



**World Food  
Programme**

**Executive Board  
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# **EVALUATION REPORTS**

*Agenda item 7*

*For consideration*

# **E**

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## **SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT OF WFP'S PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME (2011–2014)**

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## NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

**This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation assessed the contribution of the Preparedness and Response Enhancement Programme (PREP) to improving WFP's capability to respond effectively and efficiently to large-scale emergencies. The evaluation is part of a series of strategic evaluations on WFP's emergency preparedness and response.

Touching almost all the geographic and operational areas of WFP's work, the programme was implemented over three and a half years of highly complex internal and global conditions: WFP was restructuring and decentralizing its operations and functions to support the shift from food aid to food assistance; the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Transformative Agenda was launched to improve the global humanitarian system; and an unprecedented number of complex and long-duration Level 3 emergency responses were activated.

The evaluation found that PREP was timely and highly relevant, and contributed to important achievements across its priority outcome areas:

- *Personnel*: moderate improvements in the timely deployment of qualified surge capacity to Level 3 emergencies through a corporate emergency response roster and inter-divisional emergency training.
- *Finance and financial risk management*: improvements in the volume of and timely access to advance financing, which are essential for WFP's rapid response and early scale-up.
- *Accountability*: improvements in the timeliness, consistency and user-friendliness of information; formal assignment of roles and responsibilities in Level 3 emergencies; and systematic use of strategic and operational task forces and lesson-learning from Level 3 emergencies.
- *Stocks*: support to the pre-positioning of ready-to-eat foods, and modest investments in WFP's logistics capacity.
- *External partners*: a stronger framework for WFP's work with national authorities and better civil–military coordination.

However, following PREP's conclusion in December 2014, WFP continues to face critical gaps in its emergency preparedness and response capacity, especially regarding personnel, cooperating partners and cash and voucher programming, but also in other important areas:

- Several programme activities were not completed, including leadership training and deployment, staff health and well-being measures, and review of corporate response stocks.
- Other activities such as the emergency response roster and the emergency preparedness and response package need refinement and/or lack ownership and uptake in WFP.
- Important areas such as relationships with cooperating partners, cash and voucher programming, protection, and accountability to affected populations were either not covered by the programme or not yet sufficiently addressed by other initiatives.

The programme could have achieved more through better prioritization; enhanced communication with the field to strengthen ownership and application of frameworks, tools and guidance; and a more comprehensive approach that addresses phases beyond immediate response and emergency scenarios beyond sudden-onset natural disasters.

Continued strengthening of emergency preparedness and response is needed to secure and build on the programme's investments and achievements, and to maintain WFP's global leadership position in emergency preparedness and response. The evaluation makes four main recommendations: i) reinforce emergency preparedness and response as a corporate priority; ii) focus on staff capacity, relationships with cooperating partners, and cash and vouchers programming as priorities; iii) clarify and enable the Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division's role in strengthening corporate emergency preparedness and response; and iv) refine and complete several major ongoing PREP activities.

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## DRAFT DECISION<sup>\*</sup>

The Board takes note of "Summary Evaluation Report of WFP's Preparedness and Response Enhancement Programme (2011–2014)" (WFP/EB.A/2015/7-B) and the management response in WFP/EB.A/2015/7-B/Add.1, and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

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\* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

## INTRODUCTION

### Context

1. Emergency preparedness and response (EPR) is WFP's core operating area. Responding to emergencies and protracted crises accounted for at least 78 percent of WFP's total direct expenses over the last four years.<sup>1</sup> In 2010, following three large-scale and highly visible emergencies that stretched WFP's response capabilities – the Haiti earthquake, the Pakistan floods and the Sahel drought – a global WFP management meeting called for action to address the challenges. The Preparedness and Response Enhancement Programme (PREP) was launched in mid-2011, initially for three years, but later extended until December 2014.
2. PREP was implemented during a period of significant change in WFP and across the global humanitarian system. WFP was making the strategic shift from food aid to food assistance, with implications for its approach, organization and operations that led to the launch of an organization-wide restructuring and decentralization process in mid-2012. The global humanitarian system in which WFP plays a leading role was also improving humanitarian leadership, coordination and accountability through the Transformative Agenda, launched in December 2011.

### PREP Overview

3. PREP aimed to ensure WFP's ability to respond effectively and efficiently to large-scale emergencies with up to 6 million beneficiaries in three Level 3 emergencies within one year.<sup>2</sup>
4. PREP's more than 70 activities were designed to strengthen five priority outcome areas: i) personnel; ii) finance and financial risk management; iii) accountability; iv) food and non-food stocks; and v) external partners. PREP implemented some activities directly and supported other divisions with responsibilities for EPR, by facilitating inter-divisional cooperation, mobilizing funding, providing analysis or developing guidance and promoting its use, and engaging in inter-agency processes to ensure compatibility between WFP's tools and approaches and the Transformative Agenda.
5. WFP's Director of Emergencies, reporting to the Deputy Executive Director/Chief Operating Officer, was responsible for PREP's implementation, supported by a secretariat of up to eight staff and eight consultants and several inter-divisional working groups. An outreach network created in mid-2012 facilitated communication with the field. In total, 210 staff members and consultants worked on PREP activities for an average of about ten months each, under the Director of Emergencies or in other units with PREP funding.
6. PREP received USD 41 million – 43 percent of its total requested budget of USD 95 million. Of funding received, 94 percent was from extra-budgetary sources.<sup>3</sup> Table 1 shows allocations by outcome area.

<sup>1</sup> WFP Annual Performance Report for 2013 (WFP/EB.A/2014/4).

<sup>2</sup> The Generic Response Capabilities Model is built on a scenario of 2+1 corporate emergencies, with two occurring simultaneously and a third later in the same year.

<sup>3</sup> PREP's main donors are Australia, Canada, Finland, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom along with the Forward Purchase Facility. Table 1 does not include an associated United Kingdom grant of USD 14.5 million approved in 2014 for additional preparedness activities.

<b>TABLE 1: PREP FUNDING</b>		
<b>Outcome area</b>	<b>Total received (USD)</b>	<b>%</b>
Personnel	4 994 686	12
Finance/financial risk management	361 457	1
Accountability	16 310 462	40
Stocks – food and non-food	4 198 736	10
External partners – without cluster funding	9 364 626	23
External partners – cluster funding	5 777 398	14
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>41 007 365</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: PREP, November 2014.

## Evaluation Features

7. The evaluation was part of the Office of Evaluation's strategic evaluation series on EPR. Its purpose was to assess PREP's contribution to improving WFP's EPR capability and to provide lessons and recommendations for further strengthening of EPR. The evaluation assessed the relevance/appropriateness, effectiveness, sustained contribution, and supporting and constraining factors of PREP.
8. Data collection and analysis between August and December 2014 included case studies of recent Level 3 emergency responses,<sup>4</sup> staff surveys,<sup>5</sup> 244 internal/external interviews, and document/data review. Gender issues were systematically considered and data were disaggregated by gender wherever possible.
9. As PREP's broad engagement precluded analysis of each activity, the evaluation selected core activities in each outcome area according to their importance and degree of completion, and assessed the effects of these activities on recent emergency responses. The relevance and expected benefits of activities that were ongoing during the evaluation and PREP's overall contributions to its outcome areas were also assessed.

## EVALUATION FINDINGS


### Relevance

10. PREP's design was assessed as highly relevant to both addressing WFP's internal challenges and implementing the Transformative Agenda, as confirmed by staff perceptions (Figure 1).

<sup>4</sup> Iraq and Cameroon in 2014; South Sudan, the Syrian crisis and the Philippines in 2013–2014.

<sup>5</sup> The survey had a 40 percent response rate and a total of 368 respondents.

**Figure 1: Relevance of PREP activities according to staff survey responses<sup>6</sup>**



\* EPR: emergency preparedness and response; EMOP: emergency operation; FASTER: Functional and Support Training for Emergency Response; OIM: Operational Information Management Unit; UNHRD: United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot

11. However, PREP focused predominantly on large-scale, sudden-onset natural disasters. Evaluation interviews and case studies indicated insufficient attention to requirements in complex and protracted or lower-level emergencies, or to the phases prior to declaration of a corporate emergency.


## Outcome Area Results

### ⇒ Personnel

12. Personnel issues were correctly identified as major constraints to WFP's response capacity. PREP facilitated inter-divisional development of an EPR training and deployment strategy, and supported creation and use of several components including an emergency response roster for deploying surge capacity to Level 3 emergencies, and an inter-functional, simulation-based training called Functional and Support Training for Emergency Response (FASTER).
13. These tools contributed to moderate improvements in the timely deployment of surge staff to Level 3 emergencies. Since becoming operational in early summer 2014, the emergency response roster had supplied 75 deployments to four Level 3 emergencies by October 2014, accounting for between 12 and 32 percent of deployments (Figure 2).

<sup>6</sup> "Don't know" responses are not included.

**Figure 2: Shares of the emergency response roster in recent WFP deployments to Level 3 emergencies**



Sources: WFP deployment and roster records.

14. With 29 percent of its 343 members being national officers, the roster addresses the priority aim of increasing opportunities for national staff. Women accounted for 23 percent of both roster members and roster deployments, compared with 42 percent of WFP's overall international recruits and professional officers.<sup>1</sup> More than 90 percent of survey respondents reported major or some improvement from the roster. However, it has not provided sufficient capacity in all technical areas to meet the Generic Response Capability Model targets,<sup>7</sup> and feedback on deployees' qualifications and suitability varied.
15. FASTER was universally lauded for its content and delivery method, and received very high satisfaction ratings from participants. By October 2014, 73 staff members had been trained, 42 percent of whom were women and 56 percent country office staff. At the time of the evaluation, FASTER-trained deployments were still too few to affect emergency response.<sup>8</sup> As the emergency response roster became operational, its members were targeted by FASTER. With current costs of more than USD 13,000 per trainee, a substantial and sustained investment would be needed to train sufficient personnel to affect emergency response practice, especially considering the dynamic membership of the roster, with no guaranteed deployment. Another United Nations agency – which uses a similar WFP-developed training – targets training towards those standing response teams most likely to be deployed.
16. Interviewees saw PREP's support to the deployment of more administrative staff to emergencies as critical in addressing issues with housing, facilities and staff well-being, despite reports of some deployed administrative staff lacking necessary emergency experience. Respondents in Iraq, the Philippines and South Sudan reported continuing problems with living and working conditions, and activities for addressing staff health in emergencies were not funded or completed at the time of the evaluation.

<sup>7</sup> The model is a WFP tool for planning emergency readiness. It details a response scenario, outlines targets and identifies the capabilities required to meet the scenario parameters and targets.

<sup>8</sup> South Sudan and Iraq each had three people deployed who had been trained by FASTER, and Cameroon had two.

17. Despite PREP's achievements, staff throughout WFP reported that staff capacity, deployment and well-being remain crucial concerns and the highest priority for further strengthening of EPR. Critical elements of the EPR training and deployment strategy, including establishment of corporate emergency response teams, a leadership roster and leadership training, have not yet been implemented. Interviews and analysis of deployment records identified important challenges in sustaining staff in protracted emergencies, filling the posts left empty by deployed staff, covering all the technical areas needed, and ensuring sufficient staff qualifications and capacities for working in emergency settings.
18. Resolving structural human resource issues was beyond the scope of PREP, and the evaluation found widespread perceptions of insufficient leadership on EPR-related personnel issues.

⇒ *Finance and financial risk management*

19. In cooperation with other units, PREP made important contributions to improving the volume of and timely access to advance financing. Advance financing ceilings were increased from USD 557 million in 2012 to USD 920 million in 2014, significantly improving fund availability for rapid response and early scale-up. The ability to use historical funding trends and the Immediate Response Account (IRA) as collateral has made access to the Working Capital Financing Facility more flexible, helping to prevent pipeline breaks, as in South Sudan. Increased levels of delegated authority for drawing on the IRA have helped increase the speed of WFP's initial response, as in Iraq and South Sudan.
20. WFP could further improve its use of advance financing. The IRA often lacks liquidity as loans are not consistently repaid; this delayed the response in South Sudan, for example. The Corporate Response Emergency Operation (EMOP) Facility – which includes simplified financing templates and processes, and was identified as potentially important by 92 percent of survey respondents and many informants – has yet to be finalized.

⇒ *Accountability*

21. In line with wider corporate efforts to strengthen internal and global accountability, including to donors, PREP sought to make WFP's approach to EPR more systematic, transparent and learning-oriented.

**Systematic approach**

22. The 2012 revised protocol for activating an emergency response introduced the systematic use of operational and strategic task forces. This improved the involvement in corporate emergency decision-making of senior management from all divisions, and introduced a consistent, formal process for assigning key roles and responsibilities in Level 3 responses. Respondents reported areas where further improvements were needed, including in coherence between the two task forces, and internal transparency in decisions, especially relating to roles and responsibilities.
23. PREP supported the roll-out and refinement of the EPR Package, a mandatory tool to guide country offices in assessing risk and implementing preparedness actions and response procedures. Survey and interview respondents reported that the package was valuable and had the potential to increase the consistency of preparedness planning across WFP; a similar package has been adopted at the inter-agency level. However, use of the package did not always lead to the required preparedness actions or sufficient follow-up when thresholds were passed, as in Cameroon, Iraq and South Sudan. Interviewees reported that this was because of management's inadequate ownership and accountability, cumbersome processes, and insufficient staff and financial resources for implementing follow-up actions. A financial

instrument designed to support preparedness activities, the Immediate Response Account for Preparedness (IR-PREP), has not been used frequently, reportedly because its requirements are too restrictive.<sup>9</sup>

### Transparency

24. PREP has made a positive contribution to transparency. It helped strengthen WFP's Operations Centre (OPSCEN), which has provided new report templates, surge capacity for information management, and training. As a result, more timely, consistent and user-friendly information is available to strategic decision-makers and external audiences. Level 3 country offices and other WFP divisions have benefited from deployments of OPSCEN staff and training, and corporate information requests have become more streamlined, reducing the burden on operational staff.
25. However, many interviewees expressed concern about the larger investments in information flows and accountability targeting executive management and donors compared with other EPR priorities. Most country office respondents questioned the relevance of information products to their own operational decision-making, and reported that information and reporting requests were still sometimes excessive. Factors contributing to this overload included parallel channels for operational, public and donor reporting; and inadequate coordination between OPSCEN and the situational monitoring, needs assessments and vulnerability analyses produced by other divisions.

### Learning

26. PREP introduced the systematic use of lessons-learned exercises for corporate emergencies. For 89 percent of survey respondents this was an improvement, but informants criticized the lack of follow-up on the exercises, which was hampered by the absence of a corporate knowledge management system.

#### ⇒ *Food and non-food stocks*

27. In cooperation with other units, PREP contributed to increasing the availability and timely deployment of food and non-food stocks. Pre-positioning of ready-to-eat foods through WFP's Forward Purchase Facility enabled rapid dispatch, as at the outset of responses in Cameroon, Serbia, South Sudan and Ukraine. PREP's financial support to the pre-positioning of two truck fleets in Africa provided timely surge capacity, supplying trucks when needed in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan and reducing lead times from one month to one week. PREP financial support also enabled faster deployments of logistics equipment in Southeast Asia.
28. However, timely availability of appropriate food and non-food stocks remains a major challenge. Several recent Level 3 emergencies have faced critical food shortages, delays, concerns about food quality and appropriateness, and lack of support equipment. At the time of the evaluation, the updated emergency procurement procedures supported by PREP had not yet been finalized.

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<sup>9</sup> With a total annual ceiling of USD 2 million, IR-PREP can fund proposals of up to USD 300,000 for activities of three months maximum.

29. The use of cash and vouchers (C&V) in emergencies is significant and growing.<sup>10</sup> PREP limited its work in this area, recognizing that C&V programming was led by other WFP units. However, the evaluation found significant room for improving staff capacity and support processes such as rapid market assessments, pre-identification of potential partners and concluding partner agreements.<sup>11</sup>

⇒ *External partners*

30. External partnerships and partners' capacities were frequently cited as critical bottlenecks to WFP's emergency response. PREP made positive contributions in this area, particularly with national authorities and military entities, but its activities were not proportionate to the importance of the issue, especially concerning WFP's relationships with cooperating non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
31. Informants reported the main weaknesses in relationships with and capacities of cooperating NGOs, and in the capacity and efficiency of the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD). However, PREP did not include any activities for strengthening the capacities of cooperating NGOs. Although WFP recently adopted a corporate partnership strategy, joint efforts by PREP and other units to improve the processing of field-level agreements were still ongoing at the time of the evaluation. PREP contributed to UNHRD's capacity by funding the development of a well-used training centre in Subang and by pre-positioning logistics equipment, but activities for providing broader support to UNHRD were not completed.
32. In cooperation with other units, PREP's Capabilities Partnership Programme developed a framework for capacity development of national authorities, contributed to training modules, and supported several country-level capacity development projects. Interviewees reported these as useful, especially in regions with less experience of capacity development of national authorities.
33. PREP contributed to improved civil–military coordination by helping to establish a network of focal points and temporarily funding some of these posts. Better civil–military coordination was reported in Asia and the Pacific, and West Africa. However, the relevance of the civil–military coordination guidance developed by PREP was perceived as being low, and the training module was not developed.

### **PREP's Overall Contribution**

34. Perceptions of PREP's overall effectiveness diverged strongly among WFP staff; while the evaluation noted progress in many important areas, it also raised strong concerns about the sustainability of many PREP activities and achievements.
35. *Institutional focus.* The number and magnitude of the emergencies facing WFP during PREP's implementation helped ensure a focus on emergencies. Most survey respondents and interviewees recognized PREP's positive contribution to awareness and prioritization of EPR, for example through regular Board briefings and communications within WFP about the Transformative Agenda.

<sup>10</sup> See OEV's evaluation of WFP's C&V policy (WFP/EB.1/2015/5-A). The number of emergency projects using cash or vouchers increased from fewer than ten in 2009 to more than 30 in 2013, when WFP's C&V expenditure totalled USD 507 million spent in 52 countries.

<sup>11</sup> These findings are consistent with the evaluation of WFP's C&V policy.

36. *Speed and coverage.* PREP helped increase the speed and coverage of WFP's emergency responses. Changes in advance financing enabled earlier scale-up of responses and helped avoid pipeline breaks. The roster helped fill deployment gaps and speed up deployments to recent Level 3 responses. The pre-positioning of ready-to-eat foods enabled the rapid delivery of assistance in Cameroon and South Sudan. However, overall improvement of response speed and coverage was limited by constraints in staff deployment capacity, food shortages and delays in deliveries, and delays in emergency C&V programming.
37. *Consistency.* According to more than 90 percent of survey respondents, PREP helped WFP develop a more consistent and systematic approach to EPR, reducing the reliance on personalities. However 18 percent of Directors disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement.
38. *Coherence and accountability.* Changes to operational information management introduced by PREP have enhanced the transparency and external accountability of WFP's operations. The systematic use of strategic and operational task forces has strengthened the coherence and accountability of managerial decisions for Level 3 emergency responses. However, there are concerns regarding the communication of decisions and the insufficient coordination and consistency of decisions between strategic and operational task forces.
39. *Cross-cutting considerations.* PREP included activities for integrating gender considerations into EPR. However, it did not directly address accountability to affected populations, and its contribution to strengthening partnerships with cooperating partners was limited, although they are WFP's main interface with beneficiaries. PREP also paid insufficient attention to the quality or appropriateness of the assistance delivered.
40. *Effects on Level 1 and Level 2 responses.* PREP increased WFP's focus on Level 3 responses, which was widely reported to have had negative effects on Level 1 and Level 2 responses. For example, staff were deployed to Level 3 responses from other important emergencies such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia. Internal and external support was reportedly more difficult to attract in the absence of a Level 3 declaration. However, Level 1 and Level 2 responses benefited from PREP activities through, for example, advance financing and increased spending authorities.
41. *Mainstreaming.* The evaluation found that improvements in advance financing, OPSCEN and some protocols and guidance are likely to be sustained beyond PREP, either because they have been completed and require little additional investment, or because they have strong management buy-in. However, many respondents expressed strong concerns about the mainstreaming and sustainability of other important PREP activities. WFP's 2015 Management Plan included few references to PREP activities, and the evaluation found that ownership levels varied among WFP divisions. Changes in the PREP team and transfer of responsibility for EPR to WFP's Operations Department were reported as possible disruptions to the continuity of critical activities.

## Supporting and Constraining Factors

42. PREP's clear mandate to address WFP's EPR challenges helped create a positive enabling environment and bring key donors on board.
43. However, the large number of Level 3 emergencies during PREP's implementation created competition for attention and funding between responding to emergencies and making the systemic improvements sought by PREP. Introduction of WFP's Fit for Purpose initiative after PREP was designed meant that the programme had to adapt to emerging

priorities and organizational restructuring, arguably reducing the share of leadership attention available to PREP.

44. Many stakeholders considered PREP's dynamic and skilled staff and leadership critical to its success. Its cross-functional approach and ability to provide analysis and develop concepts enabled progress in several areas.
45. However, many respondents saw PREP as overly complex and insufficiently clear on what it aimed to achieve and how. Although PREP addressed well-recognized priority issues, many respondents were critical of its top-down, Headquarters-centred implementation. Stronger communication to all levels of WFP could have helped increase attention to needs in the field, improve guidance and tool design and increase uptake. PREP's subnational office survey and workshops aimed to address these gaps, but had resulted in little follow-up at the time of the evaluation.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Conclusions

46. PREP was launched at an important moment as WFP sought to strengthen its capacity to respond to increasingly complex, global humanitarian challenges. PREP aimed to improve WFP's capabilities in five highly relevant areas: personnel, finance and financial risk management, accountability, food and non-food stocks, and external partners.
47. Over three and a half years, PREP channelled approximately USD 41 million towards its activities, most of which was from extra-budgetary sources. During this same period (2011-2014) WFP's direct expenses for emergency operations were approximately USD 6.9 billion.<sup>12</sup> The evaluation team concluded that as a result of the investment, PREP contributed to important achievements in all of its outcome areas.
48. PREP's accomplishments were achieved while WFP and its Division of Emergencies were challenged by an unprecedented number of long-duration and complex Level 3 emergencies, which exceeded the scenario of three corporate emergencies a year on which PREP was based. PREP was challenged by its wide scope, high ambitions and implementation approach, which – combined with a funding level of less than 50 percent – limited its overall success.
49. Since conclusion of PREP in December 2014, WFP continues to face critical gaps in EPR, especially regarding personnel, cooperating partners and C&V programming, but also in other important areas. Several of PREP's main activities either were not completed, or need refinement and stronger ownership and uptake across WFP. PREP did not adequately address issues such as cooperating partners, C&V programming, protection and accountability to affected populations, and was too focused on the early phases of sudden-onset disasters rather than the full range of possible emergency scenarios.
50. PREP's implementation approach did not build sustainable commitment in all areas. Many respondents saw PREP as focusing too much on generating frameworks, tools and guidance, without investing enough in communicating and supporting the uptake and application of these. Some tools and guidance were therefore not fully adopted, and commitment to EPR was inconsistent across WFP. PREP's reliance on extra-budgetary funding brought in

<sup>12</sup> WFP's Annual Performance Report 2013 Annex IX-A (WFP/EB.A/2014/4); 2014 estimates: WFP's on line contributions data system.

needed resources but did not establish a sustained base of core resources for addressing continuing needs for EPR strengthening.

51. As EPR is WFP's main operational area, all relevant units will need to continue their attention to EPR strengthening, to ensure that PREP investments and achievements are not lost. Next steps in this work should build on PREP's efforts to leverage knowledge and learning and its cross-functional approach, while increasing the emphasis on consultations with field staff and partners on the design, adjustment and roll-out of activities and the full integration of EPR into the programmes of all relevant WFP divisions.

## Recommendations

52. The evaluation makes four recommendations taking into account WFP's ongoing realignment under the Fit for Purpose initiative, the global humanitarian reform agenda and WFP's position as a global leader in EPR.

<b>Recommendation 1: Reinforce EPR strengthening as a corporate priority</b>	<b>Addressed to*</b>	<b>Suggested timeframe</b>
a) Do not extend PREP as a programme, but mainstream identified responsibilities for EPR strengthening in all relevant WFP functional areas.	EMG (OSE)	Immediate/continuous
b) Adopt an integrated agenda for EPR strengthening, giving due consideration to all levels of emergency, including those associated with complex and protracted emergencies.	EMG (OSE)	Immediate/continuous
c) Integrate EPR strengthening as a priority in all organizational change initiatives.	EMG (INC, OSE)	Immediate/continuous
d) Establish a regular, internal funding mechanism and sufficient dedicated capacity for work on strengthening EPR.	EMG	End of 2015
<b>Recommendation 2: Focus on three priorities for future EPR strengthening: staff capacity; relationships with cooperating partners; and C&amp;V programming.</b>	<b>Addressed to</b>	<b>Suggested timeframe</b>
<b>2.1 Staff capacity for emergency response</b>		
a) Provide leadership, and further develop and implement a strategy to provide adequate staff capacity for emergency response.	HRM	Immediate/continuous
b) Make EPR a central element in implementation of the People Strategy and the leadership development programme, following revision of job profiles for leadership roles.	HRM	Immediate/continuous
c) Improve coverage and targeting of FASTER; and roll out the "Getting Ready for Emergencies" e-learning.	OSE (HRM)	Immediate/continuous
d) Continue to develop the emergency response roster, improve identification and vetting of candidates, and improve links among the emergency response, regional and functional rosters and the overall human resources system.	HRM (OSE)	Immediate/continuous
e) Establish corporate emergency response teams with adequate resources for set up and maintenance.	EMG (OSE, HRM)	End of 2015
f) Improve the transition from surge capacity to longer-term recruitments, especially in protracted crises.	HRM (OSE)	End of 2015



Recommendation 4: Fully capture the investments made in PREP by refining and completing the following major PREP activities	Addressed to	Suggested timeframe
a) Prepare a final end-of-programme report on PREP's planned activities, with full accounting of expenditure, status of activities at the end of December 2014, and priorities for continuation and further development.	OSE	Mid-2015
b) <b>EPR Package:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Ensure that the strategic task force (STF) systematically considers situations approaching or surpassing risk thresholds.</li> <li>ii. Strengthen mechanisms to ensure that Country Directors assume responsibility and are held accountable for completing the package's risk assessment and checklists and implementing follow-up actions.</li> <li>iii. Simplify and improve flexibility of the EPR Package. Create a more user-friendly dashboard indicating when risk thresholds are passed. Ensure continued alignment with related tools at the inter-agency level.</li> </ul>	STF  Regional Directors  OSE	Immediate/continuous  End of 2015  End of 2015
c) <b>Activation protocol:</b> Ensure that the planned revision of the activation protocol includes simplification of the protocol and review of the terms of reference for strategic and operational task forces; and addresses issues raised in the evaluation about transparency, roles and responsibilities and complementarity between the strategic and operational task forces.	OSE EMG	End of 2015
d) <b>EPR knowledge management:</b> Encourage further lesson-learning processes at the country, regional or functional level and collate findings. Enhance systematic follow-up on lessons learned exercises and report on progress to the Executive Management Group (EMG). Continue to strengthen links with other review and knowledge management processes.	OSE EMG	Immediate/continuous
e) <b>Advance financing:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Clarify the role of the Immediate Response Account as a risk fund that can be used to make grants and provide collateral for advances, and advocate for this role with donors.</li> <li>ii. Increase awareness of IR-PREP for preparedness activities, and consider increasing its funding ceiling and timeframe.</li> </ul>	RMB PGG OSE	Immediate/continuous  End of 2015
f) <b>Corporate Response EMOP Facility:</b> Refine the facility, and finalize it for EMG approval and roll-out. Enable activation of elements of the facility prior to declaration of a Level 3 emergency.	OSE, EMG (OSZ, RMB)	End of 2015
g) <b>Operational information management:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Further rationalize and streamline information requests, seeking opportunities to reduce the frequency of reporting.</li> <li>ii. Merge various information and reporting channels.</li> </ul>	OSE  EMG	End of 2015  End of 2015

<p>h) <b>Food and non-food stocks:</b></p> <p>i. Complete the supply chain strategy for food and non-food stocks.</p> <p>ii. Strengthen mechanisms for ensuring the quality and appropriateness of WFP's response modalities by strengthening analyses and their links to decisions.</p>	<p>OSC (OSE)</p> <p>OSZ (OSE)</p>	<p>End of 2015</p> <p>Immediate/continuous</p>
<p>i) <b>Augmentation of national readiness and response:</b> Support country offices and regional bureaux in capacity-building efforts for national authorities, for example by providing funding for project development, and strengthening mechanisms for exchanging good practices and lessons learned.</p>	<p>OSE</p>	<p>Immediate/continuous</p>

\* Responsibilities in parentheses indicate the unit(s) playing supporting or facilitating role.

## ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

C&V	cash and vouchers
DED	Office of the Deputy Executive Director
EMG	Executive Management Group
EMOP	emergency operation
EPR	emergency preparedness and response
FASTER	Functional and Support Training for Emergency Response
HRM	Human Resources Division
INC	Innovation and Change Management Division
IRA	Immediate Response Account
IR-PREP	Immediate Response Account for Preparedness
LEG	Legal Office
NGO	non-governmental organization
OEV	Office of Evaluation
OPSCEN	Operations Centre
OSC	Supply Chain Division
OSE	Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division
OSZ	Policy and Programme Division
PGC	Partnership and Advocacy Coordination Division
PGG	Government Partnerships Division
PREP	Preparedness and Response Enhancement Programme
RMB	Budget and Programming Division
RMW	Staff Wellness Division
STF	strategic task force
UNHRD	United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot