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## **EVALUATION REPORTS**

**Agenda item 6**

*For consideration*



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## **SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO PRRO 103121**

**Assistance to Populations Affected by  
Conflicts and Poverty**

This document is printed in a limited number of copies. Executive Board documents are available on WFP's Website (<http://www.wfp.org/eb>).

## NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

**This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the late 1980s, the Republic of Congo was categorized as a lower middle-income country. However, conflict, destructive wars and weak governance during the 1990s reversed many of its gains and contributed to the continued impoverishment of its population. Recently, the Government has begun to clarify its priorities and plans through the World Bank/International Monetary Fund Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process.

Protracted relief and recovery operation 103121 lasted for 24 months from 1 June 2007 to 31 May 2009 at a total cost to WFP of US\$10.4 million. Its overall goals were improved food security and socio-economic recovery of people affected by armed conflict and poverty. Its objectives were:

- to improve the food security and enhance the resilience to shocks of vulnerable groups in conflict-affected areas;
- to support the improved nutrition and health status of children and reduce the transmission of HIV from mothers to children; and
- to increase children's, particularly girls', attendance in WFP-assisted schools.

The largest portion of resources – 90 percent – was earmarked for recovery, with only 10 percent for relief. The relief component is not analysed in this evaluation.

One obvious general finding in the output data concerning the numbers of actual versus planned beneficiaries is that the relief component met planned targets. The recovery component did not do so well, with the exception of the activities for people living with HIV. Pipeline breakages have plagued the operation since its inception.

On the basis of data from the country office quarterly activity reports, it appears that actual food-for-education beneficiaries as a percentage of planned figures averaged only 32 percent during the period under review. Weak reporting did not allow determination of whether the food-for-education component resulted in increased attendance.


The weak reporting and from interviews meant that it was difficult to assess results of the food-for-work component. Outputs were described at most, but little if any information was available on outcomes. Activities supported under the component were too dispersed geographically, and implementing partners had weak management capacity.

Anecdotal evidence showed that people living with HIV who are on anti-retroviral therapy and receiving WFP food support gained weight and adhered to treatment.

To ensure the smooth running of the whole operation it would be essential for the Government to establish coordination and cooperation mechanisms that are truly functional.



## DRAFT DECISION\*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report Republic of the Congo PRRO 103121” (WFP/EB.2/2009/6-G) and the management response in WFP/EB.2/2009/6-G/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

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\* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.



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## BACKGROUND

### Context

1. The Republic of the Congo, although endowed with natural resources, has been rocked by external and internal turmoil. Instability and weak governance have contributed to impoverishing its population. Life expectancy at birth fell from 52.1 years in 1970 to 49.2 years in 2000 and an estimated 48.2 years in 2005.<sup>1</sup> The 2005 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)<sup>2</sup> estimated the level of acute malnutrition to be 6.5 percent, up from 3.9 percent in 2000–2001, with levels of 8.1 percent in the southern departments.
2. Economic conditions are volatile and oil revenues have caused rivalries between competing groups rather than contributing to reviving what was once a middle-income country. Since 1970, per capita gross domestic product has decreased, as has the United Nations human development index; the Republic of the Congo ranks 140<sup>th</sup> of 177 in the most recent list. Poverty and malnutrition have increased, and access to education has decreased. HIV prevalence is estimated at 5.3 percent, with women in urban areas disproportionately affected; this is exacerbated by poverty and food insecurity. The true economic potential of the Republic of the Congo has yet to be developed; unemployment remains high and other social indicators are slow to improve. Recent events, however, suggest that expanding stability and durable peace are within reach. The need for emergency interventions is expected to decrease, and the need for WFP support for recovery to increase.
3. The Government has begun to clarify its priorities and plans through the World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF) Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process, approved in September 2007. This sets out national priorities that development partners have been quick to adopt, including in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Through its food-for-education (FFE), food-for-work (FFW) and HIV/AIDS components in protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 103121, WFP has been a leading agency in UNDAF interventions. In addition, WFP's interventions support the Republic of the Congo's sectoral policies, including the national HIV/AIDS strategy (2009–2013) and Education for All (2003-2015).

### Description of the Operation

4. The PRRO under review lasted for 24 months from 1 June 2007 to 31 May 2009, at a total cost to WFP of US\$10.4 million. Given security issues in the central region of the country, the area covered by the PRRO included Pool, Pointe Noire and Nkayi departments. The overall goal was improved food security and socio-economic recovery of affected people. Its objectives were:
  - improved food security and enhanced resilience to shocks for vulnerable groups in conflict-affected areas;

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<sup>1</sup> See [http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu/indicator\\_detail.cfm?Country=CG&IndicatorID=18#row](http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu/indicator_detail.cfm?Country=CG&IndicatorID=18#row).

<sup>2</sup> Ministère du Plan, de l'Aménagement du Territoire, de l'Intégration Économique et du NEPAD et Centre National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques. 2006. *Enquête Démographique et de Santé 2005*. Kinshasa.



- support to improved nutrition and health status of children and the reduced transmission of HIV from mothers to children;
  - increased attendance in WFP-assisted schools, particularly of girls.
5. These objectives are linked to WFP's Strategic Objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4. The largest portion of resources – 90 percent – was earmarked for recovery, and only 10 percent for relief. FFE was allocated 30 percent, HIV/AIDS activities 28 percent, and FFW 32 percent.
6. Table 1 gives the corrected expected number of beneficiaries.<sup>3</sup>

TABLE 1: BENEFICIARIES												
	June–December 2007			2008			January–June 2009			Total		
	Men/ boys	Women/ girls	Total	Men/ boys	Women/ girls	Total	Men/ boys	Women/ girls	Total	Men/ boys	Women/ girls	Total
<b>RELIEF</b>												
Vulnerable groups	1 500	1 500	<b>3 000</b>	1 500	1 500	<b>3 000</b>	1 500	1 500	<b>3 000</b>	1 500	1 500	<b>3 000</b>
Nutrition programme	400	1 300	<b>1 700</b>	400	1 300	<b>1 700</b>	400	1 300	<b>1 700</b>	1 200	3 900	<b>5 100</b>
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1 900</b>	<b>2 800</b>	<b>4 700</b>	<b>1 900</b>	<b>2 800</b>	<b>4 700</b>	<b>1 900</b>	<b>2 800</b>	<b>4 700</b>	<b>2 700</b>	<b>5 400</b>	<b>8 100</b>
<b>RECOVERY</b>												
FFW	7 500	17 500	<b>25 000</b>	14 550	33 950	<b>48 500</b>	3 000	6 800	<b>9 800</b>	25 000	58 300	<b>83 300</b>
People living with HIV	2 600	6 000	<b>8 600</b>	2 600	6 000	<b>8 600</b>	2 600	6 000	<b>8 600</b>	2 600	6 000	<b>8 600</b>
School feeding	16 500	16 500	<b>33 000</b>	31 150	31 150	<b>62 300</b>	31 150	31 150	<b>62 300</b>	31 150	31 150	<b>62 300</b>
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>26 600</b>	<b>40 000</b>	<b>66 600</b>	<b>48 300</b>	<b>71 100</b>	<b>119 400</b>	<b>36 750</b>	<b>43 950</b>	<b>80 700</b>	<b>58 750</b>	<b>95 450</b>	<b>154 200</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>28 500</b>	<b>42 800</b>	<b>71 300</b>	<b>50 200</b>	<b>73 900</b>	<b>124 100</b>	<b>38 650</b>	<b>46 750</b>	<b>85 400</b>	<b>61 450</b>	<b>100 850</b>	<b>162 300</b>

7. Given the small size of the relief component, it was not analysed in the evaluation. The operation had the following planned recovery components:
- FFE: a daily meal provided for children enrolled in primary schools, with priority for the most food-insecure regions;
  - HIV/AIDS: food provided for HIV-positive women from food-insecure families and enrolled and participating in the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) and anti-retroviral treatment (ART) programmes at health clinics;
  - FFW: vulnerable people supported with FFW to rehabilitate assets destroyed during the wars; assets and activities were to be selected on the basis of beneficiary priorities, with the local community playing a significant role in their identification, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; and
  - capacity development: WFP was to build capacities within the Government to enhance its ability to manage these operations; government staff were to participate in WFP training workshops and be provided with hands-on training through joint monitoring and evaluation (M&E) missions.

<sup>3</sup> The evaluation team found errors in the PRRO project document, apparently emerging between different versions of the project; for example, demobilized soldiers were to be included in a preliminary version, but the category had disappeared in the final version.



8. The only version of the logframe attached to the programme document was in summary form, and the evaluation team was never given a complete or updated version. There were only general indicators in the M&E system. Assumptions in the logframe were more precise than in the previous PRRO and attempts were made to reflect more closely the conditions in the field. The M&E matrix was produced during and immediately after the evaluation preparatory mission (13–20 September 2008); the evaluation team received it upon arrival in Brazzaville for the main mission (8–28 November 2008). This fact alone illustrates that the PRRO's M&E matrix did not play its intended role as a guide for the building of a reliable information system.

## Evaluation Features

9. The objectives of this evaluation were accountability – registering the work carried out and the results achieved – and learning, drawing lessons from experience. It was conducted by two international consultants – the team leader, a rural development specialist, and an FFE expert – and one national HIV/AIDS expert. The evaluation included review of documentation, meetings with Government, partners and WFP, and field visits to WFP-assisted primary schools, health centres and local communities. Focus group meetings with stakeholders were also held. The team applied WFP's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) based on the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards and on good practice of the international evaluation community: the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

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## PERFORMANCE HIGHLIGHTS

### Operation Design: Relevance and Appropriateness

10. All of the recovery components of the PRRO were in line with WFP's 2006–2009 Strategic Plan, the PRSP, the UNDAF and government policies in the relevant sectors. WFP's interventions under this PRRO were seen positively as supporting these initiatives.
11. Given the damage sustained by the Republic of the Congo's infrastructure during the conflict and the high rate of unemployment among the population, the evaluation mission found that using FFW to rehabilitate damaged infrastructure for food-insecure segments of the population was appropriate. In addition, given the drop in net enrolment from 81 percent in 1991 to 55 percent in 2006, FFE was an appropriate response to attempt to reverse this downward trend. The same applies to the HIV/AIDS component, with WFP's interventions seen as an important method to ensure treatment adherence and reduce transmission of HIV. The mission believes that the operation design was both relevant and appropriate given that, as originally planned, all components were to be implemented in the most food-insecure regions of the Republic of the Congo, as determined by the WFP 2006 emergency food security assessment (EFSA).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> World Food Programme. 2006. *Enquête sur la sécurité alimentaire en République du Congo*. Brazzaville, WFP.



## Outputs and Implementation Processes: Elements of Efficiency

12. Table 2 brings together all planned and actual beneficiaries for the recovery components of the PRRO.

<b>TABLE 2: PLANNED AND ACTUAL NUMBERS OF BENEFICIARIES, APRIL 2007–JUNE 2008</b>						
<b>Component</b>	<b>April– June 2007</b>	<b>July–Sept. 2007</b>	<b>Oct. –Dec. 2007</b>	<b>Jan. – March 2008</b>	<b>April– June 2008</b>	<b>Average for the period</b>
<b>RECOVERY</b>						
<b>Food for work<sup>5</sup></b>						
Planned	25 000	25 000	25 000	48 500	48 500	34 400
Actual	6 110	6 025	16 110	12 420	8 779	9 889
Actual/planned (%)	24	24	64	26	18	29
<b>People living with HIV</b>						
Planned	8 600	8 600	8 600	8 600	8 600	8 600
Actual	8 910	10 200	13 600	13 100	14 400	12 042
Actual/planned (%)	104	119	158	152	167	140
<b>School feeding</b>						
Planned	33 000	0	33 000	62 300	62 300	47 650
Actual	9 105	0	12 873	25 800	14 100	15 470
Actual/planned (%)	28	0	39	41	23	32

13. FFW activities were planned to take place in the Pool department, but a shift occurred in 2008 with many small projects being implemented in the Cuvette department. The FFW component averaged a ratio of 29 percent actual to planned, with a peak during the last quarter of 2007. Fluctuations closely followed the arrival of food in the second half of 2007, but expectations were not met in the first two quarters of 2008, when ratios were 26 percent and 18 percent. The higher levels of planned participants in FFW for 2008 may have swamped the absorption capacities of WFP partners.
14. WFP was to provide food for food-insecure HIV-positive women in the Pool, Lekoumou and Bouenza departments. Implementation covered Bouenza and Lekoumou but, contrary to plans, Pool was excluded and the departments of Brazzaville, Niari and Pointe-Noire included. Exclusion of the department of Pool was related to continuing insecurity. Regarding the expansion of activities in other departments, the country office gave priority to areas of high HIV prevalence.
15. The actual to planned ratios for commodities distributed through the different components appear in Table 3; these mirror the number of beneficiaries supported.

<sup>5</sup> FFW beneficiaries were to include women in charge of school feeding. All calculations take this into consideration, so numbers are the sum of FFW for rehabilitation, etc., and school feeding attendants.



**TABLE 3: PLANNED AND ACTUAL FOOD DISTRIBUTED,  
APRIL 2007–JUNE 2008 (mt)**

Component	April– June 2007	July– Sept. 2007	Oct. – Dec, 2007	2007	Jan. – March 2008	April– June 2008	2008 (half year)	Full period
<b>FOOD FOR WORK</b>								
<i>Number of days</i> <sup>6</sup>				68 40			45 120	
Planned				988			1 277	2 265
Actual	47	45	248	340	298	333	631	971
Actual/planned (%)				34			49	43
<b>People living with HIV</b>								
<i>Number of days</i>				270			180	
Planned				1 200			800	2 000
Actual	302	137	405	844	493	522	1 015	1 859
Actual/planned (%)				70			127	93
<b>School feeding</b> <sup>7</sup>								
<i>Number of days</i>				40			120	
Planned				752			1 419	2 171
Actual	32		23	55	102	85	187	242
Actual/planned (%)				7			13	11

16. As expected, apart from the people living with HIV (PLHIV) component, the recovery sector had low percentages of food distributed. With pipeline breaks and transport difficulties, the country office could not meet planned distributions, even when abolishing the nutritional relief programme for the first half of 2008. In some cases, only some items in the food basket were distributed.
17. During the period under review, WFP planned to distribute a total of 2,171 mt of food for the FFE component covering the needs for 120 schooldays in 2007, and 180 in 2008. According to the most recent data,<sup>8</sup> WFP delivered a total of 243 mt of food for the FFE component. This works out to 7 percent of planned tonnage in 2007 and 13 percent of the planned tonnage in 2008.
18. FFW activities were directly linked to the capacity of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which has been weak. This weakness was also noted in the 2005 evaluation report of PRRO 103100. NGO managers noted that even with improved management NGOs were “discouraged” by the lack of a flexible and reliable food pipeline. Reporting has improved only slightly, and remains focused on the output level rather than on outcomes.

<sup>6</sup> The second line of the FFW days shows days worked by school feeding attendants (40+120).

<sup>7</sup> A teachers’ strike reduced the numbers of school feeding days to 40 for 2007.

<sup>8</sup> Data for the first quarter of the 2008/09 school year were not available at the time of this evaluation.



19. For the HIV/AIDS component, the mission noted that NGOs providing health care who were WFP's distribution partners made the selection of beneficiaries and ensured food distribution. The country office had developed tools to manage the project and put in place an M&E system. The mission found that these materials have never been used because of a lack of financial resources for direct supervision activities.
20. Delivery of food to schools was organized and managed by WFP. Private transporters were contracted by WFP to transport food from Brazzaville to the selected schools. Normally, transport of food from Brazzaville to schools should not exceed two days. During field visits, the evaluation team noticed that it could take three to five days. Many schools visited had not received the planned food in time, and many school heads and School Feeding Management Committee representatives reported delivery of food without previous notice, or during the night.
21. The recurrent themes of transport difficulties and pipeline breaks demand that WFP give special attention to the logistics problems being faced in the Republic of the Congo. Distributions of incomplete rations to beneficiaries and, worse, failure to distribute at all, are having negative repercussions on operations. These problems have existed ever since WFP resumed its operations in the Republic of the Congo, and they remain a problem.
22. In the Letter of Understanding signed between the Government and WFP, a coordination committee was foreseen for the project and its M&E system. The mission noted that this decision-making body was never established. Furthermore, according to the project document, overall coordination of PRRO 103121 at the national level was to be through consultations with principal government partners, particularly the *Direction des programmes d'aide en nature* (Directorate of In-Kind Programmes). Findings from the mid-term evaluation of the previous PRRO are still valid: due to lack of competent staff, funding and motivation, support from and cooperation with the Directorate is still minimal, if not inexistent.
23. In accordance with the project document, the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education and Literacy has responsibility for implementation of the FFE component at the national, department, district and school levels. The evaluation team noted that no School Feeding Unit had been put in place by the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education and Literacy at the central level and that only one staff member from the Department of Primary Education had been assigned, part time, as focal point for WFP school feeding activities in the country.
24. Monitoring and timely data collection were challenges. The districts where WFP operates are often remote and difficult to reach because of impassable roads during the rainy season. Until 2003, four food aid monitors were appointed by WFP to monitor activities in the field. From 2003 to 2007 there was only one food aid monitor, and at the time of the evaluation there were none.
25. No baseline survey was carried out at the commencement of the FFE component within the framework of the current PRRO. Data collected on education indicators – students' enrolment and attendance – had not led to any in-depth analysis and/or impact assessment from either WFP or the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education and Literacy. No comparative study between samples of WFP-assisted and non-assisted schools had been conducted by the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education and Literacy or WFP.
26. The FFE component was to be implemented in collaboration with fellow United Nations agencies, particularly the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The evaluation team noticed that a Memorandum of Understanding had been signed in the past with both organizations – in



2001 and 2005 with UNICEF, and in 2004 with FAO – to enable joint activities. Nevertheless, these activities were very limited, with five schools rehabilitated by UNICEF and three school gardens created with support from FAO, and were not renewed. Cooperation with these organizations was very irregular and uncommon, and no joint work plans had been developed. Each agency was pursuing its own mandate without the necessary complementarities that could create maximum impact.

## Results

27. It was difficult to assess results of the FFW component given the weak reporting, even when interviews were conducted. Outputs were described, at best, but little if any information was available on outcomes. As there were no baseline surveys at the beginning of the PRRO, no before-and-after evaluative judgement could be established with an acceptable level of certainty. More aggressive monitoring by country office staff could have complemented the weak reporting of implementing partners. There were some success stories, such as extending gardens and planting cassava, but the degree of success had yet to be seen. In sum, FFW operations were too dispersed geographically and through multiple partners, and seem to have been driven by a demand-side approach rather than a coherent prioritized vision of what WFP's country office should be doing.
28. Regarding the HIV/AIDS component, the evaluation team noted that no study had been conducted to establish the comparative advantages for people assisted by WFP in relation to unassisted people. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence showed that people living with HIV who were on ART and receiving WFP food support gained weight and adhered to treatment. For PMTCT food assistance increased the uptake of the programme as reflected in the number of beneficiaries reached. For patients infected with tuberculosis (TB) and HIV, of the 350 patients receiving WFP food, it was noted that 275 were declared cured of TB, a cure rate of 79 percent compared to the World Health Organization target of 85 percent; there were five cases of abandonment, accounting for 1.4 percent, and 70 cases of treatment failure, or 20 percent. It should be noted that, according to a study by the medical officer of the Pointe-Noire TB Antenna, the drop-out rate from treatment for TB patients was 30 percent before the NGO took over nutrition.
29. The main objective of the FFE component was to increase attendance particularly of girls in WFP-assisted schools. Although the attendance rate is a crucial indicator to establish the effectiveness of the FFE intervention, no reliable data in this area were available because reports by school heads are inaccurate. The only indication the team found was that under the previous PRRO in 2006, the average attendance rates among the 50 schools where it had been possible to collect this indicator were 90 percent for all students and 91 percent for girls. In 2007, the average attendance rates in 70 schools were 95 percent for all students and 94 percent for girls. In addition, no study had been conducted to establish the comparative advantage of WFP-assisted schools against non-assisted schools.
30. Data from the quarterly activity reports and the standard project report prepared by WFP in 2007, as well as data analyses conducted by the evaluation team, generally indicated that in most schools where FFE was implemented there had been a general increase in school enrolment. It is, however, difficult to attribute this improvement to FFE alone because it is in line with the general trend throughout the country.
31. In many countries where WFP is implementing FFE programmes the best indicator of the influence of the feeding programme on enrolment, stable attendance and drop-out rates seems to be the relationship between attendance rates and the termination of feeding.



During the mission, the evaluation team visited several schools that had not received food since the beginning of the 2008/09 school year, two months previous to the mission. According to school heads, the absence of food had not had an influence on school enrolment and attendance. On the contrary, owing to recent implementation of the national Free Primary Education policy,<sup>9</sup> there was a huge increase in enrolment.

### Cross-Cutting Issues

32. Reports showed that between April and June 2007 data were not gender-disaggregated for any of the components, so it was difficult to establish a complete picture of actual to planned outcomes for the whole 2007 period of the programme.
33. After multiple inquiries, the evaluation team discovered that components distributing household rations – FFW and PLHIV – did not have reliable gender-disaggregated data on beneficiaries. In fact no gender-disaggregated data were collected on the families of beneficiaries: the gender of the direct beneficiary determined the gender composition of the household.<sup>10</sup> According to informants, WFP's country office team never requested that the information be collected. For the other recovery component, FFE, there was no bias in beneficiaries, as the gender ratios for 2007 and 2008 were close to 100 percent, with a 22 percent advantage for boys in the first quarter of 2008.

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## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Overall Assessment

34. There were major constraints to implementing the FFW component at the level envisaged in the PRRO design, not least of which was the lack of a robust food pipeline. Nevertheless, NGOs involved in the sector benefited from capacity-building offered by WFP's country office and the regional bureau. Their targeting and delivery mechanisms had improved, although reporting still presented them with a challenge. WFP's activities, when implemented, were well received, particularly in sectors of crucial importance for beneficiaries' assets and livelihood, such as FFW for the dissemination of improved cassava cuttings.
35. The WFP country office adopted an extensive approach for the FFW component, which produced few consolidated effects. By agreeing to spread projects in diverse sectors, the country office prevented a more intensive option, which may have been more likely to build outcomes. More constant monitoring could have helped isolate the areas in which WFP's food assistance had comparative advantages.
36. The HIV/AIDS component also suffered from irregular food distributions. Despite this major obstacle, it was acknowledged that food support had helped patients who were weakened by the disease. The nutrition support for patients on ART and with TB helped them balance their diets and assimilate their daily medication, reducing side effects. Regarding PMTCT, data indicate higher programme uptake despite significant constraints.

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<sup>9</sup> The President of the Republic announced the abolition of school fees on 31 December 2007 on the occasion of his address to the nation.

<sup>10</sup> For example, a woman beneficiary would appear in the quarter table as 1F X 5 = 5F, whatever the true gender composition of her household.



37. It is difficult to assess the extent to which the FFE component contributed to improving school enrolment, attendance and the retention of children at school in the intervention areas, mainly because of the introduction of the national Free Primary Education policy in late 2007. Further studies on this are warranted, to ensure that FFE can, and will, play a role in enrolment, attendance and retention.
38. The Government of the Republic of the Congo's commitment to school feeding is high. Nevertheless, some of the obligations specified in the PRRO project document as part of the Government's contribution to the PRRO had not been fulfilled. In particular, there were no regular consultations on project implementation issues with principal government partners.
39. In recognition of the insufficiency of providing food as stand-alone support, strong partnerships must be established to ensure that interventions create sustainable hand-over strategies. WFP partnerships with other United Nations agencies should be pursued, as envisaged in the PRRO design. This will facilitate provision of the Essential Package of food aid, water, health and sanitation infrastructure, and will promote capacity at the community level.

### Issues for the Future

40. Enhanced M&E and reporting capacities of implementing NGOs or associations should be central issues for any FFW actions. Moving away from exclusive output reporting to higher-level results analysis should be the goal of WFP's country office, regional bureau and partners. This can be achieved through training. The evaluation team considers that the approach of the country office, lack of coordination in the Ministry of Planning, and laxness in monitoring and reporting have meant that partners were not well supported.
41. During 2007, the Government developed a guide on nutrition care for PLHIV. Until those guidelines can be implemented, food assistance will be necessary to ensure that no harm comes to recipients during the transition period. In coming years, it will be necessary for the Government to systematize nutrition education in health centres and to organize nutritional assistance for PLHIV in each hospital as an integral part of ART support.
42. As a matter of urgency, WFP must take all necessary measures to ensure that the logistics obstacles faced in the Republic of the Congo are analysed and addressed.

### Recommendations

43. There is a general need to consolidate the types of activities supported by FFW and the implementing agencies mobilized to implement them. Management capacities must be monitored through follow-up both in the field and in reporting tools.
44. FFW activities should complement the other activities being supported to create synergies. For example, beneficiaries of HIV/AIDS activities could be supported through FFW in income-generating activities such as small trading or arts and crafts.
45. To ensure the smooth running of the whole PRRO it is essential that coordination and cooperation mechanisms are in place and truly functional. For better implementation of M&E, it is essential that a unit be created for this purpose so that implementation bottlenecks are quickly identified and addressed.
46. To maintain a high attendance rate in WFP-assisted schools, it is essential to overcome the logistics obstacles that hamper the regular and complete distribution of food up to the final distribution points.



47. Considering that school feeding has a positive effect on school enrolment and attendance, particularly for girls, and that efforts are still needed to support the Republic of the Congo in reaching Millennium Development Goals, the next WFP FFE intervention should maintain the present level of assistance to basic education through school feeding at pre-primary and primary levels. Studies should be conducted to ensure that FFE can continue to play a useful role in the education sector.



## ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
ART	anti-retroviral therapy
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
EFSA	emergency food security assessment
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFE	food for education
FFW	food for work
IMF	International Monetary Fund
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
NGO	non-governmental organization
PLHIV	people living with HIV
PMTCT	prevention of mother-to-child transmission
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
TB	tuberculosis
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund