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**Executive Board
Annual Session**

Rome, 8–12 June 2009

ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGERIAL MATTERS

Agenda item 13

*For information**



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WFP SECURITY REPORT



* In accordance with the Executive Board's decisions on governance, approved at the Annual and Third Regular Sessions, 2000, items for information should not be discussed unless a Board member specifically requests it, well in advance of the meeting, and the Chair accepts the request on the grounds that it is a proper use of the Board's time.

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for information.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

Director, OMF* and WFP Security Focal Point:	Mr M. Lorentzen	tel.: 066513-2343
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
Security Analyst, OMF:	Ms N. Goltsova	tel.: 066513-3229
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Should you have any questions regarding matters of dispatch of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact Ms C. Panlilio, Administrative Assistant, Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645).

* Security Service Division



DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “WFP Security Report” (WFP/EB.A/2009/13-E).

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.



FOREWORD BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

There is probably no issue I take more seriously than the safety of our staff. WFP staff, along with all other humanitarian workers, face increasingly serious threats to their safety in many parts of the world. Insecurity continues to adversely affect WFP staff and operations in Somalia, the Sudan, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sri Lanka and other countries.

Tragically, for the second year in a row, WFP lost four staff members as a result of malicious acts. I know that the Executive Board joins the entire staff of WFP in mourning Silence Chirara in Southern Sudan, Abdulkadir Diad Madker and Abdinasir Adan Muse in Somalia and Daniel Bastien in Haiti. These men were killed serving the cause of the hungry poor. May they rest in peace.

I speak for the entire humanitarian community when I say that such acts, and all other violations of the safety of staff, are unacceptable and unpardonable. WFP, and the United Nations as a whole, puts the highest priority on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel. In December 2008, the United Nations General Assembly highlighted this priority with a resolution reiterating the responsibility of host governments to ensure the safety of United Nations and humanitarian workers in the field. The resolution also draws attention to the particular risks faced by locally recruited staff.

This report, however, demonstrates the stiff challenges we face in keeping our staff safe in today's harsh and ruthless environment. In 2008, we saw once again grim spikes in the statistics. The number of security incidents involving staff or assets rose 36 percent from 2007 to 2008 and the number of work-related security incidents rose by 25 percent. In addition to the 4 people who died last year, 17 were injured because of malicious acts (compared to 5 the year before) and 45 were detained by local authorities (compared to 26).

We know the root causes of these alarming numbers: increasing criminality in many countries, the spread of terrorist tactics, instability generated by the food and fuel price crisis and a growing resentment against the United Nations as a whole. Our challenge is to identify and implement the steps we can take to protect our people delivering life-saving food assistance on the front lines and in the deep field.


I would like to draw special attention to WFP's locally recruited staff, who faced increasing security threats in 2008 – 33 percent more than in 2007. We are only too aware of the vulnerability of our local staff in immensely risky environments, as well as of those who work for WFP's transport contractors and cooperating and standby partners – women and men who put their lives on the line just by going to work in the morning. Last year, the first for which we have complete figures, 13 transport contractor staff were killed in the Sudan, Somalia and the Philippines, and 5 were injured.

WFP is not without victories in its campaign to safeguard our staff. We are the only United Nations organization in the Sudan to have installed a satellite-based global positioning system (GPS) in our vehicles to track them around the clock – a move that has markedly lowered the loss rate of WFP assets. In Darfur, where most security incidents occur, WFP has developed new strategies with non-governmental organization (NGO) partners to operate despite insecurity, and in so doing we succeeded in December 2008 in delivering food to the entire planned beneficiary population for the first time.



As this report demonstrates, 2008 was a pivotal year for WFP field security. In the wake of the fatal bombing of the United Nations offices in Algiers, in which WFP staff member Gene Luna was killed, we built up counter-measures against terrorist acts and we upgraded the entire field security function. Without these steps, the number of security incidents would undoubtedly have been much higher.

And we will not stop here: WFP is committed to creating a culture of security, both among our own staff and in our collaboration with United Nations security entities. In my role as Chair of the High-Level Committee on Management, I am committed to doing all I can to ensure that the necessary funding and human resources are dedicated to the proposals put forward by the High-Level Steering Committee on Safety and Security. Never in the history of the United Nations System has such enormous political will coalesced around the issues of safety and security. Now is the time for all of us to act in concert to safeguard our staff from danger.



Josette Sheeran
Executive Director



BACKGROUND

1. The dangers and security risks faced by humanitarian and United Nations personnel in the field have been rising steadily in recent years, and they remain a source of major concern for the international community. In his report “Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel” (A/63/305) submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session, the Secretary-General noted that “the security of humanitarian and United Nations personnel continues to deteriorate”. He expressed grave concern at “the wide scale of threats, the rise in deliberate targeting of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, and their vulnerability worldwide”. The Secretary-General called for global collective responsibility and closer collaboration between the United Nations and host governments to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian and United Nations staff.
2. On 11 December 2008, the General Assembly adopted by consensus the resolution entitled “Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel” (A/RES/63/138), which was co-sponsored by more than 80 countries. In it, the General Assembly recalled that primary responsibility for the security and protection of the United Nations and associated personnel rests with host governments and urged all states to take measures to ensure the safety of humanitarian and United Nations staff and to ensure respect for the inviolability of United Nations premises.
3. Among other things, the resolution called on states to ensure that the perpetrators of attacks committed on their territory against humanitarian and United Nations personnel did not operate with impunity; it also highlighted the need to pay special attention to the safety and security of locally recruited staff and reiterated the importance of information about security incidents involving United Nations and humanitarian personnel.
4. This report supplements the Secretary-General’s report mentioned above, providing updates on the threats to the safety and security of WFP staff and assets and to the staff of partners and contractors supporting WFP operations. This report is based on significant incident reports (SIRs) for 2008 received by the Security Service Division (OMF); it is not an exhaustive record, but it is indicative of the threats and incidents experienced by WFP and partners in the line of duty.

SECURITY INCIDENTS INVOLVING WFP STAFF OR ASSETS, AND PARTNER STAFF

5. In 2008, WFP continued to face increasing insecurity and threats to staff safety in many countries, particularly in the Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The following factors continue to contribute to the growing challenges: i) expanded and sustained operations, particularly in conflict or post-conflict areas; ii) increasing criminality resulting from deteriorating public security and the limited capacity of local authorities in countries experiencing economic, political and social tensions; iii) the spread of terrorist tactics; iv) sharp increases in food and fuel prices leading to violent protests; v) rising expectations of, and local dissatisfaction with, United Nations operations or presence; and vi) the climate of impunity for violent acts against United Nations and humanitarian personnel.



6. In 2008, 657 security incidents involving staff or assets were reported, a 36 percent increase compared with 2007; this continues the trend of the past three years. (See Figure 1; all figures are contained in the Annex). Of these incidents, 473 were work-related, an increase of 25 percent over the year.
7. Four staff members were killed as a result of malicious acts: Silence Chirara, head of the sub-office in Lokichokio in Southern Sudan was killed in an ambush near the United Nations camp; administrative assistant Abdulkadir Diad Madker and senior programme assistant Abdinasir Adan Muse were killed in separate attacks by unidentified gunmen in Somalia; and administrative/finance assistant Daniel Bastien was murdered in Haiti. Two staff members died in road accidents. Seventeen staff members were injured as a result of malicious acts in work-related and other incidents. There was a rise in cases of harassment by national authorities – primarily law enforcement agencies – compared with 2007: 11 such incidents of work-related harassment were reported last year, mainly in Ethiopia.
8. There were 23 relocations and evacuations of WFP staff, of which 20 were initiated in response to deteriorating security conditions. There were 11 relocations in Somalia, 3 in the Sudan and 1 or 2 each in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Insecurity and resulting United Nations security phase upgrades prompted evacuations of some staff and dependants from the Sudan, Yemen and Pakistan.
9. In terms of geographic distribution, most security incidents involving WFP staff or assets occurred in Africa. The countries with the highest incident rates in 2008 were, in descending order, the Sudan, Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, the DRC, Burundi and Zimbabwe. There were 461 incidents in Africa, most of them in the Sudan (167), Liberia (71) and Somalia (56), confirming the trend observed over the previous year that WFP staff and assets are facing significant security challenges in these three countries.
10. In the Sudan, most security incidents occurred in Darfur, where insecurity continues to affect operations and the safety of WFP and other staff. During 2008, an average of 90,000 beneficiaries per month in Darfur were not reached because of insecurity. In October, 272,000 beneficiaries, most of them in North Darfur, were not reached after the non-governmental organization (NGO) German Agro Action suspended operations following attacks on its staff; this number is lower than in previous years, however. In December 2008, for the first time, all planned beneficiaries were reached. However this is not a sign of improved access: it is the result of improved capacity in WFP and partner NGOs to develop new strategies and reach people despite insecurity. In Darfur, carjackings, hold-ups and highway robbery continue to be the main threat to WFP staff or assets and non-WFP workers. It is worth indicating that risk mitigation measures implemented by WFP, particularly the installation of a special global positioning system (GPS) for tracking vehicles, helped to prevent significant loss of WFP assets, especially vehicles. Despite these measures, however, some programme activities could not be carried out because of the risk of exposure to banditry.
11. In the Sudan, a number of worrying security developments last year resulted in the upgrade of the United Nations security phase in several areas and a consequent reduction of staff numbers and activities. The security environment remains volatile, especially after the decision by the International Criminal Court to issue an arrest warrant for President Bashir. There remains a potential for heightened anti-United Nations sentiment and violence aimed at United Nations facilities; there is therefore a continued need for significant risk mitigation and the development of new strategies to ensure that programmes are implemented.



12. In most parts of Somalia, increased insecurity continued to disrupt WFP operations throughout the year. Somalia was identified as the most unsettled area as a result of internal fighting, the actions of extremist groups and piracy. There were multiple relocations of WFP staff because of insecurity following the killing of humanitarian workers, roadside and car bomb incidents, ambushes and clashes. Locally recruited staff continue to be commended for their dedication under extremely difficult conditions in which they risk intimidation, kidnapping and murder.
13. The second largest number of security incidents – 135 – was registered in Asia: there were 76 incidents in Afghanistan, 17 in Sri Lanka, 15 in Nepal and 13 in Pakistan.
14. In Afghanistan, the number of security incidents involving WFP staff and assets increased by 62 percent compared with 2007, reflecting a notable deterioration of the security situation. Insecurity – the main challenge faced by WFP – resulted in many project areas becoming inaccessible. Continuing attacks on WFP food convoys in southern, western and eastern regions and near the border with Pakistan resulted in the loss of 1,846 mt of food intended for 160,800 beneficiaries. About 50 percent of the country continues to be inaccessible because of insecurity.
15. In Sri Lanka, the number of security incidents rose in 2008. Intensified fighting in the north of the country had a significant impact on humanitarian access and the security of food convoys. The risks to staff, which were already many, have increased further.
16. Figures 2 and 3 show the percentages of significant security incidents involving WFP staff and assets worldwide in 2008; Figures 4 and 5 illustrate recent trends in the numbers of incidents by regional bureau and country. The regional bureau reporting the smallest number of security incidents in 2008 – 17 – was that of the Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe (OMC).
17. The 2008 data show that the highest number of security incidents involving WFP staff and assets – 357 – occurred in countries where United Nations security phase three is implemented. Phase three indicates a substantial deterioration in the security situation that may result in the relocation of staff or their dependants. The second highest number of security incidents – 143 – took place in countries at United Nations security phase four. These findings, presented in Figure 6, indicate the foremost challenge faced by the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS): to establish a balance between programme objectives and the need to provide for staff safety and security.
18. Criminality is the main threat to WFP staff and assets in many countries. The number of criminal acts in which WFP staff, their property or WFP assets were targeted increased again in 2008. WFP staff and assets were targets in 242 cases of theft, armed robbery and burglary (37 percent of all security incidents). Figure 7 shows the breakdown of property crimes affecting WFP staff or assets. WFP vehicles were stolen in 15 work-related carjacking incidents in 2008; 10 of these incidents occurred in the Sudan. Vehicles were recovered in 11 cases; the status of the others is unknown. A local staff member kidnapped in Haiti in a criminally motivated incident was fortunately rescued promptly and safely.
19. Locally recruited WFP staff members continued to face increasing security threats in 2008; they suffered the most injuries, abuse/harassment and detentions (see Figure 8). There was also a 42 percent increase in incidents in which international staff members were targeted. These findings support the observation that WFP staff operate in increasingly risky environments. The status of WFP staff members as representatives of the international community and of the United Nations contributes to the risk of being targeted by disaffected groups.



20. Of particular concern is an increase in security incidents targeting the staff of contractors and cooperating and standby partners engaged to support WFP operations, whose services are critical for WFP. WFP started to keep records of such incidents in mid-2007. The data received in 2008 show a worrying trend: 122 incidents involving contractors and 29 cases involving partners were reported. Transport contractors remain particularly vulnerable as they deliver food in immensely risky conditions. Sadly, seven drivers of trucks contracted by WFP were killed in the Sudan (five in Southern Sudan and two in Darfur); four drivers and an agent of contracted transport companies were killed in attacks in Somalia; and an assistant of a contracted truck driver was killed in the Philippines. Five contracted staff were injured in separate incidents. Two staff members of cooperating partners were killed while serving WFP, one in Somalia and one in the Sudan.
21. The largest number of attacks on trucks contracted by WFP was registered in the Sudan and Afghanistan (see Figure 11), continuing the trend over the past two years. Similar incidents occurred in Somalia, the DRC, the Philippines and Pakistan. In many of these incidents WFP trucks were diverted and food was looted.
22. Table 1 summarizes the security incidents in 2008, showing the number of staff killed, injured or detained as a result of malicious acts, and relocations or evacuations; data for 2005–2007 are given for comparison. Table 2 shows the number of contractors killed or injured as a result of malicious acts while providing services for WFP.

TABLE 1: STAFF KILLED OR INJURED IN MALICIOUS ACTS, OR DETAINED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES				
	2005	2006	2007	2008
Killed	0	0	4	4
Injured	9	2	5	17
Detained by local authorities	30	25	26	45
Percentage of designated staff evacuated or relocated	98	100	100	100

TABLE 2: CONTRACTORS KILLED OR INJURED IN MALICIOUS ACTS WHILE PROVIDING SERVICES FOR WFP	
	2008
Killed	13
Injured	5

23. As in previous years, road accidents account for most incidents categorized as “other”: 86 accidents were reported in 2008 (see Table 3). The Regional Bureau for Asia (OMB) and the Regional Bureau for West Africa (OMD) reported most of the road accidents, followed by the Regional Bureau for Southern, Eastern and Central Africa (OMJ). (See Figure 9).
24. Figure 10 illustrates the trends in security incidents for 2005–2008 by number and type. Most of the figures show 2008 SIR data in comparison with 2006–2007 and 2005 when the SIR analysis was first prepared. Table 3 lists all types of significant security incidents in 2008 involving WFP staff and assets.



TABLE 3: 2008 SIGNIFICANT SECURITY INCIDENTS INVOLVING WFP STAFF AND ASSETS: ALL TYPES

NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS	Total 2005	Total 2005 (%)	Total 2006	Total 2006 (%)	Total 2007	Total 2007 (%)	Total 2008	Total 2008 (%)	Increase/decrease 2007/2008 (%)	Total work-related 2005	Total 2005 work-related (%)	Total work-related 2006	Total work-related 2006 (%)	Total work-related 2007	Total work-related 2007 (%)	Total work-related 2008	Total work-related 2008 (%)	Increase/decrease 2007/2008 (%)
Detentions	30	7	25	7	26	5	45	7	73	17	5	18	7	12	3	20	4	67
Injuries	20	4	14	4	8	2	20	3	150	9	3	2	1	4	1	7	1	75
Deaths	16	4	13	4	17	4	11	2	-35	3	1	0	0	4	1	3	1	-25
Subtotal	66	16	52	14	51	11	76	12	49	29	9	20	8	20	5	30	6	50
Evacuation	4	1	1	0	2	0	4	1	100	4	1	1	0	2	1	4	1	100
Relocation	23	6	28	8	16	3	19	3	19	23	7	28	11	16	4	19	4	19
MEDEVACs	23	6	8	2	19	4	11	2	-42	23	7	8	3	19	5	11	2	-42
Subtotal	50	12	37	10	37	8	34	5	-8	50	16	37	15	37	10	34	7	-8
Road accidents	56	14	52	14	64	13	86	13	34	38	12	40	16	49	13	69	15	41
Thefts	85	21	91	25	89	18	104	16	17	63	20	64	25	80	21	75	16	-6
Robberies	34	8	21	6	80	17	121	18	51	22	7	2	1	68	18	94	20	38
Threats	25	6	12	3	22	5	29	4	32	20	6	9	4	18	5	18	4	0
Assaults	14	3	9	2	29	6	30	5	3	11	4	5	2	21	6	14	3	-33
Damages to WFP property	2	0	8	2	15	3	19	3	20	2	1	8	3	15	4	19	4	27
Harassment	2	0	5	1	8	2	17	3	113	2	1	3	1	4	1	11	2	175
Carjacking	14	3	4	1	5	1	17	3	240	13	4	4	2	5	1	15	3	200
Plane incidents	8	2	6	2	5	1	2	0	-60	8	3	6	2	5	1	2	0	-60
Food rebagging	10	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Burglary	9	2	13	4	10	2	17	3	70	5	2	6	2	4	1	5	1	25
Others	38	9	59	16	69	14	105	16	54	37	12	47	19	52	14	87	18	67
Subtotal	297	72	281	76	396	82	547	83	38	231	75	195	77	321	85	409	86	27
TOTAL	413		370		484		657		36	310		252		378		473		25



OVERVIEW OF WFP FIELD SECURITY ACTIVITIES

25. In 2008, WFP continued to work proactively to counter the disturbing trend of increased threats and insecurity. The threats of violence and crime are now compounded by international terrorism, epitomized by the devastating attack on the United Nations offices in Algiers on 11 December 2007 in which the WFP office in the United Nations Development Programme building was destroyed. WFP staff member Gene Luna was among the 17 United Nations staff killed in the attack. The United Nations has become a prime target of international terrorism and is exposed to elevated security risks; the change in the threat profile has resulted in increased vulnerability of its personnel and premises around the world. WFP has had to adapt its security structure, policy and practices to the changing nature and scale of threats.
26. WFP has therefore adopted the “Concept of Operations for Post-Algeria Global Security Review”, which outlines priorities in: identifying areas that warrant enhancement in response to threats and hazards; determining ways of mitigating threats; and advising on security improvements. Assessments of blast vulnerability were completed in 2008 for Afghanistan, Jordan (including the Iraq country office), the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen. A Premises Security Committee has been formed in Headquarters to guide decision-making on blast mitigation measures. Work has started on improving physical security: securing an adequate stand-off distance, reinforcing buildings and relocating offices to safer premises if improvements are not possible. The Security Emergency Fund made it possible to address the most pressing security measures immediately (see “Information Note on Funding of Security Management Arrangements” (WFP/EB.A/2009/13-D)).
27. WFP field security continued to develop its emergency response capacity. In 2008, field security officers (FSOs) were deployed to provide additional security assistance in Georgia, Myanmar, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. Three security advisers at Headquarters helped to ensure capability for immediate redeployment in an emergency. As of 31 December 2008, there were 7 professional security staff at WFP Headquarters and 42 FSOs supporting WFP operations in cooperation with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) staff.
28. There were some important changes in WFP’s field security function in 2008. The unit was upgraded to a division, in line with increased tasks and responsibilities. Its Director is also WFP Security Focal Point for the UNSMS. The post of security policy officer was created with a mandate to review WFP’s security management policy in the light of increased threats and security challenges. A second security analyst post was established to handle the growing number of tasks involving analysis of security-related information to support decision-making.
29. The FSOs continued to be instrumental in ensuring the delivery of food in hazardous environments. Without the risk-mitigation measures implemented by WFP field security and the FSO teams the number of security incidents probably would have been much higher. A highly dedicated security team in the Sudan continued to focus on assessing threats and risks to WFP operations, developing operational continuity plans with partners and integrating the work of the programme, logistics and security units. WFP is the only United Nations organization in the Sudan that has set up a satellite-based GPS that tracks vehicles around the clock.



30. The FSOs in Somalia helped to establish two new sub-offices in locations where there had been no full-time United Nations presence with international staff since the 1990s. Many of their tasks requested going beyond traditional security roles in communicating with the communities. FSOs were often the only WFP international staff present in particularly risky environments.
31. To mitigate the risks encountered by WFP food convoys moving through high-risk areas in Afghanistan, the WFP security team continuously coordinated with national authorities in relation to police escorts. FSOs liaised with international military forces on route clearances and the monitoring of convoy movements, rendering assistance when required. Good contacts were maintained with community leaders. In Sri Lanka, the role of the FSOs was crucial in negotiating access for WFP teams and ensuring that food convoys reached beneficiaries in the north.
32. The same high security standards were implemented in all other WFP operations; measures were enhanced in volatile security environments. FSOs were often called upon to address national staff problems with local authorities.
33. OMF continues to develop specialized training for FSOs, primarily through workshops to upgrade skills and improve security support for WFP operations. New specialized training has been delivered for country office security focal points, a particularly important function in countries with no FSO. In 2008, 75 staff were trained as security focal points; they are now part of the WFP security management system, supporting country offices and regional bureaux and liaising with OMF.
34. WFP field security has a systematic approach to the various aspects of security and staff safety. In addition to the blast vulnerability assessments in high-risk locations, WFP offices in other locations are also being assessed: 8 security assessments were conducted in 2008 and 31 assessment missions are planned for 2009. WFP has also started reviewing security at its warehouses in the light of rising food prices and the potential for increased insecurity.
35. WFP field security is committed to creating a culture of security in WFP, primarily by promoting personal safety awareness. The staff safety and security website, which is updated regularly, provides easy access to security information relevant to work, travel and training. Staff are encouraged to complete the “Advanced Security in the Field” interactive learning programme; this is mandatory for United Nations staff working in or travelling to a location designated as security phase one or above.
36. WFP is actively participating in the work aimed to develop a stronger, more dynamic and proactive security system in the United Nations. Efforts continue to strengthen the UNSMS by improving accountability, leadership and internal management. Priorities include addressing policy, operational and strategic weaknesses, improving the safety and security of locally recruited staff, improving the framework for accountability, enhancing cooperation with host governments and Member States, and restoring public trust in the United Nations at the global and local levels.
37. Significant progress has been made by the High-Level Steering Committee on Safety and Security and its Operational Working Group (OWG) on the Strengthening of the UNSMS. The OWG, which was chaired by a WFP expert, has addressed: i) improving the risk assessment and management process; ii) designing the new model for governance and accountability of the UNSMS, including the role of UNDSS; iii) redesigning the criteria and procedures for determining security phases; iv) suggesting alternative budgetary and programming mechanisms to include security-related resources in programme costs; and v) devising a plan to enhance the security of United Nations staff and premises, including



(as components) threat mitigation for the most vulnerable locations and guidelines on a future United Nations estate policy.

38. Particular attention is being given to compensation mechanisms and packages for staff and family members in the event of death or incapacity as a result of violence of a political or criminal nature. This is being addressed by the United Nations human resources network with support from the UNSMS; the work is being led by the Director of the Human Resources Division of WFP. A study of best practices in the international context will lead to recommendations for improvements to existing United Nations practices.
39. The OWG presented its proposals at the February 2009 session of the High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM), at which the approach outlined in the report and its recommendations were endorsed. The HLCM also recognized that this work would continue, especially with regard to addressing funding, outstanding human resources issues, and a pilot project on the proposed new security phase system. WFP is taking an active role in this process.



ANNEX





Figure 2: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2008, by Regional Bureau



OMB: Regional Bureau Bangkok (Asia)

OMC: Regional Bureau Cairo (Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe)

OMD: Regional Bureau Dakar (West Africa)

OMJ: Regional Bureau Johannesburg (Southern, Eastern and Central Africa)

OMP: Regional Bureau Panama City (Latin America and the Caribbean)

OMS: Regional Bureau the Sudan



Figure 3: Countries with Highest Rates of Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2008





Figure 4: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2005/2006/2007/2008, by Regional Bureau



* Acronym for the Regional Bureau for Eastern and Central Africa in 2005–2007







Figure 7: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2008:





Figure 8: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff in 2005/2006/2007/2008: National/International Staff Ratio








Figure 11: Countries with Highest Numbers of Contracted Trucks Attacked in 2008



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FSO	field security officer
GPS	global positioning system
HLCM	High-Level Committee on Management
NGO	non-governmental organization
OMB	Regional Bureau Bangkok
OMC	Regional Bureau Cairo
OMD	Regional Bureau Dakar
OMF	Security Service Division
OMJ	Regional Bureau Johannesburg
OMP	Regional Bureau Panama City
OMS	Regional Bureau the Sudan
SIR	significant incident report
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNSMS	United Nations Security Management System