

INTER-AGENCY HUMANITARIAN EVALUATIONS

Drought Response Ethiopia, 2015-2018

Cyclone Idai Response Mozambique, 2019

Joint briefing on findings to the WFP Executive Board
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Background: Purpose, scope and methods

IAHEs provide an Independent assessment of the collective humanitarian response of Inter-Agency Standing Committee member organizations. They rely on multiple data sources:



Affected communities

- Household / face-to-face survey (505 respondents in Mozambique, 528 in Ethiopia)
- Focus group discussions
- Selected interviews



Key informant interviews

- United Nations agencies, NGOs, donors, government representatives
- 189 in Ethiopia, 200+ in Mozambique



Document and data analysis

- Evaluations
- Monitoring data & statistics
- Needs assessments
- Cluster plans and minutes


Drought Response Ethiopia, 2015-2018



The response was helpful in the short-term and food was an important component of the assistance

- The vast majority of affected people found the assistance very useful or somewhat useful.
- People who received food were more than five times as likely as those who did not to find the assistance very useful.
- People who received food were three times as likely as those who did not to say that the response included what they needed most.


“How useful was the assistance to help you immediately?” (N=412)



The response helped to save many lives

- All interviewees were convinced that the response saved lives.
- In 2016-17, over 240,000 children under five were treated for SAM. Treatment results met international standards (fewer than three percent deaths).
- 58 percent of surveyed people believe that more people in their family would have died without assistance.

What would have happened if no assistance had been provided? (N=484)



The humanitarian system failed to learn some critical lessons

Of 14 key issues, 11 had come up during a Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team (STAIT) mission in 2016 and 10 were discussed in an inter-agency real-time evaluation in 2012.

Factors hindering learning include:

- The scale of the droughts
- Competing priorities
- Problems in the funding architecture
- Reform efforts focusing on policies rather than implementation.

2019 IAHE	2016	2012
Limited strategic leadership of the Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team (EHCT)	X	
Early warning does not lead to early action	X	X
Political influence on needs assessments	X	X
Dispute over “chronic” needs versus shocks		X
Gaps between different response sectors	X	X
Insufficient focus on livelihoods and agriculture	X	X
Insufficient attention to pastoralist areas		X
Excessive focus on water trucking		X
Insufficient links between humanitarian and development actors	X	X
Lack of good monitoring systems	X	
Limited attention to protection	X	X
Little use of cash assistance	X	
Insufficient integration of gender, age, and other cross-cutting issues	X	X
Insufficient accountability to affected people	X	


Recommendation 1: Ensure lessons are learned and reforms implemented



The international system worked closely with the Government of Ethiopia

- The close partnership with the government is a key factor explaining the success of the response.
- Government response capacity was strengthened, e.g. in nutrition, health and logistics.
- Critical gaps remain e.g. in targeting and food delivery.

Coordination structure 2017 (excerpt)



Weaknesses in data and accountability were serious

Affected communities and their leaders lack information to hold those delivering assistance to account.

Official data on key aspects of the response missing (e.g. registration lists for food aid recipients) and credibility of key available data questionable.

Ratio of reported beneficiaries to official number of people in need



Recommendation 2: Make the response more accountable



Early warning did not create enough early action

Sufficient early warning systems existed.


41 percent of people had to wait for more than five months for assistance.

Distribution delays were widely reported.


SAM admissions and school drop-out rates spiked.

How long after the drought started did you get assistance?

N=484



Recommendation 3: Strengthen early action



The response was less successful in restoring livelihoods and strengthening resilience

Only 18 percent of affected people felt more resilient after the response.


Reasons why the response was not more successful in strengthening resilience include:

The rapid succession of droughts


Insufficient funding for livelihoods and resilience (share of funding allocated to food rising after 2016)

Lack of consultation of affected communities

How well would you be able to cope with a similar drought? N=507




Recommendation 4: Prioritize resilience and support alternative livelihoods



Replace food distributions with cash and strengthen markets.



Support pastoralists in developing alternative livelihoods.




Strengthen the emergency capacity of FAO and other agriculture cluster members.

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Cyclone Idai Response - Mozambique 2019

Cyclone Idai response: Mozambique 2019




Disclaimer: The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

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WHAT WENT WELL?


...and what we should continue to do.

Coordination and complementarity with government emergency systems




Improved response capacities saved lives

Priority needs immediately after the disaster



Joint action helped to prevent a cholera epidemic, which would have been a second disaster event




Achievements based on HRP Targets

High	Medium-High	Medium-Low	Low
Food asst, CCCM, ETC, nutrition, WASH	Livelihood, health, logistics	Education, clothing, protection, shelter	Cash and vouchers, shelter

Increased focus on prevention of sexual exploitation

In **Mozambique**, PSEA was a priority from day one of the response, including:

- Messaging via community radio stations;
- Setting up a PSEA Network;
- Establishment of referral pathways that involved senior leadership; and
- Interagency *Linha Verde* complaints and feedback system.
- A focus on PSEA was a driving factor for a decision by the HCT to transform WFP's complaints & feedback mechanism into an interagency initiative.




WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN IMPROVED?

...and what we should be doing differently next time.



Community reactions to early warning



After receiving warnings or notice did you take any mitigation action?

If not, why didn't you take any action?

Needs assessment, data management & communication

*Despite all the successes, one thing, however, remained a major challenge. This was the **inability to survey the situation critically to determine where people were and what their needs were at that time...***

Source: Reflections on the humanitarian response to Cyclone Idai by the Humanitarian Logistics Cluster.

Community reactions to early warning

Lack of involvement of local NGOs and CSOs in preparedness planning and during the scale up limited their role in:

- Community-based preparedness;
- Mobilization of communities for early action; and
- Addressing protection and assistance needs of vulnerable groups.

Accountability to Affected Populations


	<p>Were you treated with respect while receiving aid?</p>	<p>“Yes” 92%</p>
	<p>Did you know what assistance you would receive?</p>	<p>“Yes”: 8%</p>
	<p>Do you know who to complain to / did you receive information on how to use the complaints mechanism?</p>	<p>“Yes”: 19%</p>
	<p>Was the assistance distributed fairly / was aid distributed equally?</p>	<p>“Yes”: 74%</p>
	<p>Did assistance reach / benefit those who needed it most?</p>	<p>“Yes”: 36%</p>

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

RECOMMENDATIONS: IAHE Mozambique

...what should we consider doing next time?

Recommendations: Mozambique Humanitarian Country Team (HCT MOZ) & the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)



Recommendations: Operational Policy and Advocacy Group (OPAG) and the Emergency Directors Group (EDG)



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WHAT ARE SOME KEY LESSONS COMMON TO BOTH IAHEs?

...what lessons do we still need to learn?

IAHE Mozambique & Ethiopia: common findings

- Importance of anticipatory action and constructive engagement with national partners.
- Supporting communities with early recovery in a way that increases their resilience.
- Use of community feedback mechanisms to promote accountability and better address vulnerabilities.
- Need for more systematic learning at a global level for continuous improvement.

Where to go for more information?



Both Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations (IAHEs) and other valuable resources can be found here:

OCHA: <https://www.unocha.org/themes/evaluations-and-reviews/reports>

IASC: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/>

INTER-AGENCY HUMANITARIAN EVALUATION Steering Group

