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**Executive Board
Second Regular Session**

Rome, 7–11 November 2005

EVALUATION REPORTS

Agenda item 6

For consideration

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Distribution: GENERAL
WFP/EB.2/2005/6-A
26 September 2005
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SYNTHESIS REVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS JOINT LOGISTICS CENTRE (UNJLC)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations Joint Logistics Centre is a common humanitarian service hosted by WFP in Rome, where the Core Unit has a permanent base. The stakeholders are members and observers of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group; they meet quarterly to review progress and to provide operational and policy guidance. The Core Unit launches and manages field operations at the request of a United Nations country team or humanitarian coordinator. It then prepares terms of reference for the Working Group, whose approval can be obtained in 48 hours; at the same time, a special operation is prepared to support the new field operation. At Headquarters and in the field, WFP provides administrative, financial and human resources support services. Field operations report operationally to the humanitarian coordinator or resident coordinator and, through the chief of the Core Unit, to the Director, Transport and Procurement Division.

This synthesis review summarizes common issues arising from past reviews of individual United Nations Joint Logistics Centre deployments and the Core Unit. It makes recommendations for strengthening the role and performance of the centre and strengthening the engagement of others in it.

The Core Unit in Rome is pursuing the recommendations of previous reviews, the most important of which are included in its current concept paper and 2005 work plan.


The United Nations Joint Logistics Centre has developed an important role as a United Nations common service emergency-response mechanism. Its coordination work and operations have been appreciated by donors, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and non-governmental organizations, but to a lesser extent by WFP, its host agency. Consolidating a positive relationship with WFP is critical to future success, because the centre cannot function without WFP personnel and financial and administrative support. The centre must retain its independence, however, and avoid bias in favour of WFP.

As its operations have matured, appreciation of its operational and coordinating roles has become clear. The centre should continue to fill critical temporary gaps in logistics services, but only with the approval of the Field Steering Group and only as a temporary response until longer-term mechanisms are in place.

The fundamental lesson learned from experience to date is that very early deployment of experienced staff linked to an effective support mechanism is vital. The Core Unit needs to be strengthened with additional experienced logistics officers to establish a cadre of staff capable of leading field operations and able to deploy at short notice.



DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of the information and recommendations in “Synthesis Review of the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC)” (WFP/EB.2/2005/6-A).

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.



OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY

1. This review was undertaken as an inter-agency initiative with representatives from WFP, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
2. Comprehensive reviews of United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Liberia have been carried out by the Dutch consulting company Royal Haskoning. The Core Unit has been reviewed by an external consultant. WFP has conducted internal reviews of its finance, human resources, information and communications technology, and procurement relationship with UNJLC. The objective of these studies was to identify lessons and best practices for application in future deployments.¹
3. This review was carried out under inter-agency guidance by a consultant with previous experience of WFP and UNJLC; WFP oversaw the review through the Office of Evaluation (OEDE). A desk study of reports of earlier UNJLC reviews resulted in a list of common issues, which with interviews involving staff of United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provided an analysis of the current status of the UNJLC, identified issues that required further inter-agency discussion and made suggestions for the future direction of UNJLC. A draft synthesis report was circulated to the four commissioning agencies for comment in advance of an inter-agency workshop² in Rome on 21–22 April 2005 that considered it in detail and made proposals for refining it.
4. The review will be presented to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC/WG) in late 2005.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

5. UNJLC evolved from an initiative to share aircraft during the 1996 Eastern Zaire crisis so that UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF in Uganda could combine to airlift relief materials into Eastern Zaire and bring refugees out.
6. Since then, the UNJLC concept of combining and coordinating logistics has been used in the 1998 floods in Somalia, the 1999 Balkans and East Timor crises and the Mozambique floods in 2000. Inter-agency air cells in Bosnia and Rwanda were similar United Nations joint operations, but they were not termed UNJLCs. There were UNJLCs in the 2001–2003 Afghanistan emergency, in Iraq in 2003 and Liberia in 2003–2004. UNJLC played a minor role in Nepal and Haiti in 2004; it is currently operational in southern and northern Sudan and in the Indian Ocean tsunami response.
7. In March 2001, IASC tasked WFP to take the lead in developing the UNJLC concept further. In March 2002, IASC/WG recognized it as a United Nations humanitarian response mechanism hosted by WFP. In October 2002, the UNJLC Core Unit was established at WFP Headquarters.

¹ At the time of writing, a review of the UNJLC for the Indian Ocean tsunami response was being completed.

² Participants: the World Health Organization (WHO), WFP, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UNHCR, OCHA, CARE International, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), UNICEF and the International Office of Migration (IOM).



Current Status

8. The UNJLC is hosted by WFP but is operationally independent of it. UNJLC is recognized by IASC as a humanitarian common service.
9. The UNJLC mission statement is to complement and coordinate the logistics capabilities of cooperating humanitarian agencies in large-scale emergencies. UNJLC works under OCHA's coordination of emergency response and expects to be operating in the field within 48 hours of activation, which means initiation by the Core Unit of UNJLC activities at the request of the humanitarian coordinator; the first action is to seek IASC/WG approval.
10. WFP provides UNJLC with administrative, financial and human resources support services. UNJLC reports operationally to the humanitarian coordinator or resident coordinator and through the chief of the Core Unit to the Director, Transport and Procurement Division (ODT).
11. The stakeholders of UNJLC – members and observers of the IASC/WG³ – meet quarterly to review progress and provide operational and policy guidance. UNJLC reports to IASC/WG, which oversees it.
12. The Core Unit (i) launches and manages UNJLC operations, (ii) maintains contact with other agencies, (iii) contributes to appeals, (iv) relieves field operations of a significant part of the reporting burden, (v) links field operations to WFP support services, (vi) organizes training, (vii) manages information, (viii) takes the initiative in improving effectiveness and capacity and (ix) is a central point where partners can discuss and decide on logistics matters such as strategic air planning, standardization of trucking fleets, strategic warehousing and commodity-tracking systems.
13. A WFP staff member on its regular budget manages the Core Unit; staff members of UNICEF, UNHCR and IOM are currently on reimbursable loan, funded by UNJLC.

ACHIEVEMENTS

14. UNJLC has filled logistics gaps, providing a responsive and innovative lead in coordination and implementation; it is much appreciated by donors, the Red Cross movement and NGOs for its “can-do” approach.
15. UNJLC has coordinated logistics and provided complementary services in large-scale emergencies, including:
 - inter-agency logistics contingency planning exercises;
 - regular logistics coordination meetings in the field;
 - logistics training with all its partners;
 - expansion and dissemination of logistics information;
 - identification of logistics bottlenecks, followed by action to clear them;
 - strategic air planning;

³ WHO, WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, the UNFPA, FAO, UNDP, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), InterAction, the Standing Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), IOM, the Red Cross movement, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Bank, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on IDPs and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR). OCHA also participates in the quarterly meetings as a stakeholder.



- planning of air operations as required;
- coordination of commercial and military flights;
- coordination with military logistics at the operational level;
- allocation of slots at destination airfields;
- prioritization of air cargoes;
- facilitation of handling of air cargo at destinations;
- planning of routes from ports of entry;
- collective negotiation of logistics rates;
- assessments of transport infrastructure;
- organization of vehicle workshops;
- handling of strategic and operational fuel issues;
- non-food item (NFI) logistics; and
- road, water and rail initiatives

ISSUES FROM PREVIOUS UNJLC REVIEWS

16. The headings in this section identify common issues from earlier reviews of UNJLC; recommendations appear in boxes.

Operational Involvement

17. There has been considerable debate among UNJLC stakeholders as to whether UNJLC should take on operational tasks in addition to its coordination role. The UNJLC capability for flexible, innovative and rapid response to operational problems is apparent in its handling of customs bottlenecks and fuel issues: an example was UNJLC's negotiation in advance of immediate needs of prime space at an airport in Afghanistan that was eventually used for helicopter operations. In addition to its coordinating role in Darfur, UNJLC has a much appreciated operational role in managing the pipeline of NFIs, assisting in the purchase of light vehicles, helping the humanitarian information centre (HIC) to make logistics maps and collecting logistics data, including transport rates. The proposal to establish a fuel cell in the UNJLC, which has already made advance fuel studies in northern and southern Sudan, was a typically useful initiative.
18. UNJLC logistics support in Afghanistan during elections and the currency conversion operation exemplifies useful operational interventions that were clearly outside its usual role.
19. UNJLC is not a legal entity, so it cannot contract logistics services directly, which limits its operational role.



Recommendations

- UNJLC's primary task is logistics coordination and augmentation, as described in the terms of reference approved by IASC/WG for individual field operations. Field steering groups should be able to approve operational logistics services, providing UNJLC has the capacity.
- Every UNJLC field operation should have a field steering group made up of country team members or their delegates.

Logistics Preparedness, Intervention Timing and Authority

20. UNJLC has made preparedness plans for the possible return of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) to southern Sudan. In 2004, the UNJLC southern Sudan team completed an electronic database of airstrips, comprehensive logistics planning maps, an overview of the likely logistics situation when peace is re-established and a review of road and river transport corridors into southern Sudan, augmented by an assessment of the status of customs and immigration services.
21. UNJLC preparations and early activation in the Iraq emergency are an excellent example of logistics preparedness planning. More recently, UNJLC has helped to consolidate the emergency logistics preparedness plans of the United Nations country team (UNCT) in Nepal.
22. UNJLC has been involved in the preparatory phase of operations through logistics preparedness planning. A UNJLC could be established in a country ahead of operations, for example as part of a United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) mission, or it could operate from another country, as in the Sudan interventions.
23. The Core Unit activates UNJLC only at the request of a UNCT or humanitarian coordinator. It then prepares terms of reference for IASC/WG, whose approval can be obtained in 48 hours. At the same time, a special operation (SO) is prepared in WFP to fund the new UNJLC.

Recommendation

Logistics preparedness missions should be a regular part of the operations of the Core Unit. UNJLC should inform partners in advance of such missions, give them the opportunity to participate and invite them to provide information on in-country logistics. UNJLC should make logistics preparedness plans for potential trouble spots in coordination with the IASC sub-working group on preparedness and contingency planning.

Length of Operational Intervention

24. UNJLC makes clear to a UNCT at the outset that its operation is a temporary measure to cover a responsibility normally assumed by a partner. In Darfur, for example, UNJLC will hand over its NFI role as soon as a partner is in a position to take over; it has already handed over its operations at airfields to the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS)⁴.

⁴ UNHAS is a common service, managed by WFP.



Recommendation

UNJLC should only operate until an alternative is in place. It should assist its successor to take over and provide capacity-building to local government where appropriate; it may transfer staff to a partner to ensure continuity.

Location of the Field Office

25. The default location of the field UNJLC would ideally be the location of the other common services, normally humanitarian coordinator's office. In Sudan, the UNJLC started in the OCHA office but lack of space forced it to set up independently, which is an unsatisfactory situation.

Recommendation

A UNJLC should ideally be co-located with the other humanitarian common services. If this is not feasible, its location should be agreed between the Chief of the Core Unit, the WFP country director and the humanitarian coordinator or resident coordinator.

Logistics Costs

26. The ability of UNJLC to contain logistics costs is shown in its renegotiation of barge utilization and prices and trucking rates; it does not publish commercially sensitive information on costs. In Darfur, the UNJLC is monitoring fuel and trucking costs but is not yet able to obtain regular information from agencies. Monitoring costs of transport by air, road, rail and river and of warehousing helps to contain costs against competition and leads to sharing of assets. In southern Sudan, cost savings can be made through joint negotiation of fuel supplies.

Recommendation

The UNJLC should enable logistics cost savings and identify market trends; agencies must be encouraged to share information in these areas.

The Relationship with WFP

27. WFP has not matched the appreciation shown by donors, the Red Cross movement and NGOs: duplication of effort and non-observance of WFP's support service rules have been common criticisms. WFP field staff perceive UNJLC efforts as benefiting others and giving an implementation role to the humanitarian coordinator, thereby eroding its own influence on the logistics scene. In the Liberia operation, the UNJLC was fully funded, while WFP was struggling for a minimum of logistics staff. The result has been that UNJLC has sometimes failed to obtain appropriate support services from WFP, and there have been considerable misunderstandings.
28. UNJLC operational activities are sometimes seen by WFP staff as peripheral to the main logistics effort, or as placing a burden on WFP that is out of proportion to its advantages. Some WFP country directors see themselves as having to decide on priorities between providing limited support services for their own operations or for the independent UNJLC, which has its own resource.



29. UNJLC saw examples of weak WFP support in terms of slowness and confusion in hiring staff, paying salaries and obtaining United Nations identification and in procurement and approval of travel. Its financial regulations prevent WFP from delegating financial authority to UNJLC staff who are seconded or on loan from other agencies.
30. Many initiatives have been taken to strengthen UNJLC's relationship with WFP in administrative and operational terms. The Core Unit has established an administration, finance and human resources liaison officer as a link between field operations and WFP support services. UNJLC is making sure that WFP staff are aware of its operational advantages.
31. Operations that benefit WFP directly, such as the formation of the fuel cell, joint work on logistics capacity assessments and putting website expertise at the disposal of the fleet forum⁵ are having a positive effect. The Core Unit has produced a brief on the relationship it sees between UNJLC offices in the field and WFP field office support services. Core Unit staff members travel more frequently to the field to look into complaints.
32. At a meeting in April 2005 of WFP senior staff chaired by the Senior Deputy Executive Director to review the UNJLC/WFP relationship, WFP reaffirmed its commitment to hosting UNJLC.

Recommendation

UNJLC cannot function without human resources and financial and administrative support from WFP, so it must consolidate a positive relationship with WFP while retaining its impartiality and inter-agency character. The relationship should be clarified by WFP through further dissemination of information by means of an Operations Department (OD) directive or other communication.

Strategic Air Coordination and Working with UNHAS

33. UNJLC has done essential work with military and civilian authorities on air corridors, airfield security, slot allocation, planning, utilization of aircraft and prioritization of humanitarian cargoes; it has the potential to overlap the UNHAS air operator role. A recent agreement between UNHAS and UNJLC for Sudan defined the role of UNJLC and provided for eventual handover of responsibilities to UNHAS.

Recommendation

UNJLC should be involved in strategic coordination of air services where necessary. At the operational level, UNJLC should continue to coordinate and prioritize humanitarian air cargoes, working with UNHAS as appropriate. UNJLC and UNHAS should issue a paper detailing their roles in coordinating air services.

Working with the Military

34. During large-scale emergencies, UNJLC is the focal point for coordinating humanitarian logistics with military forces. When OCHA civil/military coordination (CMCoord) officers have been deployed where a military force is operating, there was a risk that the roles of the CMCoord officers and UNJLC could be confused.

⁵ A WFP initiative based in ODT that brings together information on the operations of trucking fleets.



35. UNJLC and other members of the OCHA Advisory Panel to Military and Civil Defence Units contributed to the draft “United Nations Humanitarian CMCoord Concept” paper, which was endorsed by IASC/WG in March 2005. This describes the CMCoord deployment system and the relationship between CMCoord officers and United Nations staff who deal with military authorities and gives examples of generic terms of reference.
36. United Nations CMCoord officers assigned to the humanitarian or regional coordinator are responsible for coordination at the policy level; UNJLC CMCoord officers⁶ will coordinate humanitarian efforts at the operational level. The use of military and civil defence assets will be governed by IASC/WG guidelines.
37. UNJLC has been involved in operational planning with military authorities and the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia and Sudan and has undertaken a planning mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi to assess inter-agency logistics coordination and the interface with DPKO.

Recommendation

The role of UNJLC in liaison and coordination of logistics with military units should be at the operational level in the framework of the CMCoord concept. Contacts with DPKO and other United Nations-mandated forces should identify common ground and provide a link between humanitarian and military logistics.

Working with Partners

38. UNJLC is working on a standard presentation of logistics services that it can offer to humanitarian coordinators and UNCTs.
39. The funding of UNJLC has not been transparent to its partners. A recent decision to present a summary of UNJLC’s financial position to stakeholder meetings should resolve this issue. UNJLC plans to analyse periodically the cost-effectiveness of its operations and report to the Steering Group.
40. UNJLC is cooperating with public and private logistics-coordination mechanisms, including DPKO and the European Union, to prepare in advance for field operations.
41. UNJLC has an understanding with IFRC and is developing stronger relationships with NGOs.
42. UNJLC has agreed with UNDAC that its staff will be on the UNDAC roster for deployment within 24 hours in the event of a disaster; UNJLC will be on the ground early and in a position to prepare for possible extended operations.
43. UNJLC took part in Exercise Triplex in 2004, which was organized by the International Humanitarian Partnership.⁷ In collaboration with OCHA, UNJLC is planning a simulated complex-emergency exercise in 2006 for all humanitarian common services.

⁶This title is under discussion.

⁷ The IHP is a grouping of Nordic donors and agencies and the UK’s Department of International Development, which has agreed to cooperate in international humanitarian operations since 1995. A continuous process to develop the operational concept has been established and joint operations have been conducted. The concept is tested annually by participation in, among other activities, the TRIPLEX exercise, which includes United Nations agencies and certain national military groups.



44. UNJLC is working with the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), OCHA and WFP to develop a logistics support system, a multi-commodity tracking system for coordination and for operations without an NFI tracking tool.
45. UNJLC is involved in an initiative to establish a network of strategically located stocks of emergency materials. A number of depots managed by United Nations agencies and IFRC are already in operation.

Recommendations

- The quarterly meetings of stakeholders and the Steering Group should continue. It is essential that senior representatives from humanitarian agencies on IASC/WG and DPKO attend.
- To clarify the relationship of UNJLC with its partners, a template agreement should be developed covering human resources, finance and administration. Existing technical agreements between WFP and other agencies should be updated with an addendum on UNJLC in this respect.

Deployment of Chiefs of Field Operations and Technical Support Staff

46. The basis of UNJLC's effectiveness is early arrival on the ground of experienced staff with personal transport, and communications and links to support services. UNJLC achieves this better than most organizations, but initial deployments could be improved. In an emergency, simultaneous calls for staff cause rosters to break down, which has an impact on all activities.

Recommendations

- The UNJLC Core Unit should be strengthened with two additional logistics officers capable of being chief of field operations, giving it five senior logistics officers from participating United Nations agencies in addition to its chief, all of whom would be rapidly deployable. The participating United Nations agencies will be encouraged to fund these positions.
- Before this arrangement is implemented, WFP should resolve the issue of signing authority for non-WFP United Nations staff.

47. Experience shows that there are many tasks to employ these senior logistics officers during non-emergency periods. Although based in Rome, they could be available during non-emergency periods to operate from regional offices, for example on emergency preparation and training, or to work on loan to other agencies on a cost-recovery basis.



Recommendation

Although the Logistics Service has an effective standby staffing arrangement with the Augmented Logistics and Intervention Team for Emergencies (ALITE), UNJLC should maintain its register of experienced potential staff from various sources. Arrangements should be made to make staff available at short notice and to familiarize them with UNJLC.

Financing the Core Unit and Field Operations

48. UNJLC field operations are funded as SOs,⁸ which are normally part of the Consolidated Appeals Process in the coordination and support services category.
49. UNJLC activities can be started rapidly with funds from the Immediate Response Account (IRA), the Direct Support Costs Advance Facility (DSCAF), the OCHA Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF)⁹ and the United States Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Rapid Response Account before funds become available from the SO mechanism.
50. The funding of the Core Unit has not been reliable, even though it is the base from which UNJLC operations are launched. The recent approval of the Special Account will allow donors to fund the Core Unit directly.

Recommendation

Donors should be encouraged to make regular annual contributions to the Special Account to place Core Unit finances on a sound and predictable footing.

Information

51. The UNJLC website and mapping are acknowledged as valuable tools in logistics coordination and operations, but the origin of the material used is not always clear. Attendance at coordination meetings regularly increases after the issue of a bulletin on the website.
52. UNJLC produced fortnightly bulletins in Iraq focusing on transport, immigration, aviation capacity, fuel and electrical power generation as an essential service for humanitarian activities. Resources useful to the humanitarian community, from background reports to downloadable Iraqi visa application forms, were posted on the UNJLC web site.
53. The *Logistics Operations Guide* is a comprehensive collection of emergency documentation and guidelines, including a *Field Operations Manual* for UNJLC staff. It is available on CD-ROM and the UNJLC website.
54. UNJLC is not as well known as it should be, which has sometimes been a disadvantage in gaining access to the appropriate decision-making level.

⁸ SOs are used to fund interventions to enhance transport and logistics infrastructures to permit timely delivery of food assistance, especially to meet emergency and protracted relief needs or to enhance coordination in the United Nations system and with partners through designated common services.

⁹ CERF is a cash-flow mechanism under the authority of the emergency relief coordinator that enables immediate response to emergencies.



Recommendations

- The UNJLC must acknowledge the origin of the material in its maps, website and documents.
- UNJLC should develop a communication strategy to inform humanitarian actors about its mission and capabilities. UNJLC should attend humanitarian coordinator and country director workshops to give training, in line with the IASC-endorsed recommendations on humanitarian common services.



RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE OF THE SYNTHESIS REVIEW OF THE UNJLC

Recommendations	Action	Management response and action taken
Operational involvement		
1. UNJLC's primary task is logistics coordination and augmentation as described in the terms of reference approved by IASC/WG for individual field operations. The field steering group can approve operational logistics services providing UNJLC has the capacity. Every UNJLC field operation should have a field steering group made up of UNCT members or their delegated staff.	UNJLC	In the Indian Ocean tsunami operation, the disaster-management team (DMT) acts as a steering group for the UNJLC. In southern Sudan, the United Nations management meeting deals with UNJLC issues.
Logistics preparedness, intervention timing and authority		
2. Logistics preparedness missions should be considered a regular part of the operations of the Core Unit. UNJLC should inform partners in advance of such missions, give them the opportunity to participate and invite them to provide information on logistics.	UNJLC	Logistics planning missions took place in 2003 in Nepal, in 2004 in Burundi and DRC and in 2005 in Central America. The DRC mission resulted in a request by the humanitarian coordinator for UNJLC activation. Agencies are informed of UNJLC activities through the quarterly meetings and newsletters.
3. UNJLC should make logistics preparedness plans for potential trouble spots in coordination with IASC/WG on preparedness and contingency planning.	UNJLC	This is under development for the second half of 2005 and first half of 2006.
The length of operational intervention		
4. UNJLC should only intervene until an alternative mechanism is in place. It should assist with the takeover and provide capacity-building for local government where appropriate. UNJLC may transfer staff to one of its partners to ensure continuity.	UNJLC	UNJLC deployments are characterized by early development of exit strategies. During the tsunami operation, UNJLC closed its offices in the Maldives in March 2005 and Sri Lanka in April 2005 when its expertise was no longer necessary. Before the closures, individual tasks were handed over to suitable bodies; GIS/mapping, for example, was taken over by the Survey Department of Sri Lanka and HIC. In Indonesia, management of air transport will be taken over by UNHAS and GIS activities by HIC; in Sudan, UNJLC is looking for an agency to take over NFI supply management.
The location of the field office		
5. The UNJLC should be co-located with the other humanitarian common services. If this is not possible its location should be agreed by the chief of the Core Unit, the country director and the humanitarian or resident coordinator.	UNJLC	During recent deployments in the Indian Ocean and the Sudan, co-location with HIC was not feasible and alternative office space had to be identified. In Banda Aceh in Indonesia, UNJLC is co-located with UNHAS. During the preparation phase of the Iraq emergency in Cyprus, UNJLC was co-located with HIC and HAS. After entering Iraq, similar arrangements were in place in Baghdad and Basra.
Logistics costs		
6. UNJLC should enable logistics cost savings and market trends to be identified. Agencies are encouraged to share information on this subject.	UNJLC	During deployments, UNJLC collects information on transport costs as an immediate priority. Data are kept confidential and used for analysis only. Normally, an indicative range of transport costs is published. Advice to agencies on logistics costs is a sensitive issue. Crucial information is not always shared or is restricted by confidentiality clauses.



RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE OF THE SYNTHESIS REVIEW OF THE UNJLC

Recommendations	Action	Management response and action taken
The relationship with WFP		
7. UNJLC cannot function without personnel and financial and administrative support from WFP; it must therefore consolidate a positive relationship with WFP while retaining its impartiality and inter-agency character. This relationship should be clarified by WFP through an OD directive or other communication.	UNJLC OD	OD has recently reiterated its commitment to UNJLC and will maintain its custodianship. UNJLC will encourage OD to provide a formal directive in this respect.
Strategic air coordination and working with UNHAS		
8. UNJLC should play a role in strategic air coordination where necessary. At the operational level, UNJLC should continue to coordinate and prioritize air cargoes, working with UNHAS as appropriate.	UNJLC	UNJLC continues to implement this in collaboration with UNHAS and other humanitarian air transport providers.
9. UNJLC and WFP should issue a paper detailing their roles in air coordination.	UNJLC ODT	UNJLC: On 25 April 2005, UNJLC provided a draft paper outlining its air coordination functions, describing possible air functions in emergencies and in contingency planning and setting out its relationship with UNHAS. ODT: WFP/UNHAS has agreed in principle on the terms of the UNJLC draft paper and circulated it to the UNHAS entities concerned. Final guidelines will be issued in early 2006 by WFP.
Working with the military		
10. The role of UNJLC in liaising and coordinating logistics with military units should be at the operational level and in the CMCoord framework concept. Contacts with DPKO and other United Nations-mandated forces should identify common ground and provide a link between humanitarian and military logistics.	UNJLC	UNJLC is involved in development of the OCHA CMCoord handbook. Regular meetings with the OCHA Military and Civil Defence Unit are taking place to identify roles. In Sudan and the tsunami operation, UNJLC discussed and coordinated logistics issues with military actors.
Working with its partners		
11. The quarterly meetings of stakeholders should be maintained. Senior representation from the IASC/WG agencies and DPKO is essential.	UNJLC	UNJLC has held quarterly inter-agency meetings since 2003. Participants are the UNJLC focal points from IASC/WG agencies. It is recommended that IASC-WG recognize these as quarterly meetings of the Core Unit Steering Group. Standing operations procedures on collaboration with UNDAC are being developed. In the response to the tsunami, UNJLC staff co-deployed with UNDAC teams before formal activation of UNJLC.
12. To clarify the relationship of UNJLC with its partners, a template agreement should be developed covering human resources, finance and administration. Existing technical agreements should be updated with an addendum on UNJLC in this respect.	UNJLC ODT	This is under development for the second half of 2005 and the first half of 2006. In the meantime, ad hoc agreements — particularly reimbursable-loan agreements (RLAs) — are established with partner agencies as required.



RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE OF THE SYNTHESIS REVIEW OF THE UNJLC

Recommendations	Action	Management response and action taken
Deployment of chiefs of field operations and technical support staff		
13. The UNJLC Core Unit should be strengthened by two logistics officers capable of being chiefs of field operations to give the Core Unit five senior logistics officers from participating United Nations agencies in addition to the chief of the Core Unit, all of whom would be rapidly deployable. The participating agencies will be encouraged to fund these positions.	UNJLC	Additional logistics officers are included in the Project proposal 2005/2006. Discussions with agencies on further secondment arrangements are ongoing.
14. Before the above arrangement is put in place, WFP should resolve the issue of signing authority for non-WFP staff.	UNJLC ADF ADH	ADF agrees that there is an issue to be resolved in regard to approval or certification authorities by non-WFP United Nations staff, as this is not provided for under the WFP Financial Guidelines. UNJLC and WFP have agreed to start discussions on this complex issue in the second half of 2005.
15. Although the Logistics Service has an effective standby staffing arrangement with ALITE, UNJLC should maintain its register of potential staff from various sources to broaden the pool of experienced staff and reflecting its inter-agency role. Arrangements should be made such that staff are rapidly available and familiarized with UNJLC.	UNJLC	A regularly updated database of potential staff is maintained. Once it has been customized, it will be shared with UNICEF, UNHCR and OCHA. Discussions with potential standby partners and the private sector are planned for the second half of 2005 and first half of 2006 in collaboration with OTL, ALITE and the Legal Unit.
Financing the Core Unit		
16. Donors should be encouraged to make regular annual contributions to the Special Account to place the finances of the Core Unit on a sound and predictable footing.	UNJLC	A project proposal for the UNJLC Core Unit has been finalized and is being shared with donors and agencies.
Information		
17. The UNJLC must acknowledge the origin of the material in its maps, website and documents.	UNJLC	UNJLC will provide information on agencies' assistance and inputs through its website and bulletins.
18. UNJLC should develop a communication strategy to inform humanitarian actors about its mission and capabilities. UNJLC is encouraged to attend humanitarian coordinator and country director workshops to give training, in line with the IASC-endorsed recommendations on humanitarian common services.	UNJLC	UNJLC participated in a global meeting of regional and humanitarian coordinators, but was not invited to make a presentation. UNJLC is frequently invited to WFP regional logistics meetings; other agencies are being encouraged to invite UNJLC to global and regional meetings.



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

ALITE	Augmented Logistics and Intervention Team for Emergencies
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CERF	Central Emergency Revolving Fund
CMCoord	civil/military coordination
DMT	disaster-management team
DPKO	Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSCAF	Direct Support Cost Advance Facility
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
HAS	Humanitarian Air Service
HIC	humanitarian information centre
IASC/WG	Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP	Internally displaced person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRA	Immediate Response Account
NFI	non-food item
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OD	Operations Department
OEDE	Office of Evaluation
OFDA	United States Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
RLA	Reimbursable-loan agreement
SO	special operation
UNCT	United Nations country team
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRD	United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
WHO	World Health Organization

