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EVALUATION REPORTS

Agenda item 6

For consideration



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SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT – THE SUDAN COUNTRY PORTFOLIO (2010–2012)

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

Director, OEV*: Ms H. Wedgwood tel.: 066513-2030

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Should you have any questions regarding availability of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact the Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645).

* Office of Evaluation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Sudan portfolio is one of WFP's largest and most complex portfolios, with high security risks, limited access to affected populations, restricted operating environments and severe logistics challenges. The portfolio was implemented during a time of considerable change in the Sudan, with the separation of South Sudan in 2011, insecurity and access restrictions in border areas, and increasing insecurity in Darfur.

WFP's 2009–2012 country strategy objectives included a gradual shift to recovery activities. Annual emergency operations provided emergency, early recovery and safety net activities. The portfolio was characterized by relatively good funding, with few shortfalls and more than 80 percent coverage of planned beneficiaries each year. It was significantly scaled down over the evaluation period, with an overall reduction of 41 percent in beneficiaries reached.

WFP's strategic direction was found broadly coherent with the Government's strategic framework and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for the Sudan. While WFP has made efforts to move away from general food distributions, newly occurring emergencies and the high percentage of in-kind funding limits the extent and pace of this shift.


The evaluation found the WFP portfolio to be broadly coherent with international humanitarian principles. Although restricted access to areas not held by the Government led to the exclusion of populations in need of emergency relief, the evaluation concluded that WFP Sudan's approach to negotiating humanitarian access was in line with its mandate and corporate policy and maximized the reach to remote populations, albeit with some compromises.

The portfolio's scope was broadly relevant to humanitarian needs. In Darfur, WFP provided life-saving food assistance and started piloting recovery and livelihoods projects through food for work, assets and training. Although small in scale, these activities were well received by beneficiaries and in line with longer-term needs. In addition to ration reductions, refined targeting and more accurate beneficiary lists have enabled the portfolio to maintain beneficiary coverage.

Overall, reporting on results has been based largely on outputs and limited in content and reliability, especially given the scale of WFP operations in the Sudan, constraining empirical assessment of portfolio effectiveness.

The evaluation makes four main recommendations focusing on improvements in partnerships and coordination, strategic shifts to longer-term planning, monitoring and assessment, and targeting.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report – The Sudan Country Portfolio (2010–2012)” (WFP/EB.2/2013/6-C) and the management response in WFP/EB.2/2013/6-C/Add.1, and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

Fact Sheet: WFP Sudan Portfolio 2010–2012

Timeline and Funding Levels of Sudan and South Sudan Operations

Operation	Title	Time Frame	2010	2011	2012
SO 200470	Logistics Augmentation and Coordination in Support of Humanitarian Operations in South Kordofan	Aug 12 - Dec 12			Req: \$ 249,972 Contrib: \$250,000
SO 200354	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Sudan	Jan 12 - Dec 12			Req: \$ 34,533,260 Contrib: \$ 26,389,784
EMOP 200312	Food Assistance to Vulnerable Populations Affected by Conflict and Natural Disasters	Jan 12 - Dec 12			Req: \$ 412,476,013 Contrib: \$ 308,283,930
EMOP 200151	Food Assistance to Vulnerable Populations Affected by Conflict and Natural Disasters	Jan 11 - Dec 11		Req: \$ 571,935,941 Contrib: \$ 530,629,860	Legend Funding Level > 75% Between 50 and 75% Less than 50%
SO 200073	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Sudan	Jan 10 - Dec 11	Req: \$ 109,654,231 Contrib: \$ 94,757,183		
EMOP 200027*	Food Assistance to Populations Affected by Conflict	Jan 10 - Dec 10	Req: \$849,456,701 Contrib: \$ 693,472,160		
SO 108450	Operational Augmentation for WFP and NGO Partners in Darfur in Support of EMOP 107600	May 09 - Nov 10	Req: \$ 27,322,864 Contrib: \$ 5,893,862		
SO 103422	UNJLC-United Nations Joint Logistics Centre, Common Logistics Services, Logistics Planning and Facilitation, and Support to Non-Food Items and Emergency Shelter Sector	Apr 08 - Dec 11	Req: \$ 28,545,860 Contrib: \$ 20,498,315		
SO 103680	Emergency Road Repair and Mine Clearance of Key Transport Routes in Sudan in Support of EMOP 100482	Aug 04 - Aug 11	Req: \$ 260,241,888 Contrib: \$256,584,721		
DEV 101050*	Country Programme Sudan	Apr 03 - Aug 10	Req: \$46,762,529 Contrib: \$ 40,523,550		

Source: SPRs 2010-2012, latest Resource Situations

* Reported figures for 2010 include both Sudan and South Sudan

Direct Expenses, Food Distributed and Actual Beneficiaries

Direct Expenses (US\$ millions) *	619 684 000	434 000 000	299 193 000
% Direct Expenses: Sudan vs. World*	15%	12%	7%
Food Distributed (mt) - Sudan only	407 255	329 890	265 507
Total of Beneficiaries (actual) - Sudan only	6 069 938	5 497 820	3 560 883

Source: SPRs 2010-12, Programme Division WFP Khartoum Country Office, APR 2010 - 12


* Reported figures for 2010 include both Sudan and South Sudan

% of Actual Beneficiaries by Activity (Sudan only)

Distribution of Portfolio Activities

Operation	Activity	HIV/AIDS & TB	Education	Nutrition	GFD	FFW/FFT/FFA	Cash/Milling vouchers
EMOP 200312			X	X	X	X	X
EMOP 200151			X	X	X	X	X
EMOP 200027		X	X	X	X	X	X
DEV 10105.0			X			X	

Source: Project documents. SPRs 2010-2012



Source: Programme Division WFP Khartoum Country office

Top five donors: United States of America, European Commission, Japan, Canada, Switzerland.

Partners: Government of the Sudan, Humanitarian Aid Commission, 50 international NGOs and ten United Nations agencies.

PREFACE

1. In July 2011, the former country of the Sudan officially separated into two states: the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. This evaluation focuses on the current Republic of the Sudan, and all references to “the Sudan”, unless otherwise specified, refer to the Republic of the Sudan.
2. Prior to the separation, WFP operations were managed from the WFP Regional Bureau in Khartoum, with a network of area and sub-offices across the country. Since July 2011, WFP has been running independent operations from two separate country offices in Khartoum and Juba.
3. The evaluation reference period was 2010–2012, but the evaluation team did not consider any work undertaken in the areas now located in South Sudan. To the extent possible, the figures, statistical information or other data presented for the initial 18 months of the evaluation period use disaggregated data from WFP Khartoum, unless specifically indicated. Information may therefore differ from the data and figures presented in WFP’s Standardized Project Reports (SPRs) for 2010 and 2011, which used consolidated information.

INTRODUCTION

Evaluation Features

4. The Sudan country portfolio evaluation (CPE) conducted between January and June 2013, covered the 2010–2012 period and assessed: i) strategic alignment and positioning; ii) factors driving decision-making; and iii) performance and results. The evaluation serves accountability and learning objectives, and was timed to correspond with the 2009–2012 WFP country strategy and associated United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and to provide recommendations for design of the operation to begin in 2014.
5. The evaluation team required government approval and permits for travel, so could not reach non-government-held areas. As this was a non-essential mission, it was agreed that the team would not travel to some newly accessible border areas. In addition, local unrest and insecurity in North and South Darfur curtailed some planned fieldwork. To mitigate these limitations, the evaluation team collected information and secondary data from a wide range of external stakeholders, including United Nations, government, non-governmental and research organizations, to provide multiple perspectives on core points of analysis. This information was triangulated with the WFP country office, corporate systems information and the primary data collected.

CONTEXT

6. The Sudan has suffered conflicts and humanitarian crises for more than five decades. Classified as a middle-lower-income country,¹ wealth distribution is heavily skewed between the capital and rural areas. With the separation of South Sudan in 2011 and closure of the oil transit pipeline in January 2012, the overall economic situation

¹ World Bank. 2013. *Global Monitoring Report 2013. Rural-Urban Dynamics and the Millennium Development Goals*. Washington, DC.

deteriorated over the evaluation period. Outstanding issues under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and continuing border disputes have negative impacts on populations in Abyei Administrative Area and Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. Insecurity is a major constraint to the well-being of the population and the humanitarian work of WFP staff.

7. Food security, poverty and nutrition indicators are poor: the poverty index stood at 46.5 percent² in 2009; the Sudan ranked 61th of 79 countries on the Global Hunger Index in 2011;³ and its situation was classified as “alarming”, with 31.7 percent of children under five being underweight.⁴ In April 2012, of an estimated total population of 30.9 million, approximately 4.7 million people were food-insecure.⁵
8. The 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur have not ended the conflict in Darfur, where much of the population has been displaced. In 2011, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that 4.2 million people in Darfur were affected by conflict.
9. More than 1.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) from North, West and South Darfur live in ten camps in North Darfur, where they represent 1.5 percent of the state’s population; 18 camps in South and East Darfur, as 6.5 percent of the population; and 28 camps in West and Central Darfur, as 10 percent.⁶ Under the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, these IDP camps are to be closed, but the security situation remains compromised. In Greater Darfur,⁷ most rural areas are under government control, but many still host factions and militias. IDPs in rural areas live mainly in informal clusters near villages, rather than in camps with access to water and other resources. Most large IDP camps are in peri-urban areas, occasionally with checkpoints on the roads, but allowing free movement.
10. In West Darfur, improved relations between the Sudan and Chad, and the establishment of joint border patrols have improved the security environment, enabling approximately 46,000 IDPs and 15,000 refugees⁸ to return to their areas of origin.
11. Eastern Sudan has been less affected by conflict, but food security and nutrition indicators have been poor for decades, and less international support has been received than in Darfur. Two thousand refugees arrive from Eritrea every month; in 2012, there were 93,500 registered refugees in 12 camps.
12. Humanitarian access to the Three Areas – Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Abyei – is obstructed by conflict. By mid-2012, 275,000 people had been displaced or affected by conflict in government-controlled areas, and 420,000 in areas controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N). More than 110,000 people were

² United Nations Development Programme. 2012. *Status of MDGs in Sudan in 2012*. New York. http://www.sd.undp.org/mdg_fact.htm

³ International Food Policy Research Institute. 2012 Global Hunger Index. Washington, DC. This multidimensional index is based on indicators of child mortality, child underweight and undernourishment.

⁴ World Health Organization. 2011. *World Health Statistics 2011*. Geneva.

⁵ United States Agency for International Development. FEWSNET. Sudan Food Security Outlook, April–September 2012.

⁶ WFP. 2011. Comprehensive Food Security Assessment 2011.


⁷ In January 2012, Greater Darfur was divided into five states and the two new states of East and Central Darfur were announced.

⁸ OCHA. 2012. United Nations and Partners Work Plan Sudan 2012.

displaced by conflict in Abyei in 2011; few have returned.⁸ In 2011, only government and other national organizations had access to government-controlled areas, and movement of United Nations international staff was restricted. Tripartite efforts by the African Union, the Arab League and the United Nations to obtain approval for access from the Government and SPLM-N had little success. International agencies and staff obtained access to government-controlled areas in South Kordofan from 2012, and in Blue Nile from 2013.


13. The international aid environment changed significantly over the evaluation period. From 2009, humanitarian funding through the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) dropped by approximately 50 percent (Figure 1), largely because CAP funds were directed to South Sudan. Figure 2 indicates the significant decline in official development assistance (ODA) since 2010, and shows that both ODA and humanitarian funding levels started dropping in 2009, well before the separation of South Sudan in mid-2011.

Figure 1: CAP Funding 2009–2012⁹



Source: OCHA, 2012. *Sudan: UN and Partners Work Plan 2012 Mid Year Review*.

Figure 2: Aid Flows to the Sudan, 1996–2012⁹




Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Framework, OCHA Financial Tracking Service.

⁹ Figures prior to 2011 include both the Sudan and South Sudan; 2011 and 2012 figures are for the Sudan only.

14. The decrease in aid flow had several causes: donor fatigue with the protracted crisis in Darfur; further restrictions on international actors operating in Darfur and a push to close IDP camps in the area; lack of access to humanitarian agencies in the three southern border states; the Government's policy of channelling aid through national institutions; and the fiscal constraints facing most donor countries. Longer-term funding has increased, with a gradual reduction in funding requests for emergency interventions such as food assistance (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Funding Under the Humanitarian Work Plan (HWP)



Source: revised CAPs 2007–2013; OCHA Sudan Financial Tracking Service

15. The Government of the Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission was the main contact through which WFP and other humanitarian actors engaged with the authorities to plan and implement operations. WFP also worked with government ministries, including those of agriculture, social welfare, health and education at the national and state levels, and with the Zakat Chamber, the Strategic Reserve Authority, the Agricultural Bank, the Central Bank of the Sudan Micro Finance Unit and the Forest National Corporation. In Darfur, the recently renewed Darfur Development Authority was a core government liaison.
16. Major donors to the WFP portfolio were the Office of Food for Peace of the United States Agency for International Development, the Governments of Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Japan, and the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection. WFP is one of 22 organizations in the Sudan United Nations Country Team. Its principal United Nations partners in food and nutrition interventions and disaster mitigation operations were the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, OCHA and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
17. WFP operates through many partners in the Sudan, including international and Sudanese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs). The number of international NGO partners decreased after the Government started to channel funds through national institutions, but several important field-based international NGOs

remained important stakeholders in this evaluation.¹⁰ WFP also worked with the Sudanese Red Crescent Society, the International Committee of the Red Cross and a large number of CBOs. The private sector was another major stakeholder in WFP operations over the evaluation period, particularly in logistics, supply and transport work.

WFP'S PORTFOLIO IN THE SUDAN

18. The Sudan portfolio is one of WFP's largest and most complex portfolios, with high security risks, limited access to affected populations, a restricted operating environment, and logistics challenges caused by long distances and poor infrastructure. The WFP 2009–2012 country strategy objectives were to move from food aid to food assistance through a gradual shift to recovery activities. The subsequent annual emergency operations (EMOPs) delivered emergency, early recovery and safety net activities. The internal WFP Sudan Vision 2011–2015 document updated the country strategy goals and clarified the relationships among special operations (SOs) and EMOPs, adapting to the continuing need for emergency food assistance.
19. WFP is the largest humanitarian actor in the Sudan with more than 40 percent of the total CAP request every year from 2010 to 2012 (Table 1). With support from the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), WFP was able to reach 467 of its 500 planned distribution points in 2012, but it rarely worked in non-government-held areas. The expulsions of NGOs in 2009 and 2012 complicated implementation.

Year	Total Sudan CAP request (US\$, updated)	WFP request for the Sudan (US\$, updated)	WFP's share of total CAP request (%)
2010	1 843 386 608	894 651 879	48.5
2011	1 132 952 016	456 871 616	40.3
2012	1 051 018 271	447 664 857	42.6

Source: OCHA Financial Tracking Service. (<http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=home>)

20. Table 2 outlines the EMOPs, SOs and part of the country programme (CP) that made up the 2010–2012 portfolio,¹¹ confirming the dominance of emergency programming. Table 3 outlines the budget and expenditure.
21. Portfolio activities provided humanitarian food assistance through; i) general food distribution (GFD); ii) food-based nutrition programmes for children and pregnant and lactating women; iii) food for assets (FFA), including food for work/recovery (FFW/FFR) and food for training (FFT); and iv) school feeding. GFD was the largest activity, mainly in Darfur. The three EMOPs accounted for approximately 89 percent of funds. The SOs provided support to UNHAS and logistics support to humanitarian partners.

¹⁰ Including CARE, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision International and German Agro Action.

¹¹ EMOPs 200027 and 200151 included activities in what is now South Sudan; the evaluation used disaggregated data to isolate activities implemented in the Sudan.

TABLE 2: TIMELINE OF THE SUDAN COUNTRY PORTFOLIO, 2010–2012		
2010	2011	2012
EMOP 200027		
	EMOP 200151	
		EMOP 200312
		SO 200470
		SO 200354 (UNHAS)
SO 200073 (UNHAS)		
SO 108450		
SO 10342.2 (United Nations Joint Logistics Centre support)		
SO 10368.0 (emergency road repair)		
CP (development project [DEV] 10105.0)		

TABLE 3: WFP PORTFOLIO BUDGET AND EXPENDITURE BY PROGRAMME CATEGORY, 2010–2012						
	No. of operations	Requirements (US\$ million)	% breakdown	Actual received (US\$ million)	Received as share of requirement (%)	Direct expenditure (US\$ million)
EMOPs	3	1 833.9	89.35	1 528.2	83	1 189.9
SOs*	5	171.8	8.37	129.4	75	132.4
CP/DEV**	1	46.7	2.28	40.5	87	1.1
TOTAL		2 052.4	100%	1 698.1	83	1 323.4

Source: SPR 2010–2012, Resource Situation.

* Not including SO 103680 for road and mine clearance in South Sudan.

** CP/DEV requirements and actual received April 2003–August 2010; expenditure only 2010.

FINDINGS

Alignment and Strategic Positioning

22. The evaluation found the WFP portfolio in the Sudan to be broadly aligned with the core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, despite the complications arising from the Government's dual role as host government to the United Nations agencies and party to the conflicts in WFP's operating areas. WFP based its food assistance on food security assessments, and targeted all accessible food-insecure areas, taking into account the differing needs of the population and avoiding taking sides in the

conflict. The evaluation also noted that WFP continually negotiated access to insecure areas to conduct food security assessments and deliver food assistance.

23. However, the evaluation found that WFP's restricted access, including very limited access to non-government-held areas, excluded some food-insecure populations. This points to an inherent dissonance within the humanitarian principles themselves: state sovereignty must be respected, coordination involves the consent of the host country and participation requires collaboration with local and national authorities, even when this may make WFP appear non-neutral from the perspective of some stakeholders.
24. Accountability to donors and affected populations was mixed. Donors reported that WFP's accountability was relatively good, with detailed reporting and facilitation of donor monitoring visits; however, the evaluation noted funding declines as donor priorities shifted from emergency modalities. Beneficiary groups indicated that they were not always sufficiently consulted about their priorities and needs, partly because communication was often controlled by the Government and camp sheiks, with direct beneficiary consultation often the result of months of negotiation and preparation.
25. The evaluation found WFP to be well aligned with several of the principles for engagement in fragile and conflict states, particularly adaptability to changing contexts and capacity development of government partners. The different approaches taken by WFP area offices aimed to address the different contexts, and remained flexible as conditions and needs changed. WFP developed capacities in some state-level ministries and engaged in cooperative activities, despite the limited commitment at the federal level.
26. The evaluation concluded that further alignment would require greater engagement in the development-focused approach outlined in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, and collaboration to address the links between political security and development. Better interagency coordination is needed, and a more detailed understanding of household- and community-level dynamics would inform programming.
27. The country portfolio was coherent with the Government's Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Five-Year Strategic Plan 2008–2011 and Agricultural Revival Programme 2008–2012. However, the WFP planning cycle of annual EMOPs did not align with the two- to five-year cycles of government instruments; some stakeholders saw this as potentially limiting WFP's ability to contribute to longer-term improvements.
28. The evaluation found that WFP had contributed to and was well aligned with national HIV and nutrition strategies. However, although there was evidence of technical support and advocacy for nutrition policies and programming, these appeared informal and often relied on specific WFP staff members for momentum. WFP had no agreement formalizing its relationship with the Ministry of Health at the federal level – unlike the World Health Organization and UNICEF – possibly because of the limitations created by its one-year EMOP framework. Capacity development of the Ministry of Agriculture in the WFP food security monitoring system (FSMS) and comprehensive food security assessments (CFSAs) was more systematic.
29. Major stakeholders reported that WFP's programme activities were insufficiently coordinated with those of other members of the Humanitarian Country Team. There was consensus that coordination in the food security and livelihood sector was poor at the national level and only slightly better at the field level. Engagement improved from mid-2012.

30. WFP's positive relationship with its main government liaison, the Humanitarian Aid Commission, was questioned by United Nations counterparts concerned about the perception of alignment with the Government's position on humanitarian access. United Nations counterparts would like WFP to negotiate access on their behalf, but WFP reported that involving all stakeholders in consultations with the Government could jeopardize WFP's own access to affected areas and populations. The evaluation concluded that negotiation of access to affected populations is a fundamental part of WFP's mandate in the Sudan, and the country office's position is in line with WFP's corporate policies and principles. Discussions with United Nations partners should be continued in the spirit of cooperation.
31. The number of international NGOs decreased significantly following their expulsion from Darfur in 2009, with another seven leaving Eastern Sudan in May 2012. This forced WFP initially into direct implementation and then into identifying a wider range of national and community organizations, many of which were small with limited experience in food assistance; the evaluation found that WFP responded well in identifying, training and supporting new implementing partners.
32. Portfolio activities were broadly aligned with needs in Darfur and the Central and Eastern regions and Three Areas (CETA), but the geographic balance of activities depended more on previous activity than assessed food insecurity. For example, the high levels of malnutrition in CETA warranted greater attention compared with Darfur than was observed over the evaluation period.
33. The needs of the most vulnerable populations both in and outside camps in Darfur are largely chronic, requiring targeted food assistance and recovery programmes. FFA and FFT activities, such as Farmers to Market (F2M) and Safe Access to Firewood and Alternative Energy (SAFE) enabled WFP to connect food assistance to recovery activities, but their share of the overall portfolio was small, accounting for approximately 2 percent of actual beneficiaries.¹² The shift from emergency response to recovery programmes was hampered by funding shortages and new emergencies. There is considerable scope for stronger connections between short-term general food assistance and longer-term recovery activities.

FACTORS DRIVING STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING

34. The evaluation found that funding was a significant factor in determining the direction and flexibility of WFP's portfolio. The high percentage of in-kind contributions limited the options for shifting food assistance away from GFD.¹³ The evaluation found that some donors perceived WFP to be less technically proficient in recovery/resilience activities and that WFP's comparative advantage was in emergency food assistance; this further challenged the shift to longer-term activities.
35. Table 4 indicates that from 2010 to 2012 the annual EMOPs were relatively well funded, with shortfalls of 6 to 32 percent. Planned budgets decreased each year, dropping 49 percent between 2010 and 2012, with a 61 percent reduction in planned beneficiaries. These decreases reflect several factors: the separation of South Sudan, which reduced the Sudan beneficiary caseload in late 2011 and 2012; the improved food security situation in

¹² See Fact Sheet on page 5.

¹³ The United States of America provided at least 50 percent of the required funds each year; more than 60 percent of these contributions were in kind.

2010, which led to a reduction in planned food assistance in 2011; and rationalization, re-targeting and verification of IDP beneficiary lists.

	Beneficiary needs (US\$)*	Total available (US\$)	Funding shortfall (%)	Planned beneficiaries	Actual beneficiaries**	
					South Sudan and the Sudan	The Sudan
2010	951 480 882	772 984 555	19	11 032 000	9 234 074	6 069 938
2011	640 997 532	600 278 937	6	7 296 609	7 549 226	5 497 820
2012	489 583 679	333 987 656	32	4 213 185	3 560 883	

Data for 2010 and 2011 are for the Sudan and South Sudan combined, as disaggregated data were not available. Those for 2012 relates to the Sudan only.

* Based on the objectives of approved projects.

** Combined data for South Sudan and the Sudan are from SPRs. Disaggregated data for the Sudan were obtained from the WFP Programme Unit in the country office.

Source: WFP Factory, SPRs 2010–2011, Programme Division in the country office, Khartoum.


36. Although the evaluation could not precisely attribute the trends in funding and beneficiary coverage to the various contributing factors, it noted that the number of individual donors declined from 22 to 14 over the period, and that overall donor funding trends began shifting toward recovery activities as early as 2007/2008 (Figure 3), with decreasing net ODA/humanitarian funding since 2009 (Figure 2).
37. The initial improvements in security in 2010, prior to the border conflicts of 2011/2012, contributed to improved food security in the early part of the evaluation period. However, the needs of returnees, primarily in West Darfur, newly displaced households in North Darfur and the poor rains of 2011 meant that humanitarian assistance requirements did not diminish in Darfur in the latter part of the period.⁸
38. WFP conducted needs assessments through vulnerability analysis and mapping, CFSAs, the FSMS framework and emergency food security assessments. FSMS data were used in decision-making by WFP and others, but data collection was limited to WFP intervention areas. For example, under EMOP 200151, FSMS assessments showing improved food security provided the justification for a budget reduction, cutting the size and duration of the GFD ration in 2011. The country office has not systematically measured the impact of such changes, thus missing opportunities for comparative assessment and lesson learning.
39. The evaluation found that WFP had well-recognized technical expertise in monitoring and assessing food security, but limited expertise in other sectors. WFP made efforts to acquire technical expertise through partnerships, but apart from those with the Ministry of Agriculture and UNICEF, these were often small-scale and of short duration. Stakeholders observed that the narrow range of technical expertise may constrain WFP's effectiveness, particularly in policy dialogue on the transition from emergency to development.

40. In the absence of a robust corporate monitoring framework, the Sudan office had to develop its own systems, which were found to be weak, given the scale of the portfolio. Output monitoring was regular, but clear targets were absent. Local problems were remedied, but higher-level support or follow-up was seldom provided.
41. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data were primarily used for corporate and external reporting rather than to inform programme decision-making. M&E systems faced resource constraints that limited innovation. There is considerable scope to improve the use of M&E data in programme planning and decision-making, and for one-off assessments in specific areas, in addition to enhanced collaboration with partners on outcome-level data collection.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS


42. The number of actual beneficiaries decreased by 41 percent over the portfolio period, from more than 6 million in 2010 to 3.5 million in 2012 (Figure 4). The tonnage of food distributed declined by a similar 42 percent (Figure 5).
43. In 2010, 69 percent of beneficiaries resided in Darfur, increasing to 82 percent in 2012, although food security and nutrition indicators had not worsened in Darfur compared with Eastern Sudan.

Figure 4: Actual Beneficiaries, by Geographic Area



Sources: SPRs 2010–2012; country office programme data

Figure 5: Food and Vouchers Distributed, by Geographic Area*




Sources: SPRs 2010–2012; country office programme data.


* Vouchers are shown in tonnage counter-value.

44. The percentages of beneficiaries under each activity were broadly similar throughout the evaluation period, although the shift from GFD to FFA was reversed in the latter part of the period (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Actual Beneficiaries per Activity (% of total)



Sources: SPRs 2010–2012; country office programme data

Figure 7: Actual Food Distribution per Activity (% of total)

Sources: SPRs 2010–2012; country office programme data

45. Figure 7 indicates the decreasing percentages of total food distributed as in-kind GFD over the period, mainly in favour of vouchers, which rose from 1 percent of total food distribution in 2010, to 5 percent in 2011 and 13 percent in 2012. Internal (2011, 2012) reviews and external (2012) assessments of the effectiveness of vouchers demonstrated mixed results: positive effects included greater contact with mobile markets and greater beneficiary control; but beneficiaries had little knowledge of their entitlements, and limited effects on dietary diversity were reported, because beneficiaries prioritized quantity and cheaper items in their food purchase choices. While vouchers appeared to be the preferred option, more rigorous comparisons with in-kind and other modalities are needed.
46. WFP's logistics capacity in the Sudan, including in pre-positioning, fleet management and support of voucher scale-up, was critical in ensuring the effectiveness of GFD. The evaluation also noted that GFD's flexibility was essential to WFP's quick response to needs in newly accessible areas or new humanitarian crises.
47. FFW/FFR interventions were a minor portion of the portfolio, often considered pilots. Implementing partners and beneficiary communities acknowledged that the assets created helped communities to rebuild their asset base and start regenerating livelihoods. However, several CBOs questioned their longer-term effectiveness, and the evaluation did not find an overall strategy guiding activity and asset selection in each area, risk assessment, technical support, partnerships or maintenance and repair plans.
48. Confirming the findings of earlier evaluations, FFT was found to be effective in SAFE projects,¹⁴ with direct benefits to women participants including increased savings, reduced fuelwood wastage and better protection. Very limited results for agribusiness centres and tree nurseries were recorded. The F2M programme reached most of its planned beneficiaries, but as part of a larger government-managed microfinance scheme, much of this programme is beyond WFP's control. It was not clear how WFP would assess the effectiveness of its inputs, nor whether the beneficiaries of F2M would ultimately become food-secure small farmers.

¹⁴ SAFE centres support the production of fuel-efficient stoves and briquettes, the establishment of plant and community tree nurseries, livelihood and community capacity development and training, and activities focusing on care practices, health and nutrition, particularly for women.

49. WFP's nutrition activities included supplementary feeding, blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) and an integrated BSF programme (IBSFP). Moderately malnourished children were referred to targeted SF programmes, and severely malnourished children received SF through UNICEF's out-patient therapeutic programme. Children and pregnant and lactating women in Darfur received BSF during lean seasons, as a preventive approach. The IBSFP aimed to address multiple causes of malnutrition through improved feeding, food hygiene and safety practices for young children. Between 2010 and 2013, the planned numbers of BSF child beneficiaries declined by 33 percent and of SF beneficiaries by 67 percent, mainly because of funding shortages.
50. An external analysis¹⁵ of WFP's BSF data for North and South Darfur in 2011 showed very little improvement in the nutrition status of participant children, consistent with other evaluations indicating that BSF has little effect on global and moderate acute malnutrition (GAM and MAM) rates. The IBSFP, piloted in Kassala in 2009/2010, showed a significant decrease in GAM prevalence and appeared to be an effective,¹⁶ if resource-intensive intervention, costing US\$34 per child, compared with US\$12–15 for supplementary feeding.¹⁷ Supplementary feeding to address MAM through both community- and facility-based approaches, was reported to generate recovery rates of 7195 percent, but the evaluation noted the existence of unofficial and unreleased nutrition survey datasets, reducing further the availability of comparable nutrition data. Collection and analysis of more nutrition data will be essential for improving measurement of the effectiveness of these interventions.
51. School feeding, designed primarily as an emergency intervention targeting food-insecure areas, provided school meals to about 1 million primary school children a year, decreasing after 2011 under a hand-over strategy agreed with the Government, although the Ministry of Education was unable to assume responsibility for the first 10 percent of the schools to be handed over, so the programme ended in these schools. Effectiveness was mitigated by inconsistency between the design of school feeding as an emergency intervention and the long-term expectations and inputs of partners. Available data indicate relatively stable retention rates in WFP-assisted schools over the evaluation period, a stable gender ratio for enrolment in CETA, and a slight increase in girls' enrolment in Darfur. These data are of limited use in determining programme effectiveness as they are not compared with non-WFP-assisted schools or aligned with indicators used by the Ministry of Education.
52. In-depth analysis of the efficiency of single operations was beyond the scope of the CPE. However, the evaluation observed that all activities in Darfur involved relatively high transportation costs and time because of the distances from Port Sudan and the main hubs in Khartoum and El Obeid. The wet season constrains truck movement, necessitating considerable pre-positioning of food in Darfur. The continued need for security escorts from the Government or the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur increases logistics costs and transit times. UNHAS provided a vital service, enabling transport in the face of poor infrastructure and high insecurity.

¹⁵ Woodruff, B.A. 2011. *Analysis of Anthropometric Data for May–September 2009 on the Cohort of Children in North and South Darfur*. January. Sudan country office.

¹⁶ WFP. 2012. *Impact of the Integrated Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme (IBSFP) on Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) Mukram Village, Kassala State*. Sudan country office.

¹⁷ Acharya, P. and Kenefick, E. 2012. *Improving Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme (BSFP) Efficiency in Sudan*. January. Sudan country office.

53. WFP's current engagement with more than 200 local and international partners is largely via six-month field-level agreements. The high transaction costs incurred by almost continuous negotiation of contracts detracted from operational efficiency and caused widespread dissatisfaction. Efficiencies may be gained with longer-term and broader partnership agreements. The availability of technically qualified staff was reported to have become more difficult since the upgrade of the United Nations security classification, especially for posts outside Khartoum.

CONCLUSIONS

54. The Sudan portfolio is one of WFP's largest and most complex portfolios, involving security risks and logistic challenges. The evaluation period witnessed important changes in the humanitarian situation in the Sudan: initial improvements in security in 2010 – prior to the separation of South Sudan in 2011 and the border conflicts of 2011/2012 – contributed to improved food security in the early part of the period, but continuing needs meant that the requirement for humanitarian assistance did not significantly diminish in the Darfur region in the latter part of the period.
55. WFP is the largest humanitarian actor in the Sudan, unmatched in size of operations, geographic coverage and food assistance and food security assessment capacity, and covering more than 25 percent of the needs reflected in the Humanitarian Work Plan. WFP's shift from food aid to longer-term food assistance was found to be coherent with the Government's strategic framework and the UNDAF. WFP has made efforts to move away from in-kind GFD, but newly occurring emergencies and the provision of 60–70 percent of funding in kind limits the extent and pace of this shift.
56. The evaluation found the WFP portfolio to be coherent with international humanitarian principles. While restricted access to non-government-held areas excluded some populations in need of emergency relief, the evaluation concluded that WFP's approach to negotiating access was in line with its mandate and corporate policy and provided maximum reach, albeit with compromises. WFP was aligned with the principles for conflict-affected and fragile states, which was important in the move towards longer-term recovery activities.
57. The operational scope was broadly relevant to humanitarian needs. In Darfur, WFP provided life-saving food assistance, primarily through GFD, and started to pilot recovery and livelihoods-oriented projects through FFW, FFA and FFT. Although projects were small, the evaluation found them well-received by beneficiaries and in line with longer-term needs. The persistently high levels of malnutrition in the CETA region warrant increased focus in future operations.
58. In addition to ration reduction, refined targeting and more accurate beneficiary lists enabled the portfolio to maintain 80–100 percent coverage of intended beneficiaries for most activities – reflecting GFD's flexibility and adaptability. Profiling of camps and communities should continue, to ensure that food assistance reaches the most vulnerable.
59. Reporting on results was largely output-based and limited in content and reliability, especially given the scale of WFP operations in the Sudan. The limited range of monitoring data, with discontinuities and inconsistencies among EMOPs, constrained the assessment of portfolio effectiveness, especially at the outcome level.
60. Separate studies indicated initial positive outcomes from integrated interventions such as SAFE and the IBSFP, but there was very little evidence on the contributions of BSF and SF to mitigating malnutrition rates. GFD undoubtedly had an effect on household food

consumption, especially for IDPs, given the scale of the resource transfer over the three years, but the seasonal nature of food insecurity, and ongoing conflicts make it difficult to quantify these effects. There was little documentation of results from WFP's capacity development efforts with the Government.

61. The cost-efficiency of portfolio activities could not be assessed directly. WFP's unprecedented logistics capacity in the Sudan enabled the delivery of food over a large area and to remote locations, albeit at high costs in Darfur. The adaptation of logistics capacity to the scale-up of vouchers was critical to the continued coverage of the portfolio. UNHAS provided essential access to all areas and contributed to the efficiency of all humanitarian actors in the Sudan. The country office reported considerable progress in cost savings; the evaluation identified further potential efficiency gains by reducing transaction costs through longer-term partnerships, continued refining of targeting, and better monitoring of results to inform responsive decision-making.
62. The sustainability of recovery activities was limited by the lack of a long-term recovery strategy. The Government has sufficient capacity in some technical areas, but the evaluation found it unlikely that the Government will have sufficient resources to take over activities such as school feeding and FSMS in the near future. Enhanced sustainability of FFA activities, SAFE and F2M will require the incorporation of long-term technical support. While some pilot activities had positive results, comprehensive and rigorous measurement of their impacts was lacking, and there is considerable scope for enhancing analysis in specific portfolio areas.
63. WFP will decide whether to use an EMOP or a protracted relief and recovery operation from January 2014 onwards. The evaluation found that although WFP has to remain prepared for a sudden emergency, the annual cycle of EMOPs created a large work burden, often hampered the effectiveness of operations, and made longer-term planning difficult.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Partnerships and Coordination

64. **Recommendation 1: The country office must improve its partnerships and coordination with United Nations and other development actors in the Sudan.** Coordination and information-sharing regarding planning and decision-making should be more regular; as the largest humanitarian actor in the Sudan, WFP should use its presence to support strategic partnership building:
65. **Recommendation 1a: The country office should strengthen its role in inter-agency mechanisms such as the Humanitarian Country Team and the food security and livelihood sector mechanism at the federal and state levels.**
66. **Recommendation 1b: WFP should establish long-term, formal partnerships with United Nations agencies to ensure appropriate selection and sustainable implementation of recovery activities.**
67. **Recommendation 1c: WFP should move from six-monthly to annual field-level agreements with more field partners, to increase efficiency and effectiveness through longer-term planning and support.**

Strategic Shift Towards Longer-Term Planning

68. **Recommendation 2:** In the next country strategy, beneficiaries and development actors should have a greater role in identifying the mix of emergency, relief and recovery activities, and activities should be oriented towards improving self-reliance. While WFP needs to retain flexibility and the capacity to respond to recurrent and emerging crises, the portfolio should have a longer-term horizon with the aim of saving lives and rebuilding/protecting livelihoods.
69. **Recommendation 2a:** The portfolio and its operations should be designed with longer-term objectives wherever possible. Planning cycles should be more aligned to those of United Nations partners and the Government.
70. **Recommendation 2b:** The school feeding strategy should be revised and aligned with those of partners, and new ways of increasing the possibility of Government ownership should be explored.
71. **Recommendation 2c:** The portfolio should include more activities for developing the self-reliance of communities and the emergency preparedness capacities of the authorities.

Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting

72. **Recommendation 3:** With support and guidance from Headquarters and the regional bureau, the country office's M&E framework and system must be thoroughly reviewed and enhanced, with a shift in emphasis from counting beneficiaries and food tonnage to measuring results, outcomes and impacts achieved.
73. **Recommendation 3a:** Data collection should be expanded, focusing on outputs, coverage, outcomes and impacts. Outcome indicators specific to the Sudan portfolio should be added to the M&E framework, enabling inter-year comparison of outcomes and results. Existing nutrition data should be compiled and information gaps filled, in collaboration with partners. Data collection for all activities should be more regular and better adapted to context, and results should be used systematically in decision-making.
74. **Recommendation 3b:** Dissemination of M&E information to all partners should be structured and regular, with accountability established for the application of standardized data collection methods and the consistency of data reporting.
75. **Recommendation 3c:** One-off assessments should be conducted to fill major knowledge gaps, including: i) comparative assessments of modality effectiveness; ii) the contributions of supplementary feeding and BSF to mitigating malnutrition rates, in collaboration with partners; iii) review of evidence of IDPs' coping mechanisms in Darfur, with further data collection if needed; and iv) measurement of the effects of decisions such as ration cuts and gaps in assistance, taking advantage of comparative conditions, to generate evidence and lessons on results and impacts.

Assessment and Targeting

76. **Recommendation 4a:** The optimal use of limited resources should be ensured by further refining targeting, continuing the verification exercises, and expanding regular community profiling so that the most vulnerable people in prioritized communities are reached.
77. **Recommendation 4b:** More regular engagement with communities should be planned, and feedback used to refine the targeting of food assistance.

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

BSF	blanket supplementary feeding
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CETA	Central and Eastern regions and Three Areas
CFSA	comprehensive food security assessment
CBO	community-based organization
CP	country programme
CPE	country portfolio evaluation
DEV	development project
EMOP	emergency operation
F2M	Farmers to Market
FFA	food for assets
FFR	food for recovery
FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
FSMS	food security monitoring system
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GFD	general food distribution
IBSFP	integrated blanket supplementary feeding programme
IDP	internally displaced person
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MAM	moderate acute malnutrition
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	official development assistance
SAFE	Safe Access to Firewood and Alternative Energy
SO	special operation
SPLM-N	Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North
SPR	Standardized Project Report
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund