An Evaluation of WFP's Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2011-2014

Evaluation Report

WFP
World Food Programme
wfp.org

ODI

Acknowledgements

Disclaimer

The opinions expressed are those of the Evaluation Team, and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Food Programme. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

The designation employed and the presentation of material in the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of WFP concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

Evaluation Management

Evaluation Manager:	Elise Benoit
Evaluation Assistants:	Federica Zelada and Serena Succhi
Director, Office of Evaluation:	Helen Wedgwood

---

[1] To avoid indirectly associating any WFP or non-WFP personnel with the findings contained in this evaluation report, specific individuals are not named in the acknowledgements.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Boxes

Fact Sheet: WFP's Regional Response to the Syria Crisis

EMOP	Title	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
200339	Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria		*Oct 2014 to Dec 2015 ---------------------> BRs 1-14* *Req: US$2,209,500,064* *Rec: US$847,618,640*			
200433	Food assistance to vulnerable Syrian populations in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt affected by the events in Syria			*Jul 2012 to Dec 2015 ---------> BRs 1-14* *Req: US$ 2,497,111,106 Rec: US$723,105,826*		

	EMOP 200339 (Syria)	**EMOP 200433** (Regional)
Total target beneficiaries	4,500,000	2,103,019
Total MT (target)	1,853,627	71,507
Total Vouchers (target)	US$11,040,000	US$ 1,982,254,356

Source: WFP Project Documents and Budget Revisions 1-14 for EMOP 200339 and Regional EMOP 200433.

Donors to the WFP Syria Response (left) and the WFP Regional/Refugee Response (right)

Sources: 200433-Food Assistance to Vulnerable Syrian Populations in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt Affected by Conflict in Syria, exported from WINGS database, 8 August 2014; and 200339-Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria, exported from WINGS database, 8 August 2014.

WFP as a Portion of the Overall Regional and Syria Humanitarian Appeals

Appeal	WFP	Inter-Agency Appeal	WFP as % of Total
RRP 2013	US$641,911,131	US$2,981,640,112	21.5%
RRP 2014	US$851,947,912	US$3,740,654,701	22.8%
SHARP 2013	US$489,519,685	US$1,409,812,466	34.7%
SHARP 2014	US$947,118,662	US$2,276,149,354	41.6%

Sources: Calculated based on data from the Regional Response Plans (RRPs) and the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plans (SHARPs) for 2013 and 2014; mid-year updates were used where feasible. Please note that amounts indicate appeals and not the actual value of contributions received by WFP or other humanitarian agencies.

Executive summary

1.   Civil unrest in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2011 led to a major humanitarian crisis in the region, which was declared a United Nations Level 3 emergency in January 2013. WFP's responses to the crisis are among the largest and most complex operations it has ever undertaken. From 2011 to 2014, the number of refugees increased to 3 million and at least 4.5 million displaced people became food-insecure in Syria. WFP's responses were implemented in challenging circumstances as needs inside and outside the country quickly increased, and as WFP strove to manage impartial and neutral relationships with national governments, donors, other humanitarian actors and affected populations.

2.   The evaluation assessed four main elements of WFP's response: i) strategic direction and positioning; ii) organizational effectiveness; iii) programme strategy; and iv) operational performance and results. Fieldwork was undertaken in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey; information on Egypt, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic was collected remotely.

3.   The evaluation concluded that WFP responded to a fast-evolving, complex crisis and helped to improve and stabilize food security among the people it reached. The response was scaled up quickly, assisting 4.25 million people in Syria and 2 million refugees across the region in 2014, and accounting for 26 percent (in US dollar terms) of WFP's global operations. WFP funding requirements comprised 23 percent of the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan and 42 percent of the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan in 2014, WFP's logistics and procurement operations for the regional response were particularly commended. With markets operating normally in surrounding countries, WFP quickly scaled up its electronic voucher programmes to levels unprecedented in a humanitarian emergency, collaborating effectively with the private sector. The regional emergency coordination structure generally worked well, particularly in supporting the operation in Syria. WFP coordinated effectively with other United Nations agencies and structures.

4.   However, there were also challenges. Initial choices were not based on detailed analysis of conflict, gender or – crucially – the costs and benefits of different delivery modalities, including cash. More could have been done to manage the widely held perception that WFP was too close to the Syrian Government. Contingency plans for shortfalls in donor funding should have been developed earlier, and medium-term transition plans are urgently needed for countries hosting refugees, given the protracted nature of the crisis and anticipated funding limitations. WFP did not gather timely baseline data for measuring results, maintain consistent staffing in key positions or adequately linking field staff with up-to-date guidance as they rolled out relatively new delivery modalities. The evaluation also raised concerns about voucher encashment, which poses a challenge for cost-efficiency.

5.   The evaluation makes recommendations on transition and evidence-based programming, including deeper analysis of gender, conflict and context dynamics; humanitarian access and principles, and managing perceptions of WFP's role; Headquarters and the Regional Emergency Coordinator office's support for programming and operations, including human resources; and selecting delivery modalities, targeting and measuring results.

Introduction

6.   WFP's responses to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic and the surrounding region are among the largest and most complex operations it has ever undertaken. Civil unrest began in March 2011, soon leading to a major humanitarian crisis within the country and a refugee emergency throughout the region. The United Nations reported that 10.8 million people in Syria required humanitarian assistance, including 6.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 500,000 Palestinian refugees. An October 2014 WFP assessment found that 4.5 million people required food assistance in 10 of the 14 Syrian governorates that it assessed.

7.   By late October 2014, there were about 3 million registered Syrian refugees and 75,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria. While some refugees reside in camps in Iraq, Jordan and Turkey, the vast majority live in cities and host communities, where rising tensions have been reported. Data from WFP and other agencies indicate food insecurity among refugees, although food consumption scores (FCS) and the coping strategy index (CSI) are less severe than those commonly found in emergencies. Overall, 88 percent of Syrian refugees receiving WFP assistance had an acceptable FCS in the second quarter of 2014.

8.   The international response to this crisis has involved many actors. WFP is a major stakeholder, comprising 23 percent of requirements for the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan and 42 percent for the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) in 2014. The United Nations system declared the crisis a Level 3 (L3) emergency on 15 January 2013, a month after WFP made a similar declaration.

9.   By 2014, WFP was targeting 4.25 million people in Syria and 2 million refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. In US dollar terms, the response accounted for 26 percent of WFP's global operations in 2014, up from 16 percent in 2013. The response is significant for its magnitude, its concentration in middle-income countries, the United Nations' determination to stay and deliver assistance in a major conflict, and WFP's widespread use of electronic food vouchers (e-vouchers) in countries hosting refugees. To facilitate its L3 response, WFP established the Regional Emergency Coordinator office (REC) in Amman.

10.   WFP responded to this fast-evolving, complex emergency with large-scale tailored programmes that helped to improve and stabilize food security indicators for more than 6 million Syrians. Figure 1 summarizes major events, WFP responses and funding levels over time.

Figure 1: Timeline of events, funding/beneficiary levels and activities

* Refugee Response Plan

Sources: Office of Evaluation, reconstructed from WFP Standard Project Reports 2011–2013 for EMOPs 200339 and 200433; the Regional Emergency Coordinator office (REC) output report; the United Nations Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan and Regional Response Plan; and Slim, H. and Trombetta, L. 2014. *Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis*. New York, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Evaluation Features

11.   The evaluation, conducted between July and October 2014, contributes to accountability and learning, and assesses two emergency operations (EMOPs) for 2011–2014: EMOP 200339 in Syria and EMOP 200433 in refugee host countries. The evaluation terms of reference included data collection and analysis on: i) strategic direction and positioning; ii) organizational effectiveness; iii) programme strategy; and iv) operational performance and results. The evaluation also considered relevance, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and connectedness within these focus areas.

12.   The evaluation included extensive document review, and interviews and discussions with 560 stakeholders at WFP Headquarters, the REC and throughout the region, including WFP staff, partners, officials, service providers, donors and 250 beneficiaries from affected communities. Fieldwork was conducted in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Information on Egypt, Iraq and Syria was collected remotely.

13.   Data collection in Syria was challenging. To mitigate this, the team interviewed current and former staff from WFP operations in Syria, used an online questionnaire[2] and interviewed refugees in host countries about assistance received from WFP while they were displaced in Syria. The evaluation drew on WFP data that the evaluation team was often unable to validate independently, and robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data were also sometimes unavailable, including baselines, and voucher encashment figures. Despite these limitations, the information gathered from stakeholders, documents and existing data allowed the evaluation team to triangulate information for its findings.

WFP Portfolio

14.   WFP's response to the Syrian crisis is complex and diverse across the six countries. In September 2014, WFP reached nearly 6 million people through the two EMOPs compared with 3 million registered refugees in host countries and more than 4.5 million people in Syria assessed as food-insecure. Including the latest budget revision – the fourteenth – WFP aims to have provided 1.85 million mt of food in Syria and nearly USD 2 billion in vouchers in refugee host countries between 2011 and 2015.

15.   The Syria EMOP started in 2011 with 50,000 beneficiaries, growing to 1.5 million in 2012, nearly 4 million in 2013 (Figure 2) and 4.2 million in 2014, when the Syrian Government relaxed restrictions on "cross-line" deliveries to territories controlled by opposition groups. WFP targets IDPs and poor communities hosting significant numbers of IDPs identified as vulnerable in case-by-case assessments. WFP distributes primarily food, through partnerships with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) selected from a list provided by the Government. WFP seeks permission from the Government for individual food shipments; trucks require government-issued facilitation letters, often leading to negotiation over access, especially in areas outside government control. WFP staff monitor the situation when feasible, but most monitoring is conducted by partners and a third-party monitoring firm, which also has limited direct access to beneficiaries.

---

[2] The questionnaire was distributed among WFP staff members across the region and to NGO cooperating partners (32 respondents).

Figure 2: Beneficiary numbers: regional and Syria EMOPs

Source: Consolidated output data from the REC.[3]

16.   In countries hosting refugees since 2012 WFP provided limited food distributions including one-off parcels for new arrivals in Jordan and Lebanon, and food parcels for most camps in Iraq. The main mechanism has been vouchers (Figure 3), beginning with paper vouchers and gradually transitioning to electronic e-vouchers since the second half of 2013. Refugees use vouchers to purchase food from shops contracted by WFP or established for refugees in camps. This is WFP's largest voucher programme anywhere and draws on its global partnership with MasterCard and on country-level relationships with banks and retailers.

Figure 3: Values of vouchers redeemed, by month and country (USD)

Source: Consolidated output data from REC.

17.   Some Syrian refugees were excluded from WFP's portfolio. The governments of Iraq and Turkey obliged United Nations agencies to work only with refugees in camps, despite the fact that 80 percent of Syrian refugees in Turkey and 58 percent in Iraq are now living outside camps.[4].WFP assisted 70 percent of refugees in Lebanon following

---

[3] The evaluation team requested that data be exported from the REC M&E database. Figures 2 and 3 are based on those data rather than any WFP publication.
[4] Some coverage of refugees outside camps has been reported in one governorate of northern Iraq and in Turkey since September 2014, after the period covered by the evaluation.

a vulnerability-based targeting process that began in late 2013. Targeting in Egypt and Jordan was scheduled to begin in late 2014.

18.   These programmes have been supported by a range of donors: the United States of America is the largest contributor, followed by the United Kingdom and the European Commission. Five donors funded 80 percent of WFP's refugee response, and six funded 80 percent of its activities in Syria.

Findings

19.   The evaluation made 20 main findings.

Strategic Direction and Positioning

20.   *Finding 1: Initial response and analysis.* WFP recognized the mounting crisis in Syria and the region in 2011, and responded quickly at scale based on its general understanding of humanitarian needs; its awareness of the context from its programmes in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria; and the opportunities it identified for market-based responses outside Syria. While this led to broadly appropriate programmes, specific design decisions, including on targeting and distribution modality – for example between cash and vouchers – were based on insufficient analysis of markets, gender, food insecurity, contexts, conflict dynamics and cost-effectiveness. Some deeper analysis was done later, but after important decisions had been made. This absence of analysis in Syria is understandable given the volatile situation.

21.   *Finding 2: Coordination.* WFP participated positively in regional appeals and planning. It coordinated effectively with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and built positive working relationships with governments in the region. WFP's role in the emergency telecommunications, food security and nutrition sectors – through working groups or clusters – was also positive, and its logistics cluster leadership was characterized as exemplary. The evaluation identified some instances of duplication or overlap, primarily concerning WFP's cross-border and expanded cross-line operations in Syria, which started in July 2014 following United Nations Security Council Resolution 2165 and resulted in overlap with NGOs. This issue is being addressed through the Whole of Syria[5] approach.

22.   *Finding 3: Alignment and trade-offs.* WFP faces complex and competing pressures, particularly acute in Syria, from: i) its commitment to humanitarian principles, including humanity, impartiality and neutrality;[6] ii) its mandate to assist the most vulnerable and food-insecure people; iii) the limitations on its operations set by national governments; iv) its obligation to work with the United Nations Country Team; and v) the priorities of different donors. At times, Syrian authorities and opposition groups prevented WFP from reaching parts of the country. WFP had to choose its partners in Syria from a government list, but could assess them before selection.

23.   With the L3 declaration in late 2012, WFP's Executive Director set up a strategic task force to provide senior-level engagement in strategic and operational issues. The task force monitored operations, but the evaluation found less evidence of strategic direction or monitoring of progress on agreed actions. Senior managers acknowledged

---

[5] Started in July 2014, this initiative of the United Nations system aims to improve coordination, minimizing gaps and overlaps by using cross-line and cross-border deliveries to maximize the ability to reach needy populations in Syria.
[6] WFP. 2004. *Policy issues: Humanitarian Principles* (WFP/EB.1/2004/4-C). Rome, WFP.

that until recently, not all task force decisions had been clearly recorded. Given the pace and complexity of the crisis, the task force was more tactical than strategic. Management stated that as a United Nations agency, WFP's role in delivering food to the maximum number of people in need was best served by maintaining relations with the Syrian Government and negotiating access. WFP reports that this approach, which includes lobbying by senior staff, has maximized access to affected populations.

24. Syrian refugees, some United Nations officials, donors and NGOs expressed concern that WFP is seen as having a close relationship with the Syrian Government and not making sufficient use of the influence its large-scale contribution should bring to advocate for humanitarian space and unhindered access. The perception that WFP is too closely aligned with the Syrian Government has implications for its reputation.

25. Until recently, government policies prevented WFP from implementing needs-based targeting or assessing conditions among non-camp refugees in Iraq and Turkey. While the gap in assessment is understandable, WFP could have used studies by other agencies to argue for assisting refugees outside camps in Turkey. WFP recognizes this issue and progress is being made in both countries.

Organizational Effectiveness

26. *Finding 4: REC establishment*. Overall, establishment in 2012–2013[7] of the REC headed by a regional emergency coordinator was appropriate given: i) the Transformative Agenda's focus on empowered leadership and coordination; ii) the regional and highly political nature of the crisis; and iii) the presence in Amman of other regional United Nations offices responding to the crisis. The REC provided a close link between WFP's top management and operations, and helped to adapt WFP's new L3 emergency response protocol to the unfolding crisis. The REC was particularly useful in Syria, enabling field staff to focus on programming and operations while staff in Amman handled much of the administration, reporting and donor relations.

27. *Finding 5: Staffing*. The REC scaled up quickly but faced difficulty in maintaining adequate staffing levels. According to WFP staff in all six countries, the numbers, profiles and tenures of staff mobilized for the emergency were often inadequate, leading to overburdening of other staff and high turnover in core positions; for example, there were six heads of office in two years in Lebanon. The head of programme post in Turkey was often vacant, and some REC positions remained unfilled for months. This is an institution-wide challenge in emergency settings.

28. *Finding 6: REC support to programming and operations*. The REC's administrative support to country operations was effective, particularly on finance issues. The REC's support to country offices' programming included 50 field missions in 2014. However, many WFP country office and sub-office staff reported that REC support to programming and operations did not meet their main needs, particularly in late 2012 and 2013 during establishment of large-scale voucher programmes. Programme and operations staff reported limited knowledge of each other's approaches to issues such as selecting, managing and monitoring partner shops, cancelling contracts with shopkeepers, and preventing fraud and encashment of vouchers. Such challenges are common among institutions under pressure and with dispersed responsibilities.

---

[7] The post of Regional Emergency Coordinator was approved in late 2012. The REC office was established in 2013.

29.   *Finding 7: Linking operations to expertise.* WFP's effectiveness was influenced by a lack of up-to-date guidance, and challenges in linking field-based staff to relevant expertise. Some staff in country and sub-offices were unaware of guidance available within WFP and reported recreating existing materials. WFP should establish demand-driven systems to link time-pressed staff in emergencies – many of whom are short-term consultants – to guidance and expertise.

Programme Strategy

30.   *Finding 8: Coverage.* WFP's initial response, particularly during peak periods of new displacement, understandably focused on breadth over depth, including supporting all registered refugees in Egypt and Jordan, and those permitted by governments in Iraq and Turkey. Targeting work started in late 2013 in Lebanon and more recently in Egypt and Jordan. This was later than appropriate given that: i) assessments showed varied levels of food insecurity among beneficiaries; and ii) WFP knew that donor support would not continue on the same scale in the medium to long term. Delays in targeting were also heavily influenced by governments, some of which opposed targeting, and by WFP's desire for harmonization with other United Nations agencies.

31.   *Finding 9: Transition planning.*[8] It is increasingly clear that the Syrian crisis and its impacts will be long term and that donor funding will be limited. As the first financial pipeline break approached in September 2014, WFP focused on short-term contingency plans such as cutting rations (Figure 4). [9] Longer-term plans for transitioning to a more sustainable assistance model have yet to emerge, although they have been discussed by WFP and other actors, including within the United Nations Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan.

Figure 4: WFP rations in Syria: target versus achieved, January– September 2014

Source: "Ration scale fluctuations", WFP Syrian country office. Updated October 2014.

Operational Performance and Results

32.   Finding 10: M&E systems and programme uptake. The evaluation found gaps in data, which complicated the systematic measurement of results. Some gaps were related to context: data for Syria were understandably sparse, and the Turkish

---

[8] "Transition" refers to a range of options, from closing operations, handing over to national authorities or other actors and scaling down assistance through enhanced targeting or reduced transfer values, to exploring alternative cost-effective approaches for improving the food security of vulnerable populations.
[9] This planned ration cut was ultimately implemented in January 2015.

authorities limited data collection in refugee camps, ceasing monitoring for three months. Other factors were under WFP's control: the REC began systematic monitoring only in mid-2013 for the regional EMOP, did not prioritize important indicators such as encashment of assistance, and used systems with methodological shortcomings, such as an absence of baselines, which weakened the measurement of results. Credible baseline data were not gathered until 2014. Despite the constraints (such as the challenging operational environment, and the change in WFP's Strategic Results Framework), best practice dictates that systematic monitoring should start quickly, even in EMOPs. WFP staff noted that monitoring was primarily for reporting purposes, but doubted that it had led to programme adjustments other than in response to findings on voucher encashment. Monitoring was not structured or managed to inform programming.

33.   *Finding 11: Scale*. WFP covered an impressive number of beneficiaries and scaled up its interventions quickly amid rising demand, particularly where vouchers, especially e-vouchers, were used (Figure 1). In 2013, WFP reached 88 percent of targeted refugees in Egypt and 98 percent of all registered refugees in Jordan. In 2014, in Syria it served 4.25 million beneficiaries out of an estimated 4.5 million people in need of food assistance.

34.   *Finding 12: Food security*. The evaluation found that WFP's food assistance improved and stabilized beneficiaries' levels of food consumption. Data from the third quarter of 2014 in Jordan and Lebanon show that 12 and 16 percent respectively of newly arrived refugees had poor FCS, compared with 4 and 3 percent of refugees receiving assistance. This suggests that WFP assistance had a role in improving food consumption among beneficiaries, but further analysis is needed to account for contextual factors such as moving from a war zone to a relatively stable host country with informal livelihood opportunities.

35.   It is clearer that WFP assistance helped to stabilize refugees' FCS. Post-distribution monitoring from the first three quarters of 2014 revealed that the proportion of assisted Syrian households with acceptable FCS was stable in each of the host countries. More than 90 percent of recipient households had an acceptable FCS – rising to 98 percent in Turkey – in all countries except Lebanon, with 78 percent. Beneficiary focus groups acknowledged the importance of food assistance in stabilizing food consumption and noted that WFP assistance was the main source of income for purchasing food.

36.   *Finding 13: Local economies*. WFP also had beneficial impacts on local traders involved in voucher programmes and on their employees and suppliers, particularly in Jordan and Lebanon. Several WFP partner shopkeepers reported monthly revenues from WFP's voucher programmes ranging from USD 70,000 to USD 700,000. Studies conducted by WFP found that its vouchers had created 1,300 jobs in Lebanon and led to significant capital investments among shopkeepers, of USD 2.5 million in Jordan and USD 3 million in Lebanon. The multiplier values of WFP assistance were up to 1.23 in the food products sector in Jordan and 1.51 in Lebanon. These economic benefits have led some in the private-sector to view the broader humanitarian community and Syrian refugees in a more positive light.

37.   *Finding 14: Relations with host communities*. Tensions have been partly mitigated by the switch to vouchers, especially e-vouchers. Distributions of food and paper vouchers are highly visible and contributed to host communities' sense of exclusion. The use of e-vouchers in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and – to a lesser extent –

Turkey helped maintain a low profile for WFP assistance by avoiding the regular visible distributions associated with paper vouchers.

38. *Finding 15: Timeliness*. WFP generally achieved a timely response with its in-kind food assistance, but its vouchers were subject to delays resulting from slow UNHCR registration processes, particularly in Lebanon, where refugees could not apply to receive WFP vouchers until they had completed UNHCR registration. With the massive influx of refugees, registration in Lebanon required several months during much of 2013 and early 2014. Beneficiaries described waiting two to six months to register with UNHCR and another two months to receive WFP vouchers.

39. *Finding 16: Operational efficiency in Syria*. Within the Syria EMOP, several good-practice approaches were developed to increase efficiency and cost-effectiveness while mitigating risks. WFP built a complex transport and logistics network across the country, working with trucking firms in Syria, negotiating reduced costs for ground transport, and preventing companies or drivers from establishing inappropriate relationships with armed groups or others by rotating companies, drivers and routes. WFP deserves credit for implementing new approaches in a difficult environment.

40. Other efficiency issues, including diversion of aid, are difficult to assess given the major challenges to direct monitoring.[10] WFP data indicate that 97 percent of food rations dispatched were distributed among beneficiaries, suggesting a very low level of loss for an operation of this complexity. However, WFP staff were able to undertake only one-quarter of planned field visits between July 2013 and March 2014 because of security conditions. In 2013, 21 percent of randomly selected final distribution points were monitored by WFP, rising to 45 percent in 2014. This makes it difficult to measure WFP's efficiency in Syria – a common challenge for agencies in that country.

41. *Finding 17: Operational efficiency in the regional operation*. Measuring efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the regional EMOP is difficult as WFP cannot provide data for comparing the per-beneficiary costs of the three delivery modalities used: food, paper vouchers and e-vouchers. The exception is in Iraq, where WFP indicated that even when delivery costs are factored in, vouchers cost more than food, at USD 40.30 per beneficiary per month versus USD 33.56. There are trade-offs between cost and effectiveness, but the rationale for delivery modality selection would be clearer with better data on effectiveness and per-beneficiary costs for each modality, which WFP should be able to calculate.

42. *Finding 18: Encashment of assistance*. Efficiency was also affected by the conversion of WFP assistance into cash. In Iraq, between 60 and 70 percent of WFP beneficiary households reportedly sold 52 to 66 percent of their bulgur, pasta, rice and lentils to obtain cash.

43. The conversion of vouchers to cash was also described as a persistent challenge, but monitoring of encashment was not standardized despite being a recurring issue. Existing WFP figures are not based on representative samples and should be approached with caution as beneficiaries know that WFP forbids the encashment of vouchers. Discussions with WFP staff, partners and beneficiaries in Jordan and Lebanon suggest a significant incidence of voucher–cash conversion, at a cost of between 7 and 25 percent of the voucher value and presenting a threat to efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The high rate of encashment suggests that WFP should have piloted cash transfers earlier.

---

[10] As opposed to monitoring by partners or a third party.

44. *Finding 19: Market dynamics and cost control.* WFP adopted vouchers based on its awareness that markets outside Syria functioned normally and applied the good humanitarian practice of working with markets in humanitarian action. However, market-based assistance in middle-income countries is generally more expensive than in low-income settings given the higher market prices and beneficiaries' dietary preferences. Vouchers periodically resulted in beneficiaries paying higher than normal market prices. In Lebanon, WFP's economic impact study found that beneficiaries faced 6 percent higher prices in contracted shops that WFP classified as "non-competitive".[11] WFP encountered similar challenges in camps in Jordan and Turkey, and has taken steps to address them.

45. *Finding 20: Gender and protection.* WFP staff demonstrated an understanding of gender and protection issues in field locations. In refugee host countries, staff viewed vouchers as expanding women's access to assistance. Senior staff at the regional and country levels demonstrated awareness of the protection challenges facing women and girls. WFP analysis and assessments included gender-disaggregated data on outputs and some outcomes; in Jordan, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee gender marker tool was applied by WFP and other agencies. However, WFP did not analyze gender- or protection-specific dimensions of food assistance in the EMOP countries.

46. Gender analysis was poorly or not integrated into programme design, implementation, M&E and risk analysis. Although gender-disaggregated data were collected, there was little analysis of gender-related trends, and the evaluation did not find evidence of gender analysis being used to adapt programmes. Data consolidated from WFP's own reporting show that in 2013, WFP had no women food monitors in Egypt and only one in Iraq. Women were under-represented on food management committees in all regional EMOP countries; in Iraq, for example, there were 56 men versus 5 women members. Food voucher cards also tended to be issued to men members of households, although the evaluation did not examine whether WFP could have influenced this practice.

Overall Assessment and Recommendations

47. Through the two EMOPs, WFP has delivered a large-scale humanitarian response to a major emergency. The operations were scaled up quickly, and the voucher approach in the regional EMOP reflected the functioning markets and banking systems in host countries. Intervention costs mirror the higher costs necessary to approximate normal family eating practices and the higher cost of living in middle-income countries. In Syria, WFP responded rapidly and on a large scale, delivering food assistance through local partners in a highly politicized conflict. WFP established good logistics practices that will serve the programme as it remains vital for millions of Syrians for the foreseeable future.

48. Under the regional EMOP, e-voucher programming was scaled up to a new level for a humanitarian operation, expanding WFP's collaboration with the private sector. WFP's partnerships with small and medium-sized shops in Lebanon represented a useful adjustment to a well-established system of using vouchers. WFP is considering further innovations for its e-vouchers, including iris-scanning technology to reduce misuse, automated fraud detection, and remote electronic monitoring of beneficiary

---

[11] "Non-competitive" conditions arise when the top three shops in a given area capture more than 50 percent of e-voucher sales. See Bauer, J.M., Sandström, S. and Audi, H. 2014. *Economic Impact Study: Direct and Indirect Effects of the WFP Value-Based Food Voucher Programme in Lebanon*. Rome, WFP.

purchases. WFP will rarely have a better opportunity to refine these systems, and should invest in developing them and the OneCard platform, which would allow other humanitarian agencies to provide cash and voucher assistance via WFP e-vouchers.

49.   However, the analysis underlying WFP's response was limited, particularly for the regional EMOP. While this is understandable in the initial phase of a crisis, WFP did not follow up with analysis to address such questions as: i) whether high FCS scores were attributable to WFP assistance or contextual factors such as the availability of informal livelihoods; ii) how effectiveness and cost-effectiveness compared among delivery modalities; and iii) how food security compared among WFP-assisted and non-assisted refugees in Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey. While political considerations often limited action, WFP's focus on evidence and data did not lead to well-staffed vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) and M&E units, which often had only one individual per country, and staff focused on gathering data rather than analysing them to inform programming.

50.   The protracted nature of the crisis requires that WFP increase its attention to strategic issues including: i) management of humanitarian principles and the reputational risk of working with the Syrian Government; ii) ensuring that vulnerable refugees living outside camps in Iraq, including Kurdistan, and Turkey are assisted; iii) targeting assistance to a Syrian refugee population with much better food-security levels than normally seen in humanitarian emergencies; and iv) transition planning to ensure sustained assistance for the most vulnerable Syrians.

51.   As WFP assistance continues, the development of medium-term transition strategies and expansion of vulnerability-based targeting will become a major priority, particularly in refugee hosting countries. Reducing the value of refugee food rations and vouchers in Syria, as envisaged in October 2014 and enacted in January 2015, is not the most appropriate strategy when resource breaks are foreseeable and beneficiaries have varied levels of vulnerability.

Recommendations				
No.	**Issue**	**Rationale**	**Recommendation**	**Responsibility and timing**
1	Transition (*overarching recommendation*)	Findings 4, 8 and 9. Resource constraints and the protracted nature of the crisis mean that a more sustainable approach is needed.	1a) Prepare country-specific transition strategies and consider significant scaling down of assistance using a systematic vulnerability-based targeting process. Changes should be introduced through a new EMOP or protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) rather than further budget revisions. Where authorities have financial and delivery capacity, as in Turkey, prepare for hand-over of responsibility for food assistance, with WFP providing technical assistance to the authorities.	Country offices and REC with Policy and Programme Division (OSZ) support – within six months
			1b) In future crises, ensure early development and introduction of short-term contingency plans based on vulnerability analysis. These plans should be regularly updated and communicated to partners and beneficiaries to manage oscillations in donor funding.	Operations Services Department (OS)
			1c) Develop scenario-based, long-term transition plans that cover the spectrum from maintaining/expanding the response to a country-by-country exit strategy.	OS
2	Evidence-based programming	Findings 1 and 20. Appropriate analysis to underpin programme design and implementation is needed.	2) Undertake further analysis on cash and vouchers, gender, host community relations and conflict dynamics to inform country-specific programme strategies and decision-making.	REC with OSZ support – within six months: immediate
3	Humanitarian access and principles	Finding 3. It is important to assess and manage competing pressures and perceptions.	3a) Monitor application of the humanitarian principles in Syria; develop and monitor implementation of a strategy for managing perceptions of WFP's relationship with the Syrian Government and its assistance in opposition-held areas.	Office of the Executive Director (OED), REC and Syria country office – immediate

			Recommendations		
No.	**Issue**	**Rationale**	**Recommendation**		**Responsibility and timing**
			3b)	In future crises where a strategic task force is required, articulate, monitor and record strategies for balancing competing pressures on WFP and managing perceptions about WFP's role.	OED
4	Support to programmes and operations	Findings 6 and 7. There seems to be a disconnect between REC support and needs of country offices/sub-offices; access to corporate guidance and expertise for emergency field staff is inadequate.	4a)	At the country and sub-office levels, increase attention to: i) lesson-learning and information-sharing opportunities; ii) capturing lessons from innovation; and iii) early consideration of country office specific transition and exit strategies.	REC with regional bureaux and OSZ support – immediate
			4b)	Develop a flexible system for linking WFP operations staff to corporate guidance, expertise and documents, such as through better use of WFP's intranet, connecting staff facing similar programme challenges around the world, and maintaining a help desk.	Executive Management Group (EMG): OS; Resource Management Division (RM); Partnership, Governance and Advocacy Department (PG)
			4c)	Make greater use of anonymous surveys and other tools for eliciting staff views and ideas on support and other issues that may not be communicated to line managers.	EMG: OS; RM; PG; Human Resources Division (HRM)
5	Human resources	Finding 5. Adequate types and numbers of staff are not consistently available in the L3 structure, including in critical areas.	5a)	Conduct an internal review to ascertain why the REC offices for this crisis lacked staff with skills and experience in conflict analysis and negotiations, cash and vouchers, working with the private sector, M&E and vulnerability analysis.	HRM with support from OSZ and the Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division (OSE)
			5b)	Develop a responsive staffing model alongside the emergency roster to ensure that technical experts are deployed to support emergency operations for a minimum period, such as three or six months.	OS, RM, HRM

			Recommendations		
No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation		Responsibility and timing
6	Targeting	Findings 8, 9 and 11. The breadth of assistance is neither appropriate nor sustainable given the diverse vulnerability levels and resource constraints.	6a)	As an immediate step towards transition, gather and consolidate food security data on affected populations to inform vulnerability-based targeting of WFP food assistance.	REC, country offices with OSZ support: immediate
			6b)	In future EMOPs, systematically prepare for timely food security-based targeting by gathering household-level vulnerability information, including pre-assistance baselines, as early as possible and shift promptly from category or status targeting.	OSZ
7	Measuring results	Findings 7 and 10. There is a need to assess vulnerability levels of those not assisted to improve measurement of results attributable to WFP assistance, and use these data for advocacy and programme adjustment.	7a)	Use existing data or conduct needs assessments among populations currently excluded from programmes, particularly non-camp refugees in Iraq and Turkey, and refugees deemed ineligible for assistance in Lebanon.	REC with OSZ support
			7b)	Support governments in assessing conditions among host communities, but avoid raising expectations of WFP assistance.	
8	Modality selection	Findings 13, 14, 17 and 18. Analysis of alternative modalities is insufficient.	8a)	Ensure that WFP systems are able to report transparently, routinely and consistently on costs per beneficiary by delivery modality for use in modality selection, project approval and review.	EMG
			8b)	Ensure that all delivery modalities, including cash, are considered in future responses, based on a rigorous assessment of their appropriateness, to ensure that modality selection is based on context-specific and clearly recorded technical evidence.	OSZ

		Recommendations		
No.	**Issue**	**Rationale**	**Recommendation**	**Responsibility and timing**
9	Evidence and accountability	Findings 9, 10, 12, 17 and 18. There is limited impact on programming of evidence and data from VAM and M&E; and lack of food security data for targeting.	9) Assign extra medium- to long-term staff for M&E and VAM – particularly in country offices – for systematic monitoring and measurement of results and outcomes, and to analyse information and feed it into programme management and operational decisions.	REC with OSZ and support from the Resource Management Department (RM)
10	Operational efficiency	Findings 18 and 19. Food vouchers are being encashed; WFP-contracted shops are charging above-market rates.	10) Assess the reasons for voucher encashment and differing prices among WFP partner shops; improve monitoring of encashment and minimize efficiency losses; and strike the appropriate balance between accountability and the number of shops contracted for voucher programming.	REC with OSZ and RM support

Maps

TURKEY
1,029,500

3,178,404
Refugees and those awaiting registration.
Total includes 23,367 in North Africa.
As at 8 October 2014

Syrian Refugees Population Density   ⋀ Refugee Camp
- Less than 569
- 569 - 1861
- 1,861 - 9,510
- 9,510 - 28,884
- 28,884 - 103,299
- 103,299 - 190,299
- 190,299 - 400,000

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

LEBANON
☆Beirut
1,151,057

Amman

IRAQ
215,387
☆Baghdad

EGYPT
Cairo
139,929

JORDAN
619,163

Syrian refugees by country, 8 October 2014   *Source: UNHCR*

TURKEY

197,500 IDPs   Al-Malikiyah
AL-HASAKEH

1,787,000 IDPs
ALEPPO

177,000 IDPs
AR-RAQQA

300,000 IDPs
LATTAKIA

708,000 IDPs
IDLEB

245,500 IDPs
HAMA

441,000 IDPs
DEIR-EZ-ZOR

IRAQ

452,000 IDPs
TARTOUS

560,000 IDPs
HOMS

Abu Kamal

LEBANON

410,000 IDPs
DAMASCUS

770,000 IDPs
RURAL DAMASCUS

74,500 IDPs

QUNEITRA

676,000 IDPs
DAR'A

69,000 IDPs
AS-SWEIDA

ISRAEL

West Bank   **JORDAN**

Internal displacement in Syria
As of 21 October 2014

■ Capital   ■ 400,000+ IDPs
- International boundary   ■ 100,000+ IDPs
— Governorate boundary   50,000+ IDPs
  District boundary   25,000+ IDPs
▨ Hard-to-reach areas   25,000- IDPs
○ Open border crossing
⊗ Closed border crossing   iDMC

Sources: UKaid, ACAPS

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this
map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.

Internally displaced persons in Syria, by governorate, 21 October 2014   *Source: IDMC*

Linking Findings and Recommendations

This diagram shows links between particular findings and recommendations. *Click on any of the findings (left) or recommendations (right) to read that part of the report.*

FINDINGS

1. Initial Response and Analysis
2. Coordination
3. Alignment and Trade-Offs
4. REC Establishment
5. Staffing
6. REC Programmatic /Operational Support
7. Linking Operations and Expertise
8. Coverage
9. Transition Planning
10. M&E Systems and Programmatic Uptake
11. Scale
12. Food Security
13. Local Economy
14. Relations with Host Communities
15. Timeliness
16. Operational Efficiency - Syria Operation
17. Operational Efficiency - Regional Operation
18. Encashment of Assistance
19. Market Dynamics and Cost Control
20. Gender & Protection

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Transition (Overarching Recommendation
2. Evidence-Based Programming
3. Humanitarian Access and Principles
4. Programmatic/ Operational Support
5. Human Resources
6. Targeting
7. Measuring Results
8. Modality Selection
9. Evidence and Accountability
10. Operational Efficiency

1. Introduction

1.1. Evaluation Features[12]

1.   The World Food Programme's (WFP) responses to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic and the surrounding sub-region are among the largest and most complex operations the organisation has ever undertaken. Civil unrest in Syria began in March 2011 and has been characterised by continuing civil war with shifting lines among the government and multiple armed groups, which pose challenges for access. This soon led to a major humanitarian crisis within Syria and a refugee emergency throughout the sub-region. Displacement within Syria and the sub-region produced rapidly increasing humanitarian needs and caseloads for WFP and other aid agencies.

2.   Within Syria WFP targeted 4.25 million people in 2014 in addition to another two million refugees across the five main refugee-hosting countries: Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt.[13] The cost of this sub-regional response accounted for 26% of WFP's global operations for 2014 (up from 16% in 2013)[14] and is particularly significant for a number of reasons: the magnitude of the crisis, its concentration in middle-income countries, the UN's determination to stay and provide assistance in the midst of a major conflict in Syria, and WFP's wide-scale use of electronic food vouchers in the refugee-hosting countries.[15] The Syrian crisis is also WFP's and the UN system's first declaration of a Level 3 (L3) emergency under the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) Transformative Agenda. To facilitate its L3 response, WFP established a dedicated sub-regional entity, the Regional Emergency Coordination (REC) office, reporting directly to its headquarters (HQ) in Rome.

3.   This evaluation covers the period from the start of WFP's response in 2011 through to September 2014[16] and is the first to independently examine WFP's response (see TORs in Annex 1). It was conducted by a team from the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in partnership with To Excel Consulting Associates in Amman. The process included an induction at HQ in July, an inception mission in August, and the main evaluation fieldwork in September and October 2014.

4.   This evaluation is intended to contribute to learning as well as accountability and, thus, is relevant to WFP staff at all levels but also to WFP's cooperating partners, donors, and others. As an operations evaluation examining two Emergency Operations (EMOPs) – one for Syria (EMOP 200339) and one for the region (EMOP 200433) – it considers the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency[17] and connectedness of WFP's response and "provides reasons for the successes and shortcomings of the project".[18]

---

[12] See the summary terms of reference (TORs) in Annex 1 for further background on this evaluation. Annex 2 contains further information from the evaluation inception report on the methods utilised in this evaluation.

[13] WFP. 2014u. *WFP Syria Crisis Response Situation Update: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt, 3-16, September 2014.* Amman, WFP. These five countries are home to more than 3 million registered Syrian refugees and hundreds of thousands of additional, un-registered refugees.

[14] WFP. 2014t. *WFP Programme of Work*, 6 April 2014. Rome, WFP. For WFP, the regional response to the Syria crisis (EMOPS 200339 and 200433) constitutes US$1,967,523,534 of WFP's global programme (US$7,558,706,495).

[15] The "Evaluation of WFP's 2008 Cash and Voucher Policy: Summary Evaluation Report" found that 61% of WFP's global cash and voucher programming is currently within the Regional EMOP being examined in this evaluation. Indeed, the evaluation highlights that more than 90% of WFP's global food voucher programmes are within this Regional EMOP. See: WFP. 2014l. *Summary Evaluation Report for EB.1/2015: Evaluation of WFP's 2008 Cash and Voucher Policy*. Rome, WFP.

[16] In some instances the evaluation team has agreed to note subsequent developments or measures adopted by WFP which fall outside of this evaluation's time frame. These are primarily noted in the footnotes.

[17] Efficiency analysis focused on the sub-regional level, rather than the country-based interventions, given the data limitations.

[18] WFP. (Undated). *Operations Evaluations*. Posted at http://www.wfp.org/evaluation/evaluation-types/operations-evaluations [accessed 29 October 2014].

These criteria are framed in terms of the four Areas of Focus (Table 1) that the evaluation was asked to address.[19]

Table 1: Areas of Focus for the Evaluation of WFP Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis

I – Strategic Direction & Positioning	II – WFP Organisational Effectiveness
The extent to which: • WFP humanitarian response's objectives and main activities have been in line with: identified humanitarian needs, priorities and capacities; and its programme design based on good quality contextual analysis– including gender, conflict and market analysis *[relevance]*; • Food assistance has been coordinated (including humanitarian access) with relevant humanitarian and development partners, enabling complementarity of interventions at policy and operations levels *[coverage];* and • There have been trade-offs between aligning with wider-system and/or national priorities on the one hand, with WFP's mandate, policies and Humanitarian Principles, on the other *[coherence].*	The extent to which the REC architecture and institutional arrangements of the WFP L3 response have contributed to: • Corporate guidance being effectively applied in the country-based emergency responses (within WFP and in coordination with the wider humanitarian system as relevant) *[connectedness];* • Innovation, adaptation and learning for WFP [and beyond] to improve guidelines and/or systems, *inter alia* in terms of risk management; inter-agency humanitarian (multi-country) coordination dynamics; middle-income urban settings; and innovative programme implementation at scale *[relevance]*; and • Potential for sustainability and replication *[effectiveness, efficiency].*
III – Programme Strategy Issues	**IV – Operational Performance & Results**
The extent to which: • trade-offs between spread (scale) and depth (quality) of programmatic choices have been analysed, monitored and assessed *[relevance];* and • A transition strategy has been developed and integrated in implementation, namely in terms of partnerships and (national and local) stakeholders' involvement and their capacities strengthened through relief food assistance activities *[connectedness].[20]*	An assessment of: • WFP's interventions' main results (including positive/negative, and intended/unintended outcomes) achieved for people affected by the conflict, by sub-group *[effectiveness];* • WFP assistance has been delivered in a timely, efficient manner successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps *[coverage];* and • Contextual factors (internal and external) that help explain results, including targeting, partnerships, resources and capacities.

5.   Within these four Areas of Focus, the evaluation emphasised a number of issues which seemed particularly significant or innovative and which were already identified within the Terms of Reference, including: (i) challenges raised by operating in Syria (e.g., access, humanitarian principles); (ii) cash and voucher (C&V) programming; (iii) the role and potential replicability of the REC model; and (iv) the potential to transition to an approach that reflects the increasingly protracted nature of the crisis.[21]

6.   The four Areas of Focus and these associated issues were addressed between July and October 2014, beginning with a detailed review of documentation.[22] The process – during the Inception Phase and the main data collection phase – also involved a

---

[19] WFP. 2014r. *Terms of Reference: Evaluation of WFP's Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis*. Rome, WFP Office of Evaluation, p. 7.
[20] By transition the evaluation refers to a range of options: from closing operations, handing-over to authorities or other actors, scaling-down assistance (through enhanced targeting and/or reduction of transfer values) and/or exploring alternative cost-effective approaches to maintenance / improvement of food security status of vulnerable populations.
[21] ODI. 2014. *Operations Evaluation: Evaluation of WFP's Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis (2011-2014) - Inception Report*. London, Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group.
[22] This documentation review was iterative, and the team continued to consult and review additional materials, which became available during the entirety of the process (and not solely during the Inception Phase).

series of semi-structured interviews and focus group discussion (FGDs) with WFP staff and cooperating partners (e.g., NGOs), donor representatives, government officials, other UN personnel, beneficiaries, and private sector collaborators such as from banks and shops (see Annex 2 for a summary of the methodology from the Inception Report).

7. Members of the team visited Rome, Geneva, the REC office in Amman, and WFP operations in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey (see Annex 3 for a list of stakeholders consulted and Annex 4 for the field work schedules/agendas).[23] WFP staff and other key stakeholders in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt were consulted remotely, though some WFP Syria personnel were interviewed in-person in Lebanon and Turkey. In total 259 interviews and 47 focus group discussions were conducted (see Table 2 for information about the sample achieved). Lastly, an open-ended online questionnaire[24] (Annex 5) was used to gather inputs from additional stakeholders inside and outside of WFP.[25] In total, 32 responses to the questionnaire were received, the majority of them from stakeholders in Syria.[26]

Table 2: Number of Respondents to the Evaluation, by Type and Location/Focus[27]

	WFP Staff	Cooperating Partners (NGOs)	Donor Agencies	Government Officials	Private Sector Partners	Other Aid Agencies[28]	Beneficiaries	Total
Rome or HQ	15	-	-	-	-	2	-	**17**
REC (Amman)	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	**31**
Syria	15	9	2	-	2	10	-	**38**
Lebanon	25	20	5	3	6	7	92	**181[29]**
Jordan	11	9	3	4	5	6	86	**124**
Turkey	26	9	3	8	7	6	70	**129**
Iraq	15	7	-	1	-	2	-	**25**
Egypt	8	-	-	-	-	1	-	**9**
Other[30]	7	-	-	-	2	3	-	**12**
Total	**153**	**54**	**13**	**16**	**22**	**37**	**248**	**566**

8. Gender was carefully considered particularly to ensure the views of female and male beneficiaries were taken into account. In total, 55% of the beneficiaries consulted in the course of this evaluation (136 out of 248) were women. In Jordan and Turkey, the evaluation further considered views from refugees who live inside and outside of

---

[23] These three fieldwork locations were specified within the TORs. WFP determined that fieldwork was not feasible in Syria and Iraq given insecurity and was not a high priority in Egypt given the relatively small size of the WFP caseload (100,000, approx.). Members of the evaluation team spent approximately two weeks in each fieldwork location.

[24] The online questionnaire was disseminated by WFP stakeholders in the region and by the evaluation team, which requested that staff members who could not be interviewed in person be encouraged to complete the questionnaire in order to feed into the evaluation. This tact was particularly employed to gather additional inputs from stakeholders in Syria; the questionnaire was sent to the list of WFP Syria staff members, for instance, provided to the evaluation team.

[25] The evaluation team has also been in contact with a WFP Lessons Learning Exercise (LLE) team and with WFP evaluation teams working on cash and vouchers and the WFP Preparedness and Response Enhancement Programme (PREP). Furthermore, the evaluation established contact with other teams examining UNICEF and UNHCR operations in response to the Syrian crisis. For the LLE exercise outcomes, see WFP. 2014p. *Syria Lessons Learning Exercise: Draft Report*. Rome, WFP.

[26] Responses to the online questionnaire have been factored into Table 2.

[27] Given that some individuals, particularly from among WFP's staff, were consulted both in one-on-one interviews and focus groups, a small amount of double-counting may have occurred. Please note that this table also includes respondents to the online questionnaire; while the evaluation team assured respondents that responses to the online questionnaire would remain anonymous and strictly for use by the evaluation team, respondents did provide their names and organisational affiliations. However, in keeping with the questionnaires assurances on confidentiality and anonymity, the names of respondents are not included in the annex.

[28] This category primarily includes other UN agencies, but some aid agencies which have closely observed WFP programming but not partnered with WFP (particularly in Syria) have also been included here.

[29] This number includes those listed here plus 23 representatives of host communities who were consulted in order to better understand the issue of host community tensions, which was particularly significant in Lebanon.

[30] This category includes representatives of WFP's Regional Bureau based in Cairo, who were also consulted.

camps; and the perspectives of members of host communities were collected where feasible in Lebanon and Turkey.

Limitations

9.   Overall the evaluation methodology captured inputs from a large number of individuals with differing vantage points on WFP's response to the Syrian crisis. These inputs were compared with written materials and data primarily, though not exclusively, from WFP.[31] Analysis was conducted by the full evaluation team using a database that captured evidence from interviews and focus groups and key pieces of information from the document review. However, there are methodological limitations to briefly address. Firstly, data collection for Syria was particularly challenging. To mitigate this, the evaluation team took advantage of opportunities to interview current and former WFP Syria staff when available elsewhere. Further, the evaluation team particularly encouraged stakeholders in Syria to complete the online questionnaire used by the team. This questionnaire posed open-ended questions similar to those used during interviews.

10.   Secondly, beneficiary perspectives are not available for those countries where remote data collection was undertaken (i.e., Syria, Iraq, and Egypt).[32] To mitigate this the evaluation consulted Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey about assistance they had received from WFP while internally displaced in Syria prior to fleeing the country. However, beneficiary perspectives from Iraq and Egypt are not reflected in this report.

11.   Thirdly, the samples, particularly of beneficiaries, are not random and statistically significant, but aimed to cover WFP operations in each of the countries wherever possible. As an operations evaluation the team used a mixed method approach and was tasked with examining institutional, strategic, and programmatic issues rather than empirically assessing impact; hence, a representative sample, that would have been appropriate in an impact evaluation, was not necessary. Site selection ensured that a relevant cross-section of the activities was included in the field work and that perspectives were obtained from a broad set of stakeholders. Data on WFP programme outputs and outcomes was obtained from monitoring records from WFP and its partners (see key output and outcome data in Annex 6).[33] The evaluation team was often unable to validate independently data provided by WFP and others.

12.   Lastly, as noted in section 2.4, data limitations did at times pose a challenge given that monitoring and evaluation data sought by the team was not always available or was available for a limited time period or only for particular locations. Baselines did not always reflect a genuine pre-treatment measurement, thus making it difficult to state what outcomes could be directly attributed to WFP assistance. Furthermore, data on issues such as cost-effectiveness of varying modalities, encashment of food vouchers, and other issues were in several instances not collected by WFP and could not be reliably calculated based on existing documents. Such instances, which are commonly encountered during evaluations of emergency operations, required taking more qualitative approaches to issues that might otherwise have been addressed using quantitative data.

---

[31] A number of WFP documents were, despite having been requested during the inception phase, received late in the evaluation process and only once an initial draft had been developed. This prevented the field work from focusing on issues identified in the documentation.

[32] The TORs developed for this evaluation by WFP identified the countries where field work was and was not feasible or required – ruling out Syria, Iraq and Egypt.

[33] See, for instance, WFP. 2014m. *Syria Crisis Regional Response M&E Updates, April-June 2014*. Amman, WFP.

13.   Despite these limitations, this evaluation provides a comprehensive review of the programme, drawing on a wide variety of sources, and the evaluation team is confident in the findings. While, in the interest of brevity and to respect the anonymity ensured to respondents, this report cannot elaborate the diverse sources of each and every finding, it is crucial to note that findings have only been included where they have been substantiated by a range of sources; that is, findings have been triangulated where relevant and feasible. Where the evaluation at times refers to particular types of stakeholders who have contributed to particular findings (e.g., WFP staff members, cooperating partners, etc.) these are illustrative rather than fully reflective of the wide range of stakeholders and materials that contributed to each and every point.

1.2. Regional Context

14.   The crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic began in March 2011 and soon led to a major emergency within Syria's borders and a refugee crisis throughout the sub-region (see timeline in Annex 7, registered regional refugees, and 2013 WFP targeted caseloads in Syria in Annex 8 and 9, respectively). In Syria, the UN reported that, as of late 2014, 10.8 million people needed humanitarian assistance; these included 6.5 million who are internally displaced and up to half a million Palestinian refugees.[34] An October 2014 assessment report found that 4.5 million people in Syria needed food assistance in the 10 governorates (out of 14 total in the country) WFP was able to reach as part of the assessment. [35] Aid agencies report a halving of domestic wheat production as a result of conflict and drought.[36]

15.   Throughout the region, as of late October 2014, there were approximately three million registered Syrian refugees in addition to approximately 75,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS).[37] While some refugees reside in camps in Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq, the vast majority live in cities and host communities (Table 3). Given the size of the refugee population – and concerns that they are creating economic and social challenges for host countries and communities – tensions have reportedly been rising. In Lebanon, for instance, certain municipalities have evicted refugees from their homes or imposed curfews on them.[38]

16.   According to assessment and monitoring data from WFP and other agencies, food insecurity among refugees is a challenge,[39] though key indicators such as Food Consumption Scores (FCS) and the Coping Strategy Index (CSI) are less severe than commonly found in other emergencies (e.g., 8-17% acceptable FCS among IDPs in the Democratic Republic of Congo compared to approximately 50% acceptable FCS scores among new Syrian refugee arrivals in Lebanon). [40] On average [41] 87.7% of Syrian refugees receiving WFP assistance had an 'acceptable' FCS, from a low of 78% in Lebanon to a high of 98% in Turkey, in the second quarter of 2014.[42]

---

[34] For updated figures see OCHA. *Syria Crisis: Key Figures*, http://www.unocha.org/syria [accessed 20 October 2014].

[35] OCHA, REACH & SNAP. 2014. *MSNA: Syria Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment*. Gaziantep, OCHA, REACH and SNAP. WFP personnel in Syria note that at that time they were operating in 12 of the 14 governorates of Syria).

[36] FAO. 2014. *Syrian Arab Republic: Continued conflict and drought conditions worsen 2014 crop production,* FAO, Rome.

[37] Refugee figures based on the Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal for the Syria Regional Refugee Response, available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php [accessed 20 October 2014].

[38] SNAP. 2014. *SNAP: Regional Analysis Syria – Part II: Host Countries,* Geneva, Syria Needs Assessment Project, February 2014). Also see HRW. 2014. Lebanon: At Least 45 Local Curfews Imposed on Syrian Refugee, in *Human Rights Watch*, 3 October 2014.

[39] WFP, UNHCR & UNICEF. 2013. *The Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees (VASyR) in Lebanon,* Beirut, WFP, UNHCR & UNICEF; Al-Mahdy, H., Luce, E., Wood, L. & Cecchi, O. 2014. *Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Exercise (CFSME) Syrian Refugees in Jordan*. Amman, WFP and REACH.

[40] ACF. 2010 *Food Security and Livelihood Assessments*. Paris, Action Against Hunger. To provide another comparison from a non-emergency setting, a study of fishermen in Bangladesh found that only 10% had an acceptable FCS. See Rahman, M. A., Abka, R., Rahman, M.S. & Sarma, P.K. 2013. Poverty and food security analysis: A study of fishermen households in a selected area of Bangladesh, in *J. Bangladesh Agril. Univ*. 11(2): 293–299.

[41] The weighted average is used here. The unweighted average was similar, at 88.2%.

[42] These scores and the factors influencing them are further discussed in section 2.4 of this report.

Table 3: Affected Populations, % in Camps, and WFP Beneficiaries (as of mid-Oct 2014)[43]

Country	Affected populations[44]	Percentage in camps	WFP beneficiaries
Syria	10,800,000	1-2%[45]	4,200,000 (approx.)
Lebanon	1,133,834	0%	861,981
Turkey	1,065,902	20%	217,000
Jordan	619,376	15%	565,142
Iraq	222,468	42%	99,602
Egypt	140,130	0%	100,877
Total	**13,981,710**	**-**	**6,044,602**

17.   The international response to this crisis has involved a wide variety of actors. WFP is a major stakeholder, comprising (in US $ terms) 22.8% of the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP) in 2014 and 41.6% of the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) that year. The crisis has involved the UN system as a whole – which declared the crisis in Syria and the region an L3 emergency on 15 January 2013[46] – as well as local and international NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, and businesses.

18.   The response to the Syrian crisis has pulled in a large proportion of aid agencies' capacity, creating concerns that it is drawing resources and personnel from emergencies elsewhere in the world. For 2014, donors were asked for US$2.28 billion for the response within Syria as part of the SHARP.[47] The RRP for the sub-regional effects of the crisis put the humanitarian need for 2014 at US$3.74 billion.[48] As of mid-October 2014, the SHARP was funded at 38%, and the RRP at 52%.[49] These shortfalls have affected WFP, which nearly had to cut the volume and value of its assistance in the sub-region in October 2014; these cuts ultimately occurred in January 2015.[50]

19.   The situation, aside from its scale and cost, has presented a number of unique opportunities and challenges for aid agencies. Within Syria the situation on the ground has changed rapidly and often unpredictably with front lines moving quickly in parts of the country and with multiple opposition groups. The Syrian government has retained a capacity to license and control aid agency activity in the areas of the country under its control, and to restrict access to those that are not. Agency staff and local partners have had to operate in an environment of considerable personal danger and severely restricted movement, which has limited monitoring. Governments in refugee receiving countries have played a very active role in shaping humanitarian action.

---

[43] Information Sharing Portal for the Syria Regional Refugee Response, available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. For WFP beneficiary numbers, those relate to targets for Syria and those reached in September 2014 within the region - see the October 2014 WFP Situation Update for the Syria Crisis.

[44] Affected populations includes those affected by conflict in Syria, Syrian refugees as well as Palestinian refugees from Syria and, in a small number of cases, returnees.

[45] Official figures put the numbers in camps at 108,000, though these figures tend not to have been updated since late 2013. Hence, an estimate of 1-2% is provided to reflect this uncertainty.

[46] WFP declared the Syria and regional crisis an L3 emergency in December 2012. See WFP. 2012b. *Decision Memorandum: Activation of the WFP level 3 emergency response designation for the Syrian Arab Republic and surrounding countries*, 14 December.

[47] United Nations. 2014e. *Syria crisis humanitarian response Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan*. Geneva, United Nations.

[48] United Nations. 2014f. *Syria Regional Response Plan 6*. Amman, United Nations.

[49] Information from the OCHA Financial Tracking Service, as reported by OCHA at http://www.unocha.org/syria.

[50] WFP. 20140. *Syria Crisis Response – Impact of Funding Shortfalls: Urgent Funding Shortfalls Force WFP to Cut Operations in Syria and Sub-Region.* Rome, WFP. Posted at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=7310. Also see WFP. 2014d. *Funding Shortfall Forces WFP To Announce Cutbacks To Syrian Food Assistance Operation*, World Food Programme, 18 September, http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/funding-shortfall-forces-wfp-announce-cutbacks-syrian-food-assistance-operation. Budgetary shortfalls did ultimately lead to realised cuts in WFP assistance in the sub-region starting in January 2015. The feared cuts in October 2014 were averted as a result of additional donor contributions.

More widely, the international community has been divided in its approach to the crisis – creating a very challenging context for operational agencies.

20. The sub-regional nature of the crisis has made coordination and harmonisation of approaches and resourcing levels, including among UN agencies, more difficult. Further, the crisis has unfolded across middle-income countries where most aid agencies have less experience, where modalities developed for lower-income country contexts may not be appropriate, and where some costs are higher. On the other hand the crisis has been high profile, has attracted significant resources from aid agencies and has mostly occurred in countries with a well-developed private sector and functioning markets, which has offered new opportunities for collaboration with businesses.[51]

1.3. WFP's Portfolio in the Sub-Region

21. WFP's response to the Syrian crisis across the region is complex and diverse across six countries. This section captures some key elements of WFP's activities but does not describe each programme variation in detail (see Annex 6 for a breakdown of activities). However, the evaluation team considered it important to outline the two Emergency Operations (EMOPs) – see Table 4 – through which WFP responded and which have each undergone 14 revisions as of January 2015.

Table 4: Key Information on EMOPs for WFP Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis

Project Code and Title	**EMOP 200339** Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria	**REG EMOP 200433** Food assistance to vulnerable Syrian populations in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt affected by the events in Syria
Time-frame	October 2011 - December 2014	July 2012 - December 2014
Objectives	To provide food assistance to vulnerable households whose food and nutrition security has been adversely affected by the civil unrest.	Save lives and maintain food security of the targeted population of refugees; and protect livelihoods and help prevent the depletion of the refugees' assets.
Strategic Objective (SO)	SO 1 - Saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies	SO 1 - Saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies

Sources: Unless otherwise stated, information is from Budget Increase to Emergency Operation Syria 200339, Budget Revision 12 (July 2014); and Budget Revision 12 to Emergency Operation 200433 (July 2014).

---

[51] Zyck, S. A. & Armstrong, J. 2014. *Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: the role of business and the private sector: Jordan case study.* London: Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group.

Figure 1: Beneficiaries, Regional and Syria EMOPs

Source: Consolidated output data received from the M&E-REC[52]

22. In terms of programming, WFP has been involved in a clear set of activities (Table 5). In Syria in 2014 it has distributed food to up to 4.25 million Syrians (see Annexes 6 and 9) through partnerships with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and 27 NGOs, selected from a list of approved organisations provided by the Syrian government. SARC, through its mandate, serves an auxiliary to the Syrian government, but its volunteers are reported to have different local allegiances. It works with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other partners. The WFP programme started in 2011 with 50,000 intended beneficiaries but grew to 1.5 million beneficiaries in 2012 and nearly 4 million in 2013 (Figure 1); in the third quarter of 2014, when the Syrian government relaxed restrictions on cross-line deliveries[53], WFP reached approximately 4.2 million beneficiaries.[54] In Syria WFP targets IDPs and poor urban or rural communities hosting significant numbers of IDPs informed by case-by-case assessments of vulnerability.[55]

23. Food for distribution in Syria is primarily being procured in Turkey and shipped to either Syrian or Lebanese ports, from which it is transported over land into Syria. Rations, each intended for a five-person household, are packaged in Syria in WFP warehouses and then distributed by implementing partners.[56] Monitoring is provided by WFP staff but, due to access constraints, the majority is conducted by WFP's local partners and by a third-party monitoring firm, whose direct access to beneficiaries was also limited by political and security issues. In addition, WFP has proposed a small number of non-food-distribution activities in Syria, some of which have not yet started. For instance, Budget Revision 12 at the end of 2013 notes WFP's intent to start a voucher-based nutrition programme targeting 15,000 pregnant and lactating women in Syria. Later in 2014 the proposed voucher-based nutrition element was expanded to include children between the ages of 6 and 59 months; Budget Revision 14 at the

---

[52] The evaluation team requested data to be exported from the REC monitoring and evaluation database. This content is based on that exported data and not on any WFP publication.

[53] This refers to activities which cross from government-held areas into opposition-controlled parts of Syria. It is distinct from cross-border operations which go across national boundaries.

[54] See EMOP 200339 and 200433 Programme Documents and, for each EMOP, Budget Revisions 1-12; WFP. 2011. *Emergency Operation Syria 200339, Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria.* Rome, WFP.

[55] In 2015, per Budget Revision 14, WFP Syria is modifying its approach to targeting, focusing on: "vulnerability and displacement status, prioritizing those that have been displaced multiple times or displaced in less than 12 months, and those living in informal settlements; female-headed households without a regular and stable source of income; poor host families supporting one or more displaced persons, including orphans or the elderly; the most vulnerable families living in besieged areas with limited access to markets; and persons living with a disability."

[56] Following UN Security Council Resolution 2165 issues on 14 July 2014, WFP is now authorised to engage in cross-border aid deliveries as well. This recent development is still unfolding and is discussed further in section 3 of this report. However, it should be noted that cross-border rations are pre-packaged by the suppliers and are delivered directly to the target areas and do not pass through WFP warehouses for packing or re-packing in Syria.

end of 2014 expanded the total value of WFP's voucher element in Syria to US$11.4 million. However implementation of these activities has been held up.

Table 5: Main Activities and Modalities by Country

Country	Activities
Syria	Targeted General Food Distribution (GFD) - packaged household in-kind ration Blanket Supplementary Feeding (children 6-59 month old) – in kind Pregnant/lactating women – voucher[57] School-feeding – in kind
Lebanon	GFD to eligible[58] out of camp refugees and returning Lebanese – 1 month in-kind parcels at arrival, then vouchers
Turkey	GFD to all refugees in all camps – vouchers
Jordan	GFD to all refugees in all[59] (2) camps – 1 day in-kind meals at arrival, then vouchers with daily in-kind bread GFD to all registered refugees out of camps -(vouchers) To refugees in camps: School feeding (in kind) To refugees in / out camps: Nutrition (in kind)[60]
Iraq	GFD to all refugees in selected camps (in-kind in 9 camps, vouchers in 1 camp) To refugees in 2 selected camps: School feeding (in kind)
Egypt	GFD in targeted areas to eligible[61] out of camp refugees and PRS - vouchers

Source: Field work and Budget Revisions 11-12 to Emergency Operation 200433 (June 2014).

24.   In the refugee-hosting countries, WFP provides limited food distributions including one-off parcels for new arrivals in Jordan and Lebanon and food parcels for most camps in Iraq. The main WFP mechanism has been vouchers (Figure 2) – beginning with paper and gradually transitioning to electronic vouchers (e-vouchers) since the second half of 2013. WFP's voucher programme in the sub-region (Box 1) is its largest anywhere in the world and has drawn on WFP's global partnership with MasterCard[62] and country-specific relationships with local banks and shops. On a monthly basis in 2014 WFP was providing approximately US$20 million per month on its food vouchers in Jordan, US$26 million in Lebanon, and US$8m in Turkey.[63] Under these arrangements, refugees use paper vouchers or e-vouchers to purchase food from small shops contracted by WFP or established specifically to service refugees (as in selected refugee camps such as Al Za'atari and Al Azraq in Jordan and Domiz in Iraq, as well as 37 shops in 17 camps in Turkey). In Turkey WFP helped the Turkish government and the Turkish Red Crescent expand an existing e-card system.

---

[57] The proposed voucher element was not ultimately implemented under the period covered by this evaluation.
[58] Based on the UNHCR household dependency ratio
[59] A third camp exists supported by the Red Cross (as per their mandate).
[60] Nutrition activities in Jordan were later phased out due to a lack of need.
[61] All refugees for those arrived before September 2013 then based on UNHCR vulnerability criteria
[62] WFP. 2012g. *MasterCard And WFP Team Up To Deliver 'Digital Food'*, World Food Programme, 12 September. Posted at: https://www.wfp.org/stories/mastercard-and-wfp-team-deliver-digital-food.
[63] Bauer, J-M., Sandström, S. & Audi, H. 2014. *Economic Impact Study: Direct and Indirect Effects of the WFP Value-Based Food Voucher Programme in Lebanon*. Rome, WFP; Husain, A., Bauer, J-Ma. & Sandström, S. 2014. *WFP Economic Impact Study: Direct and Indirect Impact of the WFP Food Voucher Programme in Jordan*. Rome, WFP, 2014.

Figure 2: Value of Vouchers Redeemed, by Month and Country

25.   The number of voucher recipients and the share of vouchers in the regional EMOP portfolio has increased over time. In February 2013, vouchers were being used by 72% of beneficiaries in the regional EMOP; by May 2014 this figure had increased to 92%.[65] See Annex 8 for detailed data on activities and beneficiaries.

26.   WFP's portfolio does not include all Syrian refugees in the sub-region. WFP reports that it has been limited by host governments to working only with refugees who reside in camps in Turkey and Iraq despite 80% of Syrian refugees currently in Turkey and 58% in Iraq living outside camps.[66] Governments elsewhere in the region have also framed and constrained WFP's response. For instance, WFP seeks permission from the Syrian government for individual food shipments, and trucks require government-issued facilitation letters, often leading to negotiation over access, particularly for areas outside government's control. Across the region, governments set the context for WFP's interventions in other ways – by setting limits on monitoring, withholding permission for needs assessments among non-camp refugees, and influencing targeting plans.

27.   In Lebanon, WFP aligned with UNHCR to target beneficiaries on the basis of vulnerability and engaged in a lengthy analytical process that resulted in approximately 30% of beneficiary households being cut from WFP assistance in late 2013.[67] In Egypt[68], WFP targeted 100% of refugees within specific geographic areas until August/September 2013; refugees arriving after that time were targeted on the basis of referrals by UNHCR implementing partners in line with UNHCR targeting criteria.[69] Vulnerability-based targeting was reportedly set to start in Jordan and

---

[64] The evaluation team requested data to be exported from the REC monitoring and evaluation database. This content is based on that exported data and not on any WFP publication.
[65] WFP. 2014h. *Regional Output Matrix Jan – Dec 2013*. Rome, WFP.
[66] Information Sharing Portal for the Syria Regional Refugee Response, available at:
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php [accessed 20 October 2014].
[67] WFP. 2014k. *Standard Project Report 2013: Regional EMOP 200433 to Support Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq & Turkey*. Rome, WFP.
[68] WFP & UNHCR. 2014. *Concept note for Targeting Verification of Syrian Refugees in Egypt*. Cairo, WFP and UNHCR.
[69] This process of referrals has also been practiced in Lebanon for newly arriving refugees since targeting began in late 2013. While WFP and its cooperating partners feel they identify the most vulnerable refugees who are not receiving WFP assistance,

Egypt in October 2014. Targeting is also being considered in Turkey in partnership with the Turkish government's Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) but is at an earlier stage.[70]

Box 1: **Electronic Vouchers and the One Card System**

WFP has established, in the Regional EMOP, the largest humanitarian electronic voucher systems to date – serving approximately 1.8 million Syrian refugees as of the third quarter of 2014. In Turkey, WFP rolled out an e-voucher system through the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) that built on an existing card developed by TRC and Halkbank for social safety net payments. WFP also worked with the Government of Turkey, which had been providing relatively expensive hot meals to refugees, to allow WFP to deliver a much cheaper e-card (food voucher) system to enable camp-based refugees to purchase their own food. WFP worked with Carrefour in Egypt, modifying an existing gift card system to create a barcode-based voucher platform that enables the tracking of food items for which refugees' vouchers are redeemed. The e-card system established in Lebanon in late 2013 with the Banque Libano-Francaise is the largest single humanitarian e-voucher programme globally, reaching more than 700,000 people; nearly as many are reached by WFP's similar approach in Jordan with Ahli Bank.

The e-voucher systems have resulted in flexible purchasing for recipients, prompter payment for vendors and more efficient use of staff resources compared to paper voucher systems. The WFP e-voucher cards in several countries in the sub-region have multiple 'wallets' that could be used by other aid agencies to deliver cash or vouchers for different purposes on a single card – the first of its kind for WFP. The One Card platform would allow WFP to enable other aid agencies to operate separate cash and voucher programmes using a card already issued by WFP. From a beneficiary perspective, they would have one card – rather than several – to access cash and voucher transfers from multiple agencies for multiple purposes, including but not limited to food, non-food items, winterisation, and so on. This system would help to make assistance more manageable for beneficiaries while also promoting efficiencies among aid agencies, who would no longer need to arrange separate distributions or training for beneficiaries every time they launch a new cash or voucher programme.

Efforts to merge WFP and UNHCR voucher and cash assistance onto a single card in Lebanon and Jordan have regrettably stalled. In Lebanon, in particular, UNHCR and WFP have discussed collaboration on the 'One Card' system for more than a year, but the arrangement has reportedly been held up by WFP and UNHCR headquarters departments.

Source: Interviews, WFP staff, cooperating partners and private sector partners, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt.

28.   These programmes have been supported by a range of donors, with the United States being the largest contributor followed by the United Kingdom and the European Commission. For WFP's refugee response, 80% of support comes from only five donors, and 80% of WFP activities in Syria itself are funded by just six donors (see the Factsheet on page i of this report).[71] Donor support to WFP's operations is generally disbursed over the course of a year rather than at one time, thus requiring WFP to piece together adequate funding on a month-to-month basis. To do so WFP has utilised relatively novel financing arrangements, such as its recently expanded Forward Financing Facility, which enables it to spend against commitments from donors and helps it to manage gaps in donor funding.[72] WFP has also used innovative contracts with food suppliers in Turkey to ensure that supplies are available for drawdown (for the WFP operation in Syria) when needed. Some financing gaps, however, cannot be overcome, and WFP has had to adjust its support to the EMOP – and to its beneficiaries – in Syria based on the funding available in any given month. For instance, the EMOP in Syria has been consistently below its 2014 target level of

---

the ad hoc nature of this process – which relies on aid agencies encountering vulnerable households and referring them to WFP – does pose a risk that some refugees who require aid (and meet vulnerability criteria) are being missed.

[70] WFP. 2014p. *Targeting Matrix - Qualitative-* Turkey. Ankara, WFP.

[71] 200433(EMOP-Reg)-M.East, C. Asia & E. Europe, Started: 01.07.2012-Food Assistance to Vulnerable Syrian Populations in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt Affected by Conflict in Syria, exported from WINGS database, 8 August 2014; and 200339(EMOP)-Syria, Started: 15.11.2011-Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria, exported from WINGS, 8 August 2014.

[72] WFP. 2012c. *Forward Purchase Facility, Rome,* WFP. WFP/EB.A/2012/6-B/1.Posted at http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/resources/wfp248103.pdf.

1,920 Kcal per person per day (Figure 3)[73] and, in October 2014 almost declined to 1,147 Kcal per person per day before donors provided supplemental support.[74]

Figure 3: WFP Ration Scale in Syria, Target vs Achieved, January to September 2014

Source: 'Rations scale fluctuation', WFP Syria, updated October 2014.

Table 6: Distributions: commodities and voucher value

Syria EMOP 200339	Beneficiaries	Tonnage	
2011	50,000	225	
2012	1,493,375	61,191	
2013	3,720,980	248,602	
		310,018	
Regional EMOP 200433	**Beneficiaries**	**Tonnage**	**Voucher value (US$)**
2012	277,299	2,259	13,992,015
2013	1,484,647	26,786	308,205,196
		29,045	**322,197,211**

Source: Standard Project Reports EMOP 200339 for 2011-2013, EMOP 200433 for 2012 & 2013

2. Evaluation Findings

29.   The evaluation yielded a wide range of findings, which are captured here. These correspond to the Areas of Focus for this evaluation. Before exploring specific points, it is important to acknowledge that, on the whole, WFP responded to fast-evolving complex circumstances by designing tailored programmes on a large scale, which helped improve and stabilize food security indicators for more than six million Syrians. While the evaluation shows that, with hindsight, some challenges can be identified, overall WFP successfully implemented a large-scale and, in several instances, innovative intervention. And, particularly in late 2014 and early 2015 – shortly after the time period covered by this evaluation – some issues noted below relating to targeting, transition planning, and coordination are reportedly being addressed.[75]

2.1. Strategic Direction and Positioning

30.   The first series of findings concern foundational issues related to WFP engagement in the sub-region, including the overall relevance of WFP's work to the

---

[73] Previous to the BR 12 covering 2014, the daily Kcal target was 1,260 kcal.
[74] WFP. 2014g. *Rations scale fluctuation*, October 2014. Damascus, WFP.
[75] These more recent efforts fall outside of the scope of this evaluation, which covered the period through September 2014. However, where deemed significant, recent attempts to address challenges (or take advantage of opportunities) are noted in the footnotes.

needs and contexts, the level of coordination (and any trade-offs that coordination and, especially, alignment have necessitated), and the extent to which analysis was undertaken before strategic decisions were reached.

31. **FINDING 1: Initial Response and Analysis.** WFP recognised a mounting crisis in Syria and the sub-region in 2011 and responded quickly at scale based on a general understanding of humanitarian needs, pre-existing awareness of the context (e.g. based on past programmes in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan), and the accurate perception of opportunities for market-based responses outside Syria. While WFP's knowledge of the region seemed to lead to appropriate programme designs, specific decisions, including coverage/targeting and modality selection (e.g., between cash and vouchers), were not rooted in sufficient analysis of markets, gender, food insecurity, contexts, conflict dynamics, or cost-effectiveness. Some deeper analysis was done later, but after key decisions had been made. The absence of greater analysis, particularly in Syria but also in the refugee-hosting countries, is understandable given the scale of the crisis and its rapid expansion from 2011 through to mid-2014 (see Annex 8).

32. This finding does not imply the absence of any analysis. Rapid analyses of humanitarian needs[76] and market studies[77] were conducted as programmes were rolled out,[78] and more in-depth assessments were undertaken later in 2013 and 2014.[79] However, more robust forms of analysis were absent during at least the first year of the Regional EMOP, and senior WFP personnel interviewed throughout the sub-region indicated that the decisions to respond on a large scale and to quickly adopt vouchers were reached based more on general perceptions than detailed analysis. There was no detailed analysis of cash as an option and a comparative study[80] of cash and vouchers in two countries is not yet underway, despite other UN agencies and NGOs using cash. Senior WFP personnel in several instances noted a preference for vouchers over cash, because vouchers could be more clearly linked to food security and given some concern that cash could increase tensions. The recent 2015 evaluation of the WFP Cash & Voucher policy reported that "*many key informants noted a WFP leadership preference for the use of conditional vouchers*" instead of cash and that, while differences among regions exist, some WFP "[Country Offices] *believe WFP leadership seems to be gravitating towards use of conditional vouchers instead of unconditional cash*".[81] According to that evaluation, in 2011 and 2012 60% of WFP's C&V spending was on cash with 40% on vouchers; by 2013 this had swung to 70% vouchers and 30% cash. These global figures are, of course, heavily influenced by the Syria regional EMOP, which relies on vouchers tied to food purchases.

33. REC and CO personnel, including in Syria, also noted that WFP had not conducted structured context, conflict, stakeholder, or dedicated gender analyses

---

[76] See, for instance, WFP. 2012d. *Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment*. Damascus, WFP, FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. WFP. 2014b. *Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Exercise (CFSME): Syrian Refugees in Jordan*. Amman, WFP. WFP. 2013f. *Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*. Beirut, WFP.

[77] Clemens, B. 2012. *Cash for Change: Financial Sector Assessment-Jordan*. Rome, WFP. WFP. 2012g. *Macro Financial Assessment – Lebanon*. Rome, WFP. WFP. 2012i. *Voucher Assessment Mission Report*. Ankara, WFP Turkey.

[78] For Egypt, see WFP & UNHCR. 2014. *Concept note for Targeting Verification of Syrian Refugees in Egypt*. Cairo, WFP and UNHCR. For Iraq see WFP. 2012f. *Joint Rapid Needs Assessment of Syrian Refugees in the Kurdish Region – Iraq*. Erbil, Kurdistan Regional Government/Iraq and UN/NGOs.

[79] WFP, UNHCR & UNICEF. 2013. *The Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees (VASyR) in Lebanon*. Beirut, WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF.; Al-Mahdy, H., Luce, E., Wood, L. & Cecchi, O. 2014. *Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Exercise (CFSME) Syrian Refugees in Jordan*. Amman, WFP and REACH.; WFP & UNHCR. 2014. *WFP UNHCR Joint Assessment Mission Kurdistan Region - Iraq* (Draft). WFP Syria also notes that it undertook joint analyses with FAO in 2012 and 2013 which fed into their planning, particularly for Budget Revisions 12 and 13 of the Syria EMOP.

[80] This study was intended to begin in mid-to-late 2014 and to systematically compare the impact of cash assistance as opposed to food voucher assistance on household food security, most notably. However, WFP personnel interviewed later in the evaluation indicated the cash comparative study – the analytical portion of which was to be led by the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation – is unlikely to proceed given recent shortfalls in WFP funding.

[81] WFP. 2014l. *Summary Evaluation Report for EB.1/2015: Evaluation of WFP's 2008 Cash and Voucher Policy*. Rome, WFP.

upon which to base their strategies.[82] Although WFP was fortunate to have senior staff in the region with experience of the countries affected by the crisis, other senior WFP staff indicated that, particularly in Syria but also in complex environments such as Lebanon, the absence of structured, written context or conflict analyses resulted in some lost opportunities to fine tune strategies and approaches. For instance, stakeholders felt that a structured analysis of political and sectarian contexts would have been useful alongside detailed analyses of tensions between host communities and refugees across the sub-region. Likewise, no specific gender analysis was conducted (see also finding 20), though in Jordan WFP and other aid agencies used the IASC Gender Marker tool.

34.   **FINDING 2: Coordination.** WFP participated positively in regional appeals and planning, including for the RRP, the SHARP, the Comprehensive Regional Strategy Framework, and the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP).[83] WFP has coordinated effectively with UNHCR and has built positive working relations with governments in the region.[84] WFP's role in the emergency telecommunications and food security and nutrition sectors (or working groups or clusters, as they are referred to in different countries) was also positive, and its leadership of the logistics cluster was characterised as exemplary.[85]

35.   However, some gaps were noted. First, the initial cross-border operations into Syria – which WFP launched starting in July 2014 following UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2165 [86] – as well as its increased cross-line deliveries that followed the resolution resulted in some overlaps and duplication, according to NGO and WFP representatives based in Turkey and Syria. This may reflect what WFP Turkey staff members described as the information "firewall" between its Syria operations and its Gaziantep office (with the latter unable to obtain information from the former). REC personnel note that WFP was one of the first UN agencies to establish coordination between its Damascus office and NGOs engaged in cross-border operations from Turkey. However, NGOs engaged in cross-border activities did not concur and felt that coordination with WFP Syria continued to be limited until September 2014. This initial confusion suggests weak planning before UNSCR 2165 – but is not uncommon in complex and dynamic environments. The new 'Whole of Syria'[87] approach, begun in July/August 2014, is aimed at improving coordination and ensuring duplicate deliveries are not repeated. It is too early to say whether this new approach is working, but the early signs are positive.

36.   Second, in Jordan and Lebanon, WFP's role in coordinating its cooperating partners did not involve joined-up lessons learning surrounding shared activities, according to interviews with WFP staff and cooperating partners.[88] WFP's approach to coordination in Regional EMOP countries was described – by the majority of

[82] WFP. 2013h. *WFP's Global Gender Policy 2009: A Policy Evaluation WFP Syria Regional Emergency Operation Field Study Aide Memoire – Final.* Rome, WFP, Office of Evaluation.
[83] United Nations. 2014e. *Syria crisis humanitarian response Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan.* Geneva, United Nations. United Nations. 2014f. *Syria Regional Response Plan 6.* Amman, United Nations.; and United Nations. 2014. *Regional Response Plan 6: Mid-Year Update.* Amman, United Nations. United Nations. 2014b. *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan.* Amman, United Nations. It should be noted that in Jordan the contribution to the 3RP is being led by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation with a more limited role for WFP.
[84] The downsides of these close relationships are discussed later in this sub-section.
[85] This finding also draws upon WFP. 2014u. *WFP Syria Crisis Strategic Statement*, 2014-2016. Amman: WFP.
[86] United Nations. 2014d. *Security Council Resolution 2165, S/RES/2165 (2014).* Posted at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2165.pdf.
[87] Under this new UN system approach, UN agencies are using both cross-line and cross-border means to maximise their ability to reach populations in need in Syria. See, for one succinct definition, Assistant Secretary-General Kyung-wha Kang's Statement to the Security Council on Syria, New York, 28 August 2014, http://syria.unocha.org/sites/default/files/28%20Aug%20ASG%20Kang%20Statement%20on%20Syria.pdf.
[88] WFP notes that this challenge was noted in a 2013 of their sub-regional operations as well and that they had attempted to involve cooperating partners more fully in these sorts of strategic issues. However, the issue was again noted to the evaluation team in September/October 2014.

representatives of WFP cooperating partners – as highly geographical and logistical (i.e., who does what where). It did not extend to the 'how' of programme implementation or lesson learning on topics such as identifying new arrivals, managing relations with shopkeepers, or responding to beneficiary feedback. WFP staff noted that they were aware of this issue and had taken steps to address it in 2013, though WFP cooperating partners interviewed in September and October 2014 indicated that this challenge remains.

37.   **FINDING 3: Alignment and Trade-Offs.** WFP faces complex competing pressures, particularly acute in Syria, from: (i) its commitment to the humanitarian principles[89] including humanity, impartiality, and neutrality; (ii) its mandate to assist the most vulnerable and food insecure; (iii) the requirement to operate under limits set by national governments; (iv) its obligation to work with the UN Country Team; and (v) the priorities of different donors. These competing pressures are common to many crises but are particularly acute for Syria and the region. In Syria, the Syrian authorities and opposition groups at times prevented WFP from reaching particular parts of the country. WFP had to choose its cooperating partners inside Syria from a government-supplied list, but was able to assess these organisations before selecting them. WFP also reported that government policies prevented it from providing assistance to or assessing conditions (until very recently) among non-camp refugees in Turkey and Iraq.[90]

38.   With the L3 declaration, the Executive Director set up a Strategic Task Force (STF) to provide close senior engagement on strategic and operational issues. The STF did monitor operations closely, but the evaluation found less evidence of strategic direction (e.g., on issues such as humanitarian principles) or monitoring progress on actions agreed. Senior managers acknowledged that, until recently, not all STF decisions had been clearly recorded. Given the pace and complexity of the crisis, the STF had been more tactical than strategic. WFP also engaged an external expert to provide guidance on how to operationalize the humanitarian principles in Syria.

39.   As for trade-offs, WFP management confirmed that they judged that its interests in delivering food to the maximum number of people in need are best served by maintaining close relations with the Syrian government and negotiating behind the scenes over access. WFP reports that this approach, including lobbying by its most senior staff, has maximised its access to affected populations. At its height in 2014 WFP assistance reached 4.2 million people in Syria.

40.   The evaluation found quite widespread concerns about how WFP had managed these trade-offs and whether it had missed opportunities to influence the Syrian government. Interviews with Syrian refugees, some UN officials (including from WFP), many NGOs, and some donors suggest that WFP is seen as having a close relationship with the Syrian government and not making sufficient use of the influence its large scale contribution should bring, to advocate for humanitarian space and unhindered access.

41.   Further, the opening up of cross-line routes (between government and opposition-held areas) after UNSCR 2165 suggests that access was being withheld for other than genuine security concerns and that the Syrian government was willing to expand humanitarian access when international pressure was applied. This perceived closeness between WFP and the Syrian government has been bolstered by WFP's

---

[89] WFP. 2004. *Policy issues: Humanitarian Principles* (WFP/EB.1/2004/4-C). Rome, WFP.
[90] There has reportedly been some recent progress on these issues in Turkey, in particular.

strong, but now declining[91] reliance on the SARC, which has been responsible for distributing more than 60% of WFP in-kind food assistance (in terms of tonnage) since 2011.[92] SARC is seen by a number of international NGOs and Syrians as an arm of the Syrian government (given that Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies serve an auxiliary role to national governments where they operate), though others note that ICRC partners with SARC and there are no alternatives with SARC's reach around the country.[93]

42.   The *perception* that WFP is too closely aligned with the Syrian government has implications for the organisation's reputation. There is merit in ensuring that the STF gives more attention to assessing and systematically recording WFP's longer term choices on these complex trade-offs, including using the influence offered by the scale of its operation, and developing and monitoring the implementation of a strategy for communicating WFP's commitment to the humanitarian principles, and the difficult choices it faces, to relevant stakeholders in Syria and outside.

43.   In addition, in Turkey and Iraq, where non-camp refugees are currently excluded (by the authorities) from assistance, WFP's has not yet been able to adhere to needs-based targeting – given that its legal obligation to work within limits set by national governments takes precedence. While understandable, the evaluation team noted that WFP could have made use of studies by other agencies to build a case for greater attention to non-camp refugees in Turkey. This trade-off is, however, clearly recognised by WFP, which has been engaging with the Turkish and Iraqi/Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) authorities on the issue for several years. These efforts have reportedly led to some progress, including limited coverage of non-camp refugees in one governorate in Iraq and promising discussions surrounding needs assessments among – and future assistance to – non-camp refugees in Turkey.

2.2. WFP Organisational Effectiveness[94]

44.   While section 2.4 of this report takes up the question of the effectiveness of WFP's programming, this section presents findings related to WFP's organisational or institutional effectiveness. This is particularly important because WFP put in place new structures, particularly the REC office (see Annex 10), to manage the sub-regional response and report directly to WFP headquarters rather than to or through the Regional Bureau (RB) in Cairo.

45.   **FINDING 4: REC Establishment.** Overall, the establishment of the REC structure – headed by a Regional Emergency Coordinator – in 2012/13 [95] was appropriate given a number of factors: (i) the Transformative Agenda's focus on empowered leadership and coordination; (ii) the sub-regional and highly political nature of the crisis; and (iii) the presence of other regional UN offices – or other offices responsible for the sub-regional crisis – in Amman. The REC provided a close link between top management in WFP and the unfolding crisis and helped to adapt WFP's

---

[91] WFP/OIG. 2014e.*Internal Audit of WFP Operations in Syria and Neighbouring Countries, Internal Audit Report AR/14/22* Rome, WFP, Office of the Inspector General. WFP staff indicate that they have gradually reduced their reliance on SARC; SARC was responsible for 97.9% of WFP's operations in Syria in 2012, 65.8% in 2013 and 55.9% in 2014.

[92] WFP. 2014i. *Schedule of Field Level of Agreement for the period from 01-Jan-14 to 30-June-14.* Damascus, WFP.

[93] Several expressed concern at WFP's use of SARC to deliver the majority of its assistance. Others argue that SARC works with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) among others and is, in practice, a complex and internally heterogeneous organisation whose volunteers' allegiances vary around the country.

[94] In addition to those materials specifically cited below, this section also draws upon the following documents: Corporate Response Structure for Syria and Neighbouring Countries – Terms of Reference (Feb and Nov 2013); REC's interpretation of the Areas Covered Under the Exceptional Delegation of Authority (March 2014); ED circular 3 October 2012 WFP emergency response protocol; ED circular 14 Dec 2012 (and revision 17 Dec 2012): Activation of WFP L3 Syria and region (90 day extensions); and ED memos on Rosters OED/2013/013 (Aug 2013) and the update (OED/2014/008) from July 2014.

[95] The position of Regional Emergency Coordinator was approved in late 2012, but the REC office as an institution was primarily established in 2013.

L3 Emergency Response Protocol [96] to this complex emergency. The REC also facilitated the re-establishment of WFP response capacity in Turkey and Lebanon.[97] Its overall role in coordinating information from around the region, in fundraising, and, to some extent, in corporate communication was well perceived by WFP staff in in the sub-region. The L3 response protocol was largely appropriate and was, with some teething pains (particularly around split reporting lines in Egypt, Iraq and Jordan and delayed delegation of authority in Iraq and Egypt [98]), successfully implemented by the REC with the support of strategic and operational L3 structures. Some existing staff in the sub-region found the shift to the REC particularly difficult – exacerbating the already-high level of stress in some offices – given that it severed their well-established modus operandi with the RB. However, such complications were generally short-lived.

46. The REC was particularly useful for WFP's response to the crisis in Syria itself, according to all senior WFP staff interviewed. Given the pace of work within WFP Syria, the REC enabled the staff on the ground to focus on programming and field operations while handing over much of the administrative workload, reporting requirements, and donor relations to colleagues in Amman. This administrative support role was also valued by WFP in Lebanon, where the REC had deployed a stop-gap finance officer who made valuable contributions to the Regional EMOP there. WFP staff in Iraq noted the REC's particularly active role in also supporting programming there.[99]

47. **FINDING 5: Staffing.** There are, however, some caveats to this broadly positive finding about the REC. First, on staffing, the REC scaled up quickly but – partly due to broader institutional issues – faced difficulty maintaining adequate staffing levels. According to WFP staff in every country in the sub-region, the numbers, profiles, and tenures of staff mobilised for the emergency were often inadequate, thus overburdening some staff and leading to relatively high levels of turnover in key positions (e.g., six heads of office in Lebanon in two years). The head of programme role in Turkey was often vacant, and a small number of key REC positions went unfilled for months (e.g., a three-month gap in the regional M&E officer role[100]). Many WFP personnel, particularly in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq, felt that the REC should have more forcefully conveyed the staffing needs to WFP headquarters to get higher quality staff deployed on temporary assignments (TDY) for longer periods (i.e., longer than 6-12 weeks). That said, such staffing constraints and challenges, though mediated by the REC, which was responsible for human resources for the sub-regional operations, reflect broader weaknesses in WFP's preparedness to respond rapidly and in a sustained way to emergencies with the specialist and generalist staff needed.[101] That is, the REC was the 'face' of the problem in the sub-region but was not fully responsible for resolving it.

---

[96] WFP. 2012. *Executive Director's Circular (Operations Department) WFP Emergency Response Activation Protocol*. Rome, WFP.

[97] WFP previously had operations in these countries but not at the time the regional crisis surrounding Syria emerged. The REC provided support as WFP capacity in these countries was re-established.

[98] WFP. 2014s. *The Syria Crisis: WFP Operations in Syria and Neighbouring Countries*. Internal Audit Report AR/13/13. Rome, WFP Office of the Inspector General.

[99] The REC also supported programming elsewhere in the region, but Iraq was unique in that WFP staff there particularly emphasised the REC's role in programming; elsewhere in the sub-region WFP stakeholders noted the REC's administrative contribution while often finding it more difficult to identify the REC's involvement in programming.

[100] WFP staff in the sub-region noted that this gap delayed or complicated some progress on M&E, but REC stakeholders feel that it did not interrupt the sub-regional M&E function from being delivered. The REC also notes that attempts to avoid this gap ultimately proved unsuccessful.

[101] A memorandum from WFP's Executive Director in July 2014 makes this WFP-wide point well. She noted that "there are still significant gaps to be filled if WFP is to be ready to respond to the increasing number of major emergencies" and that WFP needs "to reaffirm the importance of the [Emergency Response Roster], as outlined in the earlier Circular, and to encourage all managers and staff to actively support and respect the corporate deployment system".

48. **FINDING 6: REC Support to programming and operations.** REC administration support to country operations, particularly on finance, performed well in supporting country operations. On programming issues the REC supported WFP Country Offices (COs), including, in 2014, through 50 field support missions, 19 training programmes for different units in one or several countries, and a lessons learning workshop on C&V programming. The REC's work plan for 2014 indicates that it provided extensive support to programing across the region on issues ranging from the One Card platform to gender, protection, monitoring and evaluation. Support was provided through structured training and meetings as well as communication.

49. However, there was, at times, a disconnect between the level of programmatic and operational support that the REC provided and the perception of this support within COs and sub-offices (SOs). Many WFP staff in COs and SOs felt that REC programme and operational support did not correspond to the challenges they faced, particularly in late 2012 and 2013 during the establishment of large-scale voucher programmes. In particular they were looking for more help on establishing voucher systems, negotiating and managing relations with banks, shop selection, monitoring and communicating with shopkeepers, preventing the encashment of vouchers, conflict issues (e.g., mitigating host community tensions), vulnerability measurement (including targeting), and transition planning at the sub-regional level. While documents indicate that the REC had provided support on some of these issues, that help was often not recognised by CO and SO personnel. CO and SO programme and operations staff further reported limited knowledge of one another's approaches to issues such as selecting, managing and monitoring partner shops, cancelling contracts with shop-keepers, and preventing fraud and encashment of vouchers.

50. This may partly reflect the Amman-centric nature of some REC support. COs noted that sub-regional meetings among heads of programmes generally took place in Amman – benefiting the Jordan CO, in particular – despite requests to rotate them around the region. A C&V lessons learning workshop, which took place in Amman, included 12 REC staff members and four personnel from WFP Jordan but only two from Lebanon and Syria and one each from Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt.[102] However, such challenges are common among institutions under pressure and with dispersed responsibilities.

51. Lastly, the REC's role in supporting programmes and operations was perceived somewhat differently in different COs in the sub-region. The REC's role in managing and supporting programmes and operations was often understood in different terms by different COs and by particular departments within individual COs, so there is a need to ensure clear communication about what help COs can expect from the REC and the RECs requirements of them. The REC may benefit from structured systems to gather feedback from COs and SOs, such as anonymised surveys, to ensure that expectations of the REC's programmatic and operational support are clear and well managed.

52. **FINDING 7: Linking Operations and Expertise.** Lastly, WFP's organisational effectiveness was also influenced by broader corporate issues, including a lack of guidance, limited awareness of existing guidance, outdated guidance and tools, and the challenge of linking WFP programme personnel with relevant expertise. This issue is particularly acute in an organisation that uses a high percentage of short-term staff. One WFP staff member noted: "WFP has no guidance on cash and vouchers; we needed to create everything from scratch." Similar comments were made regarding issues such as targeting and vulnerability measurement. In fact WFP has detailed guidance on nearly every element of C&V programming (though not on setting

---

[102] WFP.(Undated). *Cash & Vouchers Lessons Learned: Main Findings.* Amman, WFP Regional Emergency Coordination Office.

up large-scale e-transfer systems); on targeting through its major investment in the Cash for Change Unit (OSZIC), and has generally well-regarded Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) systems throughout the organization. Yet it was clear that some key staff within the REC and COs and in SOs were not aware of these materials, and that WFP needs to establish more robust and demand-drive systems to better link time-pressed individuals in crisis contexts with relevant corporate guidance and in-house (or external) experts.

2.3. Programme Strategy Issues

53.   This section turns to a number of programmatic issues but primarily focuses on two key themes: (i) the weighing of trade-offs between the scale (coverage), depth (quality), and sustainability of WFP programmes; and (ii) consideration of medium-or long-term 'transition' strategies for WFP's presently emergency-focused response.

54.   **FINDING 8: Coverage.** WFP's initial response to the fast developing regional crisis, particularly during the peak periods of new displacement, understandably focused upon widespread coverage and prioritised breadth over depth (i.e., supporting all registered refugees in Egypt and Jordan and all they were permitted to assist in Turkey and Iraq).[103] Where the breadth of WFP assistance was limited, this primarily reflected compliance with others' policies. For instance, Turkish and Iraqi/KRG policies led to the exclusion of non-camp refugees, and authorities in these countries blocked WFP from assessing needs among non-camp refugees. In Egypt until August/September 2013 it accepted new refugee beneficiaries on the basis of where they lived ("geographical targeting"). After that WFP assisted new Syrian refugee beneficiaries if they were assessed as vulnerable by UNHCR implementing partners, thereby aligning with the UNHCR targeting criteria.[104] WFP also began targeting in Lebanon (Box 2) in September 2013 in order to align with UNHCR. Targeting was also being pursued within the regional EMOP in Jordan (late 2014).

55.   However, these efforts are beginning late given that available assessments showed varied levels of food insecurity and since WFP, according to WFP personnel at multiple levels, has known that the breadth and value of its food assistance (primarily voucher) programmes in the sub-region would not be supported for an extended period. Of course, the decision to target assistance or not was also heavily influenced by governments in countries where WFP was operating; authorities in Jordan (and earlier in Lebanon) had discouraged WFP from targeting its assistance out of concern the humanitarian burden of food-insecure refugees might then fall to national or local institutions.

56.   The evaluation found that targeting is crucial to transition strategies for the Syria and regional EMOPs (discussed below). While there does not seem to be a rationale for WFP to transition its operations in Syria in the short term, there is an evident need – given funding shortages and the varied levels of vulnerability and food insecurity among refugees – to consider new approaches within the refugee-hosting countries. By 'transition' this report refers to a range of options (which are not mutually exclusive): (i) closing down existing operations, (ii) handing over responsibility for existing operations to others including national authorities, (iii) scaling down assistance through better targeting (or reduced per capita assistance levels) or (iv)

---

[103] The rapid growth of this crisis and the impact it had on WFP programme personnel's ability to more carefully design programmes to balance scale and depth/quality was articulated by several interviewees. For the Regional EMOP, this increasing size of the crisis is captured in Annex 6.

[104] WFP continued to assist those previously-registered refugees who it had already been supporting on the basis of geographical targeting. W WFP & UNHCR. 2014. *Concept note for Targeting Verification of Syrian Refugees in Egypt*. Cairo, WFP and UNHCR. WFP. 2014q. *Targeting Matrix - Qualitative- Turkey*. Ankara, WFP. In the case of Egypt, WFP ultimately assisted only around 2,5000 refugees out of the more than 30,000 which have arrived in Egypt since WFP modified its targeting approach (aligning it with UNHCR) in August/September 2013.

adopting/exploring alternative and more cost-effective approaches to improving or maintaining food security among vulnerable households. This topic is taken up further in the next finding.

Box 2. Targeting: Lebanon's Experience

Lebanon is the first country in the regional EMOP to have introduced vulnerability-based targeting and thus presents opportunities for learning. In Lebanon, the process began with the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR) which WFP led in 2013 (and which WFP co-led in 2014 with UNHCR). The in-depth analysis of 1,422 households yielded a closer understanding of vulnerability from a multi-sectorial perspective that included food security. However, as WFP attempted to develop a targeting approach in partnership with UNHCR and others, it was not clear how VASyR could be applied across the entire current and future beneficiary caseload given that UNHCR and other agencies had limited information on refugee households to enable systematic targeting (and given that data collection across 100,000+ households was deemed too difficult and costly).

Ultimately, the UNHCR Burden Score was selected; the Burden Score relies on a modified dependency ratio (i.e., the proportion of working-age males to others in the household). Subsequent analysis by WFP showed that this criterion was not closely correlated with the vulnerability levels assessed through the VASyR process (which did consider food security).[105] That is, the Burden Score approach was likely to have an inclusion-exclusion error of about 35%. However, given the absence of other data – and given donor pressure for WFP and UNHCR to use a common targeting approach – the Burden Score was adopted. WFP, however, introduced particular categories of vulnerable beneficiaries who, regardless of their household's burden score, would receive WFP assistance in order to try and mitigate the impact of the aforementioned exclusion error.

The subsequent process of communicating the targeting among all stakeholders was considered exemplary and prevented the large-scale protests or opposition that might have been expected. Most excluded households ultimately appealed the WFP-UNHCR decision to cut them from the beneficiary rolls, and a massive operation was put into gear to assess vulnerability among the 31,000 households, which had appealed. This initial appeals process was commendably completed in just three months. Ultimately 23% of these were deemed eligible for WFP assistance. This approach reflected some useful practices but also warns against targeting methods, which do not have a very close correlation to food security. Subsequent analyses conducted by WFP cooperating partners[106] have indicated that roughly one in three excluded beneficiaries, on the basis of the VASyR approach, should have been receiving WFP assistance and that a similar number of WFP beneficiaries should not have been targeted.

---

57.   **FINDING 9: Transition Planning.** It is increasingly clear that the Syrian crisis and its impacts will be long-term. According to senior WFP staff at HQ and the REC, donors have informed WFP and other aid agencies that they would be unable to fund the sub-regional crisis response at the same level for the medium or long term. These warnings proved accurate in October 2014 when funding shortfalls almost pushed WFP to make rapid and severe cuts in the food rations in Syria and in food assistance (particularly voucher value) going to Syrian refugees.[107] These cuts – which ultimately occurred in January 2015 – are, according to WFP staff and partners, likely to be destabilising to beneficiaries who were not forewarned that their food assistance could dramatically shift from month to month and to WFP partners, including shop-keepers, who had little warning that WFP's funding situation was so precarious.[108] Turkish officials, in particular, expressed significant frustration at the prospect of

---

[105] WFP assessment personnel noted these studies and their findings to the evaluation team during interviews but did not share the documents showing the 35% exclusion error.

[106] These include internal monitoring reports developed by WFP cooperating partners which were shown to and discussed carefully with the evaluation team but not provided to the evaluators.

[107] The evaluation team was in the sub-region conducting the field work while WFP was actively determining how to cut its voucher value. See also WFP. 2014d. *Funding Shortfall Forces WFP To Announce Cutbacks To Syrian Food Assistance Operation*, World Food Programme, 18 September. Posted at http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/funding-shortfall-forces-wfp-announce-cutbacks-syrian-food-assistance-operation

[108] This point was made by WFP staff in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Egypt who noted how dependent many WFP partner shops were on WFP's voucher programme. WFP personnel estimated that the cuts would be harmful for these businesspeople and thus felt that communicating the cuts to them would be sensitive (and needed to be handled carefully). The cuts also affected national governments in some cases. Turkish officials, in particular, expressed significant frustration at the prospect of sudden cuts in WFP's ability to support food assistance in government-operated camps, though WFP staff indicated that they had provided advanced notice to Turkish authorities that cuts were possible.

sudden cuts in WFP's ability to support food assistance in government-operated camps, undermining some of the goodwill that WFP had worked hard to generate.

58.   WFP did focus on short-term transition planning as the financial pipeline break neared. In all countries covered by the REC a Contingency Plan was developed in August and September 2014 as near-term funding challenges became apparent, but such contingency planning and communication needs to be built into programmes at an earlier stage. [109]

59.   Longer-term plans for transitioning WFP assistance to a more sustainable model have not yet emerged, though options have been discussed.[110] WFP actively considered these issues in programme meetings, resilience-oriented workshops, and internal discussion papers starting in March 2014, [111] and the REC organised a two-day resilience-oriented meeting in Amman in July 2014. Some WFP staff referred to the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) or WFP's thinking on resilience as a 'transition plan', but the former primarily comprises a list of funding requirements while the latter is more conceptual than operational. At the time of the fieldwork, WFP personnel across the sub-region and at senior levels in headquarters confirmed the absence of a strategy for moving to a more sustainable approach. That is, the internal thinking and meetings on a transition to medium-term approaches had not yet translated into programming or the development of new EMOP programme documents or the formulation of a Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation [112] (PRRO).

60.   In a few cases WFP has taken decisions, which have complicated transition or financial sustainability within the regional EMOP. These include: (i) agreeing in 2013 to take over funding for feeding camp-based Syrian refugees in Turkey (when the Turkish authorities had already been financing food assistance from their own budget) and increasing the number of camps covered in 2014; and (ii) offering in the autumn of 2013 (and signing an agreement with UNRWA in July 2014) to begin funding part of UNRWA's vouchers (for food) among many PRS in Lebanon.[113]

2.4. Operational Performance and Results

61.   The last set of findings turns to the intended and unintended results of WFP's programmes. While not an impact evaluation, this process considered results primarily by reviewing available output and outcome-level data from WFP and secondly by triangulating perceptions from beneficiaries and a wide range of stakeholders (particularly where verifiable data was relatively limited).

Results Orientation

62.   **FINDING 10: M&E Systems and Programmatic Uptake.** The evaluation found gaps in data, which at times complicated systematic and credible assessments of the results that WFP had achieved. In some cases these related to political and other factors. Data for Syria was, given the security situation, understandably sparse, and

---

[109] This financial plan was accompanied, at least in Lebanon, by an Action Plan which specified how and when WFP Lebanon would communicate financial pipeline breaks with beneficiaries, partners, government and others. The evaluation team was not permitted to review the aforementioned contingency plan or this communications-focused Action Plan.

[110] While some WFP staff referred to the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) or WFP's thinking on resilience as a 'transition plan', the evaluation finds that the former primarily comprises a list of funding requirements while the latter is conceptual rather than operational.

[111] The March 2014 heads of programmes meeting organized by the REC identified "transition to early recovery/development" as an agenda item. Later meetings on resilience and mid-term planning took place later in 2014 as well.

[112] A PRRO is a medium-term response to a crisis once it becomes protracted or moves into a recovery phase. PRROs can last up to three years and take at least six months to prepare so require relatively early thinking in order to transition from an EMOP to a PRRO. At the time of writing, a PRRO was not being developed for the sub-regional crisis.

[113] UNRWA sent the first disbursement request to WFP in August 2014. WFP's support to PRS is equivalent in value to the support WFP provides to Syrian refugees in Lebanon but is provided as cash instead of a voucher redeemable only for food.

the Turkish authorities had limited data collection in refugee camps (e.g., ceasing monitoring for three months and requesting changes in monitoring forms). Other challenges were more directly under WFP's control. For instance, WFP began systematic, comprehensive monitoring late within the regional EMOP, gave less attention to monitoring certain important indicators, and had methodological shortcomings that render an assessment of results difficult. While some of these issues are linked with the necessarily hurried nature of initial programme operations, the convention is that systematic monitoring should start as soon as possible even in emergency operations. Given the priority that WFP corporately now gives to preparedness and M&E this is disappointing.

63.   Across the refugee-hosting countries, systematic data collection and monitoring, with the exception of distribution numbers, did not begin until early-to-mid-2013 (6-12 months after the regional EMOP began).[114] The first M&E report was issued in 2014 for Egypt and December 2013 for Turkey; reports for Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon were available in the first half of 2013. However, many early reports focus primarily on outputs and have only limited information for example on coping strategies, and other potential measures of outcomes and vulnerability, though later reports shifted more towards outcomes. Despite improvements – particularly after the new Strategic Results Framework[115] was put into operation in the sub-region in 2014 – some gaps in the data collection process continued. For instance, WFP reports that data on the sale of vouchers was not systematically collected through post-distribution monitoring until June 2014 in Jordan and Egypt. Some WFP and other staff involved in monitoring said they had relatively limited resources for monitoring. WFP EMOP teams across the sub-region, despite the presence of an M&E focal point in the REC (see issues noted in Section 2.2), adopted M&E tools, which were not harmonized until mid-2013 and then did not allow for robust, cross-country analysis, according to WFP staff in COs. Smaller challenges contributed to this. In Lebanon, monitoring forms changed three times in two months in mid-2014, creating another obstacle to credible analysis of time-lapsed data. The REC has initiated efforts to consolidate data collection across the countries, but these have been constrained by the high turnover of M&E focal points and the small number of full-time M&E staff in the regional EMOP COs.

64.   Baseline data collection also proved problematic.[116] Most outcome data reported in WFP Standard Programme Reports (SPRs) – except for Egypt – present baseline data collected from beneficiaries who were already receiving assistance (i.e., from post-distribution monitoring, PDMs, rather than from pre-assessment baselines, PABs) through 2013.[117] For Iraq, baseline data was collected from individuals who had been in camps for six months or less. In Turkey the 'baseline' constituted existing WFP beneficiaries in camps who had already been receiving assistance for varying periods of time. The issue of capturing baseline data (PABs) in Jordan was first noted in a December 2013 M&E report. Since WFP assistance – particularly in a camp setting – has a near-immediate and positive impact on FCS results[118], a large portion of WFP's baseline data is not credible for rigorous assessments of results. Efforts were, however,

[114] M&E started in Jordan in June/July 2013 and in August in Egypt, Iraq and Turkey according to a WFP M&E audit. It started slightly earlier in 2013 in Lebanon. WFP. 2013d. *Syria Crisis Regional M&E System and Activity Status Matrix*, 10 December 2013. Rome: WFP Office of the Inspector General.
[115] WFP. 2014a. *2014-2017 Strategic Results Framework*. Rome, WFP.
[116] This same conclusion was reached in WFP.(Undated). *Cash & Vouchers Lessons Learned: Main Findings*. Amman, WFP Regional Emergency Coordination Office..
[117] WFP. 2013c. *Standard Project Report 2012: Regional EMOP to Support Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq & Turkey*. Rome, WFP.
[118] This statement is supported by existing research and WFP's monitoring data in the sub-region. See, for instance, FCS results reported in WFP. 2014k. *Standard Project Report 2013: Regional EMOP to Support Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq & Turkey*. Rome, WFP.

made to collect more PAB data in 2014.[119] PAB data was collected in Lebanon[120] starting in January 2014; in Egypt it was collected until August 2014, then discontinued given the changed operational context; and in Jordan WFP started collecting PAB data in July 2014. In Iraq some efforts to collect PAB from a small caseload of newly arrived refugees were made in September 2014. While gathering this baseline data is beneficial and will make it feasible for WFP to conduct new forms of analysis, the earlier absence of baselines is problematic for a programme of this size.

65.   Lastly, the evaluation noted some concerns about the use and uptake of M&E results to inform programming. WFP staff noted that monitoring was primarily done as part of reporting but did not feel that, except in cases where vouchers were being 'cashed in', it had led to programme adjustments. In a number of instances staff, particularly in COs and SOs, were not aware of M&E reports being produced by WFP for those countries. This finding matches a similar conclusion from the 2014 evaluation of WFP's C&V policy; that evaluation found that "*monitoring efforts for C&V projects collect significant but inconsistent data that is not utilized or analysed.*"[121]

66.   Such challenges in WFP monitoring – rather than just a caveat to section 2.4 – are a finding. Senior WFP leaders informed the evaluation team of the heavy investment they have made in monitoring and analysis within the organisation, though it seems that corporate guidance is not yet consistently applied to enable credible, empirical analysis of effectiveness and efficiency. This is particularly problematic given that WFP SO and cooperating partner personnel note that the majority of their time is spent on monitoring, particularly where e-vouchers are being used.[122] WFP staff indicate, however, that this situation is changing and should further improve following the introduction of the 2014-2017 Strategic Results Framework.

Indicative Results*[123]*

67.   Despite these significant challenges, the evaluation was able to document a number of indicative results based on available data and on stakeholder (particularly beneficiary) consultations.

68.   **FINDING 11: Scale.** WFP covered an impressive number of beneficiaries (see Annexes 6 and 9) and scaled up its interventions quickly amid rising demand, particularly where vouchers, especially e-vouchers, were adopted. In 2013 WFP reached 88% of all of the targeted refugees in Egypt, and 98% of all registered refugees in Jordan.[124] In Syria, WFP covered 4.25 million beneficiaries in 2014. Including the latest budget revision (14) between 2011 and 2015, WFP aims to have provided 1.85 million MT of food in Syria and nearly US$2 billion in vouchers in the refugee-hosting countries.[125]

69.   **FINDING 12: Food Security.** On measurable outcomes, the evaluation found that WFP's food assistance improves and, most notably, stabilizes beneficiaries' levels of food consumption. For the regional EMOP all countries collected data on Food

---

[119] WFP. 2014f. *Syria Crisis Regional Response: M&E Updates July-September 2014*. Amman, WFP.
[120] The PAB in Lebanon was conducted with newly arrived refugees and with individuals who had been in Lebanon for some time but who had not previously received WFP assistance.
[121] WFP. 2014l. *Summary Evaluation Report for EB.1/2015: Evaluation of WFP's 2008 Cash and Voucher Policy (Draft)*. Rome, WFP.
[122] With the introduction of e-vouchers, less time is spent on actual distribution and collection of vouchers.
[123] An even more detailed collection of data on results is contained in Annex 8.
[124] These figures are calculated using two sets of numbers, WFP beneficiary figures (from WFP SPR 2013) and numbers of registered refugees by country from UNHCR. See: WFP. 2014k. *Standard Project Report 2013: Regional EMOP to Support Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq & Turkey*. Rome, WFP.; and the UNHCR Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal for the Syria Regional Refugee Response, available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php [accessed 20 October 2014].
[125] In addition to a potential voucher scheme in Syria and some food distribution in the refugee-hosting countries.

Consumption Score (FCS) and Coping Strategies Index (CSI) as of 2013 (see Annex 6), and starting in 2014 baselines have been collected in several refugee-hosting countries for varied periods of time. In Lebanon in Q3 2014, the data shows that 16% of refugees had poor FCS on arrival and that the only 3% of WFP beneficiaries monitored with the PDM tool had a poor FCS. Likewise, in Jordan during the same time, the proportion of refuges with a poor FCS declined from 12% (PAB) to 4% (PDM). [126] June 2013 baseline data collected in Egypt indicates 71.9% of refugees had acceptable FCSs while that figure rose to 85% by December 2013. [127] These figures suggest that WFP assistance has a role in improving food consumption among beneficiaries, though further data and larger samples are needed to state this finding with greater confidence. Such a finding could also be better demonstrated if WFP was able to develop means of testing FCS against beneficiary and non-beneficiary refugees in order to account for the role of contextual factors in improving FCS scores (e.g., moving from a war zone to a relatively stable host country with livelihood opportunities, albeit mostly informal ones).

70.   It is clearer that WFP assistance has helped to stabilize refugees' FCS, in particular. Post-distribution monitoring from the first three quarters of 2014 found that the proportion of assisted Syrian households with an acceptable FCS was stable in each of the five countries hosting refugees. In all countries but Lebanon (where 78% of refugees had an acceptable FCS), more than 90% of recipient households had an acceptable FCS and as high as 98% in Turkey.[128] The importance of WFP assistance in stabilizing food consumption was supported by focus groups with beneficiaries, which emphasised WFP assistance as the main source of income to purchase food. In Iraq, assessments by REACH found that refugees receiving WFP vouchers had better diet diversity and higher FCS than those receiving in-kind food assistance, though other factors could contribute to those differences.[129] WFP data from Jordan also indicates WFP assistance improved dietary diversity.

71.   WFP assistance also appears to have reduced reliance on negative coping strategies, though it is difficult to determine the role of food assistance in mitigating negative strategies without expanded baseline data or data from refugees not receiving assistance in Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon. The most commonly utilised food-based coping strategy is relying on less preferred/less expensive food.[130] Monitoring data found that approximately half of refugee households, particularly in Jordan, reported taking on debt to purchase food or, as in Lebanon, spending savings.[131]

72.   **FINDING 13: Local Economy.** WFP's work in the region also had a beneficial impact on local traders included in the voucher programmes – and their employers and suppliers – as best captured in Jordan and Lebanon. Several WFP partner shops interviewed in the course of this evaluation described having monthly revenues ranging from US$70,000 to as much as US$700,000 as a result of their involvement in WFP's voucher programmes.[132] Studies conducted by WFP headquarters found that

---

[126] Sample sizes for these various readings are not provided in the WFP M&E report, thus making it difficult to ascertain the basis for these calculations. It is also difficult to compare PDMs with refugees arrived 2-3 years earlier with baselines calculated on the basis of newly-arrived refugees. See: WFP. 2014f. *Syria Crisis Regional Response: M&E Updates July-September 2014*. Amman, WFP..

[127] WFP, *WFP. 2014k. Standard Project Report 2013: Regional EMOP to Support Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq & Turkey*.Rome, WFP.

[128] WFP. 2014m. *Syria Crisis Regional Response M&E Updates, April-June 2014*. Amman, WFP.; and WFP. 2014f. *Syria Crisis Regional Response: M&E Updates July-September 2014*. Amman, WFP..

[129] REACH. 2014. *Multi-Sector Needs Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Camps: Kurdistan Region of Iraq Assessment Report*. Paris, REACH Initiative; REACH. 2014. *Multi-Sector Needs Assessment of Syrian Refugees Outside of Camps: Kurdistan Region of Iraq Assessment Report*. Paris, REACH Initiative;

[130] WFP. 2014n. *Syria Crisis Regional Response M&E Updates, January-March 2014*. Amman, WFP).

[131] WFP. 2014m. *Syria Crisis Regional Response M&E Updates, April-June 2014*. Amman, WFP.

[132] Interviews with 22 shopkeepers in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.

WFP's food vouchers had created 1,300 new jobs in Lebanon and had led to modest but significant capital investments among shopkeepers in Jordan (US$2.5m) and Lebanon (US$3m).[133] The multiplier value of WFP assistance was up to 1.23x in the food products sector in Jordan and 1.51x in Lebanon. These economic benefits have made some in the private sector view the broader humanitarian community and Syrian refugees in a more positive light and, in Jordan and Lebanon, helped to mitigate, to a small extent, the rising problem of host community tensions. In Syria the supply chain provides, according to interviews with WFP Syria staff, employment activities for around 1,000 Syrians, who assisted in packaging and labelling of the food rations.

73.   **FINDING 14: Relations with Host Communities.** Host community tensions have also been partly mitigated by the switch to vouchers, particularly e-vouchers, in many of the Regional EMOP countries. Food distributions – and even paper voucher distributions – were highly visible and contributed to host communities' sense of being excluded from large-scale aid efforts (and had other benefits, as discussed in Box 3). According to WFP staff, cooperating partners, beneficiaries, and local government officials, the WFP e-voucher approach in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and, to a lesser extent, Turkey helps to maintain a low profile given that e-vouchers (cards) do not require the sorts of regular distributions common among paper vouchers. WFP has taken reasonable steps to mitigate host-community tensions, though these are to some extent beyond WFP's influence and stem more from broader economic impacts of the refugee crisis (e.g., declines in the value of wage labour and increases in rent prices). In Lebanon WFP is participating in a Ministry of Social Welfare pilot scheme to provide vouchers to poor Lebanese, helping in a small way to offset perceptions that the international community helps only Syrians.

Box 3. Continuity of E-Vouchers in Situations of Insecurity

It is worth noting that e-vouchers have an ability to function even during periods of insecurity insofar as point-of-sale machines and markets continue to function. This was identified in the case of localised violence in Arsal in Lebanon's Beka'a Valley in 2014. Violence in the area created major access challenges for aid agencies for a period of several months. And while WFP was unable to distribute e-vouchers to new beneficiaries in Arsal during that time, those existing beneficiaries in the affected area could use their e-vouchers/cards to purchase food from local shopkeepers. This benefit results both from the fact that e-vouchers are topped up remotely and given that e-vouchers (as discussed under Finding 14) remain relatively low profile and are less likely than more visible aid projects to draw the attention or ire of armed groups or movements.

Performance

74.   **FINDING 15: Timeliness.** WFP was generally able to achieve a timely response in distributing in-kind food assistance, particularly in Syria, but was subject to delays in voucher programming in the Regional EMOP as a result of slow UNHCR registration processes in several countries through at least 2013. WFP started in-kind food assistance operations quickly in Syria and the region. Welcome meals and food parcels were provided in a timely manner to recently-arrived refugees, and many stakeholders noted positively WFP's ability to get programmes up and running quickly in Syria and the sub-region (despite starting from scratch in several countries).

75.   With the notable exception of Iraq, registration for voucher programming was, however, subject to significant delays, as confirmed by WFP staff and beneficiaries in, most notably, Jordan and Lebanon (the two countries in the regional EMOP with by far the largest caseloads). In each case refugees were not able to apply to receive WFP vouchers (paper or electronic) until after completing UNHCR registration. With the

---

[133] Bauer, J-M., Sandström, S. & Audi, H. 2014. *Economic Impact Study: Direct and Indirect Effects of the WFP Value-Based Food Voucher Programme in Lebanon*. Rome, WFP.; *Husain, A., Bauer, J-Ma. & Sandström, S. 2014. WFP Economic Impact Study: Direct and Indirect Impact of the WFP Food Voucher Programme in Jordan*. Rome, WFP, 2014..

massive influx of refugees, registration in Lebanon required between two and six months for much of 2013 and early 2014. Beneficiaries in Lebanon described taking two to six months to register with UNHCR and then waiting another two months to receive their WFP vouchers. Having been provided with a one-month food parcel shortly upon arriving in Lebanon, this meant that many refugees went three to seven months without food assistance before receiving further WFP support. Registration was not as problematic in Jordan given the smaller number and better-controlled border crossings with Syria.[134]

76.   **FINDING 16: Operational Efficiency - Syria.** Within the Syria EMOP, despite a difficult operating environment, WFP pushed through a number of good practice operational approaches to increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness while mitigating risks. On transport, WFP began working with a range of trucking firms in Syria and negotiated a reported 20% cut in ground transport costs, according to WFP Syria staff. In addition, to prevent trucking companies or drivers from establishing inappropriate relationships with armed groups or others in particular areas, WFP rotated their contracted trucking companies so that no one company or driver had the same route for an extended period. These basic steps come on top of a broader WFP achievement in terms of building a complex logistical network across Syria – and linking Syria with Lebanon and Turkey – where only a skeletal structure had previously existed. WFP Syria also deserves credit for having promoted the diversification of the trucking industry in Syria by awarding contracts to smaller emerging firms, which also benefited the wider humanitarian community in Syria.

77.   However, this evaluation was unable to assess whether issues such as fraud or loss had significantly affected WFP assistance in Syria, as is commonly the case in locations where various armed groups control territory. Data available from WFP indicates that 96.7% of food rations ultimately dispatched were distributed among beneficiaries[135], suggesting a very small level of loss for an operation of this complexity. However, it is not possible for this evaluation to independently verify whether existing WFP data within Syria is accurate. WFP's activities in Syria are monitored by its staff where feasible and, more commonly, by its implementing partners and by a third-party monitoring firm contracted by WFP, which also has limited direct access to beneficiaries.

78.   It is also difficult to weigh the accuracy of WFP distribution data given major challenges in on-the-ground monitoring, including those noted by a November 2014 WFP audit. That audit found that WFP staff had only been able to undertake one quarter of planned field visits between July 2013 and March 2014 as a result of security conditions. WFP also indicates that 21% of randomly-selected Final Distribution Points had been monitored by WFP in 2013, rising to 45% in 2014.[136] The audit and this evaluation found, based on interviews with WFP staff and partners in Syria, that monitoring focuses on access, market prices, numbers of people receiving food rations, and other contextual or output-oriented elements rather than outcomes. However, WFP staff and partners note that security and political considerations in the country at times complicate the detailed monitoring that WFP would prefer. Hence, it is not possible for this evaluation to conclude whether WFP assistance is subject to greater-than-reported levels of aid diversion in Syria.

79.   **FINDING 17: Operational Efficiency - Regional Operation.** In terms of efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the regional EMOP, a firm conclusion is difficult

---

[134] This delay also means that by the time WFP collected pre-assistance data from refugees they had already been in the country for a relatively long time period – thus posing another challenge for WFP's results monitoring.)

[135] WFP Syria. 2014. *Dispatches vs Distributions, 2013 and 2014.* Damascus, WFP.

[136] This is based on data provided by WFP to the evaluation team. The average proportion of final distribution points which WFP monitored in 2013 and 2014 is 32%.

given that WFP could not produce figures to compare the per-beneficiary costs associated with the three main delivery modalities used: food distribution, paper vouchers, and e-vouchers. This means that the relative cost-effectiveness of these differing approaches could not be systematically compared. The primary exception is Iraq, where WFP indicated that each monthly food parcel costs US$21.50 while each food voucher is worth US$31 per month; when associated delivery costs are factored in, vouchers continued to cost more than food parcels (US$40.30 vs US$33.56).

80.   Based on this limited evidence, it is not possible to say whether the potential cost savings associated with food distribution outweigh the benefits that vouchers enable (e.g., lower profile form of assistance, local economic benefits, greater dietary diversity). The cost-effectiveness argument for any modality or programmatic approach could be made more forcefully if WFP systematically assessed the costs associated with main modalities of food assistance. Calculating these figures would be useful for WFP decision making in future crises, particularly in managing budget shortfalls.

81.   **FINDING 18: Encashment of Assistance.** Efficiency was also affected, according to WFP staff, partners, and beneficiaries, by issues such as fraud, which was relatively limited in the regional EMOP, and by the conversion of WFP assistance into cash. WFP staff and partners describe fraud as a minor but persistent problem within the regional EMOP countries. The most common form involved the collection of large numbers of e-vouchers by particular businesses or brokers in order to redeem them *en masse* once they were re-loaded each month; some such cards were from refugees who had left the country while others were given to shopkeepers in order to pay back loans taken by refugees. Again, these forms of fraud – which rarely involved outright theft or criminality – appear relatively limited[137], and WFP has taken steps to address this challenge through in-person monitoring or shops and manual examinations of receipts and/or bank transaction records.

82.   The conversion of vouchers or food assistance into cash was a larger problem, as indicated by WFP staff, cooperating partners, and some beneficiaries. In Iraq, 60-70% of WFP beneficiary households are selling 52-66% of their bulgur, pasta, rice and lentils in order to obtain cash according to a REACH study.[138] However, the conversion of vouchers in Iraq into cash was, according to WFP staff and partners, lower than for food, thus suggesting that vouchers are greatly preferred and suggesting some mis-match between beneficiaries' expectations and WFP-provided food.

83.   The conversion of vouchers into cash was also described as a persistent challenge – a finding captured in the November 2014 WFP internal audit report. That report stated that: '*The monitoring reports of the Regional Emergency Coordination Office's (RECO) Jordan and Lebanon offices indicated a persistent encashment of vouchers intended only for food items by the beneficiaries through intermediaries*".[139] The internal audit report also confirms what the evaluation also found: that the REC had not taken steps to standardise the monitoring of conversion/encashment despite this challenge being a well-known and recurring feature of voucher programmes around the world.

---

[137] The only exception to this statement comes from the Al Za'atari refugee camp in Jordan, where a large black market in vouchers emerged and where refugees described a Jordanian 'mafia' which profited from the large-scale cashing in of WFP's paper vouchers. This level of fraud, however, reportedly declined as WFP switched to electronic vouchers. See the recent WFP Cash & Voucher Audit report.

[138] REACH. 2014. Multi-Sector Needs Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Camps: Kurdistan Region of Iraq Assessment Report. Paris, REACH Initiative. Posted at
http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_kri_report_msnasyrianrefugeesincamps_september2014.pdf.

[139] WFP. 2014e. *Internal Audit of WFP Operations in Syria and Neighbouring Countries, Internal Audit Report AR/14/22*. Rome: WFP, Office of the Inspector General.

84. WFP beneficiaries in Jordan and Lebanon also spoke of "cashing in" their WFP paper vouchers as common, though beneficiaries in all e-voucher countries indicated that the level of conversion appeared to have declined markedly once the harder-to-trace paper vouchers were replaced by e-cards. WFP monitors the conversion of vouchers, though such figures are not transparently reported on most M&E reports. WFP Lebanon, which publishes figures on conversion of vouchers into cash, reports widely fluctuating figures: 4% in its January-March 2013 report, "less" in its September 2013-January 2014 report, 17% in its January-March 2014 report, and 7% in its April-June 2014 report. Such variations suggest anomalies in WFP's sampling approach and beneficiaries' unwillingness to admit to breaking WFP's rules (which disallow the conversion of vouchers to cash). More creative means will be needed to monitor the encashment of vouchers.

85. Discussions with WFP staff, partners and beneficiaries in Jordan and Lebanon, in particular, suggest that a significant proportion of vouchers may ultimately be converted into cash.[140] Estimates of conversion were generally perceived to be higher in Jordan, where WFP limits the number of food items refugees can purchase with vouchers. In Lebanon, no such restrictions apply, which appears to increase beneficiary satisfaction and reduce conversion rates.

86. Given that the conversion of vouchers to cash generally comes at a financial cost – 7-25% of the value of a voucher according to WFP beneficiaries and shopkeepers in Jordan and Lebanon[141] – this presents a threat to the efficiency and cost effectiveness of WFP's regional EMOP. Steps to discourage the cashing of vouchers, without requiring extensive extra spending on monitoring, may merit consideration. These include switching to e-vouchers more quickly, where feasible, in future crises or allowing beneficiaries greater choice among the food items they are permitted to purchase with their vouchers. Encashment of WFP assistance suggests that WFP should have piloted cash transfers earlier.

87. **FINDING 19: Market Dynamics and Cost Control.** As noted earlier in section 2, WFP adopted a market-based voucher model rooted in its awareness that markets in affected areas (outside of Syria) were functioning normally. This approach was logical and represented the increasingly recognised good practice of working with rather than circumventing markets in humanitarian action. However, market-based assistance in middle-income settings also can pose challenges given the higher market prices found in MICs relative to low-income settings, and given that beneficiaries from MICs commonly have dietary preferences which are more costly (relative to many LIC beneficiaries). That is, the same quantity of voucher value is likely to buy less (e.g., due to higher food costs and different food preferences) in a MIC than a LIC. This results in more costly programmes and affects the financial sustainability of WFP's assistance.

88. Further, vouchers periodically resulted in higher prices for beneficiaries compared to normal markets prices, owing to rents paid by stores (in Turkey) and a lack of competition among WFP partner shops in some locations within regional EMOP countries. In Lebanon, WFP's economic impact study found that beneficiaries face 6.3% higher prices in contracted stores, which WFP has classified as 'non-competitive'[142]. Comparable data was not available in all countries where WFP was

---

[140] Based on what refugees and WFP staff told the evaluators, but it cannot be quantified from this evidence. WFP's cooperating partners monitored shops to identify conversion in different ways across the Regional EMOP countries. However, this was often more preventive than diagnostic since conversion was unlikely to go ahead when monitors were present (except in the case of 'undercover' or 'submarine' monitors used in Lebanon).

[141] The cash value of a voucher generally depends on a range of factors, including a particular refugee's ability to negotiate. In many cases, the cash value of vouchers began to increase over time in Regional EMOP countries, particularly in places where refugees had multiple choices among shopkeepers offering different rates.

[142] As defined as those with a concentration ratio of the top three stores in a given area capture over 50% of the e-card sales. See Bauer, J-M., Sandström, S. & Audi, H. 2014. *Economic Impact Study: Direct and Indirect Effects of the WFP Value-Based Food Voucher Programme in Lebanon*. Rome, WFP.

implementing voucher programmes. However, WFP Turkey encountered a similar issue and encouraged opening of extra shops and where possible allowed access to off camp shops in an effort to increase competition and drive down food prices. In Jordan, however, a WFP study did not find any significant difference in prices between WFP partner shops and non-partner shops outside of camps; that said, in the Al Za'atari refugee camp, shops operated by private firms were able to offer prices, which were lower than shops established by local community-based organizations at WFP's request.[143]

89.   **FINDING 20: Gender and Protection.** Gender issues are relevant to varying extents to each of the sub-sections of this evaluation, but analysing them in one place allows the key points to be presented in a more cohesive and accessible manner. WFP's institutional commitment to gender is outlined in its gender policies. Since 1996, WFP has had three such policies: the 1996-2001 "Commitments to Women" policy; the 2003-2007 "Enhanced Commitments to Women" policy; and the 2009-2013 gender policy. These policies defined strategies to improve women's control over food-related decision-making. They focused on targeted actions for women, gender mainstreaming in programming activities, and gender equality in staffing in addition to integrating a gender perspective into WFP's analysis and modalities. A global evaluation of WFP's 2009-2013 gender policy revealed that the policy lacked a result-based framework, a common analytical foundation, or clear accountability structures. Those global findings also characterise what this evaluation found in the sub-region.

90.   WFP staff demonstrated an understanding of gender and protection issues in all of the fieldwork locations, and it was clear that – in refugee-hosting countries – programme personnel viewed the voucher modality as expanding women's access to assistance. WFP senior staff at both regional and country levels demonstrated a keen awareness of protection challenges facing women and girls. However, no specific gender or protection analysis was conducted by WFP to determine whether there were gender-specific dimensions of food assistance within either the Syria or regional EMOP countries, even though later analyses and assessments have included gender disaggregated data related to outputs and some outcomes. However, in Jordan the IASC Gender Marker tool, was applied across multiple agencies.

91.   Data was not collected to test the presumption – expressed by WFP staff in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt – that vouchers were preferred by women and allowed women greater control over humanitarian aid than cash transfers or in-kind food. Gender was by default still understood as 'women's needs' rather than as a tool to analyse the different needs of men, women, boys, and girls in a given context, and considerations were sometimes made based on stereo-typical gender assumptions rather than sound analysis. For instance, WFP staff and partners in several countries expressed the un-tested assumption that Syrian refugee men would be less likely than women to use WFP assistance in order to benefit their entire families.

92.   In addition, gender analysis was poorly or not integrated in programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and risk analysis. While gender-disaggregated data was collected, there was little analysis of the data and gender-related trends, and the evaluation did not find evidence that it had been used to adapt programming. This is somewhat problematic given that data consolidated by the team from WFP's own reporting shows some challenges (Table 7). In 2013 WFP had no female food monitors in Egypt and only one in Iraq; figures for 2014 have yet to be published. Women also tended to be far less represented on food management committees in all regional EMOP countries (e.g., 56 trained male members in Iraq vs

[143] Husain, A., Bauer, J-Ma. & Sandström, S. 2014. *WFP Economic Impact Study: Direct and Indirect Impact of the WFP Food Voucher Programme in Jordan*. Rome, WFP, 2014.

5 female members) (see Annex 6 for country-by-country figures). Food voucher cards also tend to be primarily issued to male members of households rather to women, though the evaluation did not examine whether this was something WFP could have influenced. However, it is clear that WFP should undertake further analysis to understand its impact on gender dynamics among women and men and girls and boys.

Table 7: WFP Food Monitors, by Country, 2012-2013

	2012			2013		
	Male	*Female*	*% Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*% Female*
Syria	6	7	54%	4	7	64%
Jordan	6	2	25%	6	6	50%
Lebanon	8	4	33%	10	9	47%
Turkey	n/a	n/a	-	3	4	57%
Iraq	3	0	0%	4	1	20%
Egypt	n/a	n/a	-	3	0	0%
Total	**23**	**15**	**39%**	**29**	**29**	**50%**

Source: WFP Standard Project Reports, 2012 and 2013. Note: In Jordan monitors work in mixed-sex pairs, which helps to keep the balance among males and females.

3. Conclusion and Recommendations

93. This section integrates the findings noted throughout section 2 and presents an overarching assessment of the EMOPs being evaluated. It then turns to a range of recommendations for WFP to consider as it moves forward with its sub-regional programming and as it responds to crises elsewhere in the world now and in the future.

3.1. Overall Assessment

94. WFP has, across the two EMOPs, delivered a large-scale humanitarian response to a major emergency. The operation was scaled-up quickly, and the voucher approach in the regional EMOP reflected the functioning markets and banking systems in the host countries. The costs of these interventions reflect the higher costs necessary to approximate normal family eating practices – and the higher cost of living generally – in MICs. Within Syria, WFP responded rapidly and on a large scale with food assistance delivered by local partners in a highly politicised conflict environment. WFP established good practices for logistics that will serve it well as the programme will remain vital for millions of Syrians, for the foreseeable future.

95. The regional EMOP scaled-up e-voucher programming to new levels for a humanitarian operation, expanding WFP's collaboration with the private sector. WFP's partnership with small and medium-sized shops in Lebanon, represented a useful adjustment to a well-established voucher modality. WFP is considering adding innovations to its e-vouchers: incorporating iris-scanning technology to reduce misuse, automating fraud detection, and establishing remote electronic monitoring of beneficiary purchases. WFP will rarely have a better opportunity to refine these systems and should invest in turning them into reality. The same applies to the OneCard platform, which would allow other aid agencies to provide cash and voucher assistance via already-distributed WFP cards.

96. However, analysis underlying WFP's response was light, particularly for the regional EMOP. While understandable initially for a crisis context, WFP did not later follow through on analysis needed to address questions such as: (i) were high FCS scores attributable to WFP assistance or contextual factors such as the availability of informal livelihoods; (ii) how did the levels of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness compare among various modalities; and (iii) how did food security compare among WFP-assisted and un-assisted refugees in Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq? While political considerations often limited action, WFP's corporate focus on evidence and data did

not lead to well-staffed VAM and M&E units (often one individual per country) and staff remained focused on gathering data rather than analysing it to inform programming.

97.   The protracted nature of the crisis requires WFP to pay greater attention to strategic issues including: (i) management of the reputational costs of working closely with the Syrian government; (ii) ensuring that vulnerable refugees living outside camps in Turkey and Iraq/KRG are assisted; (iii) how to target assistance for a Syrian refugee population which, on the whole, has food security levels well above the threshold normally seen in humanitarian emergencies; and (iv) the need for a transition plan/process to enable sustained assistance targeted to the most vulnerable Syrians.

98.   As WFP assistance continues, the development of medium-term transition strategies and expansion of vulnerability-based targeting – particularly in the refugee-hosting countries – will become a major priority. Reducing the value of refugee food vouchers and food rations in Syria, as envisaged in October 2014 and enacted in January 2015, is not the most appropriate strategy when resource breaks are foreseeable and beneficiaries have varied levels of vulnerability.

99.   As the refugee crisis continues, donor resource will decline and the conditions among refugees are expected to deteriorate. Given that WFP is involved in livelihoods in many contexts, and given the growing importance of livelihood assistance for refugees as well as vulnerable members of host communities, WFP should become more engaged in advocacy with UN humanitarian and development agencies and others on this issue if it wishes to help maintain food security among Syrian refugees in a durable manner.

3.2. Recommendations

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility & timing
1	Transition (*overarching recommendation*)	Findings 4, 8 and 9. Resource constraints and the protracted nature of the crisis mean that a more sustainable approach is needed.	1a) Prepare country-specific transition strategies and consider significant scaling down of assistance using a systematic vulnerability-based targeting process. Changes should be introduced through a new EMOP or protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) rather than further budget revisions. Where authorities have financial and delivery capacity, as in Turkey, prepare for handover of responsibility for food assistance, with WFP providing technical assistance to the authorities.	Country offices and REC with Policy, Programme and Innovation Division (OSZ) support– within six months
			1b) In future crises, ensure early development and introduction of short-term contingency plans based on vulnerability analysis. These plans should be regularly updated and communicated to partners and beneficiaries to manage oscillations in donor funding.	Operations Services Department (OS)
			1c) Develop scenario-based, long-term transition plans that cover the spectrum from maintaining/expanding the response to a country-by-country exit strategy.	OS
2	Evidence-based programming	Findings 1 and 20. Appropriate analysis to underpin programme design and implementation is needed.	2) Undertake further analysis on cash and vouchers, gender, host community relations and conflict dynamics to inform country-specific programme strategies and decision making.	REC with OSZ support – within six months: immediate
3	Humanitarian access and principles	Finding 3 It is important to assess and manage competing pressures and perceptions.	3a) Monitor application of the humanitarian principles in Syria; develop and monitor implementation of a strategy for managing perceptions of WFP's relationship with the Syrian Government and its assistance in opposition-held areas.	Office of the Executive Director (OED), REC

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility & timing
				and Syria country office – immediate
			3b) In future crises where a strategic task force is required, articulate, monitor and record strategies for balancing competing pressures on WFP and managing perceptions about WFP's role.	OED
4	Support to programmes and operations	Findings 6 and 7. There seems to be a disconnect between REC support and needs of country offices/sub-offices; access to corporate guidance and expertise for emergency field staff is inadequate.	4a) At the country and sub-office levels, increase attention to: i) lesson-learning and information-sharing opportunities; ii) capturing lessons from innovation; and iii) early consideration of country office-specific transition and exit strategies.	REC with regional bureaux and OSZ support – immediate
			4.b) Develop a flexible system for linking WFP operations staff to corporate guidance, expertise and documents, such as through better use of WFP's intranet, connecting staff facing similar programme challenges around the world, and maintaining a help desk.	Executive Management Group (EMG): OS; Resource Management Department (RM); Partnership, Governance and Advocacy Department (PG)
			4c) Make greater use of anonymous surveys and other tools for eliciting staff views and ideas on support and other issues that may not be communicated to line managers.	EMG: OS; RM; PG; Human Resources Department (HRM)

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility & timing
5	Human resources	Finding 5. Adequate types and numbers of staff are not consistently available in the L3 structure, including in critical areas.	5a) Conduct an internal review to ascertain why the REC offices for this crisis lacked staff with skills and experienced in conflict analysis and negotiations, cash and vouchers, working with the private sector, M&E and vulnerability analysis. 5b) Develop a responsive staffing model alongside the emergency roster to ensure that technical experts are deployed to support emergency operations for a minimum period, such as three or six months.	HRM with support from OSZ and the Emergency Preparedness Division (OME) OS, RM, HRM
6	Targeting	Findings 8, 9 and 11. The breadth of assistance is neither appropriate nor sustainable given the diverse vulnerability levels and resource constraints.	6a) As an immediate step towards transition, gather and consolidate food security data on affected populations to inform vulnerability-based targeting of WFP food assistance. 6b) In future EMOPs, systematically prepare for timely food security-based targeting by gathering household-level vulnerability information, including pre-assistance baselines, as early as possible and shift promptly from category or status targeting.	REC, country offices With OSZ support: immediate OSZ
7	Measuring results	Findings 7 and 10. There is a need to assess vulnerability levels of those not assisted to improve measurement of results attributable to WFP assistance, and use these data for advocacy and programme adjustment.	7a) Use existing data or conduct needs assessments among populations currently excluded from programmes, particularly non-camp refugees in Iraq and Turkey, and refugees deemed ineligible for assistance in Lebanon. 7b) Support governments in assessing conditions among host communities, but avoid raising expectations of WFP assistance.	REC with OSZ support

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility & timing
8	Modality selection	Findings 13, 14, 17 and 18. Analysis of alternative modalities is insufficient.	8.a) Ensure that WFP systems are able to report transparently, routinely and consistently on costs per beneficiary by delivery modality for use in modality selection, project approval and review. 8b) Ensure that all delivery modalities, including cash, are considered in future responses, based on a rigorous assessment of their appropriateness, to ensure that modality selection is based on context-specific and clearly recorded technical evidence.	EMG OSZ
9	Evidence and accountability	Findings 9, 10, 12, 17 and 18. There is limited impact on programming of evidence and data from VAM and M&E; lack of food security data for targeting.	9) Assign extra medium- to long-term staff for M&E and VAM – particularly in country offices – for systematic monitoring and measurement of results and outcomes, and to analyse information and feed it into programme management and operational decisions.	REC with OSZ and support from the Resource Management and Accountability Department (RM)
10	Operational efficiency	Findings 18 and 19. Food vouchers are being encashed; WFP-contracted shops are charging above-market rates.	10) Assess the reasons for voucher encashment and differing prices among WFP partner shops; improve monitoring of encashment and minimize efficiency losses; and strike the appropriate balance between accountability and the number of shops contracted for voucher programming.	REC with OSZ and RM support

Annexes

Annex 1: Summary Terms of Reference

Evaluation of WFP's Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis

100. Civil unrest in Syria began in March 2011 and marked the advent of a refugee crisis which continues to gain momentum. By mid-May 2014, UNHCR identified 2.81 million 'Persons of Concern', including 2.73 million Syrian refugees registered in neighbouring countries. The main receiving countries are Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, and to a lesser extent, Egypt and Iraq. The operational environment is challenging and fast-changing. This is a complex regional crisis that combines massive refugee and internal displacements, complicated by competing and divided international, regional and national interests, and faced with challenges of dual mandates for coordination between UN agencies.

Subject and Focus of the Evaluation

101. The geographical area under review is wider than a single-country entity, as the organisational structure of the WFP response to the Syrian Crisis, termed the Regional Emergency Coordination (REC), operates out of Amman (Jordan), encompassing emergency operations targeting populations affected by the conflict in Syria and in the neighbouring countries (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey).

102. The Level-3 activations and implementation of WFP's Emergency Response Activation Protocol and related new corporate mechanisms and tools - such as: (a) the Preparedness and Response Enhancement Programme; (b) the Emergency Preparedness Response Package, and; (c) WFP's first corporate set-up of a parallel management structure to support the emergency coordination efforts (the REC), separate and independent of the Cairo Regional Bureau (OMC), provide an opportunity for organisational learning.

103. The scale of humanitarian needs also makes the WFP emergency response an opportunity for large-scale implementation of WFP innovative programming approaches, in terms of: (a) Context: urban, middle-income countries, camp and non-camp refugee populations; (b) Modalities: cash & voucher, use of technologies such as bio-metrics, electronic vouchers and one-card systems, and of; (c) Organisational learning opportunity given the shift of organisational architecture, risk-management by WFP, and testing of guidelines and systems in place.

104. The focus of this evaluation will be the WFP regional response to the Syrian crisis as embodied by its two emergency operations (the Syria specific EMOP 200339 and the regional EMOP 200433).

Objectives and Users of the Evaluation

105. Geared towards constructive learning and accountability, the evaluation will seek to: (a) provide a snapshot of results; (b) identify strengths & areas of weaknesses; (c) feed into the 2015 REC programming process, and: (d) recommend areas of focus for further evaluative work both by the REC management and organization.

106. Primary users of the evaluation will include the REC organisational structure in Amman, WFP Operations Management Department and HQ Senior Management, the country-based emergency response teams, and the OMC Regional Bureau. Other stakeholders with a possible interest in the evaluation's findings include the affected

populations, national governments and humanitarian actors engaged in the response, the Executive Board, as well as Inter-Agency Principals and Directors.

Key Evaluation Questions

107. A scoping mission undertaken to assess challenges established four Areas of Focus (AoF) and eleven key questions in coordination with the REC management (to be further refined at inception, as necessary, given the fluid context):

AoF 1: Strategic Direction & Positioning

the extent to which:

i) WFP response's objectives and activities have been in line with: identified humanitarian needs, priorities and capacities; and programme design based on good quality contextual analysis;
ii) food assistance has been coordinated (including humanitarian access) with relevant partners, enabling complementarity of interventions at policy and operations levels;
iii) there have been trade-offs between aligning with wider-system and/or national priorities on the one hand, with WFP's mandate, policies and Humanitarian Principles, on the other.

AoF 2: WFP Organisational Effectiveness

the extent to which the REC architecture and institutional arrangements of the WFP L3 response have contributed to:

i) corporate guidance being effectively applied in the emergency responses (within WFP and in coordination with the wider humanitarian system);
ii) innovation, adaptation and learning for WFP [and beyond] to improve guidelines and/or systems, and; innovative programme implementation at scale;
iii) potential for sustainability and replication.

AoF 3: Programme Strategy Issues

the extent to which:

i) trade-offs of programmatic choices have been analysed, monitored and assessed;
ii) a transition strategy has been developed and integrated in implementation.

AoF 4: Operational Performance & Results

an assessment of:

i) WFP's interventions' main results achieved for people affected by the conflict, by sub-group;
ii) WFP assistance has been delivered in a timely, efficient manner successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps;
iii) Contextual factors that help explain results.

Methodology

108. To mitigate limitations, flexibility is weaved into the evaluation process: (a) maximising use of available evidence as it becomes available (two-step desk review); (b) sustained coordination and information sharing to lighten the evaluation's footprint (e.g.: joining the OME Lessons Learned Exercise); (d) consider use of a remote approach (brief on-line questionnaire to WFP staff and/or external

stakeholders); (e) tailor-made products (more concise reports; formative workshop to inform the REC's 2015 budget revisions and provide pointers for the longer-term REC strategic planning process); (f) lighter impact assessment given operations are on-going.

109. The evaluation will use international criteria for assessing humanitarian action, and give attention to gender, protection and accountability to affected populations. Using secondary qualitative and quantitative data complemented with primary data as feasible, a remote approach in some countries, such as Syria, will be considered. The methodology will demonstrate impartiality by relying on a cross-section of information sources and using a mixed methodological approach to ensure triangulation of information.

Roles and Responsibilities

110. Evaluation Team: an independent team from ODI has been contracted to conduct the evaluation in partnership with the Amman-based The Excel Consulting Associates, under the leadership of Jim Drummond (team leader).

111. OEV Evaluation Manager: Elise Benoit is responsible for the design, follow-up and quality assurance following WFP OEV's evaluation quality assurance system.

112. Stakeholders: WFP stakeholders at CO, REC, RB and HQ levels are expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation. WFP REC & CO stakeholders will facilitate the evaluation team's contacts and field-trips.

Communications

113. Two advisory panels will be established for the evaluation in order to ensure appropriate technical and strategic input, review and follow-up: (a) an internal reference group with key representatives from relevant technical units of WFP HQ and REC team; (b) an internal advisory group with executive managers of relevant divisions and offices of L3 response.

Interactive briefs will be organised throughout the evaluation process:

- exit brief at the end of the inception mission with the key stakeholders in Amman [August]
- exit briefs at the end of the field evaluation mission in the countries visited and in Amman [September]
- formative workshop on preliminary conclusions and potential areas of recommendations [October]

Timing and Key Milestones

114. Inception: August 2014

Fieldwork: September 2014
Report:

- Draft – January 2015
- Final – March 2015
- Summary evaluation report to be presented to the Executive Board of June 2015 (EB.A/2015).

Full Terms of Reference are available at http://www.wfp.org/evaluation as are all Evaluation Reports and Management Responses.

Annex 2: Further Information on Methodology (from Inception Report)

115. The methodology presented in this section builds on the preliminary methodology guide included in the TOR (and presented in the proposal) and incorporates the evaluation team's understanding and insights gained from the induction and inception visits recently concluded at WFP headquarters and in the sub-region. The evaluation will focus both on accountability and learning, with a particular emphasis on the latter.

116. The evaluation methodology will, by necessity, be based on qualitative data collection and analysis, in the form of interviews and focus group discussions, which will be complemented with analysis of available systematic data whenever possible. The evaluation team will aim at reflecting good practices for evaluating emergency food assistance projects, including WFPs own evaluation guidance, in addition to materials from ALNAP and the OECD.[144]

Methodological Approach

117. The methods will combine a participatory approach with the deductive/inductive approach. The participatory approach depends on obtaining information from internal and external stakeholders, including programme staff and the range of partners involved in the coordination and implementation of the programme. It also depends on obtaining the views of those most directly affected by a programme – beneficiaries. Such an approach will contribute towards the evaluation's learning objective. The deductive/inductive approach is well suited for evaluating performance and results and incorporates contextual elements (which vary widely among countries being considered in the course of this evaluation). It relies on interviews with key informants and beneficiaries as well as structured observations to build upon and complement the structured data and document review. This approach will develop links between the intervention activities – including the subsidiary processes – and the results achieved.

118. The evaluation will rely on extensive secondary qualitative and quantitative data complemented with primary qualitative data collection through conducting semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) with key internal and external stakeholders at multiple levels. These will take place in person in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey and will generally be remotely in the case of Egypt, Iraq and Syria.

119. Internationally agreed upon evaluation criteria will be employed by the evaluation team. These include:

- Relevance: This refers to the extent to which a project is in line with local needs, priorities and capacities. Does the assistance or project correspond to locally perceived needs and priorities or to the outcomes of a systematic problem analysis?
- Coherence: This refers to the degree of complementarity between one activity/project and other related humanitarian, developmental and other interventions.
- Coverage: To what extent has the WFP's work reached all those affected by a particular crisis both within particular countries and across the sub-region? Likewise, given the sub-regional coverage, how has consistency – in terms of

---

[144]ALNAP. 2013. *Evaluation of Humanitarian Action: An ALNAP Guide*. London, ALNAP; and OECD. 1999. *Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies*. Paris, OECD. See also Hallam, A. 1998 Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in *Complex Emergencies in Relief and Rehabilitation Network*, Good Practice Review No. 7.

approach and assistance levels – been factored into WFP's programming despite differing conditions in each country where WFP is operating?

- Connectedness: This element will examine the opportunities which may exist, despite constraints given the protracted nature of the situation, for linking emergency programming with longer-term recovery and development priorities and with national plans and development strategies in the affected countries, given the protracted nature of the crisis.

- Efficiency: What outputs and outcomes have been achieved, in quantitative and qualitative terms, relatively to the inputs? To what extent could more be achieved with less, including by increasingly relying on more effective interventions (below)?

- Effectiveness: Looking at available output data, to what extent has the project or intervention achieved its intended goals and objectives? To what extent has effectiveness differed according to different activities and categories of beneficiaries (e.g., by gender, in and out of camps, etc.) and across the various countries included in the evaluation?

120. Due to the broad scope of this evaluation, the evaluation team will, within the framework of the evaluation TORs, pay particular attention to the following issues which have been identified at the inception phase to be particularly pertinent for learning and future programming: (i) unique challenges posed by operating in Syria (e.g., related to access, accountability, principles, etc.); (ii) innovation, especially as it surrounds the broad-based and technologically-advanced application of voucher modalities; (iii) the impact of the L3 declaration (as well as the broader Transformative Agenda) and the related establishment of the institutionally-unique REC structure; and (iv) the trade-offs involved in shorter- versus longer-term responses, whether in the form of programme types (e.g., EMOP vs PRRO), institutional arrangements(L3) or broader approaches related, for instance, to resilience. Section5 of this report also takes up these issues, which will be, based on WFP input, be prioritised within the scope of the evaluations TORs.

121. In addition, the team will emphasise protection issues, including gender and the needs of particularly vulnerable groups. Furthermore, attention will be given to coordination and communication, both internally within WFP and also with external stakeholders, including humanitarian partners, cooperating partners, and host governments.

122. The evaluation approach described above ensures as much as possible that the evaluation is sufficiently broad to capture relevant issues while not as wide-ranging as to prevent the process from attaining a sufficient level of depth and detail.

Data Collection Methods

123. In accordance with the methodological approach described above as well as the evaluation matrix, the evaluation team will rely on a thorough review of documents relevant to this evaluation. In addition, the team will set out to collect primary (and largely qualitative) information through field work involving interviews with key internal and external stakeholders as well focus group discussions with beneficiaries; structured observation will also be used where feasible.

Method	Description	Target Groups
Documentation review	The documentation review will include a wide range of internal and public materials, including those specifically related to WFP's regional and Syria programmes. Such documents are currently being provided to the team, and more will be identified during the field work.	WFP reports, including those identified during the OEV scoping visit[145] WFP data Research documents Others
Elite interviews	Elite interviews will be relatively unstructured but still revolve around a set of pre-determined questions. Given the elite nature of these interviews (senior leaders in and out of WFP), they will be particularly tailored to the perspective and role of each individual in question.	Senior WFP personnel Other senior UN and non-UN humanitarian officials Key government officials Others, as appropriate
Stakeholder interviews	Stakeholder interviews will range from structured (with cooperating partners and representatives of other UN/international agencies) to relatively semi-structured (with donor and host government representatives) and will adhere to the evaluation's overarching criteria and questions. The relatively structured nature of these protocols will enable cross-country comparisons (while still reflecting the uniqueness of the WFP's activities in each country).	WFP programme personnel at HQ, REC and country levels WFP cooperating partners and peer institutions Host nation government officials Host community representatives Donor representatives Others, as appropriate
Beneficiary and host community interviews	Those benefiting from WFP's activities will be interviewed (as well as involved in focus group discussions (FGDs). These interviews will focus on several elements of the evaluation, including but not limited to relevance, coverage, effectiveness and accountability issues.	WFP beneficiaries, including men and women, children and individuals with a variety of backgrounds (age, education, etc.)
Focus group discussions	FGDs will be conducted with beneficiaries and, later in the process, potentially with WFP personnel and representatives of cooperating partner agencies. All FGDs will be relatively un-structured and will last between one and two hours and will include between six and 12 participants. We expect to reach at least 120beneficiaries in Lebanon, 110 in Jordan and 90 in Turkey, through 32 anticipated FGDs, and if feasible, at least 1from vulnerable members of host communities in	WFP beneficiaries (new comers / older arrivals), (males / females) WFP staff Host communities

---

[145] These include the IAHE Syria CALL CCA, other OEV evaluations and products, the FAO/WFP Strategic Evaluation of the Global Food Security Cluster Aide Memoires on Turkey and Lebanon, the case-study/annex on the cash and voucher programming in Jordan and/or Lebanon, the impact study of the cash and voucher programme in Jordan and Lebanon on the local economy, programme assessment reviews and WFP lessons learning exercises/papers and internal audits.

Method	Description	Target Groups
	each field-word country through focus groups.	
Online Questionnaire	The evaluation will aim to utilize a short easy-to-use online questionnaire to obtain information from those not accessible during field work due to difficult context as well as budgetary and timing constraints. Moreover, online questionnaires will also be used to obtain information from ex WFP staff and from those who will be on leave (or break in service) during the field work. We expect to invite approximately 100 people to participate in the online survey.	Stakeholders in Syria, Egypt and Iraq Ex WFP staff Current WFP staff on breaks in service or who could not be seen during the field visits

124. The methods and their composition have been selected to enable the collection of primary and secondary data that has sufficient depth and breadth. The methods will also interlink, allowing the evaluation team to triangulate information. In addition to the data collection methods outlined above, the evaluation team will continuously undertake structured observations in field visits and meetings to complement collected information. All primary data collection tools will take into consideration gender and protection issues and ethics of evaluation and research; this will be particularly important when dealing with WFP beneficiaries and other vulnerable groups. Any beneficiary inputs will be voluntary, and any encounter (e.g., interview, FGD) will cease if the respondent does not appear comfortable or exhibits signs of anxiety or distress. All discussions with host community representatives will be equally sensitively handled. In addition, all input will be gathered on informed consent, and all those providing information for this evaluation – whether beneficiaries or others – will be informed how that information will be used and how their participation will be reflected (e.g., how their anonymity will be ensured). Inputs into an evaluation such as this are recorded only for the evaluation team's use but are not disclosed to others verbally or in evaluation reports. This level of anonymity applies not only to interviews and FGDs but also to online questionnaires.

125. The data collection process will span two main phases, the documentation review and the primary data collection field work. The comprehensive desk review will include all relevant documents and data available, which will be examined in terms of stakeholder engagement, results, and policies, systems and procedures. The documentation review will enhance the knowledge of the evaluation team on WFP internal environment and systems, as well as the programme components, and will inform field work. The documentation review is not considered a one-time event, but is rather continuous throughout the course of this assignment as several pertinent documents (including other related evaluations and assessments) will become available in the coming weeks, and important operational documents have been only just recently collected at the inception phase.

126. The second phase is the field research, in which primary qualitative information will be collected through interviews, FGDs and an online questionnaire. Interviews form a more important source than is normally the case with evaluations of development assistance due to problems of poor record keeping and documentation, typical of emergency responses. Interviews will be semi-structured and will be geared towards the targeted stakeholder, taking into account gender and other protection

issues. Interviewers will respect interviewees' right to provide information in confidence and ensure that sensitive data cannot be traced to its source. FGDs will provide deep understanding and insights into beneficiaries' perceptions and experiences, and is the most effective way to obtain views of a homogeneous and somewhat heterogeneous groups, thereby adding vigour to evaluation results and findings. The focus groups discussion guide will include a series of open ended questions which allows for flexibility and discussion. It will also provide a first-hand account of results, both positive and negative, intended and unintended, of the operation. FGDs will be particularly important in shedding light on changes in the operation processes over time, from the beneficiaries' perspective, and will be used to verify (or triangulate) information obtained through other sources.

Remote data collection methods

As noted above, the team anticipates collecting data remotely in countries such as Syria, Egypt and Iraq where the team will not be undertaking field work. In addition, due to time constraints and the wide range of stakeholders involved – and practical elements such as staff travel or leave – there will ultimately be some WFP personnel and partner personnel who the team is unable to speak with in person. Hence, remote methods will be employed. These will include phone interviews with stakeholders as well as a general online questionnaire. The questionnaire is not a survey and will primarily involve open-ended and general questions primarily related to the four Areas of Focus and broad issues such as achievements, good practices, lessons learnt, multi-stakeholder coordination and so on. The goal is for the questionnaire to allow stakeholders to share perspectives and examples. While those responding to the questionnaire will be required to insert their name, e-mail address, title and so on, respondents will be guaranteed anonymity (in the report) to allow them to provide inputs openly (as with in-person interviewees).

---

127. In order to carry out the data collection, the evaluation team will utilise a purposive sampling approach. This will not only apply to humanitarian and government respondents, but also to the beneficiaries who are interviewed in the FGDs. Purposive sampling of non-beneficiary stakeholders will include all those who have a stake in the emergency operation including humanitarian and development partnerships, cooperating INGO and local NGO/CBO partners, host governments, commercial partners, and internal WFP staff and personnel (across the different countries).For the FGDs, purposive sampling will consider factors such as geographical concentration of refugees, differing food security scenarios, reported tensions between refugees and host communities, and other criteria (e.g., assistance modalities, partners operating in differing areas, non-food-security-related variations in vulnerability).

128. This FGDs will allow the team to consider camp and non-camp refuges and other contextual variations in other countries. Within each country the FGDs will generally fall into approximately three categories: FGDs with female beneficiaries, FGDs with long-standing refugees (mixed gender) and FGDs with newer arrivals (mixed gender). All-male FGDs may also be arranged, and specialised FGDs covering particular vulnerable sub-populations may also be proposed if the need for these emerges from the evaluation. FGDs with host communities will also be arranged.

1. The evaluation team is currently utilising – and will continue to use – a robust information management system of field work results in the form of an online data entry system. Team members will be inputting the main points/results of interviews and FGDs in an online form and categorise such results according to thematic areas and the evaluation's four main Areas of Focus.

Annex 3: Selected Stakeholders Consulted

129. The following stakeholders were consulted in the course of this evaluation. This list excludes the names of beneficiaries, shopkeepers, members of host communities and other individuals who were not comfortable being listed in this report. In addition, respondents to the questionnaire – who were most commonly based in Syria – are also excluded from this list given that the questionnaire was conducted on the basis of anonymity (though respondents did share their names and affiliations with the evaluation team). The authors regret any misspellings of names or minor inaccuracies in stakeholders' titles.

Rome

Adrian Van Der Knaap, Chief, OSLT, WFP

Amir Abdulla, Deputy Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer, WFP

Annalisa Conte, Chief, Programme Innovation Service, OSZI, WFP

Arif Husain, Chief Economist and Deputy Director Policy, Programme and Innovation Division OSZA, WFP

Chris Kaye, Director, Performance Management and Monitoring Division, RMP, WFP

Corinne Fleischer, Director of Procurement Division, OSP, WFP

David Kaatrud, Director of Emergencies, OME, WFP

Dominique Burgeon, Director Emergency and Rehabilitation Division, FAO

Edgardo Yu, Chief, OSTB Information Technology Division, WFP

Elise Benoit, Evaluation Manager, Office of Evaluation, WFP

Federica Zelada, Office of Evaluation, WFP

Finbarr Curran, Director, Budget & Programming Division, RMB, WFP

Francis Nixon, Consultant, OME, WFP

Gaby Duffy, Emergency Preparedness and Response Officer, OME, WFP

Helen Wedgwood, Director of Evaluation, Office of Evaluation, WFP

Issa Sanogo, Programme Adviser/Market Specialist, Analysis and Nutrition Service OSZA, WFP

Jamie Watts, Evaluation Manager OEV, WFP

Jean Martin Bauer, Programme Officer OSZA, WFP

Julia Steets, Team Leader PREP Evaluation (Consultant)

Kennedy Owor, IT Officer, WFP

Kwame Poku, Consultant, OME, WFP

Manoj Juneja, Chief Financial Officer and Assistant Executive Director for Resource Management and Accountability, WFP

Patricia Colbert, Senior Gender Advisor, WFP (Rome)

Paul Howe, Chief Humanitarian Crises & Transitions Unit OSZPH, WFP

Ramiro Armando De Oliveira Lopes Da Silva, Assistant Executive Director, WFP

Stanlake Samkange, Director, OSZ, WFP

Tahir Nour, Chief, Cash for Change OSZIC, WFP

Syria

Adeyinka Badejo, Deputy Country Director, WFP

Adham Musallam, Head, Cross Border Team Gaziantep, WFP

Eriko Hibi, Representative, FAO

Faria Chaudhuri, Reports Officer, Cross Border Coordination Team, WFP

Hamida Lasseko, Deputy Representative, UNICEF

Helene Jreich, WFP Syria and Turkey

Isabel Rauscher, Austrian Ambassador to Syria (former)

Janthomas Hiemstra, Country Director, UNDP

Martha Myers, Country Director, Syria Response, Save the Children International

Marwan Al Anssary, Business/System Analyst, WFP

Matthew Dee, Senior Regional Logistics Officer - Syria Crisis, WFP (Syria and REC)

Matthew Hollingsworth, Emergency Coordinator, WFP

Moayad Hemidi, Programme Officer, WFP

Pete Mohan, DART Food Officer, USAID (responsible for Syria)

Rosaria Bruno, Head of Coordination Unit, OCHA

Tarik Kurdi, Representative, UNHCR

Vicki Aken, GOAL Country Director, Turkey (Cross-Border Operations into Syria)

Yacoub El Hillo, Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator

Jordan, including REC

Abdul Hadi Maharmeh, Member of Parliament and President of the Jordan Front Action Party

Ahmad Hiyari, Data Analyst , REC, WFP

Ahmad Zeno, Project Manager, Jordan Ahli Bank

Alaa Al Shanti, Project Manager, Islamic Relief

Ambassador Hamad Al Deig, Embassy of Kuwait

Antoine Josserand, REC Security Office, WFP

Aya Hijazi, Field Monitor Assistant - Mafraq

Ayad Naman, Logistics, REC , WFP

Barbara Clemens, Chief of Support Services, REC, WFP

Colonel Abdullah Al Amoush, Zaatari Refugee Camp

Colonel Atef Omoosh, Azraq Refugee Camp

Dorte Jessen, Head of Programme, WFP

Edgar Luce, M&E officer, WFP Jordan

Fausto De Santis, Programme Officer, REC, WFP

Filippo Pompili, Regional M&E Officer, REC, WFP

Frederik Copper, Information Officer, REC, WFP

Geoff Wiffin, Syria Emergency Coordinator, UNICEF

Gerald Bourke, Senior External Relations Office, Active Chief of Information Management (IM) Unit, REC, WFP

Ghazi Juma, REC Security Office, WFP

Haya Abassi, Head of Voucher Unit, WFP

Hazem Al Mahdy, Regional VAM Officer, REC, WFP

Heidi Legene, Livelihood Specialist, UNWomen

Ian Clarke, WFP Emergency Preparedness Adviser, REC, WFP

Jane Lewis, Syria Crisis Coordinator, ECHO

Jonas Herzog, Information Management Unit, REC, WFP

Jonathan Campbell, Emergency Coordinator, WFP

Kayo Takenoshita, Programme Officer (Cash & Vouchers), REC, WFP

Laila Ahadi, Procurement, REC, WFP

Laila Tomeh, Senior Emergency Coordinator, IOM

Laith Abu Hilal , Manager, Safeway

Louise Gentzel, Information Management Unit, REC, WFP

Lucio Melandri, Humanitarian Affairs Specialist, UNICEF

Maha Ahmad, Jordan Country Director, WFP

Merrin Waterhouse, GenCap Advisor, UNHCR

Michelle Sanson, Regional Protection Advisor, REC, WFP

Mohammad Al Daoud, Chief Financial Officer, Sameh Mall

Mohammad Al Jazzi, Vice President, Tazweed

Muhammad Kilani, Jordan Hashemite Charity Organisation

Muhannad Hadi, Regional Emergency Coordinator, REC, WFP

Niveen Batayneh, Project Manager, Save the Children International

Paul Stromberg, Deputy Representative (Protection), UNHCR

Pete Manfield, Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator, OCHA

Philippe-Serge Degernier, Deputy Country Director, WFP

Philbert Imboba, Logitics , REC , WFP

Qasem Almhedat, Governor of Mafraq

Rasmus Egendal, Deputy Regional Emergency Coordinator, REC, WFP

Rebecca Richards, REC Information Management Team, REC, WFP

Rikke Kasse, Market Creation Consultant

Robin Ellis, UNHCR Regional Office

Ryan Beech, Programme Officer, EMOP Jordan, WFP

Sarah Gordon-Gibson, Programme Manager, REC, WFP

Volker Schimmel, Senior Field Coordinator, UNHCR

Vitor Serano, Food Expert, ECHO

Lebanon

Anabel Ayala, Head of Project, Food Security, ACF Tyre

Ashraf ElHourani, Security Officer, WFP Lebanon

Bassel Dabous, Sr. Programme Assistant, Qubayyat, WFP

Benjamin Granby, Field Program Coordinator, PU-AMI Lebanon

Brett Hanley, Programme Officer, WFP Lebanon

Bruno Rotival, Head of Office, Directorate General for Humanitarian and Civilian Protection, EU Delegation

Carole Chedid, Resource Management and Finance Unit, WFP Lebanon

Caroline Nanzer, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, UNRWA Lebanon

Catherine Bellamy, E-Card Programme, WFP Lebanon

Charbel Habib, E-Card Programme, WFP Lebanon

David Baduel, Head of Sub Office, Qubayyat, WFP

Derya Multu, Cash Based Intervention Head of Project, ACF Spain

Eddie Karim, Card Services Division, Banque Libano-Francaise, Beirut

Ekram ElHuni, Head of Programme, WFP Lebanon

Filip Lozinski, Head of Office, Central and West Bekaa, Danish Refugee Council

Gawaher Atif, Country Director, WFP Lebanon

Giancarlo Buono, Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator, UNICEF

Hiba Abou Swaid, Project Implementation Coordinator, PU-AMI Lebanon

Janane Matar, Program Coordinator, Dorcas Relief and Development

Jean-Marie Garelli, Assistant Representative (Programmes), UNHCR

John O'Dea, UK Department for International Development

Katie M. Travers, Donor Relations and Projects Officer, UNRWA Lebanon

Louise Medhurst, DFID Humanitarian Adviser for Syria, Beirut

Mahmood Wahidi, Commodity Specialist-Relief, World Vision

Maisaa Kurdi, Project Officer, Islamic Relief Sidon Office

Maisaa Kurdi, Reporting and Monitoring Officer, Islamic Relief Worldwide

Makram Malaeb, Project Manager, Syria Crisis Response Unit, Ministry of Social Affairs

Maria Rehaime, Food Security & Livelihood Project Manager, PU-AMI Lebanon

Marion Cezard, Head of Sub-Office – Zahle, WFP Lebanon

Maureen Philippon, Technical Assistant, Directorate General for Humanitarian and Civilian Protection, EU Delegation

Mohammad Marrouf, Project Assistant, Islamic Relief Worldwide

Myrna Wehbe, Director, Card Services Division, Banque Libano-Francaise, Beirut

Nicholas Hutchings, Head of Office for North Bekaa, Danish Refugee Council

Pamela Chemali, Head of Sub-Office – Beirut, Mouth Lebanon and South Lebanon, WFP Lebanon

Peter John Grzic, Acting Emergency Coordinator for PRS, UNRWA Lebanon

Ruba Dirani, Field Monitoring Assistant, Zahle Sub-Office, WFP Lebanon

Sami Al Ajamy, Mayor, Majdal Anjar Municipality, Beqaa

Seonghee Choi, Reports and Information Management Officer, WFP Lebanon

Serena Chong, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, WFP Lebanon

Shahwan Mouawad, Zgharta-Ehden Mayor

Susana Moreno, Food Security Specialist (VAM), WFP Lebanon

Thomas White, Food Security & Livelihoods Programme Manager, Save the Children, Qubayyat

Typhaine Gendron, Chief of Field Office – Zahle, UNICEF

Yannick Martin, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, UN OCHA

Yuseff Mhanna, Distribution Coordinator, World Vision Zahle Office

Turkey

Alev Singh, Human Resources Assistant, WFP

Angus Fraser, Head of cross border operations, WFP

Bassam Al-Kuwaitli, Managing Director, RM Team (Research and Management)

Bedi Hakan Ersoy, Manager, Payment Card Systems Department, Halkbank

Cem Utkan, Head of Department, Deputy Directorate General for International Political Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Chris Bender, Head of Programme, Danish Refugee Council

Christine Clarence, Head of Sub-Office, Gaziantep, WFP

Corinna Kreidler, Technical Assistant, European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

Dominic Bowen, NGO Forum, Gaziantep

Erdem Birer – Programme Assistant, WFP

Eren Özdemir, Senior Programme Assistant, WFP

Faruk Erentay, Field Monitoring Assistant, WFP

Fatih Ozer, Head of Response Department, Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD)

Fatma Hascalik, Programme Officer, WFP

Francesco Baldo, Food Security and Livelihood Sector, Sector Co-ordinator

Helen Greiche, M&E Officer, WFP

Huseyin Oruc, Board Member IHH

Ibrahim Kizil, Camp Manager, Haran Camp

Jane Lewis, Syria Crisis Coordinator, European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

Javier Ormeno, Reporting and Communications Delegate, IFRC

Jean Christophe Pegon, Head, European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

Jean-Yves Lequime, Emergency Coordinator, WFP

Jennifer Vargas, Information and Reporting Officer, WFP

Katie Inglis, Communications, Reports and Information Management Officer, WFP

Marwa Bouka, Advisor, Group of Friends of the Syrian People

Mazen AboulHosn Psychosocial Officer, IOM

Mehmet Pehlivan, Field Monitor, WFP

Muntaha Hosa, Field Monitor, WFP

Nalan Dal, International Partnerships Coordinator, IHH

Nesrin Semen, Senior Programme Assistant, WFP

Omar Namaoui, ICT Officer, WFP

Radia Korkmax, Field Monitor, WFP

Ramazan Alcali, Team Leader, Turkish Red Crescent

Ramez Fanous, Admin/Procurement Officer, WFP

Rizwan Ali, Information Management Coordinator, WFP

Robbie Gillespie, Programme Manager, Turkey, International Medical Corps

Seval Guzelkilinic, Project manager, Turkish Red Crescent

Shannon Kahnert, Assistant Representative (Operations), UNHCR

Terri Morris, UK Department for International Development

Thomas Kurz, Deputy Head of Mission, German Embassy, Ankara

Thomas Triller, Human Rights Expert. German Embassy, Ankara

Tomas Kocian, Country Director, People in Need

Veysel Dalmaz Coordinator Governor, Gaziantep

Iraq

Aloys Sema, Head of Sub-Office (Duhok), WFP

Bahaeldin Khairi, Logistics Officer, WFP

Clement Rouquette - Country Director, ACTED

Daniele Grivel, Head of Mission - Iraq's Kurdistan Region, Intersos

Elizabeth Spencer, Emergency Coordinator, WFP

Fahad Al-Nimah, Senior Programme Assistant, WFP

Farid Al-Maqdsi, Programme Officer, WFP

Fawaz Nari, ICT Assistant, WFP

Geoff Wordley, Syrian Refugees Inter-Sector Coordinator, UNHCR

Jane Pearce, Country Director, WFP

Kate Holland, Project Development Manager / Grant Manager, ACTED

Marzio Babille, Country Representative, UNICEF

Meity Kadawait, Procurement Officer, WFP

Moayad Wahbeh, Finance Officer, WFP

Mohamed Shwan, Senior Programme Assistant, WFP

Mohammed Makki, Head of Mission, Islamic Relief

Neiaz Ibrahim, Senior Programme Assistant, WFP

Nelly Opiyo, Head of Programme / Monitoring and Evaluation, WFP

Oliver Lough, Monitor and Evaluation Manager, ACTED

Shavkat Iminov, Distribution Coordination, ACTED

Sumitra Sumitra Chakma, Cash and Vouchers Expert, WFP

Willem Cleven, Assessment Officer, REACH

Egypt

Caterina Kireeva, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, WFP

Celeste Hibbert, Reporting and Analysis Officer, WFP

Hans Vikoler, Emergency Coordinator, WFP

Khaled Catila, Procurement Officer, WFP Egypt

Koryun Alaverdyan, Emergency Coordinator, WFP

Riham Abuismail, VAM Officer, WFP

Sherifa Said, Cash and Voucher Officer, WFP

Sherine El-Sakka, Finance Officer, WFP Egypt

Ziad Ayoubi, Livelihood Officer, UNHCR

Other

Brian Lander, Sr. Partnership Officer, WFP

Brian Majewsky, Avenir Analytics, Team Leader WFP Cash and Vouchers Policy Evaluation

Carole Laleve Vallat, UNHCR Middle East Office, Geneva

Claude Bruderlein, Adjunct Lecturer on Global Health, Harvard University, and Adviser to ICRC and WFP

Darlene Tymo, Director, Geneva Office, WFP

Dorian Laguardia, Third Reef Solutions, Team Leader for Evaluation of UNHCR in Jordan and Lebanon

Eloi Fillion, Deputy Head of Operations for Near and Middle East, ICRC

Jonathan Brass UNHCR Middle East Office, Geneva

Maria Anguera de Sojo Pericas, Emergency Preparedness and Response Officer, WFP Regional Bureau for the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Eastern Europe

Nigel Fisher, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator

Serge Simonet, MasterCard

Vincent Bellis, Group Head, Customer Delivery, MasterCard

Annex 4: Field-Based Data Collection Schedules

130. The evaluation field missions in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey were arranged by WFP according to specifications requested by the evaluation team. These included key stakeholder interviews as well as interviews and focus groups with affected populations and others. The field schedules are, in the interest of brevity, not included in the text but can be downloaded by **clicking here** (or by clicking on the image below). Readers should note that these build off of the mission agendas provided by WFP and that last-minute changes were often necessary – or meetings were attended by others beyond those listed on the schedule. The evaluation team has attempted to capture these minor changes, and any omissions remain our own. Readers interested in understanding who was consulted in the course of this evaluation should refer to the list provided in Annex 3.

TIME	SUNDAY 7	MONDAY 8	TUESDAY 9	WEDNESDAY 10	THURSDAY 11	SUNDAY 14	MONDAY 15	TUESDAY 16	WEDNESDAY 12:00 AM
08:00							Entity: UNWOMEN Interviewee: Hiedi Legene/Livelihood Specialist Venue: WFP Amman		
09:00	Induction briefing: Dorte Jessen, Farah El-Zubi and Filippo Pompili	Entity: IOM Interviewee: Laila Tomeh Venue: WFP Amman	Entity: Azraq Camp Security Interviewee: Colonel Atef Venue: Azraq Camp	Transport to Za'atri Camp	Entity: Public Security Directorate/Ministry of Interior Interviewee: Dr. Waddah Hmood Venue: SRAD office/Abdali	Dorte	Entitye: Human Relief Foundation (HRF) Interviewee: Dr. Salah Daak Venue: WFP Amman		RECO Chief of Support Services: Barbara Clemens Venue: WFP Amman, Chief of Support Services office
09:30									
10:00	Security briefing: Antoine	Transport to UNHCR	Entity: Azraq Camp Manager/UNHCR Interviewee: Bernadette Venue: Azraq Base camp	Entity: Za'atri Camp Security Interviewee: Colonel Al Amoush Venue: Za'atri Base Camp	Transport to WFP		Entity: Save the Children International Intervieww: Niveen Batayneh Venue: WFP Amman	Female and Male FGD in Amman	Regional Programme Manager: Sarah Gordon-Gibson Venue: WFP Amman, Programme manager office
10:30									
11:00	Admin/settling in:Farah El-Zubi	Entity: UNHCR Interviewee: Paul, Alex, Volker, Merrin Waterhouse Venue: UNHCR Khalda			Entity: Sameh Mall Interviewee: Mohammad Al Daoud/Chief Financial Officer Venue: WFP Amman	Deputy Regional Emergency Coordinator: Rasmus Egendal Venue: WFP Amman, DREC	Entity: WFP Interviewee: Ryan Beech/Voucher Officer Venue: WFP Amman	Transport to Embassy	Transport to Ministry
11:30			Female FGD in Azraq Camp	Female and Male FGD in Za'atri Camp				Entity: Kuwait Embassy Interviewee:: Venue: Embassy	Entity: Ministry of Industry and Trade Interviewee: SG Maha Ali/ Venue: Ministry
12:00				Entity: Za'atri Camp Manager/UNHCR Interviewee: Kilien Venue: Za'atri Base Camp	Entity: Safeway Interviewee: Laith Abu Hilal/Manager Venue: WFP Amman	Entity: UNICEF Interviewee: Lucio Melandri/Humanitarian Affairs Specialist Venue: WFP Amman	Entity: WFP Interviewee: Haya Abbasi/One card Officer Venue: WFP Amman		
12:30	Programme Briefing Jordan EMOP: Dorte Jessen			Transport to Governors Office					Transport to WFP
01:00			Male FGD in Azraq Camp	Entity: Governor of Mafraq Interviewee: Mr. Qasem Almhedat Venue: Governor's Office	Entity: Tazweed Interviewee: Mohammad Al Jazzi/VP Venue: WFP Amman		Jonathan		Entity: WFP Jordan Country Director Interviewee: Maha Ahmad Venue: WFP Amman
01:30			Entity: WFP Interviewee: Field Monitors Venue: Azraq Base camp	Transport to FGD location				Transport to Parliament	
02:00		Interview with JHCO Interviewee: Mr. Mohammad Kilani Venue: WFP Amman		Female and male FGD in Mafraq	Entity: Jordan Ahli Bank Interviewee: Ahmad Zeno/Project Manager Venue: WFP Amman	RECO Procurement: Laila Ahadi Arben Casili Venue: WFP Amman Procurement Office	Transport to FAO	Entity: Member of Parliament Interviewee: Abdul Hadi Al Maharmeh Venue: House of Representatives	Entity: WFP Jordan Deputy Country Director Interviewee: Philippe-Serge Degernier Venue: WFP Amman
02:30							Entitye: FAO Intervieww: Andrea/Emergency Coordinator Venue: FAO Amman Office		
03:00	Jonathan Campbell	Entity: Islamic Relief Worldwide Interviewee: Alaa Al Shanti Venue: WFP Amman			RECO Information mgmt: Rebecca Richards Louise Gentzel Marah Khayyat Jonas Herzog Venue: WFP Amman IM office		Transport to ECHO	RECO Resource mgmt: Sandro Banal Kassaye Tesfay Venue: WFP Amman RM Office
03:30	Rikke Kasse			KII with a trader and headmistress			Transport to Resturant	Entity: ECHO Interviewee: Vitor Serrano/Food Expert Venue: ECHO office in Abdoun	
04:00	Serena Baldelli				RECO M&E/Data analysis: Filippo Pompili Ahmad Hiyari Venue: WFP Amman Programme office	Entity: USAID Interviewee: Pete Mohan Venue: Blue Fig Resturant	RECO Logistics: Philbert Imboba Venue: WFP Amman Logistics office	Entity: WFP Interviewee: Jonathan Campbell/Emergency Coordinator AND Dorte Jessen/Head of Programme Venue: WFP Amman
04:30									

52

Annex 5: Online Questionnaire

131. The online questionnaire established as part of this evaluation was available online at the website of the Overseas Development Institute from early September through the third week of October 2014. Information about this questionnaire was shared with WFP staff and other interviewees in all countries. The actual questions were preceded by the following explanatory text in order to help respondents understand the purpose of the questionnaire and to allay any concerns they may have had about attribution.

----

132. This online questionnaire has been established as part of the Evaluation of WFP's Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis. This independent evaluation is being undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London and To Excel Consulting Associates in Amman.

133. The names of those providing information for this questionnaire will not be shared with WFP or anyone outside of the evaluation team. Nor will be release any information which would indirectly allow respondents to be identified. All information provided here will be used solely on the basis of non-attribution, and we strongly value the anonymity of those providing inputs into evaluations such as this. However, we request your name and other identifying information for two purposes: (a) to help the evaluators understand respondents' vantage points; and (b) to enable the evaluation team to contact particular respondents if there is a compelling reason to do so. Again, this information will not be shared with those outside of the evaluation team.

134. The following questions are open-ended, and we encourage you to consider including specific examples and supporting information in your responses. Given that those responding to the Syrian crisis are very busy, your answers can be as long or short as you see fit, and only the initial few questions are mandatory; all others are optional, though we encourage you to answer as many as feasible.

135. Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire, which will be "open" through the first week of October. This final report of this evaluation will be available around March 2015 and will be made available to the public via WFP's website.

* 1. Name: please note that your name will be kept confidential and will not be shared with any WFP personnel or anyone outside of the evaluation team

* 2. Job title

* 3. Employer/organisation

* 4. Country: if you work in a regional office, please indicate "regional" (or "REC" in the case of WFP). Select all that apply.

Egypt, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Regional/REC

* 5. E-Mail address: please share your e-mail address so that we can follow up with any specific questions if the need arises. We would keep this to an absolute minimum.

6. Please describe how you and your work relate to WFP's regional response to the Syrian crisis? What do you do, and what is your relationship to WFP?

7. What do you see as the strengths of WFP's response in the country where you work (or across the region, if applicable)?

8. What do you see as the weaknesses of WFP's response in the country where you work (or across the region, if applicable)?

9. How effectively has WFP responded to gender – including men's and women's differing needs and roles – and other aspects of vulnerability (e.g., disability, youth, the elderly, etc.)?

10. Do you feel that there have been trade-offs between coverage and quality in WFP's response? If so, how do you think these have been assessed/studied and addressed by WFP?

11. How would you characterise WFP's coordination with other humanitarian and development stakeholders?

12. What innovations or new approaches have you noticed in WFP's regional response to the Syrian crisis?

13. If you are aware of it, how would you characterise the effectiveness of WFP's Regional Emergency Coordination (REC) structure? Please note whether you see this sort of approach as a useful model for future sub-regional crisis operations.

14. Some have suggested that WFP's response was too short term and should have considered a less purely humanitarian approach. Others have stated that, given the scale and dynamic nature of the crisis, a short-term response was the only option. What do you think these dual perspectives?

15. Please provide any additional perspectives on WFP's regional response to the Syrian crisis which you have not included above – or which you would like to emphasise.

Indicates Response Required

Annex 6: Beneficiaries, Outputs & Outcomes

Table 8: Beneficiaries – summary[146]

	Male	Female	Total
Syria EMOP 200339			
Syria 2011	25,079	24,921	50,000
Syria 2012	761,621	731,754	1,493,375
Syria 2013	1,813,978	1,907,002	3,720,980
Syria 2014	2,021,125	1,985,070	4,006,195
Regional EMOP 200433			
Iraq 2012	14,602	15,383	29,985
Jordan 2012	59,025	63,944	122,969
Lebanon 2012	50,530	52,592	103,122
Turkey 2012	10,915	10,308	21,223
Total 2012	**135,072**	**142,227**	**277,299**
Egypt 2013	41,830	40,155	81,985
Iraq 2013	49,588	51,181	100,769
Jordan 2013	263,011	282,655	545,666
Lebanon 2013	311,941	324,674	636,615
Turkey 2013	58,729	60,883	119,612
Total 2013	**725,099**	**759,548**	**1,484,647**
Egypt 2014	54,244	49,450	103,694
Iraq 2014	48,218	58,933	107,151
Jordan 2014	263,135	285,062	548,197
Lebanon 2014	365,769	380,698	746,467
Turkey 2014	100,254	98,454	198,708
Total 2014	**831,620**	**872,597**	**1,704,217**

Table 9: Beneficiaries – detailed[147]

	Actual		
	Male	Female	Total
Syria EMOP 200339			
Syria 2011			
Total beneficiaries	25,079	24,921	50,000
Beneficiaries of GFD	25,079	24,921	50,000
Syria 2012			
Total beneficiaries	*761,621*	*731,754*	*1,493,375*
Beneficiaries of GFD	761,621	731,754	1,493,375
Children 6-35 months blanket SFP	0	0	0
Syria 2013			
Total beneficiaries	*1,813,978*	*1,907,002*	*3,720,980*
Children 6 to 23 months blanket SFP	20,728	21,791	42,519
Children 24 to 59 months blanket SFP	24,643	25,903	50,546
Beneficiaries of GFD	1,813,977	1,907,003	3,720,980
Syria 2014			
Total beneficiaries	*2,021,125*	*1,985,070*	*4,006,195*

---

[146] Data for 2011, 2012 and 2013 are from the 2012 and 2013 Standard Project Reports. Data on beneficiaries for 2014 are from the May 2014 Regional Consolidated Output Distributions Matrix, using the highest number of beneficiaries reached in any month as of May 2014 as per WFP's counting methodology.
[147] Data for 2011, 2012 and 2013 are from the 2012 and 2013 Standard Project Reports. Data on beneficiaries for 2014 are from the May 2014 Regional Consolidated Output Distributions Matrix, using the highest number of beneficiaries reached in any month as of May 2014 as per WFP's counting methodology.

Regional EMOP 200433			
2012			
Iraq 2012			
Total beneficiaries	*14,602*	*15,383*	*29,985*
Refugees	*14,602*	*15,383*	*29,985*
Beneficiaries of GFD	6,151	5,406	11,557
Beneficiaries of vouchers	8,451	9,977	18,428
Jordan 2012			
Total beneficiaries	*59,025*	*63,944*	*122,969*
Refugees	59,025	63,944	122,969
Beneficiaries of GFD	20,861	23,524	44,385
Beneficiaries of vouchers	27,721	30,032	57,753
Lebanon 2012			
Total beneficiaries	*50,530*	*52,592*	*103,122*
Refugees	50,530	52,592	103,122
Beneficiaries of GFD	1,188	1,237	2,425
Beneficiaries of vouchers	49,342	51,355	100,697
Total beneficiaries	*10,915*	*10,308*	*21,223*
Refugees	10,915	10,308	21,223
Beneficiaries of vouchers	10,915	10,308	21,223
Total 2012	**135,072**	**142,227**	**277,299**
2013			
Egypt 2013			
Total beneficiaries	*41,830*	*40,155*	*81,985*
Refugees	41,830	40,155	81,985
Beneficiaries of vouchers	41,830	40,155	81,985
Iraq 2013			
Total beneficiaries	*49,588*	*51,181*	*100,769*
Refugees	49,588	51,181	100,769
Children 6 to 23 months blanket SFP	2,219	2,405	4,624
Children receiving school meals	4,154	4,291	8,445
Beneficiaries of GFD / GFD-TFD/A	49,588	51,181	100,769
Beneficiaries of vouchers	33,658	34,739	68,397
Jordan 2013			
Total beneficiaries	*263,011*	*282,655*	*545,666*
Refugees	263,011	282,655	545,666
Children 6 to 23 months blanket SFP	0	0	0
Children 24 to 59 months blanket SFP	0	0	0
Pregnant / lactating women SFP		0	0
Children receiving school meals	5,851	6,434	12,285
Beneficiaries of both GFD and vouchers			105,552
Beneficiaries of vouchers	263,011	282,655	545,666
Lebanon 2013			
Total beneficiaries	*311,941*	*324,674*	*636,615*
Refugees	311,941	324,674	636,615
Returnees	0	0	0
Beneficiaries of GFD / GFD-TFD/A	311,941	324,674	636,615
Beneficiaries of vouchers	283,525	295,097	578,622
Turkey 2013			
Total beneficiaries	*58,729*	*60,883*	*119,612*
Refugees	58,729	60,883	119,612
Beneficiaries of vouchers	58,729	60,883	119,612
Total 2013	**725,099**	**759,548**	**1,484,647**
2014			
Egypt 2014			
Total beneficiaries	*54,244*	*49,450*	*103,694*
Beneficiaries of vouchers	54,244	49,450	103,694

Iraq 2014			
Total beneficiaries	48,218	58,933	107,151
Beneficiaries of GFD			33,496
Beneficiaries of vouchers			74,026
Children receiving school meals			8,665
Jordan 2014			
Total beneficiaries	263,135	285,062	548,197
Beneficiaries of GFD			98,217
Beneficiaries of vouchers			449,980
Lebanon 2014			
Total beneficiaries	_365,769_	_380,698_	_746,467_
Beneficiaries of GFD	22,793	23,723	46,516
Beneficiaries of vouchers	350,453	364,757	715,210
Turkey 2014			
Total beneficiaries	100,254	98,454	198,708
Beneficiaries of vouchers	100,254	98,454	198,708
Total 2014	**831,619**	**872,598**	**1,704,217**

Table 10: Operational beneficiaries (Jan 13 – May 14) – Regional EMOP

Source: Consolidated output data received from the M&E-REC[148]

---

[148] The evaluation team requested data to be exported from the REC monitoring and evaluation database. This content is based on that exported data and not on any WFP publication.

Table 11: Operational beneficiaries (Jan 13 – May 14) – Syria EMOP

Source: Consolidated output data received from the M&E-REC[149]

Table 12: Distributions (commodities and voucher value)[150]

	Actual (mt)
EMOP 200339	
Syria 2011	225
Syria 2012	61,191
Syria 2013	248,602
Regional EMOP 200433	
2012	
Iraq	403
Jordan	1370
Lebanon	485
Total food	*2,259*
Total vouchers (USD)	*$13,992,015*
2013	
Iraq	1,850
Jordan	22142
Lebanon	2794
Total food	*26,786*
Total vouchers (USD)	*$308,205,196*

[149] The evaluation team requested data to be exported from the REC monitoring and evaluation database. This content is based on that exported data and not on any WFP publication.
[150] WFP.2013c. *Standard Project Report 2012: EMOP 200339 Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria*. Rome, WFP; WFP. 2014j. *Standard Project Report 2013: EMOP 200433 Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria*. Rome, WFP. WFP. 2013d. *Standard Project Report 2012: Regional EMOP 200339 to Support Syrian Refugees*. Rome, WFP; WFP. 2014k. *Standard Project Report 2013: Regional EMOP 200433 to Support Syrian Refugees*. Rome, WFP.

Table 13: Indicators of progress towards gender equality[151]

	Unit	Planned	Actual	%
Syria EMOP 200339				
2011				
Proportion of women in leadership positions (food committees)		0.0%	20.0%	
2012				
Training on food distribution included awareness of reasons for gender sensitive provision of food	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Number of food monitors - women	Individual	7	7	100.0%
Number of food monitors – men	Individual	6	6	100.0%
Project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality	1=yes, 0=no	0	0	
Project has initiatives to reduce risk of gender-based violence	1=yes, 0=no	0	0	
2013				
Number of food monitors – men	Individual	4	4	100.0%
Number of food monitors - women	Individual	7	7	100.0%
Regional EMOP 200433				
2012				
Iraq 2012				
Number of food monitors – men	Individual	4	3	75.0%
Number of food monitors – women	Individual	2	0	0.0%
Project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Number of HH food entitlements issued in men's name	Individual	4949	3037	61.4%
Number of HH food entitlements issued in women's name	Individual	2783	1708	61.4%
Jordan 2012				
Number of food monitors – men	Individual	4	6	150.0%
Number of food monitors – women	Individual	4	2	50.0%
Project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Project has initiatives to reduce risk of gender-based violence	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Number of men in leadership positions on food management committees	Individual	12	12	100.0%
Lebanon 2012				
Number of food monitors – men	Individual	6	8	133.3%
Number of food monitors – women	Individual	8	6	75.0%
Project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Project has initiatives to reduce risk of gender-based violence	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Turkey 2012				
Project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Number of HH food entitlements issued in women's name	Individual	1845	2768	150.0%
2013				
Egypt 2013				
Number of food monitors – men	Individual	2	3	150.0%
Number of food monitors – women	Individual	1	0	0.0%
Project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality goals	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Project has initiatives to reduce risk of gender-based violence	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Number of HH food entitlements issued in men's name	Individual	8664	18932	218.5%
Number of HH food entitlements issued in women's name	Individual	6536	8113	124.1%

---

[151] WFP.2013c. *Standard Project Report 2012: EMOP 200339 Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria*. Rome, WFP; WFP. 2014j. *Standard Project Report 2013: EMOP 200433 Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria*. WFP. WFP. 2013d. *Standard Project Report 2012: Regional EMOP 200339 to Support Syrian Refugees*. Rome, WFP; WFP. 2014k. *Standard Project Report 2013: Regional EMOP 200433 to Support Syrian Refugees*. Rome, WFP.

Number of members of food management committee trained (female)	Individual	25	23	92.0%
Number of members of food management committee trained (male)	Individual	25	27	108.0%
Number of men in leadership positions on food management committees	Individual	12	15	125.0%
Number of women in leadership positions on food management committees	Individual	12	9	75.0%
Training on food distribution included awareness of reasons for gender sensitive provision of food	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Iraq 2013				
Number of food monitors – men	Individual	2	4	200.0%
Number of food monitors – women	Individual	1	1	100.0%
Project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality goals	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Project has initiatives to reduce risk of gender-based violence	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Number of HH food entitlements issued in men's name	Individual	27528	16770	60.9%
Number of HH food entitlements issued in women's name	Individual	9672	5892	60.9%
Number of members of food management committee trained (female)	Individual	85	5	5.9%
Number of members of food management committee trained (male)	Individual	85	56	65.9%
Number of men in leadership positions on food management committees	Individual	10	56	560.0%
Number of women in leadership positions on food management committees	Individual	10	5	50.0%
Training on food distribution included awareness of reasons for gender sensitive provision of food	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Jordan 2013				
Number of food monitors – men	Individual	6	6	100.0%
Number of food monitors – women	Individual	6	6	100.0%
Number of HH food entitlements issued in men's name	Individual	125300	77933	62.2%
Number of HH food entitlements issued in women's name	Individual	53700	61233	114.0%
Project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality goals	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Project has initiatives to reduce risk of gender-based violence	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Number of men in leadership positions on food management committees	Individual	7	12	171.4%
Number of women in leadership positions on food management committees	Individual	7	2	28.6%
Training on food distribution included awareness of reasons for gender sensitive provision of food	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Lebanon 2013				
Number of food monitors – men	Individual	12	9	75.0%
Number of food monitors – women	Individual	12	11	91.7%
Project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality goals	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Project has initiatives to reduce risk of gender-based violence	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Number of HH food entitlements issued in men's name	Individual	191626	113326	59.1%
Number of HH food entitlements issued in women's name	Individual	50938	14007	27.5%
Training on food distribution included awareness of reasons for gender sensitive provision of food	1=yes, 0=no	1	1	
Turkey 2013				
Number of food monitors – men	Individual	5	3	60.0%
Number of food monitors – women	Individual	5	4	80.0%
Number of HH food entitlements issued in men's name	Individual	23400	12927	55.2%

		Individual	12600	9073	72.0%
Number of HH food entitlements issued in women's name		Individual	12600	9073	72.0%
Number of members of food management committee trained (female)		Individual	108	25	23.1%
Number of members of food management committee trained (male)		Individual	109	192	176.1%
Number of men in leadership positions on food management committees		Individual	7	14	200.0%
Number of women in leadership positions on food management committees		Individual	7	0	0.0%
Project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality goals		1=yes, 0=no	1	1	

Table 14: Outputs[152]

	Unit	Planned	Actual	%
Syria EMOP 200339				
2011				
SO 1: GFD				
Energy content of food distributed	kcal/person	1,556	1,556	100.0%
Number of days rations were provided	day	30	30	100.0%
Number of timely food distributions	distribution	3	1	33.3%
2012				
SO1: GFD				
Energy content of food distributed	kcal/person	1,232	914	74.2%
Number of days rations were provided	day	30	30	100.0%
Number of timely food distributions	distribution	12	12	100.0%
SO 5: Capacity development - strengthening national capacities				
Local purchases % of food purchased locally	%		16	
Local purchases: Monetary value of food purchased locally	US$		18,089,600	
GFD: Number of female govt / natl partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	Individual	5	4	80.0%
GFD: Number of govt / natl partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	Individual	62	37	59.7%
GFD: Number of male govt / natl partner staff assisted or trained to develop policies/ strategies or legislation	Individual	57	33	57.9%
Nutrition: Number of govt / natl partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	Individual	62	37	59.7%
Technical assistance: WFP expenditure for technical assistance	US$	1,775,940	1,642,857	92.5%
2013				
SO1: GFD				
Number of days rations were provided	day	30	30	100.0%
Number of timely food distributions	distribution	12	12	100.0%
Regional EMOP 200433				
Iraq 2012				
Number of beneficiaries receiving vouchers	beneficiary	30,000	18,428	61.4%
Number of men collecting cash or vouchers	collector	14,400	8,451	58.7%
Number of women collecting cash or vouchers	collector	15,600	9,977	64.0%
Energy content of food distributed	kcal/person	2,100	2,100	100.0%

---

[152] WFP. 2013d. Standard Project Report 2012: *Regional EMOP 200433 to Support Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq & Turkey*. Rome, WFP; WFP. 2014j. *Standard Project Report 2013: EMOP 200339 Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria. Rome,* WFP; WFP. 2013e. *Standard Project Report 2012: Regional EMOP 200433 to Support Syrian Refugees;* WFP. 2014k. *Standard Project Report 2013: Regional EMOP 200433 to Support Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq & Turkey. Rome, WFP.*

Jordan 2012				
Number of beneficiaries receiving vouchers	beneficiary	110,000	57,753	52.5%
Number of men collecting cash or vouchers	collector	33,600	27,721	82.5%
Number of women collecting cash or vouchers	collector	36,400	30,032	82.5%
Energy content of food distributed	kcal/person	2,100	2,100	100.0%
Number of days rations were provided	day	162	162	100.0%
Number of timely food distributions	distribution	10	10	100.0%
Lebanon 2012				
Number of beneficiaries receiving vouchers	beneficiary	120,000	100,697	83.9%
Energy content of food distributed	kcal/person	2,100	2,100	100.0%
Number of settlement packages distributed	package	6,118	5,957	97.4%
Turkey 2012				
Number of beneficiaries receiving vouchers	beneficiary	30,000	21,223	70.7%
Number of women collecting cash or vouchers	collector	1,845	2,768	150.0%
Number of timely food distributions	distribution	5	4	80.0%
2013				
Egypt 2013				
Number of beneficiaries receiving vouchers	beneficiary	76,000	81,985	107.9%
Total monetary value of vouchers distributed	US$	15,320,000	10,862,104	70.9%
Iraq 2013				
GFD				
Number of beneficiaries receiving vouchers	beneficiary	156,000	68,397	43.8%
Total monetary value of vouchers distributed	US$	33,077,000	16,891,446	51.1%
Energy content of food distributed	kcal/person	2,100	2,100	100.0%
Number of days rations were provided	day	30	30	100.0%
Number of timely food distributions	distribution	24	60	250.0%
Nutrition - prevention of acute malnutrition				
Number of children under-2 receiving micronutrient powder	child	0	4624	
Number of health centres assisted	centre	0	1	
School feeding				
Kcal transferred to school children	kcal/child	450	450	100.0%
Number of feeding days as % of school days	%	100	85	85.0%
Number of refugee boys assisted	boy	3072	4154	135.2%
Number of refugee girls assisted	girl	2428	4291	176.7%
Number of schools assisted	school	4	5	125.0%
Jordan 2013				
GFD				
Number of beneficiaries receiving combination of vouchers and food	beneficiary	150,000	105,552	70.4%
Number of beneficiaries receiving vouchers	beneficiary	895,000	545,666	61.0%
Total monetary value of vouchers distributed	US$	170,656,200	106,475,058	62.4%
Energy content of food distributed	kcal/person	2,100	2,100	100.0%
Number of days rations were provided	day	30	30	100.0%
Number of settlement packages distributed (welcome meals)	package	970,000	295,821	30.5%
Number of timely food distributions	distribution	36	36	100.0%
School feeding				
Number of feeding days as % of school days	%	100	94	94.0%
Number of primary school boys assisted	boy	10,240	3,043	29.7%
Number of primary school girls assisted	girl	9,760	3,346	34.3%
Number of primary school children assisted	child	20,000	6,389	31.9%
Number of primary schools assisted	school	3	3	100.0%
Number of secondary school boys assisted	boy	10,240	2,808	27.4%
Number of secondary school girls assisted	girl	9,760	3,088	31.6%
Number of secondary school children assisted	child	20,000	5,896	29.5%

Lebanon 2013				
Number of beneficiaries receiving combination of vouchers and food	beneficiary	528,500	239,193	45.3%
Number of beneficiaries receiving vouchers	beneficiary	1,144,200	578,622	50.6%
Total monetary value of vouchers distributed	US$	196,652,964	127,537,626	64.9%
Energy content of food distributed	kcal/person	2,100	2,100	100.0%
Number of days rations were provided	day	365	365	100.0%
Number of settlement packages distributed (welcome meals)	package	124,760	68,294	54.7%
Number of timely food distributions	distribution	251	213	84.9%
Turkey 2013				
Number of beneficiaries receiving vouchers	beneficiary	185,000	119,606	64.7%
Total monetary value of vouchers distributed	US$	64,440,000	46,438,962	72.1%

Table 15: Outcomes[153]

	Base value	Previous follow-up	Latest follow-up
Syria EMOP 200339[154]			
2012			
SO1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies			
FCS: % of households with acceptable FCS		29.5	50
FCS: % of households with borderline FCS		23.5	31.6
FCS: % of households with poor FCS		47	18.4
SO5: Strengthen the capacity of countries to reduce hunger			
Food purchased locally as % of food distributed in-country			22
2013[155]			
FCS: % of households with acceptable FCS	50		44
FCS: % of households with borderline FCS	32		42
FCS: % of households with poor FCS	18		14
2014[156]			
FCS: % of households with acceptable FCS			54%
FCS: % of households with borderline FCS			38%
FCS: % of households with poor FCS			9%

---

[153]The SPR reports provide details on the individual sources and data used for outcome indicators. The evaluation report describes weaknesses in monitoring data collection, which apply here. Inconsistencies in base and follow-up values between years are due to different sources of data being used (PDM, rolling pre-assistance baselines, nutrition studies).

[154]WFP. 2013c. *Standard Project Report 2012: EMOP 200339 Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria*. Rome, WFP.

[155]WFP. 2014j. *Standard Project Report 2013: EMOP 200339 Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria*. Rome, WFP.

[156]*Source: General Food Distribution Monitoring Report and Market Analysis*

| Regional EMOP 200433			
2012[157]			
Iraq			
FCS: % of households with acceptable FCS			79
FCS: % of households with borderline FCS			26
Jordan			
FCS: % of households with acceptable FCS			74.5
FCS: % of households with borderline FCS			18.1
Lebanon			
Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5			4.4
FCS: % of households with acceptable FCS			68.1
FCS: % of households with borderline FCS			28.1
2013[158]			
Egypt			
% of beneficiaries consuming at least 3 meals per day	18.3		43.7
FCS: % of households with acceptable FCS	71.9		85
FCS: % of households with borderline FCS	17.2		10
CSI: Coping Strategy Index (average)	14.6		11.8
CSI: % with decreased CSI	0		100
Iraq			
FCS: % of households with acceptable FCS	73.1		92.3
FCS: % of households with borderline FCS	12		3.4
FCS: % of households with poor FCS	14.9		4.3
CSI: Coping Strategy Index (average)	15.6		8.6
Jordan			
% of beneficiaries consuming at least 2 meals per day		86	90
FCS: % of households with acceptable FCS	66	85.8	90.7
FCS: % of households with borderline FCS	24	10.1	7.4
FCS: % of households with poor FCS	10	4.1	1.9
CSI: Coping Strategy Index (average)	4.9	14.8	17.2
Gender ratio: ratio of girls to boys in assisted primary schools			57
Gender ratio: ratio of girls to boys in assisted secondary schools			56
Lebanon			
% of beneficiaries consuming at least 3 meals per day	31	45	48
% of beneficiaries consuming at least 2 meals per day	72	81	93
FCS: % of households with acceptable FCS	89	94	70
FCS: % of households with borderline FCS	7	4	20
FCS: % of households with poor FCS	4	2	10
CSI: Coping Strategy Index (average)	20.4	17.1	17.4
Turkey			
FCS: % of households with acceptable FCS	81	90	93
FCS: % of households with borderline FCS	16	9	6
FCS: % of households with poor FCS	3	1	1
CSI: Coping Strategy Index (average)	16.3		12.2
2014[159]			
Egypt			
FCS: Percentage of households with acceptable FCS			92
FCS: percentage of households with poor FCS			2
FCS: Percentage of households with borderline FCS			6
CSI: Coping Strategy Index (average)			16.1
Iraq			
FCS: Percentage of households with acceptable FCS			79
FCS: percentage of households with poor FCS			6

[157] WFP. 2013d. *Standard Project Report 2012: Regional EMOP 200433 to Support Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq & Turkey*. Rome, WFP.
[158] WFP. 2014k. *Standard Project Report 2013: Regional EMOP 200433 to Support Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq & Turkey*. Rome, WFP.
[159] Only 2014 Q1 data is included. WFP. 2014n. *Syria Crisis Regional Response M&E Updates, January-March 2014*. Amman, WFP.

|			
FCS: Percentage of households with borderline FCS			15
CSI: Coping Strategy Index (average)			7.8
Jordan			
FCS Percentage of households with acceptable FCS			96
FCS: percentage of households with poor FCS			2
Percentage of households with borderline FCS			2
CSI: Coping Strategy Index (average)			12.4
Lebanon			
FCS: Percentage of households with acceptable FCS			76
FCS: Percentage of households with poor FCS			5
FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS			19
CSI: Coping Strategy Index (average)			18.7
Turkey			
FCS: Percentage of households with acceptable FCS			98
FCS: Percentage of households with poor FCS			0
FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS			2
CSI: Coping Strategy Index (average)			13

Figure 4: Total value of vouchers redeemed (USD)

Source: Consolidated output data received from the M&E-REC[160]

---

[160] The evaluation team requested data to be exported from the REC monitoring and evaluation database. This content is based on that exported data and not on any WFP publication.

Figure 5. Paper voucher and e-voucher beneficiaries (Jan to May 2014)

Source: Regional Output Matrix May 2014

Annex 7: Timeline of events, funding/beneficiary levels, and activities

136. The following timeline was prepared by WFP's Office of Evaluation to illustrate some of the key events, activities and funding levels and how they have fluctuated over time.


*Refugee Response Plan

Sources: Office of Evaluation, reconstructed from WFP Standard Project Reports 2011–2013 for EMOPs 200339 and 200433; the Regional Emergency Coordinator office (REC) output report; the United Nations Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan and Regional Response Plan; and Slim, H. and Trombetta, L. 2014. *Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis*. New York, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Annex 8: Growth of the Syrian Refugee Population

137. The following data from UNHCR captures the rapid growth of the regional refugee situation linked to the crisis in Syria.

Source: UNHCR, Information Sharing Portal for the Syria Regional Refugee Response, available at:
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (accessed 21 November 2014).

Annex 9: Targets and Distributions in Syria (EMOP 200339)

138. The following table provided by WFP Syria outlines how many beneficiaries WFP had planned to reach within Syria, how many rations it had dispatched and how many people were ultimately reached based on monitoring data.

Month	Planned Beneficiaries (target as per project document)	Rations Dispatched for Distribution: Targeted Individuals (operational plan)	Percentage of Target Achieved	Rations Distributed: Individuals Assisted	Percentage of Planned Beneficiary Target Achieved
Jan-13	1,500,000	1,232,525	82%	1,229,090	82%
Feb-13	1,750,000	1,692,375	97%	1,672,460	96%
Mar-13	2,000,000	1,989,750	99%	1,895,730	95%
Apr-13	2,500,000	2,249,750	90%	2,196,475	88%
May-13	2,500,000	2,403,555	96%	2,358,630	94%
Jun-13	2,500,000	2,500,000	100%	2,425,010	97%
Jul-13	3,000,000	2,892,390	96%	2,436,495	81%
Aug-13	3,000,000	2,382,520	79%	2,137,870	71%
Sep-13	3,000,000	2,717,395	91%	2,492,545	83%
Oct-13	4,000,000	3,421,590	86%	3,379,490	84%
Nov-13	4,000,000	3,302,735	83%	3,048,170	76%
Dec-13	4,000,000	3,817,540	95%	3,720,980	93%
Jan-14	4,250,000	3,670,835	86%	3,651,545	86%
Feb-14	4,250,000	3,713,730	87%	3,654,430	86%
Mar-14	4,250,000	4,104,055	97%	4,105,120	97%
Apr-14	4,250,000	3,876,410	91%	3,893,085	92%
May-14	4,250,000	3,274,100	77%	3,295,065	78%
Jun-14	4,250,000	3,432,320	81%	3378200	79%
Jul-14	4,250,000	3,663,740	86%	3,613,735	85%
Aug-14	4,250,000	4,158,120	98%	Ongoing	Not available
Sep-14	4,250,000	3,941,220	93%	Ongoing	Not available

Source: WFP Syria, "Dispatches vs Distributions, 2013 and 2014", October 2014.

Annex 10: Regional Emergency Coordination Structure for the Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis

Annex 11: Bibliography

More than 900 documents were reviewed in the course of this evaluation. The ones listed below include those which are directly cited in the text.

ACF. 2010 *Food Security and Livelihood Assessments*. Paris, Action Against Hunger.

Al-Mahdy, H., Luce, E., Wood, L. & Cecchi, O. 2014. *Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Exercise (CFSME) Syrian Refugees in Jordan*. Amman, WFP and REACH.

ALNAP. 2013. *Evaluation of Humanitarian Action: An ALNAP Guide*. London, ALNAP.

Bailey, S. 2013. *The Impact of Cash Transfers on Food Consumption in Humanitarian Settings: A review of evidence*. Winnipeg, Canada, Canadian Foodgrains Bank.

Bauer, J-M., Sandström, S. & Audi, H. 2014. *Economic Impact Study: Direct and Indirect Effects of the WFP Value-Based Food Voucher Programme in Lebanon*. Rome, WFP.

Clemens, B. 2012. *Cash for Change: Financial Sector Assessment-Jordan*. Rome, WFP.

FAO. 2014. *Syrian Arab Republic: Continued conflict and drought conditions worsen 2014 crop production prospe*cts. Rome, FAO.

Hallam, A. 1998 Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies in *Relief and Rehabilitation Network*, Good Practice Review No. 7.

Hidrobo, M., Hoddinott, J., Peterman, A., Margolies, A. & Moreira, V. 2012. *Cash, Food, or Vouchers? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Northern Ecuador*. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.

HRW. 2014. Lebanon: At Least 45 Local Curfews Imposed on Syrian Refugee in *Human Rights Watch*, 3 October. Posted at:

http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/03/lebanon-least-45-local-curfews-imposed-syrian-refugees.

Husain, A., Bauer, J-Ma. & Sandström, S. 2014. *WFP Economic Impact Study: Direct and Indirect Impact of the WFP Food Voucher Programme in Jordan*. Rome, WFP, 2014.

IRIN. 2010. Syria: Drought pushing millions into poverty in IRIN, 9 September. Posted at: http://www.irinnews.org/report/90442/syria-drought-pushing-millions-into-poverty.

Mackintosh, K. 2000. *The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law*. London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute.

Mercy Corps. 2013. *Syrian Refugees in the Kurdish Region of Iraq: Assisting Non-Camp Communities*. Erbil, Mercy Corps.

Miles, T. 2014. U.N. aided 38,000 victims of Syrian gender-based violence in 2013, *Reuters*, 8 January 2014. Posted at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/08/us-syria-crisis-rape-idUSBREA0711R20140108.

MOPIC. 2014. *National Resilience Plan 2014-2016*. Amman, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

OCHA. 2014. *Syria Crisis: Key Figures*, posted at: http://www.unocha.org/syria [accessed 20 October 2014].

OCHA, REACH & SNAP. 2014. *MSNA: Syria Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment*. Gaziantep, Turkey, OCHA, REACH and SNAP.

ODI. 2014 *Operations Evaluation: Evaluation of WFP's Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis (2011-2014) - Inception Report*. London, Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group.

OECD. 1999. *Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies*. Paris, OECD.

Rahman, M. A., Abka, R., Rahman, M.S. & Sarma, P.K. 2013. Poverty and food security analysis: A study of fishermen households in a selected area of Bangladesh, in *J. Bangladesh Agril. Univ*. 11(2): 293–299.

REACH. 2014. *Multi-Sector Needs Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Camps: Kurdistan Region of Iraq Assessment Report*. Paris, REACH Initiative.

REACH. 2014. *Multi-Sector Needs Assessment of Syrian Refugees Outside of Camps: Kurdistan Region of Iraq Assessment Report*. Paris, REACH Initiative.

Slim, H. & Trombetta, L. 2014. *Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis*. New York, UN OCHA IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations Steering Group.

SNAP. 2014. *SNAP: Regional Analysis Syria – Part II: Host Countries*. Geneva, Syria Needs Assessment Project.

United Nations. 2014a. *Comprehensive Regional Strategic Framework for the Syria Crisis: Framework Document*. Amman, United Nations.

United Nations. 2014b. *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan*. Amman, United Nations.

United Nations. 2014c. *Regional Response Plan 6: Mid-Year Update*. Amman, United Nations.

United Nations. 2014d. *Security Council Resolution 2165, S/RES/2165 (2014)*. Posted at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2165.pdf.

United Nations. 2014e. *Syria crisis humanitarian response Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan*. Geneva, United Nations.

United Nations. 2014f. *Syria Regional Response Plan 6*. Amman, United Nations.

WFP. 2004. *Policy issues: Humanitarian Principles* (WFP/EB.1/2004/4-C). Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2006. *Targeting in Emergencies* (WFP/EB.1/2006/5). Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2011. *Emergency Operation Syria 200339, Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria*. Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2012a. *Decision Memorandum: Activation of the WFP level 3 emergency response designation for the Syrian Arab Republic and surrounding countries*, 14 December.

WFP. 2012b. *EMOP South Sudan 200338 Food Assistance for Food-Insecure and Conflict-Affected Populations in South Sudan*. Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2012c. Forward Purchase Facility, Rome, WFP. WFP/EB.A/2012/6-B/1.Posted at:http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/resources/wfp248103.pdf.

WFP. 2012d. *Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment*. Damascus, WFP, FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform.

WFP. 2012e. *Joint Rapid Needs Assessment of Syrian Refugees in the Kurdish Region – Iraq*. Erbil, Kurdistan Regional Government/Iraq and UN/NGOs.

WFP. 2012f. *Macro Financial Assessment – Lebanon*. Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2012g. *MasterCard And WFP Team Up To Deliver 'Digital Food*, World Food Programme, 12 September. Posted at https://www.wfp.org/stories/mastercard-and-wfp-team-deliver-digital-food.

WFP. 2012h. *PRRO Central African Republic 200315 Assistance to Conflict-Affected Populations in the Central African Republic*. Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2012i. *Voucher Assessment Mission Report*. Ankara, WFP Turkey.

WFP. 2012-14. *Budget Revisions 1-13 to Regional Operation 200433 Food Assistance to Vulnerable Populations in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt Affected by Conflict in Syria*. Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2013a. *EMOP Yemen 200451 Emergency Food And Nutrition Support to Food-Insecure And Conflict-Affected People*.

WFP. 2013b. *Food Assistance for Non-Camp Dwelling Syrian Refugees*. Erbil, WFP.

WFP. 2013c. *Standard Project Report 2012: EMOP 200339 Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria*. Rome, WFP

WFP. 2013d. *Standard Project Report 2012: Regional EMOP 200433 to Support Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq & Turkey*. Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2013e. *Syria Crisis Regional M&E System and Activity Status Matrix, 10 December 2013*. Rome: WFP Office of the Inspector General.

WFP. 2013f. *Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*. Beirut, WFP.

WFP. 2013g. *WFP's Corporate Response Management Structure – Syria Crisis: Term of Reference, Version 2.0*. Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2013h. *WFP's Global Gender Policy 2009: A Policy Evaluation WFP Syria Regional Emergency Operation Field Study Aide Memoire – Final*. Rome, WFP, Office of Evaluation.

WFP. 2014a. *2014-2017 Strategic Results Framework*. Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2014b. *Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Exercise (CFSME): Syrian Refugees in Jor*dan. Amman, WFP.

WFP. 2014c. *Executive Director's Circular (Operations Department) WFP Emergency Response Activation Protocol*. Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2014d. *Funding Shortfall Forces WFP To Announce Cutbacks To Syrian Food Assistance Operation*, World Food Programme, 18 September. Posted at: http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/funding-shortfall-forces-wfp-announce-cutbacks-syrian-food-assistance-operation.

WFP. 2014e. *Internal Audit of WFP Operations in Syria and Neighbouring Countries, Internal Audit Report AR/14/22*. Rome: WFP, Office of the Inspector General.

WFP. 2014f. *Syria Crisis Regional Response: M&E Updates July-September 2014.* Amman, WFP.

WFP. 2014g. *Rations scale fluctuation, October 2014.* Damascus, WFP.

WFP. 2014h. *Regional Output Matrix Jan – Dec 2013.* Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2014i. *Schedule of Field Level of Agreement for the period from 01-Jan-14 to 30-June-14.* Damascus, WFP.

WFP. 2014j. *Standard Project Report 2013: EMOP 200339 Emergency Food Assistance to People Affected by Unrest in Syria.* Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2014k. *Standard Project Report 2013: Regional EMOP 200433 to Support Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq & Turkey.* Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2014l. *Summary Evaluation Report for EB.1/2015: Evaluation of WFP's 2008 Cash and Voucher Policy.* Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2014m. *Syria Crisis Regional Response M&E Updates, April-June 2014.* Amman, WFP.

WFP. 2014n. *Syria Crisis Regional Response M&E Updates, January-March 2014.* Amman, WFP.

WFP. 2014o. *Syria Crisis Response – Impact of Funding Shortfalls: Urgent Funding Shortfalls Force WFP to Cut Operations in Syria and Sub-Region.* Rome, WFP. Posted at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=7310.

WFP. 2014p. *Syria Lessons Learning Exercise: Draft Report.* Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2014q. *Targeting Matrix - Qualitative- Turkey.* Ankara, WFP.

WFP. 2014r. *Terms of Reference: Evaluation of WFP's Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis.* Rome, WFP Office of Evaluation.

WFP. 2014s. *The Syria Crisis: WFP Operations in Syria and Neighbouring Countries.* Internal Audit Report AR/13/13. Rome, WFP Office of the Inspector General

WFP. 2014t. *WFP Programme of Work, 6 April 2014.* Rome, WFP.

WFP. 2014u . *WFP Syria Crisis Response Situation Update: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt, 3-16, September 2014.* Amman, WFP.

WFP. 2014v. *Will drought worsen the impact of conflict on food insecurity?* Rome, WFP.

WFP. (Undated). *Cash & Vouchers Lessons Learned: Main Findings.* Amman, WFP Regional Emergency Coordination Office.

WFP. (Undated). Operations Evaluations. Posted at:

http://www.wfp.org/evaluation/evaluation-types/operations-evaluations [accessed 29 October 2014].

WFP & UNHCR. 2014. *Concept note for Targeting Verification of Syrian Refugees in Egypt*. Cairo, WFP and UNHCR.

WFP & UNHCR. 2014. *WFP UNHCR Joint Assessment Mission Kurdistan Region - Iraq* (Draft).

WFP Syria. 2014. *Dispatches vs Distributions, 2013 and 2014*. Damascus, WFP.

WFP Syria. (Undated). *The targeting criteria as mentioned in the FLAs with the CPs*. Damascus, WFP.

WFP, UNHCR & UNICEF. 2013. *The Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees (VASyR) in Lebanon*. Beirut, WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF.

Zyck, S. A. & Armstrong, J. 2014. *Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: the role of business and the private sector: Jordan case study*. London: Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group.

Acronyms

3RP	-	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
AFAD	-	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
C&V	-	Cash and Voucher
CO	-	Country Office
CSI	-	Coping Strategy Index
e-vouchers		Electronic vouchers
EMOP	-	Emergency Operation
FAO	-	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCS	-	Food Consumption Score
FGD	-	Focus Group Discussion
GFD	-	General Food Distribution
HPG	-	Humanitarian Policy Group, ODI
HRM		Human Resource Management Division, WFP
IASC	-	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC		International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	-	Internally Displaced Persons
L3	-	Level 3
LIC	-	Low-Income Country
LLE	-	Lessons Learning Exercise
MIC	-	Middle-Income Country
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	-	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	-	Overseas Development Institute
OED	-	Office of the Executive Director, WFP
OEV	-	Office of Evaluation, WFP
OM	-	Operations Management Division, WFP
OSZ	-	Policy, Programme and Innovation Division, WFP
OSZA	-	Analysis and Nutrition Service, WFP
OSZI	-	Programme Policy Innovation Service, WFP

PAB   -   Pre-Assistance Baseline
PDM   -   Post-Distribution Monitoring
PREP   Preparedness and Response Enhancement Programme
PRRO   -   Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PRS   -   Palestine Refugees from Syria
REC   -   Regional Emergency Coordination Office
RMP   -   Performance Management and Monitoring Division, WFP
RRP   -   Regional Response Plan
SARC   Syrian Arab Red Crescent
SHARP   -   Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan
SO   -   Sub-Office
SPR   -   Standard Programme Reports
TORs   Terms of Reference
UNDP   -   United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR   -   United Nations Refugee Agency
UNICEF   -   United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA   -   United Nations Relief and Works Agency
VAM   -   Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WFP   -   United Nations World Food Programme