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**Measures to enhance WFP's
programming in the poorest countries**

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INTRODUCTION

1. WFP's Mission Statement establishes that WFP should allocate at least 50 percent of development resources to least developed countries (LDCs) and at least 90 percent to low-income, food-deficit countries (LIFDCs) and LDCs combined.¹ One quarter of the world's more than 800 million chronically undernourished people live in LDCs, i.e., four out of 10 people. LIFDCs (including LDCs) are home to 88 percent of the world's hungry poor.
2. Targeting WFP's assistance to these two groups also supports the objective of the World Food Summit: "to enable food-insecure households, families and individuals to meet their food and nutritional requirements and to seek to assist those who are unable to do so."²
3. WFP has not fully achieved the 50/90 percent targets. Many priority countries still have small programmes, often because of a constrained national capacity to provide the matching resources and skills required to absorb external assistance and make effective use of food aid.
4. Increased WFP assistance to the poorest countries involves three interrelated challenges:
 - a) expanding assistance in line with relative needs rather than doing more in those countries which could absorb the aid;
 - b) maintaining quality and relevance of food assistance; and
 - c) strengthening recipient countries' capacity to make effective use of food assistance.

FOOD AID PERFORMANCE IN THE POOREST COUNTRIES

Actual deliveries

5. WFP food assistance currently reaches 65 of the 87 LIFDCs and 39 of the 48 LDCs.³ Relief operations play a dominant role in LDCs: WFP's assistance in three quarters of these countries consists either of relief food only (eight countries) or both relief and development food (29 countries). Development assistance alone is provided in most of the LIFDCs, but in only 10 LDCs.
6. WFP's total expenditure on development projects in recent years is summarized in Table 1. The proportion going to LDCs has fluctuated between 36 and 43 percent and that to

¹ The United Nations category of LDCs includes "those low-income countries that are suffering from long-term handicaps to growth, in particular low levels of human resource development and/or severe structural weaknesses." In 1997, the LDC category comprises 48 countries with a total population of 580 million people. LIFDCs include all food-deficit (i.e., basic food stuffs net-importing) countries with a per capita GNP not exceeding the level used by the World Bank to determine eligibility for IDA (soft loan) assistance. The list excludes those countries that are known to have formally objected to the LIFDC status. In 1997, the list of LIFDCs includes 87 countries, with a total population of 3.58 billion. All but two (net food-exporting) LDCs are also classified as LIFDCs.

² World Food Summit Plan of Action, Commitment Two, Objective 2.2, paragraph 20, Rome, 1996.

³ The following nine LDCs do not currently have WFP operations: Comoros, Kiribati, Maldives, Myanmar, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Togo, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.



LIFDCs between 80 and 85 percent.

TABLE 1: PROPORTION OF WFP DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE BY RECIPIENT COUNTRY STATUS (percent)

Status	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
LDC	43	36	39	43	42
LIFDC	85	81	84	80	80
Non-LIFDC	16	19	16	20	20
Total (million dollars)¹	470	398	311	341	279

Source: WFP: WIS/ODP.

7. It is apparent from the table that if WFP is to achieve the 50/90 target, it needs to step up activities in LDCs, while the share programmed to countries that are LIFDCs but not LDCs is about right. The challenge is to redirect resources from non-LIFDCs to LDCs. Progress is being made: as of August 1997, WFP has allocated or assigned 48 percent of its available resources to LDCs and 92 percent to LIFDCs.
8. Another issue is the distribution of expenditures among countries within the LDC and LIFDC categories in line with indicators of relative need, such as GNP per capita, under-five mortality rate and aggregated household food security index.² In the past, expenditures have resulted from a complex set of factors, including historical programming practices and the capacity of the country to utilize the aid it receives. Under conditions of plentiful resources, programming tended to favour countries which were able to absorb large quantities, and this experience helped to develop their capacity further. By contrast, a downward spiral of low commitments and low expenditures occurred in countries with a weaker capacity. Positive action is needed to reverse this decline and enable the poorest countries to derive greater benefits.
9. An important step in this direction has already been made: indicators of relative need have been translated into individual country allocation targets. Based on such efforts, in 1996, for the first time in years, WFP ensured that 57 percent of new commitments for development assistance was for LDCs. Further steps for enhancing WFP assistance in priority countries are proposed in this paper.

Costs and performance

10. Capacity constraints in the poorest countries have an effect on both costs and development outcome. Table 2 shows the average total cost per ton of development food aid by country status. Costs are 33 percent higher in LDCs, owing to physical features (land-locked countries, low population density), poor infrastructure and a higher need for non-food inputs.

¹ All monetary values are expressed in United States dollars.

² These indicators were identified by WFP's governing body in 1994 as the basis for determining notional country resource targets, expressed as a percentage share of total resources for development (document WFP/CFA: 38/P/7).



TABLE 2: AVERAGE COST PER TON OF DEVELOPMENT FOOD AID BY COUNTRY STATUS (in dollars)

	LDC	LIFDC but not LDC	Non-LIFDC
Average cost	630	470	480
Number of projects	67	81	37

Source: WFP WIS/ODP.

11. Another measure of implementation performance is the country office project report (COPR). The report is completed semi-annually for all projects and presents a combination of statistics, assessment and narrative comment about project status. An overall performance rating on a scale of one (highest) to four (lowest) is given to all projects. The results from the December 1996 data are given in Table 3.

TABLE 3: OVERALL IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE RATING BY COUNTRY STATUS (percent)

Rating	LDC	LIFDC but not LDC	Non-LIFDC	All countries
1	2	15	26	13
2	52	66	56	59
3	45	17	18	26
4	2	2	0	2
Total number of projects	60	88	34	182

Ratings: 1= project likely to achieve objectives; 4 = project unlikely to achieve objectives.

Source: COPRs.

12. A lower proportion of projects in LDCs are rated 1 or 2 compared with countries in other categories, and a much higher proportion are rated 3. Rating 3 is categorized as a “project facing major problems about which [local] management is not taking sufficient action.” Specific ratings in the COPR for “project management” and “government contribution” are also significantly and consistently lower in LDCs than in other countries. Less than satisfactory ratings for governments’ provision of staff and project support services were recorded for 56 percent of the projects in LDCs, compared to 21 percent in LIFDCs and 15 percent in non-priority countries.
13. A sample of WFP country desk officers who were asked about problems affecting implementation ranked “number and skills of counterpart staff” (73 percent) as the largest constraint, followed by food transport and commodity management problems, especially in countries with remote extended delivery points (50 percent). However, “WFP country office staffing and skills” (53 percent), and the “extent to which donor pledges are honoured (timing and quantity)” (47 percent), rank high among the implementation problems encountered.

Programming constraints

14. Implementation performance is affected not only by the capacity of the beneficiary country, but also by the support WFP staff are able to give to country operations. Analysis of the



staff complement reveals that in relatively small countries and those in which WFP supports only development activities WFP staff are, on average, less senior and less experienced than their colleagues in other country offices. A higher proportion of staff in LDCs are in lower grades: P3 is the dominant working grade, with lower proportions of P4/5 than in other countries.¹ Given the scale and nature of the problems in those countries and the relative weakness of government administrations, there is a powerful case to be made that WFP offices in LDCs should have stronger staffing. WFP's new organizational structure of Regional Offices will help this by providing senior management and specialized support at a sub-regional level.

15. There are also occasions when an overly rigid application of WFP's own programme approach creates obstacles. For example, WFP project design criteria stipulate that:
- *Parents must provide and pay for the cook to prepare school meals.* In the poorest countries, if this is not possible, should the cook be paid from the school allocation or should the school feeding project be abandoned?
 - *Any assets created should be of benefit to target households.* Community infrastructure such as roads and ponds benefits target households but is certain to benefit others as well. Interventions that strictly limit benefits to the poorest are likely to lack community ownership and may not be sustainable.
 - *Individuals, communities or governments should be able to sustain project activities when food aid ends.* Sustainability of public services in the poorest countries is often a distant hope. If this criterion were applied rigidly, few projects would pass the test.
16. Particularly in LDCs, greater flexibility and management judgement in applying design criteria to country circumstances would be desirable. The process of decentralization under WFP's organizational change initiative will help to ensure that such flexibility is matched with appropriate accountability as more senior managers, together with specialist support staff, are assigned to the field. This change process will also facilitate a deepening of local knowledge and project support on a continuing basis.

Emergency conditions

17. The low rate of target achievement in LDCs is also the result of the emergency conditions that prevail in parts or the entire territory of many of these countries. Normal development programmes are not possible under conditions of protracted emergencies.
18. Moreover, the pressing requirements of relief operations inevitably leave staff little time for "traditional" development projects. However, a significant proportion of relief assistance is often earmarked for rehabilitation or development: a recent analysis estimated that development activities account for 22 percent of relief expenditure. This means that in LDCs expenditure on development-in-relief is about as high as WFP's regular development assistance.

¹ This is largely a consequence of many LDCs having relatively small populations; the most senior WFP staff are normally assigned to head the largest country programmes.



A STRATEGY FOR ENHANCING WFP'S ASSISTANCE

19. The key to improved WFP concentration on the poorest countries is to develop their capacity to utilize targeted food aid. Measures to do this include capacity analysis and planning, training and other measures to enhance the capacity of recipient countries' flexibility in the application of design standards and funding criteria, new strategies for programme development and delivery instruments, maximized development benefits from relief operations, and thorough analysis of the costs of working in LDCs.

Country capacity analysis and planning

20. Analyses undertaken in preparing Country Strategy Outlines (CSOs) reveal a number of common concerns about the capacity of countries to make food assistance fully effective under given conditions. Few of the poorest countries possess the resources and experience to design, implement and monitor food assistance projects or to provide technical support during implementation. In some cases, the government may not control the entire country because of civil war. In other countries, where there is peace and stability, the governments may simply not have sufficient resources to determine fully the need and scope for food interventions targeted to the poor, particularly if these live in remote areas of the country.
21. WFP has a role, through advocacy and dialogue, of assisting governments to fully appreciate the comparative advantages of food assistance in reaching poor and food-insecure people, and to encourage support for such programmes. Research by the World Bank into public expenditure management shows that open and public debate is a necessary step to gain genuine support.
22. Clearly, the extent to which open and public debate is possible will vary among countries. Food assistance stakeholders comprise more than civil servants. They include NGOs, other aid agencies, university teachers, the media and, of course, the poor people themselves. Wide public discussion about food assistance programmes and the use of workshops to consult on plans and evaluations are ways of stimulating debate. Such action in collaboration with other donors is likely to be more effective than action in isolation.
23. Main focal points for this analysis and discussion will be the Common Country Assessment, conducted jointly by the Funds and Programmes of the Joint Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP) (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, IFAD, WFP), the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the WFP Country Strategy Outline. But the work of advocacy is continuous. Based on capacity analysis, advocacy and dialogue, country programmes can make explicit arrangements for special assistance and counterpart training in areas such as vulnerability analysis and mapping, and design of food assistance strategies, including disaster preparedness and mitigation schemes. Up-front arrangements for the monitoring of contributions to food assistance programmes will help to make government provisions and partner commitments (United Nations, bilateral and NGO) more evident.

Enhancing recipient countries' management capacity

24. Capacity analysis and planning should be accompanied by measures that not only involve national authorities, but also directly enhance the capacity for designing and implementing food assistance programmes. Improving the knowledge and skills of counterpart staff in relevant areas of competence is among the most important means of improving national capacity (governments, NGOs and local organizations). Training and other incentives play



an important role in enabling national counterparts to provide their support to donor-assisted programmes.

25. In recent years training has been given a new prominence in WFP. In 1996 over 400 training activities were held, covering 3,300 counterpart staff and some 500 national staff. About one sixth of these events were on topics related to project design and management.
26. While the need for skills training is widely acknowledged, training needs are not explicitly assessed when country strategies are planned. Thus, there is no advance preparation and some country offices find difficulty in delivering the training. A more detailed analysis of capacity needs in CSOs will permit training to be more focused on relevant design, implementation and monitoring requirements. The Regional Offices will have specialized staff to facilitate the identification and assessment of country programme training needs and assist in the delivery of training activities.
27. Training alone will not overcome the capacity problems in some of the poorest countries. The availability of essential services and contributions cannot be assumed where extremely limited public funds do not provide for the subsistence or transport of counterpart staff. Monetary compensation and incentive payments to government counterparts are considered to have detrimental longer-term consequences to development efforts. WFP and its JCGP partners have therefore agreed on a common approach and policy for ending such payments. Nevertheless, the JCGP policy also acknowledges that there may be "...a limited number of countries where the government is unable to provide the required support in personnel and other local costs and no realistic assumption can be made for it to assume these responsibilities in the foreseeable future." (Joint JCGP Statement, April 1996).
28. WFP assistance programmes in the poorest and disaster-prone countries must be able to attract essential support and services. This may only be possible if at least part of the counterpart costs (governments, local authorities or NGOs) are met by WFP. Examples of such expenditures would normally not include salary supplements but costs associated with effective programme management, such as payment of daily subsistence allowances and transport for counterparts that accompany WFP staff on field visits to remote areas.
29. The benefits of enhancing the capacity of recipient countries are not limited to the food aid provided by WFP. Improved skills in design, management and monitoring will also strengthen the absorptive capacity for food aid provided by other donors and eventually for programmes funded with national resources.

Realistic goals and standards

30. The more demanding the project, the less chance there is for success, especially in countries with a limited capacity. Food aid objectives must be realistic and suited to the circumstances; uniform solutions are unlikely to be appropriate. For example, projects in better off countries are expected to involve sizeable counterpart contributions; to expect the same in very poor and disaster-prone LDCs would not be realistic.
31. The definition of an appropriate and successful food intervention should be judged in this light. Take the example of WFP support for labour-intensive public works. The costs for maintenance of this infrastructure are expected to be a government responsibility. Such an expectation is appropriate for an economy that manages to achieve high and steady growth rates. But many of the WFP priority countries have experienced shocks to their economic advancement which make it impossible for governments to fully meet the recurrent costs of maintaining public services and infrastructure. One result is that roads improved by food



for work fall into disrepair. Typically, external assistance becomes available only when this road is completely dysfunctional. But this means that the opportunity for far more cost-effective assistance in the upkeep of the road has been missed. In some cases it may be appropriate to use food aid to support the maintenance of these structures.

32. The case for interventions that tackle the issue of recurrent costs is even stronger for supplementary feeding programmes. Such interventions typically involve substantial recurring costs, conventionally defined. But the costs of supplementary feeding to address early malnutrition could equally be considered an investment, one which brings important and enduring benefits for individuals and for the society more broadly. Like other social investments, including school feeding, supplementary feeding will often be needed beyond the conventional three-to-five year project cycle. Decisions concerning the duration of WFP support for such activities are better based on a sound analysis of their costs and benefits than on a rigid approach to government assumption of these “recurrent costs”.

Flexible programme development

33. Flexibility in exploiting the potential for targeted food assistance should apply not only to goals and standards, but also to the planning of projects and the selection of delivery instruments.
34. The traditional project planning cycle, with its origins in engineering and civil works, provides a valuable process by which new projects are proposed, scrutinized, implemented and evaluated. Its strength is the thoroughness by which projects have to satisfy preparation, appraisal and monitoring criteria. Its weakness is that the decision-making process commits resources to full-scale action from an early stage; there is no scope for an activity where the implementation needs to be tested and modified as it is tried out, nor for projects where the outcomes are uncertain. Such rigidity limits experimentation and the development of new ideas. In some circumstances a “learning” approach to programme development is preferable to the traditional project “blueprint”.¹
35. The “learning” approach to programme development has several key characteristics:
- it is a participative cycle, with close interaction between the project authority and the target beneficiaries;
 - it is an evaluation cycle, with frequent learning and feedback;
 - full resources are not committed until experience is gained at a smaller scale; and
 - it is not necessary to predict final outcomes early in the planning stage.
36. The concept of experimenting with food interventions before proposing a large-scale project is not new to WFP. Nevertheless, instruments such as the pilot project approach or the Country Directors’ delegated authority to commit up to 200,000 dollars to a contract with NGOs have been used rarely. The increased flexibility achieved through the adoption of the Country Programme Approach is expected to facilitate more frequent experimentation with food aid interventions.
37. Flexibility in project development must be matched with appropriate arrangements for management support. Until very recently, support from WFP headquarters was

¹ Robert Picciotto and Rachel Weaving (*Finance and Development*, December 1994) describe the difference between the stages of the traditional and the learning project cycles as follows:

Traditional cycle = Identification>Preparation>Appraisal>Implementation>Evaluation>Identification.

Learning cycle = Listening>Piloting>(Learning)>Demonstrating>Mainstreaming>Listening.



concentrated on specific stages in the cycle, and linked to missions: appraisal, management review-cum-appraisal, evaluation-cum-appraisal and evaluation. The mission structure provided concentrated but intermittent support.

38. The enhanced field presence through Regional Offices implies a shift of resources out of traditional missions into a more continuous programme support at the regional and country level. Regional Offices will be able to provide ongoing assistance and advice in areas such as development of country strategies, programming matters (needs assessment, gender equity, nutrition and monitoring), technical matters (financial management, procurement, logistics, human resources management), advocacy, and resource mobilization.

Flexible delivery instruments

39. In many LDCs more flexible instruments of programme delivery are required if WFP is to expand its assistance to match needs. This could involve working with the full range of implementation partners (governments, other donors, NGOs and community organizations) and the ability to respond to localized, small-scale requirements for assistance. Enhanced operational partnerships with local organizations and community groups and creation of food-fund facilities for country office utilization are among the key policy options for increasing the scope of targeted food assistance in the poorest countries.
40. WFP has a long-standing experience of working with NGOs as partners during relief operations, but has been slower to forge similar relationships for development. Collaboration with NGOs could facilitate participatory approaches and local-level needs assessment and targeting. However, there are also potential difficulties. One is the reluctance by some recipient governments to work with NGOs; another is the small-scale and limited experience of NGOs in some countries. The small scale means that procedures have to be created to enable cooperation to be decided locally, and carries the risk that not all partnerships will be successful. Direct action with local governments and contracting of management teams are possible approaches which WFP has used with success.
41. WFP intends to present a policy paper on the framework for working with local organizations and NGOs for Executive Board discussion in 1998. The paper will examine issues such as WFP assistance to the capacity development of these partner organizations.
42. Projects designed to operate at the community level normally require funding arrangements different from those for other development projects. A "food fund" could provide the framework for such flexible arrangements. Such a fund would consist of resources which could be allocated to local organizations wishing to develop social or economic infrastructure or support a social programme, where food assistance would create an incentive or tackle a nutritional deficiency. The food fund would be allocated at the discretion of the Country Director, usually supported by a national steering committee or some other appropriate structure, to offer flexible access to resources under a clear operational framework. The framework (set out in project approval documents) would define the permitted locations or areas and types of intervention. Planning and implementation would be the responsibility of the applying organization. Activities could include labour-intensive construction, rehabilitation and maintenance, learning of new skills, and supplementary feeding activities.
43. The successful management of any food fund facilities will depend on the development of simple application, appraisal and monitoring procedures. The WFP Programme Design Manual currently in preparation will include basic guidance in this regard, drawing on



WFP's experience with similar mechanisms, particularly in its work in relief and rehabilitation.

44. Opportunities to provide effective food assistance may also exist in the form of community-level programmes established by other donors. For example, "village microproject" and "social fund" programmes provide a mechanism by which local organizations can apply for financial or technical assistance to construct social and economic infrastructure. Many schemes are labour-intensive, requiring the labour to form part of a contribution in kind. Where economic pressures that result from chronic food insecurity limit the scope to donate labour, food aid can stimulate a wider and more effective contribution. The World Bank, for example, has stated that food assistance may be a necessary and integral component of a Bank-financed project and encourages collaboration with WFP or bilateral food aid donors in situations where averting or correcting undernutrition and malnutrition is essential for achieving project goals.

Development benefits derived from relief operations

45. The need for relief operations in many LDCs represents an obstacle to enhancing WFP's development food assistance but also an opportunity: food logistics capacities are developed that often reach into the most remote areas; effective partnerships are formed between aid agencies; and, work relations and trust are developed with local authorities and communities. These achievements will be lost if project planning and classification promote a dichotomy between relief and development instead of strengthening the linkages between the two.
46. The project cycle is much shorter for relief operations than for development. Development projects have a longer planning stage so that the technical feasibility of interventions may be fully assessed. The fact that development activities are included in some relief operations implies that different standards must be applied than would be feasible and appropriate in a normal development situation. Moreover, appropriate funding arrangements are needed. These issues will need to be examined in the Board's forthcoming discussion on WFP's Resource and Long-Term Financing Policies.

Cost of working in LDCs

47. Operations cost more in LDCs, for both relief and development. Since this requirement is unlikely to change in the near future, achievement of the 50/90 target brings significant cost implications to WFP. A new approach to project budgeting would clarify the actual costs of shifting programme resources to LDCs and bring other benefits to country programmes. For example, donors' ability to identify non-food assistance requirements which can be supported by complementary aid activities would be strengthened through improvements in the process of project budgeting.
48. WFP's budgeting approach for development projects tends to focus on the costs of commodities and the logistics of distribution. The expected counterpart contributions are often not analysed in detail. A lack of detail means a danger that programme support costs are not fully identified, thus creating difficulties for governments and other partners in meeting their contribution commitments and sustaining activities after the project is completed.
49. This problem will be tackled by the adoption of a project budget analysis which:
- sets out in detail the necessary counterpart contribution of staff, operations and equipment, together with WFP costs;



- helps identify recurrent cost implications for sustainable development; and
 - determines costs for supporting activities such as training, staff development, the purchase of non-food items and performance measurement.
50. The full analysis of costs, together with the full appreciation of benefits, will contribute to an informed decision as to whether it is worth making an intervention. Furthermore, a cost analysis has the potential of promoting two changes which will improve a country's capacity to implement projects. First, by identifying support costs more carefully, WFP will be able to determine those functions which can be supported by direct costs and those which are only feasible if parallel funding is made available. Second, some activities, such as maintenance of basic infrastructure (which has hitherto only rarely been included in WFP's portfolio), may be identified as appropriate for funding where countries lack the capacity to sustain investments. This would create an opportunity to expand the range of projects available to the poorest countries.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

51. To achieve the 50/90 target, WFP needs to increase its development activities in LDCs. Current strategies have proven to be generally adequate for WFP's work in LIFDCs. In LDCs, however, new and more flexible approaches are required to overcome the problems that limit the utilization and effectiveness of targeted food assistance. A variety of measures will be required. Some are of an operational nature and can be addressed by WFP management. Others are strategic in character and are presented below for endorsement by the Executive Board.
52. WFP has already begun work on measures such as the following:
- **Support to field operations.** Nine Regional Offices have been established and staffed with senior managers and specialist advisors in order to strengthen support for WFP's country operations. This process of decentralization will enhance WFP's flexibility to respond to local opportunities for joint activities with governments, other donors, NGOs and community groups. The shift of capacities to the regions of operation will also assist in ensuring that the more flexible approaches to standards, project design and implementation are guided by seasoned judgement and appropriate accountability.
 - **Advocacy.** Greater emphasis is being given to advocacy about the usefulness of targeted food assistance through public information activities and workshops involving governments, donors, NGOs and others.
 - **Programme Design Manual.** WFP has embarked upon a comprehensive review and updating of its operations manuals. A key task is the reorientation of guidelines on the CSO/Country Programme formulation process to include: food assistance-related country capacity analysis and planning; identification of training needs of counterpart and national staff; and full cost analysis for proposed interventions.
 - **Policy papers.** WFP is preparing for Executive Board consideration three policy documents with important implications for the Programme's activities in the poorest countries. These are: a policy framework for strengthening WFP's work with local organizations and NGOs; strategies for transition from relief to development which will address the issue of development in relief operations; and a review of WFP's



experience with the Resource and Long-Term Financing Policies, which will take up the issue of direct costs.

- **Analysis of full project costs.** This will provide the basis for deciding whether food assistance is appropriate for the identified intervention and if so, to what extent WFP should contribute to meeting essential costs other than food.

53. The Board is requested to endorse the selective application of the following strategies in LDCs, with appropriate supporting analysis included in future Country Programmes and subject to prior Board approval:

- **Investing in LDCs' capacity (governments, NGOs, community groups) to effectively utilize food assistance programmes.** Such expenditure would either be part of WFP's Programme Support and Administration budget (in the case of counterpart training) or of the direct project support costs to provide for non-food inputs and services essential to the success of project activities.
- **Making more use of food-fund facilities and experimental projects.** To fully exploit the potential for targeted food assistance, WFP Country Directors could propose the earmarking for this purpose of up to 20 percent of a Country Programme in LDCs .
- **WFP food assistance for maintenance and up-keep of basic public services and infrastructure.** Food assistance will be most effective if it focuses on interventions and sets objectives that are realistic given the conditions of poor countries.

