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**Executive Board  
Second Regular Session**

**Rome, 8–11 November 2010**

## **EVALUATION REPORTS**

**Agenda item 6**

*For consideration*

# **E**

Distribution: GENERAL  
**WFP/EB.2/2010/6-A**  
24 September 2010  
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

## **SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT CHAD COUNTRY PORTFOLIO (2003–2009)**

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## NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

**This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chad is a least-developed country with high rates of poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, and generally low social indicators. WFP has assisted the country in addressing its hunger needs since 1963. Since 2003, it has also assisted a large number of refugees from the Sudan and the Central African Republic, marking a drastic shift in the nature and scale of WFP assistance.


This report evaluates WFP's country portfolio – defined as the ten food assistance operations undertaken between 2003 and 2009 – and focuses on three questions: i) How well did WFP position itself strategically and align with government and partner strategies? ii) How did WFP make choices, and how strategic were these? and iii) How did the portfolio perform, and what were the results? The evaluation was conducted by a consultancy firm, with fieldwork taking place in February 2010.

The WFP portfolio in Chad presents a significantly complex and challenging operating context, and the evaluation is generally positive. WFP operations were aligned with Government policies and partners' strategies, although WFP could have positioned itself more strategically by using its important analytical work as leverage to influence national discussions of food security issues and government or partner strategies. Weak national capacity and commitment have limited government ownership and WFP's incentive and ability to work in effective partnership with the Government. Programme choices and implementation options have been bound by external factors, but have also been guided by assessments, corporate policies and – to a lesser extent – the promotion of synergy with partners, notably in eastern Chad. However, the portfolio has generally been viewed and managed as a set of discrete food assistance operations, rather than an integrated portfolio with a clear vision, common goal and strategy.

The evaluation found that the portfolio performed well, notably in refugee assistance, which made up the bulk of the portfolio. WFP responded quickly and effectively to the initial influx of refugees, and coordinated well with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to provide assistance that saved lives and contributed to a significant reduction in malnutrition rates. However, assistance to the Chadian population in the east and the Sahelian zone was judged insufficient given the prevailing food insecurity and malnutrition. Logistics operations contributed to the portfolio's effectiveness and were performed professionally and efficiently, allowing timely assistance despite the numerous challenges.

The evaluation recommends developing a five-year strategy for the country office and a management approach that integrates decision-making across the entire portfolio, to allow enhanced cross-fertilization within and among operations. Closer partnership with the Government and main partners through further engagement, integration and coordination is also recommended.

## DRAFT DECISION\*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report Chad Country Portfolio (2003–2009)” (WFP/EB.2/2010/6-A) and the management response in WFP/EB.2/2010/6-A/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

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\* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

## BACKGROUND

### Evaluation Features

1. This report presents the findings from the evaluation of WFP's country portfolio in Chad between 2003 and 2009. The purpose of the evaluation was to generate evidence in support of decision-making regarding WFP's strategic positioning in Chad. Its objectives were to provide *accountability*, through assessing and reporting on the portfolio's performance and results in the context of WFP's mandate and in response to the humanitarian and development challenges that the country faces; and to support *learning*, by generating evidence-based analysis and insights on the way in which the portfolio and its operations were planned and managed.
2. The evaluation addresses three main questions: i) How well did WFP position itself strategically and align with government and partner strategies? ii) How did WFP make choices and how strategic were these? and iii) How did the portfolio perform, and what were the results? The evaluation was conducted by a consultancy firm, with fieldwork taking place in February 2010.

### Context

3. Despite satisfactory growth of gross domestic product (GDP) and policies for crucial sectors such as health, education and agriculture, Chad struggles with low social indicators. Insufficient funding and weak capacity to plan, coordinate, manage and implement initiatives in these sectors have limited their impact.
4. Poverty affects 55 percent of the population, with rural households, especially those headed by women, having significantly higher incidence of poverty. Although access to education has improved, especially for girls, rates of infant and child mortality have remained the same since the 1990s. Food insecurity affects 44 percent of the population, and the national daily caloric intake is below the sub-Saharan Africa average. The Sahelian zone is particularly affected by chronic food deficits. Despite numerous nutrition interventions, global acute and chronic malnutrition rates have remained above critical thresholds in a number of regions.
5. Since the end of 2003, Chad has sheltered 265,000 Sudanese refugees in the east and 58,000 Central African Republic refugees in the south, fleeing the deterioration of the security situation in the Sudan's Darfur region and persistent insecurity in the Central African Republic. Increasing internal instability, due to activities by armed groups and inter-ethnic tensions, has caused the displacement of 180,000 Chadians in the east. Chad is susceptible to high climate variability; although agricultural production was relatively stable from 2003 to 2009, there was erratic rainfall, with localized droughts and floods, especially in the Sahelian zone. Major droughts usually occur once per decade, with minor ones once every five years.


### WFP Portfolio

6. In 2003, with the influx of refugees from the Sudan and the Central African Republic, there was a significant shift in the type, size and complexity of WFP's operations. Previously made up of small-scale development operations in the Sahelian zone, the portfolio became dominated by emergency operations (EMOPs), focusing on assistance to Sudanese refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities in the east, and to refugees from the Central African Republic in the south.



7. From 2003 to 2009, the Chad country office implemented ten food assistance operations: two country programmes (CPs), seven EMOPs, and one protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO). Three operations were still in progress at the time of the evaluation. The country office also implemented six special operations to augment logistics capacity and provide flight services in support of the EMOPs, but these were not included in the scope of the evaluation.

**Figure 1: Chad country portfolio operations, 2003–2009**



8. The total cost of the portfolio under consideration is US\$711 million: 87 percent devoted to the EMOPs, 10 percent to the CPs and the rest to the PRRO. The portfolio is large by WFP standards.
9. The operations in the portfolio collectively seek to contribute to the following corporate Strategic Objectives:
- Strategic Objective 1 – Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies – through assistance to refugees, IDPs and other vulnerable groups whose food and nutrition have been adversely affected by shocks; to reduce acute malnutrition; and to protect livelihoods and enhance self-reliance in emergencies and during early recovery. Activities included in relation to this objective are general food distributions (GFDs), emergency nutrition programmes – therapeutic and supplementary feeding, and mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN) – and food for work (FFW), which have been common to all the EMOPs and the PRRO.
  - Strategic Objective 2 – Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures – by supporting and strengthening communities’ resilience to shocks, through safety nets. The activity related to this objective is FFW in the CPs.

- Strategic Objective 4 – Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition – by increasing levels of education, basic nutrition and health. Main activities related to this objective are school feeding and MCHN in the CPs.

<b>TABLE 1: ACTIVITIES AND PROPORTION OF PLANNED BENEFICIARIES</b>					
<b>Operations</b>	<b>GFD</b>	<b>FFW/FFA*/FFT**</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Nutrition</b>	<b>HIV</b>
CP 100180		X	X	X	
CP 104780		X	X	X	X
PRRO 105100	X	X		X	X
EMOP 103250	X			X	
EMOP 103270	X	X		X	
EMOP 103271	X	X		X	
EMOP 102950	X			X	
EMOP 102951	X			X	
EMOP 105590	X	X	X	X	
EMOP 105591	X	X	X	X	
% of planned beneficiaries	<b>48</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>
% of actual beneficiaries	<b>55</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>

\* food for assets

\*\* food for training

## Alignment and Strategic Positioning

10. The evaluation found that the portfolio was generally well aligned with the WFP corporate strategy throughout the period, and with the national policy framework and government sectoral objectives. This alignment was particularly visible in the education sector, where school feeding clearly contributes to the national goal of education for all. An area where WFP was not fully aligned was in the balance between the assistance provided to refugees and to the host population in eastern Chad. WFP assistance was inevitably highly skewed towards refugees in earlier years, but more resources have recently been devoted to host populations, in line with government calls for this.
11. While WFP carried out important analytic work on national hunger and food security issues, the country office did not apply its analyses to influence national discussions, contribute to government or partner strategies or build national technical capacity towards institutionalization. The engagement, advocacy and dialogue required for more active strategic positioning were generally weak, and a communication gap between WFP and the Government sometimes resulted in the misperception that WFP is not a significant player in humanitarian assistance.
12. Government policies and strategies have not been backed by sufficient budget allocation to vital sectors such as school feeding, nutrition, agriculture and rural development. Weak national institutions, capacity and commitment have limited WFP's incentive and ability to work effectively in partnership with the Government to implement activities and have restricted the Government's ability to provide technical support to WFP activities. As a result, there is little government ownership of the WFP strategy and programmes, and WFP generally works with, but not through, government structures at the national and sub-national levels, even for activities that the Government values, such as school feeding and support to health clinics. At times, WFP has tried to engage more actively and

coordinate more closely with the Government, sometimes with success, such as in a recent joint mission to verify schools as a basis for future school feeding assistance.

13. Previously, WFP operations did not follow the cycle of United Nations agency-wide planning tools, but WFP now participates in development of the common country assessment, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the Consolidated Appeals Process, and the WFP country portfolio is currently aligned with United Nations strategies in Chad. However, challenges persist in translating these efforts into coordinated United Nations programmes, and there appears to be only limited joint planning and implementation of activities. The use of clusters has been mixed, with the logistics and food security clusters being the most active.
14. Apart from the effective partnership with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to assist refugees, there is little synergy between WFP programmes and those of main partners, in part owing to their limited presence. Better synergy and coordination with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) would enhance the effects of WFP's inputs to nutrition, education and FFW activities, by combining WFP food with partners' expertise and financial resources.

### **Making Strategic Choices**

15. Programme choices and implementation options have been bound by external factors. The magnitude of needs in northern and eastern Chad far outstrips WFP's ability to acquire resources and implement programmes, resulting in an understandable need to prioritize. Serious security concerns have made planning, food delivery and monitoring difficult and risky, particularly in the east, where military escorts are required. Logistics challenges are also substantial; the country is land-locked and large and has poor infrastructure, while the rainy season limits the ability to move food through the main corridor for half of the year.
16. WFP's response strategy in the east took into consideration partners' strategies and programmes and the possibilities for synergy. This was rendered possible by the high level of resources generally available to assist Sudanese refugees, and the consequent presence of more partners, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in this part of the country. In other areas, notably the Sahelian zone, less donor interest and the low capacity of partners – particularly the Government – to plan, organize and implement activities affected programme and partnership options for the CPs.
17. Corporate policies clearly guided the country office's choices of programme categories, but the parameters that define these categories are both limited and limiting. As a result, response strategies and activity choices tended to be driven by what is possible within each programme type, and not necessarily by what is the best programme option. The portfolio has been viewed and managed as a set of discrete food assistance operations, rather than an integrated portfolio with a clear vision, common goal and strategy.
18. The country office has conducted an impressive amount of analytical work to enhance its understanding of national hunger and food security issues and to guide its decision-making. There is a clear link between assessment findings and the geographic targeting of operations, which focus on parts of the country that either present the highest food insecurity, such as the Sahelian zone, or have a clear humanitarian need, such as eastern and southern Chad. However, there is not always a clear link between assessment findings and the development of response strategies.




19. The country office demonstrated an ability to recognize and adjust to changing needs. In March 2006, for example, with the increased integration of refugees from the Central African Republic into the surrounding community, and agricultural production levels that enabled many households to become self-sufficient, the country office decided to transition from an EMOP to a PRRO emphasizing self-reliance and sustainability in southern Chad. However, assessments have repeatedly shown global acute malnutrition rates above emergency levels in the Sahelian zone, which should have led to increased emphasis and resources for it, and possibly to a different programme category, than that of development project. It is important to note, though, that the 2010 EMOP in the Sahelian zone will address some of these issues, even though the drought – rather than the chronic food insecurity and high malnutrition rates – is the impetus. The evaluation also questioned whether the current EMOP programme category in the east is still warranted after almost seven years, when corporate guidance usually limits EMOPs to 24 months.
20. WFP's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system has generally been weak, focusing on outputs, which provide limited insights for informing decision-making on the basis of results. However, in the past year, significant efforts have been made to enhance M&E standards and systems, including through strengthening the staff at sub-offices and initiating the collection of outcome indicators, with a view to correcting implementation if required, and contributing to future programme design.


## Portfolio Performance and Results

21. **Relevance and appropriateness.** The activities of the portfolio were all relevant given the levels of food insecurity and need in the target areas. Assistance to refugees in eastern and southern Chad, which made up the bulk of the portfolio, was particularly relevant, and the modalities of GFD and supplementary and therapeutic feeding were appropriate for the initial life-threatening situation. However, levels of assistance for both the Sudanese refugees and the host population in eastern Chad must be reviewed. The recent increased economic activity in refugee camps in eastern Chad calls into question the continued appropriateness of GFD, especially at the current ration size, while the high level of food insecurity and malnutrition among the Chadian populations in the east and the Sahelian zone has not been sufficiently addressed.
22. Beneficiary selection criteria varied across activities and were generally adequate. Refugees living in camps were enrolled on the basis of their status, determined by UNHCR screening; IDPs on the basis of their status and of results of annual crop assessments carried out by WFP, FAO and other partners; and host populations in eastern and southern Chad on the basis of vulnerability analysis and mapping assessments validated by the food security cluster. Mid-upper arm circumference screening was used for selecting beneficiaries for nutrition projects, apart from in refugee camps, where all pregnant and lactating women were entitled to assistance. Schools for the school feeding programme were selected by the Government and WFP in areas with the lowest education levels; criteria included having a classroom, a parent association, a water supply, a kitchen, a storage room and sanitation facilities. However, only a fraction of the schools were found to meet all criteria.
23. **Efficiency.** Overall, 73.5 percent of the portfolio's financial requirements were met, which is generally good. However, while larger refugee operations in the east and south were funded at 75 and 78 percent respectively, contributions to the smaller CPs achieved only 57 percent of their requirements.

**Figure 2: Portfolio resource flows, by operation, based on actual reported expenditures in US\$**




**Figure 3: Receipts of contributions, by geographic region, during the portfolio period, in US\$**



Source: WFP Country Office and project documentation

24. The portfolio performed well in reaching from 75 percent to as much as 200 percent of its intended beneficiaries, with an average of 500,000 beneficiaries per year. There was a steady increase in assistance over time: 200,000 beneficiaries were assisted in 2003, and 885,000 in 2009. Beneficiaries in all parts of the country expressed their appreciation of the assistance they received.
25. The activity that consistently had the highest absolute and planned-versus-actual numbers of beneficiaries and tonnage was GFD, reflecting the high priority placed on the life-saving objectives of refugee assistance. Nutrition interventions did not increase at the same rate as GFD, but peaked in 2004, when actual beneficiaries exceeded planned numbers by more than 200 percent.
26. School feeding, which had the strongest government ownership, had the second highest absolute number of beneficiaries and tonnage, but its actual-versus-planned beneficiaries and tonnage were below the portfolio averages.
27. Although FFW activities had higher numbers of beneficiaries and tonnage early in the evaluation period, their relative importance within the portfolio decreased over time, to represent only a small proportion of activities. FFW was not well-resourced in the CPs and was given a relatively low priority in the EMOPs. FFW activities in the east were repeatedly suspended when additional resources were required for refugee assistance or owing to security reasons.

**FIGURE 4: TREND OF BENEFICIARIES AND TONNAGE DELIVERED BY ACTIVITY, 2003–2008**



Source: WFP Country Office

28. Efficiency was hampered by activities being designed and implemented within the context of individual operations. A structural disconnect between programme activities and the implementation structure is partly the result of this operations-based approach and partly due to the funding model.
29. Staff working on multiple operations are dispersed in N'Djamena and 12 sub-offices, rendering management and staff capacity development difficult and hampering a coordinated technical approach to activities. This complexity has also resulted in a highly centralized decision-making structure, which has sometimes delayed crucial implementation decisions.
30. There is most synergy within individual operations, given that resources are easily adjusted and technical staff are working towards the same operation outcome. However, following an operations-based approach, rather than viewing operations as part of an

overall country portfolio, has hampered the development of systems and standards that can be applied to all operations and has limited possible cross-fertilization among operations. Activities within an operation are conducted independently, with little sharing of experience and lessons with similar activities in other operations, and synergies that could come from the sharing of both technical and financial resources have not been achieved. There is need to establish a balance between setting up systems and standards to meet the programme, M&E and reporting requirements for individual operations and gaining efficiencies across operations for the overall portfolio.

31. The logistic operations were performed professionally and efficiently and were highly supportive of operations, without delaying or negatively affecting the implementation of activities. Opportunities for local or regional food procurement are extremely marginal, and 96 percent of food was purchased internationally. The cost of the food item almost doubled during the portfolio evaluation period, from US\$250/mt to US\$450/mt, but remained in line with WFP's corporate cost average. It is significant that the 34 percent ratio reserved for food cost in the portfolio is less than the corporate average of 49 percent, while the ratio of financial resources set aside for logistic operations has been almost twice the WFP average.
32. The high logistics costs are explained and justified by the extremely difficult operational conditions, with long inland and transfer haulages, and multiple handling and warehouses inside and outside Chad. Logistic operations hinge on two corridors: the Douala corridor, which accounts for 60 percent of food aid transit; and the Benghazi corridor, used for the remaining 40 percent. Although expensive, the Benghazi corridor – which opened in recent years – has proved efficient and essential for the steady supply of food assistance to eastern Chad. There are no indications that the final cost unit of food aid delivered has modified the design or implementation of any of the portfolio activities.
33. Although the language requirement, status as a non-family post and difficult environment make Chad a challenging duty station to recruit for, staffing has been increased with the expansion of programmes, and good use has been made of United Nations volunteers, consultants and short-term contracts. However, several vital positions, including country director, nutrition officer and human resources officer, remained vacant for periods up to one year, and the justified frequency of rest and recuperation breaks for international staff, combined with insufficient focus on building the capacity of senior national officers, have sometimes prevented the smooth implementation of activities.
34. **Effectiveness and impact.** The evaluation found that the assistance to refugees has been effective: it clearly saved lives in the early years and contributed to reducing malnutrition, which has stabilized at acceptable levels (Strategic Objective 1). This was made possible by a good resource level, the resulting regular pipeline flow, and the complementary services provided to refugees by the many partners – including NGOs – active in eastern Chad. Another contributing factor was the excellent partnership with UNHCR. However, there are examples where better coordination could increase the synergies, which would reduce programme costs through greater effectiveness and efficiency. One example would be to work with partners to make mills operational in camps where refugees receive unmilled rations.
35. Supporting IDPs and the host population in eastern Chad has not been as high a priority as assisting refugees, despite malnutrition rates above emergency thresholds and similar conditions to those of refugees. The FFW activities were discontinued when additional resources were required to meet refugees' needs. As a result, the level of assistance to IDPs and the host population in eastern Chad was judged inadequate, and the effectiveness of




activities has been limited by the low level of activity compared with the high level of need. This discrepancy between the food and general services provided to refugees and to Chadians has resulted in tensions in the region.

36. The FFW activities – such as the construction of small dams, wells and water catchments, the rehabilitation of irrigation dikes and roads, and reforestation – link directly to increased food production and improved food security. However, several factors have limited the effectiveness of FFW in strengthening communities' resilience to shocks through safety nets (Strategic Objective 2). These factors include a perception of the activities as unreliable, owing to frequent suspensions and the short time span of contracts with partners, and the limited resources devoted to non-food items, which reduced the scope and size of possible FFW activities. The availability of both WFP and partners' technical assistance for designing and supporting FFW activities is also limited.
37. The evaluation found that in relation to Strategic Objective 4, school enrolment during the portfolio period increased by almost 200 percent in eastern Chad and by about 100 percent in the Sahelian zone, and that girls' enrolment followed a similar trend, thus reducing gender imbalances. While attribution is difficult, the increase in access to education seems primarily due to expansion of the school feeding programme, and to a lesser extent to an increase in the number of schools. Beneficiaries clearly indicated that school feeding, including take-home rations for girls, was an important incentive in their decision to send their children to school and keep them there. However, as the Government is under pressure to expand education to all children; it focuses more on increasing access to education than on enhancing the quality of education. Unless the Government and WFP make efforts to combine school meals with good curricula, well-trained teachers, safe drinking-water, latrines and dynamic parent associations, the quality of the intended education outcome will continue to remain relatively low.
38. Except in refugee camps, nutrition activities were insufficient for the needs, and nutrition rates in the east and Sahelian zone deteriorated in many cases. More efforts should be made to improve the referral system between supplementary and therapeutic feeding and in nutrition education. WFP's support to people living with HIV is highly appreciated, encourages people to get tested and shows positive nutrition effects.
39. **Sustainability.** For the bulk of the portfolio, which focuses on life-saving activities for refugees, sustainability was not the intended outcome. However, in several camps in the south, WFP and UNHCR support along with a conducive environment have helped refugees to become self-reliant, allowing reduced assistance levels. Ownership of FFW – which is crucial for ensuring sustainability through asset maintenance – was generally low, except where the work focused on building schools, which is a clear priority for communities.
40. Sustainability is a challenge, owing to the Government's weak capacity and the limited number of NGOs. There is little possibility for handing over any of the WFP portfolio activities to the Government, which has shown no commitment to continuing activities that WFP currently implements.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

41. **Recommendation 1:** *The country office should develop a clear five-year strategy and vision for the overall country portfolio, which would permeate all country office operations and guide programme decisions and resource allocation, with a view to increasing impact and sustainability.* Senior country office staff, especially the country director, the deputy country director and heads of units, should participate in the strategy development process with senior managers from technical units at the regional bureau and Headquarters, to ensure that the engagements are realistic and implementable. Consultation with major stakeholders, including the Government, other United Nations agencies, multilateral and bilateral donors and NGOs, is also recommended, to ensure realism, relevance and coordination. External facilitation is recommended to ensure a well-articulated process.
42. **Recommendation 2:** *The country office should develop a management approach that supports implementation of the strategy and attainment of the vision, by integrating decision-making across the entire country portfolio.* The breadth of decisions and challenges across all operations requires a clearly articulated management approach that increases responsiveness to field requests, allows the country office to adapt to changing needs, and improves operational efficiency and effectiveness. Several specific actions are recommended:
- a) Develop a detailed framework, specifying who is responsible for routine and exceptional decisions and who should be informed.
  - b) Give increased responsibility – with proper oversight by senior manager – to sub-offices, especially the Abeche office in eastern Chad.
  - c) Prepare a more detailed and integrated annual work planning process, describing major activities, roles and responsibilities to guide and empower sub-office managers.
  - d) Develop a strategy to ensure that sufficient staff are available, taking into consideration rest and recuperation, etc., and that staff live and work in adequate conditions.
43. **Recommendation 3:** *The cost of implementing programme activities should be reviewed during development of the WFP country strategy for Chad, with a view to lowering the high costs of implementing projects in Chad.* It is recommended that a complete portfolio review be conducted to see where cost synergies can be gained, such as by clustering activities in smaller areas, etc.
44. **Recommendation 4:** *Given the size and complexity of the portfolio, the country office, the regional bureau and Headquarters should clearly identify what technical support and backstopping are required from the regional bureau and Headquarters and should give more consideration to staffing needs and staff rotations, to ensure smooth portfolio implementation and management.*
45. **Recommendation 5:** *The country office's systems and standards must be strengthened, to increase operational efficiency and reinforce programmes.* The country portfolio faces a complex mix of operational challenges, technical demands and reporting requirements. To enhance efficiency, simple systems and standards for communication, programming, monitoring and reporting should be put in place and communicated throughout WFP and to stakeholders. The administrative, financial and programme systems should be coordinated and aggregated to support efficient decision-making and an understanding of trade-offs.

46. **Recommendation 6:** *The country office should develop a systematic approach with its main partners, to strengthen partnership, integration and coordination with the Government.* There is also need for a high-level strategy that engages and commits the Government. This will involve frank dialogue with senior government officials and will reconnect WFP to the Ministry of Planning and Economics, which has a coordination role. The focus should not be on “what you can do for me”, but on “what we can accomplish together”, and how. WFP could use existing United Nations coordinated structures as a forum for facilitating this.
47. **Recommendation 7:** *The country office should review the scope and content of activities, and the potential for integrating them both within operations and across programme categories. This would help ensure focused efforts towards high-level performance and results.* It is recommended that a formal review be conducted looking at each operation and across operations. It should be conducted with support from the regional bureau and Headquarters with the involvement of the Government and other United Nations agencies to ensure that realistic expectations are conveyed to stakeholders and to promote ownership and buy-in.
48. **Recommendation 8:** *The country office needs a fully qualified public relations officer to ensure that the message of WFP’s good work is communicated and that important emergency situations receive sufficient attention.* This would avoid misinformation and poorly coordinated messages about WFP’s role and good work, while helping to highlight the food security situation and assistance needs of the host population in eastern Chad and the Sahelian zone.



The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Food Programme (WFP) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its frontiers or boundaries.



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## ACRONYMS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT

CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CCA	common country assessment
CP	country programme
EMOP	emergency operation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFW	food for work
GDP	gross domestic product
GFD	general food distribution
IDP	internally displaced person
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MCHN	mother-and-child health and nutrition
NGO	non-governmental organization
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund