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**Executive Board  
First Regular Session**

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# PROJECTS FOR EXECUTIVE BOARD APPROVAL

## Agenda item 9

***For approval***



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## PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATION— ANGOLA 6159.01

### Assistance to War-Affected People

Number of beneficiaries	<b>1,040,040</b> (364,000 women)
Duration of project	Fifteen months (1 April 2001–30 June 2002)
Food tonnage	228,782 tons

#### Cost (United States dollars)

Total cost to WFP	167,671,644
Estimated Government costs	39,500,000
Direct operational costs	140,444,243
Total costs	207,171,644

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# Note to the Executive Board



**This document is submitted for approval by the Executive Board.**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document, to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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# Executive Summary

The situation in Angola continues to show a high level of instability owing to intense guerrilla warfare. The country is still witnessing significant movements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of conflicts, which negatively affects the rural economy and the overall food security situation.

Given the poor 2000 harvest and the need to develop greater self-reliance programmes in conjunction with the Government and NGO partners, WFP will continue to support the population displaced in 1998/99 with free distributions until the major harvest of 2001 (March-April). By that time, it is expected that most of these IDPs will have established adequate coping mechanisms, including agricultural activities and seasonal employment opportunities.

WFP will move progressively away from general distributions and encourage the development of self-reliance strategies. Its programme will have three specific components: (i) emergency response through free food distribution (45 percent of food) focusing on newly arrived IDPs and returnees; (ii) emergency/recovery via safety nets (27 percent) targeting the malnourished; and (iii) recovery/rehabilitation schemes through food for work (28 percent), supporting food-insecure families. The average monthly distribution level will be 15,250 tons. WFP's target for 2001 will be an average of 1,040,040 people (of whom 35 percent, or 364,000, will be women and 40 percent, or 416,000, children). The projected breakdown of the beneficiaries among the above three components is 40 percent, 30 percent and 30 percent, respectively.

In mid-January, WFP and its partners will carry out a thorough assessment to evaluate if assumptions have been met (successful seeds/tools campaign and land allocation, relatively stable security situation) and if the new strategy is implementable in all provinces as of 1 April 2001. If not, provincial contingency plans will be established in order to allow WFP to refine and adjust the protracted relief and recovery operation's (PRRO) implementation more effectively as conditions change. Should the need arise, the level of assistance will be revised to reflect the adjustments effected/foreseen and to secure an adequate availability of resources to the PRRO.

Owing to current security and road conditions, the logistics operation will continue to use predominantly air transport for delivery inland. The Government will continue to contribute to WFP operations with a fuel subsidy and exemption from landing/parking fees.

The fifteen-month project would require WFP to provide a total of US\$167,671,644, including US\$39,315,839 in food costs.

## Draft Decision

The Board approves PRRO Angola 6159.01—Assistance to War-Affected People (WFP/EB.1/2001/9-C/2).



## CONTEXT AND RATIONALE

### Context of the Crisis

1. Since independence in 1975, there have been several peace initiatives between the Government of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the most recent one being the Lusaka Protocol. Signed in November 1994, the Lusaka Protocol set deadlines for military and political integration. Although the Government of Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) was inaugurated on 11 April 1997, progress in its implementation of the protocol was slower than expected, and eventually came to a standstill. The situation started to deteriorate from early 1998; dialogue was broken off and the war resumed in December 1998, and continued through 1999. Major population displacements resumed in the latter part of 1998.
2. Since the end of 1999, major government military offensives, including the capture of Bailundo and Andulo (UNITA strongholds), have greatly reduced the capacity of UNITA to conduct conventional warfare. The civil conflict is now a guerrilla war characterized by widespread attacks on local military and civilian installations, mine incidents and the occasional shelling of large urban concentrations. Movements of displaced populations continue. Agricultural production is restricted to secure areas with limited access to markets, road movements are insecure over wide areas, and there is increasing vulnerability to food insecurity, both geographically and within population concentrations. With the change in the nature of the war, IDP movements are expected to continue.
3. Prior to independence, Angola was self-sufficient in all major crops except wheat. However, the continuous civil war has led to a gradual collapse of the national economy. In the provincial capitals and towns, there has been a contraction of employment opportunities and a general impoverishment of the urban population. This has been exacerbated by the influx of displaced persons, who compete with the poorest residents for a declining number of employment opportunities. In the rural areas, there has been a change in the structure of agricultural production systems away from commercial agriculture and towards subsistence farming—adapted primarily to meet immediate consumption needs. As the opportunities for rural households to earn off-farm incomes have declined, rural populations too have become more food insecure and more vulnerable to the cyclical effects of drought and flood, the loss of key family members, etc. At the national level, the country has been dependent on food imports and food aid since the 1980s.
4. The decline in the level of primary health care provided by the public health services has had a direct impact on the vulnerability of households to food insecurity resulting from illness. This manifests itself directly in two ways: first, through the reduction of food intake and nutrient absorption as a result of illnesses such as diarrhoea, malaria, etc.; second, through the temporary or permanent loss of household labour resulting from preventable and/or curable diseases such as malaria. The direct negative impact of the collapse of the public health services on food security at a national and household level is incalculable.
5. Angola is dependent on the oil industry for 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. However, much of the revenue generated is used to finance the war effort and service the foreign debt of US\$12 billion, thereby significantly limiting the level of resources available for addressing the pressing humanitarian needs. According to the International Monetary Fund document, “Recent Economic Development”, inflation rose from 135 percent during 1998 to about 330 percent during 1999, and to 438 percent in 2000.



This led to a further decline in the purchasing power of Angolans. In March 2000 the Government removed fuel subsidies, leading to an increase in the cost of living.

6. The deep socio-economic crisis in which Angola finds itself today is reflected in the 1999 UNDP Human Development Report. In that report, Angola ranked 160<sup>th</sup> out of 174 countries considered, a drop from 156<sup>th</sup> in 1998. Between 1970 and 1995, the urban population rose from 15 percent to nearly 50 percent of the country's total. This has resulted in the creation of huge urban squatter settlements, a large increase in the number of street children and rising levels of urban violence and insecurity. Extremely high levels of absolute and relative poverty are a reality both in urban and in rural areas.

## Situation Analysis

7. The current political/security situation in Angola can be characterized as widespread, intense guerrilla warfare. A combination of active fighting, guerrilla attacks, mine incidents and occasional shelling of civilian targets means that there is a high level of insecurity and instability. These conditions make it extremely difficult and challenging for humanitarian agencies to carry out their work. At the request of the Government and the donor community, WFP and other humanitarian agencies have expanded their radius of operations. This expansion has occurred in some of the newly accessible areas, and while it is expected that it will continue during the coming year, it is likely to be on only a limited scale and confined to areas where Government control is undisputed and security zones are wide.
8. Angola is still experiencing significant movements of IDPs, especially in areas around Malange, Kuito, Huambo and Luena. More recent fighting has also prompted some large population movements in Uige, Lunda Sul, Kuando Kubango and Moxico provinces.
9. Displacement has been the major factor generating food insecurity in the country, especially in the cases of besieged cities. Most IDPs are subsistence farmers. Widespread insecurity has drastically reduced the ability of resident populations, both rural and urban, to obtain food—the main factors being the deterioration of trading networks and essential services, a lack of agricultural inputs, restricted access to fields beyond the security perimeters and the sharing of limited food resources with extended family members.
10. Since most provincial roads remain closed, and travel on the limited routes that are open is dangerous, the normal movement of goods and people is restricted to small areas of the country. This has led to a catastrophic deterioration of rural and interprovincial trading networks and a severe decline in the supply of essential services and the availability of basic agricultural inputs.
11. The ongoing conflict and the risk of landmines place considerable restrictions on the use of agricultural land. In many areas, farmers have been forced to abandon their land because it has become increasingly unsafe to plant or harvest their crops. The fallow rotation system farmers traditionally practise has become virtually impossible because of the limited availability of secure land. Furthermore, theft or looting is common in many areas, prompting farmers to harvest their crops prematurely. Normal livestock production is now confined to one or two provinces in the extreme southwest, and cattle herds across the country have been decimated. The joint FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission that visited Angola from 16 April to 4 May 2000 estimated that, in spite of favourable rainfall, the 1999/2000 aggregate cereal production (504,000 tons) was 5 percent lower than that of the previous year. The cereal import requirement from April 2000 to March 2001 was estimated at 753,000 tons, of which commercial imports were estimated at 420,000 tons. It was estimated that 333,000 tons of food aid would be



needed for that same period. Extensive WFP assistance will therefore be required until the next harvest in April 2001.

12. A combination of food shortages and the poor health and sanitation infrastructure in Angola is reflected in the high rates of infant mortality. According to UNICEF's 1999 Annual Report published in Angola, it is estimated that one quarter of children die before reaching the age of 5. Maternal mortality is estimated at 1,281 per 100,000, live births, and life expectancy at 45 years (compared with an average of 51 years for sub-Saharan Africa). The high rates of mortality and morbidity are attributed to the following interrelated factors: outbreaks of diseases such as malaria, polio and diarrhoea (linked to poor water/sanitation and low vaccine coverage); malnutrition resulting from lack of sufficient and protein-rich food, micronutrient deficiencies and repeated exposure to infectious diseases; and lack of access to general health services and scarcity of drug supplies. It is estimated that 62 percent of the population are without access to safe drinking-water, 61 percent lack proper sanitation facilities, and 70 percent do not have access to health care services.
13. According to UNDP's Angola Human Development Report for 1999, women and children have been most affected by the war and are the most deprived group in Angolan society, constituting 70 percent of the IDP population. Angolan women have one of the highest mortality rates in the world. The number of female-headed households is high and increasing, and the traditional gender division has become less demarcated. These households tend to be poorer as less land is being cultivated per household as a result of the lack of labour and tools. In most rural areas, women have no access to health services.
14. Although the statistics describe a situation of continuing extreme poverty and human suffering, the situation has improved in many parts of Angola during the past 12 months. WFP food assistance, together with other humanitarian aid, has contributed to a general improvement in the acute malnutrition situation. It is widely accepted that the situation has moved from one of acute emergency during late 1998 and the first half of 1999 to one of prolonged crisis. Although significant new movements of IDPs are expected in 2001, the humanitarian interventions to accessible areas during 1999 and 2000 have had a positive impact not only on the nutritional status of war-affected people in Angola, but also on their overall well-being.
15. By the end of 2000, a majority of IDPs will have been displaced for between 18 and 24 months, and, it is hoped, will have benefited from programmes of temporary agricultural resettlement. The production of food from these programmes and the development of alternative income sources and other coping strategies following this period of widespread violent disruption and displacement should allow for a more emergency/recovery-oriented approach during 2001–02. WFP's strategy, therefore, will need to be flexible and responsive in order on the one hand to ensure that those who remain most vulnerable are able to benefit from emergency assistance, and on the other hand to encourage those who have developed limited coping strategies to take advantage of other forms of emergency/recovery assistance.

### **The Situation of Women**

16. The protracted conflict in Angola has continued to deepen the plight of Angolan women, who constitute around 70 percent of the displaced population in the country. The disintegration of the family system by the continued war has made the majority of Angolan women heads of their households responsible for supporting relatively large families (minimum of five per household) and with few economic means to do so. The mortality rate among women in Angola is extremely high, largely because of their exposure to



hazards in their efforts to provide for their families: a high percentage of landmine victims are women, of whom many trek more than 20 km per day in search of food, fuelwood and other essentials. The deterioration of the health infrastructure, and in particular of the maternal health care services in the provinces, also has a negative impact on the already very high mortality rate among women. Other important factors include the shortage of land for agricultural purposes in secure and safe areas and the high drop-out rate among girls, which results in high levels of illiteracy and low skills levels. Women are the most deprived group in Angolan society, as reflected in the low Gender Development Index ranking of 160<sup>th</sup> out of 174 countries (UNDP Human Development Report, 2000).

17. WFP-Angola is making concerted efforts towards fulfilling its Commitments to Women, especially in the areas of capacity-building and the implementation of women-centred projects (e.g. the present flour-milling project for women's groups and the street girls project, both supported through food for work). WFP-Angola intends to reinforce its capacity towards fulfilling its Commitments to Women by creating an enabling environment and establishing mechanisms for increased women's participation in the design, implementation and management of food-for-work projects, relief food distribution and special project planning. As a matter of priority, WFP-Angola will ensure that its implementing partners abide by the principles laid down in WFP's Commitments to Women.

### WFP Response

18. Between November 1990 and December 1999, WFP provided assistance to war-affected people through nine emergency operations and three protracted relief operations, amounting to approximately 783,179 tons at a total cost of US\$492.5 million. During this period an average of 1.2 million war-affected people per year were reached, with a peak of some 2 million annually during 1993–95 (see Annex IV).
19. In March 1996, WFP launched its first protracted relief operation (PRO) Angola 5602.00. This introduced a number of rehabilitation activities and promoted the resettlement of people in their places of origin. During the original phase of the PRO and its two expansions, the number of planned beneficiaries decreased from 1,300,000 to 662,000, and the share of rehabilitation/resettlement activities gradually increased, representing in February 1998 some 52 percent of the total food commodity commitment. However, in view of renewed conflicts and consequent displacements, emergency operation (EMOP) 6138.00 was approved on 15 June 1999, for a four-month period (September-December 1999), at a total cost of US\$37.5 million, to assist approximately 800,000 people.
20. In October 1999, the Executive Board approved PRRO 6159.00, covering the basic food needs of approximately 1,127,400 war-affected people for the period extending from January to December 2000. The PRRO's cash value was estimated at US\$158,366,484. The Executive Board approved a subsequent budget increase at its Second Regular Session of 2000. The budget increase was recommended as a result of a comprehensive review and needs assessment carried out in March/April 2000, which showed a significant increase in the number of beneficiaries to 1,544,900. The revised total cost of the PRRO was US\$207,687,931.
21. During the first half of 2000, WFP distributed an average of 12,500 tons of food aid commodities per month to an average of 1,000,000 beneficiaries, for a total of 112,500 tons as of October 2000. The shortfall against planned beneficiary caseloads and planned levels of distribution is a result of logistics and pipeline constraints, which necessitated increasingly targeted food aid interventions. Of the total amount distributed,



some 70 percent was targeted to vulnerable IDP and resident populations as a general relief ration, and 27 percent to moderately and severely malnourished individuals in therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres, together with other vulnerable groups being assisted in institutional feeding programmes. The balance of resources (3 percent) supported returnees and participants in rehabilitation schemes being assisted with food-for-work rations.

22. WFP food assistance has evidently contributed to a general improvement in the acute malnutrition situation. In mid-1999 to mid-2000, global malnutrition rates fell from 17 to 4 percent in Huambo, from 32 to 3 percent in Malange, from 13 to 4 percent in Kuito and from 16 to 4 percent in Menongue.

### **Government Policies and Programmes**

23. The Government's overall response capacity remains limited. However, since early 1999, the Angolan authorities have made a commitment towards the temporary settlement of IDPs on productive agricultural land. Although in 1999 this was mitigated by the availability of arable and de-mined land and by the limited provision of seeds and tools, the Government has gone ahead with implementing this policy objective. The extension of state administration to new areas opened the possibility of medium-scale resettlement and return. By the end of October, 186,500 IDPs had been relocated. In addition, more than 100,000 people were estimated to have returned to their places of origin during the year. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) have worked closely to develop the minimum operational standards for resettlement and return. In addition to temporary settlement, the Government is currently (as of October 2000) working on guidelines of a pilot programme for transition from emergency to development assistance, to be presented to the Council of Ministers, thus demonstrating its commitment to the issue.

### **Indirect Contributions**

24. The Government will continue with its contribution of Jet A-1 fuel (US\$0.052 per litre against the market rate of US\$0.244 per litre). This is an important contribution to WFP's transport costs. Other contributions expected from the Government are exemptions from landing, parking and navigation fees for passenger and cargo aircraft and from passenger and cargo fees at airports, and the provision of warehousing space at a number of provincial locations. It is also expected that the Government will honour its obligation to refund port charges levied on WFP food imports. Total government contributions through waiver or refund of charges were equivalent to US\$3.6 million in 1998 (US\$1.9 million Jet A-1, US\$0.7 million landing/parking and US\$1 million port charges), US\$9.3 million in 1999 (US\$6.3 million Jet A-1, US\$1.45 million landing/parking, US\$1.55 port charges), and are estimated at US\$16.5 million in 2000 (US\$14.5 million Jet A-1, US\$1.3 million landing/parking and US\$0.7 million port charges).

### **Direct Contributions**

25. In May 2000 the Government formally confirmed a contribution of US\$3 million (in local currency) to the ongoing PRRO. The money is expected during the course of 2001.

### **National Government Programme for Humanitarian Assistance**

26. In July 1999 the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Commission on Humanitarian Assistance. The Commission launched a US\$55.5 million National Emergency Programme for Humanitarian Assistance, to be implemented in two phases: (i) food and other





emergency needs and (ii) resettlement of IDPs and distribution of land and seeds/tools. Phase I (US\$21.5 million) includes the procurement and transport of commodities/non-food inputs. Phase II (US\$34 million) includes an agricultural programme and an assistance programme for the reinstallation of displaced populations. Phase I has already been implemented. In Phase II, US\$17.7 million has been allocated (out of the US\$34 million). In addition, US\$15.4 million has been given for other agricultural programme activities.

### **Rationale for Providing Assistance**

27. With the continuation of the conflict in many regions, return/resettlement is likely to be limited in the course of the next year, leaving a large number of people dependent on relief assistance.
28. The continuing conflict, the limited success of the land distribution schemes, a reduced cereals harvest and the severely restricted opportunities for income-generating employment outside agriculture will result in continuing high levels of vulnerability during the year ahead. The low-intensity conflict that has characterized the past 12 months is expected to continue, and will result in an increase in the total number of confirmed IDPs. The ability of IDPs to integrate into the local economies will continue to be hampered by a restricted access to better arable land and the present stagnation that characterizes the provincial economies. Even those IDPs who are able to return to their areas of origin will require support until the harvest in the first quarter of 2001.

## **STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES**

29. As parts of Angola move away from a situation of acute emergency to one of prolonged crisis, the underlying strategy of the new PRRO is to allow a transition from large-scale free food distributions to a more targeted approach that will progressively encourage the development of self-reliance strategies. It will be important to review the situation regularly and to maintain enough flexibility in order to adapt to changing circumstances and needs as they arise.
30. Given the poor 2000 harvest and the need to develop greater self-reliance programmes in conjunction with the Government and NGO partners, WFP will continue to support the large population displaced in 1998/99 with free distributions until the major harvest of 2001 (March-April), when the ongoing PRRO ends. In April 2000, an FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission indicated the need for a high level of emergency food assistance at least until the harvest of 2001. By that time, it is expected that most of the people displaced during the large waves of 1998/99 will have established adequate coping mechanisms, including agricultural activities and seasonal employment opportunities. After this period, WFP free food assistance will be provided strictly for a limited duration, and will be carefully targeted to develop self-reliance among beneficiary populations. Free food assistance to IDPs will be provided to those newly arrived since October 2000, when the new WFP registration system is in place.
31. WFP's Commitments to Women will be an integral part of the implementation strategy of the PRRO. Women will continue to be actively involved in all aspects of the operation and will benefit from the assets created through food for work. As much as possible, food will be distributed directly to women, and they will be increasingly involved in the management and food distribution teams. They will participate equally in the



decision-making process. Income-generating activities will be supported where possible in order to empower women and improve their economic situation.

## Targeting

32. In early 2000, WFP suggested to the humanitarian partners the formation of a targeting working group, which would look at ways to better target and maximize the impact of food assistance in the country. Composed of various NGOs and some United Nations agencies (WFP, UNICEF and FAO), the working group decided that it was now time to think of ways to move slowly away from general food distribution and towards a more targeted approach, and it implied the introduction of a new registration system. The Working Group also decided to bring in a mission from outside Angola to review the situation. The mission was fielded in May/June 2000 and presented a set of recommendations on how to use food aid to develop self-reliance strategies in the present context of Angola, and which kind of registration system would be appropriate. These recommendations have been reflected in this PRRO where appropriate. The Targeting Working Group meets once every two weeks and reviews the implementation of the new strategy.
33. An improved vulnerability assessment system will be an important element in the new strategy and will enable WFP and its partners to improve the targeting of food and other assistance to those who are most vulnerable to food insecurity. Intersectoral vulnerability assessment groups led by the Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) Unit will carry out assessments at both the national and provincial levels so that the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme in targeting the most vulnerable can be reviewed and adjusted at regular intervals.
34. VAM monitors at all WFP sub-offices collect information on a range of food security indicators—security and population displacement, agricultural production, market activity and prices, nutrition survey and other health-related data. This information is analysed in collaboration with the other humanitarian institutions working in the provinces and is published regularly in the “Vulnerability and Food Security Bulletin”. This process is supported by national-level assessments such as the annual FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission. The vulnerability analysis at this level enables WFP and the humanitarian community to predict significant instances of food shortage and food insecurity on a geographic basis, thus allowing for a more effective and efficient deployment of food aid and other humanitarian assistance to areas and populations in greatest need.
35. In order to improve targeting within local communities, the VAM Unit, in cooperation with its partners in the Government and the NGO community, will carry out a household food economy survey in each of the provinces where there are significant numbers of families receiving food assistance. This survey will provide management at the provincial level with a better understanding of the household food and livelihood systems of different categories of households (female-headed, landless, those with high dependency ratios, etc.) and provide baseline data against which the effects of the programme can be measured. A number of typical “sentinel households” in each province will be monitored continuously so that the programme can be regularly adjusted. This built-in continuous assessment mechanism (combined with the monitoring system described under paragraphs 85–90) will enable WFP to target better those categories of household that are most food insecure and to draw conclusions with respect to the effects of the programme on beneficiary households.



## Beneficiary Needs

36. From April 2001, the start of the new PRRO and the first major harvest of the year, numbers of people in need of food assistance are expected to fall, provided that there is adequate land distribution and sufficient seeds/tools and that a relatively stable security situation prevails. The present caseload actually assisted by WFP is 1 million beneficiaries. Those who had been assisted with free food distribution since the major displacement of 1998/99 are expected to have developed better coping mechanisms. WFP assistance will cover 1,040,040 people, of whom 35 percent or 364,000 will be women and 40 percent or 416,000, children. Other food aid pipelines will include the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (250,000 people), bilateral assistance to the Government of Angola and possible donations through NGOs.
37. In April/May 2001, FAO/WFP will carry out the annual Crop and Food Supply Assessment exercise. The aim of this assessment will be to estimate crop production of the harvest and, consequently, the number of people who will need food assistance in the course of the year.

## The Role of Food Aid

38. The strategy of the new PRRO represents a shift towards emergency recovery. The objective will be based not only on saving the lives of displaced people and other hungry poor who find themselves in vulnerable and food-insecure situations, but also on contributing to recovery efforts through food for work and resettlement. Where possible, food aid will complement other forms of assistance in promoting a more emergency/recovery-oriented approach through the re-establishment of livelihoods in secure areas, and will therefore require significant supplies of complementary non-food inputs by WFP and other agencies.
39. Food aid is an appropriate input into humanitarian assistance strategies for Angola because of the severe food shortage in the country. Many people are in immediate need of food resources and are at risk of malnutrition and even starvation. Even if more recovery-oriented strategies can be introduced, the food shortage is likely to continue until agricultural resettlement programmes can meet more of the population's food needs.

## Intervention Approaches

40. The strategy of this PRRO is that Angola will benefit from a change in the way food assistance is provided. WFP plans to replace large-scale free food distributions with a more targeted approach, which will encourage the development of self-reliance strategies. WFP's intervention will be threefold: a) emergency/recovery response through free distribution; b) safety nets; and c) rehabilitation schemes through food for work.
41. Given the poor 2000 harvest in the southern provinces, and the need to develop greater self-reliance programmes in conjunction with the Government and NGO partners, WFP will continue to support the large population displaced in 1998/99 with free distributions until the major harvest of 2001 (March-April). By then, it is expected that most of these IDPs will have established enough income-earning means, including agricultural production, seasonal employment activities and other coping mechanisms, to be self-sufficient.
42. **Emergency response via free food assistance** will be provided strictly for limited periods and targeted to newly displaced persons and returnees. *Newly displaced households* will be given free distributions for up to a maximum of two full agricultural seasons. Given the intermittent nature of the arrival of IDPs in secure areas, the great variation in numbers



that arrive in a given period (between 10 and 1,000 families at a time) and the fact that they are often dispersed within existing communities rather than concentrated in a single camp, it will not be possible to continuously assess the food security situation of each group after its arrival. Rather, all groups will receive a full ration until the end of the first agricultural season, after which the VAM Unit, in cooperation with the humanitarian community, will carry out an assessment to determine the level of assistance required during the second agricultural season. The assessment will incorporate the results of the household food economy survey among beneficiaries, the regular monitoring of food security indicators at the municipal and provincial level and the results of the annual FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Mission. The assessment will be discussed with the provincial management team and its partners, including MINARS and the NGOs, and will be used as the basis for adjustments to the level of support to beneficiaries. *Returnees* will receive family rations for a period of eight months to enable them to construct permanent shelters and prepare their land for planting. If necessary, a further 12 months on half rations (1,300 Kcal) will be provided to encourage them to expand the area of land under cultivation. This decision will be taken following an assessment by WFP's VAM Unit.

43. **Emergency/recovery via safety nets**, either targeted or self-targeting, will help to ensure that those who genuinely require assistance to meet their family's food needs will continue to receive that assistance. These safety nets will include:
  - communal kitchens for children under 5 at risk of malnutrition;
  - therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres for malnourished people; and
  - the provision of half rations for a period of three to four months to families of children attending therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres, to ensure that the children continue to receive adequate nutrition after their discharge from the centres. This initiative is currently under discussion with UNICEF and nutritional NGOs and will first be pilot-tested in a few provinces.
44. **Recovery/rehabilitation schemes via food for work** will be self-targeting, with the aim of reaching food-insecure families in areas at high risk of malnutrition. Potential beneficiaries can choose whether or not to take advantage of the assistance offered, rather than being externally preselected.
45. WFP will monitor the output of these approaches and adjust their implementation as required. For example, if the 2000/2001 agricultural season is a failure in some parts or in all of the country, this will affect the number of people in need of free food distributions. Similarly, if the food security situation improves, it may be possible to reduce the estimates for institutional feeding programmes. WFP will continue to use its VAM Unit and partnerships with other agencies to monitor changes in the situation and adjust its programmes accordingly. The joint vulnerability assessment system with other humanitarian actors will serve as a tool for planning, targeting and monitoring the progress/impact of the three main approaches. The thrice-yearly systematic VAM assessments will also provide crucial information to help monitor and direct programme interventions.

## Risk Assessment

46. There is increasing support for more recovery-oriented activities in the face of the prolonged crisis. The strategy of the PRRO is to move away from free distributions and encourage self-reliance through activities such as food for work. However, this strategy is based on a series of assumptions, some of which are unlikely to be fully realized in all provinces during the life of the PRRO. Key assumptions are: (i) that levels of security will



improve and security zones widen, allowing the return and resettlement of IDPs in their areas of origin and a reduction in the movement of IDPs to secure areas; (ii) that sufficient land will be distributed or accessible to IDPs so that they can cultivate a large proportion of their food requirements; (iii) that there will be a successful seeds/tools distribution campaign for the 2000/2001 season; (iv) that there will be sufficient, well-distributed rainfall, guaranteeing a good harvest in the 2001/2002 agricultural season; (v) that sufficient competent partners will be available to implement food for work and the other programmes foreseen in the strategy; and (vi) that adequate supplies of the complementary non-food items necessary for implementing the programmes will be available. The realization of some of these assumptions is beyond the scope of the donor and humanitarian communities, while others can be directly affected by these communities' actions. Clearly, the successful implementation of the new strategy will require flexibility on the part of WFP and its partners, and a high level of cooperation between the Government of Angola and the humanitarian community.

47. Current predictions regarding the civil conflict indicate that the situation will probably remain basically unchanged, with the possibility of slight improvements in some areas. However, population displacements are expected to continue, and some regions are likely to face acute emergency conditions. The implementation of resettlement programmes for returnees is dependent on secure access by the staff of the humanitarian agencies, but an expansion of these areas may be limited.
48. One of the fundamental conditions for success is the distribution of land in secure areas to IDPs for temporary and permanent resettlement. The successful implementation of this scheme has been variable in the past and must be both strengthened and soundly implemented in all provinces if this project is to succeed. The distribution of seeds and other inputs to those IDPs with access to land is a key complementary action. Early indications show that the level of coverage will vary.
49. WFP will be dependent on its partners for the implementation and management of food-for-work programmes and nutrition-based safety-net mechanisms. However, the present availability of competent partners in some provinces is insufficient to permit the full implementation of the strategy, and WFP will need to encourage an expansion of activities by appropriate partners to some provinces. The availability of non-food inputs will also be crucial to the implementation of these programmes and is duly budgeted. These inputs include kitchen/canteen equipment (bowls, spoons, cups, cooking pots, serving spoons); building materials (cement, zinc sheets, doors, windows, carpentry/masonry kits, measuring tape); and hand-tools (hoes, machetes, pickaxes, jerrycans, axes, nails, water drums, compactors).

## Objectives

50. The goal of the PRRO is primarily to save the lives of people at risk of starvation as a result of war and to promote their return and self-reliance. The PRRO's objectives are to:
- through emergency food distribution, improve the immediate household food security of the most vulnerable war-affected people (newly arrived IDPs), who have been cut off from any sources of food;
  - maintain and improve the nutritional status of groups identified as nutritionally at risk through safety nets, which include support to therapeutic/supplementary feeding centres, assistance to families of children attending the feeding centres and support of communal kitchens for children under 5; and



- support war-affected people through resettlement programmes and rehabilitation schemes via food for work.

## IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

### Key Programme Components

51. WFP assistance will be targeted through the following specific mechanisms:
- emergency response via free distributions (newly arrived IDPs and returnees);
  - emergency/recovery via safety nets (therapeutic/supplementary feeding centres, support to families of children in feeding centres and support of communal kitchens for children under 5 at risk of malnutrition); and
  - recovery/rehabilitation schemes via self-targeting food for work.

### Beneficiaries, Needs, Selection of Activities and Food Baskets

52. As of April 2001, it is projected that the average target caseload will be 1,040,040 beneficiaries (see breakdown in Annex V). The allocation of commodities per type of assistance will be the following: 45 percent for general free distributions, 27 percent for safety net programmes and 28 percent for food for work.
53. Through **emergency response via free distributions**, WFP will target newly arrived IDPs and returnees.
- Average caseload: 413,000 people
  - Tonnage: 104,779 tons
  - Individual daily ration for newly arrived IDPs (grams): 470 maize, 50 pulses, 30 oil, 50 corn-soya blend (CSB), 15 sugar, 5 salt
  - Individual ration for returnees (grams): 450 maize, 65 pulses, 27 oil, 20 sugar, 5 salt
54. Those who qualify *as newly arrived IDPs* will be those who have been displaced any time from October 2000, when the new registration system was put in place. It is assumed that newly arrived IDPs are totally dependent on food assistance and have no other means of coping, and that they will not be able to develop any other coping strategies, at least until the first major harvest. Therefore, they will first receive a full 2,100-kcal ration. It is proposed that this ration include CSB for the first four months on average, but that the ration be kept at 2,100 kcal until the first major harvest. After the first harvest, the VAM Unit will carry out a thorough assessment (see paragraph 42) to determine if these IDPs are still in need of food assistance; if not, they will be taken off the distribution list. If so, it will be determined if they are still in the need of a full 2,100 Kcal or if they should receive a lower-calorie ration. Newly arrived IDPs will receive assistance for a maximum of two agricultural seasons, after which the IDPs will be taken off the distribution list. By that time, it is expected that most of these displaced persons will have established means of coping, including agricultural activities and seasonal employment opportunities.
55. *Returnees* are those who will be permanently resettled in their areas of origin through an existing resettlement programme supported by the Government and the humanitarian community. They will also receive free distributions to enable them to construct permanent shelters and prepare their land for planting—but for a period of only eight months—the length of time estimated as necessary for their achieving a minimum degree of



self-reliance. At the end the eight months the VAM Unit will carry out an assessment of the returnees' vulnerability to food insecurity, and if required, they will receive a further 12 months on half rations.

56. Through **emergency/recovery via safety-net programmes**, WFP will support severely malnourished individuals in therapeutic feeding centres, moderately malnourished individuals in supplementary feeding centres, families of children attending feeding centres and children under 5 at risk of malnutrition.
- Average caseload: 328,325 people
  - Tonnage: 60,817 tons
  - Individual rations: one ration for therapeutic/supplementary feeding, one for families of children in feeding centres, and one for communal kitchens (refer to ration table below).
57. *Severely malnourished individuals in therapeutic feeding centres* will include severely malnourished children under 5 and children from 1 to 5 at high risk of malnutrition. When their situation is acute, severely malnourished children over 5 will also be assisted.
58. *Moderately malnourished individuals in supplementary feeding centres* will include moderately malnourished children under 5 and selected expectant and nursing mothers. When necessary, malnourished or at-risk children over 5 will also be assisted.
59. *Families of children attending feeding centres* will be supported with half rations for a period of three to four months to sustain the nutritional status of the family members and to ensure adequate nutritional intake by the children after their discharge from the centre.
60. *Children at risk of malnutrition* will be assisted through self-targeting *communal kitchens*. At this stage, because of a lack of technical capacity, it would be premature to launch a thorough outreach programme based on a referral system and strict nutritional criteria. During the course of the PRRO, communal kitchens will be used as a self-targeting mechanism. However, it is WFP's intention to progressively explore the feasibility of such a programme once the conditions are right.
61. Through **recovery/rehabilitation schemes via self-targeting food for work**, WFP will reach food-insecure families in areas at high risk of malnutrition. The Programme will also help communities create sustainable assets. Potential beneficiaries can choose whether or not to take advantage of the assistance offered, rather than being externally preselected. The cash value of the ration will be set slightly lower than the rate that prevails in the labour market so it does not attract people away from other, more sustainable, economic activities. The average minimum monthly wage is currently about US\$23, and the proposed ration is equivalent to approximately US\$20. WFP will work through NGO partners with the expertise and capacity to carry out food-for-work activities. Together with the NGOs in the Targeting Working Group, WFP has identified a set of work norms for each of the different activities to be carried out. These are:
- community reforestation;
  - construction/rehabilitation of access roads;
  - construction/cleaning/rehabilitation of irrigation canals;
  - excavation of wells;
  - construction of schools and health posts;
  - rehabilitation of village markets;
  - land-clearing for cultivation; and



- seed multiplication.
  - Average caseload: 298,750 people (59,750 direct beneficiaries, who will receive family rations, each based on an average family size of 5 people)
  - Tonnage: 63,186 tons
  - Monthly family ration (kg): 60 maize, 6 pulses, 3.75 oil, 0.75 salt

62. The food basket for each type of intervention is the following:

**TABLE 1: FOOD BASKET BY TYPE OF INTERVENTION  
(daily in grams except for food for work)\***

Commodity	General (full) New IDPs Returnees	General (half) Returnees Families (Therapeutic/ suppl.)	Food for work* IDPs Residents	Institutional feeding Communal kitchens	Suppl. (take-home) IDPs Residents	Therapeutic/ suppl. (on-the-spot) IDPs Residents
Cereals	400	250	60	320	100	-
Pulses	50	30	6	40	40	40
Oil	30	15	3.75	25	25	25
CSB	50	-	-	100	100	100
Sugar	15	-	-	10	10	10
Salt	5	5	0.75	5	5	5
Kcal/day	2 083	1 168	1 675	1 925	1 125	775

\* For food for work, the monthly family ration is in kg.

63. Where maize is not consumed as a staple commodity (in the northern provinces), WFP will look into the possibility of exchanging it for cassava, to stimulate local production where possible.
64. In line with WFP's Commitments to Women, continued attention will be given to ensuring that women are represented in all aspects of the operation, including participation in the management and food distribution teams. These teams assist the implementing partners in organizing food distribution (finalization of distribution lists, processing of food commodities and verification of ration cards). WFP's Commitments to Women will be incorporated into agreements with implementing partners.
65. The new strategy will enable a greater participation by beneficiaries in the design and implementation of interventions. This is particularly true for food-for-work activities: local community organizations, community leaders and key participants will discuss, during the design of activities, how they can better target food-insecure households and women and create assets that will be of lasting benefit to the communities. Regular meetings during implementation will ensure that activities can be adjusted to reflect changing needs and circumstances.

### **Institutional Arrangements, Selection of Partners and Coordination**

66. WFP will continue to work actively with a wide range of partners, including NGOs, United Nations agencies and government counterparts on cross-sectoral issues such as resettlement, education, de-mining, infrastructure, protection, agriculture and capacity-building. WFP will work very closely with United Nations agencies such as





UNICEF, with whom a Memorandum of Understanding has been signed and is being used on the ground.

67. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration is the principal government coordinating body and, together with the Humanitarian Coordinator, chairs the national Humanitarian Coordination Group (HCG). The HCG was set up in February 1995 to monitor the overall humanitarian programme in Angola, define policies and strategies for effective implementation and provide timely solutions to problems as they arise.
68. OCHA is the main coordinating body for humanitarian assistance. OCHA operates both at the Luanda and at provincial levels with a number of field advisers. Other ministries with which WFP works directly include Health, Planning, Agriculture and Education, usually in partnership with an NGO at the local level.
69. WFP will continue to play a leading role in the coordination, programming and logistics of humanitarian food assistance in Angola. It will actively participate in the HCG and its subcommittees at the central and provincial levels. The WFP country office will continue to chair the Food Aid Coordination Group in Angola, which includes NGOs, concerned United Nations agencies and donors. This group reviews programme implementation, logistics arrangements, nutritional information/surveys, food commodity availability and outlook (pipeline) and other related factors. WFP will continue to work closely with other United Nations agencies, particularly UNICEF, UNDP, FAO and OCHA.
70. Owing to the limited capacity of MINARS, WFP will continue to coordinate the logistics operations in Angola, and remain responsible for the landside transport, storage and handling (LTSH) of all WFP-supplied food.
71. As in the past, WFP will use NGOs as implementing partners, contributing to their costs through the LTSH funds. The Programme is already working with more than 120 national and international NGOs throughout Angola. WFP will continue to choose implementing partners on the basis of their operational efficiency and cost-effectiveness. In areas where no suitable partners are available, WFP will consider direct distribution, as is already the case in Saurimo and Negage. In addition to LTSH funds, WFP will also assist with capacity-building and provision of non-food inputs for partners, provided under other direct operational costs (ODOC).
72. In order to avoid multiple food pipelines for food for work and safety nets, WFP, in agreement with donors and NGOs, has decided that a single pipeline should be kept in the course of the PRRO. The selection of implementing partners is conducted with due regard to the NGOs' staffing, resources and ability to mobilize additional funding for start-up costs, monitoring and reporting. Particular attention will be paid in the Letters of Understanding with implementing partners to ensure the active participation of women in the management and distribution teams.
73. In order to maximize the impact of its food assistance, WFP will coordinate with other humanitarian partners for the provision of non-food inputs such as shelter, water/sanitation items, cooking kits, medicines, seeds/tools and therapeutic foods.

### **Capacity-building**

74. The country office works closely with MINARS at the national and provincial levels, and with other implementing international and national NGO partners, in ensuring a capacity-building process through counterpart training in the management of the operation, including needs assessment, registration and verification, reporting, and the handling and distribution of food aid.



75. Lack of technical capacity makes it premature to launch a thorough outreach communal kitchen programme based on a referral system and strict nutritional criteria. However, as indicated, it is WFP's intention to progressively explore the feasibility of such a programme once the conditions are right. This would imply capacity-building in terms both of management and of nutritional training.
76. In the estimated budget (ODOC), there is a cash provision for the following training/capacity-building activities:
- training in registration/verification procedures for implementing partners;
  - food management training for implementing partners, including storage and handling;
  - training in monitoring, evaluation and reporting procedures for implementing partners; and
  - as regards communal kitchens, training in the management of the kitchens, in food storage, and in the preparation of meals (with CSB).

### Input Requirements

77. The PRRO budget is given in Annex I. Direct operational costs amount to US\$140,444,243, for a total WFP cost of US\$167,671,644. Estimated Government costs are US\$39,500,000; these include fuel subsidy and landing/parking fees. Therefore, the total costs of the project (including WFP and Government) amount to US\$207,171,644.

### Food Commodity Requirements

78. It is estimated that a total of 228,782 tons of cereals, pulses, oil, corn-soya blend, sugar and salt will be required for the period April 2001 to June 2002, as indicated in Table 2.

**TABLE 2: FOOD REQUIREMENTS BY TYPE OF INTERVENTION  
(in metric tons)**

Commodity	1st category		2nd category		3rd category	Total
	New IDPs	Return.	Institutions	Suppl./ Therapeutic. (+families)	Food for work	
Maize	57 575	24 300	10 515	32 357	53 775	178 522
Pulses	8 043	3 510	1 314	3 883	5 378	22 128
Oil	3 665	1 458	821	2 138	3 361	11 443
CSB	1 758	-	3 286	5 034	-	10 078
Sugar	2 461	1 080	329	431	-	4 301
Salt	659	270	164	545	672	2 310
<b>Total</b>	<b>74 161</b>	<b>30 618</b>	<b>16 429</b>	<b>44 388</b>	<b>63 186</b>	<b>228 782</b>

### Logistics Arrangements

79. WFP will receive humanitarian cargo through the three main seaports in Angola: Luanda (39 percent of food deliveries), Lobito (48 percent) and Namibe (13 percent). The cargo allocations by port are consistent with the cost-minimization strategy. Based on experience in the first half of 2000, 76 percent of the maize is expected to arrive as bulk. Bagged cargo is expected to cover 24 percent of maize, 48 percent of CSB and 68 percent of pulses. Vegetable oil is expected to arrive 70 percent break bulk (loose cartons), with the rest in containers. Sufficient transport is available to receive and transport these quantities from



the vessels to the intermediate storage points. The discharge rates are the following: Namibe 600 tons/day bulk and 400 tons/day bag; Lobito 800 tons bulk and 600 tons bag; Luanda 800 tons bulk and 600 tons bag.

80. The primary warehouses located in Luanda, Lobito and Lubango are rented commercially, and their current respective capacities are 19,000 tons in Luanda, 24,000 tons in Lobito and 6,000 tons in Lubango. Storage space at the 12 WFP provincial sub-offices is either commercially rented or supplied by the Government. Temporary storage units are available to cover any increased needs for warehousing, especially when buffer stocks have to be positioned.
81. Because of the precarious security situation, it is expected that 56 percent of the food will have to be transported by air. Considering the poor condition of some of the runways, road movements using commercial convoys will be attempted to locations hitherto served by air, wherever security and road conditions allow. Huambo and Bie provinces are expected to receive 31 percent of all the food. It is expected that a proportion of the tonnage for these two provinces will be delivered by road from Lobito and Lubango. Efforts will also be made to access Uige and Zaire provinces by road.
82. The air operations will be conducted from two major staging areas at Luanda and Catumbela, with a possible opening of a third air operations base in Namibe. The food will be transported using a fleet of six Boeing 727s, each with a capacity of 17.2 tons per flight, and Hercules L-100 aircraft. For locations with runway restrictions, such as Ganda and Balombo, the Buffalo DHC-5 will be used.
83. On average, the food airlift capacity will remain at approximately 350 tons on a daily basis. A well developed coordination and support system at the warehouses and airports will be augmented to ensure that any limitations on cargo loading, discharge, aircraft refueling or aircraft turnaround are attended to with minimal delays.
84. The WFP sub-offices in the provinces are responsible for ensuring the prompt dispatch of food commodities from extended delivery points (EDPs) to distribution sites in close cooperation with WFP's implementing partners. MINARS has already been approached to provide additional trucking capacity for secondary transport operations at no expense to WFP. The greatest impediment to secondary transport in many isolated locations with a lack of road access is the shortage of fuel, which has to be airlifted into these locations. Because of this need to airlift humanitarian cargo to most destinations, the LTSH rate amounts to US\$322 per ton. This rate reflects the reduction achieved in internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) costs as of June 2000 under the ongoing PRRO 6159.00, down from the US\$355/ton initially approved by the Executive Board.

### **Monitoring, Ongoing Evaluation and Reporting**

85. The monitoring and (ongoing) evaluation (M&E) system is intended to measure: (i) the progress of operations against planned activities; and (ii) the impact of WFP food assistance and project activities on the lives of beneficiaries. As process monitoring is an essential prerequisite for effective impact monitoring, the country office will reinforce the present monitoring system through regular consolidation and analysis of existing quantitative data. The Office of Evaluation (OEDE) will carry out an internal evaluation towards the end of 2001, the results of which will be used in the design of subsequent WFP assistance.
86. The monitoring system will utilize specific reporting formats and checklists and ensure that all data required for reports are collected in a uniform and comparable manner. Information will be disaggregated by beneficiary groups and gender.



87. Wherever possible, beneficiary information collected through the combination of monthly and quarterly reporting formats prepared by implementing partners and sub-offices will be stored in a central database in the country office, and this information will be made available to the VAM Unit for the generation and updating of maps.
88. Given the increasing importance of the rehabilitation component in the overall programme, WFP will work closely with implementing partners to ensure an adequate level of monitoring and enhanced reporting, which will provide key information on rehabilitation activities and the creation of assets, and the impact of these activities on target communities.
89. WFP will work in close coordination with implementing partners and other United Nations agencies to measure the impact of humanitarian assistance. Selected indicators, including those on nutritional and health status, will be tracked against baseline information in order to gauge the effectiveness of WFP interventions. The intersectoral impact indicators (which are linked not only to food assistance) will include elements such as:
- global acute malnutrition rates;
  - morbidity rates;
  - trends in the number of moderately or severely malnourished children attending supplementary or therapeutic feeding centres; and
  - re-admission rates for children attending supplementary or therapeutic feeding centres.
90. In addition to the above monitoring and reporting procedures, the country office will collect additional qualitative information regarding its operations and their impact through periodic and flexible appraisals at the community level. Baseline data will be provided by the household food economy surveys to be carried out among the beneficiary populations (see paragraph 35), and the regular monitoring of a sample of these households will enable conclusions to be drawn with respect to the effects of the programme on the well-being of the beneficiary population as a whole.

### **Disincentives, Displacement and Dependency**

91. The ongoing conflict and the presence of landmines place considerable restrictions on the access to and use of agricultural land in many parts of the country. In certain areas, farmers have been forced to abandon their land because it has become increasingly unsafe to plant or harvest their crops. In those areas, WFP food assistance is having limited adverse effects on local markets. In order to ensure close monitoring of WFP's intervention in this regard, the Programme has created a tool for identifying in which area WFP food may cause local production and market displacement. With this tool, WFP is then able to adjust its intervention accordingly. The VAM Unit's regularly published "Vulnerability and Food Security Bulletin" provides updated information on the food security situation and the degree of food availability at the district level. As much as possible, WFP targets those families who have no purchasing power, so that WFP food has little effect on market prices.
92. Since 1998, WFP-Angola has pursued a policy of procuring, whenever possible, locally produced commodities. This policy is limited, however, by the very low local production resulting from insecurity and landmines. It has also been quite tedious to carry out tendering procedures in an adequate manner in the Angola context.



## Security Measures

93. As the war and guerrilla attacks continue, WFP's staff and assets remain in constant jeopardy from the direct effects of fighting and from possible breakdowns in law and order. WFP's food stocks remain particularly vulnerable to possible looting or misappropriations in the warehouses. WFP food is also a target for banditry when transported by road.
94. The country office participates in the United Nations Common System Security measures and has a full-time security officer responsible for coordinating WFP's security structure and ensuring adequate arrangements in all offices.
95. Security arrangements in the sub-offices and central warehouses are continually reviewed in order to effectively meet optimal standards. In the warehouses, lighting is being improved, electrical installations upgraded and several generators are in the process of being replaced. Where fences are too low, barbed wire and fencing material are being installed. Most of the warehouses in all provinces are protected by police.
96. WFP's provincial sub-offices in high-risk areas such as Luena, Kuito, Huambo and Malange have been equipped for the protection of WFP staff. Furthermore, WFP will continue to make significant investments in the maintenance of its communications structure, which includes ultra-high frequency (UHF) and high-frequency (HF) radio communications and radio-based e-mail.

## Contingency Mechanism

97. In April 2000, WFP-Angola put in place a strategic and contingency planning process, with the objective of strengthening the country office's emergency preparedness. Given the dynamic nature of the situation in the country, contingency planning is being used to allow WFP to respond swiftly to changing conditions and to reorient the interventions so that they meet the operation's strategic goals. In this ongoing process, potential contingencies and scenarios are being developed and appropriate WFP responses planned in detail. This mechanism will continue under PRRO 6159.01, with contingency planning oriented towards the realization of recovery activities when and where possible.

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## EXIT STRATEGY

98. The exit strategy is dependent on the evolution of the situation. Under the current circumstances WFP intends to decrease its relief operations gradually and progressively and increase support for emergency/recovery activities such as food for work and resettlement. The proposed PRRO therefore represents a transition from pure relief assistance to relief/recovery, and will promote the development of self-reliance strategies.



## ANNEX I

## PROJECT COST BREAKDOWN

	Quantity (tons)	Average cost per ton	Value (dollars)
<b>WFP COSTS</b>			
<b>A. Direct operational costs</b>			
Commodity <sup>1</sup>			
– Maize	178 522	123.36	22 022 474
– Pulses	22 128	229.60	5 080 589
– Oil	11 444	719.91	8 238 650
– Corn-soya blend	10 078	261.11	2 631 467
– Sugar	4 300	280	1 204 000
– Salt	2 311	60	138 660
<b>Total commodities</b>	<b>228 783</b>	<b>171.85</b>	<b>39 315 839</b>
External transport		106	24 250 998
ITSH		322	73 668 126
<b>Total LTSH</b>		<b>322</b>	<b>73 668 126</b>
<b>Other direct operational costs</b>			<b>3 209 126</b>
<b>B. Direct support costs (see Annex II for details)</b>			
<b>Subtotal direct costs</b>			<b>15 095 315</b>
<b>C. Indirect support costs (7.8 percent of total direct costs)</b>			
<b>Subtotal indirect support costs</b>			<b>12 132 086</b>
<b>TOTAL WFP COSTS</b>			<b>167 671 644</b>

<sup>1</sup> This is a notional food basket used for budgeting and approval purposes. The precise mix and actual quantities of commodities to be supplied to the project, as in all WFP-assisted projects, may vary over time depending on the availability of commodities to WFP and domestically within the recipient country.



## ANNEX II

<b>DIRECT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS (<i>dollars</i>)</b>
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<b>Staff</b>	
International	5 681 250
United Nations volunteers	52 500
International consultants and SSA	175 000
United Nations Common System costs	218 750
Local staff and temporaries	3 505 450
Overtime	103 125
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>9 736 075</b>
<b>Technical support services and training</b>	
Project monitoring and evaluation	75 000
Training (staff and counterpart)	93 750
Other (specify)	
Hazard pay	109 148
R & R	219 915
Premises—improvements	66 250
Newspapers and periodicals	5 000
Hospitality	5 000
Miscellaneous	41 250
Public information	18 750
Insurance costs (paid at HQs)	62 500
VAM	854 971
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1 551 534</b>
<b>Travel and DSA</b>	
International	45 000
Blanket travel	100 000
Mission status DSA	147 200
In-country travel	440 000
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>732 200</b>
<b>Office expenses</b>	
Rental of facility	536 625
Utilities	20 000
Communications	400 000
Office supplies	360 000
Equipment repair and maintenance	62 500
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1 379 125</b>
<b>Vehicle operations</b>	
Fuel and maintenance	437 500
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>437 500</b>
<b>Equipment</b>	
Vehicles	96 000
Communication equipment	200 000
Computer equipment	170 000
Furniture and equipment	14 131
Other (specify)	
Generators and photocopiers, etc.	50 000
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>530 131</b>
<b>Other</b>	
Advocacy	678 750
Other	
OEDE evaluation	50 000
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>728 750</b>
<b>TOTAL DIRECT SUPPORT COSTS</b>	<b>15 095 315</b>



## ANNEX III

PRRO BENEFICIARIES PER CATEGORY AND PROVINCE										
No.	Province	Newly displaced	Returnees	Therapeutic/Suppl. feeding		Companions	Communal Kitchens	Food for Work	Total	
		Full free distributions	Full ration	Wet ration	Dry ration	Individual rations for families*	Compan. **	Aged under 5		FFW
1	Bengo	5 000	5 000	700	-		825	3 750	10 000	25 275
2	Benguela	25 000	11 000	2 500	3 500	30 000	1 200	350	12 500	86 050
3	Bie	45 000	12 000	900	10 000	54 500	900	12 200	30 000	165 500
4	Cunene	1 000	2 000	100	1 200		100	2 900	12 500	19 800
5	Huambo	30 000	14 000	8 000	8 000	80 000	4 500	9 300	25 000	178 800
6	Huíla	20 000	20 000	150	4 500		150	6 300	30 000	81 100
7	Kwanza Norte	17 000	6 000	1 000	-		500	2 300	25 000	51 800
8	Kwanza Sul	12 000	6 000	100	200		100	1 370	23 750	43 520
9	Kuando-Kubango	15 000	4 000	130	320		130	4 850	10 000	34 430
10	Luanda	10 000	5 000	450	700		600	3 600	5 000	25 350
11	Lunda Sul	25 000	3 000	500	100		500	2 050	10 000	41 150
12	Malanje	20 000	20 000	3 500	2 000	27 500	900	11 600	25 000	110 500
13	Moxico	31 000	4 000	200	1 000		250	6 050	30 000	72 500
14	Namibe	2 000	-	50	850		50	2 400	10 000	15 350
15	Uíge	30 000	5 000	900	-		500	3 300	30 000	69 700
16	Zaire	5 000	3 000	300	-		250	700	10 000	19 250
<b>Total</b>		<b>293 000</b>	<b>120 000</b>	<b>19 480</b>	<b>32 370</b>	<b>192 000</b>	<b>11 455</b>	<b>73 020</b>	<b>298 750</b>	<b>1 040 075</b>

\*Rations for families of children in feeding centres will be pilot-tested before possible extension to other provinces during the course of the PRRO.

\*\*Companions are those who accompany children for wet feeding and tuberculosis patients.





## ANNEX IV

## WFP EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA


Project no.	Type	Duration	Beneficiaries (no.)	Tonnage (tons)	Total WFP cost (US\$)
4531.00	E	02.11.90 to 01.02.91	721 939	29 183	18 344 171
4913.00	E	01.04.92 to 01.01.93	250 000	17 845	9 495 779
4945.00	E	01.07.92 to 31.12.92	758 000	69 213	39 803 219
5298.00	E	01.07.93 to 30.06.94	1 963 000	103 177	62 629 319
5298.01	E	01.02.94 to 30.06.95	1 936 000	158 510	80 919 819
5298.02	E	01.07.95 to 29.02.96	1 345 000	46 203	27 148 926
5698.00	E	15.01.96 to 14.11.96	255 000	27 155	14 932 912
5698.01	E	01.05.97 to 30.09.97	315 000	20 060	13 399 496
5602.00	X	01.03.96 to 28.02.97	1 300 000	84 822	53 435 588
5602.01	X	01.03.97 to 29.02.98	662 000	96 033	71 347 653
5602.02	X	01.03.98 to 31.08.99	539 500	79 840	63 377 585
6138.00	E	01.09.99 to 31.12.99	798 000	51 138	37 736 020
6159.00	X	01.01.00 to 31.12.00	1 544 900	277 074	207 687 931
<b>Total</b>			<b>12 388 339</b>	<b>1 060 253</b>	<b>700 250 418</b>

E = Emergency  
X = PRO or PRRO



## ANNEX V

## Food Security Situation by Municipality as of August 2000



The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Food Programme (WFP) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its frontiers or boundaries



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## LIST OF ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CSB	Corn-soya Blend
GURN	Government of Unity and Reconciliation
HF	High Frequency
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
LTSH	Landside Transport, Storage and Handling
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MINARS	Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODOC	Other Direct Operational Costs
OEDE	Office of Evaluation
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping