

برنامج
الأغذية
العالمي



Programme
Alimentaire
Mondial

World
Food
Programme

Programa
Mundial
de Alimentos

**Executive Board
First Regular Session**

Rome, 18–19 February 2013

EVALUATION REPORTS

Agenda item 6

For consideration

E

Distribution: GENERAL
WFP/EB.1/2013/6-A
10 January 2013
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SUMMARY REPORT OF THE JOINT UNHCR/WFP IMPACT EVALUATION ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF FOOD ASSISTANCE TO DURABLE SOLUTIONS IN PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS – CHAD

This document is printed in a limited number of copies. Executive Board documents are available on WFP's Website (<http://executiveboard.wfp.org>).

NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

Director, EVA*: Ms H. Wedgwood tel.: 066513-2030

Evaluation Officer, EVA: Ms C. Conan tel.: 066513-3480

Should you have any questions regarding availability of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact Ms I. Carpitella, Senior Administrative Assistant, Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645).

* Office of Evaluation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This theory-based impact evaluation was managed jointly by the evaluation offices of the World Food Programme and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It used a mixed-method approach to assess the outcomes and impacts of the food assistance delivered to refugees from the Central African Republic since their arrival in southern Chad from 2002 and draws lessons regarding its contribution to durable solutions for the refugees.


The evaluation found that in the first years following displacement, general food distribution in the form of full rations allowed a majority of refugees to reach acceptable food consumption levels. It also had a positive effect on global acute malnutrition, which remained generally acceptable over time even in camps where rations were reduced or limited to vulnerable groups.

Refugees' wealth levels and income sources, however, had not significantly improved over time and did not match those of the local population. A deterioration of refugees' food consumption both in terms of quantity and quality and an increase in short-term coping strategies ensued when rations were reduced in the oldest camps. The expected evolution towards an increased capacity of the refugees to develop their own livelihoods in the medium term – and as a result to maintain their food security despite a reduction in food assistance – did not occur. In addition, chronic malnutrition remained high and did not improve over the years. Some evidence of gender-based violence, notably post-distribution conjugal violence, was noted.

These mixed results are attributed to the absence of a common strategy between agencies for promoting self-reliance, along with a lack of coherence between the stated objectives and the activities implemented, which is partly explained by recurrent funding constraints. Despite objectives gradually shifting from meeting immediate food needs to promoting self-reliance, general food distribution of full or reduced rations remained the principal modality of assistance over time; complementary or alternative modalities were marginal. In addition, livelihood support remained limited over the period, and was late and insufficiently diversified given the local constraints. Finally, the implementation and outcomes of nutrition programmes also suffered from the lack of a clear strategy and actions to combat chronic malnutrition, and of a lack of technically qualified partners.

The evaluation makes a series of recommendations for WFP, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and their partners, with a view to guiding them towards realizing their longer-term objectives, including the refugees' self-reliance, and improving programme management, monitoring and evaluation of the food aid, nutrition and protection activities.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “Summary Report of the Joint UNHCR/WFP Impact Evaluation on the Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations – Chad” (WFP/EB.1/2013/6-A) and the management response in WFP/EB.1/2013/6-A/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

INTRODUCTION

Features

1. This evaluation is part of a series of four impact evaluations jointly commissioned by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2011 and 2012.¹ The objective of the evaluations is to assess the contribution of food assistance to durable solutions for refugees in protracted situations.
2. The evaluation focuses on the assistance provided to refugees from the Central African Republic since their arrival in Chad beginning in 2002. It aims to account for its outcomes and impacts and to provide lessons on how the two agencies can improve the contribution of food assistance to refugees' self-reliance at both local and global levels.
3. Impact was measured by verifying a theoretical model developed on the basis of the two agencies' explicit objectives, which posit that their combined activities contribute to increased refugee self-reliance. The theoretical model includes three stages of evolution from the refugees' initial situation upon arrival (S1) to a maximum level of self-reliance (S3), with a corresponding diminishing level of food assistance for each stage.
4. Since the camps were set up at different times and assistance levels decreased over time once joint assessment missions (JAMs) found an adequate level of self-reliance, it was possible to compare the theoretical model with the actual evolution of the situation.

	Situations		Expected results
Short term	S1	General food distribution (GFD) – full rations.	Lives saved; improved food consumption; safety and protection provided. Minimal level of self-reliance.
Medium term	S2	GFD – half rations.	Improved food basket; improved nutritional status (acute and chronic malnutrition). Increased capacity of beneficiaries to establish livelihoods.
Long term	S3	GFD replaced by distributions targeted to persons with special needs (PSN – 20% of the population).	Refugee self-reliance; local integration; resettlement or repatriation.


* The theoretical model also takes into account complementary inputs from partners, including livelihood support from UNHCR mostly in the form of provision of seeds and tools, and income-generating activities.

5. The evaluation used mixed and complementary methods to triangulate the information gathered: a review of secondary data, semi-structured qualitative interviews, a quantitative survey, direct observation and presentations of preliminary findings.
6. The quantitative survey was conducted in three camps that were representative of situations S1 (Moula), S2 (Amboko) and S3 (Yaroungou), and was based on a sample of 641 refugee households; 246 households in eight neighbouring villages were also surveyed to compare the refugees' situation to the local population and provide an indication of the level of self-reliance that can be reached realistically given the local context. Forty-three percent of the households surveyed were headed by women.

¹ The other evaluations covered Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Rwanda.

Context

7. Since 2002, Chad has hosted as many as 70,000 refugees from the Central African Republic, who arrived in the country in successive waves. UNHCR does not anticipate repatriation in the near future, although many spontaneous returns have been reported.



Source: UNHCR annual reports

8. Chad has ratified the 1951 and 1969 (African) conventions on refugee status. It recognizes *prima facie* all the refugees from the Central African Republic, but does not allow them to obtain citizenship. The Chadian authorities support a policy of integration and self-reliance for the refugees, and this translates into allocation of land to refugees, freedom of movement, and freedom to engage in economic activities and to access markets for buying and selling products.
9. The seven camps for the refugees are located in southern and southeastern Chad in the regions of Logone Oriental, Moyen Chari and Salamat, which are among the country's most advantaged regions in agro-climatic terms: 9 percent, 18 percent and 20 percent of households, respectively, were food-insecure in 2009, compared with a national average of 17 percent (WFP vulnerability survey). The population in these regions is ethnically similar to the refugees; their main activity is agriculture, along with livestock farming, fishing, hunting and gathering wild foods.

TABLE 2: CAMP CHARACTERISTICS						
Area	Goré area			Maro area		Haraze area
Region/ department	Logone Oriental/Nya Pendé			Moyen-Chari/Grande Sido		Salamat/ Haraze-Manguaigne
Camp	Amboko	Gondjé	Dosseye	Yaroungou	Moula	Koy/Moyo (*)
Population	11 040	9 660	9 090	11 000	4 200	7 800
Arrival year	2002	2004	2005	2002	2007	2008 (*)
Ethnic groups	Kaba; Arabs	Kaba	Peulhs	Ngam Gawaama	Mbaye Ngam	Rungu
Economic activities	Agriculture, commerce	Agriculture	Livestock, agriculture	Agriculture	Agriculture	Fishing, agriculture

Source: UNHCR database, February 2012


Notes: Area refers to the main city near the camps.

(*) While the refugees in Daha, near the border with the Central African Republic, were resettled in the more distant camps of Koy and Moyo in April 2011, many of them chose not to move.

10. Assistance and protection for the refugees are ensured by government entities – in particular the *Commission nationale pour l'accueil et la réinsertion des réfugiés et des rapatriés* (CNARR, the National Commission for the Reception and Reinsertion of Refugees and Returnees) – and WFP and UNHCR, along with national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The European Commission also funds two Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) programmes aiming to support the refugees' transition toward self-reliance and integration.
11. **WFP food assistance** was implemented through six programmes from 2003 to the time of the evaluation: three emergency operations (EMOPs) followed by three protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs). The objectives of meeting refugee food needs remained relevant throughout most of the period in light of continuing refugee influx until 2008, but evolved as of 2005 to integrate the promotion of self-reliance for the earlier refugees. The main WFP donors during 2003–2011 were the United States of America (53 percent), Japan (12 percent), the European Commission (11 percent) and the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (9 percent).
12. **The main food assistance modalities** were general food distribution (GFD) and nutrition programmes (treatment of severe and moderate malnutrition, and supplementary feeding for pregnant and lactating women). On average, 97.5 percent of the planned beneficiaries received assistance, of which 52 percent were women. Despite objectives gradually shifting towards the promotion of self-reliance, food-for-work interventions remained marginal and mainly benefited the host population as did food assistance for people living with HIV/AIDS.
13. For the first three to five years after their creation, all camps received full rations (2,100 kcal/day) as part of GFD. The rations were then reduced to 1,200 kcal/day or cut. There are two exceptions. In Yaroungou, the GFD was discontinued without the reduced ration stage following two and a half years of assistance and was replaced by targeted distributions to PSN identified by UNHCR and specific GFD during lean seasons. In Gondjé, the distribution of full rations lasted only one year.

TABLE 3: GFD RATIONS OVER TIME

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
	July	July	Dec	Feb	Feb	Feb	Dec	Feb	Apr	Apr	Feb
Amboko	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1
Gondjé	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1
Dosseye	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1
Yaroungou	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1
Moula	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1
Koy	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1
Moyo	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1	S1



 S1 - Full ration

 S2 - Half ration

 S3 - No GFD (only assistance to PSN)

Source: WFP Goré


RESULTS: OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS OF FOOD ASSISTANCE

Food Security


14. The outcomes and impacts of food assistance on refugees' food security were measured using the food consumption score and the coping strategies index (CSI).²
15. The regression analyses conducted for the camps surveyed show that the two main factors influencing food consumption score were the food assistance received and the recipients' wealth levels. On the other hand, the CSI was found to be little influenced by the level of food assistance received, and to depend mostly on households' wealth level and ethnicity.
16. That explains the particular case of Amboko, where the population's food consumption was better than in similar (S2) camps or neighbouring villages. This population was also found to rely less on coping strategies, especially the most negative strategies. The socio-economic characteristics of the Amboko refugees are unusual: one third of the households are made up of Arabs, most of whom are traders and richer than the other ethnic groups; Amboko has the highest proportion of households in the wealthiest category (see Figure 9).
17. Aside from Amboko, the following trends were identified in relation to food consumption (see Figures 2–6):
 - The camps benefiting from full rations (S1) always had a vast majority of households with acceptable levels of food consumption, even when refugees had recently arrived and still had only limited livelihoods options (Haraze, Moula and Daha in 2010).
 - The proportion of households with acceptable food consumption scores was consistently higher in the camps benefiting from full rations (S1) than in the camps receiving half rations (S2) and in the camp where GFD was discontinued (S3: Yaroungou). Camps receiving full rations also had a higher proportion of acceptable food consumption scores than neighbouring villages, as measured in a 2012 evaluation survey.
 - The reduction of rations led to a systematic deterioration of household food consumption (quantity and type), although there was no significant difference between the S2 camps and Yaroungou (S3).

² **The food consumption score** combines food diversity, food frequency (the number of days each food group is consumed), and the relative nutritional importance of different food groups, based on recall. **The CSI** measures how often twelve strategies were used by the households during the seven days preceding the survey to overcome difficulties in accessing food. The strategies include: consume cheaper food; consume more wild food as part of the diet; send household members to eat elsewhere; borrow food from relatives/neighbours; go into debt to buy food; consume seed stock held for the next season; reduce portion size at mealtimes; reduce the number of daily meals; reduce food consumed by adults so that children can eat; reduce the food consumed by non-working members of the household; go entire days without eating.


Figures 2–6: Distribution of Households by Food Consumption Scores (2006–2012) (%)




Source: Vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) survey 2006




Source: VAM survey 2008



Source: VAM survey 2010



Source: Post-distribution monitoring survey 2012



Source: Evaluation 2012

18. In terms of coping strategies used by households to overcome difficulties in accessing food, the evaluation provided evidence that households in Yaroungou (S3) and Moula (S1) resorted more often to coping strategies to get food (with CSI scores of 55.7 and 58.4 respectively) than did the local population (with a score of 49.7). A major component of these strategies involved modifying or reducing food consumption, which can adversely affect households' food security and their future. By contrast, the CSI score in Amboko was 42.1.
19. Comparison with the villages shows that food assistance had a positive differential effect on the food consumption of households headed by refugee women (see Table 4). Those households, however, resorted more often to the most severe coping strategies (31 percent, versus 18.5 percent for households headed by refugee men).


TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS ACCORDING TO CATEGORY OF FOOD INTAKE (BY GENDER OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD) (%)			
Gender of head of household	Poor intake	Threshold intake	Acceptable intake
Camps			
Men	16.9	29.4	53.8
Women	21.3	23.5	55.2
Villages			
Men	8.0	25.7	66.3
Women	32.1	20.3	47.6

Source: 2012 evaluation survey

Nutrition


20. Analysis of available data since 2008 shows that the rates of global acute malnutrition (GAM) varied over time and between the camps, but were most often at levels considered acceptable by international standards (<5 percent) and below the regional averages for the local population (Chad GAM, 2006–2010: 16 percent).
21. A notable exception was Dosseye, where GAM rates always remained above the acceptable threshold, and were above 10 percent in 2011. This difference could not be attributed to food assistance, which was similar to that provided in other camps where the rates were lower, but to other factors, including the fact that the population is largely composed of Peulhs.³

³ Peulhs are nomadic pastoralists, and a number of studies have shown that measurement of GAM rates using weight-by-height (as used in these cases) tends to overestimate GAM rates in pastoralists. Complementary analyses using the mid-upper arm circumference show less alarming results. But GAM rates in Dosseye are higher than in the other camps and deserve specific attention.



Source: 2012 evaluation survey

22. Comparison of the GAM rates across the camps in the S1, S2 and S3 categories shows the positive impact of full rations (S1) on GAM rates, which is consistent with the findings on food consumption (see paragraph 16). In contrast, there were no clear differences between the S2 and S3 situations attributable to the level of food assistance received.
23. Chronic malnutrition rates were high (above the 30 percent threshold) in all camps over the period, and particularly in Dosseye, but were comparable to the national rates for Chad (39 percent). The incidence of anaemia was largely above the 40 percent threshold in all the camps, and two out of three refugee children suffered from it, indicating a major public health problem. The comparison of the S1, S2 and S3 situations, whether in terms of chronic malnutrition or anaemia, did not produce clear patterns suggesting a correlation with the level of GFD received.



Source: 2012 evaluation survey

Livelihoods


24. The outcomes and impacts of food assistance on the refugees' livelihoods were measured using income sources and wealth ranking as indicators,⁴ which revealed that even after seven years in the country, refugee households had not developed livelihoods comparable to those of the local population.
25. **Agriculture.** Agriculture deserves special attention as it was the main activity of most households and was practised by respectively 92 percent, 94 percent and 98 percent of the households of Moula, Yaroungou and the villages, where 75 percent of the population derived income from agriculture. By contrast, trade was preponderant in Amboko and only 55 percent of households derived some income from agriculture.
26. Agriculture was more developed in Yaroungou (S3) than in Moula (S1). Contributing factors included the longer stay in the camp, the larger size of the cultivated plots, and greater assistance from UNHCR in terms of agricultural inputs and tools. However, after seven years the refugees' agriculture was still notably less developed than that of the local population both in terms of area cultivated and yields.

TABLE 5: AVERAGE AREA CULTIVATED AND AVERAGE GRAIN PRODUCTION BY CAMP (2011)				
	Moula (S1)	Amboko (S2)	Yaroungou (S3)	Villages
Area cultivated (ha)	1.42	2.63	2.69	3.06
Grains harvested (kg)	258	543	330	976

Source: 2012 evaluation survey

27. **Income.** Households in the S1 and S3 camps had similar income structures. Besides engaging in agriculture, raising livestock and selling food rations – identified as the most frequent sources of income – they resorted in the same proportion to short-term activities such as brewing and selling alcohol; selling firewood, hay or wild plants; performing daily labour; and engaging in survival sex. These activities are indicative of a greater vulnerability level.
28. Another vulnerability indicator is the high mobility of refugees who seek more favourable conditions elsewhere for engaging in economic activity. Refugees sometimes travelled hundreds of kilometres from the camps, including in the Central African Republic, and were away for periods ranging from a few days to several months at a time.
29. **Wealth.** The Moula (S1) and Yaroungou (S3) camps had similar wealth profiles, with a predominance of households in the poorest categories. The longer presence of the Yaroungou households (more than seven years) in comparison with Moula households (four years) did not result in their accumulating more capital.

⁴ Wealth ranking is determined by a number of indicators on asset ownership (as a proxy for poverty).



Source: Evaluation survey, 2012. Wealth is calculated on the basis of household capital. Level 1 represents the poorest households, level 4 the wealthiest.

30. Food assistance played both a positive and a negative role in the development of household livelihoods. When combined with medium-term activities such as agriculture, it allowed for more of the households' needs to be met and reduced the extent to which refugees resort to unsustainable short-term activities. When rations were reduced, short-term activities increased and in Moula, the recent ration reduction had also constrained access to informal credit, because households could no longer use their rations as debts repayment. The GFD cycle also had a regulating effect on migration, because refugees had to be present when beneficiary lists were verified prior to distributions.
31. However, some indicators point to the fact that GFD in the form of full ration can limit the development of medium-term livelihoods options such as agriculture. Interviews in Gondjé, where the full ration lasted only one year, showed that the rapid reduction in assistance made refugees aware of the need to act to secure their own livelihoods as quickly as possible and contributed to a faster development of agriculture than observed in some other camps – Moula in particular – even though it received less agricultural support. Nonetheless, other factors such as more land availability and a traditionally agriculture-oriented population also played a role.

Protection and Gender

32. The protection situation was largely satisfactory notably owing to the *Détachement intégré de sécurité* (DIS, Integrated Security Detachment), a police unit in charge of security in the refugee camps set up by UNHCR and CNARR late 2010, which worked well. Each camp also had a committee of volunteers, supported by UNHCR and the DIS, which conducted night patrols. Refugee women noted an improvement in security at night and also greatly appreciated the possibility to refer to women DIS officers, who made up 25 percent of the DIS workforce in the camps visited and included high-ranking officials. However, the lack of funding for the DIS since early 2012 could threaten the continuity of the DIS and compromise refugees' security.

33. The refugees moved a great deal, mostly in search of economic opportunities that did not exist in the camps (land, employment, trade), for family visits, education and health. While CNARR was issuing free and timely safe-conducts, cases of non-respect of this document by the police had been reported. In addition, the safe-conduct system did not cover cross-border movements, although both agencies recognized that such movements are frequent. As a result, the agencies lacked information about the movements. While the evaluation could not verify it, key informant interviews revealed that some refugees may have been benefitting from assistance on both sides of the border or may have been coming back to the camps only when distributions occurred.
34. The direct effects of food assistance on protection were few but some instances of gender-based violence identified by the evaluation should be noted.
- There was an increase in the incidence of conjugal violence following distributions. Conflicts occurred when husbands sought to constrain their wives to sell part of the ration to purchase alcohol or “luxury” food items (meat, fish). One of the main income-generating activities for women – brewing and selling alcohol, sometimes made with the cereals from the food ration – contributed to an exacerbation of conjugal violence.
 - There was violence against women who ventured outside the camps to grow food or collect firewood, and vulnerable refugee women were sometimes being forced to engage in transactional sex to meet basic needs, including food. Generally speaking, better food security limits the need for refugees, especially women, to resort to strategies that could endanger them.
35. Some exclusion errors in the assistance to PSN in Yaroungou should be noted. While all households headed by women that include children were considered PSN and were thus entitled to food assistance, some of them were being excluded because changes in their marital status were not being correctly assessed; this highlights UNHCR’s difficulty in verifying matrimonial status in the local context.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESULTS

External Factors

36. **Contextual constraints.** There were positive factors found benefitting the development of refugee livelihoods (see paragraph 8). In addition, the ethnic and linguistic proximity between the refugees and local population was found to allow for social and economic ties and the refugees had generally been well received. Also, all the camps visited had permanent markets and were close to markets in neighbouring towns, and the commercial network and the supply of foodstuff worked well.
37. Nevertheless, there were constraints to attaining self-reliance. Agriculture, the main activity of the great majority of refugee households, had its limits. The inadequate traditional production systems and limited land area provided by local authorities to the refugees (preventing them from letting land lie fallow to maintain soil fertility, a necessary practice given how few inputs were used) led to declining yields and production after two or three years.
- “We want to go home. The soil here is so poor. We did our best, but the land is worn out.”*
Refugee man in Yaroungou.
38. The destruction of crops by livestock, pests and striga also causes significant losses as do the recurrent conflicts between (refugee and local) farmers and herders, which are

difficult to prevent and settle given that many herders are protected by the authorities and enjoy impunity. Finally, since 2008 the Maro area has suffered a series of floods, affecting 21 percent and 32 percent of the population of the Moula and Yaroungou camps respectively in 2010, and as many as 42 percent of the Yaroungou refugees in 2011 (UNHCR). The floods led to loss of harvests in varying degrees, affecting the food security and livelihoods of the affected households, and further increasing the pressure on available land.

39. Shorter-term activities were also subject to constraints linked to the depletion of natural resources associated with the arrival of the refugees and to limitations of the daily labour market.
40. **Under-funding.** Recurrent under-funding⁵ had a negative effect both on the rations distributed (see paragraph 49) and on the ability of the agencies to implement activities for livelihoods development. This was due in part to the substantial needs arising from new emergencies in the country, which included an influx of Sudanese refugees from 2003, internal displacements between 2007 and 2010, and drought in the Sahel region since 2011.⁶ In addition, some donors withdrew because they opposed the extended use of GFD in a context considered favourable for self-reliance; the European Commission stopped supporting the food assistance programme after 2010 to focus on the LRRD programme.

Internal Factors

41. **Coherence between objectives and assistance.** Despite the stated self-reliance objectives and a recent convergence of planning between the two agencies in this respect, livelihood-promotion activities were limited, tardy or lacking in relevance. WFP's food-for-work activities, which could have provided work opportunities in a context of high competition for daily work, remained marginal, while cash transfers to replace or supplement reduced GFD were envisaged only very recently. The livelihood support implemented by UNHCR and its partners had been insufficient overall and focused on traditional agricultural systems, which are subject to a number of constraints, while too little attention had been given to suitable alternatives such as support for vegetable gardening, irrigated rice cultivation, soil fertility replenishment, income-generating activities and training.
42. The 2011 relocation of refugees from the Daha camps (situated in the immediate vicinity of the border despite the UNHCR standards, which call for a distance of 50 kilometres) to the Moyo and Koy camps also had a negative effect on the livelihoods of the refugees, who had to start over. A significant number of refugees preferred not to relocate, in spite of losing the benefit of assistance.
43. **Transition strategy.** There was no consensus strategy amongst stakeholders for the transition to self-reliance. WFP had articulated a phase-out strategy in its operational documents but did not always adhere to it. UNHCR established a transition for the Goré camps in 2011. In practice, two different transition models had been adopted.
44. In Yaroungou, GFD was cut in 2007 without the intermediary stage of the reduced ration⁷ and UNHCR's livelihood support activities were replaced by the LRRD programme, which also introduced cost recovery for health, education and water. Since

⁵ Specifically, WFP EMOPS (2003–2006) were only 67 percent and 54 percent funded.


⁶ By comparison, Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad were estimated to total 281,000 in 2011 and the internally displaced persons 180,000 in 2010 (UNHCR).

⁷ Assistance to PSN and ad hoc distributions in the lean seasons continued.

then, there was limited monitoring by UNHCR of the evolution of the situation and coordination with the LRRD actors was limited. Conversely, in the Goré camps, half rations replaced full rations and UNHCR continued a mix of traditional and LRRD livelihood support as cost recovery was introduced for education and water but not for health.

45. The contested reintroduction in Yaroungou of GFD (half rations) in early 2012 on the grounds of a deterioration of the refugees' living conditions suggests that the transition might have been too brutal and the more progressive Goré model has garnered more support. However, it also highlighted a fundamental divergence between partners (including the two agencies and stakeholders of the LRRD project) regarding the fact that, given the local context, integration through self-reliance might imply a certain level of deterioration of some aspects of the refugees' living conditions.
46. The absence of a common strategy is also manifest in the fact that UNHCR opposes the move to replace GFD by targeted distributions for the 25 percent most-vulnerable households, which WFP had planned for the near future – even though increased livelihood support seems a more sustainable solution than continued GFD. The lack of consensus has had a negative effect on refugee participation in, and support for, the transition process, and refugees have strongly opposed any reduction of assistance.
47. **Programme management.** The programme had generally suffered from a lack of supervision and monitoring and evaluation, though the situation improved after a WFP programme officer was assigned to Goré in 2010. A lack of mutual trust between WFP and UNHCR also complicated joint decision-making, which was limited mostly to JAM recommendations – in spite of twice-yearly coordination meetings at the country office level and good coordination at sub-office level.
48. The nutrition programmes suffered from lack of a clear strategy and actions to combat chronic malnutrition, although needs were great and it is one of WFP's corporate Strategic Objectives. Lack of technical skills and weaknesses in monitoring systems, along with low coverage, insufficient screening and surveillance systems, and a lack of specific measures to prevent and treat anaemia, were also noted. A lack of technically qualified partners in the region and high turnover of partners had a negative impact on the nutrition programmes' implementation and outcomes.
49. **Use of rations.** The energy value of rations was often lower than planned. Between October 2007 and August 2008, and again in 2010, the full rations at the Goré camps provided less than 1,500 kcal, and provided only between 1,000 and 1,200 kcal at Moyo and Koy in 2009 and 2010. Rations consistently lacked certain nutrients, which impeded prevention or reduction of the persistent high levels of chronic malnutrition and anaemia. Furthermore, the rations rarely included corn-soya blend, and the lack of supplementary foods was a problem, especially for children under the age of 30 months.
50. Failure to comply with the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) clauses regarding UNHCR provision of fresh foods and WFP facilitation of grain milling⁸ had a negative effect on the use of the GFD rations by the refugees, who had to sell part of the rations to meet their needs. At Moula, Amboko and Yaroungou respectively, 56 percent, 48 percent and 48 percent of the households stated that they had sold part of their ration from the last distribution, usually less than a quarter of the amount received.

⁸ MOUs signed by WFP and UNHCR in 2002 and 2010 divided responsibilities between the two agencies.



Source: 2012 evaluation survey

51. The move in 2010 from monthly to every-other-monthly distributions in the Goré camps (in accordance with the 2009 JAM recommendation to reduce distribution costs) further increased ration-selling because refugee households managed their resources for the short term.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

52. In the first years following displacement, GFD in the form of full rations allowed most refugees to reach acceptable food consumption levels and kept global acute malnutrition under control. In this respect, the expected short-term outcomes were met and the situation of refugees compared favourably to that of the local population on these indicators.
53. On the other hand, the evolution expected over time towards an increased capacity of the refugees to develop their own livelihoods in the medium term and a related ability to maintain their food security despite a reduction in food assistance did not occur, implying that the longer-term outcomes were not met.
54. Despite different periods of residency in Chad, refugees from the S3 (long-term) and S1 (short-term) camps displayed similar characteristics in terms of income sources and wealth levels, which did not match those of the local population. (Conclusions could not be made on the S2 situation, given the special socio-economic characteristics of the refugees in Amboko). As a result of the limited livelihood development of the refugees, the reduction in rations after the first few years of displacement resulted in a deterioration of refugees' food consumption in terms of both quantity and quality, and in an increase in short-term coping strategies. The ensuing need to search for better opportunities than those provided in the camps led to an increase in refugee movements, exposing refugees – and in particular women – to protection issues.
55. The evaluation underlined contextual factors explaining these results: the plots available to refugees were small, which constrained production, yield and ultimately the income derived from agriculture, which was the main activity of most local and refugee

households. Also, while varying access to land, seeds and tools affected the level of agricultural development in the camps, the fact that agriculture developed faster in the camps where GFD was reduced more quickly implies that prolonged GFD of full rations can act as a disincentive for refugees to engage in medium-term economic activities such as agriculture.

56. Prompt implementation of alternatives to GFD could have mitigated that situation. Yet the only complementary activity included in the WFP programmes was food for work, and its implementation remained limited. Similarly, UNHCR's livelihood-support activities were insufficient overall and too focused on constrained agricultural systems, while suitable alternatives such as income-generating activities were insufficiently developed.
57. Other factors limiting progress towards self-reliance included the lack of transition strategy agreed among the two agencies and their partners, which limited common decision-making beyond the JAM recommendations and had a negative impact on an already precarious funding situation. Shortcomings were also noted in programme management, notably for nutrition, worsened by the lack of technically competent partners.
58. Acute malnutrition remained at generally acceptable levels, but chronic malnutrition and anaemia rates remained high over time and were not given sufficient attention. Implying that other factors played a role, the only correlation that the evaluation found between these results and the level of food assistance received concerned the positive impact of full rations on acute malnutrition. It noted some instances of gender-based violence that deserved attention.
59. While most refugees wished to be repatriated eventually, they were not informed of developments in potential return areas. Given the lack of interest in third-country resettlement, the option of integration in Chad appears to be the most likely durable solution in the medium to long term. The evolution towards self-reliance – one of the cornerstones of integration – did not occur, partly because assistance results could have been better, but also because the resources and opportunities available were insufficient to meet the combined needs of the local and refugee populations. Ultimately, the goal of full self-reliance might need to be relativized: a certain level of assistance will continue to be necessary.

Recommendations

⇒ *Longer-term strategies and durable solutions*

60. **Recommendation 1: UNHCR should lead the formulation of a consensus among those providing assistance to refugees on a strategy for the transition to self-reliance.** Such a strategy should: be defined with the concerned relief and development actors in the host area; set realistic goals for self-reliance and integration given the local context; and acknowledge that in certain contexts such as Chad where the population lives below assistance thresholds, self-reliance will imply a worsening of refugees' living conditions. Failing to recognize this will continue to result in incoherent action and lack of consensus among partners.
61. **Recommendation 2: WFP and UNHCR should pursue alternative and complementary activities to GFD congruent with self-reliance objectives.**
 - WFP should consider urgently the introduction of food assistance modalities such as cash and vouchers, food for work, school feeding programmes or vulnerable group feeding as alternatives to GFD.

- UNHCR should enhance its support for traditional livelihoods (agriculture) and increase alternative and complementary activities that have proven effective locally (vegetable gardening, irrigated rice cultivation, soil fertility replenishment, income-generating activities and training).
62. **Recommendation 3: UNHCR should formulate specific criteria for selecting camp locations taking self-reliance objectives into account.** This will help local authorities to select appropriate sites and avoid the need for refugees to relocate.
63. **Recommendation 4: UNHCR and CNARR should monitor refugee movements more closely and facilitate spontaneous returns of refugees to their countries of origin.** UNHCR and CNARR should improve their monitoring and understanding of the motives of refugee movements. UNHCR should encourage CNARR to officially authorize cross-border movements and should support refugee visits to their countries of origin to assess conditions and take informed decisions concerning their return. Finally, WFP and UNHCR should enhance coordination with their respective programmes in the Central African Republic to prevent double-dipping.
64. **Recommendation 5: WFP and UNHCR policy and programme support offices at global level should take note of recommendations 1 to 4,** which are likely to be applicable in displacement contexts beyond Chad where self-reliance objectives are formulated. It is particularly important that in the first years after displacement UNHCR lead formulation of a consensual strategy for the transition to self-reliance and that WFP introduces food assistance modalities alternative to GFD early on so as to support rapid withdrawal from GFD.

⇒ *Programme implementation*


65. **Recommendation 6: WFP and UNHCR should enhance the management, monitoring and evaluation of assistance.**
- Monitoring systems should be enhanced to allow for better-informed decision-making.
 - Given diverging opinions between WFP and UNHCR on the phasing out of GFD, a JAM mission should be conducted soon. Systematic close monitoring of refugees' food security situation and their access to basic services should be undertaken when GFD is reduced or discontinued.
66. **Recommendation 7: WFP and UNHCR should promote enhanced use of food rations by beneficiaries** by respecting the MOU clauses concerning UNHCR provision of fresh foods and WFP facilitation of cereal milling. The frequency of GFD distributions should also be harmonized across the camps and two-month distributions avoided.
67. **Recommendation 8: Protection.**
- UNHCR should set up a monitoring system to track the occurrence and development of protection issues, particularly those related to gender-based violence.
 - UNHCR should also seek to reduce post-distribution conjugal violence; provide alternative income-generating options to women brewing alcohol; and avoid exclusion errors especially of women PSNs.
 - UNHCR should advocate for increased engagement of relevant actors including other United Nations agencies and the Government to address specific protection issues, including those linked to the conflicts between farmers and herders.
 - Finally, donors should continue funding the DIS as long as there are refugees from the Central African Republic.

68. **Recommendation 9: UNHCR should enhance the relevance of nutrition strategies and improve their implementation and monitoring.**

- UNHCR should adopt a flexible, context-specific approach and formulate a specific public health strategy for Dosseye, where acute and global malnutrition rates are higher than in the other camps and deserve particular attention. This should include robust nutrition-promotion actions targeting mothers and fathers.
- A strategy to combat anaemia should also be formulated and active monthly screening for malnutrition of all children under 5 should be implemented in all camps to improve the identification of malnourished children.
- UNHCR should ensure that nutrition surveys are conducted during the same period of the year to improve analysis of changes in malnutrition.
- To improve the management and implementation of nutrition activities, WFP and UNHCR should invest in developing the technical competencies of their own and partners' staff; UNHCR should establish medium-term partnerships with specialists in the prevention and treatment of malnutrition, with a view to reducing high partner turnover rates.

ANNEX

Central African Republic Refugee Camps in Southern Chad



The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Food Programme (WFP) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its frontiers or boundaries.

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CNARR	<i>Commission Nationale pour l'accueil et la réinsertion des réfugiés et des rapatriés</i> (National Commission for the Reception and Reinsertion of Refugees and Returnees)
DIS	<i>Détachement intégré de sécurité</i> (Integrated Security Detachment)
EMOP	emergency operation [WFP]
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GFD	general food distribution
JAM	joint assessment mission
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
PSN	person with special needs
S1, 2, 3	camp representative of situation 1, 2 or 3
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping