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Security report

Introduction

1. In 2024, the Security Division recorded the highest number of incidents affecting WFP operations, with figures surpassing those of 2023: the worst year on record until that point. This deteriorating trend – which started in 2021 – is not unique to WFP; rather, it is representative of broader dynamics affecting humanitarian organizations globally.

2. As food insecurity is more prevalent in fragile and conflict-affected settings, WFP operations are strongly affected by the challenges that come with operating in such environments. Violent conflicts continue to grow in complexity, with emerging technologies rapidly proliferating in the hands of more actors. This has led to an exponential increase in the difficulty and the required speed of decision making on and near the front lines of a conflict.

3. While aerial unmanned vehicles, loitering munitions, mis and disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks already represent a widespread security risk, advances in artificial intelligence (AI), three-dimensional printing and lethal autonomous weapons have the potential to make WFP operations even more complex in the near future.[1]

4. In parallel, in the normative context, humanitarian space is being eroded at a concerning rate, as demonstrated by the growing number of attacks, acts of violence and threats against humanitarian personnel, their premises and assets.[2] Despite the growing attention regarding this issue,[3] fiscal pressures continue to mount across the WFP donor base. In 2024, WFP funding returned to pre-pandemic levels, and projections for 2025 and beyond are looking progressively less promising.

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[1] United Nations. A New Era of Conflict and Violence.

[2] United Nations Security Council. 2024. Resolution 2730 (2024) (S/RES/2730 (2024)).

[3] For example, Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 2024. Government response: Towards a new Declaration for the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel. This proposal has been put forward by a ministerial group comprising Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Sierra Leone, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

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5.   Notwithstanding these challenges, in 2024 WFP started an internal restructuring process with the goal of increasing the organization's efficiency and effectiveness. As a result, the Security Division consolidated its role as a key enabling function under the newly formed Workplace and Management Department. In doing so, the division aims to sharpen its core mission based on the recently finalized duty of care accountability framework; one of the main priorities of the Executive Director.[4]

6.   In addition to this corporate process, the Security Division accelerated plans to revitalize the security function and to strengthen its ability to respond to changing operating environments. Informed by insights from an internal audit of security in field offices and aligned with broader United Nations reform processes, in 2024 the division launched the security strengthening programme, a multi-year investment plan that adopts a comprehensive risk management framework to ensure that WFP personnel can operate in the most challenging of environments.

7.   The following paragraphs provide further detail on the incidents and risks that affected WFP operations in 2024, and the division's efforts to mitigate the impact of those trends.

Staffing highlights from 2024

8.   Key trends and figures:

➢   The global security workforce comprised 539 employees, a decrease of 2.7 percent from 2023 (554 employees). The reduction was driven primarily by the restrictions in the funding environment, despite the continued demand for additional security support in the field.

➢   68.5 percent of those employees were nationally recruited personnel.

➢   69.4 percent of WFP's personnel operated in countries classified as "non-family" duty stations.[5]

Incident trends

9.   In 2024, the number of safety and security incidents affecting WFP, and the cooperating partners and contractors operating on behalf of WFP, increased by 8 percent, from 1,759 in 2023 to 1,902 in 2024.[6] This increase correlates with funding cuts in 2023, which reduced operational capacity, heightened exposure to civil unrest, and increased risks at aid distribution points.

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[4] The duty of care accountability and governance framework, introduced in November 2024, outlines WFP's unwavering commitment to ensuring a healthy, safe, respectful and inclusive workplace. The framework sets out core principles, definitions, accountabilities and governance structure.

[5] Duty stations classified at the "D" or "E" hardship level that have been declared as non-family.

[6] The total number of incidents recorded for 2023 (1,759) differs from the figure reported in last year's security report (1,734) owing to belated reporting, as the dashboard continued to receive and log incidents for 2023 after the previous report was issued. The updated figure reflects the most complete dataset available at the time of writing.

Figure 1: Trend in safety and security incidents, 2018–2024

Number of incidents affecting WFP global operations

10.   Incidents involving WFP contractors roughly doubled in 2024, from 89 in 2023 to 180 in 2024, with notable increases in Ethiopia, South Sudan and the Gaza Strip. There has been a significant spike in threats to WFP contractors including armed attacks and abductions.

Major incidents

11.   Compared with 2023, the number of major incidents – that is, those resulting in death, major injury or abduction – increased by 8 percent, totalling 55 events in 2024. Those incidents involved 83 individuals, including WFP personnel, eligible dependants, cooperating partners and contractors. This marks a 15 percent increase in the number of people affected compared with 2022.

12.   Contractors and cooperating partners continued to be most exposed in high-risk settings, accounting for the majority of recorded deaths. In 2024, a total of 17 fatalities were recorded among WFP personnel, cooperating partners and contractors. Of these people, five were WFP personnel, eight were contractors, and four were cooperating partners. Acts of violence were responsible for 9 of the 17 fatal incidents, with armed attacks being the leading cause in countries such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

13.   Compared with 2023 – one of the deadliest years of the last decade for WFP personnel – the number of WFP fatalities related to security incidents nearly halved, from nine in 2023 to five in 2024.[7] Three WFP employees died in the Sudan's war-torn Blue Nile State after an aerial strike on a WFP compound, while two WFP employees and two dependants lost their lives in fatal road traffic crashes[8] in Chad, Mali and South Sudan.

14.   While the number of deaths and abductions decreased in 2024, the number of major injuries rose significantly. A total of 36 major injuries were reported, marking a 63 percent increase compared with 22 major injuries in 2023.

15.   A total of 29 abductions were recorded in 2024, largely in countries where this threat had already been prevalent, including Cameroon, Ethiopia, Haiti, Nigeria and South Sudan. Two WFP employees were abducted in the Sudan and one in Ethiopia. In 2023, five WFP employees were abducted. All WFP personnel have been released.

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[7] There were ten fatalities in 2023, one of which was safety related, i.e. caused by the earthquake in Türkiye.

[8] The term "road traffic crash" is used to highlight the preventable nature of such incidents and to avoid the implication that they are accidental or inevitable. This aligns with the terminology of the United Nations and the World Health Organization. Source: World Health Organization. 2023. *Global status report on road safety 2023*.

16. Contractors were disproportionately affected by major incidents, representing 43 percent of all cases, and accounting for 18 of the 36 major injuries, 10 of the 29 abductions, and 8 of the 17 fatalities. Most of these incidents occurred in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and South Sudan – operational environments in which contracted personnel face heightened exposure to ethnically motivated violence and armed conflict in rural areas. Burkina Faso is also affected by jihadist activity.

Incidents by threat type

17. As reported in previous years, **crime-related incidents**, especially property crime – robberies, burglaries and thefts – continue to account for more than half (58 percent) of the reported incidents affecting WFP (figure 2). While this trend is concerning, one key factor is that most risks to WFP personnel, assets and operations stem from circumstantial or opportunistic crime, rather than deliberate targeting, which would indicate a lack of acceptance of WFP.

Figure 2: Percentage of incidents by threat type

18. Incidents stemming from **civil unrest** rose by 61 percent, from 72 in 2023 to 116 in 2024. Notably, 97 percent of these incidents were work-related. Incidents related to violent protests also increased in number, with 28 instances recorded in 2024 compared with 11 in 2023. The countries with the highest increases in incidents associated with civil unrest were Ethiopia and South Sudan, with increases of 233 percent each, Chad with 400 percent – albeit from a low base of only one incident in 2023 and four in 2024 – and Uganda with 120 percent.

19. In addition, harassment and intimidation incidents increased threefold, with the majority occurring at distribution sites, WFP facilities or other work-related locations. Such incidents relate to disturbances directly linked to WFP operations.

20. **Environmental and safety-related incidents**[9] increased by 16 percent, from 432 incidents in 2023 to 503 in 2024, highlighting a rise in hazard-related events. Climate-driven factors, such as extreme weather, contributed in particular to road traffic crashes, which led the overall increase in this category. Incidents related to **armed conflict** increased by 5 percent,

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[9] Cooperation with the Occupational Safety and Health Unit focuses on continued upgrades to vehicle tracking systems and speed control tools. Awareness campaigns were conducted for WFP personnel to prevent occupational health and safety accidents, and training was provided to all staff to encourage the reporting of all work-related road safety incidents through the Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments system.

from 150 incidents in 2023 to 157 in 2024, while **terrorism** accounted for a very small portion of the incidents affecting WFP, with 26 incidents in 2024 – a 13 percent decline from 30 in 2023.

By region

21. As the region with the largest WFP footprint, the **Eastern Africa region** continued to account for the largest share of reported incidents (figure 3), rising from 45 percent in 2023 to 48 percent in 2024. The region also saw the largest number of major incidents recorded, with Ethiopia, South Sudan and the Sudan together accounting for 47 percent of deaths, abductions and major injuries.

22. In 2024, Ethiopia surpassed South Sudan in terms of the number of reported incidents, totalling 307 – a 48 percent increase from 207 in 2023. This rise corresponds to the growing footprint of the Ethiopia country office, which is now WFP's largest, with more than 1,200 employees and 17 sub-offices. Hazard-related incidents more than doubled in Ethiopia, from 52 in 2023 to 105 in 2024.

Figure 3: Regional comparison of incidents related to WFP operations, 2023–2024

HQ = headquarters; RBB = Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific; RBC = Regional Bureau for the Middle East, Northern Africa and Eastern Europe; RBD = Regional Bureau for Western Africa; RBJ = Regional Bureau for Southern Africa; RBN = Regional Bureau for Eastern Africa; RBP = Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean.

23. The **Middle East, Northern Africa and Eastern European region,** which has the second-largest WFP footprint, recorded the second highest number of incidents, with a 12 percent increase, from 243 in 2023 to 271 in 2024. The surge was triggered mainly by an increased number of incidents in the State of Palestine operations, following the outbreak of conflict in October 2023. WFP and its contractors and partners operated in an environment with high security risks, with reported incidents surging nearly tenfold compared with the previous year, from 9 in 2023 to 86 in 2024. This increase is particularly significant given the small footprint of the country office, which has only 225 employees. Attacks on humanitarian convoys, looting of food commodities and collateral exposure to active conflict are the most common incidents recorded.

24. The **Western Africa region** witnessed a 35 percent increase in security incidents, from 193 in 2023 to 260 in 2024. This trend is largely associated with the increase in incidents reported in Chad, which rose from 20 incidents in 2023 to 82 in 2024, and the improved reporting capacity of the team on the ground, which has resulted in a more comprehensive evidence base for WFP's operations in the region.

25. The **Southern Africa region** saw a 24 percent decrease in safety and security incidents, which dropped from 174 in 2023 to 132 in 2024 – a downwards trend consistent with the previous year. Despite these seemingly positive figures, the security environment continues to present major challenges for WFP, given the pervasive presence of jihadist threats and non-State armed groups, which continues to hinder access and significantly affects WFP's ability to operate.

26. Similarly, the **Asia and the Pacific region** experienced a 20 percent decrease in recorded safety and security incidents, from 174 incidents in 2023 to 139 in 2024, while incidents in the **Latin America and the Caribbean region** increased slightly, from 148 in 2023 to 162 in 2024. Incidents at **headquarters** in Rome decreased from 37 in 2023 to 31 in 2024.

The internal audit of security in field offices

As part of its annual workplan, in 2024 the Office of Internal Audit examined security risk management in WFP field offices, reaching the overall conclusion of "**major improvement needed**".

The governance arrangements, risk management practices, and controls assessed were deemed to be generally established and functioning, but major improvement was needed in the provision of reasonable assurance that the objectives of the security function could be achieved. The audit report indicated issues in the following seven areas:

1. gaps in the operationalization of security governance structures and resource allocation;

2. data access limitations and the misalignment of security performance indicators with security objectives;

3. insufficient management of and preparedness for security risks;

4. gaps in the digital transformation process;

5. gaps in the incident management process, which affected decision making;

6. gaps in scheduling, processing and the analysis of results from security assistance missions; and

7. ineffective cooperation with key partners in field locations.

Observations 1, 4 and 7 were deemed high priorities, meaning that prompt management action was required to ensure that identified risks could be adequately mitigated. The audit observations were fully acknowledged and helped the Security Division by informing the direction of the security strengthening programme.

Strengthening WFP effectiveness through external engagements

27. To address the challenges affecting the safety and security of WFP's operations in multiple regions, the Security Division scaled up its engagement with the security counterparts of WFP's main international non-governmental organization partners, and several consultations with a core group of partners were conducted in late 2024. This process highlighted opportunities for pooling resources in priority areas and sharing risk in order to build equitable partnerships in settings such as those in Afghanistan, South Sudan and Ukraine.

28. Consultations with WFP's cooperating partners resulted in the definition of common objectives for strengthening WFP's support for local non-governmental organizations. Areas such as risk assessment and risk management during operations, incident response and the delivery of first aid training were identified as common priorities. Supporting the Security Division's partners in these areas will be a core focus of the division under the planned corporate localization policy.

29. These activities are collectively coordinated by the division under the security strengthening programme, which was presented to the Board in June 2024 and formally launched in September 2024. The programme aims to drive efficiency, field support and capacity strengthening in line with WFP's restructuring process, while advancing the United Nations reform through stronger coordination, decentralization and accountability. The programme reinforces Grand Bargain commitments through localization, investments in strengthening the capacity of local partners, improved financing and strengthened partnerships.

30. As part of its commitment to cooperating within the United Nations system, in 2024 WFP contributed to the work of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, helping to refine key policies on commercial air travel safety; acceptable risk oversight mechanisms; risk avoidance, including through alternative work modalities, and the relocation or evacuation of personnel and their families; security risk management manuals; country applicability; and budgetary issues.

31. The Security Division is also actively contributing to shaping other inter-agency processes under United Nations reform efforts. During its 47th and 48th sessions in April and October 2024, the High-Level Committee on Management requested an independent review of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS), including issues relating to policies and resources. Tabled for 2025, the review will cover governance arrangements and structures; security decision making; UNSMS policies, guidance, practices and procedures; effectiveness and efficiency, with a focus on Jointly Financed Activities and Locally Cost-Shared Security Budgets; capabilities, including workforce; adaptability; and impediments to effective security support.[10]

Spotlight on the security strengthening programme

The security strengthening programme was launched by the Security Division in 2024 as a response to the growing number of threats, and with the objective of strengthening security risk management at all operational levels in WFP.

After an inception phase in 2024, the programme was designed to cover the period 2025–2026 and comprises three pillars: strategic activities, focusing on duty of care; enabling activities, including more efficient use of technology, the rationalization of WFP's workforce, and knowledge management; and external partnerships, with other United Nations entities and cooperating partners. About 30 percent of the programme was funded from WFP's core resources.

Adhering to United Nations security standards, WFP utilizes a comprehensive risk management approach to mitigate the challenges faced by its personnel and eligible dependants. The programme aims to increase the agility and capability of WFP's security personnel, enabling them to tackle emerging security challenges more effectively, while ensuring a secure environment for employees, partners and beneficiaries.

Operational security response

Enabling programme delivery through regional and country access strategies

32. Throughout 2024, humanitarian access continued to be constrained by active conflicts, insecurity, administrative restrictions and increasingly complex geopolitical dynamics. In the State of Palestine, WFP's operations were severely hindered by the repeated malfunctioning of coordination mechanisms and the absence of sustained security guarantees, which affected safe passage, convoy clearance, and "last-mile" delivery. In the Sudan, escalating

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[10] Jointly Financed Activities and Locally Cost-Shared Security Budgets are cost-sharing arrangements among United Nations organizations. Jointly Financed Activities is a global mechanism where United Nations organizations contribute financially to cover costs related to security and other services based on the presence of individual United Nations entities, whereas Locally Cost-Shared Security Budgets cover security costs in specific countries.

hostilities and the fragmentation of control between multiple armed actors obstructed access corridors, thereby delaying aid delivery to people living under critical conditions. In Haiti, gang control over key roadways, fuel depots and entire urban zones drastically reduced the humanitarian space and increased risks for WFP employees, facilities and convoys.

33. In Ukraine, the international armed conflict continues to present significant operational risks, particularly in front-line and newly accessible areas. Cross-border insecurity, missile strikes and drone attacks on critical infrastructure – including WFP warehouses and supply chains – required flexible logistics planning and coordination with local authorities and inter-agency partners. The situation required frequent updates to a robust risk analysis system, rapid adaptation to shifting front lines, and the roll-out of contingency arrangements to ensure the security of personnel and to maintain operational continuity.

34. Insecurity and restrictions in the Niger and parts of the Sahel region continued to limit WFP's operational reach. Travel bans and insecurity in conflict-affected zones complicated the delivery of food assistance and hindered regular monitoring of developments. Due to these access challenges, which were compounded by regional instability, the Security Division opted to maintain a multi-layered, adaptive approach to movement planning and access negotiations.

WFP's corporate scale-up: operational highlights

Adaptive strategies to address the Sudan regional crisis

The ongoing conflict in the Sudan has caused a humanitarian crisis, with consequences for the wider region. Throughout 2024, WFP faced persistent challenges in securing sustained access for cross-line and cross-border operations, with fighting and arbitrary restrictions on humanitarian convoys delaying the timely and consistent delivery of critical aid.

In this highly volatile setting, the Security Division played a major role in supporting the establishment of alternative operational hubs, adapting strategies to ensure the continuity of field operations despite fragmented territorial control and shifting front lines. For instance, when the Rapid Support Forces captured locations in which WFP had established a presence (e.g. Wad Madani), security risk assessments prompted the relocation of WFP personnel, assets and operations to newly established hubs in other parts of the Sudan and in Chad. The Port Sudan facility serves as the primary local United Nations headquarters.

The operational environment was further complicated by aviation-related incidents involving the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), managed by WFP. These included episodes of shelling and small arms fire near landing zones, as well as airspace restrictions that led to last-minute flight cancellations or rerouting. Such incidents posed significant risks to humanitarian air services, disrupted personnel and cargo movements, and necessitated constant adjustments to flight schedules and security planning. Despite these challenges, UNHAS remained a lifeline in terms of critical aid delivery, staff relocations and humanitarian access, especially in situations where road travel was deemed unsafe or logistically impossible.

To meet operational demands and enable programme implementation, the Security Division expanded its local presence through surge deployments. This included the addition of various security personnel and temporary rotations to augment the capacity of ground operations. With Chad emerging as a crucial humanitarian corridor and a safe zone for relocated employees, the division intensified its coordination with operations in that country. Planning also included the establishment of fully equipped guesthouses, with integrated very-high-frequency radio and very-small-aperture terminals to support communications.

Lastly, WFP has placed a strong emphasis on crisis coordination and analytical response. Inter-agency coordination mechanisms, evacuation drills and robust information-sharing platforms were deployed to manage specific risks in real time. Strategic planning incorporated the lessons learned from the evolving crisis in the Sudan, including a reconfiguration of crisis management structures and the adoption of 360-degree assessments for senior security personnel, signalling a shift towards more adaptive and accountable leadership in high-risk contexts.

35. In 2024, regional tensions led to disruptions in a number of UNHAS operations, as seen in Haiti, Lebanon, and the Sahel, where UNHAS became one of only a few viable access providers due to deteriorating ground conditions. Maritime disruptions, particularly in the shipping corridor through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, further complicated WFP's global supply chain, as sea lines of communication were rerouted or delayed, resulting in increased transit times and operational costs.

36. WFP addressed these challenges through strengthened coordination and tailored access strategies. Technical access cells remained active in complex settings including Burkina Faso, Myanmar, the Sudan and Ukraine, facilitating real-time analysis and joint planning. Local engagement and community acceptance strategies remained central to WFP's programme delivery.

WFP's corporate scale-up: operational highlights

Convoy challenges and security responses in the State of Palestine

WFP operations in the State of Palestine have been affected by a significant increase in incidents since the outbreak of conflict in October 2023. Attacks on humanitarian convoys, looting of food commodities and collateral exposure to active conflict are the most common incident types.

WFP operations in Gaza are implemented under strict security risk management protocols, with all movements governed by standard operating procedures for convoy security. Only critical life-saving activities – implemented by small mission-specific teams – are authorized. Each mission requires a detailed concept of operations, utilization of humanitarian notification systems, and coordinated approvals, including from the Coordination and Liaison Administration of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), along with full deconfliction with Israeli authorities. Despite these protocols, significant operational challenges persist.

In 2024, the systematic and widespread looting of aid convoys was a major impediment to the distribution of aid in southern parts of the Gaza Strip. According to an estimate by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, up to 30 percent of aid entering the enclave ended up stolen.

In 2024, WFP recorded 42 incidents impacting humanitarian aid convoys in the Gaza Strip. Ten of these were the result of civilian-perpetrated unrest, while 19 incidents were perpetrated by criminal networks, which expanded their reach and capabilities throughout the year. These groups frequently blocked roads to intercept humanitarian vehicles, doing so to extort protection fees or to loot aid for resale on the black market.

Eleven incidents were related to IDF access restrictions or a failure of deconfliction activities. In six instances the IDF accidentally opened fire on WFP convoys. In two cases, WFP personnel were harassed or intimidated, and on three occasions, drivers were arrested. The remaining two incidents involved stray bullets.

To manage this complex security risk environment, strict security risk management measures were actively applied to reduce risk exposure, contact with local communities was maintained where possible, and movement configurations were constantly reviewed and adapted based on evolving conditions. In addition, WFP deployed dedicated security and humanitarian–military interaction teams that coordinated in real time with the Coordination and Liaison Administration and Israeli authorities to facilitate clearances, ensure liaison and advocate consistent ground-level compliance.

WFP conducted routine pre-mission briefings and drills, followed by after-action reviews to capture lessons learned and refine mission planning. Personnel movements were consolidated to reduce exposure, and the overall presence of WFP personnel in the Gaza Strip was kept to a minimum. All WFP premises were regularly validated and deconflicted, and personnel received full operational briefings.

Using technology to improve the Security Division's effectiveness and efficiency

37.   In 2024, the Security Division significantly strengthened the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of its global operations by mainstreaming the use of certain technologies. Under the umbrella of an organization-approved digital road map and in alignment with the broader corporate direction, progress in key areas was achieved through projects aiming to improve data quality; compliance with security policies and guidelines; knowledge access; and the digitalization of processes.[11]

38.   A core achievement was the roll-out of an improved mechanism to monitor internal compliance with security policies and guidelines. The tool facilitates the assessment of WFP's compliance performance, the streamlining of task tracking, and validation that a task has been completed for both global security personnel and key security decision makers, such as country directors. In addition to increasing efficiency by minimizing the number of questions in the tool's survey, escalation protocols are embedded into the system to ensure timely submission and accountability at all levels.

39.   Another major milestone for the division in 2024 was the introduction of WFP's first AI-powered tool in security incident reporting. By improving the accuracy and consistency of incident categorization, the tool aims to increase data reliability and support evidence-based decision making. It also reduces the manual workload of field-based personnel and enables more consistent reporting practices across operations.

40.   Since gaps in the incident management process were a priority identified in the internal audit of security in field offices, the division developed a tool that supports the capturing of best practices and lessons learned. Dubbed the "Security Knowledge Manual", this mobile-friendly, field-informed resource consolidates key policies, guidance and best practices, ensuring that both security and non-security personnel can access the information they need in a timely manner.

41.   Together, these advancements reflect a strategic shift: the Security Division has prioritized digitalization, recognizing that digital tools are a core enabler of more coherent, responsive and accountable security operations and therefore support duty of care throughout WFP.

Optimization of resources and budgetary highlights

42.   As competition over funding for humanitarian interventions grows, the attention of both WFP as an organization and the Security Division has shifted towards partnerships, localization and reassurance. A key example of the division's work in this area is its effort to ensure the development of mission-critical technical and security competencies.

43.   Over the years, the Security Division has built its internal training capacity in compliance with UNSMS standards, implementing training initiatives that generate common services in support of the broader United Nations and humanitarian community. For instance, WFP plays a major role in the delivery of women's security awareness training, having equipped 1,600 female personnel from United Nations and cooperating partners with context-specific security skills between 2021 and 2024. This achievement underscores the Security Division's dedication to integrating the person-centred approach into security risk management.[12]

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[11] The digital road map of the Security Division was approved by WFP's Digital Business and Technology Committee, an internal body that oversees corporate digital efforts to ensure disciplined project implementation and sustainability, as well as alignment with WFP's strategic objectives.

[12] A person-centred approach to security risk management recognizes and addresses the diverse threats and vulnerabilities that UNSMS personnel face based on their personal characteristics in a particular context. This approach ensures that security activities, processes and measures established to support the mandates of UNSMS organizations are inclusive, adaptable and effective.

44. In 2024, the division explored ways to expand and decentralize training so as to strengthen field readiness and build a more robust talent pipeline. The goal of this approach was to ensure that officers are skilled and sufficiently equipped to implement proactive security measures and to foster safer operating environments for personnel and WFP cooperating partners.

45. Security-related costs at headquarters and regional bureaux totalled USD 31.5 million (an increase of 12 percent from 2023). That figure accounted for 5.5 percent of the programme support and administrative (PSA) budget.

46. In field locations, the estimated costs related to security amounted to USD 55.7 million representing 10.1 percent of the total direct support cost (DSC) budget at the country office level. A breakdown is shown in the table below.

WFP SECURITY EXPENDITURES – 2024				
Description	***USD***		**Description**	***USD***
Headquarters and regional bureau personnel	12 352 094		Field personnel	25 891 395
Department of Safety and Security	15 683 515		Residential security country office	2 316 686
Headquarters and regional bureaux – other costs (Security Emergency Fund, training, security assistance missions)	3 435 072		Security equipment	11 020 885
			Local cost – shared security budgets	7 269 456
			Security guards (only country offices)	9 153 663
Total for security under PSA	**31 470 681**		**Total for security under DSC**	**55 652 085**
Percentage of total PSA budget	5.5		Percentage of total DSC budget	10.1
PSA total	**568 300 000**		**DSC total**	**514 366 289**

Acronyms

AI	artificial intelligence
DSC	direct support costs
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
PSA	programme support and administrative (budget)
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNSMS	United Nations Security Management System