplication and a conflict of interest with other humanitarian interventions. Indicative of the relationship was the fact that there was no consultation with other principal United Nations partners prior to WFP's withdrawal from Somalia on 5 January 2010 (which de facto included the suspension of United Nations flight services and United Nations security services for which WFP had assumed responsibility). Not surprisingly WFP felt very isolated and unsupported by the broader humanitarian community the first few months of 2010.

85. For the first six months of 2010 WFP was preoccupied with internal issues including strengthening measures of compliance and a significant collapse in its funding base. Insufficient attention was given to the gaps in capacity and response resulting from its withdrawal and suspension from *al-Shabaab* controlled areas in south-central Somalia. Indicative of the lack of foresight and joint contingency planning was the fact that WFP was unable to transfer TSFP food resources to UNICEF for nine months because there were issues with the type of agreement required.

86. This background has made it particularly challenging for WFP to re-emerge and harness effective collaboration across the United Nations system. This has to some degree been remedied by global level agreements with UNICEF on the respective roles and responsibilities of both parties in nutrition and with FAO on joint Information Systems for Food and Nutrition Security (ISFNS).

87. The relationship between WFP and UNICEF was unsettled between 2006 and 2010. Differences in personalities (especially at senior management level) and priorities led to limited collaboration on nutrition and school feeding/education. In nutrition, UNICEF and WFP were both supporting moderately malnourished children, sometimes in greater collaboration at the same sites, though with different protocols until 2009. A Joint Plan of Action was signed between WFP and UNICEF in January 2009 leading to a clearer definition of roles and responsibilities, with WFP taking responsibility for treatment of moderate malnutrition (in accordance with the global MOU), and for providing a caretaker and discharge ration to UNICEF-led therapeutic programmes. The new strategic approach by WFP with a focus on nutrition is generally seen as positive by UNICEF and other humanitarian actors in its support to vulnerable children and pregnant and lactating women (PLWs), with an emphasis on prevention of malnutrition.

88. At the technical and field level the relationship now appears stronger with both organizations increasingly discussing and collaborating on nutrition strategic planning, providing support to cluster activities and, in Somaliland, providing complementary and unified support to the MOH. A more integrated approach to nutrition response continues to be developed by the two agencies through 2011–2012, bringing treatment of moderate acute malnutrition alongside that for severe acute malnutrition. However WFP has been unsuccessful in obtaining routine

⁷⁰ The CPE understands that actual decisions on the scale of food aid to be requested in 2009 and 2011 were as much determined by Headquarters in Rome as they were by the CO Somalia.

⁷¹ Interviews with WFP, other United Nations and INGO respondents to the CPE.

medications from UNICEF to support its TSFP and has yet to engage more fully with UNICEF to draw its infant and young child feeding (IYCF) expertise into WFP programmes.

89. WFP and **FAO** have collaborated closely on food security information systems in Somalia for many years and assessments and market surveys undertaken by the VAM unit are complementary to the food security and nutrition analysis undertaken by the FSNAU, which since 2000 has been managed by FAO⁷². In fact it represents a particularly successful technical relationship and understanding between these two organizations and one model upon which global agreement on Information Systems for Food and Nutrition Security (ISFNS) was built.

90. Finally, WFP have over the past eighteen months demonstrated a stronger institutional commitment to broader planning mechanisms such as the UNSAS, which is acknowledged by the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator as a very positive development. Within the framework of the UNSAS, initiatives involving strategic partnerships between WFP, FAO, UNICEF and other partners are evolving⁷³ which suggests that there is a move to achieve further cohesion during the time-frame of the strategy. Furthermore, WFP is committed, along with FAO and Oxfam (with the support of UNDP and OCHA) to the Horn of Africa Plan of Action, which sets out a framework for operationalization for the current crisis in the region.

2.2. Factors driving WFP's strategic decision-making

91. In accordance with the TOR and the evaluation matrix of the Somalia CPE, this section of the report focuses on the evaluation findings with respect to the factors driving strategic decision-making, including the extent to which WFP:

- has analysed the national hunger, food security and nutrition issues, or used existing analyses to understand the key hunger challenges in the country;
- has developed and implemented appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems with which to make evidence-based and strategic decisions;
- has made appropriate risk management decisions in responding to the scale of humanitarian need and the security and partnership risks; and
- has been driven by external factors to make operational decisions, and to what extent this has affected the overall performance and results.

2.2.1 Analysis of national hunger, food security and nutrition issues

92. The analysis of national hunger, food security and nutrition issues within WFP is undertaken by the Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (VAM) Unit. VAM is a well-developed approach with numerous corporate-level guidelines available and regularly updated. The VAM unit for Somalia has been relatively small⁷⁴ given the

⁷² Previous to 2000 the FSAU was hosted by WFP Somalia.

⁷³ There are current discussions between WFP and FAO in three potential areas: i) the rehabilitation of infrastructure on the DurDur Irrigation Project (Somaliland); ii) the rehabilitation of water resources along pastoral migratory routes through Togdheer and Sool (Somaliland); and iii) building resilience in rural communities through improved productive agricultural capacity and better protection of livestock (also including UNICEF).

⁷⁴ The VAM unit currently has one international and four national staff and one focal point in each of the four Area Offices (Mogadishu, Galkaiyo, Hargeisa and Bosasso); the unit is soon to be expanded with two additional international staff.

size and complexity of the WFP operations in Somalia because it is complemented by the FSNAU, now managed by FAO since 2000.

93. At the conceptual level, the Somalia VAM Unit makes particular use of the Food and Nutrition Security Conceptual Framework, which is attached as Annex 8 to this report. At the analytical level, particular attention is given to the Household Food Consumption Score (FCS)⁷⁵; this is often calculated as part of VAM rapid assessments in Somalia and is also one of the main indicators used for outcome monitoring. Food security profiles are determined by combining food consumption scores with food access indicators.

94. The analytical approach adopted by WFP/VAM draws directly from field statistics and could be categorized as less subjective than the FSNAU's Integrated Phase Classification (IPC), which is more a convergence of diverse indicators. Also, the FCS focuses at the household level, whereas IPC focuses at the level of a particular livelihood group. A household-level focus is particularly valuable in understanding food security among urban and IDP populations. Consequently, in conducting the joint FSNAU-WFP Mogadishu household assessment in December 2011, FSNAU agreed to use the FCS in the analysis. There is, however, a need to examine in more detail the ways in which FCS complements FSNAU's nutrition and food security analysis.

95. In general, WFP relies very heavily on FSNAU data and analysis in its own understanding of national hunger, food security and nutrition issues. This is appropriate because FSNAU provides the most comprehensive source of food security and nutrition information for Somalia and is used by both implementing agencies and donors alike; this level of consensus in needs assessment and both aid and funding allocations is almost unique (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 27).

96. VAM has a close, informal relationship with FSNAU. WFP has funded some of FSNAU's work⁷⁶ and information is regularly shared between VAM and FSNAU. VAM has, on a small number of occasions, challenged FSNAU results with appropriate field evidence, which at the technical level seems wholly appropriate. There have, on the other hand, been other occasions when the FSNAU has been challenged by WFP management, which then undermines the technical relationship between VAM and FSNAU. A more formal WFP/FSNAU partnership is currently being drafted under a strategic agreement to develop global Information Systems for Food Security Platform. This is a joint WFP/FAO initiative⁷⁷ with Somalia as a potential pilot country.

97. A range of different types of activities are undertaken and/or led by the VAM Unit. These can be broadly categorized into: i) mapping; ii) assessments; iii) food security monitoring and market analysis; and iv) response analysis (formerly known as allocation planning). With few exceptions (e.g. the comprehensive food

⁷⁵ The FCS is a composite score based on dietary diversity, food frequency and the relative nutritional importance of different food groups.

⁷⁶ WFP funded FSNAU on an ad hoc basis in 2009, 2010 and 2011 totalling US\$85,000 for undertaking nutrition surveys with a regional representativeness (2009–2010) and collaborated on the study looking at sources of dietary iodine.

⁷⁷ The new FAO/WFP Joint Strategy on Information Systems for Food and Nutrition Security will guide cooperation from 2012 to 2017 to improve the collection and management of data to support food and nutrition security programmes and policies.

security and vulnerability assessments⁷⁸), the outputs of these activities are not publicly available and are primarily used internally within WFP. The Quarterly Food Security Updates⁷⁹, for example, are not disseminated outside WFP but are used internally to inform the CO about the food security situation in the various operational areas and ensure that current programming approaches are appropriate to changes in the local context. Similarly, Quarterly Market Update reports are used internally as an early warning indicator and in cross-checking prices submitted in tenders.

98. The comprehensive assessments allow for a more accurate understanding of the underlying causes of food insecurity (particularly the seasonal dimensions) to inform programming choices and targeting decisions, and provide a baseline, sampling frame and key indicators for subsequent WFP monitoring and assessments. The WFP assessments differ from FSNAU baselines and assessments in that they provide quantitative district and household level data across different livelihood groups, examining the root causes of food insecurity and identifying potential solutions. All of the comprehensive assessments address gender issues, but – with the exception of the Mogadishu study – there is no consideration of clan issues. The rapid assessment reports reviewed for the current evaluation were found to be very well written. Surprisingly, however, gender issues were not addressed in the reports reviewed, though almost all involved focus group discussions with women.

99. WFP also maintains a village database for their operational areas, providing a complete listing of all settlements. Twice a year the information is updated by CPs to provide an estimate of the current population for each settlement, the presence of minority, marginalized groups or IDPs, and the presence of basic services. Although some WFP staff regard the database as inaccurate and unreliable, it potentially offers a more up-to-date reflection of population numbers than the UNDP 2005 figures, which are the official figures used by FSNAU and others and are known to be very inaccurate.

100. **Market price monitoring** is undertaken by the VAM Unit, who collect weekly market price data for 31 key food and non-food items across 26 main urban markets, provided that these are accessible to WFP Field Monitors. Currently, it is only possible to monitor markets in the northern and central regions. Some market data is shared with FSNAU (e.g. commercial cereal import data collected from ports) and considered a useful contribution to their analysis. FAO, FEWSNET and VAM are working together on cross-border data collection regionally; there is the potential for the VAM Unit to work more closely with both organizations on market analysis. A limitation to the market analysis thus far is sufficient understanding of what quantities of imported goods are consumed in Somalia and how much is re-exported to Ethiopia and Kenya; informal cross-border outflows of cereals to Kenya and Ethiopia may be higher than inflows to Somalia (Sanogo, 2011a,b).

101. A detailed study of the impacts of food aid on local production and the structure, conduct and performance of the maize and sorghum markets was published in January 2010 (Godiah, 2010), though the focus was very much at the macro level as opposed to the local level. The impacts of food assistance on local

⁷⁸ To date, four comprehensive assessments have been undertaken (Puntland, Somaliland, Central and Mogadishu). The publications appear to have had limited circulation, and only the Puntland study is available online through the WFP Assessment Bank.

⁷⁹ It is planned that the Quarterly Food Security Updates will be discontinued in 2012 to focus more on early warning information.

markets have not been studied other than the review conducted by ASEP in 2006⁸⁰. In September 2011, a market analysis was undertaken to determine the feasibility of cash-based interventions in Somalia (this has previously been referred to in section 2.1.5 of this report).

102. Significant changes have taken place during 2006–2011 in the way in which analysis is translated into operations. This is reflected in new terminology; what was previously referred to as ‘allocation planning’ is now called ‘strategic review and response analysis’. In the early years, allocation planning was entirely VAM driven, involving mathematically based calculations to determine which areas were appropriate for targeted feeding programmes and which areas were appropriate for blanket feeding programmes⁸¹. Since 2011, however, the process is much more participatory, involving a series of ‘*Strategic Review and Response Analysis*’ workshops⁸² with WFP staff from CO and AO levels and representatives from the local authorities. There is also more transparency in the way in which changes to the Response Plan are made with the introduction of the 2011 ‘Directive on the Reporting of Changes to the Allocation Plan Beneficiary Figures’. Despite these improvements, there is still a fundamental lack of understanding among donors, FSNAU and other external stakeholders about how WFP translates needs assessment information into operations; one informant described the process as a ‘complicated jump from assessment to programming’.

103. One major challenge in formulating the Response Plan is the question of population numbers. There is widespread disagreement on the actual numbers of people/households throughout Somalia, and a belief that the figures used in the FSNAU survey work are incorrect. These are extrapolated from the 1975 population census figures and as such are the most up-to-date available for Somalia. Although the WFP village database (described above) informs planning at a local level, the constraint is that the regional response plans are based on the revised census figures, and as such could be significantly incorrect. The mechanism for geographic targeting (to the level of districts and livelihood zones), on the other hand, is considered to be reasonably good, particularly in comparison with many other countries where WFP works (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 30).

104. At a global level, WFP has been trying to enhance its response analysis capacity since at least 2008, first through the Enhanced Capacity in Food Security and Response Analysis Project (ENCAP)⁸³, and then through the Response Analysis Project (RAP)⁸⁴. Recent changes in the response planning process adopted by the CO (as described earlier) appear to have been partly inspired by RAP. While this is a positive move, still more can be done to improve on and broaden the CO’s response analysis process by applying the lessons and experiences from both RAP and other approaches.

⁸⁰ Food Aid in northern Gedo: A Critical Review (ASEP January 2006).

⁸¹ For example, if an area was classified by FSNAU as ‘Humanitarian Emergency’ and more than 50 percent of households were affected, then blanket feeding was recommended.


⁸² The Strategic Review and Response Analysis workshops initiated in 2011 take place once a year to allow local authorities to understand the approaches being planned by the different clusters, to discuss specific strategic issues (e.g. the shift away from GFD), and to review and revise the draft Response Plan.

⁸³ ENCAP (2008–2010) was carried out to further expand WFP’s capacities and tools to support its move from a food aid to a food assistance agency, particularly for initial and advanced Emergency Food Security Assessments (EFSAs) and market analysis to support decisions on the most appropriate transfer mechanisms (food, cash, and/or vouchers).

⁸⁴ RAP (September 2008–March 2011) aimed to strengthen the linkage between assessments and response strategies by improving the adequacy, timeliness, and consensual nature of food security and nutrition analyses.

105. From **analysis to operations**: A comparison of the number of WFP beneficiaries (planned and actual) and FSNAU’s figures for the population in crisis is shown in Figure 5. Given that the relief interventions of the allocation plan are largely based on FSNAU data, one would expect a close correlation between FSNAU and WFP figures. However, this appears to be only partly the case for the period under review. The population in crisis fell by more than half from 2006 to 2007 (1,950,000 to 1,250,000), yet the actual WFP beneficiaries remained more or less constant. Between 2007 and 2009 there was a steep increase in the population in crisis, and this was matched by a massive increase in the numbers of planned and actual WFP beneficiaries⁸⁵. Although this increase was perceived as “inflated” by many informants (including within the United Nations system and the donor community), this does not appear to be supported by the evidence available; the graph shows that the 2008–2009 increase mirrored the FSNAU figures. Between 2009 and 2010, WFP figures also mirror FSNAU figures, though the actual number of beneficiaries was consistently less than the planned number, presumably due to funding shortfalls. The dramatic increase in FSNAU figures in the latter part of 2010 and throughout 2011 was not matched by WFP figures; at this time WFP was still banned from much of southern Somalia, which is where much of the population in crisis was located. Yet it was reported by a number of key informants that, with the famine declaration in 2011, there was an explicit push by WFP Headquarters to target a larger population in crisis than was feasible on the ground. But (based on the figures in the SPRs) this push was apparently not translated into actual planning and distribution. The actual amount of food distributed in 2010 and 2011 (106,726 mt and 106,397 mt) was almost identical, and assuming that the methods of counting and recording the beneficiaries remained constant, it can be deduced that fewer people in 2011 received food support though for a longer duration.

Figure 5: WFP Somalia Actual Beneficiaries vs. Planned Beneficiaries against trends in Population at Risk (FSNAU)



Sources: WFP (2006–2009) SPRs for PRROs 10191.0 and 10191.1; WFP (2009–2011) SPRs for EMOP 10812.0 and 200281; and FSNAU Technical Series 2006–2011

⁸⁵ WFP assumed responsibility for the CARE caseload of 1,000,000 beneficiaries from the start of 2009 which accounted for a significant proportion of this increase.

106. The main conclusion that can be drawn from the interpretation of Figure 5 is that – while assessments and analysis may be done well in coordination with the FSNAU (as described above) – the numbers of planned and actual beneficiaries are influenced by other factors relating to available funding and the capacity to deliver.

107. Rather than gaps in the data, the gaps that currently exist relate more to analysis and cultural understanding. The issue of clan is particularly pertinent here, and little effort has been made to examine how clan relationships affect both vulnerability and programming⁸⁶. Partly related to this is a lack of understanding of the power relationships between pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. It is recommended that clan issues are examined in a more systematic and proactive way.

108. Another analytical issue that needs to be addressed is in the definition of an ‘IDP’ in relation to the concept of vulnerability. This categorization appears somewhat out-dated, particularly in the northern regions, where many IDPs have been displaced for much of the last 20 years, and when their host neighbours are often in no better condition. The WFP CO and other informants to this evaluation suggested that the attitude of “permanent right to assistance” needs to be challenged and a more analytical approach that focuses on urban poverty rather than IDPs should be adopted. The evaluation would endorse this and the implications it would have on current programming approaches.

109. Finally, although the approach to response analysis has clearly improved in the past year, it needs to be regarded more as a process, not simply an annual series of workshops. Information collected through M&E activities, for example, should be compiled and presented in such a way that it can feed into the response analysis process (see M&E section). There is also the potential for WFP to play an active role in promoting response analysis work at an inter-agency level in a way that ensures greater transparency of how different agencies with different mandates determine interventions to address different issues in different contexts.

2.2.2 Application of appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems

110. The M&E system was very weak and lacking in leadership and staff capacity from 2006 up to 2008. In 2007, for example, it was noted by the Oversight Office that standard monitoring reports were not available (WFP, 2011). In terms of staff capacity, there was a reported reluctance on the part of management to bring in specialist M&E staff until late 2007 when a United Nations Volunteer was recruited to manage the M&E Unit. The number of field monitors was doubled in 2008, but it was not until the latter part of 2008 that the M&E Unit was professionally managed, initially by a consultant, and then by a permanent staff member who came on board in May 2009.

111. A stronger, more systematic approach to M&E was developed between 2008 and 2010: monthly monitoring reports started in September 2008; monitoring checklists were revised several times during this period; four training programmes for field monitors were conducted during May 2009–September 2010 (WFP, 2011); an issue tracking database was established in 2010; and a beneficiary hotline was established in July 2010. A description of the current M&E system and a table of risk categories associated with programme issues is provided in Annex 9 to this report.

⁸⁶ The WFP Security Unit have some understanding of clan dynamics in relation to political and security issues.

112. While the technical capacity of the M&E Unit is relatively strong (yet understaffed), all analysis is done at the Country Office level. There is currently little or no analytical capacity at the AO level, which would enable a faster response to issues identified at field level.

113. The level of technical support from the Regional Bureau or Headquarters to the M&E Unit has been minimal. Within the past two years, Headquarters has provided guidance for the preparation of Standard Project Report through corporate menus of output and outcome indicators from which the CO can select its own indicators. This has led to greater standardization in the use of indicators and clarified the confusion that previously existed between Headquarters, regional bureaux and country offices. While there is thus some technical guidance from Headquarters for monitoring at the output and outcome levels, there is no support and no set targets for process monitoring. The only other type of technical assistance from Headquarters is in software development to support the corporate M&E databases.

114. Now that the issue tracking database has been in operation in its current form for one year, revisions should be made to simplify the system, make it easier to close some of the low- or medium-risk issues, and also provide programme staff with more useful analysis that highlights particular themes that need to be considered in programme decision-making. It would however be useful for M&E staff to provide a more 'user-friendly' quarterly analysis of the issues database that summarizes the types of issues recorded and highlights any recurring themes or types of problems in specific areas so that these can be followed up more easily by programme staff. Currently, programme staff review the issues database for themselves and draw their own conclusions on particular issues which is not an efficient or effective way of working.

115. The beneficiary hotline has not been well utilized. Between July 2010 and January 2012 just 44 calls were recorded (an average of 2.5 calls per month) (Saint-Cyr, 2012). Based on anecdotal information collected among beneficiaries during focus group discussions, the low number of phone calls is thought to be due to a lack of awareness of the existence of the hotline, the reluctance among beneficiaries to call an international number (also noted by Saint-Cyr, 2012), and the difficulties in getting through to the number from Somalia⁸⁷.

116. The majority of beneficiaries met during the evaluation reported that there was inadequate direct consultation and feedback provided by WFP. Many beneficiaries felt that questions and issues raised with the WFP Field Monitors (both directly and via the CPs) are rarely, if ever, followed up⁸⁸. While it is not the job of the WFP Monitors to provide feedback to beneficiaries, they are often the only point of contact that beneficiaries have with WFP. Field Monitors' capacity to engage appropriately is constrained by time and work pressures, largely due to their obligation to the heavy monitoring/compliance functions. Consideration needs to be given to recruiting

⁸⁷ The Evaluation Team tried several times to call the number but could not get through. When eventually the call was successful, the hotline operator was rude and put down the phone when asked how the call would be charged.

⁸⁸ While the issues recorded in the issue tracking database followed up in a very systematic manner, the way in which this is done is very much determined by WFP's internal processes and systems. Although the system often involves follow up with CPs (who are then expected to provide feedback to beneficiaries where necessary), it is simply not designed to provide feedback directly to beneficiaries.

additional monitors and building their capacities, to allow more time at field level and to expect them to do more than simple quantity verification⁸⁹.

117. The monthly M&E reports provide an update on implementation quality, compliance and tracking of identified issues. The reports produced by the CO are seen as 'best practice' within WFP and have been shared with various Country Offices in Asia so that the format (and especially the issue tracking system) can be replicated elsewhere. A summarized version of the M&E reports is also available to donors on a monthly basis, though few donors that we met reported to have made use of these, preferring instead to rely on alternative information sources such as the donor briefings and bilateral meetings.

118. Information on project outputs and outcomes is not reported in the M&E reports, but is provided in the weekly SITREPs submitted by the CO to Headquarters and in the Standard Project Reports (SPRs). SPRs are issued once a year according to guidelines from Headquarters (since 2010).

119. Given that the standardization of output and outcome indicators is relatively recent, it is perhaps not surprising that a review of the outcomes reported in the SPRs for PRRO 10191.1 (2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009) and EMOP 10812.0 (2009 and 2010) reveal a lack of consistency. PRRO 10191.1, for example, contributes to four WFP strategic objectives (SOs), yet outcomes were reported for all four SOs in 2006 only. In 2007 and 2008, outcomes were reported for just three SOs, and in 2009, outcomes were reported for only two out of the four SOs. Similarly, for EMOP 10812.0 (which contributes to WFP's SO1 and SO3), outcomes were reported for SO1 only in 2009.

120. Outcome reporting for these operations relied very heavily on secondary data sources, particularly from FSNAU, UNICEF and education ministries in Somalia. Some primary data is collected by WFP including monthly nutrition data (some nutrition data is collected through CPs), household consumption scores (collected bi-yearly) and community asset scores (collected bi-yearly). However, there are some questions about the reliability of the nutrition data provided by the CPs. The output reporting in the SPRs shows a greater degree of consistency, being generated from monthly CP reports, the M&E checklists used by the Field Monitors, and the issues tracking database.

121. In general, the current M&E system is strong on process and outputs indicators but weak on outcomes indicators. The system provides heavy 'detective' controls, which effectively capture cases of diversion and non-compliance with implementation protocols, which are then followed up with appropriate actions. This focus was clearly necessary following the allegations of 2009 and 2010, but lack of attention to outcomes means that WFP does not adequately understand a key dimension of M&E which is the real impact of the food assistance, either for the targeted individuals or for the wider community and local markets in different contexts.

122. Information collected through the M&E system has improved the quality of programme implementation and created much better awareness among the programme staff of the challenges involved in implementation process and the issues

⁸⁹ Beneficiaries, for example, indicated that often they would need advice on the use and preparation of food, or basic nutritional awareness, but that currently field monitors had neither the incentives nor the time to get involved in this level of work.

that need to be resolved through the issue tracking system. Corrective measures have included wide-scale capacity-building of partners in nutrition (including the development of training materials), training of school staff in food storage and management and the suspension of schools mismanaging food commodities. However, these relate much more to capacity requirements and implementation modalities rather than identifying which strategies impact most effectively on food and nutrition insecure households in different contexts, which is where the measure of outcomes is most critical.

2.2.3 Risk management

123. Any agency operating inside Somalia has to address a variety of risk factors, and take a proactive approach to risk identification and mitigation measures. WFP has taken these issues on board with some degree of success, aiming to balance its degree of risk acceptance with its requirement to operate in a highly complex and changeable environment. Some of the contextual, programmatic and operational risks faced are also discussed in other sections of this report.

124. The evaluation team considers that WFP's political analysis and engagement in 2008 and 2009 was insufficient, leading to the eventual confrontation with *al-Shabaab*, and these risks should certainly have been foreseen. Although WFP does appear to have maintained a wide degree of engagement with the other authorities at different levels, and certainly was in contact with *al-Shabaab* at a district level, it also is evident that this contact was not adequate at the decision-making level of the organization.

125. **Contextual risks:** Between 2008–2009 WFP raised the levels of food aid to Somalia in response to the growing food needs of the Somali population⁹⁰, resulting in deliveries during 2009 averaging almost 30,000 mt a month. This strategy was in conflict with *al-Shabaab's* agenda of greater agricultural self-sufficiency within the areas it controlled, and the lack of political understanding of the ramifications of this strategy can be seen – with the benefit of hindsight – as a particularly high risk, and perhaps reflects a certain lack of political astuteness within WFP at key levels.

126. During the period 2006–2008 WFP was one of a small number of food aid suppliers to Somalia, but by far the largest. By the end of 2008, WFP was feeding almost 2.8 million people across the country, with a further million being assisted by CARE in the central areas of the country. When that agency ceased its food operations in January 2009, WFP took over CARE's caseload, programmes, food stocks and associated costs.

127. Thus, from early 2009, there was an increased reliance upon WFP as the principal food aid distributor in Somalia (see Table 3 below) which in the political context of Somalia was a high-risk approach. The only other significant player was the ICRC, which significantly increased the size of its food operations, in part due to the needs created by WFP's lack of access to the south⁹¹.

⁹⁰ FSNAU 'population in crisis figures' increased from 1.3 million in the first half of 2008 to 3.2 million in the first half of 2009, rising again to 3.6 million in the second half of that year. Some 43 percent of the Somali population was in need of food assistance in early 2009.

⁹¹ In January 2012, ICRC was also told by *al-Shabaab* to halt its food distributions.

Table 3: Approximate annual food assistance beneficiary numbers per Agency

	WFP	ICRC⁹²	CARE
2006	1,471,000	464,982	No info
2007	1,526,000	456,690	No info
2008	2,784,530	512,592	ca. 1 million
2009	3.5 million (after handover from CARE)	464,118	Nil
2010	2,027,972	683,938	Nil
2011	1,902,480	1.1 million	Nil

128. It is also clear now that WFP had not developed a contingency plan by the time of its withdrawal/suspension from *al-Shabaab* controlled areas of southern Somalia in January 2010. Thus, negotiations had to begin at that point to try and find another agency able and willing to continue some of the feeding and/or nutrition interventions in these areas. In the event, UNICEF agreed to take over the nutrition work, but finalizing an agreement between WFP and UNICEF took eight months. Given the ‘warnings’ *al-Shabaab* had made up to this point, WFP should have done more preparatory work for this eventuality.

129. With some 60 percent of programme funding coming from USAID in several years (see Table 4), there was an insufficient ‘spread’ to fund the on-going programme activities should this line of support cease. Therefore, when the USAID resource was in fact withdrawn⁹³, and many other donors took similar action, the WFP Somalia food pipeline emptied. This created a major crisis for WFP and greatly reduced its activities, and it was only through the use of existing stocks and additional emergency support drawn from the CERF and multi-lateral funding through WFP Headquarters that any food aid activities could continue.

Table 4: USAID contributions as a proportion of total contributions to WFP Somalia⁹⁴

	Percentage of total contributions from principal donor (USAID)	Number of donors
2006	39.33	19
2007	66.59	23
2008	64.85	24
2009	26.46	20
2010	53.48	9
2011	23.06	32

⁹² Figures from ICRC Annual Reports.

⁹³ The personal liability of WFP staff under the OFAC regulations was one of the reasons given for the withdrawal of United States funding from Somalia in 2010.

⁹⁴ USAID contribution figures still to be verified by the evaluation (anomaly to findings in 2009).

130. **Reputational risks:** the CO also appears to have made no allowances for reputational risk, and WFP's reputation has indeed been damaged in Somalia. This in turn has affected other agencies by association, to a point now where several major agencies decline to work with WFP. The period between 2007 and 2010 was characterized by its unilateral and internal working methods, its lack of engagement with partners and poor record on communication generally. The external damage from the various allegations directed at WFP since mid-2009 – even though largely unproven – has been considerable.

131. Surprisingly, there was no strong corporate reaction to these allegations and several key internal informants felt let down by this: WFP at the Headquarters level remained silent and continued as if nothing had been said. On top of these was the further reputational damage done in January 2010 when WFP withdrew from south-central Somalia without conferring with any of its partners, which, according to numerous CPs, suggested WFP did not consider them as real partners. The current CO team is working hard to rebuild the confidence and trust of its partners and donors ... but it is much easier to damage than to rebuild.

132. The support and oversight roles played by the WFP Regional Bureau (RB) and WFP Headquarters with respect to institutional risks particularly between 2008–2010 are unclear to the evaluation team. From interviews with a wide range of informants, the RB's engagement with WFP Somalia programme seems to have been fairly marginal – limited largely to policy and regional strategy issues, especially as the CO was reasonably well resourced for much of the period. This low level of engagement was a point also identified in the 2010 audit report. Given the high-risk environment in Somalia, the evidence over time of problems with inter-agency relationships, and the importance of Somalia in the regional perspective, it is surprising to the evaluation team that there was not more obvious interaction.

133. **Operational risks:** in a complex and at times hostile environment, WFP's preoccupation during the months until its withdrawal from southern Somalia in January 2010, was very much on its own security. One key respondent familiar with WFP operations at the time stated that WFP's focus was principally on managing the security risks associated with its staff, facilities and equipment, and less so on managing the risks associated with distributing commodities (including diversion and misappropriation). During 2009 WFP assumed the security lead upon the request of the UNDSS who did not have sufficient capacity or access to the south. Nevertheless, 14 WFP staff and contractors have been killed while on duty since 2006.

134. The security risks are clearly extreme in some places, so field activity for expatriates is very constrained. One international logistics officer, for example, has only been able to visit the warehouse in south Galkaiyo on one occasion in three months – and with a monthly throughput, even in 2011, of some 4,000 mt, this lack of ability for direct oversight poses considerable risks. Much reliance is placed on national staff and hard-to-verify communications.

135. National staff members in some of these places spend long periods in the field, undertaking their monitoring roles, engaging with the authorities, the CPs and communities. They are the real face of WFP across the country, operating in difficult and often dangerous situations. The killing in December 2011 of two field monitors and a CP staff member in Mataban district of Hiran region highlighted this risk. There is a clear feeling at field level that the CO needs to be more supportive and

engaged with these teams. Without this, and with many staff on short-term contracts, they feel undervalued and unsure of how their families would be supported if this were to happen again.

136. At the same time, donors have already suggested that to appropriately monitor and support the current targeted food-programming operations on the ground WFP needs to have more skilled staff at field level, and the evaluation would support that. With knowledge that open field monitor positions are proving increasingly difficult to fill, it is suggested that this presents a significant risk factor for the monitoring and oversight, as well as other support functions, as WFP moves into other areas. Although third party monitors are being used, most respondents did not feel they were good replacements for WFP's own staff.

137. WFP's selection of, and engagement with, many of the local CPs remains a risk in some cases. Many are not NGOs in the accepted understanding of the term but often groups aligned to one faction/clan/political grouping or another (and frequently implementing WFP activities because of the associated resources). Some are more professional and neutral than others, but by being able to operate in some of the areas, they have to maintain a degree of closeness to the controlling authorities. WFP therefore has to follow a fine line between needing these partners to gain access to vulnerable communities, and remaining as neutral and impartial as possible.

138. **Risk management support:** the CO has been the subject of two internal audit exercises (July 2008 and November 2009) and one external audit (third quarter 2010) – with the findings in each case said to be 'unsatisfactory'. Three consistent themes centred on the M&E systems, the process of verification of food distributed vs. beneficiary numbers, and issues around local agreements with partners. A considerable advance has been made at the CO level in addressing these points since the audits, and it is clear the current CO team is determined to improve on the past.

139. Prior to 2009, a Risk Assessment Questionnaire (from the Audit Department) was regularly completed by the CO. In 2010 and as a response to the 2009 audit, a more detailed risk management matrix was drawn up, and this is now regularly updated⁹⁵. In addition, an internal supplier's database was established. With a greater reliance in recent years on local Somali cooperating partners, more rigorous background checks have been introduced on CPs by WFP CO since 2011 to assess their suitability and neutrality, covering both their programming capacity and their affiliations. All new CPs are verified via this database before signature of an FLA.

140. Since the second half of 2010, a complete series of new Standard Operating Procedures have also been drawn up for use in all activities of the Somalia CO, to tighten procedures and ensure a 'checklist' of points to be verified. While these remain a response to the need for tighter compliance, they have been described as clear and helpful for staff to follow, despite being somewhat bureaucratic.

141. Engagement from Headquarters also is reported to have been sporadic – sometimes particularly supportive (but this largely down to individuals), through to decision-making on behalf of the CO, often creating more confusion in a context that was changing regularly on the ground. One particular case in 2011 highlights this

⁹⁵ It is interesting to note, however, that the current version (2010) still does not include any political or reputational risk factors. Update for 2012 underway at time of the evaluation.

attitude: after the famine declaration in 2011, there was a “presumption” by WFP that it could access areas of the south through certain NGOs with whom it had yet to secure operational agreements. The information was inappropriately posted in the public domain to the strong objection of its partners on the ground, although this time WFP took the initiative to limit the damage as quickly as possible.

142. A United Nations inter-agency Risk Management Advisor (RMA) post has been established in the RCO’s office (since late 2010) for the United Nations Somalia agencies, whose role is to support the United Nations agencies in the risk identification and monitoring tasks. This was partly as a response to donor acceptance that despite the operational risks, certain safeguards had to be established and information flows between the partners was a critical feature of that process.

143. While this role supports WFP rather than directs its approach, informants suggest that WFP still needs to become more open and accountable to others than in the past, and take advantage of the support rather than ‘hide the problems’.

144. The United Nations RMA is also putting together another comprehensive database of contractors using feedback from the various agencies, which then allows them to crosscheck new potential partners against their history with other agencies. WFP was hesitant about contributing information to the database until it could be assured of adequate protection within the system, which resulted in considerable delays.

145. WFP CO convened a series of three risk management consultation meetings in Nairobi in June 2011 to explore a common approach to manage and mitigate risks in difficult humanitarian environments along similar lines to the OECD international conference organized in late 2010⁹⁶. Those attending included WFP and other United Nations agency staff, donor representatives and INGO staff. Based on the conference outputs and other recent studies and reports on the theme of risk analysis and humanitarian action, the intention was to develop a common understanding of the operational risks and constraints faced by operational agencies in Somalia, and to obtain agreement on a shared risk management framework in consultation with donors and other partners. Evaluation feedback indicated that this was a very positive series of meetings, open and frank, and future steps in this process will be taken forward by the UNCT and the RMO.

2.2.4 External factors influencing operational decision-making

146. There have been many external factors, which have influenced WFP’s operational decision-making during the course of 2006–2011. Many of these have already been referred to and the implications outlined within previous sections of this report. To summarize, the most consequential were: i) the loss of life to 14 WFP staff and contractors since 2006 and attacks on WFP facilities in Somalia; ii) the conditions imposed on WFP (and other humanitarian agencies) by *al-Shabaab* which forced the decision to withdraw; iii) the ban on WFP from operating in *al-Shabaab* controlled areas; iv) the allegations of food aid diversion in the

⁹⁶ “*Risk and Results Management in Development Co-operation: Towards a Common Approach*”, Copenhagen, 25–26 November 2010.

international media and the UNMG Report which led to intensive internal investigations (and the commissioning of an external audit); v) the OFAC regulations holding organizations to account should United States government funding benefit individuals or organizations associated with terrorism; vi) the reduction in programme funding 2010; and vii) the declaration of famine in parts of Somalia July 2011. A time-line of the principal events is outlined in Table 5 below.

Table 5: Principal external events affecting WFP decision-making 2006-2011

Year		Principal External Events
2006	Q2	Widespread rains and flooding directly affected some 400,000 people in the south of the country
	Q4	TFG took control of Mogadishu
2007	Q1	600,000 people newly displaced from Mogadishu due to conflict
	Q2	Failure of 'Gu' rains (April–June) increased numbers of those in need by 50 percent
2008		<i>Significant global food price increases during 2008</i>
	Q1 Q2	United States Government designate <i>al-Shabaab</i> as a foreign terrorist organization United Nations-brokered Peace Accord reached
2009	Q1	Two WFP staff members killed CARE International caseload taken over by WFP Two staff members abducted
	Q2	Channel 4 TV reports diversion of food
	Q3	<i>Al-Shabaab</i> attacks WFP Wajid compound; 4 attackers killed
	Q4	Press reports on OFAC restrictions being related to WFP food diversions 'Deepening drought' started to impact, continuing through 2010 <i>Al-Shabaab</i> bans food assistance in areas under their control while farmers are harvesting <i>Al-Shabaab</i> ordered WFP to purchase food from local farmers Donor response being scaled back due to 'allegations' of diversion
2010	Q1	WFP announces suspension of activities in south, before being banned by <i>al-Shabaab</i> UNMG Report issued accusing WFP of widespread diversion USAID stops support, which prompts a significant drop-off in other donors' contributions to WFP
	Q2	Strengthened OFAC regulations from the United States limit funding possibilities
2011	Q2	Declaration of famine in six regions
	Q4	Two WFP staff members killed

2.3. Portfolio performance and results

147. This section of the report focuses on the evaluation findings with respect to the performance and results of the WFP portfolio against benchmarks and targets set in the project documents. An overall assessment against the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria of relevance and coherence, coverage and

connectedness, efficiency and effectiveness, and impact and sustainability is provided in the third section of this report.

2.3.1 Overview

148. The Somalia PRRO 10191.1 which ran from mid-2006 to mid-2009 had four main objectives which included: i) saving the lives of conflict and disaster-affected people; ii) protecting and helping to restore the livelihoods and enhancing resistance to shock of vulnerable households; iii) improving the nutrition and health status of children, mothers, TB patients, people living with HIV and other groups at risk; and iv) supporting access to basic education, with special emphasis on girl education. These objectives were in line with Strategic Objectives 1–4 of the WFP Strategic Plan 2006–2009.

149. The subsequent operation, the Somalia EMOP 10812.0 which ran from mid-2009, is in line with Strategic Objectives 1 and 3 (SO1 and SO3) of the current WFP Strategic Plan 2008–2013 namely:

i) **save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies** for which the goals are *to save lives in emergencies, reduce acute malnutrition, protect livelihoods, enhance self-reliance in emergencies and early recovery, and to reach IDPs and other vulnerable groups whose food and nutrition security has been adversely affected*; and

ii) **restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations** for which the goals are *to support the return of IDPs through food and nutrition assistance, and to support the re-establishment of livelihoods and food and nutrition security of communities and families affected by shocks*.

150. Some 87 percent of the resources allocated to the EMOP (and 78 percent of the beneficiaries) were in support of the SO1 in contrast to the early recovery and transition focus of SO3. By 2009, WFP focused on three principal outcomes:

i) *reduced acute malnutrition in children under five* in targeted, emergency-affected populations (SO1) and

ii) *improved food consumption* for targeted, emergency-affected households (SO1) through GFD, TFSP and MCHN; and iii)

iii) *adequate food consumption* for targeted households and communities (SO3) through selective safety nets, such as school feeding, food for assets (FFA), food for training (FFT) and institutional feeding⁹⁷.

151. Annex 10 outlines the expected results from the two principal operations during the course of the evaluation period. The table identifies sources of information that provide a measure of achievement against these outcomes (which principally relate to nutrition and attendance at school by gender). In most cases these were not reported against by WFP and there is little evidence to ascertain the results.

152. WFP's operations grew substantially during the evaluation period from a caseload of 1,471,000 with 78,089 mt in 2006, to 3,204,920 beneficiaries⁹⁸ with

⁹⁷ WFP Somalia Emergency Operation (EMOP) 10812.0 "Food Aid for Emergency Relief and Protection of Livelihoods" 2009–2010.

⁹⁸ WFP took on a caseload of 1,000,000 beneficiaries from CARE at the start of 2009.

334,569 mt in 2009, driven by a deterioration in the security situation in south-central Somalia, successive droughts and high food prices. This followed the trend of population at risk determined through seasonal assessments and nutrition surveys by the FSNAU (see Figure 4 earlier in the report).


153. At any one time, it was very difficult to plan with any degree of certainty in Somalia during this period 2006–2009 – insecurity across parts of the country prevented access and caused frequent new displacements of people – and the CO had to respond to this changing situation with many different variables. Reallocation of resources to the life-saving programmes meant food supplies for other interventions (in particular the recovery and protection of livelihoods) had to be withdrawn from other programming areas, and often also moved around the country.

154. Also at this time of scale-up, WFP increasingly recognized that targeting through its traditional response mechanism (principally GFD) had a high “inclusion” error and furthermore took insufficient account of the requirements of different livelihood zones. As indicated in section 1.3 of this report, it was from late in 2010 that WFP began focusing on a nutrition targeting mechanism as a means to identify the most vulnerable and food insecure households. Targeted supplementary feeding (TSFP) with a family or protection ration was introduced in preference to the unconditional food transfers through GFD. The proportion of WFP activities represented by nutrition interventions consequently increased substantially during the evaluation period. No evidence has yet been generated to ascertain the impact of this alternative approach, although some initial concerns are discussed below in section 2.3.2.

155. Other elements of the new strategy were to cease providing special assistance to long-standing IDPs (they would be targeted like the overall relief caseload), to increase the focus on food for work (FFW) in emergencies as a targeted alternative to GFD, and more emphasis on food-for-asset (FFA) activities as an early recovery/disaster mitigation strategy. Also now under consideration are food vouchers as an alternative transfer modality to food assistance especially in certain contexts and seasons, but these were not piloted before the end of 2011. This change has been supported through the establishment of a technical team at CO (and AO) level with skills in nutrition, livelihoods and cash and voucher transfer.

156. Figure 6 below illustrates the food resources allocated to different activities during the evaluation period according to the categories of interventions now recognized under the new programme strategy: i) emergency relief; ii) nutrition; iii) food security and livelihoods; and iv) safety nets.

Figure 6: Total food distribution by intervention WFP Somalia 2006–2010



2.3.2 Emergency response

157. As indicated in Figure 6 above, the relief component has been by far the largest proportion of WFP inputs to Somalia over the evaluation period, expanding from 67 percent in 2006 to as high as 95 percent of all food deliveries in 2008. At this stage WFP was distributing enough food to feed over three million people in Somalia, nearly half the country’s population. The majority of this was through traditional GFD interventions with WFP having scaled up its own activities and incorporated the CARE International caseload after that agency withdrew at the end of 2008. The focus was principally in the most food and nutrition insecure areas of south-central Somalia as well as areas hosting large IDP populations (most notably the Afgoy corridor and Mogadishu).

Table 6: Actual beneficiary numbers (first figure) and the percentage of actual vs. planned beneficiaries (for relief activities only)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GFD	1,035,000 128.7%	876,150 146%	2,422,990 111.8%	2,186,219 100.9%	304,402 67.4%	Planned beneficiaries 1,902,480; Actual 1,342,165
IDPs, refugees, returnees	55,500 68.9%	288,400 136%	725,290 IDPs supported (included in above figures)	No data	1,413,328 36.5%	
FFW + FFA	39,280 44.1%	17,800 100%	15,630 167.3%	7,607 96%	9,704 86.7%	Other data not yet available

Sources: WFP (2006–2009) SPRs for PRROs 10191.0 and 10191.1; WFP (2009–2011) SPRs for EMOP 10812.0 and 200281.

158. Since late 2010 WFP has moved away from GFD and adopted a more conditional approach to food assistance (see previous section 2.3.1). This change in strategy reduces the dependency of the general population, regardless of livelihoods and context, on external food assistance. Both the FSNAU seasonal assessments in 2009 categorized Gedo region in the south as being “food aid dependent”, largely

because so much free food had been distributed so widely and local production had ceased. Numerous informants in the field talked negatively of the sight of long convoys of free food passing through their areas, and confirmed the need to help people with alternative strategies rather than through food hand-outs.

159. However, beneficiaries interviewed during the evaluation indicated that while they understood the general rationale for these changes, they had concerns that the current targeted food distributions (focusing on households with malnourished children) do not consider some of the more vulnerable groups (e.g. families with no children, the elderly and people with disability), and this exclusion factor needs to be carefully considered. It was even inferred by beneficiaries that families would keep a child malnourished to ensure inclusion in the programme⁹⁹. Not least this is an issue as the traditional sharing culture in Somali society means that targeted food is often redistributed to other vulnerable individuals¹⁰⁰. This situation may be of particular concern at present as it is only recently that the move away from GFD in some areas has occurred, and thus it may take some time for other coping strategies to be found.

160. Through **Food for Work** (FFW) food insecure households are provided with opportunities for paid work (from which to earn food), and this is also labelled **Food for Assets** (FFA) where the activities undertaken also produce outputs of benefit to the workers and their community. Food for Work has been effective as a short-term intervention with the aim of getting food to people in need, and is largely acknowledged as being self-targeted, thus reaching those in greatest need. It is also acknowledged as being a better option than untargeted GFD in terms of sustainability. Nevertheless, over the period under review the number of beneficiaries receiving food support through FFW and FFA in Somalia has been very limited in comparison with GFD (ranging from 2.47 percent in 2006 down to 0.35 percent in 2009, and 0.56 percent in 2010¹⁰¹).

161. WFP actively developed FFW projects that could be undertaken by women and/or other more vulnerable community members, such as community rubbish clearance work. WFP reports indicate that the percentage of females receiving food via FFW activities varied between 40 percent (2007) and 51 percent (2009/2010). In other situations, mixed groups are included in the projects and/or specific roles found for the more vulnerable members of the beneficiary community. In other cases, female-headed households have been prioritized for involvement in the activities.

162. WFP has made a conscious effort to assess and support some of the rural areas which are more difficult to access if they are identified by FSNAU surveys, and currently operates via over 3,000 FDPs. For several reasons – access, security, logistics, critical mass of populations – it is more challenging to operate in these areas. Feedback from numerous informants suggested that there may be higher vulnerability outside the urban areas, and although clearly the definition of vulnerability will vary between these contexts, limited food resources could perhaps have a greater impact in these rural communities especially where some ‘resilience’ or recovery activities are in place, rather than via on-going food hand-outs.

⁹⁹ A Nutritionist from IMC has recently posted on en-net the concern that “several organizations [in Somalia] have reported that mothers are starving their children in order to benefit from nutritional products and protection ration” (May 2012).

¹⁰⁰ Jaspers, S. and Maxwell, D. (July 2008), Targeting in Complex Emergencies: Somalia Country Case Study.

¹⁰¹ Source: WFP Somalia SPRs.

163. **Wet feeding** in Mogadishu: WFP supported wet feeding operations in Mogadishu on several occasions during the evaluation period, working through international and local partners. In order to reach significant numbers there was no targeting in these cases and food was provided to anyone who came to the feeding centres. In 2007, the numbers being fed approached 80,000 people per day; in 2009, when WFP supplied the food commodities to a consortium of NGOs, 165,535 people (40 percent children and 54 percent women) were receiving two meals a day via 16 soup kitchens (OCHA, 2009). In 2011 the beneficiary figure was between 55,000 to 60,000 people per day (approximately 45 percent women, 40 percent children and 15 percent men): feeding centres provided safe places for women and children, and as such served a strong protection function in addition to the food delivery¹⁰².

164. **Pipeline management:** when the food pipeline is constrained due to poor donor response, as it regularly has been in recent years, food allocated or committed towards the “recovery” interventions has to be withdrawn and reallocated to the emergencies, thus undermining any longer-term programmes (see examples given in paragraph 251). Pipeline breaks, reduced rations and partial deliveries have been common in all areas of the country, particularly from late 2008 onwards. Significant supply shortfalls were reported in early 2009, throughout 2010 and the first half of 2011.

165. The CO has clearly worked hard to prioritize food deliveries to the most vulnerable groups and to advise the various CPs of the shortfalls in advance, but has often been left with no alternatives as the food pipeline was far from full. In November 2009, for example, only 21 percent of the planned distribution in Puntland was met, due to resource shortages, and in September 2010, food distributions to over 88,000 people were cancelled due to shipping delays.

166. WFP CO has established a pipeline committee, which meets when required, to manage the food supply chain and finalize other pipeline issues, such as shortfalls, status of purchases and shipping, to organize reallocations of foodstuffs between regions, and other related controls. This function allows a frequent oversight on the supply chain, and aims to address the challenges of the pipeline breaks as much in advance as possible.

167. **Looking forward:** new strategies to address populations in humanitarian emergencies and acute food and livelihood crises are emerging with cash and vouchers offering an alternative transfer modality to food assistance. Where markets can support such interventions it is a very cost-effective alternative. It was calculated that in December 2011 the price of 1 kg of sorghum on the local market was approximately 44 percent of what it cost WFP to purchase and transport 1 kg of food aid sorghum¹⁰³.

168. One United Nations official in Puntland advocated for increased programming and investment in resilience and mitigation measures rather than continuing emergency interventions, which would allow the targeted beneficiaries to strengthen their own capacities to be able to deal with the next emergency themselves. With

¹⁰² Source: a principal Cooperating Partner.

¹⁰³ Evaluation team calculation based on FSNAU’s 2011 monthly average price (in Somali Shillings) across the country for sorghum per kg (from market price data spreadsheet) and calculation one single mean price per kg across all regions for the year. Price in US\$ converted on the basis of an average exchange rate with the Somali Shilling during 2011. WFP Somalia Logistics provided a US\$ figure for comparable cost of food (purchase, shipping and warehousing); this figure excludes all overheads (including salaries, office and other logistics).

joint pilot projects currently being established, WFP could be a key partner in this initiative.

2.3.3 Nutrition response

169. The FSNAU maps 2006/07–2011 presented in Annex 11 reveal how rapidly the nutritional situation can change within six months across Somalia, with some areas moving from “serious” to a “very critical” nutritional situation and back again in a short period of time. This illustrates the sensitivity of the under-5 population to changes in seasonality and food security; in particular, availability of milk related to seasonal migration of pastoral populations and its effect on children’s nutritional status which is well documented¹⁰⁴. WFP’s strategies for malnutrition prevention and response therefore need to look more comprehensively at these underlying issues and seek to address them through programme synergies with livelihood activities as well as through enhanced engagement by WFP with beneficiary communities on food management and health and nutrition advice.

170. From 2006–2007 WFP’s “social support programme” constituted a small component of its portfolio providing a low level of assistance to approximately 32,000 people through MCH, therapeutic and supplementary feeding, as well as support to hospital inpatients and TB and HIV patients. In 2008 Ready-to Use Supplementary Food (RUSF) was introduced through a scaled-up SFP alongside monthly GFD rations in areas of critical nutritional concerns to address the high malnutrition rates in Somalia as part of an emergency intervention developed jointly with UNICEF and the nutrition cluster. Individual monthly rations consisting of fortified oil (0.6 kg), CSB (7.5 kg) and sugar (0.5 kg) continued to be provided to TB/HIV patients, orphans and pregnant and lactating women (PLWs). A total of 145,180 beneficiaries were reached (2008 SPR).

171. The nutrition component of WFP’s portfolio has been further scaled up since 2010 to play a prominent strategic role through the introduction of a complementary mix of activities: Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme (BSFP) for children aged 6–36 months in IDP camps in the north and aged 6–59 months in targeted communities in southern border areas; Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme (TSFP) for acutely malnourished children aged 6–59 months and PLWs; Mother and Child Health and Nutrition (MCHN) providing take-home rations for all children aged 6–24 months and PLW attending MCH for immunization, child health clinics, antenatal and postnatal care as well as a one-off family ration for expectant mothers delivering at MCH facilities.

172. The move to increased nutritional programming accompanied the scaling down of GFD activities. It emerged in response to an improved analysis of the food and nutrition security situation and a desire to move to a targeted approach to achieve a more sustainable improvement in the situation through a focus on meeting seasonal food requirements of vulnerable households, preventing malnutrition and enabling early recovery¹⁰⁵. The scale-up of nutritional interventions and change in focus from

¹⁰⁴ Mwirigi, L.M. and Waweru, J., Seasonal trends in pastoral malnutrition in Somalia. Field Exchange Issue 41, August 2011; Sadler, K., Kerven, C., Calo, M., Manske, M. and Catley, A. (2009). Milk Matters: A literature review of pastoralist nutrition and programming responses. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and Save the Children, Addis Ababa; and FSNAU Nutrition Analyses.

¹⁰⁵ Strengthening WFP Food Assistance in Somalia. A strategic shift from general distributions to conditional approaches that incorporate recovery elements in an emergency operation. Concept Note (Version 4, 2 February 2011).

GFD is viewed by stakeholders, particularly MOHs, as a positive and appropriate response to the needs of vulnerable PLW and children under five across Somalia, in particular the approach to supporting attendance for maternal and child healthcare and prevention of malnutrition with earlier case-finding. The programme complements treatment services for severe acute malnutrition provided by UNICEF and partners.

173. In place of rigid implementation, WFP’s nutritional programming has become increasingly flexible to respond more closely to the changing and variable needs on the ground following regular situational analyses. For example, TSFP can be scaled up or down in response to needs, BSFP will be implemented seasonally in the north of the country to protect children during hunger gaps, and family rations can be provided alongside TSFP as and when needed, at an appropriate level of ration size and for the required duration¹⁰⁶.

174. Pipeline breaks and inconsistent food deliveries have affected nutritional programmes throughout their duration (see Figure 8 for an example). In particular, the expected commodities for take-home rations for the TB programme have not always been received and MCHN has, on occasion, experienced gaps.

175. In addition, the number of beneficiaries targeted by the TSFP and MCHN programmes has frequently not been reached, as evidenced in Table 7 below. Reasons provided for these shortfalls have largely related to limited access to beneficiaries or of beneficiaries to programme sites due to insecurity. In 2006 the lack of specialized cooperating partners to implement the supplementary feeding programme affected the overall achievement against the plan.

Table 7: Actual vs. planned beneficiaries in nutrition programmes

	2006	2007	2007	2008	2009	2009	2010
	PRRO 10191.0	PRRO 10191.0	PRRO 10191.1	PRRO 10191.1	PRRO 10191.1	EMOP 10812.0	EMOP 10812.0
Children TSFP	30.3%	74.3%	109.7%	141.0%	98.1%	71%	79.8%
PLW MCH	55.7%	64.2%	147.1%	20.9%	98.1%	74.7%	29.5%
HIV/AIDS patients supported to complete ART	160%						
TB patients	117.6%						
TB/HIV patients supported to complete treatment		100.1%	170.2%	101.7%	95.4%	No data	158.8%

Sources: WFP (2006–2009) SPRs for PRROs 10191.0 and 10191.1; WFP (2009–2011) SPRs for EMOP 10812.0.

176. In 2007 (PRRO 10191.1) the very high number of HIV/AIDS and TB patients supported with supplementary rations surpassed the plan reportedly as a result of

¹⁰⁶ Targeting of sites for BSFP and TSFP follows FSNAU nutrition surveys and assessments, which define areas of high malnutrition and illustrate seasonal peaks, and is according to nutrition cluster recommendations. Based on the analysis TSFP is implemented in areas with GAM above 10 percent or with GAM below 10 percent in the presence of aggravating factors, while BSFP is implemented for a period of 4 months with potential extension in areas where GAM exceeds 20 percent and/or where no partners with sufficient technical capacities to implement TSFP can be identified.


increased advocacy and outreach programmes by partners. In 2009 pipeline breaks also adversely affected food distributions as WFP had to reduce or cut rations, while 2010 saw WFP suspended in parts of south and central Somalia.

177. Additional logistical challenges to the programmes have resulted from the system of delivering only one month’s supplies to CPs at a time, which does not allow partners to have any food in reserve to cope with variable new admissions or attendance. When food deliveries are delayed this results in a serious constraint to the programme. Exacerbating this difficulty is the limited ability of many of WFP’s CPs to adequately plan in advance and request the necessary amount of commodities. This is proving a challenge for both MCHN and TSFP where supplies often run out before the end of the month and beneficiaries who attend in the last days of the month do not receive food, as witnessed by the evaluation team at programme sites.

178. The **Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme (TSFP)** provides support to moderately malnourished children and there is a consensus by government and partners that it is an important programme. However, it is currently constrained by limited mobility, the majority of the programme being at static MCH centres or camp sites. It is likely to be missing many children in remote, rural areas. There are requests for WFP to scale up a mobile programme in conjunction with MOH and integrate TSFP further with the Outpatient Therapeutic Programme (OTP) (which treats severe acute malnutrition) to ensure continuity of treatment and improved outreach into remote areas. Integrating TSFP with OTP is a priority in Somaliland and Mogadishu to ensure that malnourished children are captured early before they become severely malnourished and so that recovering children can be discharged from OTP into TSFP as a safety net to aid recovery and prevent relapse.

179. Routine medical treatment has been lacking in TSFP to date due to difficulties in obtaining supplies from UNICEF.

Figure 7: TSFP admission trends by Area Office 2009–2011




180. The graph above in Figure 7 shows the admission trends in TSFP since September 2009 by Area Office. It can be seen that WFP has clearly managed larger caseloads in Mogadishu, while admissions have increased in all areas in 2011 as a result of the famine and the opening of new sites in response. At the time of the evaluation, WFP’s database did not permit a disaggregated analysis by gender. However, FSNAU nutrition analyses 2006–2011 have found only isolated incidences of statistically significant differences in acute malnutrition by gender or between sex

of the child and morbidity status or child feeding practices,¹⁰⁷ suggesting no significant gender bias in child acute malnutrition across Somalia.

181. The alignment of the family ration with the TSFP has both positive and negative implications: CPs reported that the family ration provides a good protection ration for TSFP beneficiaries which is evidenced by very high and increased recovery rates; however, interviews with beneficiaries suggested that families will go to greater lengths to keep a child in the TSFP programme in order to continue to receive the family ration, including maintaining a child with a low weight or “sharing” a malnourished child between families for multiple registration. In addition, the logistical implications of the family ration and the size of the commodities for distribution complicate the evolution of the TSFP to progress to mobile clinics.

182. The pilot project to replace the family ration with vouchers, which is just starting in Burao (February 2012), could prove an appropriate transfer modality which allows easier scale up of mobile TSFP, pending the feasibility of its application in rural areas.

Figure 8: SAACID CTC Mogadishu SFP admissions September 2009 to December 2011



183. The graph above in Figure 8 from a WFP partner in Mogadishu clearly shows the impact of the introduction of the family ration to the TSFP in March 2010 and the reintroduction in September 2011. A dramatic increase in admissions was attributed to an increase in registration of people travelling from further afield, as well as duplicate registrations by people enticed by the higher value of the family food ration on top of the supplementary ration. The graph also clearly illustrates disruptions to the programme due to supply breaks.

184. M&E systems are in place for TSFP to capture performance indicators, however the low capacity of partners limits the accuracy and potential use of this data. While WFP CPs have received training on implementation, it is evident from the inaccurately completed record books and discussions with staff at programme sites

¹⁰⁷ However, a higher proportion of boys than girls tend to be malnourished. This disparity is considered most likely an effect of the use of the WHO 2006 sex-differentiated reference standards, which have been observed to discriminatively identify more boys as acutely malnourished.

that the nutritional performance indicators are not well understood or documented by staff working at the distribution sites. WFP Food Monitors are insufficiently skilled in nutrition to be able to provide advice and improve monitoring of outcomes.

185. Performance data has been regularly collected by WFP since late 2009 and while it appears to show that TSFP is far surpassing the Sphere indicator of 75 percent recovery rate, it should be interpreted with extreme caution due to the reporting constraints noted above. It may not be an accurate reflection of reality, especially considering that many areas experience high population mobility and therefore a high rate of defaulters might be expected.

186. There is very little engagement by WFP with beneficiary communities on food management, or in provision of health and nutrition advice, including improvement of Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) practices. Indeed, beneficiaries at most sites visited reported that they do not have an opportunity to talk to WFP representatives at all. Attempting to address underlying causes of malnutrition is an essential part of programming and both screening and food distributions present an opportune contact time with vulnerable groups, which could be capitalized on in this regard. A better understanding by WFP of its beneficiaries would assist them to tailor programmes appropriately.

187. The **Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition (MCHN)** programme aims to promote growth and prevent acute malnutrition among infants and young children and promote improved pregnancy outcomes. In 2011, 52 percent of the 43,669 new admissions in MCHN were girls, representing a roughly equal number of boys and girls in the programme.

188. This programme is greatly appreciated in Somaliland and Puntland by government and humanitarian partners alike. CPs and MOH report increased attendance of women for antenatal, postnatal care and delivery, and of children for immunizations¹⁰⁸. In addition it is perceived as a useful initiative to prevent malnutrition in children under two, exploiting the ‘window of opportunity’.

189. Initial challenges such as clinics being overrun with patients and shortage of storage space for commodities appear largely to have been resolved through dialogue and support to facilities and staffing by WFP. However, greater sensitization of beneficiaries and the community to fully understand the programme is still required as those interviewed¹⁰⁹ were not always aware of the purpose or protocol of the programme.

190. **Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme (BSFP)** has been implemented in central Somalia since 2009 as well as periodically in specific areas of northern Somalia. BSFP as a response to the famine started in the south in August 2011. Partners in the south consider it to have reduced acute malnutrition in their areas of operation but evidence from their anthropometric data is as yet inconclusive.

191. WFP’s analysis of the seasonal nature of peaks in acute malnutrition has informed the design of the BSFP in the north, where it will operate in 2012 as a

¹⁰⁸ This is firmly backed up by increasing beneficiary numbers at Farskulle MCH, Lasaanod obtained by the evaluation over nine months from October 2010 to June 2011.

¹⁰⁹ For example one group interviewed by the evaluation were unaware that if they had two children under two years of age, they would both be eligible for a ration.

seasonal programme during hunger months to prevent acute malnutrition. In Somaliland BSFP is viewed as a very helpful initiative by key stakeholders including UNICEF, MOH and CPs.

192. However, BSFP while appropriate as an emergency measure, can only be a temporary solution. The seasonal nature of increasing acute malnutrition, particularly in the north, can be largely attributed to pastoral livelihoods and food insecurity and in particular the seasonal movements of pastoralists leaving vulnerable young children with no source of milk. As yet there appears to be a lack of engagement by WFP to address these underlying causes, through enhancing beneficiary knowledge and understanding of improved IYCF practices, including nutritional education on appropriate foods for young children and alternatives to milk. The BSFP could be used as a vehicle for the promotion of optimal IYCF practices and nutritional education by WFP CPs, with the engagement and support of MOH and UNICEF. There are also opportunities for creating synergies between projects which have yet to be exploited, such as FFW to improve sanitation facilities in conjunction with other partners or FFT in literacy for the vulnerable mothers of these children.

193. Despite nutrition becoming an ever increasing focus of the WFP operation in Somalia, the CO has been slow to invest in adequate technical human resources to support the implementation of the nutrition programmes, resulting in a lack of attention to these qualitative aspects. WFP is currently increasing its nutrition technical staff, both in the CO and field offices, which is an important move towards a more effective nutrition response.

194. **Food support to TB/HIV patients** is perceived by TB centre staff and organizations involved in TB and HIV care and treatment as highly effective in attracting people for screening and ensuring compliance with treatment regimes, leading to a good cure rate for TB patients. The on-going WFP-led HIV/TB study¹¹⁰ is an excellent initiative to provide a better understanding of the nutritional and food security needs of patients and will be an important guide for programmes to tailor support to needs.

195. TB performance indicators for 2011 show a high cure rate for TB patients (all above 80 percent and most months above 90 percent for both inpatients and outpatients) with low proportions of defaulters. In addition, SPRs report 84.8 percent and 87 percent adherence to treatment by TB patients in 2007 and 2008 respectively. Qualitative evidence defined WFP's food support as an important contributing factor to this success.

196. However, adequate and consistent food supplies to TB/HIV programmes have proved a challenge to achieve over the portfolio period¹¹¹, to the extent that in two out of three centres visited by the evaluation team (Burao and Bosasso) staff were unable to display the ration entitlements for outpatients as they are never sure how much and which commodities they will receive from one month to another.

197. Other actors are also engaged in food support to institutions serving TB and HIV patients and it is essential that WFP keep abreast of who is providing what and

¹¹⁰ Nutrition and food security survey in HIV and TB facilities in Somaliland. Implemented by WFP, Ministry of Health Somaliland, SOLNAC, ANPPCAN; jointly conducted by UNAIDS, UNDP, WFP, UNICEF and local health authorities.

¹¹¹ Principally because of pipeline breaks which will affect institutional support first.

where so that it can fully understand the contribution of its programmes and ensure minimal overlap, particularly when providing full take-home family rations.

198. Synergies between nutrition programmes: in areas where both BSFP and MCHN are in operation, there is likely to be an amount of overlap between them since both programmes are accessible to children under two in the IDP population. While not intentional, this may be beneficial as an additional boost during seasonal malnutrition peaks, although it has implications for efficient use of resources. There is also some overlap between TSFP and MCHN, as the directive to remove children temporarily from MCHN while they are in TSFP is not being followed in all programme sites. WFP should endeavour to rigorously collect outcome data and analyse these aspects of programming.

199. The use of different products for the different nutrition programmes may be confusing for beneficiaries and both CP staff and communities should be clearly advised on the products in use by WFP. The recent study to compare effectiveness of RUSF and CSB was an important exercise by WFP and future studies as well as close monitoring should be put in place to guide future programme decision-making.

2.3.4 Food security and livelihoods response

200. Activities that fall under food security response include food for assets (FFA) and food for training (FFT). These are often referred to as recovery responses or livelihoods responses. Under EMOP 10182, food for work (FFW) was also considered to be a recovery activity and the two terms (FFW and FFA) are often used interchangeably¹¹². Up to 2011, beneficiary numbers for FFW and FFA were combined and reported under FFW, whereas there are currently separate targets for these two activities. The apparent confusion that existed between FFW and FFA is now becoming clearer in the documentation and planning.

201. Food for Assets (FFA): the specific objectives of FFA are: *to provide unmet food needs for the food insecure households; to build assets that are beneficial to the communities; to reduce communities' dependency on food aid; and to empower the communities to take more control of their lives* (FFA Implementation Guidelines, 2010). FFA projects are typically more appropriate to rural contexts than urban.

202. FFA projects are intended to be community-driven and often require partnership with relevant authorities or organizations independent of government who can provide the level of expertise required. Key partners to date have included the Puntland Highway Authority (PHA)¹¹³ on feeder roads and local NGOs working on water catchment, shallow well and soil conservation projects. Consultations are currently underway between WFP and IFAD on soil and water conservation structures in Somaliland, and WFP and FAO on the rehabilitation of roads, canals and wells, and improving water resources along pastoral migratory routes in Togdheer and Sool regions of Somaliland.

¹¹² FFA focuses on the creation of community assets requiring technical inputs (e.g. soil and water conservation structures, irrigation canals, construction of community roads, etc.) and food is provided against achievement of that asset. FFW provides an alternative to GFD and aims to distribute food through self-selecting targeting and involves non-technical activities (e.g. rubbish collection and road maintenance) that allow for a quick start-up and replication.

¹¹³ Formerly known as the North East Somalia Highway Authority (NESHA).

203. It has taken time for WFP Somalia to develop the institutional commitment and strategies in support of FFA. Efforts by some programme staff from 2006–2008 to promote FFA (and FFW) activities were not well supported by WFP management at CO level (including initial efforts by FAO to collaborate with WFP on canal rehabilitation projects) for reasons that were not apparent to the CPE. As shown in Table 8 below, the quantity of FFA outputs recorded in 2006 was relatively small, increasing in 2007 and 2008, and then much less in 2009 because of security issues in south-central Somalia.

Table 8: Actual FFA outputs¹¹⁴ reported under PRRO 10191.1 and EMOP 108120 2006–2010

Output	Unit	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Water pans constructed	No.	4	34	34	29	
Check dams built or reinforced	M ³				572,637	167,048
Irrigation canals rehabilitated	Km	2	3	2		
Drainage channels constructed	Km				1	
Airstrips brushed or rehabilitated	M ²	225				
Shallow wells constructed	No.	5	9	29	11	
Shelters constructed	No.	12	180		28	
Farmlands protected from erosion	Ha	57	625	1	210	180
Soil bunds constructed in farmlands	No.		15,120	587,417		
Stone terraces built against erosion	No.		415	69,442		
Water diversion embankments for grazing	No.		608			
School canteens constructed	No.	6	21	0		
Meat markets rehabilitated	No.			3		
Water ponds constructed	No.			1		
Creek points constructed	No.			22		
Communal latrines constructed	No.	24	23			
Roads constructed/rehabilitated	Km	14	72	188	35	126
Seedlings produced	No.	225	16,476		11,000	

Source: SPRs 2006–2009 for PRRO 10191.1

204. FFA projects are time-consuming to plan and prepare. The initial project should be based upon priorities established by the communities themselves and proposals are then drafted by a local NGO or another partner. A lot of time is spent reviewing proposals either by the WFP AO in conjunction with relevant line

¹¹⁴ The SPRs do not indicate number of beneficiaries for FFA/FFW.

ministries or agencies such as FACA in Somaliland who undertake the initial screening¹¹⁵. Added to this is the time spent negotiating the terms of the FLA, providing capacity-building support to the partner, and monitoring the technical aspects of the project which becomes very inefficient use of time when projects are small scale and remote.

205. Pipeline breaks or an escalation in emergency response levels can be very disruptive to FFA projects since they are the first to face a cut in resources. One example was a rangeland conservation project implemented by PENHA in Sool and Sanaag 2007–2008, which incurred a series of pipeline cuts after communities were already mobilized and engaged. Another was the PHA Meiro-Alula channel crossing project (Puntland) which suffered a pipeline break in March 2011; this led to an eight-month delay in completing the project because work could not continue once rains had resumed and had to wait for the following dry season.

206. Where communities associate themselves directly with the project from inception to implementation, the level of commitment is high. A good example is the shallow well project at Dudur, Togdheer region, where the infrastructure is being maintained by the community. Similarly, PHA reported cases where feeder roads are being maintained by the communities: in the case of the Kalaale road, the community requested tarmac from PHA to repair a section and they contributed to the cost of the labour. The establishment and training of formal community structures for the management and maintenance of the assets also supports the sustainability of the projects (Diang'a and Ngigi 2009). In the past WFP has not given enough thought to the sustainability of FFA projects, but this appears to be changing with the introduction of the 2010 FFA Guidelines.

207. Sustainability also requires good design, planning and appropriate technical inputs as evident in the case of the PHA feeder roads projects. PHA/NESHA has good technical capacity, partly due to earlier support from ILO and the Government of Japan, among others. Importantly for the FFA work, ILO¹¹⁶ has supported PHA/NESHA in developing and implementing labour standards, operational aspects, and in calculations for substituting heavy machinery-based approaches with labour intensive approaches.

208. Environmental impact assessments are rarely carried out (e.g. when constructing a water pan). In some cases this has led to other unintended negative impacts to the communities, which would have been avoided with proper planning and involvement of the relevant technical experts. Although the current FFA Guidelines mention that projects should be environmentally sound, there does not appear to be any guidance on assessing this. The developmental impacts of some of the road rehabilitation work undertaken with PHA are illustrated in Table 9 below.

¹¹⁵ There is an FFA Assessment checklist, and the FFA Implementation Guidelines (May 2010) refer to 17 steps under the FFA Project Proposal Approval Process.

¹¹⁶ ILO has been working with NESHA since 2003 to improve its project implementation models and also played a role in the Lafagorayo project, a particularly challenging route (steep, rocky and narrow) across three mountain peaks at the edge of the sea.

Table 9: Developmental impacts of selected PHA/NESHA FFA road rehabilitation projects

Name of road project	Developmental impacts
<p>Lafagoray (6.5 km)</p> <p><i>515 households supported for nine months</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Journey time from Bargal to Alula districts reduced from more than 24 hours to two hours. • Transportation costs from Bosaso port to Alula district reduced by more than 50 percent. • Positive market impacts for palm dates (for Puntland markets), frankincense and livestock (for export to Arabian countries). • Community resettlement in these two districts and related villages increased. • Improved access to social services • Improved security • 80 skilled workers trained with blasting, construction of retaining walls, recording work norms and food payment forms, radio operation, etc.
<p>Kalyheed (27 km)</p> <p><i>29,820 person work days</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved access to Kal-yaheed shallow wells by residents of Dangorayo town. Before rehabilitation, just five tanker trucks used the route per day and the water cost was US\$150 per tanker. After rehabilitation, 20 tanker trucks per day used the route, and resultant cost of water was US\$85. • Security stability has been improved in the area.

Source: PHA Reports

209. In general, FFA projects to date have been implemented in a piecemeal fashion involving a lot of work for relatively small gains, particularly when partnering with small NGOs for one-off asset building. The limited reach and technical competence within local NGO partners has been a major challenge. FFA projects in the notably food insecure areas of Somaliland have been on a negligible scale without requisite technical assistance. More strategic partnerships are needed for FFA to be implemented at scale and achieve greater impact. The partnership with PHA provides a good example of this and there is potential to undertake further FFA work with FAO (as currently being negotiated). ILO also has considerable experience in building capacity for the implementation of large-scale labour schemes and might usefully support WFP partners in this respect.

210. Food for Training (FFT): The specific objectives of FFT are: *to provide knowledge and skills training based on the local situation for self employment or other opportunities; to provide opportunities for income generating activities; and to provide unmet food needs to the most vulnerable groups* (WFP Somalia FFT Implementation Guidelines 2010). The types of training supported include literacy and numeracy linked to skills training, handicrafts, vocational training, health services, and life skills training.

211. FFT tends to target women¹¹⁷, people with disabilities, IDPs and other vulnerable groups in urban areas. As shown by Table 10, the number of participants and the number of centres supported through FFT is comparatively small. The scale of FFT interventions is limited by the number of training institutions available.

¹¹⁷ In 2008, 54 percent of FFT participants were women (WFP global guidance on enhanced commitment to women targets 70 percent participation in FFT).

Table 10: Actual FFT outputs reported under PRRO 10191.1 and EMOP 108120 2006–2010¹¹⁸

Output		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<i>Number of people trained in income generation activities, literacy and numeracy</i>	Planned	450		6000	1416	
	Actual	575		5630	1296	
	Actual vs. Planned	128%		94%	91%	
<i>Number of literacy centres supported through FFT</i>	Planned				7	20
	Actual				7	18
	Actual vs. Planned				100%	90%

Source: SPRs 2006–2009 for PRRO 10191.1

212. The students of the FFT training centre visited by the CPE in Puntland indicated that they came to the training centre to learn and while food is an additional incentive, they would prefer cash. They reported that 80 percent of their students found employment after completing their training. However, there is concern about the quality of the training¹¹⁹ provided through some of the FFT partners and the relevance of the training for the job market. If graduates are to find employment (often self-employment) there may be a need for a start-up business loan or micro-finance facility to be provided through the partner.

213. The review of WFP’s FFT programme in Afghanistan (Samuel Hall, 2010) highlights the fundamentally challenging contradiction of the short-term nature of food distribution in relation to the long-term approach needed for capacity-building and skills training. The review recommends a five-year strategic plan to shift the FFT programme from a quantitative food ration delivery mechanism to a sustainable and comprehensive contribution to the social and economic welfare of communities and individuals. Similar strategic thinking is needed to overcome the current challenges mentioned above and enhance the FFT programme in Somalia.

2.3.5 Emergency school feeding programme

214. WFP first introduced the Emergency School Feeding Programme in Somalia from 2003 on a pilot basis covering 21 schools. The pilot was very successful achieving a 40 percent increase in enrolment over one year. The ESF programme was then extended and by 2008 covered 352 schools, but the programme was seriously affected by the insecurity in the south during 2009 and only 269 schools were assisted that year covering 59,000 pupils. Since WFP’s withdrawal from *al-Shabaab* controlled areas the ESFP has only operated in the northern areas of Somaliland and Puntland, and very recently in Central region. A description of the ESF programme and its objectives is provided in Annex 12 to this report. Table 11 below provides a summary of the achievements of the respective WFP operations in delivering school feeding against annual targets set on a year-by-year basis.

¹¹⁸ The PRRO reports number of beneficiaries supported, whereas the EMOP reports number of centres supported, making comparisons over the period difficult.

¹¹⁹ The lack of a standardized training curriculum made it difficult to assess the quality of the training.

Table 11: Actual vs. planned beneficiaries

	2006 PRRO 101910	2006 PRRO 101911	2007 PRRO 101910	2007 PRRO 101911	2008 PRRO 101911	2009 PRRO 101911	2009 EMOP 10812	2010 EMOP 10812
Schools assisted through school feeding actual/planned	118/85 138.8%	21/15 140.0%		186/240 77.5%	352/376 93.6%	269/342 78.7%	319/350 91.1%	272/297 91.6%
Schools provided with non-food items for school feeding				91.1%				
Children receiving school meals	123.9%	123.9%	69.0%	91.5%	102.1%	67.7%	99.5%	66.3%
Children receiving take-home rations			92.1%	84.9%	102.1%	73.6%	104%	64.6%

Source: WFP Standard Project Reports 2006–2010

215. The last Primary School Survey supported by UNICEF and conducted across Somalia was 2006/2007 when 1,855 schools were identified as operational in the country, the majority concentrated around urban areas. The total enrolment figure was 383,983 students representing a GER of approximately 23 percent. At that time WFP was supporting 186 primary schools, approximately 10 percent of the total number of operational schools in the country. Because of access issues, it has been very difficult to ascertain the number of primary schools operational in Somalia since that date.

216. As a result of the expansion of WFP's school feeding programme to southern Somalia, the number of schools significantly surpassed the plan in 2006¹²⁰. The number of schools targeted was then increased significantly (by 24 percent) in 2007 beyond realistic levels. From 2008 to 2009 the programme was better able to almost achieve planned numbers. The targets were scaled down in 2010 because of WFP's reduced access to south-central Somalia, but nevertheless the number of children receiving school meals and take home rations fell well short of planned figures.

217. Generating accurate and comparative education statistics has been very challenging in the Somalia context, not least because of a lack of reliable population data and schools are constantly affected by insecurity across the southern and central areas of the country. Schools do not consistently maintain registers and where local education authorities do exist, their capacity to collect and analyse data is very limited. The last survey of primary schools across Somalia was conducted in 2006 by UNICEF and since then such a comprehensive survey has not been possible.

218. WFP conducted a school feeding baseline survey in Somaliland and Puntland between March and May 2008 drawing upon a sample frame of 96 schools from 270 schools either receiving WFP assistance or under consideration. The aim of the survey was to collect baseline information on impact indicators to assess the school

¹²⁰ 40,900 school children received two hot meals every school day in selected primary and secondary schools across Somalia in 2006 against the 33,000 planned.

feeding programme, but any follow through on this exercise has been limited by the lack of reliable data. In July 2011, WFP CO commissioned an evaluation of the ESF programme in Somaliland and Puntland¹²¹ comparing WFP supported schools with schools receiving no support making reference to the earlier baseline survey.

219. An overall increase in enrolment in Somaliland was established in the three years from 2007/2008 to 2009/2010 of 43.8 percent including an improvement of girl's enrolment from 36.68 percent to 41.31 percent in the sample of 25 schools assisted by WFP. The gender ratio improved from 0.58 to 0.70 indicating a reduction in the gap between the number of boys and the number of girls enrolled¹²², which is attributed to the take home ration being introduced in Somaliland in 2009. In the corresponding school years, the level of girls' enrolment in non-WFP assisted schools (13 included in the sample) had not changed significantly (42 percent) and the gender ratio (0.75) was better, but this demonstrates (the evaluation argues) that schools needing to improve were the ones selected by WFP.

220. An overall increase in enrolment in Puntland for the corresponding period was 16.3 percent in the sample of 42 schools assisted by WFP. Girls' enrolment in Puntland has increased from 38.8 percent in 2005/2006 (at the time of the UNICEF supported primary school survey) to 43.77 percent in 2010/2011 in these same schools. The gender ratio in Puntland is currently 0.77 representing the lowest gender disparity within Somalia.

221. These results demonstrate that in Somaliland WFP is attaining a 10 percent increase in enrolment per annum¹²³, a key benchmark in the project documents, but in Puntland, it is falling short of the mark since the baseline survey was conducted which may mean that the schools selected have little further capacity to improve. It is not possible to ascertain from the statistics available whether there is an increase of over 5 percent in class attendance rates, and furthermore results on retention and completion are not clear either. There were no results for Central region available to the evaluation team because ESF only began late into 2011.

222. Neither the Ministry of Education in Somaliland, nor Puntland, has an established central database being supported by an education information system, which records essential education statistics and trends. As such WFP largely depends upon information that it generates itself (or partners such as UNICEF) and this may often be at odds with the information of the regional education authorities.

223. The recent evaluation of the ESF programme in Somaliland and Puntland highlighted the fact that only 12 percent of teachers are female and often less than a quarter of CEC members are women. This still remains one of the key factors preventing girls from attending primary education. Furthermore, the supply of water and the provision of sanitation facilities at school sites remain limited and insufficient to ensure learning facilities conducive to both girls and boys.

¹²¹ Nuru, S., Isse, M. and Ali, M., WFP Mission Report on the ESFP Evaluation in Puntland (10–14 July 2011) and WFP Mission Report on the ESFP Evaluation in Somaliland (16–21 July 2011).

¹²² The increase in girls' enrolment was most significant in Sanaag region where it increased by 308 percent from 2007/2008 to 2009/2010 with a change in the gender ratio from 0.19 to 0.83.

¹²³ The Government of Somaliland introduced a policy of free primary education early in 2011, which may have attributed to increased enrolment, but only in the last school year of the period evaluated.

224. It is very evident to the evaluation that the ESF programme is highly appreciated by school communities where it is provided and it is making a positive impact on improving enrolments and especially the inclusion of girls. There have been issues raised by the recent WFP evaluation in Somaliland and Puntland regarding food deliveries to specific schools and the inappropriateness of cereals (maize grain rather than maize meal) provided, but children are generally benefitting from two regular meals per day while at school and girls have in addition a ration of 3.6 kg of vegetable oil which is very beneficial to the household.

225. However, despite setting up school feeding units within the respective Ministries of Education, an effective and meaningful partnership with WFP has not been achieved. There is insufficient “ownership” of the school feeding initiative by government authorities who consider this more a WFP driven intervention than a government programme. There is a dearth of reliable information generated to assess and analyse the programme and monitoring of schools is still principally undertaken in parallel without sufficient technical support to the schools, which bear the responsibility of delivering. Head teachers are tasked to complete a series of forms daily to ensure accountability of food provided through the programme, but there is as yet little accountability of whether school feeding is being targeted in areas of greatest food insecurity and poverty and thereby achieving the results set out in the design of the programme.

226. The ESF programme is still very much focused around principal urban centres (Hargeisa, Burao, Bosasso, Garowe and Galkaiyo)¹²⁴ and insufficient attention to much more food insecure areas of central/eastern Somaliland and the coastal belt of Puntland. Furthermore, during the 2010/2011 school year, 19 schools in Somaliland and Puntland were suspended from the ESF programme for being “non-operational” without sufficient investigation into the reasons why they had closed (it was reported to the evaluation by the Ministry of Education in Togdheer Region that most of these schools are in isolated and very food insecure areas and have been closed because of the drought and remedial measures might have prevented this). Since WFP has only limited resources for about 10 percent of primary schools operating, it is critical that a re-assessment be undertaken with the government authorities of which schools should be assisted according to agreed criteria and an exit strategy applied where schools are no longer able to fulfil the programme objectives¹²⁵.

227. Other practical considerations¹²⁶ which would support the achievement of the programme objectives at selected schools are: i) improved water storage and sanitation facilities (especially for girls); ii) construction of simple fuel-efficient stoves as well as food storage facilities; and iii) the provision of preferred cereals or milled grains.

¹²⁴ In Puntland 23 percent and in Somaliland 10 percent of the WFP-assisted schools are urban based (2012).

¹²⁵ See Annex 12 for further information.

¹²⁶ Practical issues which arose during the course of FGDs undertaken in the field by the evaluation.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1. Overall Assessment

3.1.1 Relevance and Coherence

228. The evaluation period 2006–2010 in Somalia presents one of the most difficult operating environments experienced since the collapse of the central government in 1991. There is probably no other context world-wide (other than Afghanistan) that is more challenging to the humanitarian community to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable sectors of the population (predominantly in the south-central areas of the country).

229. While WFP, as the largest humanitarian actor in Somalia, has had access to areas of highest food and nutrition insecurity within these areas of Somalia, it has certainly strived to provide levels of food assistance commensurate with the needs of those who are most food and nutrition insecure.

230. WFP has had very good technical engagement with the FSNAU; it has also identified where complementary studies were required and undertaken these assessments, and it has drawn on a broad base of analysis from Somalia to determine its own operational priorities. However, the process of translating this analysis into response (while improving in the past two years) has not been sufficiently transparent to a broad range of stakeholders. It raises issues about the lack of first-hand knowledge WFP has of the degree to which vulnerable households directly benefit from that assistance, the appropriateness of food as a sole transfer modality, the relevance of particular food commodities in different livelihood zones and therefore the level of accountability WFP has ultimately to the targeted beneficiaries. With respect to the target communities themselves, WFP endeavours to address issues of gender¹²⁷, but takes insufficient account of clan differences and issues specific to particular livelihood zones especially the education of pastoralists.

231. Probably because of the particularly challenging humanitarian environment, WFP adhered to its traditional response mechanism of GFD from 2006 to 2009 without due consideration to the changing political agenda within Somalia and the evolving strategies of other humanitarian actors responding to the situation (including within the UNCT). WFP appeared to give insufficient consideration to the implications of its actions and work practices. The intransigence of WFP, combined with the allegations of food aid diversion in 2009, the ban by *al-Shabaab* in 2010, has made it particularly difficult for WFP to restore credibility and re-engage effectively with the humanitarian community serving Somalia.

232. New senior management of the Country Office and closer engagement with the Regional Bureau and Headquarters has facilitated a new approach. There are clear indications of WFP assuming a more inclusive leadership and taking closer account of what other stakeholders have to contribute. This is particularly well demonstrated within the changes to the Food Assistance Cluster, which has assumed a much broader strategic role since the famine declaration, but also in other areas of risk management and allocation planning with local authorities and partners at the field level. Global agreements between WFP and UNICEF on nutrition and potentially with FAO on Information Systems for Food and Nutrition Security are influential in defining complementary roles within the Somalia context.

¹²⁷ Through equal distribution and taking into account women as resource managers within the household.

3.1.2 Coverage and connectedness

233. Emergency food aid to Somalia has traditionally been coordinated between WFP, CARE and ICRC to ensure sufficient coverage between the agencies across food insecure areas of the country. Over the years WFP has ensured comprehensive coverage by working to good effect through a large number of international and Somali NGOs. WFP assumed responsibility for CARE's operational areas in 2009 following their suspension by *al-Shabaab*, feeding over 3 million people in crisis that year.

234. However, in view of the humanitarian imperative in south-central Somalia, WFP's contingency planning was insufficient at the time of its own withdrawal (followed subsequently by the ban from *al-Shabaab*) in January 2010, and ICRC did not have the capacity to assume this role. WFP's lack of leadership in country at the time, its preoccupation with internal investigations and the establishment of controls, meant that WFP accorded little attention to alternative ways of working (such as supporting others in areas of vulnerability where it did not have access) nor advocating for others better placed to intervene.

235. During 2008–2009 GFD represented over 90 percent of WFP's caseload, so resources for interventions for food security and livelihood "recovery" in more stable areas of the country were limited. In fact interventions focusing on nutrition and livelihood support through FFW/FFA at this time were frequently disrupted by resources being re-allocated to emergencies, or pipeline breaks, which were not always communicated in sufficient time to partners and beneficiaries.

236. Furthermore, many of the non-emergency interventions have tended to favour areas with relatively easy access from Area Offices and principal routes. Consequently programmes such as ESF, which have grown substantially during the evaluation reference period, are still favouring areas of higher population density over areas with higher food and nutrition insecurity (especially in Somaliland and Puntland). Similarly, TSFP is still very focused upon MCH units or camp-site centres which exclude populations that do not have access to such static facilities who may be in greater need because of their isolation.

237. Over the past two years, while WFP has been less engaged with southern Somalia (other than Mogadishu), WFP has been able to focus more on its programme experience from more stable northern areas of the country and has made good progress in developing operational strategies which are intended to address communities in "transition" enabling them to build back household and community assets thus ensuring better levels of resilience¹²⁸ to shocks in future.

3.1.3 Efficiency and effectiveness

238. WFP has operated principally as a food provider in Somalia working on the assumption that food assistance is the means to address food and nutrition insecurity in the Somalia context. It has fulfilled this role well and has the requisite logistics capacity and skills set to achieve its outputs (especially under SO1) in a very challenging context. Overall the principal benchmark applied by WFP of the number

¹²⁸ Resilience is defined as "the capacity to anticipate, manage, adapt to, cope with and recover from risks to livelihoods and it expresses the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize so as to still retain essential functions, structure, identity and feedbacks" (FAO, WFP and UNICEF 2012).

of beneficiaries supported through the programme exceeded the number planned from 2006–2009, although it was affected by lack of donor funding in 2010.

239. The level of CAP support to WFP and partners has demonstrated the donor confidence in WFP until the allegations of diversion were raised in 2009–2010. There have been multiple pipeline breaks during the evaluation period, which have affected operations (principally nutrition and “recovery” programmes), but these have largely been outside the control of the organization.

240. Since 2010, WFP has rightly decided to strengthen internal controls. This focus on compliance measures has helped to significantly tighten the distribution procedures through to the FDPs and beneficiaries. The result of these compliance measures is however that the organization (and not just in Somalia) is much more focused on measuring *outputs* through the M&E system than it is on *outcomes*, which provide a measure of how well WFP is achieving its objectives and consequently the *purpose* of the programme. WFP staff and its partners must be confident that they are delivering programmes effectively. The only reasonable measure of outcome gained from the evaluation is that school feeding is achieving a 10 percent increase in enrolment in WFP assisted schools in Somaliland and reducing the gender disparity in both Somaliland and Puntland from 2008–2011. However these could be attributed as much to policy change and other factors as WFP interventions.

241. WFP has recently adopted a more conditional approach to food assistance that appears to address the “inclusion” error, which was becoming an increasing concern as GFD was applied so extensively. TSFP incorporates a much stronger focus on nutrition in an emergency context and is flexible to respond to changing and variable needs on the ground. It has been well received by both state actors and humanitarian partners as a progressive step forward, but reliable evidence has not yet been generated to determine the effectiveness of this approach.

242. WFP in Somalia has not been inclined to explore alternative approaches to address food and nutrition insecurity other than through external food aid sourced from outside Somalia. WFP’s consideration of cash and vouchers has been very cautious in Somalia¹²⁹, applying analysis and considerations to cash and vouchers that it had never applied before to food aid. The evaluation considers that both these alternatives could overcome some of the access issues affecting in-kind food distribution in southern and central Somalia as well as prove very cost-effective in certain contexts.

3.1.4 Impact and sustainability

243. The principal tool used by WFP for assessing impact are the FSNAU seasonal assessments which are indicative of a range of contributing factors, not just WFP programme interventions. It is therefore very difficult (except where WFP commissions independent studies) to determine the degree of impact that different WFP interventions have on households and communities in areas of high food and nutrition insecurity. Furthermore, WFP works through a multitude of partner organizations, many of them Somali NGOs, who do not adequately understand or accurately document nutritional performance indicators, which now constitute the principal measure of outcome since TSFP has been adopted.

¹²⁹ WFP has been much more pro-active in supporting cash and voucher interventions in neighbouring Kenya.

244. Consequently, there is still very little understanding of the contribution food assistance (and other interventions for that matter) has on food and nutrition insecurity in Somalia and therefore the effectiveness of the programme. As yet, it is also not possible to ascertain the suitability of targeting the family ration through TSFP as an alternative modality to GFD. There is also little understanding of the environmental impact certain FFA projects may have. There is on the other hand anecdotal evidence of some areas (especially in southern Somalia) having developed food aid dependency over time and of in-kind food distributions impacting adversely on farming communities (less is known of pastoralist or fishing communities).

245. Where the context allows, WFP should be adopting a longer term approach to its programming, taking into account some of the underlying and structural issues that affect food and nutrition insecurity in different livelihood zones by working more in collaboration with local authorities (where feasible) and technical organizations such as FAO, IFAD, UNICEF and ILO. The recent joint strategy on building resilience (FAO-WFP-UNICEF) in Somalia is encouraging in this respect and must be implemented at sufficient scale and over a long enough time (7 to 10 years) to have an impact¹³⁰.

246. WFP has been engaged in the development of a Somali National Nutrition Strategy and the Disaster Risk Management proposal for Somaliland, but its efforts to build institutional capacity within viable local authorities has been varied and lacks sufficient government ownership. WFP has to invest more capacity and resources to achieve this end because ultimately representative state authorities in more stable and secure contexts have to assume responsibility for managing disaster preparedness, nutrition programming, training and school feeding.

3.2. Lessons learned

247. **WFP unquestionably plays a critical role in the humanitarian context of Somalia.** Food aid has an important role to play in alleviating food and nutrition insecurity in Somalia; there is little doubt that the absence of WFP from much of south and central Somalia during 2010–2011 exacerbated the humanitarian situation within the country following two failed harvests and forced displacement which led to the declaration of famine in July 2011. **However, there is a need to open up the debate on the relevance and impact of food aid.** This has long been a “closed” subject in the Somalia context, which requires more exploration in terms of its impact on vulnerable households, the dependency it generates and the degree to which it complements or undermines the agricultural/pastoral economy.

248. **Transparency.** Organizations like WFP have to level with themselves, their stakeholders and the public about what happens on the ground and why, if humanitarian action is to be viable in the context of Somalia exacerbated by the war on terrorism and the shrinking of humanitarian space. There are risks associated with operating in such a complex environment and any insistence that no funds be diverted and no losses be countenanced is unrealistic and is tolerated to a greater degree in contexts outside Somalia. WFP must adopt a more open and strategic approach to retain relevance to the circumstances in which they are forced to work.

249. **Accountability.** All humanitarian organizations including WFP owe it to themselves and their stakeholders (whether donors, United Nations partners,

¹³⁰ Frankenberger, T. et al, Enhancing Resilience to Food Security Shocks (March 2012).

Cooperating Partners, local authorities, beneficiaries and their communities) to be accountable for the strategic choices that they make and how they are determined. Furthermore, an openness and inclusion in the process helps to ensure complementarity with what others are doing and to forge strategic partnerships and ownership, which are important for impact and sustainability. The inclusion of potential beneficiaries of different gender, ethnicity and age in different stages of programme planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation is particularly critical to ensure relevance.

250. A broader range of response options. Over the years WFP has built its reputation on very effectively providing logistics support to operations that deliver in-kind food assistance. It has become difficult for that capacity and culture of the organization to consider and adapt to other interventions, which in different contexts might be more cost-effective and of greater relevance to the intended beneficiaries. There needs to be greater institutional incentive within WFP to explore change, to adopt better informed and responsive programming (including cash and voucher modalities) and to accord distinct credit to programmes which achieve results that are proven to change lives.

251. Delegated authority. For WFP to be more effective and responsive within the different and diverse contexts of Somalia, it has to base strategies and capacities on local conditions and place greater confidence in Area Offices with the requisite capacities to assume responsibilities for coordination, decision-making and allocation of resources.

3.3. Recommendations

Food security analysis

252. Principal Recommendation 1: the WFP-VAM Unit for Somalia should be strengthened to provide food and nutrition security information to complement the assessments and analysis being undertaken by FSNAU, FEWSNET and other contributors. The information should principally support WFP's capacity to make relevant and decisive strategic programme decisions, but also contribute to improving the knowledge of both state actors and other humanitarian partners to plan and respond effectively. Specific recommendations are as follows:

- a. Independent studies to be carried out (with the technical support of RB and Headquarters) to determine: i) the benefit households of different compositions, wealth groups and livelihood zones, derive from food assistance; ii) the impact of food assistance on local agricultural and pastoralist economies (including the effect on labour markets) within Somalia; and iii) the situation of the 'urban poor' (as opposed to traditional IDP communities), with particular reference to gender and clan affiliation, in order to inform WFP's future targeting strategy (*by mid 2013*).
- b. Improve the collection and analysis of data on food market economics within Somalia (with the technical support of RB and Headquarters), specifically the capacity of markets to respond to changes in demand through market-based responses (such as cash and vouchers) and the implications of cross-border trade flows on household access to essential food commodities (in collaboration with FEWSNET and FSNAU) (*by end 2013*).

Strategy development

253. Principal Recommendation 2: WFP should base the overall Country Strategy (developed within the framework of the overarching strategy of the UNSAS) on Area-level strategies which should take into account: i) the very different political and security contexts of the country; ii) the diversity of livelihood zones; iii) the different emphasis across the relief-development continuum including contingency planning, emergency preparedness and response, recovery and transition; iv) alternative transfer modalities for food assistance (food-based, voucher-based and cash-based) that can be applied in different situations (rural/urban); and v) the variable capacities of state authorities, institutions and humanitarian partners. Specific recommendations are as follows:

- a. WFP Area level strategies (where feasible) to concentrate more on addressing the underlying causes of malnutrition through collaboration with principal partners (FAO, IFAD, ILO and UNICEF) who offer different expertise and competencies that complement WFP, thus ensuring: i) a concerted approach to building household and community resilience to shocks in the most vulnerable areas of Somalia; ii) better programming synergies and more effective use of resources (e.g. integrating FFA within broader agricultural and pastoral development projects as well as TSFP with OTP); and iii) prioritizing interventions (such as school feeding) in areas of higher food and nutrition insecurity where coverage is low (*by end-2013*).

Monitoring and evaluation

254. Principal Recommendation 3: there should be a fundamental paradigm shift within the programme to place greater emphasis and incentives on achieving results. Information and analysis generated by the WFP M&E Unit should be more than a compliance tool; it should more effectively inform and support WFP programming by providing first-hand information on the relevance and impact of different interventions on different socio-economic groups and rely less on relatively weak secondary data. Specific recommendations are as follows:

- a. Identify realistic and measurable outcome indicators (with the technical support of the RB and Headquarters) that attribute themselves directly to different WFP programme interventions (especially innovative approaches such as TSFP) that can be incorporated into the M&E system and reported in the SPRs (in addition to the output data) (*for incorporation into the SPR 2013*).
- b. An outreach strategy must be developed which articulates how issues and concerns raised by the beneficiaries and their communities (through the process of field monitoring) will be taken into account and inform programme planning and design (*by mid-2013*).

Capacity development

255. Principal Recommendation 4: WFP must have the requisite skills and resources to deliver an enhanced field monitoring function and to develop more effectively the capacity of state authorities and cooperating partners in support of assessments, implementation and reporting on WFP programme interventions with close reference to other capacity-building efforts of the United Nations system. Specific recommendations are as follows:

- a. WFP to develop the capacity of Area Offices to better generate and analyse output and outcome information within their zones supported by an increased number of trained field monitors with a better understanding of the nutrition and food security objectives incorporated within WFP programming (*by mid-2013*).
- b. WFP to more effectively support capacity-building objectives within the Area-level strategies focusing on the requisite capacity of government institutions mandated to fulfil emergency preparedness and disaster risk management (e.g. NERAD and HAMDA) and planning departments in the education and health sectors to assume increased responsibility for information collection, monitoring and technical support to training, school feeding and nutrition interventions (*by end-2013*).

Communications and coordination

256. Principal Recommendation 5: WFP must improve considerably on its external consultations and communications with respect to its analysis, programme planning and decision-making to ensure better transparency and greater accountability to its principal stakeholders. Specific recommendations are as follows:

- a. WFP should build upon recent initiatives to liaise regularly with donors and cooperating partners at Country and Area Office levels respectively and define a communications and partnership strategy (with the technical support of the RB and Headquarters) which will identify activities through which partners are regularly informed of programme developments and related issues (*by mid-2013*).
- b. WFP as co-lead (with FAO) of the newly established Food Security Cluster (at Nairobi and field levels) should take this opportunity to: i) actively facilitate consideration of a range of response options from short- to long-term which address the food and nutrition security analysis available (from FSNAU, FEWSNET and WFP); ii) in the process define the role that WFP, FAO and other partners can play in that response; iii) share with other principal actors WFP's analysis, implementation plans, progress reports, monitoring and evaluation with respect to its food assistance programme; and iv) use the forum to advocate for alternative strategies in the event that a principal actor like WFP cannot gain access to specific areas (*by mid-2013*).

Acronyms

AFLC	acute food and livelihoods crisis (IPC)
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AO	Area Office (WFP)
BSFP	blanket supplementary feeding (WFP)
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund (United Nations)
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CISS	Coordination of International Support to Somalis
CMEA	Common Monitoring and Evaluation Approach (WFP)
CO	Country Office (WFP)
COMPAS	Commodity Movement, Processing and Analysis System (WFP)
CP	cooperating partner (WFP)
CPE	country portfolio evaluation (WFP)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
EMOP	emergency operation (WFP)
ESF	emergency school feeding (WFP)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning System Network
FFA	food for assets (WFP)
FFE	food for education (WFP)
FFT	food for training (WFP)
FFW	food for work (WFP)
FLA	field level agreement (WFP)
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GFD	general food distribution (WFP)

GHF	general hospital feeding (WFP)
HADMA	Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency
HE	humanitarian emergency (IPC)
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDP	internally displaced person
ILO	International Labour Organization
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (FSNAU)
ISN	Interim Strategy Note 2008–2009 (WB)
JNA	Joint Needs Assessment (Somalia)
JSP	Joint Strategic Plan 2008–2013 (EC)
MAM	moderate acute malnutrition
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MCH	mother and child health
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (UNICEF)
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NERAD	National Environment Research and Disaster Preparedness and Management Authority (Somaliland)
NGO	non-governmental organization
OE	Office of Evaluation (WFP)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFAC	Office of Foreign Assets Control (US Government)
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OTP	Outpatient Therapeutic Programme (UNICEF)
PDM	post-distribution monitoring (WFP)
PLW	pregnant and lactating women
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation (WFP)
RB	Regional Bureau (WFP)
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Plan 2008–2012 (Somalia)
RFBM	Resource, Financial and Budgetary Matters (WFP)

RMA	Risk Management Advisor (United Nations)
RP	response plan
RTE	real time evaluation
RUSF	ready-to use supplementary food (WFP)
SACB	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SAM	severe acute malnutrition
SP	strategic plan
SPR	Standard Project Report (WFP)
SS	social sector support (WFP)
SSS	Somali Support Secretariat
TB	tuberculosis
TFG	Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)
TSFP	targeted supplementary feeding programme (WFP)
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMG	United Nations Monitoring Group
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSAS	United Nations Somalia Assistance Strategy 2011–2015
UNTP	United Nations Transition Plan 2008–2010 (Somalia)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (WFP)
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme (United Nations)

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