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SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT MALAWI COUNTRY PORTFOLIO



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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal point indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Malawi saw between 2000 and 2008 phases of extreme crisis and instability and of recovery accompanied by gains in food security, economic stabilization and strengthening of governance. Over this period, Malawi evolved from being a volatile programme environment to a country in recovery. WFP has assisted Malawi since the 1960s; in the 8 years since 2000 it implemented 12 operations worth US\$556 million with the aims to save lives, protect and rebuild livelihoods, reduce malnutrition and improve educational outcomes.

This report evaluates the portfolio against three questions: i) How well did WFP position itself strategically and align with government and partner strategies? ii) How did WFP make choices and how strategic were these? and iii) How did the portfolio perform, and what were its results?

The evaluation was conducted by a team of five consultants, with field work taking place in December 2008. The evaluation found that WFP's operations were closely aligned with government priorities and contributed to food security by strengthening policy frameworks and institutional capacities and by delivering assistance to those in need. WFP demonstrated its comparative advantage in emergency situations but faced difficulties with the transition from emergency to recovery periods. Articulating and implementing a changing role was further affected by the lack of unanimous approval WFP received from stakeholders for its changing role. Food assistance was efficiently and effectively delivered, and produced positive outcomes with its nutrition and education programmes. Food for work/assets was scaled back due to other priorities. The evaluation recommended the country office consider carefully its role in the recovery phase of Malawi.

DRAFT DECISION*

The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report Malawi Country Portfolio” (WFP/EB.2/2009/6-E) and the management response in WFP/EB.2/2009/6-E/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.



BACKGROUND

Context

1. Malawi saw between 2000 and 2008 phases of extreme crisis and instability and of recovery accompanied by gains in food security, economic stabilization and strengthening of governance including Malawi's aid architecture. This period was characterized by emergencies on two occasions – in 2001/02 and 2005/06 – triggered by a combination of external shocks and political/technical factors and static poverty and human development indicators, showing modest or no gains over this period. At the same time, the country saw improvements in food security (availability) as a result of agriculture input subsidies and strengthening of the overall policy framework and management. Institutional capacities and macro-economic performance improved, with the Government taking greater ownership and increasingly playing a stronger role in aid coordination. And, as emergency situations declined, food aid became a politically more sensitive issue.
2. Over this period, Malawi evolved from being a volatile programme environment characterized by recurring emergencies to a country in recovery. Improvements allowed the Government to shift its focus from emergency response towards social protection, social development and disaster preparedness in its most recent Poverty Reduction Strategy. Long-term food security moved to the centre of the Government's political agenda after 2005 as the most visible public policy issue. However, many of the structural causes of food insecurity remain, including the degradation of natural resources, demographic trends, lack of economic diversification, and it may be aggravated by changes in the frequency and severity of natural disasters, such as floods and droughts.

WFP Portfolio

3. Between 2000 and 2008, WFP implemented 12 operations in Malawi with a total of over 950,000 mt of food with a value of US\$556 million. During this period the Programme saw a massive scale-up of its operations in response to the droughts in 2005/06. The main objectives of the operations were: i) saving lives in emergencies, which reflects WFP responses to the number of emergency situations in Malawi over the last years; ii) protecting livelihoods by preventing the need for negative coping strategies in the face of emergencies; iii) (re)building livelihoods through support for community infrastructure, soil and water conservation, and community assets; iv) reducing severe and moderate malnutrition of vulnerable groups, in particular children, pregnant and lactating women, and people infected or affected by HIV and AIDS; and v) improving educational achievements by ensuring higher and equitable enrolment and attendance rates, lower drop-out rates and better potential for learning. The portfolio included operations of all of the four programme categories of WFP. The main programme activities were food for work/assets (FFW/A), nutrition and school feeding, which took place under the various programme categories. At the time of the evaluation, nine of the operations were completed and three were ongoing. The evaluation did not cover the operations assisting refugees.

Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation

4. The purpose of this country portfolio evaluation was to generate evidence and analyses in support of decision-making about strategically positioning WFP in Malawi. The objectives of the evaluation were to provide *accountability* (assessing and reporting on the



performance and results of WFP's portfolio in the context of its mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges that the country faces) and support *learning* (generating evidence-based analysis and insights to inform the preparation of a country strategy, its implementation, and the way in which the portfolio and its operations are planned and managed). The evaluation covered WFP's portfolio for the period 2000–2008, including two operations responding to major droughts (2001/02 and 2005/06), which were partly managed out of the regional bureau, and the associated scale-up and subsequent change in WFP's role.

5. The evaluation addresses three main questions: i) How well did WFP position itself strategically and align with government and partner strategies?; ii) How did WFP make choices and how strategic were these? and iii) How did the portfolio perform and what were the results?
6. The evaluation was conducted by a team of five independent evaluators, with field work taking place in December 2008.

PERFORMANCE HIGHLIGHTS

Alignment and Strategic Positioning

7. **WFP programmes were closely aligned with the Government, contributing to food security by strengthening policy frameworks, institutional capacity and government efforts.** WFP worked within the Government's policy framework and priorities and used government systems. All three programme activities (FFW/A, nutrition, and school feeding) were well aligned, and emergency and logistics activities were well integrated into government and partner responses. In particular, WFP:
 - was fully integrated into government coordinating mechanisms for managing the emergency response during the 2001/02 and 2005/06 crisis periods;
 - avoided running parallel systems and programmes that would duplicate or weaken government efforts. While such parallel structures came about, the decision to establish a parallel food distribution system rested outside WFP.
 - was fully integrated into early warning, assessment and disaster preparedness systems. WFP made a valued contribution to the development and operation of these systems, which were particularly important in 2001/02 when systems were weak and the overall situation unstable.
 - contributed to policy and capacity development for nutrition and school feeding and used government systems for programme delivery in these two areas;
 - used government systems, local markets and transport suppliers for the purchase and delivery of 49 percent of commodities procured between 2000 and 2008; and
 - used its position to support broader coordination efforts, led by the Government or within the United Nations system and non-governmental organization (NGO) community.
8. **Alignment with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) was good.** The most recent UNDAF was developed in the same spirit as the Delivering as One pilot countries and shows a close collaboration between organizations in its development. WFP participated actively in the process and its mandate and operational priorities are reflected in the UNDAF. However, the evaluation has concerns about these



commitments being implemented on the ground. Experience in Malawi has shown good cooperation and alignment between the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and WFP during emergencies and with other United Nations organizations in the area of HIV and AIDS, but is not guaranteed in other areas.

9. **WFP played a strategic role in the emergency responses of 2001/02 and 2005/06.** WFP's capacity to scale up its country presence and response capacity during the emergencies underpinned the Programme's recognized strength and strategic role in emergencies. This strategic position led to tangible and positive outcomes in the delivery of services that were in line with government priorities, and strengthened the Government's policy framework and systems. WFP is recognized by the Government and its partners for the central role it played.
10. **Changing circumstances demand adaptation and a changing role.** After the emergencies were over and Malawi moved into recovery mode, WFP's role did not enjoy unanimous approval from all parties it worked with during the evaluation period covered, especially during periods of transition and recovery. The Government and partners alike felt that WFP's comparative advantage was in emergency response and that it was time for the Programme to scale back. At the same time, WFP's programmes remained well aligned with government priorities after the emergencies, as is shown in the delivery of food inputs into the Government's humanitarian, social protection and development priorities. However, as the size of the portfolio was scaled back and associated resources for programme delivery were reduced, the country office increasingly faced difficulties in responding to the changing government requests. Priorities shifted to assistance for policy development, technical assistance and capacity development in support of the Government's move towards social protection. WFP was not in a position to maintain leadership, or carve out a clear role in this context, even less so as dwindling resources weakened the country office's capacity for strategic positioning of the Programme or for innovative programming.

Making Strategic Choices

11. **Three external factors shaped WFP's strategic decisions** during the evaluation period: i) the evolution of the situation in Malawi, which required WFP to respond to crisis and then transition from emergency to recovery; ii) the growing capacity of the Government (policy framework, resources and institutional capacity) to address food security and coordinate assistance, which required WFP to gradually move from implementing programmes to capacity development and handing over; and iii) donor perception of WFP's role and performance in the emergency and recovery phases, with a clear bias towards seeing WFP as an emergency response agency.
12. **Robust analyses and subsequent choices during emergency periods.** WFP has a clear corporate mandate for emergency operations supported by robust planning, analytical and technical assessment capacity on food security and emergency issues, in Malawi and globally. In Malawi, during the crises the Programme had the capacity to conduct crop assessments with FAO and vulnerability assessments with the Government, and to support disaster preparedness with many others. WFP made a substantive contribution to the overall situation analysis used by partners, played an important role developing and coordinating the international response, and used the results of these analyses in its own emergency responses. WFP played a lead role in this respect and supported the humanitarian community at large.



13. **The analysis underlying programme activities was less robust, with unevenness between and within operations.** For the programme activities (FFW/A, nutrition and school feeding) the link between analytical underpinnings, strategic choices and programme design was not as clearly defined. For a number of programme activities, the operational strategies did not differentiate between emergency and non-emergency situations, and appeared based on the assumption that the difference lay in terms of scale. Situation analyses that should have informed choices about operational strategies were not systematically used and often not updated over time so that they appeared to miss important changes and trends that should have informed programmatic choices. Analytical capacities and linkages with programme design further weakened as the number of WFP professional staff was reduced in response to declining overall resource levels, as the tonnage-based programme was scaled back and therefore resources for country office support were reduced.
14. **WFP's tendency to rely on analyses generated by counterparts is an effective alternative in a resource-scarce environment.** However, the Programme did not have sufficient internal capacity (except during emergencies) to generate supplemental information, or analyse counterpart information and understand its implications. For instance, many underlying causes of food insecurity remain and require development solutions but also ongoing monitoring and early warning to avoid situations similar to 2001/02 and 2005/06. The Government has given diverse signals, being on the one hand critical of WFP's food aid role, while at the same time asking for WFP's support in developing social protection measures — a new role that requires WFP to work in recovery and to shift from being a food aid agency to a food assistance agency. Funding cuts seemed to have undermined analytical capacities and strategic choices.

Portfolio Performance and Results

⇒ *General and targeted food distribution*¹

15. **The WFP logistics system delivered food assistance to Malawi programmes in an efficient and effective manner throughout the evaluation period and under rapidly changing conditions.** WFP's strategic positioning appeared strong for the period prior to 2006, particularly in relation to emergency operations. This was reflected in WFP's proven efficiency and effectiveness as a channel for emergency assistance to Malawi. Costs were close to or below WFP corporate transport and handling rates, and highly competitive with alternatives. These competitive rates were also realized during the 2005/06 emergency, when some donors were concerned that these costs may be inflated. The record reflects robust management practices and institutional systems, although the evaluation found it challenging to reconcile information about the regional operations with implementation plans within the country.
16. **To minimize pipeline breaks and ensure timely delivery of food assistance, WFP exchanged significant quantities of food between various ongoing programmes.** Emergency operations (and country programmes) were generally well resourced, but resource levels and timing of receipts were unpredictable and sometimes erratic. WFP responded to these constraints and resultant delays in procurement with the exchange of commodities between various ongoing programmes and between various WFP programmes and country offices in the countries of the Southern African Development

¹ The evaluation took place too long after the emergency situations of 2001/2 and 2005/6 to validate through field work the relevance, appropriateness and effectiveness of general food distribution.



Community. These actions were taken to overcome shortages, avoid pipeline breaks and meet most urgent requirements. The volume of food exchanged – borrowed from or lent across countries in the region – amounted to 135,000 mt, or 5 percent of the total volume of food distributed during the period under review. This achievement highlights a high degree of flexibility, which WFP logistics support succeeded in maintaining throughout the 12 operations implemented in Malawi. These logistics capacities also served programme implementation during non-emergency periods.

17. **The Joint Emergency Food Aid Programme created at the initiative of WFP evolved into an effective and well-developed coordinating, planning and delivery capacity.** The joint programme was the focal point for the food component of the Food Crisis Joint Task Force and a key mechanism for coordination between the Government, NGOs, donors and WFP, particularly during the emergency periods.

⇒ *Nutrition*

18. **WFP's approach to malnutrition combined addressing underlying causes of malnutrition with curative measures, using programme categories to complement each other.** The emergency operations (EMOPs) and protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs) focused on relief and aimed to maintain nutritional status and prevent sharp increases in acute malnutrition. This approach was complemented through country programmes that sought to increase food consumption and improve health and nutrition practices, addressing underlying causes of malnutrition. Nutrition programmes in response to HIV and AIDS did not adopt a similar strategy as for other nutrition programmes, but followed the same approach regardless of which programme category was used, with the main difference being the scale of the case-load. Support therefore addressed short-term food security, but had no longer-term impact in the absence of sustainable livelihood initiatives. The lack of funding available for livelihood initiatives was an issue throughout the review period and restricted WFP's ability to engage in preventative and sustainable initiatives with long-term impact.
19. **A dynamic context requires more adaptation.** As emergencies receded, the PRROs would have needed to shift from their focus on relief towards prevention to complement better the country programmes with their curative approach. The change in government programmes for therapeutic care towards a community-based system, introduced in 2008, will require WFP programming to adapt to the diminishing demand for its main commodity (corn-soya blend). These adaptations are necessary to ensure a shift from emergency to recovery programming in transition toward development.
20. **Supplementary feeding programmes implemented consistently achieved and/or exceeded Sphere standard indicators for recovery of children, but the same was not the case for therapeutic feeding programmes.** The Sphere indicator for supplementary feeding programmes of 75 percent cured was consistently achieved or exceeded since 2003. Combined with the substantial increase in beneficiary numbers, the evaluation concluded that WFP made a significant contribution to the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition. By implication, WFP also contributed to the prevention of severe acute malnutrition and excess mortality in targeted areas. This success can, in part, be attributed to the full integration of WFP assistance into government priorities and programmes. The main challenge for therapeutic feeding was the late admittance of severely malnourished children to nutrition rehabilitation units, and those who were admitted had complications that often included HIV and AIDS. The institutions in which nutrition programmes were embedded tended to be weak, which affected performance. Since 2008 the less severe cases are treated through outpatient therapeutic programmes, which means institutional



programmes will focus on severe cases and might not achieve Sphere standards. Nonetheless, WFP-supported therapeutic feeding programmes were generally received well, and the care-giver programme was credited with reducing default rates.

21. **WFP's programmes in nutrition and institution-based HIV and AIDS relied heavily on the capacity of the Ministry of Health and the Christian Health Association of Malawi.** WFP maintained a robust working relationship with its partners, who highly valued WFP inputs, including contributions to strengthen the Ministry's capacities. These contributions were significant in the area of nutrition policy and capacity development at the central level, particularly during crisis periods. Capacity development at the field level appeared focused on warehouse management and food storage, related to the care of WFP inputs. Other, system-level capacity development is to take place with the assistance of UNICEF rather than WFP, which does not have the resources for such support during non-emergency periods.
22. **A variety of interventions target a similar beneficiary profile in Malawi.** In some districts programmes take place in parallel, including nutrition support to anti-retroviral treatment, take-home rations for girls and orphans and other vulnerable children (under the school feeding programme), and cash transfers. There was little clarity on how these programmes are coordinated to ensure complementarities, rather than duplication of benefits.

⇒ *School Feeding*

23. **Institutional and policy support to the education sector.** WFP contributed to the School Health and Nutrition Strategy and Policy and to the Universal School Feeding planning of the Ministry of Education. The Ministry highly values WFP contributions, and is using the experience as the basis for scaling up school feeding nationally. It is also requesting increased WFP involvement in policy and capacity development in support of such expansion of school feeding. However, other investments in the education sector are lagging behind but would be needed to ensure the education sector and its quality expands commensurately with the enrolment achievements of school feeding. These investments are needed to enhance the ability of the Government to provide, among other things, sufficient qualified teachers, classrooms, materials, curriculum and systems management.
24. **WFP's school feeding objectives focused on access to education and showed positive results.** School feeding adopted WFP's traditional educational outcomes of increased primary school enrolment and attendance and reduced drop-out rates of children in food-insecure areas, particularly for girls and orphans, through the provision of school meals. There was no change in strategy depending on the circumstances under which school feeding was implemented; school feeding in emergency situations continued as an expansion of regular school feeding and then formed the basis for the expansion of the programme after the emergency was over. The main achievements of school feeding could be seen in outreach, enrolment, attendance and pass rates as detailed below.
 - The number of beneficiaries reached generally exceeded targets. The programme reached an average of 330,000 children per year since 2000, and has expanded to reach 635,000 children beginning in 2008. Most schools that received emergency school feeding in 2002–2004 became part of the regular school feeding programme.
 - The programme contributed towards higher enrolment and retention rates. On average, enrolment increased 40 percent in programme schools. Attendance was consistently higher than in schools not receiving school feeding: 97 percent as compared to the national average of 92 percent. The perception of teachers is that children are now



more alert and more participatory in the classroom and their performance has improved.

- School feeding is credited with contributing to greater gender equality. For girls' enrolment, the evaluation observed that schools with school feeding registered on average increases in girls' enrolment of just under 38 percent, while on average other schools registered a drop of around 10 percent.
- School feeding was also linked to improving pass-rate performance, with the percentage increase in girls' performance in project schools nearly twice the increase in non-project schools.

25. **However, the evaluation also observed problems with monitoring systems that limited the extent to which programme performance can be monitored and managed.** The evaluation observed that baseline information on the schools in a given district is not collected at the beginning of an intervention; hence it is difficult to monitor progress or the effectiveness of school feeding in the schools where it is taking place. To measure performance, surveys would have to compare programme and non-programme schools and/or collect information before and after the introduction of school feeding. However, this is not done systematically. In addition, each operation measures different indicators, and almost none of them follow WFP's corporate indicator compendium, making comparisons difficult. The existing surveys and assessments, by WFP and various other agencies, do not build on each other and thus lose the opportunity to compare data and monitor progress and do not link with a monitoring system for school performance, as rudimentary as that may be. Overall, this situation makes it difficult to monitor the results of school feeding assistance and make informed decisions about programme adjustments.

⇒ *Food for Work/Assets Programmes*

26. **FFW/A as part of WFP's food security strategy.** FFW/A was a central element in WFP's food security strategy, supporting livelihoods and income-generation, while aiming to avoid negative coping strategies that reduce productive household or community assets. FFW/A was integrated into 8 of the 12 operations, with between 42 percent and 12 percent of resources allocated for this purpose at the design stage. For the programmes that were implemented, the evaluation found that FFW/A schemes contributed to overall emergency efforts and improved food security and livelihoods of beneficiaries. Over the years the focus shifted from employment creation through public works to building productive assets with the potential of improving the food security and livelihoods of beneficiaries. Between 2003 and 2007, 75 percent for this component was spent on FFW for public works employment creation (in place of general food distribution). However, FFW/A for recovery (aiming to create assets to recover livelihoods) did not receive much support from donors, resulting in the suspension of the programme in 2008. This funding situation is a reflection of WFP's difficulties in positioning itself well in the recovery context.
27. **FFW/A schemes produced significant and tangible assets, which are valued by communities.** The evaluation verified the existence of assets, and that they were generally relevant to needs and of good quality. Projects also appeared to have a broad base of beneficiaries, many of whom received training related to the use and maintenance of the assets by the NGO implementers. WFP supported the creation of national networks and made effective use of them during implementation. The robustness of planning improved over time. In particular, NGO partners appeared to become more effective with community consultation processes to identify which assets were appropriate, improving relevance and sustainability. The ability of NGOs to bring additional resources into the projects was also



a critical performance factor. A full assessment of outcomes was not possible given limited monitoring data, which focuses at the output level. Nonetheless, consultations with communities during field visits indicated increased incomes from irrigated farming or resources from trees planted with support from the programme. These observations are, however, insufficient to come to conclusions about the impact of the operations on the livelihoods of participants in the schemes.

28. **Distribution of benefits from most productive assets has depended on ownership patterns within the community.** For example, irrigation schemes tended to benefit community members with land in close proximity to the asset. Although many people participated in establishing the assets (such as irrigation schemes or fish ponds), fewer people could access the longer-term benefits from them, as doing so depended on ownership of land. In most communities, chiefs played a significant role in allocating suitable land for establishment of community assets and assisting in resolving ensuing conflicts once people started realizing benefits. The ability of the communities to manage the assets and sustainably reap the benefits also depended on whether they felt full ownership of the assets, the type of community structures established to manage the assets, and the training and back-up support received. It also depended on the nature of benefits from the assets, whether short-term or long-term. Those assets with short-term benefits to the community, in particular irrigation, have been favoured and well nurtured, while those with longer-term benefits (forestry and soil and water conservation) have faced problems of sustainability.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall Assessment

29. WFP was clearly aligned to and working in the context of the Government's systems, which it supported and strengthened during phases of crises and during recovery. The alignment exists also with United Nations partners, through the UNDAF, and cooperation took place during emergency situations – albeit such coordinated efforts cannot be taken for granted. WFP played a strategic role in line with its core mandate of responding to emergencies, but found it more challenging to re-invent itself after the emergencies through a transition into recovery. This challenge was, in part, caused by the country office's reduced capacities as funding was scaled back. This led WFP into a vicious circle of declining resources and contradictory positions taken by partners, where programme choices were driven as much by funding cuts as by WFP's own strategic decisions.
30. WFP was well equipped to undertake the necessary analytical work in the emergency context and use the information in operational and logistics decision-making. However, analytical work for programme activities and its translation into programme strategies and design was less strong. Experience varied by sector, with nutrition finding a good combination of using the different programme categories to meet complementary programme objectives. This was less so for other programme activities. Also in this area, the challenge of shifting from emergency to recovery was noted, which would have required changes to programme strategies and their design.
31. WFP's portfolio performed well in emergency situations, demonstrating its strong logistics capacity. The performance of the other programme activities showed positive outcomes in the areas of supplementary feeding, where Sphere standards were met or exceeded over the last five years, and in school feeding, where improved enrolment rates and greater inclusion of girls was attributed to school feeding. Therapeutic feeding faced



challenges in reaching Sphere standards, but more so due to circumstances whereby children entered the feeding programmes only once severely weakened and normally with other complications. FFW/A worked well in emergency situations as a complement to general food distributions, but showed mixed performance when used in livelihood recovery, when its performance depended on funding – which in emergency situations was switched to other programmes – and on ownership and access to the assets created.

Lessons for the Future

32. The Malawi experience demonstrated the importance of WFP's capacity to operate in emergency contexts and in recovery situations, and to adjust its strategy and operating mode between the two. This means that WFP has to be able to combine its successful surge capacity in response to the emergencies with an ability to transform and adapt its programming in non-emergency situations. Such transition is required *within* programme activities that shift in emphasis, objectives and approaches.
33. Alignment, strategic positioning, coordination and cooperation are management- and human resource-intensive. These activities require a significant amount of time of staff that is qualified to engage in meaningful dialogue, follow up the discussions and make expected contributions. In Malawi, these processes also required diplomatic and negotiation skills to deal with a context that was determined by Government–donor tensions (2001–2004), political sensitivities about food security after 2005, and donor concerns about WFP's cost accounting and later role in transition. Human resources and time to deal with these matters are as little accounted for as the resources it takes to undertake analytical work to make strategic choices. These capacities will be needed even more as WFP transitions from a food aid to a food assistance organization.

Recommendations

34. **Recommendation 1: The forthcoming country strategy should specifically address WFP's role in Malawi's recovery process.** It should:
 - i) be based on a credible analytical framework, noting positive trends to be supported and measures to mitigate ongoing structural risk to food security;
 - ii) present WFP's contribution to the Government's social protection and social development objectives in a manner that differentiates those contributions from past emergency-oriented assistance;
 - iii) be based, to the extent possible, on agreement with the Government and donors on appropriate roles, around which support and resources can be mobilized; and
 - iv) stress long-term efforts to reduce dependence on food assistance, and include clearly defined parameters for an eventual hand-over strategy. It therefore should include capacity development measures.
35. **Recommendation 2: The resource implications of the country strategy should be spelled out clearly, including requirements to meet demands to play a different role in recovery.** Building on the lessons from this evaluation, it is important to recognize that sufficient internal analytical capacities exist and can be employed to position WFP strategically and lead related discussions with the Government and partners. A minimum level of resources needs to be maintained even when emergency operations and related tonnage-based programmes are scaled back.



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

EMOP	emergency operation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFW/A	food for work/assets
NGO	non-governmental organization
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund