ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGERIAL MATTERS

Agenda item 12

For information*

WFP SECURITY REPORT

* In accordance with the Executive Board's decisions on governance, approved at the Annual and Third Regular Sessions, 2000, items for information should not be discussed unless a Board member specifically requests it, well in advance of the meeting, and the Chair accepts the request on the grounds that it is a proper use of the Board's time.

Executive Board documents are available on WFP's Website (http://executiveboard.wfp.org).

NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for information.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal point indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document reports on security and safety incidents in 2014 affecting the staff and assets of WFP, its partners and contractors. Crime remains the most frequently reported threat, but the likelihood of complex attacks is increasing; the Ebola crisis required special security interventions.

The Board approved security expenditures of up to USD 10 million from the General Fund in 2014; country offices were required to provide an additional USD 8.8 million in cost sharing (see CEB/2010/HLCM/FB/8/Rev.2). Funding was also provided for jointly financed security activities: WFP contributed USD 11.3 million for the United Nations Department of Safety and Security in 2014.

The Field Security Division continued its strategic plan for 2012–2016. Changes in the division to increase its field presence and reduce the headcount at Headquarters helped to improve coordination with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security and to mainstream security risk management in WFP. The number of field security officers increased in 2014 to 52, reflecting the increase in Level 2 and Level 3 emergencies. The division led work on technical issues related to explosions, conducted technical assessments on behalf of other United Nations organizations and started to train security professionals in blast mitigation. WFP continues to evaluate its risk-mitigation measures at its offices.

Security risks in the field are managed by WFP's field security officers and regional security officers, assisted by 25 international consultants and supported by local security assistants, security focal points and Headquarters staff. Security assessment missions evaluate minimum operating security standards and the effectiveness of risk mitigation. The division works with other units to integrate security into WFP planning, and with the United Nations Security Management System on the development of new concepts, processes and tools. The division is about to become part of the Resource Management Department with a view to ensuring that security, health, safety and wellness remain central concerns, in line with WFP's Framework of Accountability.

REVIEW OF THE WFP FIELD SECURITY FUNCTION

1. The Field Security Division continued its strategic plan for 2012–2016, with security risk managers at the heart of its approach. Coordination with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and enhanced communication with other divisions are helping to integrate security into the planning of all WFP processes.

2. In 2014, USD 200,000 was allocated to the Field Security Division (OMF)[1] for projects identified in the field security business process review to fund: i) training and development related to e-learning; ii) coordination with the Human Resources Division to improve the induction of new staff; iii) analysis of security expenditure; and iv) development of a communications plan to increase awareness of security risk management.

3. An OMF audit of field security in 2014 evaluated the adequacy and effectiveness of internal control processes, and noted positive developments such as a model for collating and analysing security costs in country offices and a training course in French for local security assistants in Cameroon. No high-risk observations arose from the audit.

SECURITY INCIDENTS INVOLVING WFP STAFF OR ASSETS AND PARTNER STAFF [2]

4. The main observations regarding WFP security in 2014 are:

> One WFP staff member was killed in a work-related traffic accident.

> No staff member was killed or seriously injured by violence in the line of duty.

> The number of contractor and partner staff fatalities in the line of duty declined from 17 in 2013 to 5 in 2014. Casualty rates among partners and contractors remained higher than among WFP staff, indicating that security measures for WFP staff are more effective.

> The number of staff kidnapped declined, but kidnapping remains a significant concern; one WFP staff member abducted in South Sudan remains missing.

> National staff and their dependents continued to be more affected by violence in non-work incidents than international staff, suggesting that local populations are more exposed to threats and that international staff are better protected at their residences.

> Reported incidents affecting WFP staff and assets declined for the first time in five years.

> As in previous years, more than half of all reported incidents were criminal acts.

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[1] In 2015, the acronym was superseded by RMQ.

[2] This report is based on incidents reported to the Security Information Management and Security Analysis Support System.

WFP Staff[3] Fatalities

5.   An international security officer from the country office in the Syrian Arab Republic lost his life in a traffic accident involving a WFP armoured vehicle, and one international staff member lost her life in a non-work traffic accident in Ethiopia. No WFP staff member was killed in the line of duty in violent acts.

WFP Staff Injuries

6.   The number of injuries from acts of violence decreased in 2014 compared with the previous year. No staff members were injured in acts of violence in the line of duty. Four staff members were injured in violent non-work incidents, three were injured in assaults in Haiti, Nepal and South Sudan, and one was shot in Pakistan. Eight staff members were injured in work-related accidents: six in traffic accidents in Bolivia, Senegal, South Africa, the Syrian Arab Republic (two) and Zimbabwe, and two in workplace accidents in Egypt and Somalia.

Contractor/Partner Staff Fatalities and Injuries

7.   The number of fatalities in the line of duty among contractor and partner staff declined from 17 in 2013 to 5 in 2014. Three contractor employees lost their lives in the line of duty in the Syrian Arab Republic, two in an ambush and one in a suicide-bomb explosion. Six other contractor staff were injured in the same two incidents. Two contractor employees lost their lives in work-related accidents, one in a traffic accident in Guinea and the other in a workplace accident in Yemen. No partner employees were killed or injured in 2014. Two contractor employees were injured in work-related accidents, one in Italy and one in Malawi.

Abduction/Kidnappings

8.   The number of victims of kidnapping declined from 2013 but such incidents remain a significant concern, primarily in the Sudan where half of the reported incidents occurred.

9.   One WFP local security assistant was kidnapped while on duty at Malakal Airport in South Sudan; his whereabouts are unknown. A national staff member kidnapped near Damascus was released unharmed after 15 days. Two partner staff members were abducted in the line of duty in separate incidents in Afghanistan. Five contracted truck drivers were abducted in four work-related incidents in the Sudan.

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[3] In this report "staff" refers to all those employed by WFP with the exception of people locally recruited on hourly pay rates, together with their spouses and recognized dependants. It hence includes consultants, staff on temporary assistance contracts and interns.

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GLOBAL TRENDS

10.   There were 697 reported security incidents involving staff and assets of WFP in 2014, a 27 percent decrease from 2013; 70 percent were work-related. These figures are consistent with previous years (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Security incidents involving WFP staff/assets (2008–2014)

11.   There were 729 reported security incidents affecting WFP operations[4] in 2014, a 30 percent decrease from 2013 (Figure 2). After the peak of reported incidents in 2013, this decline is related in regression towards the mean[5] and in part to more effective security measures.

**Figure 2: Security incidents involving WFP operations (2010–2014)**

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
[4] Incidents affecting WFP personnel or assets or those affecting the staff of partners or contractors working for WFP.

[5] A statistical phenomenon: if a variable is extreme on its first measurement, it will tend to be closer to the average on its second measurement.

DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRY

12.   The distribution of reported incidents by country is consistent with previous years. The Sudan and South Sudan remain the countries with the highest number of incidents involving WFP personnel or assets. The largest numbers of incidents were reported in the same five countries as in 2013 (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Countries with highest rates of security incidents involving WFP staff/assets in 2014

13.   The ranking changes significantly, however, when the scale of WFP's presence[6] and the number of incidents involving WFP staff and assets are considered (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Countries with highest rates of reported security incidents involving WFP staff/assets in 2014 per 100 staff

14.   The highest percentage of incidents affecting WFP assets and contractors' staff in relation to employee numbers was the 19 percent in Zimbabwe, which was in fourth place in 2013 with 15. WFP faces relatively few risks in Zimbabwe but the country office has significant funding constraints; the number of staff fell by 45 percent between December 2013 and December 2014, but the number of incidents fell by only 33 percent.

15.   Risk levels in Afghanistan are high but the number of incidents per capita is relatively low, which suggests that exposure to security risks is also related to factors such as funding, risk awareness and humanitarian access.

16.   Côte d'Ivoire, a focus of the Ebola crisis, ranked fifth in this category in 2014. The small number of WFP staff meant that the five safety and two security incidents reported in 2014 gave a high per-capita rate.

17.   In Pakistan, the number of security incidents affecting WFP operations increased from 15 in 2013 to 25 in 2014. The nature of the incidents was consistent with the previous year, but reported robberies increased from one in 2013 to eight in 2014, including five armed robberies affecting WFP staff and three highway robberies affecting contractors. Highway robberies were not reported in 2013, and are increasing throughout the country. Thefts and armed robberies involving United Nations staff members have increased in Islamabad in particular.

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[6] The number of WFP employees by duty station as at 31 December 2014; statistics from the Human Resources Division.

18.   In Italy, the number of reported incidents rose from 8 in 2013 to 18 in 2014. Burglaries affecting Headquarters staff increased from two to eight, reflecting an increase in crime in Italy.[7]

19.   There was a small increase in reported incidents in Somalia, but a drop in staff numbers resulted in a 45 percent increase in the per capita rate. The country office reported six terrorism incidents affecting WFP operations, a type of incident not reported in 2013. These developments were mainly related to an increase in Al-Shabaab activity.

20.   In the Syrian Arab Republic, incidents affecting WFP contracted trucks declined from 61 in 2013 to 13 in 2014. Sound security practices, logistics and access planning reduced some risks, and contractors were less exposed to risks because the abnormally heavy winter and the expansion of insurgent activity limited access to many areas.

21.   In South Sudan, the number of reported traffic accidents declined sharply. Conflict in many areas in the first half of 2014 impeded humanitarian access, which reduced road movements and traffic accidents. A strict curfew imposed because of the deteriorating security situation reduced the number of arrests of staff members.

22.   In the Central African Republic property crimes affecting WFP, in particular the looting of its trucks, declined with the withdrawal of former Seleka forces to the north.

23.   Crime continued to affect WFP's operations in Uganda, but a decrease in reported incidents moved the country office from 7th position in 2012 to 17th in 2014. There were fewer accidents involving light vehicles after tracking devices were fitted to improve fleet management, and thefts in warehouses declined significantly after controls were improved.

DISTRIBUTION BY REGION

24.   The highest numbers of security incidents affecting the staff and assets of WFP, its contractors and partners were reported by the Nairobi regional bureau – 29 percent – and the Cairo regional bureau – 28 percent (Figure 5[8]).

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[7] According to the 2014 survey of the Italian National Institute for Statistics, the number of home intrusions grew by 120 percent compared with 2013.

[8] "Not assigned to WFP administration" refers to non-operational locations where WFP staff are posted; New York is an example.

Figure 5: Significant security incidents involving WFP staff/assets in 2014, by regional bureau


OMB: Bangkok Regional Bureau; OMC: Cairo Regional Bureau;
OMD: Dakar Regional Bureau; OMJ: Johannesburg Regional Bureau;
OMN: Nairobi Regional Bureau; OMP: Panama Regional Bureau

DISTRIBUTION BY THREAT AND INCIDENT TYPE

25.   Criminal incidents were predominant at 57 percent in 2013 and 2014. Incidents related to terrorism increased from 2 percent to 4 percent, but this was due to the decrease in the total number of reported incidents and an increase in terrorism-related incidents from 21 in 2013 to 27 in 2014 (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Distribution of reported security incidents affecting WFP staff/assets in 2014 by threat type

26.   Three quarters of the reported criminal incidents were property crimes. Robberies surpassed non-violent theft and burglary to become the most-reported incident type affecting WFP personnel in 2014 (Figure 7). Eight staff members sustained minor injuries in robberies, but there were no major injuries or fatalities.

Figure 7: Distribution of reported security incidents affecting WFP staff/assets in 2014, by incident type

27.   Road accidents continued to be the second most reported incident type, even though the number of road traffic accidents declined by 20 percent compared with 2013. The decline is partly accounted for by regression towards the mean after the peak in 2013 and partly by driver training and enhanced driving safety (Figure 8). Of the reported traffic accidents 78 percent were work-related.

Figure 8: Road traffic accidents involving WFP staff/assets (2009–2014)

28.   The Kenya country office reported the most accidents, followed by Ethiopia (Figure 9).

Figure 9: Country offices with highest number of traffic accidents in 2014

DISTRIBUTION BY VIOLENT VERSUS NON-VIOLENT

29.   Non-violent acts such as thefts, burglaries and road accidents accounted for 63 percent of reported incidents involving WFP personnel and assets. The other 37 percent related to violence or threats of violence such as robberies, assaults and car-jacking (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Distribution of violent versus non-violent incidents in 2014

HIGH-RISK COUNTRIES

30.   The precarious security situation in Iraq deteriorated further as a result of the capture by insurgents of Fallujah early in 2014 and of Mosul in June 2014 and a rapid advance towards Baghdad and the Syrian border that brought large areas under their control. Ongoing fighting and the hostile stance of the insurgents reduce WFP's access in these areas. Kidnapping is a serious concern.

31.   The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic poses a number of threats, particularly kidnapping. The number of attacks on trucks was reduced, but transport risks remain significant. This was highlighted in the fatal attack of 6 August when two contracted truck drivers were killed and three were injured by an explosion.

32.   The risks to staff in Afghanistan remain significant. The withdrawal of international forces at the end of 2014 resulted in increased hostility and reduced access in large parts of the country. Through its access strategy, however, WFP has established a unique position and gained or maintained access in many areas.

33.   Pakistan continued to face serious insecurity. Military operations against militants in North Waziristan led to concerns about retaliatory attacks on Pakistani cities. As sectarian violence increased, threats to the security of WFP staff and operations from conflict and suicide bombers became pervasive.

34.   In the Central African Republic, instability continued to affect WFP's operations. Access was challenged through harassment at militia checkpoints, thefts of WFP food, threats to the lives of people of some religious or ethnic origins, and conflict.

35.   The security situation in South Sudan deteriorated in December 2013 when political disagreements escalated into violence in several states. The fighting dominated the first half of 2014, with high rates of crime resulting from the absence of law and order.

36.   In the Sudan, conflict between the Government and militias continued in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and the Darfur regions. In Darfur particularly the fragile economic situation, the proliferation of weapons and lawlessness led to widespread violent crime; humanitarian workers were often targeted. Kidnap for ransom is a serious concern, as evidenced by incidents affecting staff from the International Organization for Migration and two pilots working for the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur.

37.   In Somalia, attacks by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu targeted politicians and the offices and staff of the United Nations and African Union. Al-Shabaab is evidently able and determined to engage in complex terrorist operations, and its control over supply routes in South-Central poses challenges for safe operations by contractors.

38.   In Yemen, the Houthi militia expanded its control over Sana'a and much of the northern and central provinces in 2014; clashes between Houthi, the military and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula peaked in October. Kidnapping was a major threat, particularly for international staff. WFP implemented secure working modalities, restricted movement and temporarily relocated staff from Sana'a to Aden, but maintained its operational capacity.

39.   In Mali the security situation was volatile throughout 2014, with widespread criminality. United Nations' forces were increasingly targeted by explosive devices, and the kidnapping of westerners remained a severe risk in the north.

40.   Niger continued to be affected by insecurity in neighbouring countries. Boko Haram seized towns in the north-east along the Cameroon and Niger borders, and the security situation there deteriorated. The risk of banditry also increased along the Mali border, where the presence of al-Qaeda destabilizes the security environment.

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

41.   Armed conflict and terrorism will continue to pose the most significant threats for WFP operations; robust security measures will be required to counter them. Security management, risk awareness and funding will remain determining factors for the safety and security of WFP staff.

42.   Kidnapping incidents for ransom and political purposes are expected to increase.

43.   Crime is expected to remain the most frequently reported threat type affecting WFP, particularly property crimes against WFP staff.

44.   Traffic accidents will probably remain a significant cause of injuries and fatalities among staff. The application of fleet-management tools and strict application of safety rules have minimized the risks.

45.   Complex attacks are likely to increase in frequency and sophistication. WFP is exposed to this threat as a member of the United Nations, whose programmes are viewed by some groups as contrary to their ideologies, and because such groups oppose cooperation between WFP and host governments. WFP is a high-profile international target, and its staff may be threatened or its assets damaged in attacks against other entities.

46.   As a result of the above, OMF expects to face increasing numbers of complex challenges in the coming years as it seeks to ensure the safety and security of WFP staff.

OVERVIEW OF WFP FIELD SECURITY

SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT

47.   The Field Security Division (OMF) continues to participate in the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) risk management working group to develop new concepts, processes and tools. These have been agreed by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and are reflected in a new manual; a new e-tool is being tested for implementation in 2015.

48.   OMF works with other divisions to integrate security into WFP planning and practices. It is helping to develop and implement an access framework for Afghanistan, working with the programme, logistics and field security units on mapping and analysing the context in which WFP operates. In 2014, OMF contributed to the *Programme Guidance Manual*, third-party monitoring guidelines and the *Field Operations Pocket Book*.

49.   OMF became increasingly involved in civil-military coordination during 2014. It was invited to the Swedish military training academy to speak on United Nations security and to develop relations with global military organizations. WFP was appointed leader on civil-military coordination in UNSMS, and is supporting a major exercise of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2015.

FIELD SECURITY CAPACITY

50.   In view of the number of corporate emergencies in 2014, OMF was required to provide security support in volatile and dangerous situations. The Ebola crisis also required special security interventions, which involved the recruitment of security and medical professionals.

51.   As in previous years, OMF employed consultants in 2014 to support country offices in crisis management and temporarily filled some positions during surge deployments with field security officers (FSOs) and Headquarters staff. Consultants were also hired for deployments in countries affected by Ebola and in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab republic and Yemen. As of 31 December 2014, 56 FSOs were deployed at various duty stations, compared with 50 in 2013, and 6 regional security officers were in post.

52.   In countries with no FSO presence, OMF is supported by local security assistants or security focal points. A training workshop for security focal points was implemented in early 2014, following four similar workshops in 2013.

SECURITY ASSESSMENT MISSIONS

53.   WFP's security assessment missions evaluate the effectiveness of risk-mitigation measures and identify vulnerabilities that may have developed since previous missions. In 2014, external consultants carried out 15 assessments of physical and procedural security measures at WFP offices and made 1,272 recommendations, compared with 14 assessments in 2013 and 1,472 recommendations. The overall findings indicated major deficiencies in equipment and facilities for minimum operating safety standards (MOSS).

TABLE 1: SECURITY ASSESSMENT MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS	
Contingency/emergency planning	194
Documentation	228
Equipment	460
Framework of Accountability	88
Processes and practices	268
Roles and responsibilities	34
TOTAL	**1 272**

Figure 11: Security assessment mission recommendations

TRAINING

54. Security training is a cost-effective way to minimize risks to WFP's personnel, premises and assets. In line with the 2012 UNSMS policy on security training and WFP's 2014 People Strategy, OMF is building the systems required to develop security expertise: FSOs focus on basic security-awareness training and Safe and Secure Approaches to Field Environments (SSAFE) programmes, and the training unit works with WFP divisions, UNDSS and other UNSMS organizations to design training programmes for higher certification.

55. The following training activities for security professionals were implemented in 2014:

➢ 27 local security assistants were certified in a competency-based learning programme;

➢ 9 security officers qualified under the security certification programme;

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> ➤ 3 security officers received intermediate training programme certification; and

> ➤ 49 staff attended two workshops for regional security officers and two for field security officers in Rome to discuss best practices in relation to operational challenges in the field.

56.   Training for managers with security responsibilities in 2014 involved:

> ➤ a security focal point workshop for nine staff who had not previously been trained to improve compliance with WFP security reporting requirements, budgeting and risk mitigation measures; and

> ➤ a mandatory UNDSS online learning programme for security management team members; all country directors and their deputies are expected to take it.

57.   In 2014, WFP's field security professionals continued to train staff with a view to minimizing risks in the field, and cooperation among UNSMS organizations provided security-awareness training. WFP security professionals trained staff at their duty stations, and the training unit supported training conducted by WFP divisions and the other Rome-based agencies, and by the United Nations System Staff College in Turin for junior professional officers.

58.   WFP field security staff continued to support the SSAFE programme, which is mandatory in 34 countries, with a view to equipping staff to operate in hostile environments and to respond appropriately to threats. The training unit provided five SSAFE training sessions for 100 Headquarters staff from WFP, the other Rome-based agencies and the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services in Vienna.

Specialist Training

59.   In 2014, WFP trained eight staff in hostage incident management, one security officer attended the hostage negotiators course conducted by the Manchester police in the United Kingdom, and 21 staff attended emergency trauma bag training for non-medical emergency first responders. OMF also supported the Functional and Support Training for Emergency Response programme.

PREMISES SECURITY AND BLAST MITIGATION

60.   In 2014 OMF carried out 17 blast vulnerability assessments − 6 of them for other United Nations agencies − to determine mitigation measures where appropriate and feasible. There were two assessments of primary significance: i) to assess and recommend mitigation measures for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Villa complex in Mogadishu and ii) to verify implementation of recommended mitigation measures in the Darya village complex in Afghanistan.

61.   WFP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees are developing training in blast assessment to support security professionals in vulnerability assessments of premises. In 2014, blast experts reviewed existing training material and in 2015 will deliver a pilot training in Budapest.

62.   Under the Physical Security Network, within which WFP is the leader for blast and vulnerability assessments, UNSMS experts will work with the UNDSS Physical Security Unit to develop standard methods and practices for security at all United Nations buildings.

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UNDSS COSTS AND THE WFP SECURITY EMERGENCY FUND

63.   The Board approved expenditures of USD 18.8 million in 2014 for UNDSS costs and the WFP Security Emergency Fund special account. The amount takes into account WFP's estimated USD 11.5 million share of UNDSS costs and USD 7.3 million for the Security Emergency Fund for the purchase of security equipment not covered by country projects.

TABLE 2: WFP SECURITY EMERGENCY FUND AS AT 26 JANUARY 2015 (*USD*)			
Programme	Allocations, 2014	Commitments and actuals, 2014	% of total
Staffing	3 706 367	3 787 980	20
MOSS	2 524 633	2 698 074	15
Security assessment missions	797 000	553 128	3
Training	272 000	192 304	1
UNDSS	11 290 028	11 290 028	61
TOTAL	**18 590 028**	**18 521 515**	

64.   Funding is allocated to WFP offices by OMF for equipment and enhancements to premises to ensure MOSS compliance and risk mitigation in line with the "no programme without security" and "no security without resources" policies, especially for operations with low direct support cost income or where additional mitigation measures are needed. Funds were provided for 31 country offices in 2014.

UNDSS JOINTLY FINANCED ACTIVITIES

65.   WFP's projected share of UNDSS costs for 2014 was USD 11.5 million, as shown in the initial budget for jointly financed UNDSS field-related security costs for 2013–2014; this was based on the number of WFP staff in the field (see CEB/2010/HLCM/FB/8/Rev.2). The 2014–2015 cost-sharing budget was revised to give a WFP cost share of USD 23.2 million. WFP contributed USD 11.3 million to UNDSS in 2014.

| TABLE 3: UNITED NATIONS FIELD-RELATED SECURITY COSTS (*USD million*)		
	UNDSS	WFP share
2002–2003	42.9	6.5
2004–2005	113.1	13.2
2006–2007	172.3	20.2[*]
2008–2009	174.4	17.3
2010–2011	209.9	24.4[**]
2012–2013	218.6	23.5
2014–2015	218.6	23.2

* Credit of USD 3.2 million received in 2006.
** Credit of USD 1.4 million received in 2010.

66.   In 2014 country offices were asked to provide USD 8.8 million from projects, as shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF WFP CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOINTLY FUNDED ACCOUNT COST SHARE				
Country office size	**% recovery of USD 8.8 million**	**No. of country offices**	**USD million**	**Country office share** *(USD)*
Large	50	12	4.4	366 667
Medium	30	11	2.64	240 000
Small	20	18	1.76	97 778
TOTAL			**8.8**	

TABLE 5: JOINT FINANCING ARRANGEMENT COST SHARE IN 2014, BY COUNTRY	
Country office size	**Country**
Large	Afghanistan, Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kenya, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen
Medium	Bangladesh, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Mali, Myanmar, State of Palestine, Philippines, Niger, Senegal, Uganda, Zimbabwe
Small	Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Rwanda, United Republic of Tanzania

Figure 12: Percentage share of Joint Financing Arrangement costs by regional bureau in 2014

67.   WFP works with UNDSS to address concerns about the high cost of local cost-sharing budgets, to identify savings and to calculate the funding required for safe and secure programme delivery. WFP will continue to ensure that UNDSS remains accountable and transparent through regular budgetary discussions at the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and will provide updates as to changes in the structure of UNDSS and its allocation of resources to the jointly financed activity.

LOOKING FORWARD

68.   As of 2015 OMF is part of the Resource Management Department. This enables the department to ensure that wellness, security, budgeting, programming and management services are jointly considered in WFP's decision-making and ensures that security remains a strategic concern in line with WFP's Framework of Accountability.

69.   The division will continue to address the physical security needs of WFP operations and to work with WFP divisions and risk-management functions to promote a holistic approach to security matters. The joint-access strategy with the programme and logistics units will contribute to WFP's enterprise risk management approach. The need to ensure humanitarian access will become increasingly important in guaranteeing the security of WFP operations, and WFP will work with UNDSS to ensure that humanitarian values and operating approaches are reflected in UNSMS.

Acronyms Used in the Document

FSO   field security officer

MOSS   minimum operating safety standards

OMF   Field Security Division [superseded by RMQ in 2015]

SSAFE   Safe and Secure Approaches to Field Environments

UNDSS   United Nations Department of Safety and Security

UNSMS   United Nations Security Management System