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Annual Session**

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EVALUATION REPORTS

Agenda item 7

For consideration



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ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT 2012



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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

Director, OEV*: Ms H. Wedgwood tel.: 066513-2030

Senior Evaluation Officer, OEV: Ms S. Burrows tel.: 066513-2519

Should you have any questions regarding availability of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact the Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513 2645/2558).

* Office of Evaluation

FOREWORD

The Annual Evaluation Report summarizes findings from all the evaluations conducted by the Office of Evaluation during the previous year, and reports on its corporate performance, the evaluation work plan and related evaluation activity.

Partnership is at the core of WFP's role in the international humanitarian system and central to recent international dialogue on, for example, the post-2015 development goals and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Transformative Agenda.

Partnership is also critically important for WFP's intended beneficiaries, whether they are affected by sudden, slow-onset or protracted crises driven by political, economic or governance factors, conflict, natural disasters or climate change.

WFP subscribes to good partnership principles such as equality, transparency, a results-oriented approach, responsibility and complementarity, and reflected in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.

This year's Annual Evaluation Report highlights findings and lessons for WFP's partnerships work, reflecting its appearance as a common theme in all the evaluations completed in 2012.

Helen Wedgwood
Director, Office of Evaluation
WFP

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Evaluation Findings

The ten evaluation reports completed in 2012 all identified major findings relevant to partnerships. They covered a wide range of WFP's work in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, of particular relevance to Strategic Objectives 1, 3 and 4. In addition, the evaluation of WFP's private-sector partnership and fundraising strategy focused on this increasingly important feature of WFP's work in emergency and development contexts, central to its transition from food aid to food assistance.

Partnership was at the core of the logistics cluster and private-sector strategy evaluations, which concluded that WFP is a valued partner and benefits from its partnerships. However, although significant results have been achieved, reaching higher-level objectives will require further development of partnership at all levels.

Cluster operations led to better logistics approaches, with increased coordination enhancing programme delivery and, thereby, the effect of humanitarian operations on affected populations. Cluster operations were found to be relevant and effective, and provided value to participating organizations. WFP's special account for the global logistics cluster, and advance funding mechanisms significantly enhanced the timeliness and likelihood of achieving outcomes.

There was widespread support for WFP's cluster leadership, although engagement in global policy dialogue and outreach declined over time. WFP's financial and reporting systems used by the cluster did not meet partners' need for transparency, which constrained accountability, benchmarking and the quantitative assessment of costs and benefits of common services.

Private-sector support helped fill important funding gaps, especially in WFP's new approaches, and many positive contributions to WFP's objectives were identified, especially from long-term partnerships with corporations in areas such as nutrition and in sudden-onset emergencies. However, internal coordination was weak, and the strategy's insufficient distinction between partnership and fundraising was found to blur boundaries, to the detriment of results on both.

Country portfolio evaluations confirmed WFP's strong logistics and delivery capacity, particularly for large-scale emergency relief operations. Evaluations noted more inclusive and strategic approaches to partnership over time, with increased efforts to coordinate targeting, and enhanced use of vulnerability analysis and mapping, monitoring and evaluation data to inform planning and operations.

Factors limiting effectiveness included an approach to constraints that was sometimes reactive rather than proactive, with an unclear medium-term vision and strategy; insufficient analysis of the root causes of food insecurity; and a tendency to stick to traditional delivery models. Insufficient operational coordination and limited attention to sustainability, capacity development and ownership meant missed opportunities for achieving the potential benefits of a more integrated approach.

The need for strengthened partnerships was acutely evident in the series of joint impact evaluations of food assistance in protracted refugee situations, which found the approach currently implemented not fit for purpose and called for a new strategic partnership among agencies and the international community.

Overall messages on partnership work from the findings of all evaluations conducted in 2012 include the following:

- WFP should improve the articulation and management of roles and responsibilities among offices at the global, regional and country levels.
- Greater attention to equality, mutual benefit, complementarity, comparative advantage and mutual accountability is required in WFP's partnerships, to maximize their potential and shared benefits.
- WFP's work with partners requires more transparency, based on consistently tracked and communicated data regarding costs and benefits.
- Partnership strategy and selection requires more analysis and consistency, especially those with government partners.

Drawing on specific evaluations and syntheses, the following four overarching recommendations are made:


- i) Mainstream the understanding and application of good partnership principles, based on an inclusive and strategic approach to partnerships of all types.
- ii) Reaffirm the importance of country strategies, and clarify their role in WFP's, governance, partnerships, and strategic and operational frameworks.
- iii) Follow through on commitments to strengthen monitoring and reporting systems that will enable WFP to consistently share and report on planning, costs and benefits, results and outcomes.
- iv) Ensure stronger, more consistent application of analytical tools to underpin WFP's programme effectiveness, including conflict, political, livelihoods, gender and partner capacity analysis.

Evaluation at WFP

The Office of Evaluation completed 100 percent of its work plan for 2012, with four of the evaluations conducted jointly. The office continued to promote learning from and use of evaluations through its contributions to strategic decision-making and its evaluation dissemination products. Several evaluations attracted considerable internal and international interest. Guidance for evaluations was updated to improve consistency on analytical transparency, communication and recommendations in particular; and international partnership principles and risk management assessment were integrated into guidance for country portfolio evaluations. Work to improve evaluation coverage of gender and efficiency began in 2012. Staff continued to engage with the international evaluation system, notably on real-time evaluations, gender in evaluation, and the evaluation function peer review mechanism.

The 2013 United Nations Evaluation Group/Development Assistance Committee peer review of WFP's evaluation function will consider progress since the last peer review in 2007, and will take stock of recent corporate initiatives to strengthen WFP's organizational culture, enabling environment and capacity for evaluation. Recommendations from the peer review are expected in 2014, to shape future evaluation strategy within the Office of Evaluation and more broadly in WFP.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “Annual Evaluation Report 2012” (WFP/EB.A/2013/7-A) and WFP management response in WFP/EB.A/2013/7-A/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

1. INTRODUCTION

- Following this introduction, section 2 synthesizes findings from evaluations completed in 2012, concluding with recommendations for WFP. Section 3 reports on Office of Evaluation (OEV) activities, including engagement with the international evaluation system, promotion of learning from and use of evaluation, and improvement in evaluation quality. A brief outline of future developments concludes the report.
- The 2012 evaluation work plan applied the recent evaluation strategy to focus on complex strategic and impact evaluations of multiple operations, aiming to contribute to both accountability and learning. Evaluation syntheses were added to the strategy, to enhance synergy, learning and utility. Table 1 lists the ten evaluation reports completed: two global evaluations, three country portfolio evaluations (CPEs), three impact evaluations, and two syntheses. Figure 1 illustrates their geographical coverage. More details of evaluation coverage are provided in Section 3.


Type	Theme
Global	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Global logistics cluster – Private-sector partnership and fundraising strategy
Country portfolio	<p>WFP's country-level strategic positioning, performance and results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Afghanistan – Somalia – Zimbabwe
Impact	<p>Food assistance in protracted refugee situations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Rwanda – Chad – Bangladesh
Synthesis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Transition from food aid to food assistance – Food assistance in protracted refugee situations

Source: OEV

- While the findings cannot be considered representative of all WFP operations, evaluations in 2012 examined a wide range of WFP's work in fragile and conflict-affected contexts – of particular relevance to Strategic Objectives 1, 3 and 4.¹ In addition, the evaluation of WFP's private-sector partnership and fundraising strategy focused on this increasingly important feature of WFP's work in emergency and development contexts, central to its transition from food aid to food assistance.

¹ Strategic Objectives 1 – Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies; 3 – Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations; and 4 – Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition.

Figure 1: Evaluations by type, 2012



4. Partnership was a common theme of all the evaluations. It emerged from the 2012 synthesis report of Four Strategic Evaluations on WFP's Transition from Food Aid to Food Assistance conducted in 2011. Evaluations of the logistics cluster and joint work with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in protracted refugee situations focused on WFP's partnerships in the humanitarian system. The three CPEs offer insight into WFP's positioning, particularly concerning the increasing priority attached to international humanitarian partnership principles and practice in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, such as at the Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Transformative Agenda.
5. The Principles of Partnership established by the Global Humanitarian Platform (GHP) in 2007² were used to derive the messages from global evaluations. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations were applied in CPEs in Afghanistan and Somalia. Both sets of principles are summarized in Box 1. Major findings, lessons and recommendations relating to partnerships are reflected in the overall messages of this report.
6. Partnership was also applied to the evaluation process, with four of the 2012 evaluations conducted jointly – a record number for OEV. The additional time and complexity are justified by the enhanced outreach, accountability, joint learning and potential utilization as the organizations concerned follow up on the evaluations.

² GHP and United Nations Global Compact. 2007. *Principles of Partnership*.

Box 1: Humanitarian Partnership Principles

Global Humanitarian Platform Principles of Partnership

Equality

Equality requires mutual respect among members of the partnership, irrespective of size and power.

Transparency

Transparency is achieved through dialogue – on an equal footing – with an emphasis on early consultations and early sharing of information.

Result-oriented approach

Effective humanitarian action must be based on reality and action-oriented, with results-oriented coordination of operational capacities.

Responsibility

Humanitarian organizations have an ethical obligation to each other to accomplish their tasks responsibly, with integrity and in a relevant and appropriate way.

Complementarity

The diversity of the humanitarian community is an asset if agencies build on their comparative advantages and complement each other's contributions. Local capacity is one of the main assets to be enhanced and built on.

Source: www.globalhumanitarianplatform.org

OECD/DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations

1. Take context as the starting point.
2. Do no harm.
3. Focus on state building as the central objective.
4. Prioritize prevention.
5. Recognize the links between political security and development objectives.
6. Promote non-discrimination as the basis for inclusive and stable societies.
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts.
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms among international actors.
9. Act fast, but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion.

Source: OECD. 2007. Paris.

2. EVALUATION FINDINGS

7. This section synthesizes significant findings and messages from each evaluation type, and sets out overarching conclusions and recommendations arising from all the evaluations completed by OEV in 2012.

2.1 Global Policy and Strategic Evaluations


8. Building on the IASC's evaluation of the overall cluster system in 2010, the joint evaluation of the global logistics cluster (GLC) was the first evaluation of an individual cluster. It focused on WFP's contribution to the international humanitarian cluster system through development of a global logistics support cell and systems; coordination of global and country-level partnerships; and logistics services provision in emergencies. The evaluation was jointly managed by the evaluation offices of WFP, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The evaluation of WFP's private-sector partnership and fundraising strategy focused on WFP's efforts to mobilize financial and other support for shared goals from private-sector partners, including corporate and non-profit entities and private individuals.

9. Both evaluations were global in scope. In addition to secondary data analysis and document review, surveys and more than 440 interviews, evaluation teams visited eight countries³ and analysed seven more through desk review.⁴ Reflecting the broad reach of both evaluation subjects, the evaluations used participatory workshops to validate findings and shape recommendations.

⇒ *Joint evaluation of the global logistics cluster*

10. This evaluation assessed the overall satisfaction with, and the effectiveness, efficiency, utilization and results of, the cluster's products, services and activities at the global and country levels.
11. Between 2005 and 2011, the cluster was active in 42 humanitarian responses across 29 countries. There was general satisfaction with the activation process, designed to address humanitarian logistics gaps. The evaluation found that cluster operations led to better logistics approaches, with increased coordination enhancing programme delivery and thereby the effect of humanitarian operations on affected populations.
12. The cluster's operations were found to be relevant and effective, and provided value to participating organizations. WFP's special account for the GLC and its advance funding mechanisms significantly enhanced the timeliness and likelihood of achieving outcomes. Stakeholder perceptions of results from working with the cluster are summarized in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Respondents' perceptions of the results of working in partnership with the logistics cluster
(% positive responses)



Source: Joint Global Logistics Cluster Evaluation.

13. The cluster's service provision met partners' needs for transport and warehousing appropriately, and the evaluation refuted suggestions that WFP had benefited more than others from cluster services. There was no common service catalogue at the time of the evaluation, and gaps identified related to the cluster's ability to provide customs clearance and procurement services. However, challenges related to mandate, legal status and risk management limited the GLC's ability to address these gaps.

³ Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan in Africa; Indonesia and Pakistan in Asia; and Haiti and Nicaragua in Latin America and the Caribbean.

⁴ The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal and the Sudan in Africa; Libya in North Africa; and Bangladesh, India and the Kyrgyz Republic in Asia.

14. The support cell's management and staff were mainly oriented towards field support, in line with the objectives of the cluster system; however, the evaluation found that more could have been invested in global-level management, performance monitoring, partnership and the development of tools, guidance and systems.
15. The GLC's work was enabled by considerable donor support, and WFP's mainstreaming of the costs of 9.5 staff positions into its core budget helped to sustain its role, although some funding needs at the global level were unmet.
16. There was widespread support for WFP's leadership, although engagement in global policy dialogue and outreach declined over time, and WFP's financial and reporting systems did not allow the transparency needed for partners' trust. This constrained accountability, benchmarking and quantitative assessment of the costs and benefits of common services.
17. Although the cluster's ability to learn and apply lessons, especially from country-level operations, was hindered by a lack of systematic approaches, the cluster improved over time, largely owing to its core of skilled staff.
18. The evaluation made recommendations for improving the overall work of the GLC through development of a strategic plan, with enhanced organizational structure and decision-making, strengthened management of the cluster's human resources, financial and reporting systems, stronger partnership outreach, and global policy and inter-cluster engagement.

⇒ *Evaluation of WFP's private-sector partnership and fundraising strategy*


19. The 1999 United Nations Global Compact sets the framework for United Nations cooperation with the corporate sector. The Secretary-General issued further guidelines in 2009,⁵ articulating principles for cooperative arrangements with the corporate sector. These principles include advancing United Nations goals, shared values and principles; delineating responsibilities and roles clearly; maintaining integrity and independence; avoiding unfair advantage; and ensuring transparency.
20. The 2008 strategy's objectives were to expand private-sector partnerships and fundraising and establish a self-financing model. Commissioned in the face of the challenging financial environment – particularly for the predictable and flexible funding increasingly needed to achieve Strategic Plan objectives – the evaluation assessed the quality and results of the strategy, how they were achieved, and how WFP's approach could be improved.
21. The evaluation commended the presence of a Board-approved strategy as an additional tool for WFP's governance and accountability in an increasingly important area, and noted that most comparator agencies do not have an equivalent. However, the strategy's insufficient distinction between partnership and fundraising was found to blur conceptual and strategic boundaries, to the detriment of results on both. While motivation for raising funds and entering partnerships was high, more resources and guidance were needed. In addition, the self-financing and management fee model encourages the prioritization of corporate fundraising over long-term partnership for shared goals.
22. Private-sector support has helped fill important funding gaps, especially in WFP's new approaches: 35 percent of private-sector funds support these approaches, compared with 10 percent of WFP's overall funds. Many positive contributions to WFP's objectives were

⁵ Secretary-General of the United Nations. 2009. *Guidelines on Cooperation between the United Nations and the Business Sector*. New York.

identified, especially from long-term partnerships with corporations offering comparative advantages in technical areas such as nutrition, and where corporations had facilities and access that were not available to WFP, including in sudden-onset emergencies.

23. However, the management fee charged on private-sector resources was not applied consistently and caused confusion among partners and inside WFP. Strategy implementation was insufficiently coordinated, with insufficiently clear roles and relationships among the dedicated unit, country and regional offices, and others concerned. The objectives, scope and limits of corporate partnerships were not always clearly defined, and management arrangements did not safeguard sufficiently against conflict of interest.
24. Although good progress was made towards targets for annual income and in-kind contributions, overall results were mixed, with a significant gap between results and 2017 targets. Results did not compare favourably with those of comparator agencies,⁶ all of which showed increases in contributions from private sources between 2009 and 2011. Figure 3 presents the highly variable trend in overall resources raised, with declines in recent years and a persistent gap between the 10 percent target and actual private-sector contributions to total WFP resources. The evaluation concluded that six of nine targets are unlikely to be reached by 2017 without changes in WFP policy and strategy.

Figure 3: Trends in private funding to WFP, 2004–2011



Source: WFP Annual Performance Reports, which do not include extraordinary gifts in-kind.

25. The substantial resources required for developing and maintaining corporate partnerships were not always measured or factored into decision-making. Although they can generate significant in-kind contributions, corporate partnerships tend not to generate the flexible funds that are increasingly necessary to WFP as a food assistance agency. Funding from foundations was underexplored, as was fundraising from the general public, compared with comparator agencies.

⁶ UNHCR, UNICEF, major humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations Global Compact.

26. At 6 percent of the amount raised, fundraising costs were significantly lower than the 25 percent permitted in the strategy. WFP did not apply the management fee consistently or up to the allowable level of 13 percent, and less than half of the available loan was drawn down. These factors limited investment potential and constrained results. All comparators spend proportionately more on private-sector fundraising than WFP.
27. The evaluation recommended developing separate and comprehensive strategies for resource mobilization and partnerships; increasing the pursuit of partnerships and fundraising with the general public and independent foundations; integrating the costs of mobilizing private resources into WFP's overall budget, rather than charging a separate management fee; implementing a prioritized plan for partnership development and fundraising; modifying reporting lines to enhance internal coordination; and revising WFP's due diligence process to address conflict of interest and provide individual project rather than organization-level clearance.

⇒ *Messages related to partnerships*

28. The following messages from the global evaluations relate to international humanitarian partnership principles, based on GHP and Global Compact principles.

⇒ *Internal coordination*

29. **Message 1: WFP should improve the articulation and management of roles and responsibilities among offices at the global, regional and country levels.** The private-sector strategy evaluation cited lack of clear priorities, roles and responsibilities, and disconnected efforts between the country and Headquarters levels. The GLC evaluation cited ambiguities and inconsistencies in reporting lines, staff selection and representation with humanitarian country teams and coordinators
30. **Message 2: WFP's performance was enabled by internal synergies and systems, but coordination could be enhanced.** The GLC support cell's placement in the Logistics Division was found to enable its use of and access to WFP logistics infrastructure, skills, training and tools. The GLC special account and advance funding mechanisms significantly increased timeliness when other actors needed information and predictable support. However, country offices' alignment, understanding and support were cited as posing particular challenges. Over time, country office understanding of the GLC and WFP's responsibilities improved, but remained inconsistent. The Private-Sector Partnerships Division was found to lack the resources to engage with and support country offices' resource mobilization.

⇒ *Complementarity*

31. Both evaluations identified examples of partnerships that built on partners' comparative advantages. The most significant results were found in longer-term partnerships addressing nutrition and emergency response, where companies shared common objectives with WFP, beyond their funding relationships.
32. **Message 3: WFP's comparative advantages often make it a natural partner; to maximize impact, they should be augmented by emphasizing complementarity towards shared goals.** WFP's comparative advantages related to logistics capabilities, country presence, infrastructure, scale, staff skills and a results-oriented culture. Corporate partners recognized that WFP's comparative advantages helped deliver greater benefits to the poor and malnourished than did their other partnerships. However, the private-sector increasingly seeks partnerships that go beyond fund provision and emphasize the

complementarity between corporate social responsibility objectives and wider business objectives.

33. **Message 4: WFP should clearly articulate its partnership strategy with national governments.** Both evaluations found mixed results on whether WFP's efforts were improving national government capacity, systems and country ownership in line with aid effectiveness and international humanitarian engagement principles. While positive examples were found, both evaluations identified strategic gaps in articulating how – or whether – WFP's efforts contributed to national capacity.⁷ The 2011 strategic evaluation of partnerships⁸ noted that WFP's ability to respond to requests for capacity development was limited, and it was difficult to accommodate such requests within short-term project-driven models. The 2012 series of evaluations on food assistance to refugee populations⁹ noted that short-term project modalities also inhibited effective partnerships to promote self-reliance.
34. Connectedness to national governments depended significantly on government capacity and ability to engage. Effective partnerships and hand-over to national governments were more frequently found in development and natural disaster situations than in complex emergencies, where capacity and neutrality challenges limited scope.

⇒ *Equality*

35. **Message 5: Greater attention to equality, mutual benefit and accountability is required in WFP's partnerships, to maximize their potential and shared benefits.** The sheer scope and scale of WFP's capacities make it an attractive partner but may create imbalances that need careful management. Equality was apparent in the GLC's coordination work, reflecting WFP's investment in developing service-oriented skills and practice among logistics staff, including for facilitation, coordination and relationship management. However, GLC service provision tended towards more of a provider–client relationship than a partnership.
36. The private-sector evaluation found that concepts of equality and mutual benefit were not adequately mainstreamed in WFP. WFP's private-sector work emphasized financial contributions rather than full partnerships. While such relationships have elements of mutual benefit and accountability, they are inherently less equal. Partnerships encountered the fewest difficulties when all the partners saw clear advantages in the relationship and agreed on goals and modalities. Both evaluations cited the long-term logistics emergency response team partnership with the United Parcel Service, TNT, Agility and Maersk as an example where the partnership's strength was based on clearly articulated roles, responsibilities and protocols, and the individual strengths of the companies involved.

⁷ The GLC's lack of a clear strategy or agreement among members on its role in building national capacity is partly the result of ambiguous IASC guidance in this area.

⁸ "Summary Report of the Strategic Evaluation – From Food Aid to Food Assistance: Working in Partnership" (WFP/EB.1/2012/6-A).

⁹ "Synthesis Summary Report of the Joint UNHCR/WFP Impact Evaluations on the Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations" (WFP/EB.1/2013/6-C).

⇒ *Transparency*

37. **Message 6: WFP's work with partners requires more transparency, based on consistently tracked and communicated data regarding costs and benefits.** Partners consistently cited the need for WFP to increase transparency, echoing the 2011 strategic evaluation of WFP's partnership work.⁸ Perceived lack of transparency appeared to stem from shortcomings in WFP's monitoring and reporting systems, and its communication of cost-benefit data to partners. Additional requirements consistent with WFP's recent membership of the International Aid Transparency Initiative can be expected.

⇒ *Shared values and principles/maintaining integrity and independence*

38. **Message 7: Partner selection poses challenges for WFP and requires more analysis and consistency.** The nature and management of partnerships vary considerably across WFP's work and changes in WFP practice were recommended by each evaluation. This builds on previous evaluation⁸ findings that WFP had limited selection criteria for determining partnerships, which hindered a more strategic approach to partner selection.
39. Due diligence criteria for selecting private-sector partners were inconsistently applied. Due diligence processes for corporate partnerships were usually applied once at the macro-level. A conflict of interest was identified in that due diligence assessment was undertaken by the department that depended on generating funding under the self-financing model. The evaluation recommended transferring the responsibility for due diligence reviews, and assessing due diligence at the project level, rather than granting general clearance to corporations, to ensure that ethical issues at the project or country level are addressed.
40. The GLC operates as an open partnership in which actors are not vetted and can opt in or out at any time. This poses challenges when actors follow different principles or have limited capacity to deliver services. Establishing common ethical principles for coordinating or collaborating with corporate and military actors is particularly difficult, given the multiplicity of policies and principles. The evaluation suggested establishing a strategic advisory group, groups of like-minded partners based on stakeholder mapping, and clear articulation of partner responsibilities.

2.2 Impact Evaluations

41. The series of impact evaluations assessing the contribution of food assistance to durable solutions in protracted refugee situations was completed in 2012. These evaluations were conducted jointly with UNHCR, using a common evaluation framework to facilitate synthesis of findings. These were OEV's first joint impact evaluations, and the synthesis evaluation report was the first presented to WFP's Executive Board.
42. The international community has long aimed to support refugees in leading self-reliant, independent lives. After long collaboration in providing assistance to refugees, in 2002 WFP and UNHCR adopted a new Memorandum of Understanding – updated in 2011 – renewing their commitment to shift from a refugee care and maintenance approach towards supporting self-reliance and durable solutions. For WFP this meant going beyond in-kind food distribution to include food for work (FFW), improved nutrition interventions, innovations in food procurement, new delivery modalities, capacity development and support for livelihoods pending durable solutions involving integration into the host community, resettlement or repatriation for refugees.

43. The series evaluated four situations with long-term UNHCR/WFP collaboration, and assessed the effects and contribution of food assistance for refugees encamped for long periods – usually more than 20 years – in Bangladesh, Chad, Ethiopia and Rwanda.
44. Each evaluation collected primary data and analysed trends in nutrition indicators such as global acute malnutrition (GAM), severe acute malnutrition and chronic malnutrition/stunting rates, where available. Household food security was measured using the food consumption score, household dietary diversity score and coping strategies index.
45. The evaluations assessed the effects against the intended results of a logic model derived from UNHCR and WFP documentation. As summarized in Table 2, this model posits that the two agencies' combined efforts would contribute to increased self-reliance over three stages following refugee arrival: the *short term*, with hunger alleviation, increased food consumption, basic security and protection; the *medium term*, with improved nutrition status and livelihood capacity; and the *long term*, with self-reliance pending the durable solutions of local integration, resettlement or repatriation. The series as a whole tested the validity of the logic model and overall approach, and the extent to which strategies were effective, realistic and credible, especially from the beneficiary perspective.

TABLE 2: SUMMARY LOGIC MODEL OF FOOD ASSISTANCE IN PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS		
Period	Assistance	Expected Results
Short term	Emergency response assistance	Lives saved; improved food consumption; safety and protection; minimal self-reliance
Medium term	Transition from emergency response with complementary interventions, e.g. water, sanitation, education, housing	Improved food basket: improved nutrition status – acute and chronic malnutrition; improved education; increased capacity to establish livelihoods; income-generating activities
Long term	Livelihood interventions; asset building	Refugee self-reliance; local integration; resettlement or repatriation

Source: Evaluation documentation

⇒ *Food security and nutrition*

46. The evaluations confirmed the positive impact of food assistance on immediate hunger alleviation. The overall nutrition situation was of grave concern in all cases, but trend analysis of refugee GAM rates identified positive effects of food assistance over time and when compared with local host population GAM in all four countries. As Figure 4 indicates, in Chad, GAM rates in camps were fairly stable, close to the internationally defined “acceptable” level of 5 percent, and usually better than rates among the local population. In Ethiopia, the trend since 2005 was positive, except for a spike in 2009, but GAM remained above “acceptable” levels. In Rwanda, GAM rates in camps ranged from 5 to 10.6 percent in 2008, the only year for which data was available at the time of the evaluation.¹⁰ Data for Bangladesh show a deteriorating trend, from “serious” towards “critical” – 15 percent or more – for all refugees. However, rates in refugee camps were similar to or better than those in the local host population, and substantially better than

¹⁰ A 2012 UNHCR nutrition assessment recorded improvements in GAM rates to between 2 to 3 percent.

those among unregistered Rohingya living in makeshift camps, whose 30 percent GAM rates were double the World Health Organizations's (WHO's) "critical" threshold.

Figure 4: GAM rates among surveyed population groups



47. Funding constraints and pipeline breaks reduced some rations to below the 2,100 kcal/day standard, with deficiencies in proteins and micronutrients. In Rwanda, refugees never received the intended ration package. In Chad, a reduction to half rations led to reduced quality and quantity of food consumption, especially as planned complementary activities were not adequately provided.
48. Over the medium term, the limited effect of food assistance on food security was reflected in unacceptably high proportions of refugee households, especially those headed by women, remaining food-insecure, with low dietary diversity, and high anaemia and stunting rates in all four cases. Except for in camps in Chad receiving full rations, barely half or less of the refugee households attained acceptable food consumption scores. Chronic malnutrition rates were at or above 30 percent – the serious threshold – in all cases, and were critical in Rwanda, at above 40 percent. However, the situation was better for refugees receiving food assistance than for unregistered Rohingya in Bangladesh, and for the local population in Chad.

⇒ *Self-reliance and livelihoods*

49. Over the longer term, the evaluations found that the expected evolution towards self-reliance did not happen. There was limited support for livelihoods capacity in all cases, and livelihood options were very limited. Refugees did not have access to formal labour markets, except in Rwanda, or adequate land for agriculture, except in Chad. As a result, the most common work for refugees was informal labour in poor and risky conditions, competing with local populations. In Bangladesh, the value transfer of food assistance influenced choices of economic activity, resulting in registered refugees having higher-skill and less risky employment than unregistered Rohingya.

50. With limited livelihood options, refugees had to use alternative coping strategies in a household economy ruled by the distribution cycle. The main sources of income and collateral were food rations and non-food items, which were sold and exchanged primarily to meet basic needs and pay for milling, health services and school expenses.
51. *Protection and gender.* Women generally managed household food supplies and bore the burden and risks of indebtedness. However, except for in Rwanda, women's participation in camp committees remained limited. In all four cases, women's livelihood activities were especially precarious and often exposed them to risk. Many women and adolescent girls relied on activities such as collecting fuelwood, begging and domestic service; transactional and survival sex were common.
52. Refugees generally reported feeling safer inside camps, but protection issues were reported inside camps in all four cases. Women were more vulnerable in all cases, because of domestic violence and their search for livelihood opportunities. In food-insecure households, girls and women were sometimes forced into early and unwanted marriages.
53. The evaluations indicated considerable variation in protection support, with interventions against sexual and gender-based violence tending to be reactive and failing to address the root causes, as perceived by refugee women and girls.

⇒ *Host community relations*

54. The evaluations presented a mixed picture of relations between refugees and host populations. This relationship was never purely antagonistic or purely harmonious, although it tended to be better where there was cultural affinity. Conflict typically occurred when food assistance to refugees was perceived as ignoring the needs of local poor people and/or when refugees competed with local people for work and scarce natural resources. UNHCR/WFP had very limited engagement with host communities, and missed opportunities for synergies.

⇒ *Factors influencing the results*

55. Two contextual factors stood out: donor funding policies and host government policies. Long-term support for protracted refugees fits uneasily with conventional donor funding's differentiation between humanitarian and development assistance. This resulted in serious funding shortfalls and inadequate support for progress towards self-reliance. Mobility and access to job markets are essential for self-reliance. In all four countries, host governments did not permit formal integration of refugees, insufficient land was made available and mobility was restricted.
56. The most prominent factors influencing results that are within WFP's control were missed opportunities for synergies involving livelihoods and social protection programmes with host populations; poor follow-up to joint assessment missions and weak joint action planning; inaccurate recording and infrequent revalidation of refugee households; insufficiently frequent and poorly timed distributions of non-food items; and inadequate monitoring of food distributions.
57. The overarching conclusion from the series is that the intended evolution towards self-reliance has not occurred. The international community's response to refugees in protracted crises is failing to deliver. To resolve the issues blocking progress, there is need for concerted action among all actors, backed by political will and financing to enable refugees to make productive contributions to the countries where they live, and to support other long-term durable solutions where possible.

58. Recognizing that WFP and UNHCR cannot solve this failure alone, the synthesis calls for a change in paradigm and makes five recommendations: for WFP and UNHCR to develop a strategy and management mechanisms to ensure a transition to self-reliance, using a more holistic approach and establishing the appropriate partnerships at the corporate and country levels; for IASC to strengthen the international accountability architecture for delivering this shared responsibility; for United Nations country teams to engage livelihood actors and build political will for a new approach; for donors to overcome funding barriers; and for WFP and UNHCR country teams to develop joint programme strategies to ensure support to the transition to self-reliance.

2.3 Country Portfolio Evaluations

59. Much of WFP's work is in complex, fragile, conflict-affected or unstable contexts. The 2012 CPEs of Zimbabwe, Somalia and Afghanistan reflect this¹¹ and bring the total in this series to 12 since its introduction in 2008/09. A CPE assesses the strategic positioning and choices, performance and results of the portfolio of all WFP operations and activities in a country, and supports evidence-based decision-making for future strategy and programming in line with WFP's Strategic Plan. The evaluations covered the periods 2006–2010 in Zimbabwe, 2006–2011 in Somalia, and 2010–2012 in Afghanistan.

⇒ *Context and WFP operations*


60. All three countries faced acute humanitarian and food security needs. In Zimbabwe, 10 to 15 percent of households are food-insecure during peak hunger periods. Somalia and Afghanistan receive some of the world's highest per capita levels of humanitarian assistance, with famine declared in six regions of Somalia in 2011. In all three countries, the collapse of basic services particularly affected women and children.
61. Humanitarian need was exacerbated by instability and conflict, restricting humanitarian space and limiting WFP's access to populations in crisis. Extreme volatility, complex political economies, and the merging of aid and political agendas complicated WFP's strategic and operational decision-making. In Somalia and Afghanistan, active conflict had impacts on WFP's operational coverage.
62. WFP portfolios in all three countries were large-scale operations based mostly on general food distribution (GFD). For example, at its peak in 2009, WFP's emergency operation (EMOP) absorbed almost 50 percent of the United Nations' budget in Somalia, targeting nearly 50 percent of the country's population or more than 3 million people. Most of the Somalia portfolio was for relief, with a 2009 EMOP superseding the 2006–2008 protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO). The Afghanistan portfolio was a mix of relief and recovery, including a large food-for-education component and an EMOP in 14 drought-affected provinces.
63. Instability and volatility were marked features of WFP's operations in all three countries. The Zimbabwe portfolio covered two periods, shifting from large-scale GFD aid in 2006–2008 to a more flexible programme with innovative approaches from early 2009, responding to macroeconomic recovery and political stabilization.
64. Volatile funding levels drastically affected coverage in Afghanistan and Somalia, as plans were not matched by donor contributions. In 2009, the Afghanistan PRRO was WFP's second largest – with 9 percent of WFP's global budget – targeting 7.6 million people with a budget of US\$1.2 billion; a year later, food distribution had

¹¹ All three countries appear on the World Bank's Harmonized List of Fragile Situations 2012.

dropped by 40 percent, from more than 250 to 150 million mt. As indicated in Figure 5, this food reached only 76 percent of planned beneficiaries, with funding down to just 45 percent of planned.


65. In Somalia, as Figure 5 shows, the size of the operation increased and decreased by 300 percent within three years. In all three countries, WFP was highly dependent on a narrow donor base: one donor provided 60 percent of Somalia funding; two provided 73 percent for Afghanistan; and four provided 75 percent for Zimbabwe. When these contributions declined or became unavailable, WFP had to contract its operations, with the implications for beneficiary coverage illustrated in Figure 6. Such circumstances highlight the difficult prioritization choices faced by WFP when high levels of food insecurity continue, and the importance of robust analysis to underpin decisions.

Figure 5: Food distributed



Sources: Standard Project Reports (SPRs) 2006–2011. Data for 2011 are from the Afghanistan and Somalia CPEs only.

Figure 6: Actual beneficiaries



Sources: SPRs 2006–2011. Data for 2011 are from the Afghanistan and Somalia CPEs only.

Strategic Positioning

⇒ *Alignment with food security/humanitarian need*

66. The 2012 CPEs found that WFP portfolios were broadly relevant to humanitarian needs, with modalities making some adjustments to contextual change. In Zimbabwe, WFP shifted from general food distribution in the early period, to pilot testing of new modalities as economic recovery began. However, in Somalia and Afghanistan, WFP tended to stick to traditional programming responses in crisis situations, with insufficient search for alternative delivery models to improve relevance. There was insufficient analysis of food aid as an effective response to humanitarian needs of different groups such as pastoralist households in Somalia, or vulnerable women in Afghanistan; its potentially distorting effects on local agriculture and livestock economies; and the implications of political shifts and trends.

⇒ *Alignment with international principles and good practice*

67. While the Zimbabwe CPE concluded that WFP largely succeeded in navigating the complex environment, the Afghanistan and Somalia evaluations found that it did not fully align with the principles of international good practice for humanitarian and development actors in fragile situations. Lacking full conflict analysis at the design stage, portfolio management – particularly in the early phases – was insufficiently conflict-sensitive in adjusting to volatile operating environments, including political dynamics. WFP's insufficiently rigorous risk and conflict analyses in the face of blurred humanitarian and political boundaries sometimes made it difficult to sustain the principle of impartiality. The evaluations found that lessons were applied in both countries later in their portfolio periods, with adjustments in partnership approach and operating modalities promising a more conflict-sensitive approach.

⇒ *Alignment and partnerships with State actors*

68. As found in other CPEs, WFP faced tensions in seeking alignment with State actors while responding to the humanitarian imperative. The evaluations confirmed WFP's continued efforts to coordinate with government, even where opportunities were limited. In Zimbabwe, land reforms and political orders resulted in large-scale displacement of urban populations. Although WFP's support programme to internally displaced persons was not initially aligned with national policy, sensitive handling attracted recognition and support from the authorities. WFP helped develop and operationalize important national policies, including the food deficit mitigation strategy. In Somalia and Afghanistan, humanitarian actors faced the challenge of partnering governments whose legitimacy was contested by other national actors. In both countries, WFP sought to work alongside credible State authorities, although the Somalia CPE found insufficient sensitivity to the political ideologies of opposing forces.

⇒ *Coherence and coordination – WFP's role in the humanitarian partnership*

69. In Afghanistan and Zimbabwe, CPEs found a continued trend of strong coordination in the United Nations partnership at the country level, with WFP leading in the food security cluster. In Somalia, in contrast, the evaluation found difficult relationship in the humanitarian community, and a tendency for WFP to work alone during the first half of the portfolio period. Despite the recent adoption of a more inclusive approach, the evaluations illustrate the continuing challenges in managing the complex set of accountabilities to the United Nations and broader humanitarian partnership.

70. As recorded in previous Annual Evaluation Reports (AERs), WFP's operational coordination was limited, with scope for greater partnership on the ground. Cooperating partners were viewed as implementers rather than full partners, especially in the initial periods, but all three evaluations found evidence latterly of a more strategic approach.

Making Difficult Choices

71. WFP often operates in turbulent and hazardous contexts requiring difficult choices. For example, the evaluations acknowledged that WFP continued operations in Afghanistan and Somalia despite insurgent attacks and rapidly shrinking humanitarian space: since 2008, 13 WFP staff and contractors and 5 partner staff have been killed on duty in Somalia.

⇒ Risk management

72. Risk management received substantial attention in the evaluations, reflecting its critical importance for WFP, and the importance of corporate decisions and guidance. Findings were mixed, with the Zimbabwe report praising WFP's willingness to take well-calculated risks based on good use of information to make critical tactical shifts in response to changes on the ground. In contrast, weak analysis of contextual and reputational risks compromised WFP's effectiveness in Somalia, especially during the early period covered by the evaluation. Contingency planning was absent, despite the rapid expansion of WFP's food aid coverage to nearly half Somalia's population and the risks associated with dependency on a narrow donor base in a highly politicized environment. WFP's poor coordination with partners and eventual withdrawal from parts of Somalia were found to increase risk for already vulnerable populations.

73. "Leakage" of commodities was a prominent concern in Afghanistan and Somalia. Reports of corruption in Somalia by the United Nations Monitoring Group resulted in two external audits, both of which found unsatisfactory results. A stronger focus on compliance monitoring and security has since been adopted in both countries. In Afghanistan, WFP's measures to manage and mitigate the extreme degree of risk in the operating context included creating a risk register and increasing the focus on internal compliance. However, the Somalia evaluation notes that although robust risk management systems are essential in volatile situations, they should not compromise or distract attention from WFP's Strategic Objectives, monitoring and management for results, and outcomes.

⇒ Use of analysis

74. The use of analysis to guide strategic choices was commended in the Zimbabwe evaluation, and WFP portfolios in all three countries were based on available food security data, while recognizing its limited reliability. In Somalia, WFP's longstanding collaboration with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on food security information systems was a particularly successful technical relationship, providing a model for global agreement on information systems for food and nutrition security.

75. The CPEs praised WFP's use of vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) data to inform its own programming in Afghanistan and Zimbabwe, and government and donor decisions and programming. However, this was not the case in Somalia, where wider sharing of information with the humanitarian community was recommended. VAM units were considered understaffed in relation to needs in Afghanistan and Somalia.

76. The evaluations identified several important gaps in WFP's use of analytical tools – including conflict, do-no-harm, political, gender, social and livelihoods analyses – with major effects. For example, the evaluation linked WFP's forced withdrawal from southern

and central areas in Somalia to its insensitivity towards *al-Shabaab*'s rejection of food aid. Recent progress included a move from allocation planning to strategic review and response analysis in Somalia; greater recognition of diverse needs based on local livelihoods analysis; and the commissioning of analyses for more nuanced political appraisal in Afghanistan.

77. The Zimbabwe and Somalia CPEs did not systematically report on gender issues; the Afghanistan evaluation assessed WFP's efforts on gender as unsystematic and shallow. There was an absence of clear vision and goals, strategic partnerships, accountability processes and internal training. The Somalia evaluation found some prioritization of women in FFW and food-for-training (FFT) activities, and all three CPEs noted targeting of women and children in relief activities, but this does not equate to a gender-sensitive or mainstreamed approach.

⇒ *Monitoring and evaluation systems*

78. The unsatisfactory quality of WFP's monitoring systems has been a recurrent theme of previous AERs. The 2012 CPEs reflected this weakness but also noted some recent improvements.
79. Zimbabwe was commended for its use of information in the design of cash-and-voucher (C&V) pilots. In Somalia and Afghanistan, weak systems in the first half of the portfolio periods were recently strengthened, with standard operating procedures and third-party monitoring arrangements where WFP staff access was impossible. While both evaluations raised concerns about the effectiveness of these arrangements, recent efforts to strengthen them were noted. Both offices invested in improving accountability to local populations through beneficiary hotlines, although concerns were raised regarding their effectiveness.
80. Monitoring has tended to focus on compliance and the input-output level. Outcome monitoring and evaluation of the type needed to inform strategic programming decisions remains a major challenge, and outcome reporting linked to WFP operations was widely variable. All the evaluations make recommendations in this regard.

Effectiveness: Performance and Results

81. As in previous years, CPEs encountered a scant evidence base for assessing longer-term outcomes, impacts and sustainability, but were able to report on WFP's shorter-term effectiveness in the three countries.

⇒ *Relief*

82. Most of WFP's relief activities, including GFD and some nutrition activities, are directed to Strategic Objective 1. Others, such as those supporting populations affected by HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (TB), relate to Strategic Objective 4:
- Large-scale GFD was a major constituent of all three portfolios. WFP's capabilities in logistics and coverage were consistently praised, although some operations suffered reduced funding, pipeline breaks, access difficulties, constrained operational space, and some leakage. Emergency food distribution was acknowledged as being critical in Zimbabwe and Afghanistan, but the Afghanistan CPE found it the "least robust of all WFP activities in terms of meeting its primary objectives". The Somalia evaluation found GFD most problematic in terms of accountability and beneficiary value.
 - Nutrition and supplementary feeding operations targeted women and young children, people suffering from TB, and people living with HIV and AIDS. Operational constraints hindered effectiveness, but greater progress was found than in previous

years, with improvements in beneficiary food consumption and reductions in acute undernutrition. Support to TB patients showed particularly encouraging effects: all three CPEs reported the contribution of food assistance to clinic attendance and cure rates, although the Zimbabwe report noted that gains were not sustainable beyond the period of beneficiary eligibility. WFP also made useful upstream contributions in nutrition, including supporting the development of new national food security/nutrition policies in Somalia and Afghanistan

⇒ *Recovery*

83. Recovery interventions included school feeding, food for assets (FFA) and FFT:

- School feeding programmes were diverse in scale: in Afghanistan, WFP targeted all 34 provinces with 25 percent of PRRO resources; in Somalia, only 10 percent of primary schools in northern areas were covered; and in Zimbabwe, schools mainly provided distribution venues for vulnerable group feeding. Results echoed the mixed findings of the 2011 AER, with some evidence of increased enrolment in Somalia, but weaker results in Afghanistan, where a detailed study found no significant gains in enrolment overall. While recognizing the challenges, the evaluations identified concerns over which WFP has some control, including targeting errors, limited performance data, and an absence of capacity development or hand-over strategies.
- Food-for-assets programmes were relatively small portfolio components in Somalia and Zimbabwe, but larger in Afghanistan. CPEs found a positive trend in the assets created, and increasing community asset creation scores in Afghanistan. Implementation challenges constraining effectiveness included limited partner capacity; a piecemeal approach to design; a lack of year-to-year continuity; and sustainability concerns, although a more cohesive and integrated approach was recently adopted in Afghanistan.
- Food-for-training initiatives in Somalia and Afghanistan were successfully targeted, but results on post-training employment rates were mixed. Both CPEs identified the need for a strategic shift in design from a mechanism based on delivering food rations to more comprehensive and sustainable contributions to community welfare.
- Cash-and-voucher transfers were used in very small proportions of all three portfolios. Results were mixed, and found to be most successful in Zimbabwe, where the food entitlements of beneficiary households were met over the evaluation period. The Afghanistan pilot encountered confusion over beneficiary groups, but opened new avenues for WFP to engage in safety net assistance for the urban poor. However, the evaluation also noted a programming risk associated with WFP's sporadic engagement and the raising of expectations that may not be sustained in a declining funding trend. The Somalia evaluation did not support WFP's decision not to use cash transfers, citing incorrect assessment of market capacity and use of such transfers by FAO, UNICEF and NGOs.

⇒ *Efficiency*

84. Findings on efficiency referred to efforts to improve internal controls within WFP, which were significant in Somalia and Afghanistan. In Somalia, WFP adopted targeted vulnerable group feeding in the latter part of the portfolio period, in an effort to reduce exclusion errors. Pipeline breaks had significant effects on the timeliness of delivery in Somalia and Afghanistan, but not in Zimbabwe. In Afghanistan, efforts were made to increase local production through the Purchase for Progress (P4P) programme, but only on a small scale. C&V modalities were not of sufficient scale to affect the overall efficiency of the portfolio.
85. Efficiency issues are especially complex in unstable and conflict-affected situations, where there are higher delivery costs and risks of pipeline breaks and fewer options for local commodity procurement. In Zimbabwe, regional and local procurement kept direct costs per metric ton relatively low. The Afghanistan and Somalia portfolios both incurred high delivery costs resulting from the extreme conditions. For instance, the Somalia evaluation calculated that the average 2011 price of sorghum on the local market was 44 percent of the cost to WFP of purchasing and transporting an equivalent amount.

⇒ *Sustainability*

86. Sustainability, ownership and national capacity development are reflected in international principles for good practice in fragile contexts and relate closely to Strategic Objective 5. Despite successes with individual institutions in all three countries, the evaluations echo previous years' findings regarding insufficient focus on capacity development, ownership and sustainability in WFP's planning and operations. The Afghanistan and Somalia CPEs emphasized the need for a medium-term vision and strategies for sustainability and national ownership of food security responses; the Zimbabwe CPE advised WFP to continue leveraging its experience, expertise, credibility, and strategic position for the development and implementation of a national social protection framework.

⇒ *Country portfolio evaluation conclusions*

87. The CPEs confirmed WFP's strong logistics and delivery capacity, particularly for large-scale emergency relief operations. They also provided evidence of encouraging recent efforts in the use of analysis, VAM, monitoring and evaluation data to inform planning and operations, and the use of pilots for testing alternative modalities and food assistance innovations. All three evaluations commended recent efforts to coordinate targeting and food security analysis with other actors in the countries, and to adopt more inclusive and strategic approaches to partnership.
88. Factors limiting effectiveness included an approach to operational constraints that was reactive rather than proactive, with an unclear medium-term vision and strategy in two of the countries; insufficient analysis of conflict and the political economy as root causes of food insecurity; and a tendency to stick to traditional delivery models of GFD. The evaluations observed insufficient operational coordination, internally and with other actors, which affected overall portfolio coherence and led to missed opportunities for multiplying the potential benefits of a more integrated approach. They also noted the lack of focus on sustainability, capacity development and ownership.

2.4 Overall Conclusions and Recommendations

89. The evaluations conducted in 2012 were highly relevant to WFP's prominence in humanitarian response, and all made observations concerning the importance of partnerships in achieving WFP's increasingly complex objectives.
90. WFP is a valued partner and benefits from its partnerships. However, although significant results have been achieved, reaching and sustaining higher-level objectives requires enhanced partnerships at all levels. A broader and more strategic partnership perspective is needed, underpinned by clarity on the different types of partnership, the opportunities that each provides and their different requirements.
91. The 2012 evaluations emphasized WFP's need to strengthen and diversify its funding base to obtain the flexible and predictable funds required for achieving all of its Strategic Objectives in increasingly complex contexts. An enhanced funding base will support better risk management and reinforce WFP's actual and perceived impartiality, especially where political and humanitarian boundaries are blurred.
92. The need for enhanced partnerships was particularly prominent in the series of evaluations on the contribution of food assistance to durable solutions in protracted refugee situations. The evaluations found that current international and local partnerships are not fit for purpose, and refugees are paying the price for the failures of agencies to follow up on joint assessment missions, and to exploit opportunities for synergies and partnerships that support livelihoods; and the failures of host governments, donors and the international community to overcome barriers to effective support.
93. Many of the messages on partnerships raised by the global evaluations were echoed across all the 2012 evaluations:
- WFP should improve its articulation and management of roles and responsibilities among offices at the global, regional and country levels.
 - WFP's partnerships should pay greater attention to equality, mutual benefit, complementarity, comparative advantage and mutual accountability, to maximize their potential and shared benefits.
 - WFP's work with partners requires greater transparency, based on consistently tracked and communicated data regarding costs and benefits.
 - Partnership strategy and selection requires more analysis and consistency, especially for partnerships with governments.

Recommendation 1: Mainstream the understanding and application of good partnership principles. This mainstreaming should be based on an inclusive and strategic approach to partnerships of all types, and requires investment and leadership from senior management in setting expectations and monitoring standards, developing capacity and incentives for staff development, and providing guidance and support. This recommendation builds on recommendations from specific evaluations, including the global and strategic evaluations calling for clearer partnership and funding strategies.

94. As reflected in the international humanitarian reform dialogue, the 2012 evaluations confirm that the traditional divide between emergency and development is not appropriate for addressing the complex challenges that WFP encounters. Country portfolio and other evaluations reaffirmed the importance of medium- to long-term country strategies that

recognize relief–development dynamics; place partnership, capacity development, ownership and sustainability at centre stage; and set out a clear approach to national government and international humanitarian alignment issues, based on stronger political, conflict and related analysis.

Recommendation 2: Reaffirm the importance of country strategies, and clarify their role in WFP’s governance, partnership, strategic and operational frameworks. Country strategies should take a medium- to long-term approach that recognizes the dynamics of relief and development; is centred on capacity development, ownership and sustainability; sets out a clear approach to alignment issues with national governments and international humanitarian actors; and facilitates stronger and mutually accountable partnerships that support WFP’s new approaches and enhance synergies on the ground.

95. Senior management recognizes the importance of transparency and accountability, which are central to the organizational strengthening and change management process launched in 2012. Evaluations in 2012 found some evidence of recent progress in monitoring, but improvements are still needed, especially regarding consistency and outcome monitoring, essential for results reporting and for satisfying the transparency and accountability needs of partners and programme participants.

Recommendation 3: Follow through on commitments to strengthen monitoring and reporting systems that will enable WFP to share and report on planning, costs and benefits, results and outcomes consistently. This will require appropriate and sustained investment in and management of the roll-out of the 2012 Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy to ensure adequate systems and staff capacity for data collection, analysis and use in decision-making at all levels. Progress will depend on the clarity, feasibility and comprehensiveness of indicators and measures; the practicality and coherence of systems aligned to contextual and Strategic Plan requirements; and effective management and leadership.

96. The evaluations reaffirmed VAM as a strength, although they identified capacity concerns in highly complex contexts such as in Afghanistan and Somalia. Several evaluations highlighted the need for more engagement with the development of national systems, especially for safety nets and livelihoods support, and noted the risks associated with sporadic engagement. Use of tools such as the conflict, political, partner and livelihoods analysis vital for effective programming was found to be variable. These tools are especially relevant in the complex and fragile settings of much of WFP’s work, and critical for guiding difficult strategic choices in the challenging and rapidly changing contextual and funding environments increasingly faced by managers.

Recommendation 4: Ensure more consistent application of analytical tools to support WFP’s programme effectiveness – including strengthened VAM, conflict, political, livelihoods, gender and partner capacity analysis – to shape locally appropriate programme design within broader country office and national strategies, particularly in high-risk, fragile and conflict-affected situations.

3. EVALUATION AT WFP

97. The Office of Evaluation monitors its performance against WFP's corporate framework for management results and performance indicators, developed in 2010. This section of the AER reports on many of these indicators, starting with a review of the implementation status of the 2012 evaluation work programme – OEV's performance against plans. It then outlines activities undertaken to: i) promote learning from and use of evaluation; ii) improve the quality of evaluations and the evaluation function in WFP; and iii) engage with the international evaluation system. OEV's use of human and financial resources in 2012 is reported, concluding with a brief look ahead.

3.1 Evaluation Activities in 2012

98. The Office of Evaluation's focus on complex, strategic and impact evaluations covering multiple operations imply that many evaluations start in one year and are completed in the next. For example, last year's AER reported that only five of the evaluations planned for the 2010/2011 biennium were completed in 2010, with all 21 completed by the end of 2011. In line with WFP's shift to annual planning cycles, data on 2012 performance against plans (Table 3) details evaluations starts and completions¹² separately.

99. In 2012, OEV started 108 percent of planned evaluation starts, and completed 100 percent of planned completions. The higher than planned start rate was because the Timor-Leste CPE was brought forward at the request of the Regional Director, to enable findings to inform major programming decisions by mid-2013.


Evaluation type OEV Workplan	Country portfolio	Impact	Global	Synthesis	Total
Planned starts 2012	4	5	1	2	12
Additional requests in 2012	1	0	0	0	1
Actual starts 2012	5	5	1	2	13
Start rate 2012 (%)	125	100	100	100	108
Planned completions 2012	3	3	2	2	10
Actual completions 2012	3	3	2	2	10
Completion rate (%)	100	100	100	100	100

Source: OEV.

100. Overall evaluation coverage data vary according to the mix of evaluations undertaken. The 2012 work plan contained more single-country and fewer global evaluations with multiple country cases than the 2011 plan. Figure 7 indicates 2012 evaluation coverage by region.

¹² Start = when budget expenditure starts. Preparatory work not requiring expenditure may be carried out before this date. Completion = date of final approval of evaluation report by Director, Office of Evaluation. Reports approved at the end of a calendar year may be presented to the First Regular Session of the Executive Board in the following year.

Figure 7: 2012 evaluation coverage, by WFP region (completed evaluations)



Source: OEV.

3.2 Activities to Promote Learning from and Use of Evaluation

⇒ *Evaluation consultations with Board members*

101. At the annual consultation on evaluation in May 2012, WFP Board members provided guidance on priorities for evaluation and discussed the findings of the 2011 AER. The WFP Secretariat continued the practice – started in 2010 at the request of Board members – of organizing an informal round-table consultation prior to each Board session, for more detailed discussion of tabled evaluation reports. These sessions have been well attended and have enriched interactions among the Board, management and OEV in preparation for formal Board sessions.

⇒ *Closing the learning loop*

102. The Office of Evaluation promotes the use of evaluation evidence in WFP management's decision-making on policies and operations through: i) information products designed for specific audiences; ii) timely provision of evaluation information and lessons to strategic decision-making processes; and iii) post-evaluation learning and dissemination events. In 2012, within the resources available, OEV aimed to increase such use by:

- i) building more learning events into the evaluation process, for evaluation users to consider and give feedback on draft recommendations before their finalization; and
- ii) proactively or on request, contributing to regular and one-off events and decision-making processes organized by others; the Evaluation Brief *Evaluation into Use: How the Office of Evaluation Stimulates Learning for Programme Improvement* gives more details.

⇒ *Learning events during the evaluation process*


103. In 2012, workshops with internal and external stakeholders were held near the end of five evaluation processes: the CPEs of Somalia and Afghanistan; the evaluation of WFP's private-sector partnership and fundraising strategy; the joint WFP/UNHCR impact evaluation of food assistance in protracted refugee situations in Bangladesh; and the joint evaluation of the global logistics cluster. The workshops enhanced understanding of evaluation findings and the factors that drive them, clarified evaluation messages, and helped ensure that final recommendations were relevant, realistic and focused.

104. *Input to strategic decision-making processes.* Following the early-2012 publication of the four strategic evaluations on dimensions of WFP's shift from food aid to food assistance, OEV presented a synthesis of findings to a retreat of Operations Department senior management and regional directors. Evaluation evidence was also provided to the Mid-Term Review of the Strategic Plan 2008–2013, the organizational strengthening and realignment process, development of the private-sector strategy and the update of the School Feeding Policy. OEV provided inputs for the new Strategic Plan 2014–2017, the Strategic Review Committee, and the Policy Committee.
105. *Other learning events.* The GLC evaluation was presented at a regular cluster partners' meeting and to a meeting of GLC donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs in Geneva. As this was the first independent evaluation of an individual cluster, and was also a joint evaluation, its findings, approach and methodology generated considerable interest from other humanitarian actors and evaluation professionals.
106. *Regular information products.* Evaluation briefs were prepared for all evaluation reports completed in 2012. With the increase in tailor-made approaches and syntheses, no new "top ten lessons"¹³ were produced. The slower development of WFP country strategies reduced the demand for evaluation country syntheses¹⁴ to supplement the programme of CPEs.
107. *Website development.* In line with WFP's evaluation policy, all OEV's evaluations are accessible in the evaluation library on WFP's official website. The evaluation site also provides information on OEV's objectives and work programme, the types of evaluation undertaken, and the tools employed.
108. For the first time, web statistics are available, as shown in Figure 8. The total – 3,566 – number of single visitors to the intranet site and the percentage of returning visitors, especially on the intranet site, are encouraging. However, the 2,300 visitors to the public website are fewer than desired.

¹³ Syntheses of lessons from multiple evaluations on a single topic.

¹⁴ Syntheses of lessons from past evaluations in a single country that are relevant to preparation of a country strategy.

Figure 8: Evaluation websites, new versus returning visitors



3.3 Evaluation Quality Improvement

109. In 2012, the Canadian International Development Agency published the *Review of the World Food Programme's Humanitarian and Development Effectiveness (2006–2011)*. As this was based on the contents of 52 WFP evaluations published between 2006 and 2011, it first assessed the quality of that evidence base and found that:

All 52 evaluations in the sample were found to be sufficient quality to be included in the review. Of a possible maximum total quality of score of 45, the mean score for all evaluations was 38. [...] Only five evaluations had a score of 30 or less. The quality criterion related to evaluation findings and conclusions being 'relevant and evidence-based' is of primary importance. For this quality criterion, the mean score averaged across all evaluations in the sample was 3.8 out of a maximum score of four.

110. The review identified the need for improvements in evaluation coverage of efficiency, environmental sustainability and gender. The need for gender coverage was underlined by an assessment under the auspices of the United Nations System-Wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, which rated OEV's 2012 evaluations as "approaches the requirements of [United Nations Evaluation Group] UNEG gender-related norms and standards".

111. The United Nations Evaluation Group and the OECD/DAC Evaluation Network carried out their first Peer Review of WFP's Evaluation Function in 2007, leading to the current Evaluation Policy. Five years later, in recognition of significant changes in WFP's external and internal environment, with direct implications for the future of WFP's evaluation function, the Executive Director requested a follow-up peer review. Preparations began in 2012, and the review will be conducted in 2013.

112. Significant internal changes include the Framework for Action to Strengthen WFP initiated by the new Executive Director, which emphasizes improving business processes for measuring results and building a culture of accountability; preparation of WFP's new Strategic Plan for 2014–2017; and roll-out of a new monitoring and self-evaluation strategy. Developments in the external environment since 2007 include the IASC Transformative Agenda to improve coordination, accountability and learning in the humanitarian system; the ongoing debate about United Nations system-wide arrangements for evaluation; the post-2015 international development goals; and the Busan Declaration's priorities for partnership and mutual accountability.

113. The peer review will focus on the strategic level, reviewing current evaluation policy and arrangements, to ensure that WFP's overall evaluation function is fit for purpose for the coming period.
114. To complement and prepare for the peer review, OEV conducted an internal organizational review, resulting in adjustments to the OEV management structure, functional roles and evaluation quality management systems.

⇒ *Office of Evaluation staff skills and knowledge development*

115. During 2012, 90 staff days – 5 percent of working time – were spent on professional development overall. This is well above OEV's target of 2 percent, compensating for lower rates in 2011. Several staff members participated in evaluation conferences and "webinars" organized by networks of evaluation professionals on technical evaluation topics.
116. In addition, OEV maintained internal staff groups or communities of practice focusing on the types of evaluation being conducted, to facilitate skill and knowledge development. Topics were selected in response to staff needs and included exchanging practices, methodologies and tools to support the systematic use of WFP and international evaluation standards.

3.4 Engagement with the International Evaluation System

117. The Office of Evaluation continued to participate in the inter-agency real-time evaluations working group convened by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and participated in the inter-agency real-time evaluation of the Horn of Africa crisis.
118. The Office of Evaluation remained active in UNEG, participating in the group's task forces on impact evaluation, joint evaluation, peer review, human rights and gender equality. The Director became Vice-Chair of UNEG and a steering group member for an independent assessment to determine UNEG's future strategic direction. OEV also engaged with the independent system-wide evaluation of Delivering as One, was consulted on an evaluation of OCHA and was used as a comparator for the evaluation of UNHCR's evaluation office – both conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations Secretariat.
119. The Office of Evaluation was selected to make presentations at professional events: the annual conferences of the Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation and the American Evaluation Association; the UNEG Evaluation Practice Exchange; and an evaluation seminar held by the Danish International Development Agency. OEV was represented at the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action annual general meeting, the European Evaluation Society conference, a FAO symposium on food and nutrition security and an International Fund for Agricultural Development seminar on impact evaluation.

3.5 Human and Financial Resources for Evaluation


120. This section reports on the resources available to OEV, as distinct from the resources that may be dedicated to the evaluation function elsewhere in WFP.

121. *Human resources.* Despite significant staff turnover in 2012, OEV maintained its full staff complement and the 50:50 balance between professionals on rotation and externally recruited experts set by WFP's Evaluation Policy. Over the year, OEV's professional staff positions were 99.5 percent occupied. The overall number of positions in OEV did not change, but a Junior Professional Officer was assigned to OEV for a year from August 2012, and junior consultants continued to be hired as evaluation analysts. Table 4 provides details of the established staffing situation, and Annex III provides the full list of staff.

TABLE 4: OFFICE OF EVALUATION STAFFING, 2012				
	WFP staff on rotation	Externally recruited evaluation specialists	Locally recruited	Total
Director (D2)		1		1
Senior evaluation officers (P5)	1	2		3
Evaluation officers (P4)	3	1		4
General service staff (G6 and G5)			3	3
TOTAL	4	4	3	11

122. Building on recent positive experience of using long-term agreements (LTAs) to procure specialist evaluation expertise, six new LTAs were established in 2012, bringing the total to ten: 97 percent of the 70 independent evaluation consultants hired in 2012 were contracted through LTA firms; 76 percent of these consultants constituted new contacts for OEV, bringing fresh specialist expertise; and 11 consultants participated in more than one evaluation. Other hiring methods included contracting individuals. No other competitive tenders were required in 2012.

123. Average evaluation team size was 5.8 members. As shown in Figure 9, 56 percent of team members were men and 44 percent women, representing a 4 percent increase in female membership since 2011, and a 9 percent increase since 2010; 79 percent of consultants were from developed countries and 21 percent from developing countries – a drop of 7 percent since 2011, but these figures do not include local research teams subcontracted in-country by the main WFP contractor and used extensively for impact evaluations. OEV also hired eight consultants on short contracts for assignments to improve evaluation quality and use.

Figure 9: Composition of evaluation teams

124. **Financial resources.** The 2012 Management Plan allocated US\$4.89 million for OEV staff and non-staff expenditure. All funds for non-staff costs were spent, and OEV raised an additional US\$50,000 from UNHCR to complete the series of joint WFP/UNHCR impact evaluations of food assistance in protracted refugee situations.
125. The 2012 Programme Support and Administrative (budget) (PSA) allocation represented a 2 percent increase in total resources (staff and non-staff) over the annual equivalents in the 2010–2011 biennium; but no actual increase in non-staff resources, which are used for implementing evaluations and related activities, such as quality improvement and closing the learning loop. The ratio of resources allocated to OEV to total WFP expenditure remained at 0.13 percent.
126. This resourcing level prevented coverage by operations evaluations – each of a single operation – commensurate with the 2008 evaluation policy, a gap also noted in AER 2011. However, as anticipated in the Outlook section of AER 2011, during 2012 OEV worked with the Budget and Programming Division, the Performance Management and Reporting Division and the Operations Department to agree on an approach to single-operation evaluations in line with WFP’s new organizational design and strengthening process, the monitoring and self-evaluation strategy, wider approaches to corporate risk management, and OEV’s lead role in setting standards and developing capacity for evaluation.

3.6 Evaluation Outlook

127. In late 2012, the Executive Director approved a new funding mechanism to launch a series of single-operation evaluations in 2013, funded from direct support costs. The series will be designed to be handed over by 2015 to the appropriate units within the management line as a system for conducting decentralized single-operation evaluations with maximum efficiency in evaluation management. Hand-over arrangements will be aligned to the roll-out of the new WFP organizational design and the monitoring and self-evaluation strategy, and will take into account the findings of the UNEG/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer review of WFP’s evaluation function.

128. Assuming adequate resourcing, OEV will also maintain the current evaluation strategy through 2013 and 2014, focusing on: i) complex evaluations of multiple operations, jointly with partners where appropriate, aiming to contribute to both accountability and learning at strategic levels; ii) syntheses of evaluation series to enhance synergy, learning and utility; and iii) more sustained promotion of organizational learning and use of evaluation evidence in decision-making.
129. The outlook for beyond 2015 has been left open to allow OEV to respond to emerging evaluation needs and priorities as a result of i) the new WFP Strategic Plan and associated organizational development processes; and ii) the UNEG/DAC peer review of WFP's evaluation function to take place throughout 2013.

ANNEX I

FACT SHEETS FOR COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATIONS

Afghanistan (2006–2011)

Timeline, funding level, beneficiaries by activity and food distribution

Operation	Title	Timeframe	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
PRRO 200063	Enhancing Resilience and Food Security in Afghanistan	Apr. 2010–Mar. 2013					Req.: US\$1 100 364 923 Contrib.: US\$454 967 745	2013
Special Operation (SO) 200092	Provision of Common Humanit. Air Service to United Nations agencies, NGOs and counterparts in Afghanistan	Jan. 2010–Dec. 2011					Req.: US\$39,726 786 Contrib.: US\$27 844 278	
SO 107080	Provision of Emergency Telecommunications Service to Humanitarian Community in Afghanistan	Oct. 2007–Feb. 2008		Req.: US\$323 212 Contrib.: US\$323 212				
SO 105140	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service	Apr. 2006–Dec. 2009		Req.: US\$67 404 174 Contrib.: US\$57 624 699				
PRRO 104270	Post-Conflict Relief and Rehabilitation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	Jan. 2006–Mar. 2010		Req.: US\$877 317 083 Contrib.: US\$688 552 577				
P4P	Purchase for Progress	Mar. 2010–Mar. 2015					Req.: US\$31 114 170	2015
Food distributed (mt)			114 515	217 008	248 807	275 955	145 267	163 803
Direct expenses (US\$ millions)			94.8	133.7	204.8	206.6	168.8	194.3
% direct expenses: Afghanistan vs. world			4	5	6	5	4	5
Beneficiaries (actual)			M 4 F 2 467 675 2 262 834	M 5 F 3 450 009 3 314 867	M 6 F 4 521 773 4 173 494	M 5 F 4 734 855 4 291 065	M 4 F 3 397 888 3 158 159	M 5 F n.a. n.a.
Total beneficiaries (actual)			4 730 509	6 764 876	8 695 267	9 025 910	6 556 047	6 972 839

Sources: Food distributed, SPR; direct expenses, APRs 2006 – 2010; actual beneficiaries, SPR.
Total WFP expenses at global level (World)


LEGEND Funding Level
> 75%
Between 50 and 75%
Less than 50%

Activities by operation and beneficiary share

	Education	Nutrition	GFD	Cash	FFW/FFA/FFT	HIV
PRRO 200063	X	X	X		X	X
PRRO 104270	X	X	X	X	X	X
SO 200092	—	—	—	—	—	—
SO 107080	—	—	—	—	—	—
SO 105140	—	—	—	—	—	—
Planned % of beneficiaries	58	1	29	1	1	1
Actual % of beneficiaries	55	1	26	1	16	1

Source: WFP Dacota

% Planned beneficiaries by activity



Donors:

United States of America, Japan, India, United Kingdom, Australia

Partners:

Government of Afghanistan, seven international agencies and 80 NGOs


Note: Acronyms are written out in the acronym list at the end of this document.

Somalia (2006–2011)

Timeline, funding level, beneficiaries by activity and food distribution*

Operation	Title	Timeframe	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
PRRO 101911	Food Aid for Relief and Protection of Livelihoods	Aug. 2006– Mar. 2007	Req.: US\$507.9 Contrib.: US\$367.4					
PRRO 101910	Food Aid for Relief and Recovery in Somalia	Jan. 2006– Mar. 2007	Req.: US\$122.0 US\$101.6	Contrib.:				
EMOP 10812	Food Aid for Emergency Relief and Protection of Livelihoods	Apr. 2009– Jun. 2011				Req.: US\$639.9	Contrib.: US\$352.7	
SO 10801	Targeted Augmentation of Security Requirements in Somalia Vital to the Continuity of Relief Assistance	Dec. 2008– Apr. 2009			Req.: US\$2.9 Contrib.: US\$2.9			
SO 10681	Humanitarian Air Services in Support of Relief Operations in Somalia	Aug. 2007– Jul. 2011			Req.: US\$83.1 Contrib.: US\$61.1			
SO 10619	Somalia Inter-Agency Security Telecommunications	Jun. 2007– Jan. 2008		Req.: US\$0.9 Contrib.: US\$0.4				
SO 10578	Emergency Rehabilitation Works for Logistics Infrastructure in Somalia	Feb. 2007– Dec. 2011		Req.: US\$43.0 Contrib.: US\$18.1				
Food distributed (mt)			78 089	93 952	217 539	334 569	106 726	106 397
Direct expenses (US\$ million)			53.5	67.7	178.8	267.9	119.8	137.4
% Direct expenses: Somalia vs. world			2	2	5	7	3	4
Beneficiaries (actual)			M F	M F	M F	M F	M F	M F
			673 000 798 000	724 850 801 150	1 267 815 1 516 715	1 570 410 1 634 510	988 421 1 039 551	688 561 653 604
Total beneficiaries (actual)			1 471 000	1 526 000	2 784 530	3 204 920	2 027 972	1 342 165

Sources: Food distributed, SPR; direct expenses, AFRs 2006–2010; actual beneficiaries, SPR. Requirements (Req.) and contributions (Contrib.) are in US\$ millions. * CPE does not cover the famine response of late 2011.




Activities by operation and beneficiary share

	Education	Nutrition	GFD	FFW/FFA/FFT	HIV
PRRO 101911	X	X	X	X	X
PRRO 101910	X	X	X	X	X
EMOP 10812	X	X	X	X	X
Planned % of beneficiaries	6	15	74	4	1
Actual % of beneficiaries	5	8	82	4	1

Source: WFP Dacota

% Planned beneficiaries by activity**



** Education includes school meals and take-home rations; Nutrition includes targeted and supplementary feeding and supplementary feeding for pregnant and lactating women

Donors: United States of America, private donors, Spain, Canada, United Kingdom

Zimbabwe (2006–2010)

Timeline, funding level, beneficiaries by activity and food distributed

Operation	Title	Timeframe	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
PRRO 10595	Protracted Relief for Vulnerable Groups in Zimbabwe	May 2008–Apr. 2010				Req.: US\$602.7 Contrib.: US\$428.0	
SO 10822	Logistics Coordination and Provision of Tertiary Transport in Support of the Humanitarian Community's Response to the Cholera Outbreak in Zimbabwe	Mar. 2009–Apr. 2010				Req.: US\$1.0 Contrib.: US\$0.8	
REG PRRO 10310	Assistance to Populations in Southern Africa Vulnerable to Food Insecurity and the Impact of AIDS	Jan. 2005–Jul. 2008	2005 Req.: US\$830.6 Contrib.: US\$692.1 (total allocated budget for OMJ)				
Food distributed (mt)			183 015	147 452	216 804	216 269	107 408
Direct expenses (US\$ million)			98.8	97.9	155.6	154.4	80.1
% Direct expenses: Zimbabwe vs. world			4	4	44	39	2
Beneficiaries (actual)			M F	M F	M F	M F	M F
Total beneficiaries (actual)			1 368 452 1 501 750	1 368 452 1 501 750	2 394 085 2 600 877	2 540 204 2 751 888	852 135 937 999
			4 275 176	2 870 202	4 994 962	5 292 092	1 826 134

Source: Food distributed, SPR; direct expenses, APRs 2006–2010; actual beneficiaries, SPR.
Requirements (Req.) and contributions (Contrib.) are in US\$ millions.
Total WFP expenses at global level (World)


LEGEND Funding Level
> 75%
Between 50 and 75%

Activities by operation and beneficiary share

	PRRO 10595	Planned % of beneficiaries	Actual % of beneficiaries	REG PRRO 103310	Planned % of beneficiaries	Actual % of beneficiaries	Planned % beneficiaries PRRO 10595 and REG PRRO 10310	Actual % beneficiaries PRRO 10595 and REG PRRO 10310
HIV	X	9	9	X	9	4	9	7
Education	X	6	4	X	16	9	1	6
FFW/FFA/FFT		—	—	X	0	0	0	0
GFD	X	85	87	X	75	87	81	87
Nutrition		—	—	X	0	0	0	0
C&V	X	0	0		—	—	—	—

Source: WFP Dacota.

% Planned beneficiaries by activity*

**Donors:**

United States of America, United Kingdom, Australia, the Netherlands, Canada

Partners:

Government of Zimbabwe, 4 International Agencies and 39 NGOs

* Cash and Vouchers, FFW and Nutrition are included as activities but figures are 0% due to a low absolute figure of beneficiaries not captured by the %

ANNEX II

FACT SHEETS FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS

Food Assistance to Refugees in Protracted Situations – Rwanda


PRRO funding levels against full project period

Type	WFP project no,	Title	Timeframe	Total WFP cost (US\$)	% funded
PRRO	105310*	Assistance to Refugees and Recovery Operations for the Most Vulnerable Households	Jan. 2007–Dec. 2009	54 033 547 ¹	61.9 ¹
PRRO	200030	Assistance to Refugees, Recovery Support to Host Communities and the Most Vulnerable Households	Jan. 2010–Dec. 2011	39 143 591 ²	64.1 ²


¹ Resource Situation
1 Feb 2011 (PRRO 105310)

² Resource Situation
25 Jan 2012 (PRRO 200030)



*PRRO 105310 was planned to start in January 2007 but actually started in July 2007. Before that, the regional PRRO was operating in Rwanda.



Source:
SPR (2007–2010);
Project document 200030
(planned 2011);
Executive Brief (actual as of
December 2011)



Source: UNHCR Statistical Yearbook.



Sources: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database; WFP SPRs.

WFP operations by activity (number of refugees shown, when disaggregated data are available)

Operation	Supplementary feeding	Therapeutic feeding	GFD	FFW
PRRO 105310	X	X	2007: 50 981 2008: 51 803 2009: 53 719	X*
PRRO 200030	X	**	2010: 53 004 2011: 53 434	o***
Average			52 588	

*FFW is for the host population.

**Therapeutic feeding activities handed over to UNHCR at end of 2008.

***No FFW due to limited funding

Source: WFP SPRs 2007–2010 & WFP Executive Brief (as of 19 Jan 2012)

Donors: Multilateral funders, United States of America, Japan, Canada, Ireland, Finland, Turkey, Luxembourg, United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), United Nations, Norway


Partners: Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Africa Humanitarian Action, American Refugee Committee, Forum for African Women Educationalist, German Technical Cooperation, Jesuit Refugee Service

Food Assistance to Refugees in Protracted Situations – Bangladesh



PRRO funding levels against full project period

Type	WFP project no.	Title	Timeframe	Total WFP cost (US\$ millions)*	% funded
PRRO	100451	Assistance to the Refugees from Myanmar	Jan. 2002–Dec. 2003	4.4	82
PRRO	100452	Assistance to the Refugees from Myanmar	Jan. 2004–Dec. 2005	4.5	84
PRRO	100453	Assistance to the Refugees from Myanmar	Jan. 2006–Dec. 2008	8.4	89
PRRO	100454	Assistance to the Refugees from Myanmar	Jan. 2009–Dec. 2010	9.8	59
PRRO	200142	Assistance to the Refugees from Myanmar	Jan. 2011–Dec. 2012	10.8	66


*Latest SPR. project document. budget revision.



Source: SPR (2002–2011)



Sources: UNHCR Statistical Yearbook for 2006–2009. webHIS for 2010–2011.



Sources: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database. WFP SPR.

Donors: United States of America, Canada, Australia, Japan, Germany, Others

Partners: Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, Ministry of Health, UNICEF, UNFPA, *Action contre la faim*, Bangladesh Red Crescent Society, Research Training and Management International, Technical Assistance Incorporated, CONCERN, Handicap International, MSF Holland, CARITAS, IFRC, Austcare, SHED




Food Assistance to Refugees in Protracted Situations – Chad


PRRO funding levels against full project period

Type	WFP project no.	Title	Timeframe	Total WFP cost (US\$)	% funded
IR-EMOP	102860	Food Assistance for Refugees from the Central African Republic in Chad	Jun. 2003–Jul. 2003	197 436	93
EMOP	102950	Food Assistance to Refugees from the Central African Republic in Southern Chad	Jul. 2003–Mar. 2005	4 496 373	67
EMOP	102951	Food Assistance to Refugees from the Central African Republic in Southern Chad	May 2005–Feb. 2006	5 665 571	54
PRRO	105100	Assistance to Central African Refugees in Southern Chad	Mar. 2006–Apr. 2010	36 656 975	83
PRRO	200059	Assistance to Central African Republic Refugees and Host Population in Chad	Apr. 2010–Dec. 2011	28 958 353	85


Source: SPRs, Resource Situations



Source: SPR



Sources:
 Total refugees: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database (2003–2009)
 2010 figures: UNHCR Global Report 2010
 WFP Assisted: SPR



Source: UNHCR Statistical Yearbook

Donors:

Algeria, Denmark, European Commission, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Nigeria, United Kingdom, Switzerland, UN CERF, United States of America, Private Donors and Multilateral Funds

Partners:

ACRA, ACT\FLM, African Concern, Belacd, CARE, CND, COOPI, CSSI, DED, Habdoul Al-Amdoulaye, ID, Johanniter, KRATA\Kindamedro, Mekesna, Solidarites, UJAP, UNICEF, UPR\UPRM

ANNEX III

OFFICE OF EVALUATION STAFFING AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2012

Director	Helen Wedgwood	(From 8 January 2012)
Senior Evaluation Officer	Jamie Watts	
Senior Evaluation Officer	Sally Burrows	
Senior Evaluation Officer	Marian Read	
Evaluation Officer	Claire Conan	(On special leave without pay until 22 February 2012)
Evaluation Officer	Diane Prioux de Baudimont	
Evaluation Officer	Elise Benoit	(Temporary Duty Status (TDY): 9 January - 22 February 2012) (Staff member: From 3 September 2012)
Evaluation Officer	Michel Denis	(To 27 August 2012)
Evaluation Officer	Ross Smith	
Programme Officer Junior Professional Officer (JPO)	Lorraine De Limelette	(From 31 August 2012)
Evaluation Analyst	Cinzia Cruciani	
Evaluation Analyst	Federica Zelada	
Evaluation Analyst	Jan Michiels	(To 25 September 2012)
Consultant	Antigoni Dimitriadou	(From 26 November 2012)
Senior Administrative Assistant	Roberta Fenix	(From 1 December 2012)
Senior Administrative Assistant	Rosa Netti	(To 31 October 2012)
Senior Staff Assistant	Eliana Zuppini	(To 31 August 2012)
Senior Staff Assistant	Luisiana Lopez	(From 3 December 2012)
Senior Staff Assistant (TDY)	Valerie Olivier	(From 10 September 2012 to 30 November 2012)
Administrative Assistant	Kathryn Bell-Greco	(From 1 March 2012)
Office Assistant	Marta Nasisi	(From 1 November 2012)

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

ACRA	<i>Cooperazione Rurale in Africa e in America Latina</i>
ACT/FLM	Action by Churches Together/ <i>Fondation Luthérienne Mondiale</i>
AER	Annual Evaluation Report
CND	<i>Centre national de déminage</i>
COOPI	<i>Cooperazione Internazionale</i>
CPE	country portfolio evaluation
CSSI	<i>Centre de support en sante internationale</i>
DED	<i>Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst</i>
EMOP	emergency operation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFA	food for assets
FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GFD	general food distribution
GHP	Global Humanitarian Platform
GLC	global logistics cluster
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ID	<i>Initiative développement</i>
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
LTA	long-term agreement
MSF	<i>Médecins sans frontières</i>
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee
OEV	Office of Evaluation
P4P	Purchase for Progress
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
SO	special operation
SPR	Standard Project Report
TB	tuberculosis
TDY	temporary duty status
UJAP	<i>Union des jeunes agriculteurs de la Pende</i>

UN CERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
UNEG-DAC	United Nations Evaluation Group-Development Assistance Committee
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UPR/UPRM	<i>Union des producteurs de riz/Union pour la promotion de la production du riz à Maro</i>
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping