Summary report on the evaluation of the United Republic of Tanzania country strategic plan (2017–2021)

Executive summary

The evaluation of the United Republic of Tanzania country strategic plan for 2017–2021 was conducted between March and November 2021. It assessed WFP’s strategic positioning and its contribution to outcomes, the efficiency with which the plan was implemented and the factors explaining WFP’s performance. It serves the dual purpose of accountability and learning and will inform the preparation of the next country strategic plan for the United Republic of Tanzania.

The country strategic plan for 2017–2021 articulated WFP’s increasing focus on technical assistance for government-led programmes and processes through five strategic outcomes focused on food assistance for refugees and food-insecure people, nutrition, access to agricultural markets, disaster risk reduction and social protection, and innovation.

The evaluation found that while the country strategic plan was aligned with national policies, WFP food assistance activities for refugees were constrained by enhanced government focus on repatriation. The evaluation revealed that geographic targeting was broadly appropriate and that the targeting of direct support activities addressed the needs of vulnerable people within the project areas; however, there was limited assessment of the needs of the most vulnerable and the underlying causes of food and nutrition insecurity at the start of the country strategic plan and insufficient focus on gender and broader inclusion.

WFP maintained a strong pipeline to the camps, maximizing efficiency and effectiveness and achieving progress with cash and livelihood interventions despite funding challenges and imposed limitations. Budget cuts and subsequent reductions in the food basket meant that strategic outcome 1 was only partially achieved, with mixed results for nutrition indicators. WFP positioned itself as an important nutrition partner for the Government. Nutrition activities
led to positive outcomes such as increased diversity of crops grown and livestock reared, but the indicators were not adequately analysed. Access-to-market activities were successful in decreasing post-harvest losses. Support for supply chain management was a key success area. There were positive results in terms of supporting the Tanzania Social Action Fund but limited progress with disaster risk reduction. There were positive individual results with technology-specific innovations but they were not adequately linked to the rest of the WFP portfolio.

In general, cost efficiency improved over the life of the country strategic plan. A challenging funding environment limited the ability to finance the plan at the intended level. Staff turnover and limited investment in certain technical staff profiles affected implementation. Rigorous examination of available monitoring data was not consistent across activities, suggesting that it was not actively used for adaptive management.

Partnerships have proven instrumental across the country strategic plan, and WFP is widely considered an approachable partner with proficiency in a wide range of sectors and issues.

The evaluation generated four recommendations. Two strategic recommendations identify ways for WFP to make the most effective contribution, through a more focused strategy organized around demonstrated results, with a focus on food assistance for refugees, nutrition and agriculture. Two operational recommendations cover monitoring and learning and assessment of readiness.

**Draft decision***

The Board takes note of the summary report on the evaluation of the United Republic of Tanzania country strategic plan (2017–2021) (WFP/EB.A/2022/7-C) and management response (WFP/EB.A/2022/7-C/Add.1) and encourages further action on the recommendations set out in the report, taking into account the considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

*This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the decisions and recommendations document issued at the end of the session.*
Introduction

Evaluation features

1. Country strategic plan (CSP) evaluations are the primary instrument for accountability and learning in accordance with the expectations of the WFP Executive Board and WFP management. They provide evidence of WFP’s strategic positioning and results to inform the design of the next generation of CSPs and potentially contribute to the design of United Nations sustainable development cooperation frameworks.

2. The evaluation of the United Republic of Tanzania CSP for 2017–2021 was conducted between March and November 2021. It covered WFP activities from 2015 to mid-2021. It assessed the nature and success of the CSP design process, the extent to which the CSP introduced strategic shifts and the implications of such shifts for performance and results. The primary users of the evaluation are the WFP country office and its internal and external stakeholders, including beneficiaries.

3. The evaluation adopted a mixed-methods approach using a variety of primary and secondary sources, including a desk review, key informant interviews and e-surveys. Findings were triangulated to avoid bias in evaluative judgment. Due to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic precautions and protocols, in-country work was not possible and the evaluation was conducted remotely. Findings, conclusions and recommendations were discussed with internal stakeholders during an online workshop in November 2021.

Context

4. The United Republic of Tanzania is a resource-rich, lower-middle-income country with a population of 63.3 million that is predominantly rural (65 percent) and young, with children under 14 representing 43.4 percent of the population.

5. Food security is a major economic and social problem; with a Global Hunger Index score of 25 (2020), hunger in the country is classified as “serious”. The country is vulnerable to climate risks; droughts are frequent and have devastating impacts on the economy, agricultural output and food security.

6. The real gross domestic product growth rate fell from 5.8 percent in 2019 to 2 percent in 2020 due to the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. It was expected to recover to 4.5 percent in 2021, below its long-term potential of about 6 percent.

7. The United Republic of Tanzania was host to 225,252 refugees and 27,788 asylum-seekers as of June 2021, the majority from Burundi (69 percent) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (31 percent). In 2018 the Government withdrew from the comprehensive refugee response framework.

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1 In 2021 the CSP was extended one year to ensure alignment with the starting date of the new United Nations sustainable development cooperation framework, which is 1 July 2022.


5 *Global Hunger Index 2020: Tanzania*.


### TABLE 1: SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Year</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population total (millions) (1)</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of agriculture in gross domestic product (percentage) (2)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2020</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (rank) (3)</td>
<td>163 of 189 countries</td>
<td>2020</td>
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<td>Poverty headcount ratio at USD 1.90 a day (2011 purchasing power parity) (percentage) (2)</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Hunger Index (score) (4)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height-for-age (stunting – moderate and severe), prevalence for children under 5 (percentage) (5)</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global acute malnutrition, prevalence for children under 5 (percentage) (5)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prevalence of HIV, total (percentage of population age 15–49) (6)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Development Index (score) (3)</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolment of primary school children (percentage) (7)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2020</td>
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**Country strategic plan**

8. WFP has operated in the United Republic of Tanzania since 1963, focusing on emergency, recovery and development operations. Over the last decade, its strategy has shifted from addressing short-term humanitarian needs to increased technical assistance for Government-led programmes and processes.

9. The CSP for 2017–2021 was centred around five strategic outcomes and nine activities focusing on food assistance for refugees and food-insecure people, nutrition, access to agricultural markets, climate change, disaster risk reduction and social protection, supply chains and innovation. The CSP was developed with a goal of eventual exit and handover by 2030. Figure 1 illustrates the major changes in the country context, WFP’s strategic focus and lines of activity and the United Nations development assistance framework.
The CSP had an original budget of USD 455.67 million (figure 2) and aimed to reach 591,331 beneficiaries (for an overview of annual beneficiaries, see figure 3); however, it was revised six times (as of May 2021), resulting in a decrease of the budget to USD 420.79 million and a decrease in planned beneficiaries to 508,828. The CSP was 48.45 percent funded as of September 2021 (figure 2). The United States of America was the main donor, providing 41 percent of total CSP resources, followed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (11 percent) and the European Commission (11 percent).
Figure 2: The United Republic of Tanzania country strategic plan (2017–2021) strategic outcomes, budget, funding and expenditures

Strategic outcome 5
WFP and its partners in the United Republic of Tanzania and beyond are mobilized to foster, test, refine and scale up innovation that contributes to the achievement of the SDGs by 2030. Planned to represent 1.2% of the original budget.

Strategic outcome 4
Disaster management and social protection systems in the United Republic of Tanzania are able to meet their basic food and nutrition needs throughout the year, including in times of crisis. Planned to represent 0.5% of the original budget.

Strategic outcome 3
Targeted smallholders in prioritized districts will have increased access to agricultural markets by 2020. Planned to represent 5.5% of the original budget.

Strategic outcome 2
Vulnerable populations in prioritized districts are able to meet their basic food and nutrition needs in line with national targets by 2021. Planned to represent 7.9% of the original budget.

Strategic outcome 1
Refugees and other acutely food insecure people in the United Republic of Tanzania are able to meet their basic food and nutrition requirements in times of crisis. Planned to represent 6.5% of the original budget.

Needs-based plan
Total expenditure**
USD 180.4 MILLION

Allocated resources**
USD 203.2 MILLION

Expenditure per strategic outcome versus total expenditure
USD 131.0 MILLION (73.1 PERCENT)
USD 13.2 MILLION (7.3 PERCENT)
USD 5.5 MILLION (3.03 PERCENT)
USD 9.7 MILLION (2.64 PERCENT)
USD 2.6 MILLION (1.5 PERCENT)

USD 12.5 MILLION (6.9 PERCENT)
Direct support costs
USD 10.37 MILLION (6.08 PERCENT)
Indirect support costs

* The needs-based plan budget percentages by strategic outcome have been calculated at the grand total costs level, including direct support costs (USD 28.97 million) and indirect support costs (USD 10.97 million). These figures refer to budget revision 06; there was a budget revision 07 but it was not covered in the evaluation.

** Allocated resources and expenditures figures are cumulative, covering the period 2017–2 September 2021.

*** Allocated resources by strategic outcome do not add up to USD 203.2 million as resources were also allocated to non-strategic outcomes (USD 2.3 million), as well as to direct support costs (USD 1.54 million) and indirect support costs (USD 10.97 million).

Source: Country portfolio budget, revision 6 and Integrated Road Map analytics annual country report 1.
Evaluation findings

To what extent are WFP’s strategic position, role and specific contribution based on country priorities and people’s needs as well as WFP’s strengths?

Relevance and alignment

11. WFP’s work with relevant ministries and institutions at the design stage ensured the CSP’s alignment with national policies, strategies and plans. Initially aligned with the national refugee policy, the government’s withdrawal from the comprehensive refugee response framework and its subsequent focus on repatriation constrained WFP’s food assistance and limited its options for working on livelihood activities.

12. The CSP identified gender-sensitive programming opportunities aligned with the national strategy for gender development. Actions to incorporate gender considerations were included across all strategic outcomes. Strategic outcomes 3 and 4 proposed gender-transformative action by, for instance, investing in technologies that empower women and addressing structural inequalities affecting women farmers (strategic outcome 3), given that the majority of smallholder farmers in the United Republic of Tanzania are women.8

Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable

13. Geographic targeting was broadly appropriate for resilience building, nutrition services and access-to-market activities, which focused on the most food-insecure areas, namely the central and northeast parts of the country.

14. The CSP design was informed by a 2015 zero hunger strategic review9 and other reviews and assessments; however, these analyses did not allow for an appropriate understanding of the underlying causes of food and nutrition insecurity. As a result, WFP interventions at

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the subnational and district levels were not sufficiently tailored to meet the needs of the most vulnerable groups.

15. During the COVID-19 pandemic, adaptive measures were taken to support the most vulnerable groups in camps. For those with special needs, who had difficulty standing in line or might be more susceptible to contracting transmissible diseases at overcrowded distribution points, food distribution methodologies were adapted to ensure social distancing, and the distribution of pre-packaged food baskets eliminated the need for refugees to wait in long lines.

Strategic position and responsiveness to a dynamic context

16. During the course of the CSP, WFP grew as a strategic player and an important government partner in nutrition. It co-chairs the nutrition-sensitive technical working group and supported the development of the second national multisectoral nutrition action plan; however, a nutrition strategy early in the CSP could have provided the basis for WFP to position itself alongside other United Nations partners, such as the United Nations Children's Fund and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, in a stronger position to clearly communicate its value proposition to government partners and to enhance collaboration.

17. In social protection, WFP’s role in providing technical assistance to the Tanzania Social Action Fund was considered a good example of strategic positioning with Government and both sides intended to expand that collaboration, subject to the availability of funding.

18. WFP responded appropriately to COVID-19, including a new activity targeting people who were food-insecure as a result of the pandemic. At the operational level, WFP adjusted its standard operating procedures to enable activities to continue safely. For instance, distributions shifted from groups to individual households and from a four-week to a six-week cycle.

Coherence with other United Nations agencies

19. WFP worked with United Nations partners through the United Nations development assistance plan (UNDAP). WFP chairs the UNDAP resilience thematic results group and led both the United Nations emergency coordination group and the agriculture theme of the Kigoma Joint Programme. WFP’s leadership of the emergency coordination group was welcomed, although it was challenging to engage all actors in disaster preparedness planning in advance of emergencies.

20. While its engagement in structured strategic planning beyond the UNDAP was initially limited, WFP has increased its strategic collaboration efforts since 2021, namely by signing a memorandum of agreement with the United Nations Children’s Fund identifying priority areas of collaboration in nutrition and social protection.

What are the extent and quality of WFP’s specific contribution to country strategic plan outcomes in the country?

21. Under strategic outcome 1, activities aimed at ensuring that refugees and other acutely food-insecure people were able to meet their basic food and nutrition requirements by providing cash and/or food transfers. Between June 2018 and May 2020, WFP delivered timely and predominantly full rations to refugees; following significant budget cuts in 2020, however, WFP began to reduce rations, leading to a 68 percent basket in December 2020. Minimum dietary diversity for women did not improve among refugee women and remained below target (figure 4), while targets for the minimum acceptable diet indicator for children age 6–23 months were exceeded overall, even though they fluctuated.
Figure 4: Progress towards selected nutrition outcome targets for strategic outcome 1 (2016–2020)

Note: Baseline data for women with minimum dietary diversity collected in 2017. No data were available for minimum acceptable diet in 2017.


22. Most of the food consumption indicators were not met, and some even worsened in 2020 following ration cuts; however, it should be noted that around 80 percent of households in the refugee camps consistently reported an acceptable food consumption score, showing that WFP maintained a strong pipeline to the camps and maximized the efficiency and effectiveness of refugee feeding despite funding cuts and the inability to make progress with cash and livelihood activities due to the Government’s increased focus on repatriation and imposed limitations.

Figure 5: Progress toward food security outcome targets for strategic outcome 1 (2016–2020)


23. Under strategic outcome 2, WFP aimed to improve nutrition status in prioritized districts in line with national targets by 2021. WFP supported a range of nutrition interventions for at-risk populations and provided capacity strengthening to government entities involved in nutrition programming. The evidence shows increases in the diversity of crops grown and livestock reared, and external stakeholders confirmed a change of mindset of targeted communities on using locally available foods through nutrition-sensitive agriculture practices. As indicated in figure 6, certain indicator targets were met or exceeded (e.g., moderate acute malnutrition treatment) while others, such as minimum dietary diversity and minimum acceptable diet, fluctuated over the implementation period.
The reasons behind the fluctuations were impossible to assess because there was no adequate analysis of drivers or trends of the seasonal fluctuations in the indicators. Targets for the proportion of the eligible population that participated in the programme were not achieved due to a slow programme start, delays in seed distribution and challenges coordinating with the main cooperating partner.

Figure 6: Progress toward nutrition-sensitive and nutrition outcome targets for strategic outcome 2 (2016–2020)

Note: Baseline data for women with minimum dietary diversity was collected in 2017.

24. Under strategic outcome 3, WFP aimed to increase smallholder access to well-functioning markets by supporting value chains and promoting climate-smart agriculture and crop diversification. Despite consistent underfunding of this outcome, post-harvest losses decreased considerably and there was improvement in the volume purchased and sold. Through the Kigoma Joint Programme, WFP supported smallholder farmers in refugee-hosting communities and directly implemented activities aimed at improving post-harvest management practices, leading to a post-harvest equipment adoption rate of 74 percent.

25. The operations of the Farm to Market Alliance, a global consortium of eight global public and private sector partners, were downsized from 17,000 to 1,300 beneficiaries due to programmatic and funding challenges. Despite those difficulties, WFP built on partnerships with private sector actors to connect farmers in the Kigoma Joint Programme and Climate-smart Agriculture Project10 with post-harvest loss prevention equipment providers.

26. Under strategic outcome 4, WFP aimed to strengthen disaster management and social protection systems to ensure that they addressed the basic food and nutrition needs of the poorest and most food-insecure populations.

27. Outcome indicators for this strategic outcome were established but not monitored. Nevertheless, there were indications of positive change. One of WFP's strengths was observed in the support provided to the Government through the Tanzania Social Action Fund partnership. WFP channelled support through, among other things, resilience building activities, including training on planning, implementation, coordination and monitoring of community asset creation.

28. Supply chain strengthening was a focus under outcome 4, and WFP invested in strengthening transport infrastructure through the rehabilitation of railroad cars to augment its regional food distribution capacity. This was considered a key success.

29. Under strategic outcome 5 WFP aimed to facilitate, test, refine and scale up innovations that contributed to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 through a variety of projects, including solar-charged tablets for children in remote villages and the use of artificial intelligence to improve the income and productivity of women smallholder farmers. Activities demonstrated the potential relevance of technology-specific innovations but were not sufficiently integrated with activities in the rest of the portfolio to advance or support existing programme interventions.

30. WFP engaged in capacity strengthening by facilitating government processes and working with partners on conducting training, an important example being the work with the Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre to develop a new multisectoral nutrition action plan; however, the CSP lacked outcome indicators for properly monitoring such work.

Gender and protection

31. The CSP incorporated a strong commitment to gender and to providing assistance in ways that promoted equality and empowerment.

32. There were positive examples of individual initiatives aimed at, for instance, engaging men in childcare, guiding social and behaviour change communication, training truck drivers on HIV, nutrition, gender and child protection and reducing violence against women. More needs to be done to improve gender analysis and move beyond a focus on male/female participation in terms of quantitative data alone, however; hence, the country office has recently signed on to the WFP Gender Transformation Programme.

33. Analysis aimed at better understanding the vulnerabilities and drivers of protection has been undertaken but has not yet led to differentiated approaches to managing ration cuts that might enhance protection of the most vulnerable groups or individuals. Sexual and gender-based violence in and around refugee camps remains a challenge.

Accountability to affected populations

34. Consultation and provision of information were largely effective in the camps. Since the start of the CSP, there were improvements to the complaint and feedback mechanisms following specific recommendations (e.g., making WFP staff available and accessible during distributions so that feedback was brought to their attention immediately and engaging social workers to assist refugees who cannot write or gain access to the help desks). Issues with equitable access to the mechanism and ensuring that feedback was adequately captured remained, however, both in and outside the camps.

Sustainability

35. Some CSP results show potential for sustainability. For instance, there are strong indications that capacity strengthening activities in areas such as nutrition-sensitive agriculture at the community level may continue where they are showing good results and people have learned new practices; however, as these activities were implemented in a limited way, their scalability and funding remain a concern.

36. Activities focused on social protection and innovation had an experimental focus and sustainability was not central to their design. Even so, the benefit streams of the Tanzania Social Action Fund have a high likelihood of being sustained because the systems supported by WFP were institutionalized.
**Humanitarian–development–peace nexus**

37. Examples of positive advances in self-reliance, stability and fragility emerged through the Kigoma Joint Programme, which is seen as a leading practice in peacebuilding and, specifically, in reducing natural resource management tensions between refugees and host communities. Local purchase of food for refugee food assistance for the programme was a particularly good example of how WFP combined elements of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

38. While humanitarian, development and peace activities were reflected in the design and implementation of the CSP, there is limited evidence that this was intentional, and results have been limited.

39. WFP intended to give refugees greater freedom of choice with regard to food and to allow them to be relatively self-reliant; however, those plans were affected by the government's repatriation agenda, resistance to WFP's proposed introduction of cash-based transfers on the grounds that they might discourage repatriation, and the need for tighter controls on business activities in the camps, which limited livelihood activities.

**To what extent has WFP used its resources efficiently in contributing to country strategic plan outputs and strategic outcomes?**

**Timeliness**

40. Outputs were not consistently achieved on schedule. Pipeline breaks in 2018 and 2019 and funding shortfalls in 2020 led to ration cuts. Despite this, acceptable food consumption scores for 80 percent of the refugees indicate that WFP was able to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of refugee feeding.

41. The nutrition activities experienced delays due to challenges with the cooperating partner and WFP therefore began to work directly with local partners.

**Coverage and targeting**

42. Nutrition activities were smaller scale in terms of coverage than similar programmes conducted by other United Nations entities and civil society organizations. When compared to the magnitude of the problem, the programme fell short of the CSP coverage target.

43. Partners working on refugee activities petitioned WFP to conduct nutrition needs assessments of marginalized groups to properly understand their needs and include them in supplementary feeding programmes. This could have targeting implications, given that post-distribution monitoring (2020) shows that almost 30 percent of households include at least one disabled person.

**Cost efficiency and effectiveness**

44. The value of food and cash distributions and the amount of food distributed under strategic outcome 1 increased over the period of implementation, which led to an increase in per beneficiary benefits and expenditures (figure 7).\(^\text{11}\)

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\(^{11}\) The increase in 2018 expenditures may be explained by the increase in nutrition and social and behaviour change communication training sessions in 2018.
Figure 7: Strategic outcome 1 expenditures, activity 1: value of cash and food and associated beneficiaries, total and per beneficiary

Note: Cash was distributed in addition to food only in 2017.
Sources: For beneficiary data: country office tool for managing effectively (COMET); for expenditure data: Integrated Road Map Analytics annual country reports 2017–2020; for food/cash distributions data: WFP Information Network and Global System (WINGS) data provided by country office; per-beneficiary values computed by evaluation team.

45. As shown in figure 8, for outcome 2 expenditures and beneficiary numbers for nutrition activities increased in 2018 before achieving enhanced efficiency in 2019 and 2020. These efficiency gains are illustrated by a three-fold increase in the amount of food distributed from 2017 to 2018 with only a two-fold increase in total expenditures over the same period (figure 9). Cost efficiency for nutrition activities started to improve in 2019 largely due to WFP taking on the cooperating partner’s role.

Figure 8: Strategic outcome 2: total expenditures and beneficiaries

Sources: For beneficiary data: COMET; for expenditure data: Integrated Road Map Analytics annual country reports 2017–2020.
What factors explain WFP performance and the extent to which it has made the strategic shift expected under the country strategic plan?

Resource mobilization

46. A challenging funding environment limited the ability to fund the CSP to the intended level. Over 70 percent of available funding was earmarked at the activity level, and shortfalls were experienced in all strategic outcomes. Fundraising for food distributions, nutrition and access to markets was difficult due to donor fatigue and competing priorities (including crises in other countries). Until 2019, WFP’s engagement with donors did not satisfy some donors who had expressed the desire to think through strategic approaches and creative responses to funding challenges with management. Since then, the country office has strengthened engagement through regular briefings and consultations.

Staffing

47. Insufficient technical staffing, high turnover and reliance on short-term consultants affected CSP implementation and the ability of the country office to undertake analyses and generate essential learning.

48. While two nutrition positions were filled in 2017, more investment in the number and capacity of technical staff would have allowed for greater progress in the development of a strategic approach. Staff turnover also complicated fundraising efforts and limited coverage, continuity and consistency of approach and vision.

CSP design

49. The expected outputs of the CSP were too ambitious given country office capacity. The CSP called for too many new simultaneous activities and was not realistic about what could be achieved in a single CSP cycle. Furthermore, activities followed separate programmatic approaches, often in different geographic areas, and WFP only minimally developed the opportunity for synergies across strategic outcomes and cross-cutting issues.

Partnerships

50. Partnerships have proven instrumental across the CSP, and WFP is widely considered an approachable partner with proficiency in a wide range of sectors and issues.
51. Through its work on supply chains WFP strengthened its relationship with key government entities and provided a meaningful contribution to the development of the economic corridor around the railway. The highly visible nature of this direct support for public infrastructure greatly enhanced the standing of WFP.

52. WFP was considered a strong and supportive partner for non-governmental organizations on refugee activities but was slow to put in place changes in programmatic approaches, for example to address the specific nutritional needs of disabled and chronically ill refugees.

**Monitoring**

53. Monitoring was conducted regularly via mobile vulnerability analysis and mapping and post-distribution monitoring; however, rigorous examination of available monitoring data for programme improvements was not consistent across activities. In some instances, data were not actively used in a timely and responsive fashion to investigate potential discrepancies in activity implementation and subsequently adjust approaches as needed.

54. Gender differences went unnoticed in the CSP logical framework, from target-setting through to baseline data collection and annual results reporting. Where sex-disaggregated data are available, they frequently reveal large discrepancies (e.g., minimum acceptable diet data in strategic outcomes 1 and 2) but there is no discussion of that in WFP annual reporting and there was limited awareness and no response beyond questioning the integrity of the methodologies.

**Conclusions**

55. The CSP aligned with national objectives outlined in government policies, strategies and plans, as well as the SDGs. Several significant changes in context, national strategies and capacities and population needs took place over the CSP period, particularly in connection with the national refugee policy and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. WFP adapted its programming well to respond to these contextual changes. Outside of the UNDAP, strategic alignment with WFP’s sister agencies was initially limited, although WFP increased its strategic efforts in that regard in the final year of the CSP.

56. Gender considerations were evident across all strategic outcomes. In practice, however, gender-transformative elements were not fully developed.

57. Positive results were observed in areas in which WFP has an established position and credibility. WFP contributions were stronger at the activity level than at the systems level, including with regard to refugees, nutrition and agriculture. The effectiveness of support for refugees was hampered by shifting government policies but WFP effectively pivoted to continue providing food and assisting host communities. Despite pipeline breaks in 2018 and 2019, WFP maintained strong supply chains to the camps, maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of refugee feeding; indeed, supply chain management was consistently strong.

58. While WFP has positioned itself as a strategic player in nutrition through technical support, its ability to scale up operational activities was limited by funding constraints. Despite a slow start, the last two years started to see progress on nutrition. Agriculture activities saw progress with operational results and positioning, building on existing experience in livelihoods and agricultural productivity to gain small-scale but high-quality results.
59. Parts of the CSP were less effective due to a combination of internal and external factors. Disaster risk reduction, social protection and innovation were new initiatives, and were the areas in which WFP struggled most. Disaster risk reduction and social protection activities did not achieve the desired outcomes, and projects supported under the innovation strategic outcome were found to be insufficiently linked to the rest of the CSP. The latter activities were important initiatives to pilot but the next CSP will need to show proof of scalability.

60. Opportunities to strengthen performance measurement and analysis were not fully taken. While indicator- and target-setting followed minimum corporate standards, overall the targets set were not sufficiently ambitious to demonstrate true progress. The strategic outcomes for agriculture, disaster risk reduction, social protection and innovation all had limited performance datasets at the output and outcome levels, affecting the ability of the country office to reflect meaningfully on progress. Logic assumptions within and across strategic outcomes were not sufficiently reviewed and adapted until late in the CSP period. Staff turnover and regular loss of institutional memory made that more difficult.

61. Changes in government policy were a key external factor that hampered the country office in delivering on its humanitarian mandate to provide food assistance. Despite the difficult policy context and constraints, WFP adapted well. In terms of targeting, the needs of specific vulnerable populations require more attention, including more needs analysis and customization for women and people with disabilities.

62. The use of resources was generally efficient given the challenging operational environment. The country office responded appropriately to circumstances beyond its control that affected resource availability and timeliness, such as pipeline breaks and a challenging funding environment. The CSP largely recovered from a slow start for nutrition activities with the correction of initial inefficiencies in management structure. However, those activities could not be scaled up due to funding shortfalls.

63. The agricultural productivity and nutrition knowledge transfer components of the CSP have the potential to be sustainable but the critical mass needed to drive change on a population or sector scale is lacking. The disaster risk reduction, social protection and innovation activities were largely experimental and new to the country office, and sustainability was not central to their design.
## Recommendations

<table>
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<th>#</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Level/nature</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Other contributing entities</th>
<th>Priority: high/medium</th>
<th>By when</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Focus on thematic areas where the country office has demonstrated that it can add value – refugees, nutrition and agriculture – and apply a long-term view.</strong>&lt;br&gt;1.1 Ensure that new and experimental activities are linked to existing initiatives to enhance relevance, effectiveness and efficiency and thus their potential for success and stakeholder buy-in.&lt;br&gt;1.2 Ensure appropriate balance in change pathways across a longer timeline than the individual country strategic plan, particularly for translating direct operational roles into government system implementation at scale. This can be done through:&lt;br&gt;• a parallel process of country strategic plan lifetime and annual planning;&lt;br&gt;• a long-term theory of change that should – theoretically and practically (since theories of change typically cover a 10–15-year process) – inform several sequential country strategic plans. The first country strategic plan should be used as an incubator to conceptualize, test and validate new activities and assess their scalability before adopting them as strategic outcomes in a second country strategic plan.</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Country office, with regional bureau support</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>June 2022</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Improve the definition of change pathways across the country strategic plan.</strong>&lt;br&gt;2.1 Itemize in detail the assumptions underlying the envisaged change pathways – including internal and external risks and opportunities – to ensure that the country strategic plan has sufficient capacity for adaptive management, if necessary. This is especially needed when strategic outcomes focus on new workstreams that explore new areas of work and new organizational functions.&lt;br&gt;2.2 Follow through on conceptual integration of the strategic outcomes through integrated stakeholder and/or geographic targeting.&lt;br&gt;2.3 Reflect priority cross-cutting issues in pathways and target setting by, for instance, including meaningful gender targets that seek to ensure gender-responsive programming or ideally, where possible, gender-transformative outcomes.</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Country office</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>June 2022</td>
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| 3  | **Set up an operational framework for analysing performance data regularly in order to make effective adaptive management decisions using a structured approach.**  
3.1 Identify and address data gaps and inconsistencies.  
3.2 Set up a monitoring system for analysing performance trends and apply learning from the analysis to adapt strategic and operational elements of the country strategic plan.  
3.3 Where information to inform decision making is insufficient, generate a learning agenda for addressing evidence gaps. A learning agenda that is linked to performance measurement and the management decision making system seems a natural fit for the country strategic plan cycle, where lessons from one cycle inform strategic repositioning and revisions to programmatic approaches between cycles. Specific areas for a learning agenda that arose in the first country strategic plan and that could be useful for the second country strategic plan are a gender assessment and investigation of the reasons for annual fluctuations in minimum dietary diversity and food consumption scores. | Operational   | Country office |                             | Low                   | June 2023 |
| 4  | **Assess operating model readiness in order to understand the risks and opportunities that should be reflected in programme design.**  
4.1 Conduct a capacity gap analysis or operating model review as part of the country strategic plan design process in order to address operational challenges. By addressing issues at the preparedness state such a review would minimize the level and number of risks that need to be managed through the organizational risk register.  
4.2 Conduct a full readiness assessment with regard to operating model elements, including policies, processes, people, culture, partnerships and technology, before finalizing the design of the next country strategic plan. | Operational   | Country office |                             | High                  | June 2022 |
Acronyms

COMET  country office tool for managing effectively
COVID-19  coronavirus disease 2019
CSP  country strategic plan
SDG  Sustainable Development Goal
UNDAP  United Nations development assistance plan
WINGS  WFP Information Network and Global System