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**Executive Board  
Second Regular Session**

**Rome, 15–17 May 2002**

# **EVALUATION REPORTS**

## **Agenda item 3**

***For consideration***

# **E**

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
21 March 2002

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

## **SUMMARY REPORT OF THE EVALUATION OF THE WFP ANGOLA PORTFOLIO**

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# Note to the Executive Board



**This document is submitted for consideration to the Executive Board.**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

Director, Office of Monitoring and Evaluation (OEDE):	Mr K. Tuinenburg	tel.: 066513-2252
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Chief Evaluation Officer, OEDE:	Mr J. Lefevre	tel.: 066513-2358
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# Executive Summary

At the time of the evaluation mission's visit in September 2001, the Angola portfolio covered four main operations:

Type	Title	Value US\$
PRRO 6159.01	Assistance to War-Affected People	167,671,644
SO 5857.02	Passenger Air Transport Service	6,333,916
SO 5970.02	Non-Food Item Transport by Air	3,672,746
QAP 6020.00	Food Assistance to the Community Infant Programme	5,372,270

There were two approved Special Operations (SOs) for which funding was being sought:

SO 5887.02	De-mining in Support of Resettlement	1,792,067
SO 10027.00	Integrated Voice and Data Communications	883,000

The original protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 6159.00, covering the period January to December 2000, was extended to March 2001. It was essentially an emergency operation: recovery activities were not part of the PRRO strategy, given the high level of insecurity and uncertainty. The current PRRO 6159.01 introduces a recovery concept in the PRRO strategy. WFP has managed to develop a recovery strategy, despite the fact that neither the Government nor the United Nations system has defined a recovery framework under which WFP could operate.

PRRO 6159.01 was able to meet its primary objective of saving the lives of people at risk of starvation by providing regular and continuous food aid to newly arrived and resettled internally displaced persons (IDPs) who would otherwise not have had access to food aid. Given security constraints and the logistical structure, the two special operations played a critical role in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to places of difficult access and were crucial in meeting the PRRO objectives and those of the humanitarian community.

The recovery strategy only partially addressed its goal of promoting return and self-reliance, because resettlement was possible only on a limited scale in some areas. The assumption that the civil war would abate was not borne out by subsequent events, which were characterized by increasing instability and insecurity.

Three challenges remain for the next phase of the PRRO:

➤ **To determine WFP's goals and articulate programme implementation guidelines accordingly.** Although increasing the importance of recovery activities should be emphasized wherever possible, the use of percentages as indicators of success should be discontinued.


➤ **To articulate a flexible and field-based recovery strategy** with identifying acronyms



such as food for assets (FFA), food for infrastructure (FFI), food for skills (FFS) and food for education (FFE) for all food-for-work (FFW) activities. The strategy should place greater emphasis on participatory approaches and community mobilization and should highlight self-reliance achieved as a result of recovery FFW activities.

- **To develop flexible approaches for each province** to allow for rapid increase of the recovery component when security and military conditions allow. There should be a return to focusing on life-saving activities should security conditions further deteriorate and impede resettlement programmes and recovery activities.

## Draft Decision



The Board notes the recommendations contained in this evaluation report (WFP/EB.2/2002/3/1) and notes also the management action taken so far, as indicated in the associated information paper (WFP/EB.2/2002/INF/6). The Board encourages further action on these recommendations, with considerations raised during the discussion taken into account.



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## EVALUATION SCOPE AND METHOD

1. The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the relevance, appropriateness, timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of WFP assistance in Angola. It sought to provide inputs and recommendations for the design of the next phase of the PRRO, to enhance understanding of the usefulness of the PRRO category and to provide accountability to the Executive Board.
2. An evaluation team of five<sup>1</sup> visited Angola from 20 September to 11 October 2001. It spent considerable field time interviewing beneficiaries—groups and individuals—to obtain first-hand feedback from food-aid recipients. The methods used included:
  - documentary evidence;
  - internal reporting;
  - nutritional and morbidity surveys by implementing partners;
  - synthetic studies;
  - observational data on activities and living conditions in Huila, Malanje, Bie and Benguela provinces; and
  - a questionnaire for donors and interviews with primary and secondary stakeholders.
3. The mission held extensive interviews with WFP staff, government counterpart officials, partner organizations and donors. At the end of the mission, two mini-workshops, including a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis, were held in Luanda with WFP staff and base managers to provide feedback on mission findings and to discuss resulting recommendations.

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## CONTEXT FOR WFP'S ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA

4. Since independence in 1975, Angola has alternated between periods of internal insecurity and warfare and periods of relative but uneasy peace. WFP has been providing food aid to the country for a long time, and in the past decade alone provided almost 1 million tons of food aid for a total assistance value of US\$700 million. Between 1993 and 1995, at the height of the war, WFP provided food aid for two million Angolans affected by the conflict. Assistance is currently taking place in a context different from that of ten years ago. After a three-year hiatus, during which the Government of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) set out to implement the 1996 Lusaka Peace Accord, fighting broke out again in 1998. This latest war has seen UNITA change its strategy to guerrilla activities. Security is always relative in Angola; the long list of security incidents and shrinking security perimeters highlight this situation. Renewed warfare has led to new and massive population displacements. The population has been significantly assisted by WFP, which will provide targeted food assistance for an estimated 1,040,000 newly arrived IDPs and returnees over 15 months from April 2001 to June 2002, involving an estimated 229,652 tons of food.

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<sup>1</sup> The mission was composed of an economist/team leader (consultant), a socio-economist (consultant), a WFP senior evaluation officer, an agronomist (consultant) and a logistician (local consultant).



5. Because of security concerns and United Nations security provisions, road access is very limited. Areas of access are essentially major cities, towns and district centres, around which the population has congregated, remaining within established security perimeters. Most travel and transport has to be by air.

## PRRO STRATEGY AND DESIGN

6. The PRRO strategy was articulated through:
  - general food distribution (GFD) to IDPs arriving after October 2000 and returnees;
  - safety-net supplementary and therapeutic feeding for malnourished individuals and families in feeding centres, and communal canteens for children under 5 at risk of malnutrition; and
  - self-targeting FFW in areas at high risk of malnutrition.
7. Unlike its predecessor, which was a relief operation without a well-developed strategy for recovery, PRRO 6159.01 is based on a twin-track recovery strategy consisting of safety nets and FFW activities. Forty percent of resources were allocated for GFD, 30 percent for safety nets and 30 percent for FFW. Assumptions were too optimistic, however, and FFW percentages achieved in terms of direct beneficiary caseload were only 6.4 percent as of September 2001. In the absence of a national recovery strategy, WFP's ability to establish one should be commended.
8. The mission found that implementing partners and WFP field staff were confusing the three categories, and that use of the nutritional safety net was questionable. The recovery strategy seemed to focus on FFW as an end in itself, rather than on the self-reliance it was intended to develop. The post-October 2000 IDP category provided a cut-off point, but it was based on chronological factors that were intended to reflect vulnerability, rather than on vulnerability or nutritional factors. The mission felt that this did not always reflect true vulnerability, because some of the older caseload IDPs were also in need of assistance.
9. The mission found projects submitted for recovery FFW that had clearly not been identified through participatory techniques; reforestation is an example. Guidelines for FFW are being prepared by the country office. Greater emphasis should be given to activities such as skill building that encourage female participation, instead of to labour-intensive activities such as road repair and land clearing. This could be applied, for example, in teaching women how to make and use improved cooking stoves that are 50 percent more fuel-efficient than open fires.
10. The intended shift towards recovery activities has not yet been matched by an increase in trained and experienced staff to prepare and implement the PRRO, as envisaged in Guidelines for Preparation of a PRRO. Recovery activities are more difficult and time-consuming than GFD and require more management and supervision per ton distributed.
11. The mission found that a general PRRO strategy for Angola is appropriate, but that the situations in each province call for slightly different approaches. Development of sub-strategies for provinces could improve cohesiveness and coordination.



### Recommendations

- ⇒ Categories used for WFP beneficiaries in the PRRO should be revised by choosing either emergency needs that substitute for unavailable commodities or food security based on vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) indicators.
- ⇒ The next PRRO should be designed using a logframe analysis and should include indicators by which to measure achievements.
- ⇒ The recovery strategy should focus on skills and asset development for IDP communities. Using identifications relating to achievements—FFA: assets, FFS: skills, FFI: infrastructure, and FFE: education—should improve monitoring and reporting.
- ⇒ Training in rapid rural appraisal (RRA) and participatory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques should be provided for WFP staff, implementing partners and government counterparts.
- ⇒ Province-specific strategies and implementation guidelines should be developed with the Government and implementing partners for improved integration and coordination of the humanitarian response.

12. The period covered by the PRRO is of special importance. The current PRRO has a duration of 15 months, three more months than allowed for an emergency operation (EMOP). The mission judged this to be too short: the lead-time for presenting the next phase is nine months, which means that after only nine months of implementation of the current phase the country office has to prepare the next phase. It is important for the time span of the PRRO to match the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and planned harmonization of activities and programmes of United Nations agencies. Donor funding cycles, although disparate, are important resource-planning criteria.

### Recommendation

- ⇒ The next PRRO should cover a 30-month timeframe, from 1 July 2002 to 31 December 2004.

## ACHIEVEMENTS AND RESULTS

13. PRRO 6159.01 was able to meet its primary objective of saving the lives of people at risk of starvation by providing regular and continuous food aid to newly arrived IDPs and resettled persons. This was carried out at the country level through a network of WFP field offices covering all provinces through a complex logistical apparatus for the delivery of food.
14. The PRRO is currently providing food assistance to almost 800,000 IDPs. This figure is below the estimated 1,040,000, mainly because of logistics and security constraints and caution with regard to the registration, re-registration and verification of beneficiaries.
15. The two special operations (SOs), Non-Food Item Transport by Air and Passenger Air Transport Service, were crucial for the success of the humanitarian response in Angola. The service is widely used by WFP staff and the humanitarian community.
16. Recovery activities have often been hampered by late arrival of seeds and tools, resulting in missed agricultural opportunities and extension of GFD. WFP is using a sensible approach: limiting the GFD period in light of additional VAM assessments that allow



decisions to be made as to whether additional assistance is needed because of bad harvests. The mission felt that the period for GFD could have been reduced in some instances.

### Recommendation

⇒ GFD should last until the first harvest, unless the period of arrival or resettlement is inadequate, in which case GFD should be extended to the second harvest. Continuation of GFD should be exceptional and the result of a rapid participatory needs assessment at the community level. Beneficiaries' incapacity to meet food needs should be covered under FFA/FFS schemes.

17. The Quick Action Project (QAP) has provided pre-school education opportunities for poor children, but more needs to be done by the Ministry of Education (MINARS) to ensure that children receive more than free food and supervision. Many early-learning centres (PICs) visited by the mission did not provide educational or health programmes as originally envisaged. The QAP could be incorporated into the PRRO under an FFE component.
18. The proposed de-mining SO responds to a real need in Angola: the presence of land mines is a major obstacle to expanding agricultural activities and resettlement. Several specialized non-governmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations agencies and donors are already involved in de-mining, however, so the mission sees no need to place de-mining in WFP's portfolio. WFP should nonetheless be involved in identifying mine-clearing priorities, especially for resettlement areas.
19. The Integrated Voice and Data Communications operation remains an important need for the donor community. Efforts to obtain funding for this SO should be increased.

## IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT

### Resourcing

20. By September 2001, six months into the 15-month operation, only US\$52 million, or 32 percent of PRRO 6159.01 requirements, had been committed. There are several outstanding donor contributions, however, so it is hoped that resourcing will be substantially higher before the end of the PRRO period. The previous PRRO was funded at almost 70 percent of requirements.
21. The PRRO category is not necessarily an effective funding window for Angola, where the feasibility of undertaking recovery activities is subject to a range of perceptions among donors. Some focus exclusively on emergency; others focus on development. The PRRO is therefore effective as a funding mechanism mainly for donors financing recovery as part of their budget. Not all the donors interviewed fully understood the advantages of a PRRO rather than an emergency operation. There was no consensus among donors as to a common relief-to-recovery strategy.
22. The SOs for transport services were well funded. The de-mining operation and the Integrated Voice and Data Communications operation, however, had not attracted donor funding at the time of the mission's visit.





### Recommendation

- ⇒ WFP should organize a workshop with donors and the Government to prepare the next PRRO, establish a clear understanding of PRRO funding capacity and flexibility and encourage donor consensus and commitment regarding future activities in Angola.

### Appropriateness of Food Rations

23. Interviewed beneficiaries considered food rations to be adequate, provided that they were fully distributed. There were a few complaints that some varieties of beans took a long time to cook, which used up more fuelwood. Maize is the main staple in Angola, and the monthly food basket provided by WFP is in general appropriate. Beneficiaries judged FFW rations to be appropriate for work compensation, though there are regional diet preferences, such as cassava in the north. Local purchases of cassava, some maize, fish, salt and sorghum are used to reflect these preferences. In general, the mission found that WFP was responsive to nutritional indicators and took action when needed.
24. There were pipeline breaks resulting in the need to cut back distributions. WFP staff dealt well with these challenges, even if this involved hard decisions regarding beneficiaries and rations. During an outbreak of pellagra<sup>2</sup> in 2000, WFP adapted the food basket for Kuito and provided corn-soya blend (CSB), sugar and dried fish for a few months. The office is now considering grinding and fortifying maize flour locally with the assistance of UNICEF. This would address the pellagra problem but at significant additional cost for the milling; it appears to be the most feasible short-term solution. Medium-term strategies should promote greater diversification of food crops such as groundnuts.

### Efficiency

25. Security is the critical factor governing humanitarian operations in Angola. Road transport is limited to 40 percent, and extensive air transportation has to be used for logistical operations, which accounts for their high cost.
26. The mission felt that inputs were adequately transformed into outputs, though further cost reductions should be possible, especially in logistics. For example, the B-727 aircraft is cheaper to operate and has a greater payload than the Hercules L-100 at its currently mandated altitude, but is less sturdy. Degradation of the Kuito airstrip has led to interruption of the B-727 flights and use of the more expensive Hercules L-100.
27. Sub-offices used different strategies to mitigate the effects of pipeline breaks and ensure minimum coverage. In Kuito, for example, a minimum provision of one ration per family was guaranteed by registering at least one vulnerable person per family, even if no family members met the criteria (children under 5, expectant and nursing mothers, disabled people and people over 55). This has probably led to an increase in the number of cardholders from single-member families and consequent blurring of the vulnerability category.
28. Because of the security situation in Angola, it is frequently impossible to deliver food aid by cost-effective surface transport. The main priority is to ensure timely and adequate delivery of food aid. The current logistics operation, however, does not always maximize the amount delivered for a given cost.<sup>3</sup> Internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH)

<sup>2</sup> A non-infectious disease caused by niacin deficiency.

<sup>3</sup> This is true particularly when air transport has to be used and when lack of airstrip maintenance, as at Kuito, requires the use of aircraft that are more expensive to operate.



contracts include a provision to fund implementing partners' project-related expenses beyond transport, shipping and handling, but there is no policy to determine the objective of this support, which leads to varying ITSH rates being applied.

### Recommendations

- ⇒ Develop an ITSH policy based on clear objectives and review existing ITSH contracts accordingly.
- ⇒ WFP and the humanitarian community should advocate that road rehabilitation and airstrip maintenance are guaranteed by the Government. Both are critical for humanitarian operations and for improving cost-efficiency.

### Security, Access and Protection

29. Since fighting started again at the end of 1998, localized violence has spread. Attacks and sudden flight occur in areas considered secure; roads are open but unsafe. Populations are less liable to be cut off from resources, but sudden displacements, loss of assets and violations of social, economic and cultural rights are more probable. In this situation, WFP's work has an important protection aspect.
30. Humanitarian operations are now limited to government-controlled areas—urban centres and district towns with limited security perimeters. The United Nations is able to be present in a very small percentage of the country, albeit in areas with high concentrations of population.
31. There are security implications for WFP staff, partners and beneficiaries. The minimum operating standards (MINOPs) were integrated into government policy by the 18 October 2000 decree, “Norms for the Resettlement of IDPs”; regulations for the decree’s application are being developed. Applied correctly, MINOPs can enhance protection of the rights of a displaced population, give continuity to WFP policy and increase ability to withstand pressures that threaten beneficiaries and staff.

### Recommendation

- ⇒ MINOPs should apply to temporary and permanent IDP resettlement. Adherence to these norms should be a requisite for WFP's involvement; staff should have a clear policy to refer to when aid has to be denied to prevent situations where this may have a negative effect on beneficiaries.

### Coverage, Assessment and Targeting

32. The mission found that WFP staff were well motivated and achieving good coverage of accessible areas. WFP is working to full capacity, however, and cannot increase its coverage unless additional resources are made available.
33. Two types of assessments were made:
  - **At the provincial level**, quarterly vulnerability assessments (VA) were made by the VAM unit. These reflect the multi-sectoral nature of vulnerability and provide information on population movements, crops, markets, nutrition, health, sanitation and coping strategies. The information is disseminated in a bulletin that is appreciated by partners, the Government and donors. VAM assessments are used to adjust food rations and numbers of beneficiaries; they are useful for planning and should be expanded. Provincial VA groups include interventions by partners that complement



WFP food aid. WFP determines the definition of beneficiaries, a coordination role that should be exploited further.<sup>4</sup>

- **At the community level**, some household assessments have been undertaken by partners. VAM does not have the resources for household or community assessments. Joint assessments by WFP staff, partners and the Government are not part of a defined framework, but a system could be developed. Food-aid monitors check community food aid, but there are no assessment guidelines. Also, WFP and implementing partner staff do not have adequate skills in PRA or RRA techniques.
34. Improved targeting was the central element of the PRRO strategy. The two beneficiary categories were:
- IDPs arriving after October 2000; and
  - resettled returnees.
35. The definition of vulnerability was based on IDPs' arriving after October 2000 rather than actual vulnerability or nutritional factors. Although this provided a cut-off point, the mission felt that it did not adequately target all vulnerable people. The mission did not accept that IDPs and returnees were more vulnerable than other people; its view was confirmed in discussions with implementing partners and interviews with beneficiaries. WFP would find it operationally more manageable to use a system of rapid assessment of VAM indicators rather than to differentiate between displaced persons and residents. The mission did not feel that displacement alone was a good indication of vulnerability, since most of the population had been displaced at least once. A rapid-assessment tool is required to determine levels of vulnerability.
36. Beneficiaries may move from camp to camp to be registered. Attempts at verification have had limited success. In June 2001, for example, the verification team in Kuito failed to map hut locations, and re-registered IDPs did not receive new ration cards. More can be done to improve verification.

### Recommendations

- ⇒ Targeting should be based on vulnerability to food insecurity as determined by VAM indicators.
- ⇒ For targeting at the community level, VAM should develop an assessment tool based on vulnerability indicators; this should use household economy and RRA techniques and analysis of nutritional/epidemiological data. RRA tools should be designed and applied by mobile teams working on programme monitoring. This requires a change in the allocation of human resources, with emphasis on training and re-tasking of food aid monitors.

<sup>4</sup> This is linked to an integrated approach using lead NGOs.



## Monitoring and Reporting

37. In the absence of a logframe, the current monitoring system functions in a vacuum: it focuses on inputs, outputs and food distribution. Planned training in gender-sensitive monitoring has not taken place, and most food aid monitors lack the skills for qualitative post-distribution monitoring. Nutrition surveys are undertaken by specialized NGOs such as *Médecins sans Frontières* (MSF) in some areas, but are not carried out systematically. Nutrition surveys have proved useful for adjusting food aid rations and identifying critical malnutrition.
38. WFP progress reports are largely quantitative; they provide little information on qualitative achievements. Reporting by implementing partners is weak, quantitatively and qualitatively. Some of the reports reviewed by the mission were inadequate and lacked quality control and follow-up action by WFP sub-office staff. This may be because of the number of implementing partners and because there are barely enough monitoring staff.
39. There is scope to use VAM expertise to develop more results-oriented monitoring systems. There is now a VAM monitor in most sub-offices, and VAM has developed a province-level system of monitoring assumptions that has proved a useful management tool.

### Recommendation

- ⇒ M&E systems must be based on a logframe planning process that identifies assumptions, criteria and performance indicators and allows for development of pro-active monitoring and evaluation. More systematic qualitative monitoring by food aid management is required, especially community-level post-distribution monitoring.

## Implementing Partners

40. WFP has undertaken projects with over 200 national and international NGOs. Such a range of implementing partners inevitably leads to results that vary according to skills and experience. There has been uneven performance in GFD, distribution and reporting. In some cases, entire community food allocations were handed over to traditional chiefs, in violation of WFP's direct distribution procedures.

### Recommendations

- ⇒ There should be a common approach to GFD guidelines and procedures by all WFP implementing partners.
- ⇒ WFP should use the lead-NGO concept to reduce the number of activities that it has to monitor.

41. The shift towards increased recovery activity requires levels of management expertise and technical skill that are different from those used for GFD. Very few implementing partners possess the community-mobilization and participatory skills essential to success, and this limits the number of FFW recovery activities undertaken. The late provision of non-food items is also a limiting factor.



### Recommendations

- ⇒ FFW training workshops should be held for MINARS staff and all WFP's recovery partners in the provinces.
- ⇒ In selecting implementing partners for recovery activities, criteria should be established for participatory skills and ability to complement activities with non-food items.

### Management

42. WFP focuses on getting food to districts for distribution rather than on long-term food-security objectives, and has not yet developed an operational capacity for recovery. Such a capacity is critical for the shift towards recovery, which requires greater technical skills, planning, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), supervision and training than regular GFD. High staff turnover reflects the emergency-driven nature of operations. International staff tend to stay less than two years, and there is no formal hand-over process. Only a fraction of Luanda-based programme officers are nationals. Current staff are very experienced in emergency operations, but a mix of people with emergency skills and people with development expertise would improve programming, in particular the transition to recovery. Opportunities for learning are left to informal contacts between sub-offices. Greater communication between sub-offices and head office regarding approaches and techniques could lead to significant improvements and make sub-office staff feel that they were part of a team when dealing with day-to-day implementation. A PRRO workshop held centrally and in the provinces in March 2000 was an excellent initiative.
43. Progress has been made regarding decentralization, following a February 2001 retreat. This should be reflected in clear mandates and terms of reference for sub-offices. Given the different situations in the provinces, the PRRO strategy should be locally adapted and a maximum of decision-making transferred to the sub-office level.

### Recommendation

- ⇒ The country office should seek to retain international staff for a longer period of time and for at least the duration of the next PRRO. It should recruit more qualified national staff to reduce high staff turnover and improve institutional memory.

## COORDINATION ISSUES

### Government

44. For the current PRRO, the Government has provided an unprecedented US\$3 million for the purchase of local food commodities in October 2001. Fuel subsidies and exemptions from parking/landing fees for air operations will save WFP a further US\$40 million. Greater government commitment to meeting the needs of its people is still necessary in view of the insufficient spending on social sectors.<sup>5</sup> The National Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance Plan (PNEAH) should be tied to the United Nations-led CAP to ensure smooth coordination and avoid duplication.

<sup>5</sup> IMF, February 2001.



45. MINARS has indicated substantial improvements in relations with WFP, which is reported to act more in terms of partnership, with joint missions and field visits undertaken as often as possible. MINARS does not always accept WFP's operation in terms of security and access; it would like to see more food aid in remote areas where the IDP population is resettled.

#### Recommendation

- ⇒ The Government should be encouraged to increase its participation in humanitarian assistance and its commitment to the social sector. This requires increases of funding and human resources within a capacity-building approach focusing on training in PRA, RRA and FFW techniques.

#### Inter-agency Coordination and Integration

46. Technical sub-groups have been created over the past two years; they meet regularly and operate efficiently. This move allows ministries, WFP, United Nations agencies and NGOs to discuss technical issues and adopt measures. Coordination mechanisms now exist at the central and provincial levels in the humanitarian community.
47. In terms of integration, WFP has been working on food-assistance programmes but has not developed its operations as part of an integrated approach to humanitarian assistance. There is room for substantially improved integration with donors and partners who undertake complementary activities. A United Nations Common Assistance and Strategy (UNCAS) is being planned to address this situation.

#### Recommendation

- ⇒ Integration partnerships should be developed with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Association of European Non-Governmental Organizations for Food and Emergency Aid (EURONAIID) and the European Parliament, using the lead NGO concept. Synergies with implementing partners should be sought to ensure that all needs are met.

### MEETING WFP'S COMMITMENTS TO WOMEN

48. Compliance with WFP's Commitments to Women is not yet complete; there is an urgent need to tackle gender concerns for all activities and at all levels of programming.
49. Implementing partners interviewed by the mission were unfamiliar with WFP's gender policy. Gender-disaggregated data collected at the field level is not verified or analysed and is not forwarded for input to the Luanda database. Food distribution is not targeted to women, although at food distributions observed by the mission the majority of beneficiaries waiting in line were women. WFP and its partners invest little in community mobilization and organization because of the emergency nature of the programme; gender imbalances, equity and the special needs of households headed by women are consequently not addressed. Statistics show that women provide considerable labour in FFW activities. More FFW activities should provide special opportunities for women, such as literacy, skills training and income-generating activities.



50. A planned training course for staff and partners on gender analysis and qualitative gender-sensitive monitoring has yet to take place, which to some extent explains the current situation.

#### Recommendation

- ⇒ The country office should ensure that gender concerns are reflected at all levels and in all types of programming, guidelines and Memoranda of Understanding with partners, and that all staff and partners understand the rationale for gender mainstreaming.

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### ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

51. The design of the PRRO document does not contain the required section on environmental impact as per PRRO guidelines and WFP's 1999 Environmental Review guidelines. Environmental concerns consequently do not play a major role in design and implementation, except for a limited number of reforestation activities. Given the widespread deforestation and the fact that charcoal and wood production are the main coping mechanisms of IDPs and the settled population, the future PRRO must take environmental impact and mitigation measures into account.

#### Recommendation

- ⇒ WFP must seek to minimize the negative environmental impact of continuing internal population displacements and incorporate environmental concerns and awareness-building in PRRO activities.



## ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CAP	Consolidated appeals process
CSB	Corn-soya blend
EMOP	Emergency operation
EURONAIID	European Union Association of Non-Governmental Organizations for Food and Emergency Aid
FFA	Food for assets
FFE	Food for education
FFI	Food for infrastructures
FFS	Food for skills
FFW	Food for work
GFD	General food distribution
IDP	Internally displaced person
ITSH	Internal transport, storage and handling
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MINARS	Ministry of Education
MINOP	Minimum operation standard
MSF	<i>Médecins sans Frontières</i>
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PIC	Early learning centre
PNEAH	National Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance Plan
PRA	Participatory rural appraisal
PRRO	Protracted relief and recovery operation
QAP	Quick Action Project
RRA	Rapid rural appraisal
SO	Special Operation
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
UNCAS	United Nations Common Assistance and Strategy
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
VAM	Vulnerability analysis and mapping

