World Food Programme

A Report from the Office of Evaluation



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the WFP School Feeding in Emergency Situations

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Acknowledgement

In the context of the thematic evaluation of WFP school feeding in emergency situations, the team conducted between October and December 2006, three field visists to Pakistan, Sudan and the Democratic Repubic of Congo (DRC) with emergency school feeding.

The team, wishes to extend thanks to all those who facilitated the team's work in the field and in Headquarters.

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Acronyms

AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
ANA	Annual Needs Assessment
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CD	Country Directors
CP	Cooperating Partner
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement - Sudan
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CEDAW	Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
CSB	Corn Soy Blend
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCD	Deputy Country Director
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EFA	Education for All
EFNA	Emergency Food and Nutrition Assessment
EiE	Education in Emergencies
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EPSP	Emergency Preparedness Support Program
ERRA	Pakistan's Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority
ESF	Emergency School Feeding
FAM	Food Aid Monitors
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FFE	Food for Education
FFT	Food for Training
FFW	Food for Work
FLA	Field Level Agreement
GFD	General Food Distribution
GoNU	Government of National Unity (Sudan)
GoP	Government of Pakistan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HEB	High Energy Biscuits
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee

ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
IP	Implementing Partner
IRC	International Rescue Committee
LTSH	Landside Transport Shipping and Handling
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRRDO	Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OEDE	Evaluation Department of WFP
OVCs	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operation
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
SF	School Feeding
SFP	School Feeding Programme
SFU	School Feeding Unit
SO	Sub-Office
STH	Soil Transmitted Helminth
THR	Take Home Ration
ToR	Terms of Reference
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees / UN's refugee agency
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment & Mapping
WAC	Western Africa Coastal
WFP	World Food Programme

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Executive Summary

This evaluation sought to identify how WFP's school feeding might effectively address the needs of people in emergency contexts, with a view to learning from current practices and improving future implementation. Three field studies, desk research and a survey questionnaire constituted the basis of the evaluation. Being a thematic evaluation, its scope called for findings and conclusions brought to a corporate level.

The evaluation found that school feeding projects implemented in emergencies are challenging for WFP, as the Programme faces constraints that are specific to these settings. Security restrictions and limited accessibility to affected areas, often combined with low capacities of local partners and governments, make a timely response to large-scale needs particularly challenging, especially so when there is limited technical expertise available in WFP country offices. In situations where WFP cannot manage these challenges, the responses developed can be problematic, particularly with regard to appropriate targeting of support, the proper alignment of Emergency School Feeding (ESF)[1] programmes with education sector support programmes and the smooth implementation of school feeding projects. In order to develop an effective and efficient programme, WFP must be able to clearly articulate and consider the specific comparative advantages of ESF programmes in its own strategic planning and in its interaction with partners; doing so will necessarily increase the technical demands on WFP staff.

The evaluation identified locally driven programme planning as a key element for responding to these emergency-related implementation challenges. Here, WFP often has to "compensate" for the lack of strategic direction from government partners, who otherwise (i.e. in more stable "development" situations) would play a greater role in defining the key parameters of the school feeding intervention. In the absence of reliable educational data from the government, WFP has to develop other strategies to acquire the necessary understanding of the educational challenges and relevant objectives for support. In particular the targeting of school feeding projects has to be based not only on an understanding of the nutritional needs but, more importantly, the educational needs of the affected population. One possible approach is to seek closer strategic partnerships with organizations that are supporting primary education in the given context.

In the design of its ESF projects, WFP also has to find ways to systematically address the implementation constraints hindering support to the most vulnerable groups of school-aged children. First, the choice of ESF implementation modalities (e.g. biscuits vs. cooked meal) has to take better account of the infrastructure-related constraints at school level (cooking facilities, etc.) to avoid delays and irregularities in the distribution of food to the students. WFP has to carefully consider the specific objectives of the project to make sure that the chosen implementation modality and food commodities optimally support the project objectives within the constraints of the school environment. A comprehensive feasibility appraisal is therefore required, which includes the logistical challenges and possibilities for food delivery, in particular to the most remote – and often most vulnerable – schools. Contextual challenges and

[1] The acronym "ESF" will be used throughout the report to refer to school feeding activities as implemented in emergency settings, for purposes of easier reading. However, this does not imply that "ESF" should be understood as a programming category in itself.

their budgetary implications have to be considered in the customized and locally driven project planning process, and sufficient funds have to be made available to finance the adopted strategies.

Governments tend to play a more limited role in the implementation of school feeding projects in emergencies compared to their implementation in development situations. Nevertheless, it remains important for WFP to seek as much government cooperation as possible. ESF projects can provide opportunities for capacity building within government agencies and departments which can be built upon in a longer-term strategy for the education sector.

Ultimately, there is no definitive line between school feeding as implemented in emergency or development contexts; both contexts may have many similar challenges. WFP rather should recognize that in addition to specific emergency-related challenges, constraints present in development situations will almost inevitably be exacerbated in emergencies. Thus, in order to fully support school feeding in emergencies, WFP will need to provide comprehensive guidance to staff members managing ESF projects,

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Education in emergencies, chronic crises and early reconstruction contexts

The field of education in emergencies has come to prominence after the World Education Forum in Dakar in 2000 and Graca Machel's reports to the United Nations (UN) on the impact of war on children (1996, 2000). Recently, organizations and individuals working from different perspectives have joined their efforts under the umbrella term, 'Education in Emergencies[2]'. The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), formed in November 2000, works to promote quality education for those affected by emergencies, in situations of crisis and early reconstruction. It includes UN agencies, international and national Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), donor and recipient governments, policy makers, individual practitioners, researchers and students.[3]

One of the key initiatives of the INEE has been the development and subsequent dissemination and support for implementation of 'Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction Contexts'. These Standards were developed with the aim of raising the profile of education as a critical humanitarian intervention and promoting quality and accountability in the provision of education in emergencies. They are a first attempt to articulate widely accepted good practice in a number of key areas or Standards categories.

A small body of literature on gender issues in education in emergencies highlights the particular challenges for girls to access relevant education in emergency contexts. Tools on promoting women and girls' education and on mainstreaming gender into education in emergencies have also been developed in conjunction with the INEE[4]. Other documentation, which also draws on the wider literature on gender and conflict/emergencies and gender mainstreaming in humanitarian relief,[5] discusses in more detail the potential for education to empower girls and women teachers affected by conflict. This work points to the need not just to ensure that girls and boys have equal access to education in emergencies, but also that gender-differentiated needs, perspectives and priorities of students, teachers, parents and community members are met in and through education programming.

Cutting across all of the above is the theme of protection; it is one of the underlying principles of education in emergencies and a strong advocacy argument to advance the position of education within humanitarian aid. Yet, despite the convictions of those involved in the field, there is as yet little empirical evidence for the linkages between education and protection. Nicolai and Triplehorn's study (2003), "The role of education in protecting children in conflict", broadly grounded in programming experience rather than based in explicit research data, is a useful reference document and provides a rights-based framework for understanding how education can provide physical, cognitive and psychosocial protection for children. However, it is widely recognized that more empirical research is required to gain deeper insights into how

[2] There is an understanding that this term is a shorthand that refers to a range of formal and non-formal education activities in acute emergencies (natural and man-made), chronic crises through to early reconstruction contexts.

[3] See www.ineesite.org

[4] INEE 2006; INEE/IRC/WCRWC, 2006

[5] See for example, Kirk, 2004a &b; Kirk, 2005; Kirk & Winthrop, 2006; GPWG/ WCRWC, 2005; UNICEF ROSA 2005

and under what conditions education in emergencies can provide different forms of protection for boys and girls, male and female youth.

Location of ESF within the context of Education in Emergencies (EIE)

As the potential of food assistance to contribute to overall education development goals is not being fully appreciated[6], the same may be said of ESF in relation to Education in Emergencies goals. There is some attention given to school feeding as an access strategy[7] and, again, especially for girls[8]. Provision of food for the babies of adolescent mothers is also recommended as a strategy to encourage girls, who are often marginalized, into school (especially those who have been involved in fighting forces).

However, the literature does not provide detailed discussion of the potential or actual role that emergency school feeding can have within a broader framework of rights-based, relevant and quality education for girls and boys, male and female youth affected by emergencies of all kinds. Topics such as the linkages between food security and nutritional input; and physical and psychosocial protection through education have not yet been fully explored. There is international recognition of the potential for food distribution to exacerbate the issues of sexual exploitation and abuse to vulnerable girls and women[9], but the protective potential of ESF for girls and young women students is as yet unexplored. Furthermore, the literature does not focus on the different types of food assistance and the appropriateness of each to respond to the specific needs in different emergency contexts: natural, man-made, slow or sudden onset, and with different population groups; refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), host communities. Although WFP documentation discusses the potential of ESF to rally community support and engagement in education (especially of women) to act as a catalyst to bring together other actors to provide a comprehensive package of necessary inputs for children affected by emergency and/ or to contribute to the stabilization and strengthening of the education system, these are not currently addressed in any comprehensive way in the literature on education in emergencies.

1.2 Synopsis of WFP's support to education

WFP's food support to education mainly focuses on primary education, although some support is given to pre-primary schools or as part of early child development programmes, in some countries, and support can also be given to secondary education in some Country Programmes, as appropriate. This range of activities falls under the umbrella term of Food for Education (FFE), which is however often referred to, within the WFP context, by the term "school feeding"[10]. Support to non-formal education, whether it is literacy programmes for out-of-school children, youth or adults, vocational training or life skills programmes, is considered Food for Training (FFT). Attempts to promote integrated programming such as the "Essential Learning

[6] UNESCO-WFP Cooperative Programme, 2003.

[7] See for example, INEE's Good Practice Guide on School Feeding; also in the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crisis and Early Reconstruction Contexts, school feeding is referred to as an effective strategy to attract children to school and to therefore increase enrollment – see Category 2, 'Access and Learning Environment'.

[8] See INEE's Good Practice Guide on Women's and Girls' Education

[9] E.g. UNHCR/ Save the Children, 2002

[10] This evaluation also uses the term "school feeding" in this wider sense, i.e. comprising all types of modalities (cooked meals, snacks or take-home rations).

Package" (a joint WFP-United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) initiative) for example, are meant to ensure complementary support to education and nutrition, health, and hygiene activities.

FFE can be implemented through different modalities depending on the needs and context, each supposing different operational requirements. Particularly in an emergency context, the choice of the modality is often a compromise between feasibility, priority needs and objectives.

1.2.1 Types of programme

School feeding in its strictest sense refers to the provision of a snack or a meal at school, to be eaten by the students at school. More generally, the term can also include the provision of take-home rations to encourage schooling.

a) School feeding can be provided as a freshly prepared meal or snack. It mainly consists of a mixed food basket, consisting of staple food (wheat, maize, sorghum as grain or flour) or fortified blended food commodity (Corn-Soy-Blend (CSB), Wheat Soy Blend, etc), pulses and oil, sugar or salt. Fresh foods and other ingredients are contributed locally, generally as part of the community support.

b) A ready-to-eat snack to be consumed at school can alternatively be provided; generally these are fortified biscuits. These are of lower nutritional value compared to a freshly prepared meal, hence bearing a smaller potential to improve the actual nutritional situation. On the other hand, being dry and 'ready to eat', they do not require major investments in establishing infrastructure or efforts to prepare and serve the meal at the school. Consequently, the use of fortified biscuits allows for a faster and easier implementation, which often makes them the more suitable commodity under extreme emergency conditions.

c) Take Home Rations (THR) is another modality of FFE which provides an income transfer to the child's household. This modality acts as an incentive for consistent school attendance by minimising the opportunity costs related to education. As a result, it stimulates participation in education, particularly among food insecure populations and those in which certain groups of children, such as girls, are denied opportunities to attend school. THRs benefit the entire family, but not the student directly. A THR programme does not aim to reduce short-term hunger or to contribute to better nutrition during schooling. The provision of THRs allows for individual targeting, hence supporting the most vulnerable or disadvantaged population groups.

THRs are often used to reduce gender gaps in education or to stimulate participation in non-formal education such as literacy classes. In the short-term, THRs benefit the household food security; the food support helps to meet immediate needs, resulting in increased food consumption for all household members. Commodities are selected to best meet the actual needs, often being of a good nutritional as well as economic benefit to the family (i.e., staple food; oil, grain). In the longer term, there is often an increase in disposable income within the family that may be used for acquisition of other basic food or non-food item or to further support education for children.

1.2.2 Objectives of school feeding programmes

The objectives behind all FFE programmes are primarily educational; that is, the programme aims to improve educational outcomes through improved access and participation in education, particularly through increased enrolment and attendance. These objectives may include the alleviation of short-term hunger, which enable students to concentrate and learn better. Short-

term hunger occurs when children (predominantly those from food insecure households) have an inadequate breakfast and is exacerbated when they have to walk long distances to school.

Beyond the given 'educational support' outcomes, school feeding programmes can potentially contribute to an improved nutritional situation, particularly with regard to micronutrient deficiencies. This secondary objective of nutritional support is in some senses a 'given' (all food provided through WFP has nutritional benefits) but requires more care in implementation to achieve the objectives. To ensure effectiveness in alleviating short-term hunger and to minimize possible substitution effects (replacing food normally eaten within the family), it is necessary for the school feeding to occur as early as possible in the school day. On-site feeding programmes, if substitution effects are kept at minimum, would not show any immediate impact on household food security (that is, there is no benefit to the household; all the benefit is to the child receiving the food).

1.3 Purpose, objective and overall scope of the evaluation

This Thematic Evaluation of WFP School Feeding SF) in emergencies has been commissioned by WFP's Office of Evaluation Evaluation (OEDE). The decision to conduct this evaluation was triggered by various external and internal requests for more knowledge on the subject. The scant documentation and limited existing body of knowledge about school feeding projects in emergency contexts does not indeed correspond to the significant number of SF projects carried out in WFP Emergency or Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (EMOPs and PRROs) in recent years in emergency contexts (see Table 1). Some 20 to 38 percent of these operations implemented between 2002 and 2005 had ESF as a main activity - i.e., representing at least 40% of their overall beneficiaries; and 50 percent of all WFP school feeding beneficiaries in 2004 were part of an emergency response (EMOPs and PRROs).

The existing WFP guidelines specifically focused on ESF programmes produced in 2004, were primarily the result of an ad-hoc initiative prompted by WFP participation in the preparation of Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction Contexts facilitated by the INEE. The ESF guidelines were not based on a solid appraisal of the situation on the ground. The purpose of this evaluation was therefore to draw lessons for the future implementation of ESF in the various emergency contexts in which WFP operates; to identify aspects of ESF on which further guidance is needed and eventually to inform the preparation of the WFP policy paper on Food for Education and possibly the refinement of the 2004 "Guidelines for school feeding in an emergency situation".

With inherent limits in time and resources, the evaluation did not intend to specifically assess the effectiveness of the school feeding projects visited, but to be attentive to types of potential benefits observed in case studies in the different emergency contexts. This exercise also was not designed to draw conclusions on cost-efficiency aspects of school feeding in emergency contexts.

Table 1: Number of countries and beneficiaries reached by ESF programmes 2002-2005

Year	Number of operations[11]			Number of countries of implementation	Number of beneficiaries reached
	EMOPS	PRROS	Overall		
2002	9	21	30	29	7.9 million
2003	10	30	40	41	9.5 million
2004	12	29	41	47	10.2 million
2005	15	33	48	50	14.5 million

Source: ToR of ESF Evaluation

The evaluation focused on current WFP practices with regard to school feeding operations as implemented in emergency situations (EMOPs) and Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRROS). The objective of the evaluation was to explore ways in which school feeding effectively addresses the needs of people – and especially children -in emergency situations, by looking into the following:

- The relevance of objectives generally associated with ESF operations in the various emergency and operational contexts of WFP projects.
- The efficiency and effectiveness of ESF operations for contributing to these objectives.
- The constraints on and opportunities for managing ESF operations in the different emergency and operational contexts and how these influence the performance of these projects.
- The factors influencing the sustainability of ESF benefits in the various contexts encountered by WFP.

This evaluation does not include a cost-benefit analysis of ESF operations to arrive at a quantitative estimate of their efficiency. This is mainly due to two factors: first, operational costs are not usually measurable against an activity; many tasks are carried out for the benefit of several projects, and SF-related costs will not easily be separated from those of another activity. Secondly, the implementation set-up for ESF projects can be so different, depending on local realities and opportunities, that no comparison could be made in terms of efficiency of one option over another. The analysis of efficiency in this evaluation will rather be based on a qualitative analysis of the implementation process of ESF, complemented by selected measures of costs per unit of output (e.g., cost per meal, etc.) if this information was available from the WFP country office or Cooperating Partners.

The evaluation intended to examine these areas in a variety of different scenarios distinguished from each other on the basis of a) the context of the emergency, b) the context of the WFP operation, c) the features of the specific ESF programme and d) the objectives of the programme[12].

[11] Including revised projects but counting regional projects once.

[12] See in Annex 1 the conceptual framework used by the team, provided in the Terms of Reference (TORs).

1.4 Methodology and evaluation process

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness and sustainability, along with other key ESF-operational concepts, guided this inquiry. Assessing the effectiveness of ESF operations was primarily based on acquiring a contextual understanding of the intended intervention logic and its actual implementation founded on case studies. The evaluators used expert judgement to identify plausible links between ESF support and observed or presumed effects or to find patterns of effects of ESF operations and possible analogies with SF implemented in development contexts. The intention was to deepen the understanding of the operational mechanisms of school feeding projects and their particular strengths and weaknesses when implemented under emergency conditions.

The evaluation consisted of four components: a) a desk study, b) a series of three field visits to countries with ESF operations[13], c) a survey, distributed to ESF project managers in WFP country offices and d) an analytical phase, including an analytical workshop in Rome to review the data and process the information compiled throughout the evaluation.

1.4.1 Field Visits

The evaluation centred on three field visits, to Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Sudan. The evaluators selected these countries in cooperation with OEDE and with guidance from other WFP units to arrive at a diverse sample based on the following considerations:

- Geographical representation of WFP programme (Sub-Saharan African and Asian countries)
- Man-made or natural disasters
- Sudden or slow onset emergencies
- Infrastructures/ operations in place (prior WFP operation (including FFE) or office before the operation; existence of concomitant operations; development of country structures / governance)
- Characteristics of the target population type (stable or moving, united or scattered)

The specific countries for the field visits were thus chosen based on the following rationales:

- The Sudan represented a variety of operational contexts in one country: long-term conflict with large-scale displacement, IDP camps, returnee areas, government involvement and no government involvement. A slow onset natural disaster (crop failure) is also an issue in Sudan. There was also particular interest from the country office in being involved in and learning from the evaluation.
- The DRC also offered the chance of examining a number of key points of interest: a man-made crisis, IDP populations and an overall heterogeneous emergency situation with correspondingly complex operational features and where security is a key concern.

[13] Sudan, Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

- Pakistan represented a key Asian country with ESF implementation after a sudden-onset natural disaster and allowed for study of the role of ESF in the continuum between EMOP and PRRO.

During the field visits, the evaluators used the following tools for data collection:

- A review of key documents to extract data on objectives pursued by the ESF programs, operating costs (cost per meal, overhead, etc.), targeting strategies, socio-demographic make-up of the beneficiary population, etc. Reports of particular importance were monitoring and evaluation reports, technical project documents and end-of-project reviews, when available.
- Individual interviews and focus group discussions with
  - Project managers and project staff from WFP (head and sub-office levels).
  - Relevant partners (UNICEF, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), relevant NGOs, and Ministry staff members).
  - WFP's implementing partners for ESF operations in the field, including Parent Teacher Association (PTAs) and other community groups involved in ESF implementation.
  - Beneficiaries of ESF operations in the different operational and emergency contexts.

The focus groups were primarily used to gain insights into the specific emergency and operational context, the priority needs and perspectives of the populations, and the judgement and analytical perspectives of key WFP staff (project managers) involved in ESF, as well as representatives of other donors and selected WFP partners. The aim was to examine the constraints and opportunities faced in the management of ESF operations in the different scenarios.

1.4.2 E-mail survey of WFP country office staff

An e-mail survey was sent out to WFP staff members in 24 country offices (SF focal points, Country Directors (CDs) and Deputy Country Directors (DCDs)) involved with ESF programmes to solicit feedback on programming and objectives, management practices, and issues pertaining to sustainability. The survey was designed and disseminated after the first mission to Pakistan.

The response rate for the survey was 35%; OEDE received 45 responses from 17 countries, out of 130 staff members that had been contacted[14]. Findings from this survey were used to complement, confirm or complete information gathered through the desk or field studies.

1.4.3 Analytical Workshop and Debriefing

After the three field visits, the evaluation team met in Rome for a three-day analytical workshop, followed by a debriefing meeting with OEDE and the advisory group for this evaluation. The purpose of the analytical workshop was the compilation and processing of the information from

[14] OEDE received responses from Afghanistan (5), Algeria (2), Burundi (1), Colombia (4), Congo (1), DPR Korea (1), Iran (1), Iraq (4), Lesotho (1), Mozambique (2), Myanmar (4), Somalia (2), Sri Lanka (8), Swaziland (1), Timor Leste (1), Uganda (3), Zambia (1)

the desk review and all three missions. The analytical workshop helped to prepare the debriefing for WFP staff members and members of the advisory group and also formed the basis for the drafting of the final report.

2 FINDINGS

2.1 Relevance of objectives potentially addressed by school feeding in emergencies

Synopsis of current WFP guidance on needs assessment and setting of ESF objectives

The 2004 guidelines on school feeding in emergencies[15] suggest that the ***general objectives*** **typically pursued by school feeding[16] remain relevant in emergency situations**, in particular improvement of enrolment and attendance, reduction of afternoon absenteeism, the relief of short-term hunger and the reduction of gender-related or geographical disparities. In addition, the traumatic and disrupted conditions often inherent in emergencies would *add the need* to protect children from risks and/or disruptions in their education, to enhance the psycho-social development of children and to alleviate strain on the family food supply[17].

Apart from suggesting possible objectives for school feeding projects, both the ESF guidelines and the SF handbook also advise on appraisal and **problem analysis processes that should be part of the formulation and design of an ESF project**. However, guidelines for appraisals, particularly in an emergency context, do not exist. The 2004 ESF guidelines propose a situation analysis with a standardized baseline assessment[18] that, among other things, should determine "the situation at schools and whether it is appropriate for inclusion within a SF programme"[19].

Both the ESF guidelines and the 1999 SF Handbook call for a **comprehensive assessment of the current condition of the education system** and the effect that the crisis has had on it, including its significance as a potential source of conflict, the current state of enrolment, gender and/or ethnic discrepancies, and the level of hunger and/or malnutrition among students[20]. The availability of teachers, teaching aids, and the quality and language of curricula should also be assessed. The School Feeding Handbook also specifically states that an appraisal of projects in the education sector should include examination of specific cultural practices that, as additional barriers to education, can counteract efforts to increase enrolment and attendance, such as early marriage, seasonal farm labour needs, preference for private schooling, etc.

Finally, the SF Handbook calls for a **careful assessment of the potential role of WFP food aid in overcoming the identified problems**, allowing for the possibility that school feeding could play a role only in certain regions or in support of certain population groups.

2.1.1 Relevance of supporting education in emergency contexts

Although humanitarian practitioners and policy makers are increasingly recognizing the value of supporting education in emergencies, the idea is still strongly opposed by some. The central argument - also used by WFP members - is that in a life-saving operation, the imperative of rapidly distributing food to starving people leaves no room for concerns over education. People

[15] WFP, 2004

[16] I.e., those suggested by the 1999 SF Handbook

[17] WFP, 2004, p.17

[18] Using the protocols and templates of the standardized baseline survey.

[19] WFP (2004); p. 12

[20] WFP (2004); p. 13

would first need a minimum level of security and therefore freedom of mind before being able to think of such longer term issues.

While these arguments are unquestionable, most emergency situations in which WFP operates are long-standing emergencies or protracted crisis, where the lives of people are not immediately threatened. In these contexts, it is often the affected population itself that clearly prioritizes education.

2.1.2 The relevance of nutritional objectives in school feeding programmes.

Corporate guidance from WFP headquarters mandates SF/ESF programmes to focus on educational objectives only (including relieving short-term hunger), in part because nutritional effectiveness cannot be adequately quantified (see Chapter 2.2 below). However, targeting mechanisms take nutritional needs of school children into consideration. In practice, this means that school feeding programmes generally provide food commodities of high nutritional value to help supplement the nutritional needs of school-aged children.

As a result, many of the reviewed ESF projects do not have formal nutritional objectives, but are being implemented with the informal expectation that they will address nutritional needs of beneficiaries[21]. In Sudan, CPs and other stakeholders thought that SF projects indeed were meant to contribute to the achievement of nutritional and educational objectives[22]. These differences between official corporate guidance and the actual expectations of staff and partners on the ground raise the question if nutrition should be included in the formal objectives of ESF programmes.

The case of DRC illustrates this issue particularly well. The situation in the country is defined by generalized food insecurity and extreme nutritional needs. Many donors strongly prefer to focus all of the scarce resources on improving the food security situation and nutritional status of all people in the affected areas[23]. Some donors criticised the fact that to some extent school feeding competes with resources allocated to life-saving activities and instead supports an age - and socio-economic- group that is not necessarily the most vulnerable. In such contexts where the nutritional needs of the general population are so immense and resources are necessarily limited, it is therefore critical for WFP to clearly articulate how addressing the **combined educational and nutritional needs** school-aged children in the country can be a relevant choice. Specifically, this implies that WFP needs to:

- Clearly argue why meeting educational needs is a relevant priority for WFP in emergency situations, even in light of possibly immense unmet nutritional needs of the general population ;
- Show the effectiveness and unique comparative advantage of SF, in terms of its contribution to improved education and food security outcomes in the longer term for the children who do attend school.

[21] An exception exists, in post-tsunami Aceh, WFP's Nutritional Rehabilitation Programme through Primary School Feeding officially pursues nutritional objectives, i.e., "the improvement of nutrition, health and performance of students"; WFP (2005), p. 27.

[22] E.g., in Sudan, several CPs stated that "closing the food gap", "increasing food security at the school" and "improving nutritional status of children" were among the objectives they pursued with their school feeding projects.

[23] E.g., WFP management in DRC stated that donors are often critical of SF if it does not clearly respond to a crisis. The criticism has been that food that would be needed to respond to emergency conditions is being used for non-emergency SF.

In situations like in DRC, the chances for effective learning are in fact restricted by food insecurity and malnutrition. The stabilization of children's nutritional status is a pre-condition for their educational development. Here, school feeding has a definitive comparative advantage over other available means to address these educational challenges.

Under these circumstances, there is a need to strongly consider the nutritional improvement of students as a first-level potential benefit that would enable students to attend school regularly without gaps in attendance due to either sickness or the need to find food; it would also help meet short-term hunger needs to enable students to focus on their lessons.

However, setting specific nutritional objectives should not be taken lightly – it has significant implications for the design and implementation of ESF projects. Pursuing nutritional objectives requires a careful assessment of nutritional needs and the mobilization of sufficient resources to ensure an adequate nutritional response. It also helps to have a stronger focus on the effective use of food in terms of improved nutrition, and the inclusion of nutrition-relevant indicators in monitoring and evaluation. Nutritional objectives would help to strengthen the focus on better nutrition and would help to enhance nutritional benefits. In certain contexts, this could add an additional value to SF programmes and possibly improve their comparative advantages. It would also allow for a stronger position advocating for SF programmes.

2.1.3 Lack of coherence between formal objectives, priority needs and implementation realities

In neither of the three countries[24], the formulated objectives[25] were completely consistent with the observed needs. As a result, formal objectives had little relevance for guiding the SF implementation in the field. Cooperating Partners (CP) and WFP field staff were often not closely following the formal objectives. Many had formulated "informal" objectives for their projects, which were often more consistent with the actual needs than the ones stated in the project documents.

- In Pakistan, the PRRO document refers to "standard"[26] educational objectives, including the reduction of gender disparities and the increase and maintenance of primary school attendance. WFP staff and CPs, however, stated the "return to normalcy" after the earthquake as the primary objective of SF, which was judged by the evaluation team as a relevant objective in the context. Furthermore, overall primary enrolment and attendance of girls was already high before the earthquake in Azad Jammu and Kashmire (AJK), This particular group was probably not a priority target group for school feeding[27].

- In Sudan, the current EMOP set very broad objectives for school feeding activities for a country-wide programme that had to respond to widely differing situations and emergency

[24] DRC, Sudan, Pakistan

[25] I.e., those stated in the official programme documents, e.g., the PRROs in Pakistan and the EMOP in Sudan.

[26] I.e. the objectives defined and accepted within WFP guidance as those which school feeding appropriately respond to (e.g. increased enrolment and attendance, reduced short-term hunger, income transfer…).

[27] This refers to the pre-earthquake situation, however, and ESF was expected to help families revert to that situation despite the shock, displacement and often loss of livelihood.

contexts[28] (outlined in 1.4.1). In practice, this meant that the formal objectives were not necessarily consistent with the shape and content of the actual SF activities as implemented on the ground. Again, field-level implementers often had a good understanding of what the actual needs were, and which of those school feeding could address.

- Project documents in DRC did not formally state any nutritional objectives, in accordance with current corporate guidance on ESF objectives (see Section 2.2)[29]. However, most interviewees stressed that responding to the high level of generalized food insecurity was the primary need in the country. Similarly, donors interviewed in Kinshasa stressed that they expected WFP to use its limited resources for saving lives. WFP staff in DRC also stated a contribution to reducing short-term hunger as one of the ESF objectives.

In the end, the formal objectives had little significance for shaping the actual implementation of WFP's school feeding activities (see Chapter 2.4.2). Partners in Sudan were, for the most part, not necessarily aware of any objectives WFP may have defined for SF. Each partner essentially decided on the specific objectives to be pursued for which it merely seeks – and most often received – WFP's support. In Pakistan, there were different perceptions among key stakeholders, including WFP staff, about the objectives that SF officially should and practically could pursue[30]. The evaluators' recommendations for clarifying ESF objectives and modalities can be found in Chapter 4.

One underlying factor in the observed disconnect between formal objectives, needs and the "perceived objectives" identified in all three countries was the **lack of a focused design process for the school feeding** component of WFP's emergency or rehabilitation programmes. Field staff was focused on fulfilling the requirements of large scale General Food Distributions (GFD), or on logistics, rather than on the demands of a sector-specific and technically challenging programming, such as ESF. Finally, the overall organizational and the country-specific WFP structure and modus operandi in the three case study countries made it difficult to design ESF activities based on locally-specific needs assessments. All three aspects will be treated in more detail in Chapter 2.4.2.

2.1.4 Revising corporate SF objectives

In all three countries, CPs, WFP sub-office staff and other closely involved stakeholders stated objectives for SF activities that fell outside of the range of corporate WFP objectives. In Khartoum, CPs mentioned issues ranging from WFP's standard educational objectives (improved attendance, reduction of short-term hunger and the improvement of gender balance in schools) to less well-established and formally recognized goals that go beyond education, such as: helping to meet nutritional requirements, increasing food security at school, closing the food gap, improving the nutritional status or providing protection to children. The situation was similar in Pakistan, where the objectives described ranged from psycho-social support, to maintaining nutritional standards or increasing daily retention (i.e., reducing late-morning

[28] Sudan EMOP 10503.0 document, paragraph 34: "WFP will seek creative collaborative arrangements and move towards recovery activities like […] improving access to […] schools."; and paragraph 38: "School feeding […]will contribute to relieving short-term hunger and increasing coverage to about 646,000 children".

[29] Nonetheless, the ESF contributed to meeting nutritional requirements of school children and showed a considerable effect on children nutritional situation. This will be discussed further in Chapter 2.2.

[30] Conclusion drawn from interviews with cluster members in Muzaffarabad, CPs and WFP staff members in NWFP and AJK.

absenteeism) – none of which are mentioned in the PRRO document or are included in WFP's corporate objectives. In DRC, most striking was the repeated mention of the acute nutritional needs to which SF could respond, although WFP did not officially recognize its nutritional dimension.

A key objective of the Earthquake Response and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) the lead government agency for the overall recovery effort in Pakistan, was the facilitation of a return to normalcy for the children who had been affected by the earthquake. One of its most important elements was a return to the regular and 'healthy' routine of children attending school every day, in part to offset the effects of trauma. The provision of food at school was seen as an incentive for students to return to the schools earlier[31] than they otherwise might have done[32]. Interviewees in Sudan and DRC mentioned similar social and emotional needs, for example, the opportunity to play with classmates during lunch break (in lieu of going home in search for food) or the improvement of social cohesion among students in post-conflict societies[33]. The real-time evaluations for WFP's tsunami response in Aceh and Sri Lanka [34] also identified multiple psychosocial needs of children in emergency contexts that potentially could be considered by WFP and other humanitarian organizations in formulating their emergency responses. Feedback from beneficiary communities in Sudan and DRC even suggested that psychosocial needs in post-emergency situations extend to the parents of students who – in the absence of school feeding – have to worry about providing a meal to their children before and after their day in school. Such concerns add to the already high levels of stress for men and women living in emergency and transitional contexts.

2.1.5 Conclusions

The apparent disconnect between stated objectives and needs is primarily linked to the fact that **opportunities for locally designed SF components of PRROs and EMOPs are either not available or not utilised**. Limiting factors for locally designed programmes are at least in part the result of the context of the emergency. However, **limitations are also linked to WFP's general modus operandi** which does not prioritize building staff capacity in sub- and country offices to develop technically relevant expertise for assessing educational needs or taking into account existing barriers to education and the more general education system when designing their programmes. There is currently **not a strong culture of sister-agency partnership** which would allow WFP to build on another agency's educational assessments. Another limiting factor is that **country offices do not "expect" the careful assessment of the nutritional and educational needs** prior to deciding the implementation of SF – despite the fact that the existing corporate guidance calls for a customized design of the intervention. Literally following the corporate guidance on designing objectives for SF seems to produce as good a chance for PRRO or EMOP approval as a careful design of customized objectives.

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[31] Consensus seemed to exist that many or most students would have returned to school after the earthquake and in fact, several examples were quoted or observed where the students had returned before school feeding had begun.

[32] The point was made by WFP programme staff, Ministry of Education (MoE) officials at the federal and provincial level, the Special Adviser at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and NGO representatives and teachers in the earthquake affected areas.

[33] The issues of play and social cohesion were mentioned in several locations around Sudan, e.g., in several schools in Abyei and Kadugli.

[34] WFP (2005): Full report of the Real Time Evaluation of WFP's response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami.

2.2 Appropriateness and potential benefits of school feeding in emergencies

Synopsis of WFP guidance regarding the benefits of school feeding

WFP's 1995 ***Operational Guidelines for WFP Assistance to Education***[35] state that school feeding can **improve children's attendance and enrolment in school.** School feeding by and large[36] is also thought to help offset the effects of **short-term hunger**[37], particularly prevalent when children have no or inadequate breakfast or have to walk long distances. As a result, school feeding has a positive effect on **the learning achievements of children**, through more regular school attendance, increased attention and concentration. There is evidence to suggest that the **provision of a nutritious meal at school can have a positive impact on the cognitive capacity** of students, particularly if malnourished children are targeted[38].

The nutrition situation of school-aged children and its link to education and global strategies are presented in Annex 3. Improvements in student health and nutrition offer the possibility of improving educational efficiency[39] and school-based health and nutrition programmes are seen as having a good potential to improve actual nutrition of school aged children[40]. The **health- and nutrition-related benefits of on-going SF programmes** are rarely assessed however. The existing studies have produced contradictory evidence regarding effectiveness of SFs in that respect, but agree that school feeding alone can not be expected to address the full range of factors determining a child's nutritional status. The **use of micro-nutrient fortified foods** can make a positive contribution to alleviate micro-nutrient deficiencies particularly with regard to iron and iodine deficiency and can help to contribute to a better development of children. Alleviation of iron deficiency anaemia is particularly relevant for young women in view of reducing child-birth complications[41]. Nutritional benefits are enhanced if combined with programmes to control worm infections.

The 1995 guidelines refer to the following **potential indirect effects of school feeding** that, although not systematically studied, should be taken into account when considering the merits of school feeding: a) the **enriching contribution to teaching-learning processes**[42]; b) the stimulation of **community participation** in education; c) the provision of a **setting for community development activities** such as creating employment opportunities; and d) the provision of an **outlet for local food production**[43].

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[35] WFP (2005): Operational Guidelines *for* WFP Assistance to Education, Rome, 23.10.2005; SCP 15/INF/3

[36] The 1995 guidelines find that while it has been established that short-term hunger is negatively affecting the cognitive abilities of children, studies that tried to assess the ability of SF to counteract this negative effect had remained largely inconclusive. Nonetheless, the guidelines find that continued support to school feeding to promote the cognitive development of children was warranted (WFP (1995), p. 7).

[37] Short term hunger or 'temporary hunger' can be measured by low blood sugar levels setting in after four to six hours of fasting and influenced by level of activity (Hicks, 1996).

[38] Acute malnutrition, especially iron and iodine deficiency, directly affects cognitive development. Simeon and Grantham-McGregor, 1989; Pollit, Jacoby and Cueto, 1996; Moore, 1994; Jarousse and Mignat, 1991; Agarwal *et al.*, 1987, SCN 16 1998

[39] B. Levinger, Nutrition, Health, and Learning- School nutrition and health network, monograph series, 1992

[40] Partnership for Child Development in: SCN News 16, Nutrition of School Aged Children, July 1998.

[41] Lize van Stuijvenberg and Spinnie Benadé (1998): Addressing Micro-nutrient deficiencies in school aged children with fortified biscuits, In: SCN News 16. UK Department for International Development (DFID) (2003).

[42] *Sherman (2003*) describes an interesting example of a joint nutrition education project of FAO and the Government of Zambia, where addressing nutritional needs was transformed into curriculum elements and specific teaching materials to be used in the existing education system in Luapula Valley in Zambia.

[43] E.g., the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Home Grown School Feeding programme aims to link food for education with investments in agricultural productivity and marketing so that local producers can meet the increased demand.

This evaluation was not designed to quantitatively measure the effectiveness of SF in the various countries studied. Rather, the aim was to qualitatively examine which factors can affect the effectiveness of school feeding projects implemented in emergencies and to assess to what extent the findings from earlier quantitative studies of development school feeding programs can be assumed to apply also to ESF programmes. The paragraphs below discuss first the circumstances in which school feeding can be seen as potentially effective in addressing one objective or another, highlighting also the factors that are thought to limit its effectiveness.

2.2.1 Appropriateness of school feeding to address identified priority issues in emergencies

2.2.1.1 Potential of school feeding to effectively address educational needs

All case studies consistently suggest that school feeding can act as an **effective tool to increase daily retention**[44]. Teachers and students in most of the schools listed this as one of the benefits of the distributed food[45]. The effect connects logically to contextual conditions in Sudan and DRC; in a situation where food is scarce, parents usually cannot provide a snack for their children to take to school. The provision of a mid-day meal allows children to remain in school instead of returning home for lunch - with distances to schools often too long to come back- or leaving school to find their own food. In cultural contexts in which children do not necessarily eat before school, a mid-morning or mid-day lunch is also an incentive for children to stay in class when they may otherwise have to leave to find food before the end of the school day. UNICEF representatives in Khartoum also explicitly stressed that the ability to improve daily retention was one of the unique advantages of school feeding.

[44] "Daily retention" should be understood as children staying longer within the day, i.e. following the school class throughout.

[45] Parents of a student in Rumbek stated that before the SF started, their children did not stay in school for whole day, whereas now they would stay until the end; in Kadugli, teachers stated that children who live close by had gone home during lunch hours before the SF – and had often not returned. Now, these students would be more likely to stay and learn all day, with less disruption and more attention on the quality of education.

Table 2: Summary of evidence and influencing factors for effectiveness of (E)SF on education

Intended Effect	Established Evidence SF - general	Anecdotal Evidence for "E"SF effects	Main disconnect in particular situation[46] (-)
Attendance	SF can have positive effect	*Pakistan (-):* feedback from students & teachers suggests no effect *Sudan (+/-):* Feedback from students & teachers suggests improved attendance, but only in some areas *DRC (+):* feedback from students & teachers suggests positive effect	*Pakistan: (-)* inaccurate (food vulnerability-based) targeting: e.g. in AJK already high motivation of students to go to school *Sudan:* (-) Already high motivation of students from IDP communities to go to school; distance to school, access to and quality of facilities and instruction main barriers to education.
Enrolment	SF can have positive effect	*Pakistan (-):* Feedback from students & teachers suggests very limited effects on enrolment or attendance in elementary schools. *DRC (-):* Feedback from students & teachers suggests limited to no effect on enrolment.	*Pakistan: (-)* inaccurate (food vulnerability-based) targeting *DRC: (-)* School fees in a context of extreme poverty, exacerbated by low quality of education are the main barriers to education among targeted students, not student or parent motivation
Reducing short-term hunger / improved learning	SF can have positive effect	*Pakistan (-):* Despite stated "improved attentiveness" of learners, the effect was questionable (Main contradicting factors: extremely poor teaching, lack of resources, lack of basic sanitation. *Sudan (+/-):* Stated effects in some locations (long walk to school, no breakfast), in others questionable *DRC (+):* Effect reported in most locations (no breakfast, no lunch from home)	*Pakistan:* (-) inaccurate targeting; short-term hunger not an issue in visited areas and flawed implementation (late distribution) *Sudan: (-)* late food handout, due to logistical challenges (preparation of early wet meal in dilapidated / inadequate school infrastructure)
Increased daily retention	No evidence available	*Pakistan (+/-):* late distribution of biscuits allowed an impact on daily retention (if problematic), *Sudan (+):* Daily retention increased in most locations *DRC (+):* Students able to stay in school throughout the school day	*Pakistan:* (-) late distribution compromises on short term hunger objective (if that was a problem). *Sudan: (+)* Children not forced to find food or money for food themselves or go home (long distances) to eat lunch *DRC: (+)* Children not forced to organize food themselves

[46] This table does not imply that the disconnects listed in this column are systematically linked to reduced effects on attendance, enrolment, etc. They are simply the reasons that were thought to be responsible in the particular situation. Also, in DRC, this was particularly difficult to do, as there had been no SF since June 06.

Factors limiting effectiveness of ESF on education

The low coherence between the formal objectives of SF and the actual needs of the target populations was a factor that has limited not only the relevance of SF but also reduced the effectiveness of SF in producing results. In Pakistan, increased enrolment of girls was one of the objectives of the SF component of the PRRO. However, AJK, one of the areas affected by the earthquake, already had the highest girls' enrolment and attendance in the country prior to the earthquake. The oil THRs for middle school girls in NWFP seemingly were included in the PRRO in order to align it better with the scope of the country programme and not to respond to a clearly identified need of improving enrolment and attendance for girls post-earthquake[47]. This made the provision of biscuits as an incentive to attend superfluous[48] and thus ineffective in attracting additional students to school[49]. The limited effectiveness was partly the result of the little attention given to understanding the actual factors limiting school attendance (see following section). In Sudan, the evaluators observed a similar situation: WFP provided SF to beneficiaries for whom – having recently returned to the South - claiming access to culturally relevant education (often implying education with English language and with Christian foundations rather than Islamic) already was a clear and strong priority[50].

WFP at times had difficulties to recognise the main barriers to education. In DRC, where poverty was endemic, fees of only $1/ month per student were, for many families, impossible to provide in addition to the associated costs of supplying uniforms, books and learning materials. Offering an additional meal in school did not offset these costs[51] and so the positive effects of SF on enrolment were limited. In NWFP (Pakistan), the cultural forces that keep girls from finishing their education are particularly strong. Girls who are preparing to be married can drop

[47] It is worth mentioning that while the PRRO also intended to include AJK for the THR component, this was refused by the government of AJK because it was unnecessary.

[48] It should be noted that ultimately, this "ineffectiveness" of ESF is based on inaccurate needs assessment and lack of focused programme design in the sense that an increase in attendance was not among the primary needs in AJK.

[49] A visit to a school in Muzaffarabad (AJK, Pakistan) showed only on insignificant increase in the attendance level, from 47 students on the first day to 53 on day of the visit. In another school, enrolment had actually gone down from an initial high of 97 students after the earthquake (without biscuits) to approximately 72 students at the time of the visit – and after distribution of the biscuits had commenced. About 20 students had moved to another school that was not receiving any biscuits, but other NGO support, which could not be identified.

[50] Similarly, the school feeding programme in Afghanistan started up after the overthrow of the Taliban had already removed some of the most significant barriers to education. A large number of parents and students who were ready to take advantage of the new educational opportunities created massive increases in school enrolment[50]. The 2004 evaluation of the Afghanistan PRRO 10233 accordingly judges that the increases in enrolment and attendance had mainly been a result of the changed political environment, a successful UNICEF supported "back to school campaign"[50] and the influx of returnees; the incentive of a free meal or THR added only little in this situation. A potential contribution of school feeding to this increase seemed also unlikely, because WFP had only been able to supply schools with significant disruption in distribution (on average biscuits were provided for 90 school days instead of the targeted 220 days, planned vs. actual food dispatch). In the end, school feeding had started after the beginning of the academic year and was discontinued after only 4 months due to a pipeline break (WFP (2004a), p.32-33).

[51] In DRC, the school meal often was consumed in addition to the little amount of food prepared and consumed at home. This is positive, because it increases the likelihood of a beneficial nutritional effect of the school meal, but also means that the family does not substitute any of the home-cooked food with the school meal and thus does not incur any savings.

out of school despite the provision of food rations.[52] The 2006 evaluation of WFP assistance to Darfur under EMOP 10339.0/1 finds that education was already a priority for the targeted IDPs in Darfur and that the main issue was in fact the lack of access to education (i.e., the low number of schools), not the lack of encouragement to attend. The evaluation therefore concludes that school feeding was not as effective as a more directly related educational incentive may have been[53], such as a school fee waiver, the provision of school buildings, or recruitment of better qualified teachers. Similarly, one of the main barriers to education for girls in NWFP (Pakistan) is the extremely low number of middle schools for girls, creating limited access.[54]

Ultimately, these issues are also linked to the fact that opportunities for locally designed programmes did not exist or were not fully utilised when the SF project was initiated. In the particular cases above, there was no appraisal of the educational needs before implementing ESF activities[55]. In addition, WFP's overall modus operandi also seems to favour an automatic response with a standard set of tools, without an analysis of their effectiveness in the particular emergency situation. The 2005 Thematic Review of Targeting in WFP Relief Operations suggests that "multiple food aid modalities are typically employed in WFP relief programming more as a matter of course or habit than as a well considered strategy […]. There also appeared to be an assumption that by employing multiple modalities all target populations would be covered"[56].

The effectiveness of SF is also affected by shortcomings in their implementation at school level. In countries such as Sudan where many students do not receive breakfast before leaving their homes and have long distances to walk to reach their schools, a key objective for on-site school feeding is the reduction of short-term hunger . However, the first meal is often not served before 11 a.m.: too late to function as a nutritious breakfast to alleviate short-term hunger during the morning hours and to improve learning potential of students (especially so because the school day ends at the end of the morning). The main challenge in many schools is that traditional 'three-stone' fires make cooking very time consuming, which often makes it impossible to prepare a meal before late morning or even before lunchtime. Instead of the intended two meals, schools therefore often only served one meal per day, during the school lunch break. After not having received breakfast at home, many children therefore went without food for the entire morning[57].

One important factor contributing to this situation was that the selection of SF modalities and commodities did not sufficiently take into account the limited availability of adequate infrastructure in the schools. In Sudan, choosing prepared meals as delivery modality for both an early morning snack and a midday meal put considerable strain on the communities who were

[52] Several of the girls that were interviewed during the visit to Pakistan were already engaged to be married and their expectation was that they would drop out after marriage. In this situation, SF promote the education of girls would therefore have to be accompanied by wider efforts to support the education of girls – to address this and other barriers to education. In Mansehra (Pakistan), for example, only three girls' schools existed in the entire district. This limitation makes the supply of oil as a THR ineffective in terms of total enrolment; though it may help intelligent poorer girls take up places in the schools, and may have some effect on delaying marriages until the course is completed.

[53] WFP (2006c), p.11

[54] THR of oil are restricted to girls' middle schools in line with the country programme

[55] There are various possible causes for this omission, which will be discussed further in Chapter 0.

[56] The evaluation team saw the use of SF as a tool in Darfur as a particular example of this principle (WFP (2005b), p.39)

[57] Feedback from teachers and students in Juba, Kadugli and Rumbek.

expected to provide the facilities and materials such as utensils for preparing the meals. In the mountainous regions of Pakistan, the logistics (and costs) involved in moving high volume-low weight biscuits to remote areas meant that schools who may have needed the biscuits the most (to fulfil any of the stated objectives) were often the ones to miss out. The linkage between delivery modality and the minimum necessary conditions at school level for each modality will be discussed further in Chapter 2.2.2 below.

2.2.1.2 Nutritional effects of SF in Emergencies

In contexts defined by severe food insecurity and hunger, the **question of nutritional benefits of school feeding becomes more important.** Although more research on this issue is required, a consensus seems to exist that school feeding programmes implemented in stable development contexts, allowing for an uninterrupted implementation, can have certain positive nutritional and health effects, in particular by minimising the consequences for children who are suffering from extreme malnutrition and micro-nutrient deficiencies[58]. The evaluation findings specific to emergency contexts are broadly consistent with these earlier conclusions. Students seem healthier and appear to be more actively playing in schools where food is being served; they are also apparently less often stricken by minor sickness[59]. Where prepared meals were the applied modality and students could make the most of the school rations as "one additional meal", their families valued an improvements in their own overall nutritional and health status.

However, earlier studies already established that the broader nutritional impacts of school feeding programmes alone are limited[60]. School feeding in isolation from other nutritional or health related programmes can only address some of the elements that determine the actual nutritional status of children[61]. Nutritional benefits alone therefore cannot justify the choice of school feeding as an intervention type (Box 1: School Feeding vs Nutrition Intervention – the limitations of school feeding)[62].

[58] Partnership for Child Development in: SCN News 16, Nutrition of School Aged Children, July 1998,

[59] WFP Sri Lanka PRRO, Nutrition Baseline Survey for FFE, 2004. Lize van Stuijvenberg and Spinnie Benadé (1998): Addressing Micro-nutrient deficiencies in school-aged children with fortified biscuits, In: SCN News 16. DFID (2003).

[60] This translates into the relevance for more comprehensive school health programmes.

[61] For a discussion of the importance of complementary activities in the context of school feeding programmes, please see Chapter 2.4 below.

[62] In the case of DRC, for example, WFP has to be able to convincingly demonstrate that educational effects of its school feeding programme are likely to accrue if not in the short term, then at least in the medium term in order to justify its choice of SF as an intervention.

Box 1: School Feeding vs Nutritions Intervention - the limitations of school feeding

School feeding programmes are not nutrition interventions to tackle malnutrition at its roots or to compensate for nutritional shortcomings during early childhood. Malnutrition has multiple causes, including poor food consumption patterns, illness, lack of sanitation and poor health and hygiene practices[63]. Serious mental damage, such as reduced intelligence and lower physical capacity is predominantly a result of poor nutrition during earlier periods in life[64], before children start going to school. School feeding programmes therefore cannot be considered to be pure nutrition programmes, and should not be prioritized at the expense of efforts to reach pre-school children with effective nutrition interventions[65]. Strategically, school feeding programmes cannot replace nutrition programmes that target vulnerable groups, such as pregnant and lactating mothers or children under two years of age.

The comparative advantage of school feeding programmes therefore lies in their ability to play a supportive role with regard to children's education in that they can help to bring children to school. The added nutrition from school meals also can help students to be more attentive and to increase their concentration span during lessons, ultimately enabling children to learn better. This is particularly relevant in areas where malnutrition is a severe and acute problem.

The reverse question is, however, if SF can be justified on the basis of its contribution to educational benefits alone - without considering its potential effects on the nutritional and health status of beneficiaries. In the case of the specific objectives of reducing short-term hunger and increasing daily retention, the evaluation found that properly implemented school feeding projects as "food-based" interventions have a distinct role to play. If the aim was to increase enrolment and attendance, however, the evidence in favour of school-feeding was less clear-cut; Here, where effectiveness is less clearly tied to food as an input, WFP has to explicitly demonstrate the comparative advantage and effectiveness of SF in comparison to other strategies for supporting enrolment and attendance[66]. This is particularly important in emergency situations like in DRC or Darfur where, in light of the severe food and nutrition needs of the population, donors and partners put pressure on WFP to use all of its resources for life-saving interventions, like general food distributions or nutrition interventions.

The justification of 'food support to education' therefore critically depends on the link between food insecurity, malnutrition and effective learning. WFP has to demonstrate that even marginal improvements of food intake and nutritional status can effectively address those nutritional problems that often hamper the students' ability to learn[67]. It is exactly this link that constitutes the unique comparative advantage of SF.

[63] UNICEF, 1990, Causal Model of Malnutrition.

[64] World Bank (2006), Repositioning Nutrition as Central to Development, A strategy for large scale action, Washington, p.12.

[65] World Bank (2006), Repositioning Nutrition as Central to Development, A strategy for large scale action, Washington, p.12

[66] Such as waiving or subsidizing of school fees for students from particularly poor families or improving the quality of education through teacher training, provision of materials and school supplies, uniforms / clothing, or in situations where there is resistance and cultural barriers, raising community awareness of the benefits of education, especially for girls.

[67] Interviewees in DRC asserted that the extremely high and wide spread food insecurity, acute malnutrition and hunger among children reduces children's activity level, makes them less attentive and hinders their physical and mental development. Hence, even a small improvement in diet has the potential to contribute significantly to more effective learning.

Challenges inherent to SF programmes in contexts of general food insecurity

Experience in DRC shows that **SF may also have some negative consequences in insecure contexts with high malnutrition and food insecurity** [68]Interviews with students and teachers in several schools revealed that some children feel "uncomfortable" about eating in school when nobody else in their family has the opportunity for a regular meal – sometimes including siblings who attend other schools that do not receive food support. Food supplies to schools can also create tensions between the school-based food monitor and other school staff, with teachers wanting to have dry rations to take home and share with their families instead of eating the food at school, as is WFP policy. The visit to DRC, a context of widespread food insecurity, also showed that the food can lead to tensions and "rivalry" between schools, where parents of children who are not receiving support, are protesting what they view as unfair distribution of resources between neighbouring schools. For some schools, the delivery of ESF was also described as a security risk - some interviewees described how the food stocks turned the school into targets for looting and that they regularly had to face demands for food supplies from local fighting forces[69].

2.2.1.3 Other potential direct and indirect effects of school feeding

Feedback from community members provided anecdotal evidence of indirect or unplanned positive effects of school feeding projects. In Sudan and DRC, where prepared meals were the chosen intervention, one of the frequently mentioned benefits was **increased community participation,** stimulated through the involvement of community members in the management of the school feeding project[70]. In many schools, women from the community served as cooks, and the Comités de Gestion took over responsibilities in the management and oversight of the programme. DRC would seem to offer the most promising context for active community involvement, which could be attributed to the long-standing presence of church-led, community-based support to the education sector, so necessary in a context in which government support has been non-existent. The dire need for food also seemed to be a driving force for active community participation. However, the demands that school feeding places on communities and PTAs can also potentially overburden them. In Juba (Sudan), for example, the already high demand on the minimal resources of PTAs for a range of community interventions prevented them from getting involved in school feeding even in a supportive role.

Another benefit of ESF is its potential to promote a **quicker return to "normalcy"** after unsettling and often traumatizing emergency conditions have eased. After Pakistan earthquake, a sudden onset emergency, several teachers claimed that the biscuits "helped" students to settle back into their normal school and life routines. In situations of slower onset or more protracted emergencies, the potential of school feeding is more that of preserving a sense of normalcy, linked to which are **other psycho-social benefits** that interviewees ascribed to the project. Teachers often claimed that eating together at the school helped the students to integrate

[68] See discussion of the relevance of nutritional objectives in section 1.1.

[69] For a discussion of how these negative side-effects of school feeding can be linked to prepared meals as a particular delivery modality, see Section 2.2.2.

[70] This became particularly clear in interviews with community members and teachers in Sudan and DRC, less so in Pakistan, where the dry-feeding modality offered much less opportunity for community involvement.

themselves into their peer group[71]. The social benefit has a particular significance in post-emergency and post-conflict situations. The meal at school also gives children time to play and spend leisure time together. These are factors that contribute to the positive socialization of students in school and thus to the stabilization of the overall social environment in schools.

2.2.1.4 Using ESF as part of a safety net strategy

The fact that stand-alone school feeding interventions are not able to comprehensively address malnutrition has implications for their potential role as safety net components. If the primary goal was to ensure nutritional effects alone, other tools, such as targeted supplementary feeding, would be more suited. If, however, the safety net strategy includes a component to safeguard the educational development of children (which, it can be argued should be the case under the imperatives of the Millennium Development Goal (MDGs) and EFAs), school feeding does have a role to play because, a) it can ensure that children can remain in class and attentive during school hours, even if their parents are not in the position to provide school snacks or lunches; b) it can give children a sense of security and normalcy, based on the fact that in times of turmoil they are ideally, in a protected environment, able to share concerns and feelings with peers and trusted adults and to focus on a more positive future.

However, considering school feeding as a safety net component should take into account the effects that can realistically be expected from a time-limited project:

- Any improvements of "the quality of learning" linked to a reduction of short-term hunger or "daily retention" will necessarily be limited to the duration of the project and will be short-lived unless conditions of life improve.
- Likewise, any effects on attendance and enrolment of children not previously in school will also be limited, for many families, to the duration of the intervention. A short-term supply of food may not be able to change and remove the barriers to education that have kept children out of school prior to an emergency. However, for children who were already in school before the emergency, the continuation of their schooling despite social and economic disruption (with or without displacement) is vital; otherwise their schooling may be discontinued permanently.
- Also the point that other education interventions are required, such as professional orientation to teachers to ensure that schools - even with food – do provide protective environments

School feeding programmes as part of a safety net strategy should therefore not be used to attempt to increase or improve educational variables, but they could potentially be helpful in trying to "maintain" enrolment, attendance or the quality of learning at pre-emergency levels. This has implications for the needs assessment process and subsequent targeting strategy: rather than targeting areas with particularly low enrolment and attendance, WFP would instead target areas that are in greatest danger of a reduction of enrolment and attendance, daily retention or the quality of learning - and these may or may not be those areas with low pre-emergency enrolment and attendance.

[71] Similar benefits were observed in the post-conflict situation in Sri Lanka's North East, where children affected by many years of conflict and civil war were given the opportunity to share meals at school. The social aspect of sharing a meal with classmates was considered to be a very important benefit of the SF programme.

2.2.1.5 Conclusions on the effectiveness and the "niche" of SF in Emergencies

One key question is whether a combination of nutritional and educational benefits can justify the choice of school feeding as an intervention in emergencies. School feeding can be an effective intervention when **nutritional effects are a direct prerequisite for the achievement of subsequent educational objectives** regarding access and quality, and when one cannot be achieved without the other. Improving the **quality of learning** by alleviating short-term hunger and reducing afternoon absenteeism illustrates objectives whose attainment depends on the achievement of even marginal and temporary nutritional effects in order to ensure subsequent educational benefits.

Low **enrolment and attendance**, however, can be caused by many different factors: high school fees, lack of schools, systematic discrimination against certain groups of students, and so forth. Efforts to improve enrolment and attendance therefore need to be based on an in-depth understanding of the specific barriers to education that reduce access to education in particular situations. When existing barriers are directly or indirectly related to unfulfilled nutritional or food-related needs, the use of SF as a "food-based" intervention has a potential relative advantage over other access strategies. Generally, SF offers the greatest comparative advantage in situations where nutritional and educational needs are inherently linked and where they should be addressed in combination.

2.2.2 Comparative advantages of different SF delivery modalities in emergencies

Synopsis on the choice of different delivery modalities in emergencies

The SF Handbook provides **detailed information on the advantage of different available food commodities.** The choice over the selection of different modalities and commodities is open to local decision-making, based on locally available resources and capacities. However, information on the advantages and disadvantages of different modalities and commodities is difficult to find[72].

The SF Handbook explores in detail different **possible meal combinations of food commodities** for different types of school schedules[73], comparing them based on their energy, protein and micronutrient content, their costs, the choice of available commodities, food preparation and possible meal diversity. It also gives **recommendations for different kinds of meals,** such as early morning or mid-morning meals, lunch and snacks. For early morning or mid-morning meals, for example, the Handbook advises the selection of meals that are easy and quick to prepare in order to allow for timely serving of the meal[74]. However, information on the advantages and disadvantages of different modalities and commodities is difficult to find[75] and the Handbook does not yet differentiate the suitability of meals or commodities for different types of emergency contexts.

There are specific requirements for setting up an SF under an emergency context. Experience of the comparative effectiveness of different modalities and their potentials in relation to operational requirements, such as inputs required at school level, is available in selected locations, but not accessible globally.

[72] General principles include age range, number and duration of school sessions, school budget, dietary patterns, etc. (WFP (1999), part 2, p. 14).

[73] E.g., half-day, afternoon half-day and full-day schools.

[74] WFP (1999), part 2, p.11

[75] General principles include age range, number and duration of school sessions, school budget, dietary patterns, etc. (WFP (1999), part 2, p. 14).

The particular characteristics of different delivery modalities for school feeding (prepared meals, dry-feeding, THRs) have implications for their relative potential to contribute to education and nutritional objectives. Each modality also brings with it different operational requirements for school feeding operations and requires different pre-conditions in the schools before food can be delivered. The significance of the particular characteristics and their implications for programming and implementation ultimately depend on the particular emergency context of each school feeding project. This chapter discusses the various possible ESF modalities, highlighting the major strengths and weaknesses of each.

2.2.2.1 Comparative advantage of each modality to address various objectives

School meal / snacks:

As mentioned elsewhere in the report, different modalities differ in their potential for contributing to different objectives. Overall, prepared meals are the most versatile modality in their contribution to nutritional, educational and psychosocial objectives, while snacks and take-home rations have more narrowly focused effects.

From a nutritional perspective, the serving of a freshly-cooked meal is more likely to lead to **significant nutritional improvements** and the **alleviation of micro-nutrient deficiencies** than the provision of biscuits, dates or other "dry" foods. The mixed food basket in itself is, if well designed, more nutritious than the biscuits usually provided as dry-rations. Because it is being served and eaten in school and not at home, it is certain that the students will be the primary beneficiaries.

Sharing a meal at school among peers can also increase the **social cohesion** and improve the overall social and emotional experience of the students in the school environment, an opportunity that is not offered to the same extent by dry-rations that are mostly used individually as snacks or by take-home rations[76].

Allowing students to have lunch at school also can offer a unique opportunity to help **increase daily retention** among students attending a full day of lessons (a single shift system). These students would have been forced to leave school during the lunch hour to find food for themselves or who would have returned home for lunch and would not have returned to school afterwards[77].

Finally, school canteens also offer a broad range of opportunities for the **community to become involved** in school/education matters. In DRC in particular, local women (mothers of the school children) appreciated and competed for the positions of school cooks, because they valued the share of food rations they received to feed their own families. Cooked meals in that respect also provide the opportunity to channel food to most vulnerable families/mothers in the community, if the selection process is guided in this direction and if the vulnerable families or mothers have the necessary skills and can be organized appropriately. The cooks need to be carefully selected (e.g., particularly poor, food insecure households) in a transparent process. Prepared meals also

[76] The evaluators observed several food distributions in Sudan. In all cases, students were sharing a bowl of food with classmates. Students also used the time before and after the distribution of lunch for play and other leisure activities. If students had returned home for lunch, this opportunity for socialization would have been lost.

[77] As already mentioned elsewhere, a representative from UNICEF in Khartoum particularly stressed the improvement of school attendance and retention of pupiles throughout the day as a comparative advantage of school feeding that was not offered by any other means. As stated above, many teachers and education officials concurred to this particular effect, in Sudan and in DRC.

have particular potential to link school feeding to broader development processes in the communities[78]. Local procurement, the creation of training and employment opportunities for cooks and possible links with school garden projects may be strategies to further pursue these possibilities.[79]

Dry Snacks:

The particular strength of dry-feeding lies in its efficiency in contributing to the alleviation of short-term hunger. Fortified Biscuits require minimal labour and almost no preparation, and can easily be distributed early morning. Biscuits do not require the establishment of complex infrastructure and preparation facilities, although they do require basic storage facilities. The lack of requirements for infrastructure is of particular importance for programmes at a sudden onset of an emergency or an acute crisis. In this regard, biscuits can more appropriately respond to the needs of Soil Transmitted Helminth (STH) without the pre-conditions necessary for cooked meals. In Pakistan, biscuits were sometimes complemented by dried dates; an ad-hoc experiment initiated due to a specific donation. They can provide a substantial contribution for additional nutritional energy, and they were attractive to the school children. Such local-commodity based snack can be less costly than High Energy Biscuits (HEB) and appropriate in some instances.

In areas where most of the children go to school on an empty stomach, an early distribution of food is necessary to alleviate short-term hunger. In principle, cooked snacks have potential to alleviate short-term hunger in a way that also provides a comprehensive food input, but the use of commodities that are easy and fast to prepare (e.g., CSB beverage or porridge) is required. However, even so, there are implementation difficulties in the preparation of cooked snacks in the early morning period, e.g., the arrival of cooks to school several hours before classes begin, storing the food and the firewood on the school campus (to ensure availability early in the morning) and minimising interruption of learning. These preconditions coupled with the issues of timing of meal distribution discussed earlier severely limits the effectiveness of the objectives.

Take-home rations:

THRs are not assumed to bring a substantial direct contribution to the food intake of children, but have a particular strength in contributing to improved household food security. THRs are

[78] 'Comités de Gestion' in DRC were actively involved in the management of the school feeding projects, supporting the ongoing development of these important community-based education governance structures.

[79] At the same time, it should be noted that local procurement did not happen in any of the countries that were visited during the field phase. The possibility for linking SF to school gardens was being explored in several locations in Sudan (e.g., Rumbek) and DRC, so far without any visible concrete steps.

particularly effective in serving as an incentive for parents to send and keep their children in school, providing that the rations are sufficient to overcome the support costs or cultural barriers. They are therefore a particularly effective modality to use for encouraging increased enrolment in school. However, while THR can promote long term retention, they do not impact the alleviation of short-term hunger. They do not require preparation or kitchen infrastructure, although like all other modalities they do require storage. Table 3 gives more information on the comparative different modalities

Table 3: Comparative advantages of different modalities for school feeding

Modality	Links to objectives	Necessary pre-conditions / operational requirements	Other significant characteristics in emergency contexts
Prepared meals	*Strengths:* Significant contribution to **nutritional objectives**, due to higher nutritional value of meals that are directly given to students. Possible effects on daily retention by offering complete lunch at school. *Weaknesses:* Time-consuming preparation potentially leads to late distribution, reducing its effects on short-term hunger Possible time-lag between targeting of new area, start up of programme, food delivery and beneficial effects (due to pre-conditions and operational requirements). May only be possible for schools to qualify which serve the less vulnerable children	*Disadvantages:* Long and complex preparation requires significant level of resources and infrastructure at school level (fuel, cooks, water, etc.) Requires in particular more resources from communities including actual food commodities →Might overburden teachers / communities (e.g. in Sudan) or MoE Can lead to neglect of most vulnerable areas (due to high level of required pre-conditions / operational requirements)	*Advantages:* Strong appeal as "real food" increases its attractiveness and utility in situations with high food insecurity. Strong appeal as a contribution to the establishment of quality schools in an early reconstruction context More potential for community involvement. Allows for additional food based interventions to overcome immediate food needs of most food insecure families through Food for Work (FFW) as incentives for cooks Offers higher potential for links to broader development processes and objectives (e.g. stimulating agriculture through local procurement) *Disadvantages:* Strong appeal as "real food" might be a source of conflict in volatile, highly food insecure contexts (e.g., DRC) Preparation in school increases the risk of allegations of poisoning, food related illnesses, etc. (DRC, Sudan) May interfere with the actual learning period because of teacher involvement or because of the time taken to administer
Fortified Biscuits	*Strengths:* Possible contribution to reducing short-term hunger in morning hours. *Weaknesses:*	*Advantages:* No preparation required, therefore no or low need for minimum standards for cooking-related	*Advantages:* Ease of preparation / distribution makes it suitable for use in poorly equipped school environments Appeals primarily to school children and thus reduces

Modality	Links to objectives	Necessary pre-conditions / operational requirements	Other significant characteristics in emergency contexts
	Low contribution to achieving nutritional objectives Low contribution to reducing daily retention Comparatively low contribution to increased attendance and enrolment due to overall lower appeal (low compared to prepared meals)	infrastructure at school level. Low level of required community inputs (no firewood, additional food items, etc.)	risk of conflict and rivalry over food between schools. *Disadvantages:* Overall lower appeal compared to "real food" reduces its acceptance and potential for buy in from other stakeholders, in particular in situations of severe malnutrition and food insecurity. Low potential for linking SF with other development processes.
Take Home Rations	*Strengths:* Particularly effective in contributing to increased enrolment and attendance. →Allows the targeting food support to particularly vulnerable groups (OVCs) if beneficiary selection committees are properly trained and monitored. →Possible to increase enrolment and attendance of particular student groups (e.g. girls). Contribution to household food security and household welfare (leads to increased consumption, partially to reduced expenses on food (saving) or partially as income transfer.) *Weaknesses:* Low / uncertain contribution to student nutrition. No contribution to daily retention (unless there is penalisation for leaving) or the reduction of short-term hunger.	*Advantages:* No preparation required, therefore no or low need for minimum standards at school level. No community inputs required (e.g. firewood, additional food items, etc.). *Disadvantages:* Requires reliable monitors of attendance / enrolment to ensure correct distribution of rations. High risk of diversion and misuse (particularly in the case of oil as a high value food commodity).	*Advantages:* Ease of preparation / distribution makes it suitable for use in poorly equipped school environments *Disadvantages:* High overall appeal due to high monetary value increases the risk of rivalry and conflict over food in volatile environments, especially if distributed to certain groups (e.g.,girls) only.

2.2.2.2 *Prepared meals and their implications for infrastructure requirements and additional inputs*

The selection of distribution modalities and of specific food commodities has significant implications for the **conditions that have to be in place before food delivery can start** and that ultimately are needed for the effective operation of the programme. The visits to DRC and Sudan in particular demonstrated that prepared meals are by far the most demanding delivery modality in this respect.

The daily preparation of fresh meals is obviously particularly **demanding in terms of the school infrastructure** required for this task. Schools need kitchens or at least basic cooking facilities, a basic store to protect the food from misappropriation and spoilage, utensils including cooking pots and serving bowls and also water for cooking and cleaning[80]. The visits to Sudan and DRC, where prepared meals were the only delivery modality, have shown that a significant proportion of schools could not adequately provide these inputs and so were either excluded from the programme altogether or encountered difficulties in the preparation of meals. Many schools were ultimately not able to participate in the SF programme at all.[81] In South Sudan, where for many years education did not receive any state support, schools had been established with the most rudimentary facilities by the communities and were staffed by volunteer teachers. Only a small fraction of these schools were able to provide the necessary inputs and infrastructure without significant outside assistance. In and around Goma, DRC, WFP had to drop some of the requirements in order to avoid a situation in which none of the targeted schools could be included in the programme[82].

Prepared meals are also particularly demanding in terms of **resources that are required from the communities**. Apart from providing volunteer cooks, parents and the overall communities are often called upon to contribute additional food commodities (often those that are expensive or in short supply), cooking and eating utensils[83] as well as soap to clean them[84]. Compared to other modalities, the preparation and distribution of a school meal is particularly labour intensive and requires that a group of cooks, often volunteer women, work the whole day, from food preparation in the early morning to cleaning of pots and rationing for the next school day in

[80] The storage of the food commodities for wet-feeding is generally more space intensive than storage of dry-rations (biscuits) or commodities for THRs. Shelf-life of food commodities in wet-feeding is also generally shorter than that of biscuits. CSB has a 'shelf life' between 6 to 18 months (US CSB is said to be best before 18 months). The quality and taste of the product is relatively sensitive to extreme climates. High temperature or humidity lead to losses in vitamins and can change palatability (up to rancidity under extreme conditions). Coupled with long transport distances, this poses a significant logistical challenge for WFP, in particular in emergency situations, where transport routes are often interrupted and transport is more time-consuming. In comparison, biscuits have a shelf-life of up to two years. Biscuits are less sensitive to extreme climates.

[81] In Rumbek and Juba in South Sudan, for example, there were many schools that could not provide cooking facilities or storage for the food and thus ultimately were found not to be eligible for receiving food support.

[82] Interview with WFP staff in Goma.

[83] According to corporate policy, it should be WFP's responsibility to provide these NFIs, but this responsibility was often not fulfilled; NFIs were sometimes required from the partners and sometimes left up to the school. The major problem was that the approach was not transparent to involved institutions. If provided by WFP, the NFIs often came extremely late (DRC: 11 months after start of ESF in expansion area, and by that time the programme already had been stopped for 5 months due to a pipeline break).

[84] This was observed in Kadugli (Sudan), for example.

the afternoon and evening[85]. Schools often reacted to these demands by either charging a fee to all students (e.g., to purchase firewood), thereby making school less accessible for poor families, or by asking children to bring in firewood[86].

The large majority of teachers interviewed in Sudan and DRC did not feel that supporting the SF programme in the school **took time away from their educational tasks**. In Pakistan, management of the biscuit stock and distribution was mostly done during the teachers' break time. In DRC and Pakistan, the teachers who helped organizing the students at meal time considered this to be part of their usual task of supervision during breaks and not as an extra burden. Nonetheless, for some teachers, namely those nominated as school focal points for the SF, the **amount of extra work was significant**. In the DRC schools visited, the teacher responsible for the SF project would arrive at the school at 5:30 every morning to open the store to distribute the food to the cooks for preparation. Although in one school the focal point received food rations like the cooks, in most, despite the significant amount of work that had to be done, they did not receive any additional compensation[87]. In some instances, the extra work associated with biscuit distribution or meal preparation led to complaints about the additional workload and in particular the filling of the distribution forms or keeping of records added to their already busy day. Some SF focal points in Sudan stated that the food "was just not worth the effort" they had to invest on a daily basis.

For various reasons, in many emergency and transitional contexts there are very few women teachers in schools, especially at the upper primary levels; even fewer women are in positions of responsibility. For example, in South Sudan it is reported that around 12% of all teachers are women. This means that at the school level it is primarily men who are given the role of storekeeper/FFE Focal point. However, in DRC where there are also few women teachers, WFP and partners have insisted on women being nominated to such positions. Although one could argue that this practice is in line with WFP's Gender Policy[88], the implementation becomes rather problematic if it is not accompanied by an explanation or other complementary activities and sensitization. In situations where there is only one woman teacher in a school, she will automatically be nominated to this position, without a choice. Rather than being an opportunity for empowerment, with access to training, the position requires the woman to be at the school early in the morning until late into the afternoon, well after her male colleagues are at home. Furthermore, as evidenced in the interactions with the male teachers and WFP staff, the automatic nomination of the only woman in the school to food–related activities actually reinforces the stereotypes that women should do food related tasks. However, when it came to decision-making about the ESF program then the women focal points at the school level have very little involvement. Clearly, this issue has to addressed and especially discussed at the local level, including at the school, and decisions made about how to involve women in ways which promote leadership and capacity building without overburdening or reinforcing negative

[85] However, it should be noted that preparation time can also be influenced by the choice of the particular food commodity. The evaluators found a particularly negative example in two DRC schools, where a certain type of beans required three hours of preparation the day before their consumption, a staff member to guard the pre-cooked beans overnight and another hour of preparation the next day.

[86] In Sudan, all but a few schools that had gas stoves either charged money (between 100 – 300 SDD per month per child (between 0.53US$ - 1.57 US$)) while other schools asked children to bring in firewood. In DRC, children in one of the visited schools had to pay 50 CDF (approximately 0.12 US$) per month for firewood.

[87] Feedback received in interviews at the school.

[88] Reference to WFP Enhanced Commitments to women gender policy

stereotypes. This could include, for example, trainings for all the women school focal points and links to other opportunities.

Prepared meals: Issues of food safety at schools

One significant issue with prepared meals is the **lower level of oversight that WFP has over the actual preparation of the food** and consequently the quality of the food eaten. Especially in emergency or recovery contexts where untrained cooks have to prepare the food under less than ideal conditions, gastro-intestinal problems are likely to occur if safety and hygiene standards are not maintained[89]. Funds from WFP - or contributions from CPs – for training of cooks and improving the kitchens are often not provided A high turnover of staff at the school, which is also a factor usually associated with volatile emergency situations, increases the need for providing new training on a regular basis for newly arrived staff. At least some of the challenges to training are therefore very much inherent to different kinds of emergency situations. Untrained cooks and the inability of communities to contribute with vegetables and spices also led to situations where the same dish was prepared every day or where cooks simply alternated between CSB and pulses[90]. Generally, but particularly where food insecurity was high, there was high acceptance[91] of the meals[92]. Still, it appears important to ensure that meals remain attractive to students, if prepared in variation, using different additional ingredients and flavours and applying different preparation recipes.

2.2.2.3 Conclusions

The choice of delivery modality and food commodity assumes particular significance in emergency situations. Specific characteristics of different modalities and commodities that are of lesser consequence in more stable development contexts have **increased importance in more volatile, impoverished and resource-deprived emergency or early recovery contexts**. Examples include preparation time, the relative and perceived value of the food commodity, support for and supervision of the preparation process, and the requirements of additional inputs and infrastructure. By keeping in mind the specific responsive objectives that SF is aiming to achieve, WFP can make more strategic choices of the particular modalities and commodities that are most optimal in the given context and thus increase the chance of effective implementation. The current **guidance on modality selection does not provide sufficient context-specific information and selection criteria** to help WFP staff with the optimal design of their interventions.

[89] I.e., use of un-safe water, too short cooking time, food not properly done as it was the case in a school in Sudan (Rumbek), where legumes were not well cooked and children complained of stomach problems.

[90] WFP guidance assumes that communities will contribute condiments and other complementary food commodities.

[91] One corresponding observation from a UNICEF representative in Khartoum was that it basically did not matter what variety WFP provides to schools, because people were are so desperate that they would eat anything, anyway.

[92] However, it should be noted that dislike of certain food commodities also seemed to stem from "cultural aversion". In Juba, for example, many students, cooks and teachers seemed to dislike the sorghum that WFP provided, which seemed surprising because Juba and surroundings were known to be sorghum producing areas. It eventually became clear that the aversion stemmed primarily from the fact that sorghum had been the only cereal they had had available before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the Government of National Unity Sudan (GoNU) had been signed.

2.3 Implementation mechanisms for specific emergency contexts

2.3.1 Minimum conditions and complementary activities in ESF programme design

Synopsis of current guidance on minimum conditions and complementary activities for (E)SF

Both the ESF guidelines and the SF handbook give guidance on **setting pre-conditions to ensure that schools that join the programme meet minimum conditions** to allow for the secure delivery, storage and preparation of food commodities. The ESF guidelines concede that whereas in non-emergency settings the investments for sufficient food safety and hygiene can often be left to partners[93], WFP should expect that in an emergency context "**a partner's capacity to do this may be reduced**"[94]. To increase the chance of securing sufficient donor funding for all necessary items, WFP should list all non-food items for an "optimal" implementation[95] in its programme proposals. This would enable WFP to clearly show the consequences of subsequent cuts or compromises.

The ESF guidelines urge staff to include training and materials **to educate food handlers in hygienic food preparation** into programme designs, to reduce the risk associated with centralized food provision for student health and ultimately also to protect the reputation of WFP as a trustworthy humanitarian organization. The **availability of potable water and operational sanitation facilities** are "musts"[96], with a minimum supply of 5 litres of filtered[97] and disinfected water per day and per student for cooking and drinking[98]. The suggested **minimal acceptable solution for sanitation** is a pit latrine or a *ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrine.*[99] Only schools that **meet these minimum conditions are eligible to receive food support**[100]. Those who fail to meet them should **receive support to help meet the standards**. However, neither the guidelines not the Handbook offer more explicit suggestions on how this support should be offered.

Deworming is stressed as a **necessary part of a minimum package** linked to SF interventions, in particular because feeding intervention provides an "ideal mechanism" for delivery of deworming treatments. On the topic of **educational minimum standards,** the SF Handbook states only that WFP should consider "conditions conducive to learning" as part of the minimum standards[101], without giving further details.

2.3.1.1 ESF and minimal acceptable standards for water, hygiene and sanitation

Only few SF programmes had systematically considered which **minimum standards for water, hygiene and sanitation at school level** were necessary for the effective implementation of the programme in the given context and how they would ensure that these minimum requirements

[93] Governments, NGOs, communities

[94] WFP (2004), p.20

[95] As examples, the ESF guidelines mention the repair or building of kitchens, food storerooms, the purchase of fuel-efficient stoves, training needs for cooks and programme managers at school level, etc. (WFP (2004), p.20

[96] Ibid.

[97] In case of turbidity (cloudiness) of water.

[98] Disinfection could happen either with chlorine or by boiling the water for at least one minute (WFP (1995), p. 3).

[99] WFP (1995), p.6

[100] The ESF Guidelines specifically state that "infrastructure for the storage, transportation, food preparation and sanitation necessary to implement the SF programme must be in place at all levels *b*efore delivery, food preparation and SF can begin" (WFP (2004), p.23).

[101] WFP (1995), p.4

were in place before or during the implementation of SF[102]. Although all interviewed WFP staff members agreed that minimum conditions were important for preparing meals at the school[103], the knowledge and understanding of the issue varied greatly among different sub-offices and among the three countries, with no clear documentation of the local contextualization of the School Feeding Units recommended standards. Consequently, the enforcement of **minimum pre-conditions for the implementation of school feeding varied greatly**; some simply ignored them rather than deprive the children perceived as being in need, some had informally adopted their own local requirements, while other resorted to the rigid enforcement of standards with predictable results[104].

Although kitchens, latrines or other necessary installations in schools were either non-existent or rudimentary (see Section 2.2.2.2) only a few sub-offices included support to poorly equipped schools as part of their programme design to help them meet the pre-conditions for programme participation[105]. In one case, WFP set deadlines for non-compliant schools to achieve these minimum conditions without offering help to work towards compliance. In DRC, on the other hand, where the primary (informal) objective was the reduction of short-term hunger and nutritional support, fulfilment of minimum conditions at school level was generally not used as a pre-condition for participation, apart from accessibility of the school and the availability of water; there was much more flexibility in the programming approach.

Among survey respondents, only 22% of WFP staff considered minimum criteria during the selection of individual schools for programme participation.

[102] E.g., in Sudan, the 2006 EMOP document makes no direct mention of necessary minimum conditions. The document (EMOP Sudan 10503.0 Food Assistance to Population Affected by Conflict) only globally mentions that "schools are selected in consultation with Ministry of Education (MoE) and UNICEF or, based on MoE approved criteria, by CPs" (EMOP 10503.0; p. 14). However, the evaluators acknowledge that Sudan is a special case, because of the wide variety of conditions in Sudan that WFP has to respond to.

[103] Minimum standards for hygiene, water and sanitation were less of an issue in Pakistan, because of the use of dry-feeding. Nevertheless, minimum standards of shelter, number of teachers and teaching aids (blackboards and books) were used initially. The overall minimum standard was that of UNICEF-assisted schools – but this was abandoned as WFP was then tied to the slow rate of UNICEF support in targeted schools.

[104] In South Sudan, a key WFP staff member repeatedly stressed the particular importance of adhering to latrines as minimum requirements for schools to receive school feeding. However, in discussions with the CPs operating in the area and from school visits, it became clear that this condition was not always fulfilled. The draft School Feeding Strategy: Abyei Area and South Kordofan State mentions a set of "basic criteria" that schools should eventually fulfil, but at the same time stresses that during the phase-over of schools from support under the CP to support under the EMOP, an "abrupt discontinuation of school feeding" should be avoided – indicating a degree of flexibility in enforcing the pre-conditions as inclusion or exclusion criteria. In DRC, where community participation and action to create makeshift kitchens and store, the prior fulfilment of minimum conditions at school level was generally not used as a pre-condition for participation in school feeding, apart from accessibility of the school and the nearby availability of water.

[105] The draft School Feeding Strategy: Abyei Area and South Kordofan State states that schools that currently are not meeting the pre-conditions for participation will be given conditions and a time frame to work towards their fulfilment. CPs would be encouraged to work with communities towards meeting the conditions. WFP staff working in these areas also stressed that WFP would take note of the conditions at the schools and work with communities to improve them without excluding them from the programme. In Kadugli, UNICEF and WFP are working together on the installation of water and latrines. WFP has also established a partnership with Save the Children for this purpose and is even engaging in joint planning (Interview with the WFP management in Kadugli).

2.3.1.2 Implications of minimums standards for targeting / school selection

The absence of clear strategy for setting locally appropriate minimum standards introduces further **ambiguity in the selection of schools**. There is a strong risk that inappropriately ambitious minimum standards dominate and compromise a school selection process based on vulnerability criteria. The likely effect is that the programme prioritizes better-equipped schools[106] at the expense of other, less well-equipped schools that typically serve the more vulnerable school-aged children. This was observed in Sudan and DRC where many of the schools included in the SF program were indeed already benefiting from external assistance – for example from the church. Schools with more vulnerable students without such assistance were not able to participate.

Efforts to partner with other organizations to improve the infrastructure in schools can also have the effect of skewing WFP's own targeting process and principles. In South Kordofan, WFP partnered with UNICEF to facilitate the installation of latrines in schools. Although very positive on the one hand, partnerships of this kind also often require WFP to work with other agencies' school selection criteria and processes, which often are different from the targeting priorities of WFP. In no location did it seem that the implications of these different targeting processes had been discussed in depth[107].

The considerable logistical requirements involved in either the delivery of food to schools or in the preparation of 'real meals' can contribute to a situation where remote schools are neglected in favour of the more accessible ones, even though the more remote schools may be in greater need. The risk exists that pre-conditions and operational requirements of prepared meals are too high for many schools and communities and in particular for those schools that serve the most vulnerable parts of the population. This too often results in a situation where the most vulnerable schools are excluded from assistance.

2.3.1.3 The importance of "complementary activities" for the effectiveness of SF

Findings of earlier studies of SF programmes in development contexts suggest that SF is an effective tool to achieve educational objectives only if it is used to complement efforts of communities, governments or other agencies to improve the quality of the school and of the educational services. Key improvements are the provision of teaching and learning materials, teacher training and support, strengthening of PTAs and community education structures. These educational inputs are often more important in emergency contexts than they are in development situations, not least because the needs are much greater[108].

Providing these educational inputs is outside of WFP's mandate. It is therefore particularly important for WFP to plan and develop SF programmes in connection with educational or

[106] This would include, for example, schools that already have the support of the church or other agencies.

[107] In Pakistan WFP also partnered with UNICEF and was held back by UNICEF's inability to reach the most vulnerable in a timely way.

[108] In long term emergency situations, education systems have often been left to deteriorate for long periods of time. In sudden on-set emergencies, education systems are not prioritised by donors and the wide ranging needs of education are exacerbated by the emergency. Everything from the number and quality of the physical infrastructures, to the administrative and professional support offered to teachers to the number and quality of teaching staff, curriculum and teaching/learning materials all need to be addressed. Emergency situations (and immediate post-emergencies) are now seen as 'windows of opportunity' for redressing some of the worst inequities. While school feeding can support initiatives developed to address some or all of these issues it cannot be done in isolation.

health-related inputs of 'strategic partners', including UN agencies, international and/or national NGOs, and education authorities. Interviewees in all three countries mentioned WFP's relationship with UNICEF as particularly promising, at least for the provision of complementary educational inputs. In Kadugli, Sudan, particularly, there was an on-going discussion of a tighter, more formal partnership with UNICEF. Although this was happening at the local level and not explicitly connected to HQ activities, this approach does reflect the involvement of WFP at a corporate level in close partnership with other child-focused agencies, especially UNICEF, within the framework of the 'Essential Package'.

Although the rationale for this kind of strategic relationship between UNICEF and WFP was widely accepted, the actual degree of cooperation and coordination between both agencies was often quite low. One key challenge to a more intensive coordination lies in the specifics of the targeting and school selection processes of each organisation, which often resulted in identifying differing sets of schools. One exception was the arrangement between UNICEF and WFP in Darfur, where overlap in the broadly – defined target areas of both organisations allowed for support from both agencies to the same schools.

Because of the scale of its educational activities and the relatively large number of schools it is supporting as well as the range to educational support activities it is offering, UNICEF usually has relatively broad selection criteria. WFP, on the other hand, can generally only support a small number of schools with one specific food assistance programme. WFP therefore has to select strategically the ones it will support and has to be careful not to compromise its own mandate of supporting the most vulnerable when it is following UNICEF's - or any other partner's - criteria for school selection[109]. This should be recognized in the efforts that are being made in the different locations to clarify and develop the relationships between WFP and its partners, especially UNICEF.

Emergency situations can also offer particular opportunities for collaboration and coordination among different actors. The establishment of sector 'Clusters' is a relatively new approach introduced as part of the ongoing UN reform process during 2005. Pakistan was one of the first examples, with Education Cluster meetings held regularly at the central level in Islamabad as well as at different 'hubs' at the field level[110]. Education Clusters also now exist in DRC, and in Sudan there are regular education sector coordination meetings at different levels. WFP staff members who attended such meetings reported them as being very helpful; furthermore, interviews with other sector actors indicated that WFP was viewed as a key partner in such meetings and mechanisms. Increased sector coordination, facilitated through the Education Clusters at global, national and regional levels, global networks[111] and other coordination bodies are likely to further assist WFP in partnering with other organizations to achieve leverage with food assistance interventions. It is therefore important that WFP FFE Focal Points are encouraged to participate actively in such coordination activities. Because WFP's education

[109] In Pakistan, for example, WFP initially followed the UNICEF selection process, but found that, for a range of reasons, UNICEF was not targeting the most vulnerable areas. As a result, WFP was forced into developing its own targeting procedures.

[110] The case of Pakistan is of particular interest as, although at the time, an Education Cluster had not been officially approved through the global Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) process, one was established in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, led by UNICEF and considered one of the more successful clusters. At the time of the evaluation the Education Cluster had already transformed into an Education Sector Working Group.

[111] Such as the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE; www.inee.org) and tools such as the INEE's Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction Contexts, as well as through increased UN coordination and shared work-planning.

interventions are not 'stand-alone', FFE/SF staff may need to play an active role in advocating for a more substantive discussion of the complementarity of interventions of different agencies[112]. Partnerships in the health, nutrition and food security sector would help to improve the nutritional benefit of the actual programme and could contribute to a more sustainable and longer-term improvement of the nutrition situation[113].

2.3.1.4 Conclusions

School feeding programmes are not "stand-alone" interventions. They require inputs from others in terms of both educational and health/nutritional needs. Equally, school feeding programmes are unlikely to fully deliver educational or nutritional outcomes without the support of complementary programmes. Depending on the implementation modality, they require infrastructure for sanitation, water, hygiene and cooking and storage facilities at school level for their smooth implementation. In communities where these conditions do not exist, WFP needs to work together with strategic partners such as UNICEF or suitable organisations among its CPs to help to ensure the necessary infrastructure is in place.

In order to ensure their effectiveness in addressing educational needs and improving educational indicators, **school feeding programmes need to support efforts from other organizations to improve the quality of education, teaching and learning** at the schools. Again, strategic cooperation with such suitable partners as UNICEF, UNESCO and education-oriented NGOs is necessary.

These additional inputs can be classified as three, partly overlapping, categories:

a) Commitments and supplies that have to be in place before an SF program can be considered (pre-conditions);

b) Requirements for implementing a quality SF program that may be gradually reached – over time and with support from different partners;

c) Other educational development activities that are complemented by the SF programme.

Table 4 gives an example of additional inputs and activities that are normally required for the provision of prepared meals.

[112] Such as teacher training and capacity building of education authorities

[113] In Sudan, examples of promising areas for such partnerships are the following: Curriculum development and training on health and nutrition (i.e., health, nutrition and learning); Safe and healthy environment, including the introduction of fuel saving stoves, environmental protection (i.e. UNICEF and local NGO); Parasite control, particularly de-worming programme (i.e., with UNICEF, WHO); School/community gardens (i.e., with Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)); use of local food produce through collaboration with local food production sector (i.e., FAO).

Table 4: Example of pre-conditions, operational requirements and complementary activities for ESF with "prepared meals"

Preconditions (for SF start up)	Operational requirements - on a sliding scale	Complementary activities
Conditions, commitments and supplies which have to be in place before an SF program can be considered in a school	*Requirements for implementing a quality SF program that may be gradually reached – over time and with support from different partners. There should be commitments to gradual upgrading of all requirements as resources allow*	*Other educational development activities which are not directly related to the SF program but which in combination with the SF programme support the achievement of educational outcomes*
Availability of water if not on school campus then within reasonable carrying distance (even if only through purchase) Functioning 'learning environment' that has a specific learning program with students and teachers attending regularly Safe learning space Commitment from CPs (including donors) / MoE/other agencies to work together	Improved Water availability for cooking and sanitation • Water carried from nearest water point → • Water available on the school compound Latrines • Simple pit latrine → • availability of Ventilated Improved Pit Latrines → • etc. Focal point at school level to coordinate SF program → • Trained FP → • trained FP who receives extra incentive and coordinates complementary activities Cooks → • Adequate # cooks → • Trained cooks → • Trained cooks who have job descriptions and clear contracts for the provision of quality food	Teacher training • Head teacher training • Administrator training PTA development activities Integration health, nutrition food security, life skills into the school curriculum Health and nutrition activities in schools (e.g., health clubs & campaigns, medical check-ups) and micro-nutrient supplementation School gardens Deworming programmes Healthy school environment, including fuel saving stoves.

2.3.2 Partnerships for ESF projects

Synopsis on current guidance on implementation setups / strategies for ESF

The ESF guidelines and the SF Handbook provide only **limited guidance on establishing working relationships** with different WFP counterparts for implementing ESF programmes.

The SF Handbook stresses that "**development" SF projects are fully "owned" by the Government**, which therefore would assume primary responsibility for project implementation. Continued demonstration of government ownership is a precondition for continuing support. The ESF guidelines relax this requirement somewhat and stipulate that the **national government should be WFP's primary partner -** wherever possible and appropriate. The counterpart would either be the MoE or the appropriate agency that has assumed leadership in coordinating the humanitarian activities. Local authorities should join the partnership according to the guidance and leadership of the national authorities.

Relationships with Implementing Partners (IPs) may take on **many different forms**, ranging **from contractors to programme partners** who bring some of their own resources into the project. The guidelines warn that after long periods of conflict, the choice of IPs may be limited and suggest developing criteria for IP selection; they concede that in certain situations, it might be necessary to invest in the development of IP capacity[114]. The guidelines also propose to conduct workshops with IPs, school staff, aid workers and the community to explain the mechanisms of SF[115].

WFP staff is encouraged to **establish relations with local or international organizations** with previous experience in the national education sector, especially when WFP is preparing to provide assistance to the sector for the first time. This is intended to help WFP to develop an **understanding of the sector and allow for the effective coordination** of SF with existing education programmes. If WFP switches to emergency support from a previous SF support in a development context, COs are encouraged to assess the need for expanding their circle of partners. The Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), linked to preceding comprehensive needs assessments, is meant to be one of the starting points from which partnerships can develop, but does not require the assessment of educational indicators.

2.3.2.1 Working with the government

In emergencies, a close relationship with the government can have positive implications for the potential of SF programmes to contribute to capacity building and thus sustainability of the project[116], but it can also limit their reach and their effectiveness.

Discussions with WFP staff and MoE officials in Sudan and DRC illustrated that an early involvement of MoE staff in SF activities can help to strengthen the capacity, reach, presence and leadership role of the educational authorities within the sector. In DRC, the timing of closer collaboration with government was especially relevant as the new Government had plans to establish more autonomous provincial education authorities. From WFP's perspective this helps to enhance the chances of sustainability for school feeding projects[117] and also can make a small contribution to strengthened capacity in the education sector overall[118]. Working with the

[114] The document provides no further guidance on how this can be accomplished.

[115] WFP (2004), p.23

[116] For a more comprehensive discussion of sustainability, please see Chapter 2.5 below.

[117] See Chapter 2.5 for a more in-depth discussion of sustainability.

[118] E.g., in Kadugli (Sudan), WFP organized general training sessions for the local education authorities on logistics, planning and M&E; another activity that was directly relevant to the need of strengthening capacity among its partners.

education authorities can also increase the chances that school feeding can be integrated into the overall sector policy and planning, including Education for All (EFA) planning processes. By linking the programme to other projects and inputs in support of education, school feeding can become part of an integrated support system for children – under the coordination of the national education authorities[119]. This is another important prerequisite for programme sustainability.

However, involving government authorities also can create difficulties in SF implementation. In Darfur and South Kordofan, for example, where the local authorities were formally responsible for the last leg of delivery of the food commodities to the schools, the Government partners had difficulties in fulfilling their commitments. This meant that PTAs had to pay for the last leg of delivery. In other areas in Sudan, where the government had been directly responsible for the monitoring of programme implementation, monitoring at school level has been extremely weak[120]. In the CETA region, difficulties of this kind were one reason why WFP decided to phase out the CP-supported schools in the EMOP[121]. In Darfur, the close involvement of the government in the implementation of the ESF under the current EMOP seemingly contributes to a situation in which a large part of the population that is living in rebel-controlled areas cannot be reached.

2.3.2.2 Implications of working with Co-operating Partners

In all three visited countries, WFP is working with CPs - local or international NGOs that take over specific tasks, like the distribution of food and monitoring, based on the stipulations of their Field Level Agreements (FLAs) - or other similar LoUs with WFP. The details of the relationships between WFP and its CPs varied from country to country.

In many of the cases observed by the evaluators, WFP's relationship to its CPs was essentially one between WFP as a client and the CPs as logistics contractors – rather than as a possible partnership between the two parties. In Pakistan, WFP took a very dominant position in its dealing with the CPs and set the conditions for the working relationship without much consultation or consideration of the concerns of its CPs. This may have been a consequence of the fact that partners had previously been involved in the General Food Distribution (GFD) during the height of the emergency. A number of NGOs complained that WFP conditions during the EMOP had been so difficult to fulfil and the relationship so autocratic that some NGOs decided not to get involved again in the SF programme under the subsequent PRRO. The shift from a purely logistical operation (where a level of authority may have been perceived as necessary) to a multi-dimensional operation (e.g., a SF project) was not sufficiently acknowledged by the staff of WFP and was not reflected in the subsequent contractual arrangements. It is also possible that partners who could manage the logistical requirements of a General Food Distribution (GFD) did not, in fact, have the required education expertise that allowed them to be constructive partners in a specifically school feeding operation[122]. As a

[119] E.g., the MoE in DRC referred particularly to the need of linking school feeding to additional health interventions at school level.

[120] According to feedback from WFP staff, this had been the case in CETA (Kadugli, Abyei) and in Darfur.

[121] In Guinea-Bissau, the Government remained involved in the SF implementation during the emergency phases just as it was involved during preceding development phases. However, the capacity of the MoE and the Government in general was so weak that, in practice, WFP remained responsible for many of the management tasks. Still, implementation was frequently set back by the capacity shortcomings of the Government (WFP (2003), p. 35).

[122] Feedback collected during a focus group discussion with members of the education cluster group in Muzaffarabad (AJK), where WFP is currently forced to implement the ESF programme directly, due to the lack of NGOs capacities.

result, in many locations, WFP had difficulties finding CPs for the ESF programme. There were no formal partners meetings in Pakistan although there were several levels and types of education sector working groups (formerly cluster) meetings[123]. Evidence from other SF programmes suggests that in other locations, WFP also has room for improvement in terms of its relationships with CPs. The 2006 self-evaluation of the school-feeding programme in Liberia finds that coordination and cooperation between CPs and WFP had improved.[124] Still, the report stated that delays in food delivery to the schools most often have to be attributed to poor coordination between WFP sub-offices and their cooperating partners – caused by a lack of regular meetings and up-to-date distribution plans[125].

In DRC, some of WFP's partners had very similar complaints: An NGO representative complained that WFP treated them like a contractor, without giving the organization the freedom to link school feeding to their own education projects. Other CPs expressed similar concerns and some decided to end their relationship with WFP as a result[126]. This can be a loss for both the CP and for WFP (that does not ususally have the capacity to implement alone) and ultimately it supposes a long-term loss for the beneficiaries. One contributing factor in the partners' discontent is linked to the fact that the standardised FLA template used by WFP in their agreements with partners is often inappropriately complex, and leaves no space for local contextualization. This makes it difficult for CPs to exploit possible synergies with their own programmes and the programmes of other organizations[127].

Feedback from WFP staff on their relationships with CPs was mixed. In DRC, WFP management in Kinshasa acknowledged that partnerships with CPs were necessary to reduce the costs and to facilitate monitoring – using WFP staff would simply be too expensive. At the same time, staff in one sub-office had a very negative opinion of the work done by CPs and spoke in favour of direct implementation; they felt there was no comparative advantage to working with CPs[128]. One problem in this SO was that NGOs were often not able to work in insecure areas and partners were simply not available in many of the most challenging areas of the country. The discontent, at least in some locations, therefore seems to be mutual. What is clear, however, is that this type of partnership is not conducive for producing synergies between WFP and its partners, despite the fact that the potential for synergies is significant. Similar problems were seen in Pakistan, where senior staff in the country office felt that the co-operating partners did not want to work in "difficult" (remote) areas and so the offices were forced to implement themselves with consequent higher costs of implementation than they were prepared to pay to

[123] A representative from a local NGO stated that, apart from its work with WFP, it also implemented other educational support projects, but the educational credentials of his organization had not so far translated into any benefits for their involvement with WFP, partly because there was hardly any overlap of schools. If there was an overlap, then "there might be cost-saving".

[124] WFP had established monthly coordination meetings at CO level, involving also the MoE.

[125] WFP (2006b), p.14

[126] Interviews with various CPs of WFP around DRC

[127] The survey helps to shed some more light on the qualities that WFP staff seeks in their cooperating partners. Asked what characteristics would make some cooperating partners better than others, 53% thought that capacity for tasks like reporting, distribution and M&E was a particularly important quality of CPs. In contrast, only 13% of respondents thought that experience in and knowledge of SF would be a quality they would look for in their CPs. This picture is mirrored by the survey answers on the kinds of input that WFP staff is seeking from partner organizations. Whereas 71% of respondents stated that CPs would bring in complementary items, such as storage, salaries and medical inputs, only 24% of respondents thought that CPs were being used to contribute to an improvement of the education environment.

[128] Feedback from WFP management in DRC.

the CPs. The partners themselves stated that they were operating at a loss (that is they were subsidising the implementation of school feeding to the detriment of other programme initiatives) and so were unwilling to continue.

2.3.2.3 Direct implementation as an option

In the specific "emergency" or "recovery" contexts in which WFP is working, the capacity of CPs – and even the availability of any possible partners is often extremely weak. With the time pressure under which WFP operates as a contributing factor, the Organization can end up being responsible for the entire food delivery, monitoring and liaison with the schools.

One particular challenge in dealing with CPs was to find a mutually acceptable agreement on the last-leg of delivery of food commodities to the schools. In all three countries, this had been an issue at some point and had led to tensions between WFP and its partners and in some instances disruption of services to certain schools. In Pakistan, the last-leg of delivery, including that to remote schools, proved to be too difficult and expensive for CPs to manage. Disagreement over the reimbursable costs ultimately contributed to the withdrawal of CPs from the SF programme[129]. Around Kosti in Sudan, WFP was forced to intervene and search for another partner because the CP in charge of these schools had not succeeded in organising delivery to these schools. Eventually, delivery to these schools was disrupted completely when WFP's contractor withdrew from the programme because of excessive costs. In DRC, WFP also had to ensure the last-leg delivery to schools itself as well, due to high transport costs which NGOs have to bear as soon as entering more remote areas. The CPs would only receive the food at the schools to ensure distribution to the students, and ensure follow-up visits.

At the core of this problem seems to be the fact the Landside Transport Shipping and Handling (LTSH) proved to be too low for the circumstances in which SF was being implemented in all three countries and that WFP was not willing (or able) to increase the rates in these cases. Part of the issue is that WFP calculates the costs for school feeding using the same formulae as that used for GFD. But school feeding generally has higher costs because of smaller quantities per location, specific (often particularly difficult) locations and with different delivery schedules. This, in addition to the sometime negative attitudes of WFP staff towards the partners, means that partners do not feel that the benefits of SF outweigh the difficulties related to implementation. At the same time, WFP staff in all three countries conceded that responsibility for delivery to the schools adds considerably to WFP's expenses and demands on its staff.

In Sudan and Pakistan, WFP had not only to organize transport but had to take over the distribution of food at the schools as well as the monitoring processes. In Sudan in particular, the visit to Rumbek demonstrated that direct implementation is extremely demanding for WFP (in terms of resources and time required). Here, WFP set up Field Level Agreements (FLAs) directly with the PTAs in the supported schools, using the standardized template that had been originally designed for agreements with NGOs. For community-level PTAs, of course, this template was extremely complex and it was very time-consuming for WFP staff to draft a complete agreement. In Pakistan, direct implementation through WFP made it even harder for WFP to reach (and monitor) the delivery and use of food in the most remote communities. According to Food Aid Monitors (FAMs) in Mansehra, administrative hurdles (e.g., difficulties

[129] Several NGOs had provided their own transport cost-calculations to WFP that ranged from $75 to $87. WFP deemed this to be too high and maintained that it would only reimburse costs up to $27 per ton. Once the CPs withdrew from the SF programme, partly as a result of this disagreement, WFP incurred costs of over $100 per ton for distributing the biscuits directly.

of field visits for WFP staff) and higher costs made it difficult for WFP to "get the food out", in particular to more vulnerable communities that were further away and less accessible. WFP also had to rely on day labourers to truck the food to beneficiaries, without any control or oversight as to whether the food is actually delivered[130]. In some instances, such as DRC, however, where the poor road conditions and limited transport options made the delivery costs very high for smaller NGO implementers, WFP had a clear advantage with respect to cost-efficiency of deliveries.

2.3.2.4 The challenge of working directly with communities / PTAs

In most of the visited schools, PTAs did not have the capacity to serve as cooperating partners for WFP. In Rumbek (Sudan), where WFP had FLAs directly with PTAs at the supported schools, WFP FAMs reported that they had to provide paper and pencils to some of involved PTAs to allow them to draft their ESF proposals and monitoring reports. WFP staff had to go and "collect" reports from many of the schools, because the PTAs did not have the means to deliver them to the WFP office. Even then, reports come late, so that the Sub-Office (SO) had to release the new monthly ration without having received the previous reports and attendance figures. Although this WFP support to the PTAs had to contribute in some small way to their increased capacity, there was no explicit attention to this from WFP; WFP's concern was to get the ESF running rather than necessarily to support the PTAs. Overall, the transaction costs of direct implementation in Sudan were extraordinarily high and the required efforts effectively overburdened WFP's local staff[131]. The options for enlisting PTAs as full-fledged cooperating partners were therefore necessarily limited and generally only occured because of the lack of more suitable co-operating partners. Direct implementation can effectively overburden involved PTAs, and take away time and energy from their other responsibilities[132]; this is especially so if there is no systematic attention paid by WFP (or by another organization) to PTA capacity building. Even in DRC, where communities and PTAs were generally very committed and involved in the management of the programme at school-level[133], they were still not in a position to take over all the necessary tasks and responsibilities of a CP.

[130] This was the case for SF around Muzaffarabad in AJK.

[131] It should be noted that PTAs are generally very weak in emergency and post-emergency situations. All the limitations involved in community participation are true for PTAs. Generally, they do not have a role in this type of implementation or support – they are either fund-raiser for the school, conduct advocacy for education and/or have a monitoring function regarding teacher attendance. In Pakistan, the evaluators found little evidence of community participation in SF – of course there was little requirement for it as it was simply a biscuit distribution.

[132] In Juba (Sudan), the already high demand on the resources of PTAs for different kinds of community intervention prevented them from getting involved in school feeding in even a supportive role.

[133] Communities in DRC organized themselves often very effectively to build the necessary food-related infrastructure such as simple kitchens and to establish "comités de gestion" that played an important role in ensuring compliance, transparency and good management of resources.

Box 2: Types of WFP partners in ESF programmes

The graph below shows how survey respondents answered when asked what organizations they are collaborating with in the implementation of ESF projects. Clearly, NGOs or church-based organizations are the most common partners. It is striking that only 20% of respondents indicated a collaboration with other UN agencies.



One last consideration is the possibility of bringing in additional support to WFP supported schools through other donors or NGOs. The nature of WFP's CPs in many countries implies that there is substantial potential for using the CP partnerships as a means to bringing in additional resources that can complement or augment WFP's support to the schools. Where WFP is not able or willing to provide additional inputs and/ or financial resources such as training for cooks and school personnel, when working directly with the communities, WFP essentially foregoes this opportunity.

Working directly with communities presented considerable challenges for WFP. The SF system was designed for implementation by partners, not by WFP and those partners were generally expected to bring additional funding or expertise to the implementation of the programme, which communities generally cannot do. Thus, partnerships with CPs have clear and overwhelming advantages *vis a vis* direct implementation by WFP, or the use of community structures. This is particularly true when the workload for WFP staff is taken into account.

2.3.2.5 Conclusions: main considerations regarding partnerships

Because of their differing comparative advantages, the choice of implementation mechanism is critical for each of WFP's ESF projects. A closer relationship with government partners holds the promise of improved government capacity and therefore better chances of sustainability, but also increases the risk of political bias and interference in the programme. Working with CPs can allow WFP to channel complementary resources to communities and also reduces WFP's overall transaction costs, thereby increasing the geographical reach of the programme. However, at the same time, suitable CPs might not be available to support the most vulnerable groups in the population. Direct implementation might be WFP's only available option in particularly challenging emergency contexts. However, this is also the most challenging and resource-intensive implementation mechanism for WFP, requiring considerably higher levels of staffing and a higher level of technical skills of the staff.

WFP should review its relations with CPs and other partners for untapped potential and possible synergies between the CPs' priorities and WFP's own mission. The dominant "client-contractor" relationship that WFP maintains with its partners does not allow this potential to unfold. In particular, WFP has not always been able or willing to access the expertise of its partners working in the education sector to increase its own access and understanding of the challenges in the different national education sectors. In the examples examined by the case studies, WFP has been more reactive than pro-active in shaping its implementation strategy.

2.4 Particular challenges to consider for the design of school feeding interventions under emergency conditions

Synopsis on current available guidance on targeting in SF programmes in emergencies

Both the SF Handbook and the ESF Guidelines offer only limited guidance on targeting. The SF Handbook stipulates that **targeting criteria will be agreed upon with the Government** during project formulation. Both documents state that targeting should take into account government priorities, WFP policies and resource availability.

Geographic targeting should be based on the analysis of the country situation and the **problems that food aid is addressing**. Proposed targeting indicators are i) gender-specific rates of enrolment and attendance; ii) gender-specific indicators of educational efficiency such as drop-out, promotion and repetition rates; iii) household food security; iv) average distance of schools from homes of pupils; v) regional and/or household socio-economic and nutritional indicators.

The SF Handbook stipulates that all **rural schools in the targeted geographical area - and as decided on a case-by-case basis in peri-urban schools** - are potentially eligible for WFP assistance. Individual schools can participate if they are able to meet agreed-upon minimum standards for hygiene, physical infrastructure and learning conditions. Schools that do not meet the minimum standards will receive support to work towards their fulfilment, either from WFP or – assisted by WFP – from other donors. The ESF guidelines set a slightly different focus: They stress that in keeping with WFP's mandate, **no schools should be excluded because they lack cooking facilities or water sources or because of low accessibility**. WFP should instead work with its partners to build the necessary infrastructure.

Both the Handbook and the Guidelines **advise against selecting individual students** within schools for support, with the exception of girls.

2.4.1 Key implementation tasks affected by constraints of emergency situations

A number of key implementation tasks were seen to be potentially affected by constraints inherent to emergency and recovery situations, such as the ability to conduct appropriate and education specific needs assessments to ensure a needs-based programme design; the opportunities for monitoring and evaluation so as to adjust programme based on lessons learned; and the timely and regular delivery and transport of food commodities. Furthermore, cross-cutting most stages of the project cycle is the issue of targeting, greatly affected in contexts of emergency[134].

2.4.1.1 Limited opportunities for needs assessment, planning and programme design

In all Pakistan, DRC and Sudan sites, the major constraints in implementing the planned SF programmes derived from insufficient needs assessment that subsequently shaped planning and design of the programmes. In Pakistan, the suddenness and magnitude of the disaster certainly was one context factor that contributed to this shortcoming. A solid needs assessment and planning could not occur during the EMOP, and WFP understandably started distributing biscuits to schools in conjunction with GFD even though there were no predetermined objectives for school feeding, no organised needs assessment and only limited access to schools outside of the camps (primarily because there were very few operational schools outside the

[134] See also WFP review of targeting in relief operations (WFP/EB.1/2006/7-B)

camps). Although not articulated as such in the project documents, under the circumstances this was the only possible response, since it would help restore a sense of normalcy in the camps.

The PRRO in Pakistan had to be prepared only months after the earthquake, still at the height of the emergency. Under these conditions, the time pressure and other factors (see Sections 2.4.2.2) limited the extent of needs assessment and planning that was possible. The needs assessment was driven by the VAM which, as previously discussed, took a broad-based approach to the nutritional needs of the population with no real effort to correlate these to educational needs. In Sudan and DRC, the needs assessment and the overall geographic targeting was also based primarily on nutritional indicators and was largely disconnected from the formulation of the formal educational ESF objectives that were then stated in the EMOP document. No specific assessments of educational needs took place and no regionally specific project documents existed that proposed geographically adapted and appropriate objectives and implementation structures for any of the three areas in Sudan, although documents were in the process of being developed[135]. Still, even these strategies were not based on a comprehensive, regionally-specific needs assessment that looked beyond food vulnerability issues into the state of the education system in Darfur and into other potential barriers to education for children in the different locations.

2.4.1.2 Monitoring limitations

WFP staff has difficulties in appropriately monitoring the implementation of SF programmes in most locations. In some cases, such as in AJK (Pakistan) or Rumbek (Sudan), the difficulties of monitoring were exacerbated by the need to implement the SF programme directly, without external CPs. However, field staff in all locations reported difficulties in covering even the relatively low number of schools with an appropriate monitoring plan. Although logistical challenges – just getting out to the schools, especially during inclement weather – were described, the situation was also the result of insufficient staff time allocated to school feeding programmes.

Overall, WFP monitoring indicators assess quantities (food delivered and number of beneficiaries served) and enumerate quantitative inputs and outputs. In other words they monitor implementation but they do not capture any qualitative aspects, impacts and outcomes of the programme such as the achievement of objectives, their coverage, major constraints, the performance of partners or the perceptions of beneficiaries[136]. ESF monitoring is often restricted to measures of quantity; this means that the extent to which monitoring data can be used to inform programme adjustment is limited, as this would require more qualitative insights into the results of project processes.

The survey results support the findings from the case studies. The difficulty of collecting sufficient and qualitatively appropriate data is by far the most-cited challenge. 60% of respondents considered this to be a problem in their programmes.

[135] However, as mentioned above, in a few areas, such documents were being developed during the visit of the evaluation team. For example, the evaluators received a copy of the draft „School Feeding Strategy: Abyei Area and South Kordofan State" to cover the period from October 2006 to December 2007.

[136] At least in Sudan, reporting from partners also focuses on information regarding the delivery and distribution of food commodities. Of the examples reviewed, no narratives with additional details are attached.

2.4.1.3 Challenges to the timely and regular delivery of food commodities

In all of the observed programmes, the delivery of food commodities to schools had been interrupted at least once. Sometimes the disruption affected only specific geographic areas during certain times of the year, or particular commodities, in other cases, the programme overall was affected and sometimes delayed significantly because the food did not reach the schools. Big pipeline issues in DRC - and according to some, bad planning for known pipeline interruptions.

2.4.1.4 Targeting: a challenge for ESF

Observations on vulnerability of children in emergencies

During emergencies or in their aftermath, school-aged children can find themselves in a variety of situations that expose them to physical, mental or socio-economic risks. Humanitarian organizations therefore have to be sensitive to specific vulnerabilities and should strive to address any corresponding needs through their support programmes. ESF is no exception.

Although there are situations in which children affected by emergencies have expanded protection and support (for example in well-run refugee camps) in emergencies, children can find themselves vulnerable in the following ways:

- Physically; a higher propensity to violence in their communities that endangers them in different situations of their daily lives, including on the way to school.
- Psychosocially or mentally; related to trauma induced by violent events, the erosion of normalcy, and the disintegration of the social fabric of family and community. Both children and parents are susceptible to this kind of mental stress. For children, however, the vulnerability of their parents and the possible stress within their home environment means that their own situation becomes even more difficult.
- Socio-economically; related to the often reduced availability of resources at family level to meet the needs of all family members, and especially children, including resources for education;
- Nutritionally and health-related; due to shortfalls in resources, time and attention with which to nourish and feed family members and the community as a whole
- Educationally; in that access to education and quality of education may be diminished, - resulting in disappointment and despondency especially for older students who wanted to pursue education to the end of their present cycle and to enter higher cycles.

The visits to Pakistan, Sudan and DRC illustrated that emergencies often create particular groups of children that are affected by combinations of these vulnerabilities:

- Girls are among the most vulnerable in many emergency and post-emergency situations. Their socio-economic vulnerability is often particularly high, and physical protection is a cause of concern. School enrolment and attendance of girls is often low, particularly for older girls due to health and security concerns. Generally, cases such as Pakistan (where

girls were somewhat inappropriately directly targeted) are in the minority with regard to emergency school feeding. [137]

- Former child soldiers are among the most vulnerable in both Sudan and DRC. Not only do they often face stigmatization and marginalization in their own communities, but they have also missed important educational opportunities and have to cope with serious traumatizing experiences[138].
- Returnees also have particular educational needs, due to their specific socio-economic situation and history of displacement; WFP is implementing school feeding in many areas that have seen an influx of IDP or returning families.
- WFP staff agreed that SF is meant to support remote rural schools rather than urban or peri-urban schools. However, with the exception of DRC[139], where WFP made deliberate efforts to target more remote schools, the reality was often different to the intention. In Sudan and Pakistan, urban and peri-urban schools, or schools situated along the main roads, were often the only ones that actually did receive support – due to logistical and in Sudan security related problems in reaching the more remote schools[140].

The challenge of targeting based on educational needs

WFP's "two-step targeting process" of geographical targeting, based on VAM vulnerability data and the subsequent selection of schools within the targeted area, tends to neglect potentially important educational indicators. The net that WFP casts in the geographical targeting process covers the entire area that receives any kind of WFP assistance: GFD, FFT, Food for Work (FFW), supplementary and therapeutic feeding and school feeding. As all of WFP's project intervention types with the exception of school feeding pursue objectives primarily focused on food security, geographic targeting primarily takes into account food security and food vulnerability indicators. It does not consider the educational needs of the population in any depth.

In Sudan and Pakistan, this resulted in a situation where the eligibility of schools to participate in a programme in support of education[141] was primarily determined within the food security and food vulnerability indicators. Potential variations in educational needs within the overall target area were not considered[142]. In Pakistan, all functioning government primary schools in the earthquake affected area became eligible for assistance through school feeding under the

[137] According to statements from WFP staff in DRC, girls were being targeted. However, it was not clear how the intention was translated into the implementation. Neither in DRC nor in Sudan WFP used gender-specific THRs as a modality.

[138] Although WFP was supporting individual ALP schools in both countries that catered in particular to child soldiers and other marginalized groups, there was no evidence of a specific WFP strategy to address the particular needs of this group. One particular school in Rumbek used the ALP curriculum and had among its students mostly child soldiers, teenage mothers, etc.

[139] In DRC, WFP decided to withdraw support from urban schools that previously had received food in favour of including more rural schools.

[140] This was the case in DRC, Pakistan and Sudan and raises the question to what extent WFP's intention to support "the most vulnerable" is realistic. This issue will be discussed further in Section 0.

[141] Provided they were able to meet the minimum standards required for a smooth implementation of the SF programme (see Chapter 2.4 for more information on minimum standards).

[142] E.g., WFP in Abyei was preparing to cover all the schools in the surrounding area, without further selection based on educational needs.

PRRO. Although the PRRO contained a list of general targeting criteria[143], they ultimately failed to focus WFP's support on the schools or areas within the earthquake region with the greatest educational needs[144].

The survey supports the impression from the case studies. When asked how they decided which schools to include in the ESF programme, only 16% of respondents said that they considered low education indicators in enrolment or attendance in their selection. In contrast, 78% of respondents indicated that they took into account food insecurity or food vulnerability criteria. The food security status is thus considered much more regularly than the educational status – and the educational needs – of the beneficiaries –which in relation to the discussion of Chapter 2.1.2 makes it all the more surprising that nutritional objectives are rarely formally articulated for ESF.

Balancing "desirability" and "feasibility" in targeting

In its current form, the targeting process is designed to estimate the number of vulnerable / food insecure school-aged children in the overall geographical area in which WFP is working. However, targeting currently does not systematically assess where schools with the most vulnerable children are located within this broad geographical area and therefore what the logistical and budgetary implications are for delivering food to the specified number of children. Although the targeting process establishes the number of children that WFP intends to support, the mechanism is not designed to assess to what extent it will actually be logistically and financially possible to get the food to these schools.

In Pakistan, this issue has significantly diminished the efficiency and effectiveness of WFP's programme. Although the Vulnerability Assessment & Mapping (VAM) unit initially nominated all schools in 82 Union Councils and pledged to focus on the most remote areas, WFP ultimately could not find any CPs that were willing to implement the SF programme in these areas under the financial conditions that WFP was willing to offer[145]. In reality, and despite the very ambitious targeting criteria, the only schools that ultimately received food deliveries were those that were relatively easily accessible[146]. In Kosti (Sudan) the delivery of food commodities to a more remote region was interrupted, because the contractor refused to continue delivery on the previously agreed terms, claiming that the fees were too low to cover the cost of delivering to the remote schools. In many cases, WFP is thus reacting to the existing implementation challenges instead of strategically and systematically considering the prevalence of needs to direct the flow of resources[147].

[143] The official targeting criteria in the PRRO documents stipulate that SF should be delivered to those areas that are areas characterized by (i) low enrolment/attendance and high illiteracy, (ii) poor access/greater traveling distance to and from schools; and (iii) relatively high food-insecurity and malnutrition rates.

[144] A similar situation also existed in Kenya, SF under the current PRRO is pursuing primarily educational objectives (i.e., "maintaining enrolment, preventing drop out and stabilizing attendance"), but the targeting process ultimately only considers nutritional indicators (applied in the overall geographical targeting of WFP) for determining the eligibility of schools to participate in the programme.

[145] This also links back to the issue of the low LTSH that made working with WFP financially unattractive for many potential CP candidates (mentioned in Section 2.3.2.2).

[146] This was suggested by WFP staff in the visited sub-offices.

[147] The 2004 Evaluation of WFP's assistance to Afghanistan found a similar situation: major cities in certain districts (e.g., Kabul in the Kabul district or Kunduz in the Kunduz district) received a high concentration of resources "around the areas office", i.e., in close proximity to the office. Schools in Kunduz, for example, received 94% of all resources designated for the entire district of Kunduz. The situation in and around Kabul was similar. WFP (2004a)

The lack of appropriate mechanisms to conduct local needs assessments limits the appropriateness and accuracy of the targeting criteria and targeting strategies employed by WFP. The definition of targeting criteria depends on the clear identification of needs and appropriate corresponding objectives, but staff is left with virtually no guidance for directing the support to specific schools.[148] In the end, staff in sub-offices were often implementing school feeding in a "strategic vacuum" and so often implemented the programme more in reaction to internal or external constraints (e.g., availability or lack of partners, accessibility, etc.) than pro-actively to achieve clearly defined objectives. Although this was most pronounced in Sudan, a similar situation existed in both Pakistan and DRC. In DRC, sub-offices were currently working quite independently from the country office in Kinshasa. However, staff members from different sub-offices expressed concern that there was a lack of appropriate WFP CO policy on criteria; their preference was for more strategic guidance to direct the SF programme. In the absence of appropriate guidance, many sub-offices tended to determine the scope, reach and direction of their SF programme on the basis of "what was possible" – given, again, the availability of partners, the relative accessibility of schools, etc. - and not based on a consideration of "what was necessary" to respond to the needs of vulnerable children. Although the development of a new PRRO in DRC entailed a much more detailed and strategic discussion of the role and niche of SF, at the time of the mission visit, WFP's mode of operation in DRC with regard to school feeding was, as in Sudan, more "reactive" than "strategic"[149].

In the absence of more strategic and needs-based criteria for selecting individual schools to participate in the SF programme, the selection was largely made on the basis of the ability of individual schools to provide the food and sanitation related infrastructure that was deemed to be necessary to ensure the smooth implementation of the SF programme. As a result, WFP again ended up favouring the schools that could mobilize the resources to provide these facilities with the effect that schools that served the most vulnerable children tended to be excluded from the programme. The implementation of the SF programme in DRC overcame this tendency by strategically focussing on more remote, rural schools.

Frequently the needs assessment (Emergency Food Security Assessment, Emergency Needs Assessment, or others) was stated as the major data source for providing recommendations on programme design, target numbers and target areas[150]. When taking a closer look, however, the link between data analysis and ESF design was not clear and the calculation of the food gap and the determination of the ESF target numbers did not match[151]. In general, the objectives and the methodology applied did not allow for the generation of appropriate ESF target numbers or specific beneficiary groups. Similarly, the annual needs assessment does not necessarily yield

[148] This also might be linked to the general tension between WFP being a "GFD" organization (oriented towards bulk, getting food out, etc.) and the "programmatic", "strategic" requirements of implementing ESF activities.

[149] WFP staff members in DRC also expressed that they felt "pressure" from UN and OCHA to use among other things their SF activities to react to crisis situations as they occurred, which made it difficult for them to set and adhere to strategic priorities. As a result, WFP staff members thought that their support went "all over the place" (Interview with WFP staff members).

[150] For example, in the case of Sudan, the country wide Annual Needs Assessment (ANA) 2005 and EFSNA Darfur recommended school feeding.

[151] A household sample is used to calculate percent of food insecure population. Based on percent of food insecure population the percent of school aged children from food insecure households is calculated based on population data (approx. 27% of population). However, this is not the number of children that could be reached through school feeding. Children from both food secure and insecure households would attend school, and not all kids from food insecure households make it to school. Some areas wouldn't even have a school in the near surrounding (i.e. one of 15 sampled villages in Kosti, 6 hours walk to the nearest primary school).

any sub-district specific data that could be used for targeting. The assessment extrapolates the number of vulnerable children from a clustered sample and therefore does not yield any information on the actual location of the most vulnerable communities or their accessibility[152]. Because of the small number of sampled communities, the assessment also does not generate representative data on the extent to which communities across the area have access to schools[153].

The Standardized School Feeding Baseline Survey, is another available tool which aims to assess the baseline situation in selected beneficiary schools and achievements after a certain time span. Although used as such in certain locations, is also not designed to identify target areas or target numbers and is not necessarily applicable for programmes in an emergency context. Consequently, programme planners in the field currently have to find individual approaches.

One promising approach taken by staff members from a WFP sub-office in Sudan was an on-going collaboration with UNICEF in conducting a feasibility assessment for the ESF programme in Abyei. This initiative could be a model for similar future projects. The UNICEF led 'Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces', an assessment frequently conducted in emergency situations, might be an opportunity to collect additional ESF relevant information.

WFP's experience in DRC illustrates that the selection of schools for participation in the programme can also be particularly politically sensitive; especially in fragile post-conflict and transitional situations. In DRC, WFP was faced with rivalry and tension between supported and non-supported schools. It can be argued that these challenges were also linked to the specific nature of the selection and targeting process in the country. Selection criteria had not been made *transparent* to all institutions and communities, which would have been particularly important in the DRC context. Therefore, a large number of communities and schools had expected support and had started to prepare for its implementation at the school (with the construction of kitchen, for example). However, in the end, only a few of those schools actually received food[154].

2.4.1.5 Conclusions

Targeting criteria and the targeting process need to be responsive to both needs and resources. Currently, this link is limited a) because educational indicators are playing only a minor role in the geographical targeting and subsequent school selection and b) because the needs assessment falls short of identifying the specific geographical areas (educational and nutritional) and beneficiary groups in which particular needs that could potentially be addressed through school feeding are the greatest.

Ultimately, WFP also has to link the targeting process to a consideration of the logistical challenges and thus the related costs of supplying the selected schools. The targeting practice neglects to make this link and results in a situation in which the most vulnerable schools are ultimately not supplied with food commodities because unforeseen logistical challenges push the cost of deliveries to their remote locations above the budget limit. The field studies suggest that more flexibility is needed in adjusting this limit to meet the conditions of the emergency.

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[152] After the assessments, VAM and Programme together with MoE, HAC and partners agreed on specific target areas in Lake State.

[153] In Afghanistan, the VAM assessment was done two months after the programming for ESF was completed – which meant that programming had to be done on the basis of vulnerability data from the previous year (WFP (2004a).

[154] Information obtained from field visit to non-supported schools in Bukavu.

The design and implementation of the targeting strategy is central to the effectiveness of the SF programme in that it links to its different components: the objectives and the underlying needs determine what targeting criteria are selected; the targeting strategy and criteria will have to be set with full awareness of the specific comparative strengths (effectiveness) of SF; the SF modality will have to be selected so that the pre-conditions and operational requirements will be attainable for the targeted areas and groups; and CPs and partners will have to be recruited to provide the needed services to the targeted areas.

2.4.2 Internal and external constraints to ESF implementation

2.4.2.1 The context of ESF projects

Emergency school feeding programmes are operating under particularly challenging conditions. As is illustrated in Figure 1, their operational context is a product of **two major influences**: the overall political, economic and social context of the country and the particular characteristics of the emergency that has taken or is taking place and that has triggered WFP's emergency response. Any of the possible combinations of pre-emergency conditions at country level and the effects of a particular disaster can result in hugely differing context conditions for WFP's ESF activities. A country with a relatively well-developed governance structure will be affected very differently by a particular emergency event (i.e. an earthquake) than a country with a governance system that had (already) been weak before the disaster. Likewise, the education sector of a country with a historically strong tradition of educating its children will suffer differently from a collapse of the economy than a country where the education sector had already been weak before the downturn. ESF programmes are therefore implemented in contexts that are unique

Figure 1: The context of emergency school feeding programme



The humanitarian community overall, and WFP as one of its members, have to operate under particular emergency-specific constraints. As for other actors, the characteristics and make-up of the humanitarian community itself further define for WFP the opportunities and constraints under which ESF programmes are implemented. WFP's challenge is to "bridge" both types of constraints with its own organizational means in order to ensure the smooth and efficient implementation of its ESF programmes – and to take advantage of opportunities for strategic partnerships with other humanitarian actors. The more challenging the particular emergency conditions are, the harder it is for WFP to successfully compensate for external constraints and shortcomings with its own internal resources and to shield its own organizational processes from negative external influences. This is especially so, as WFP is operating under its own organizational constraints.

2.4.2.2 External emergency-related constraints affecting ESF implementation

A number of external constraints particularly affected the above management tasks:

Access and infrastructure:

Problems of insecurity and/or insufficient transport infrastructure, including roads that regularly become inaccessible, affect the work of WFP and its cooperating partners. Cooperating Partners cannot work in certain areas, when the security of their staff cannot be guaranteed. In other cases, the road network was so poor that transport to remote schools became prohibitively

expensive for cooperating partners or for WFP. During certain times of the year, roads that already were in poor condition became flooded and completely impassable[155]. This is an inherent constraint to implementation in various contexts, affecting all types of activities but given the nature of the programme, is particularly serious for ESF.

Low management & administrative capacity in government agencies and at school level:

The capacity of government partners for data collection, monitoring or programme supervision in emergency situations was particularly low. In addition, schools often also did not have adequate data that gave WFP a reliable picture of the educational situation on the ground. WFP therefore often operated in an information vacuum, where essential data (enrolment, attendance, access to schools) were not available. Such limitations have particular implications for ESF, especially when implemented in the form of cooked meals- as its effectiveness may partly depend on the ability of governments to get involved in its implementation.

Low management capacity or absence of implementing partners:

As already discussed, another major constraint was the low availability or outright lack of NGOs or other organizations that were willing or able to act as co-operating partners. Over 70% of survey respondents mention this as a challenge in their work with their partners[156]. In Sudan, DRC and Pakistan, this meant that WFP often had no choice but to implement the SF programme directly. This put considerable strain on staff resources, which was particularly noticeable in WFP's difficulties to regularly monitor the implementation of directly implemented programmes, but also affected the delivery of food commodities to the schools.

2.4.2.3 WFP-internal constraints affecting ESF implementation

The above-mentioned external constraints presented a significant challenge to WFP in its effort to ensure a smooth implementation of ESF activities. They put additional strain on the organizational resources of WFP at country- and sub-office level and exacerbated organizational weaknesses and internal constraints that WFP was facing in its own operations.

Limited technical and strategic guidance:

Especially in light of the challenging conditions that WFP was working in, the use of technical guidance in designing and implementing ESF programmes was low overall. Many staff members linked this to the fact that easily accessible, context-appropriate advice did not exist. The ESF guidelines and the SF Handbook were not being used regularly. Staff members also shared a negative assessment of the ability of HQ to provide useful, locally appropriate guidance for the management of their programmes. Contacts with SF focal points in the Regional Bureaux or the School Feeding Unit in Rome were said to be rare.

However, the low use of technical expertise is not just an issue of inappropriate supply, but also a matter of low demand on the part of WFP staff. Many staff members interviewed did not consider SF as an intervention type that required much "technical" expertise. Some thought that implementing school feeding programmes was mostly a logistical challenge, and in that sense

[155] Findings from the survey support the observation from the case studies that logistics concerns are among the most serious challenges for WFP staff in ESF implementation. 53% of respondents cited logistical limitations due to transport or security difficulties as a challenge in their programmes. 47% mentioned pipeline and other resourcing issues as problems.

[156] 71% of respondents mentioned lack of capacity as a major constraint in their work with implementing partners. The second constraint was a lack of commitment on the part of CPs, mentioned by 31% of respondents. Finally, a lack of resources on the part of CPs was cited by only 18% as a problem.

not very different from the implementation of other WFP interventions. Others saw the potential usefulness of additional technical inputs, but did not think that WFP should invest scarce resources in acquiring this type of know-how when the same money could be used to finance life-saving food aid deliveries[157]. In the absence of easily accessible and readily applicable guidance, many staff members by default followed the operating principles of more familiar interventions such as GFD.

Nonetheless, some WFP staff members and managers expressed the need to increase technical guidance in the design and implementation of SF programmes. In Sudan, the managers of one of the three area offices were exploring the possibility of placing a full-time technical support person in the programme unit of the central Khartoum office to technically support and advise the SF projects in all areas of the country. Several WFP managers cautioned that improved guidelines alone would not be sufficient to address the low level of SF-related technical expertise of WFP at the field level. Instead, they suggested that WFP should support field staff in developing technical capacity that would enable them to appropriately and professionally analyse and respond to the challenges faced.[158]

Limited attention to building technical and programme-oriented capacities of staff

The limited technical expertise available is partly linked to the nature of staff assignments and the recruitment process within WFP in general, favouring the diversification of its professionals' experiences. Programme officers with responsibilities for ESF implementation (FFE Focal Points) were therefore recruited based on generic Terms of References (ToRs) and were not required to have any significant prior experience in school feeding or the education sector. Furthermore, they did not have access to any school feeding-specific technical orientations or in-service training sessions. Learning had to happen mostly on the job, and even then without specific tools or resources to guide the professional development process. Receiving appropriate guidance often depended on personal contacts among staff members[159].

In all of the visited countries, general food distributions clearly determined the overall distribution of human resources and defined the overall "mindset" of WFP staff. In most sub-offices, staff members with FFE responsibilities focused primarily on the logistical challenge of food distribution and devoted relatively little time to the implementation and monitoring of SF projects. In Rumbek (Sudan), staff members organized their workdays according to the demands of GFD delivery and worked on school feeding only when the GFD schedule allowed. As a result, the only schools that were monitored regularly were those located close to areas that received food rations under the GFD – essentially, because FAMs "were there anyway".

In the case of Sudan, where only about 2% to 6% of food quantities are committed to school feeding, this setting of priorities in the assignment of scarce staff resources is understandable. However, problems with the availability of staff resources for ESF monitoring are not limited to countries where GFD absorbs the greatest share of WFP's resources. Even in Liberia, where SF plays a much larger role in the overall WFP programme (about 33% of the food quantities covering approximately 50% of beneficiaries), the capacity and number of field staff (in

[157] The last view was shared primarily by staff members responsible for Darfur. The core of the message was that the technicalities and development implications of SF could be explored once the acute emergency in Darfur was over.

[158] This assessment was made by WFP managers in Sudan and DRC.

[159] In Sudan, any communication between SO field staff (FAMs, SF focal points, etc.) and COs or Regional Bureaus often needs to be cleared by the SoHO or the HO, which additionally hindered the up- and downward flow of information.

particular monitors) was not yet adequate to the task. The 2004 evaluation of the Western Africa Coastal (WAC) PRRO found that "given the paucity of programme staff within country offices, and the necessarily limited technical support available from ODD, the range of recovery activities supported in each country exceeds the ability of country offices to ensure sound project design and implementation, not to mention monitoring and assessment."[160] The 2006 self-evaluation stated that the quality of field monitors varied greatly. None of the monitors had ever taken part in a training particularly designed for the SF / THR programmes[161].

The shortage of skilled and experienced staff is exacerbated by the high staff turnover that is typical for humanitarian projects operating under emergency conditions. This was also reported from WFP's Tsunami response in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, where the evaluators found that "even where [skilled] staff could be deployed, they were often not in posts long enough to be really effective"[162].

Limited autonomy of sub-offices

WFP's organizational structure and culture regarding hierarchy does not always optimally support the adoption of flexible planning, design and implementation approaches by individual sub-offices to react to rapidly changing and sometimes volatile situations. In Sudan and DRC, the sub-offices visited had little or no discretion to use money flexibly and quickly for locally planned initiatives. Sub-offices convey their budgetary needs to the central office in the capital at the beginning of the year, but there is no budget management at the sub-office level: they have to seek approval for project expenditures, even for relatively small costs such as utensils for schools, as witnessed in Southern Sudan. The time necessary to get the approval ranges from 1 to 3 months. Field level staff in Sudan and Pakistan also found the lack of communication between the CO and the SO level problematic, which made it even harder for field level staff to react flexibly to demands from beneficiaries and other constraints at the local level.[163]

In Pakistan, the low level of discretion to adapt the programme also affected the performance of the monitoring system. Beneficiaries and WFP FAMs complained that the reporting requirements that had been set up by the CO in Islamabad were far too complex for many of the schools.

Security rules and regulations

The extensive security rules significantly limited the mobility of WFP staff and thus their ability to flexibly respond to the changing demands of SF implementation. In many locations under UN security phase three, for example, the requirement to move with two cars to transport one WFP staff member created an additional constraint for the efficient use of staff time and other resources. The real-time evaluation of WFP's Tsunami response made a similar observation. The evaluators stated that the "security regulations impeded the emergency response in significant ways" and that the "excessive number of complex security rules meant that staff

[160] WFP (2004c), p. 36

[161] WFP (2006b), p.15

[162] WFP (2005)

[163] In Pakistan, many of the grievances of local staff had to do with their attempts to creatively deal with the absence of suitable CPs for the implementation of the programme. According to SO staff, requests and proposals from the SO to the CO often received no response. It also has to be noted, however, that staff in the country office also noted a lack of responsiveness from their colleagues in the SOs, suggesting that the communication problem might have existed in both directions.

could only work effectively by sometimes ignoring them"[164]. The particular operational demands of ESF call for more flexible internal security policies and procedures and/ or for more creative ways of working with local partners whose travel is subject to less formal restrictions.

Logistical challenges, including pipeline breaks

Pipeline breaks had affected the delivery of food to schools and thus the projects in all three locations visited. In DRC, pipeline breaks have resulted in a situation where schools effectively only received food for 8-15 days per month from January 2006, before projects were suspended completely since June (and until the mission's visit in December). Logistical problems are also a known limiting factor in other ESF programmes. In Afghanistan the start of the school feeding programme (biscuits and take home) was delayed considerably by the late arrival of biscuits. The programme to provide take home rations for girls (oil) was then also suspended in absence of the fortified biscuits.

Figure 2 illustrates the main external constraints, their relationship to WFP internal constraints as well as their relationship to the key ESF implementation tasks that were affected by these combined limitations.

2.4.3 Operational implications of preceding and overlapping "development" school feeding projects

In both Sudan and Pakistan, ESF programmes had either been preceded by "development" SF programmes or continued to operate and therefore overlapped with their implementation. In the case of Sudan, as discussed in Chapter 2.3.2, the shift in some areas from SF implemented under a CP to EMOP-based SF had implications, first of all, for the targeting process that WFP was able to apply. Indeed, targeting criteria were necessarily inconsistent, as defined for different types of contexts: issues arose in Southern Sudan, when school feeding projects were defined in areas newly targeted under the emergency operation and all the same still forming part of those targeted by a longer-standing developmental support. It was found that in such case of overlapping SF projects, it was advisable for WFP to choose to apply one of the other of the two programmes – or to develop a locally-appropriate hybrid, to avoid discrepancies in the treatment of neigbouring communities as well as very complex programme management. The change of situations, from more development-type to emergency, can also lead, as in some areas of Sudan, to a change in administrative management by the local authorities, which can also become a source of difficulties. It then calls for modifying the implementation mechanisms of a project which in essence and purpose has not changed.

In the case of Pakistan, the needs WFP had to address as well as the government and non-governmental partners with whom it was dealing were quite different before and after the earthquake. Operational advantages for WFP's emergency response from its involvement in the education sector prior to the earthquake were therefore small or even non-existent. There was evidence to suggest, however, that the existing development SF programme contributed to the decision of WFP staff to distribute the biscuits. The initial provision of biscuits to schools in the earthquake affected areas seems to have been more a reaction to the availability of biscuits than

[164] Similar to the present evaluation, this previous evaluation considered the requirements associated with security to be particularly cumbersome. Staff was required to give 36 hours advance travel notifications and supply two vehicles for field missions where security was at Phase III (WFP (2005). The question could be asked however, why agencies and partners did not co-operate to plan field trips so saving each agency at least one vehicle.

a response to clearly identified needs[165]. The Emergency Food and Nutrition Assessment (EFNA; WFP / UNICEF (2005)) did not, in fact, mention ESF as a response during the first three months of the emergency, but focused on measures to save lives, including GFD and interventions to support mother-child health. More or less limited at first to IDP camp schools, the distribution of biscuits under the EMOP, gradually expanded to most of the earthquake-affected area. Requests from other humanitarian agencies and partner organizations for the inclusion of "their" beneficiaries into the distribution were the main driving force behind this expansion[166]. School feeding under the subsequent PRRO was based on the recommendation of the Emergency Food Needs Assessment to phase over from GFD into "targeted food aid", such as FFW and (E)SF. However, despite eventually recommending the phasing over from GFD into the ESF, the EFNA did not investigate the educational needs of the earthquake-affected population, but only the food-related vulnerability in the affected region[167]. At the same time, the log-frame of the PRRO mentions exclusively educational objectives for the SF component of WFP's rehabilitation strategy. Needs assessment and official objectives were thereby considerably at odds.

[165] Expert judgment based on feedback from key stakeholders within WFP.

[166] This ultimately caused an overlap in the provision of food to the Country Programme schools. This overlap still existed at the time of the visit of the evaluators. One of the challenges in this regard is that the effort under the CP to improve the gender balance in supported schools through the gender-specific distribution of THRs of oil is slightly counteracted by the blanket distribution of biscuits to all students (boys and girls) under the PRRO in the same schools.

[167] This might explain why eventually targeting for the school feeding activities took place only on the basis of food insecurity as a selection criterion.

Figure 2: External (context) and WFP-internal constraints that affect key tasks in the implementation of ESF projects



2.4.3.1 Conclusions

The implementation of SF programmes in emergencies requires WFP to apply customized SF programmes to respond to very specific needs. However, the absence of an effective process for needs assessment, planning and programme design and the difficulties in setting up an efficient and meaningful Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) system currently hinder the effective implementation of SF. These weaknesses are linked to a number of interrelated internal and external constraints. Most prominent among these limitations is the lack of appropriate guidance for the design of needs assessment and planning and design processes as well as the relatively low availability of technically skilled staff and the absence of adequate training opportunities. Providing these elements represents an important prerequisite for a more needs-based and locally appropriate design and implementation of SF programmes. Such practices should be led by appropriately trained and supported staff in WFP's sub-offices and should be grounded in an in-depth local assessment, including inherent challenges and opportunities for ESF as well as potential opportunities and threats it poses for WFP in terms of implementation.

2.5 Sustainability issues to be addressed in the implementation of ESF

Synopsis of available guidance on sustainability of SF

An EB document on Exit Strategies for School Feeding[168] outlines the following components for SF exit strategies:

1. Setting milestones for achievement: The identification of and responsibility for reaching these milestones should be clearly communicated to all stakeholders and agreed to by all parties involved.

2. Government commitment: Phase-outs are more successful if the commitment actually involves budget contributions from the Government and an active role in SF implementation.

3. Community contributions: Commitments from communities, in particular parents, is also essential to ensure continued strong SF programmes after WFP assistance comes to an end.

4. Technical assistance: Technical support throughout the project, during the phase-out and beyond, is particularly important for ensuring an adequate transfer of skills and maintaining the programme's stream of benefits long after external assistance has ended.

5a. Management and communication: Phase-out strategies should be accompanied by a management plan that ensures that SF leadership is taken over by national actors after WFP's exit.

5b. Making Sure Everyone Understands the Exit: WFP must ensure phase-out plans are clearly communicated to all stakeholders in a school feeding project, including teachers, parents and beneficiaries.

6. ***Involving the private sector:*** **A**ctive private sector involvement helps develop support and expertise among key political and economic players. The sooner private sector interests are involved, the earlier and more concrete the support will be.

Under emergency conditions, the above guidance is not always immediately applicable, in part because the prerequisites do not exist. For example, where displaced people in developing countries are living in camps, without access to income generation activities, there may be no way of planning for hand-over of the SF activities unless an alternative donor can be found. In post-conflict situations where SF is introduced while the national government has minimal financial resources and it will take years to rebuild the national economy, such hand-over again cannot be easily foreseen. At the same time, sustainability perspectives are always important –and should be kept in mind even from the outset of an emergency response (can cite various docs if required – including GHD

2.5.1 Government participation and capacity building

In Pakistan, WFP's involvement with government agencies in the education sector was limited and WFP had only little opportunity to promote capacity development in the MoE or the sector in general[169]. In Sudan under the country programme, WFP staff was closely working together with the SF unit of the MoE of the GoNU in Khartoum. After transferring the school feeding programme from the country programme to the EMOP in the CETA region, however, the nature of the co-operation changed fundamentally (see Chapter 2.3.2) and ultimately removed the role that the GoNU MoE had to play in the administration of the programme in those areas. Representatives from the MoE school feeding unit expressed their uneasiness with this development and stated the need to "build-up" or "maintain" the capacity of the SFU as a potential actor to take over the ESF schools when (or if) they will be transferred back to the

[168] *Exit Strategies for School Feeding: WFP's experience*; Executive Board, First Regular Session, 5-7 February, 2003.

[169] At the federal level, WFP's primary government counterpart was not the MoE, but the federal Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction Agency (ERRA), created after the disaster specifically to manage and administer the relief operations in all sectors in the earthquake affected areas. Due to the devolution, it was not the Federal MoE, but the provincial and district education authorities being involved in implementation.

country programme. The challenges for WFP to accomplish this successfully in emergency contexts like Sudan, DRC or Pakistan are significant. In Sudan and DRC, the prevailing political situation (including local perceptions of and status of the government authorities), insecurity and volatility in some areas, coupled with sometimes high levels of corruption exacerbated these challenges. There were also clearly tension between sustainability objectives and the material interest of government officials in a UN–supported project such as ESF, which was identified as a strong incentive for increased government involvement. In Pakistan, it is likely that any more formal cooperation with the MoE will be at the provincial level, as this devolution was already the policy of the government prior to the earthquake.

Experiences in other countries underline the fact that the task of increasing the necessary capacity to hand over school feeding programmes to government partners can only be accomplished in the long-term. The 2003 study on WFP support to Education in West Africa states that one of the challenges in Sierra Leone in moving from relief to recovery to development was to "gradually build government capacity to manage ESF" and that, despite ongoing efforts, it appeared that WFP would "have to provide support to the government in project implementation for several more years"[170].

The survey results show that the involvement of government partners is already one of the major elements of WFP's strategies to exit from support to ESF programmes. 51% of respondents indicate that increasing the Government ownership and working towards the transfer of the programme to the Government is one of the key elements of the exit strategy for their particular programme and 58% of respondents recommend increasing the involvement of government partners, in order to improve the chances for sustainability of the programme when WFP assistance ends. At the same time, however, a majority of respondents (62%) indicate that the current lack of capacity in government partners and communities is the major challenge that prevents WFP to actually exit from school feeding support[171].

2.5.2 Community participation and capacity building

In DRC and Sudan, many interviewed stakeholders felt strongly that sustainability of school feeding efforts would depend crucially on the extent to which WFP and its partners succeed in involving communities in the planning and implementation process of the school feeding projects[172]. Evidence from all three countries suggests, however, that community participation has to be incorporated into the design of the programme: it will not simply develop on its own. In Pakistan, community involvement in the school feeding activities at school was extremely limited, which seemed to be linked to the fact that WFP and its partners primarily functioned as providers of the biscuits, without any further linkages to other elements of the operation of the schools[173]. In DRC, community involvement was higher: women from the community worked

[170] WFP (2003), p. 35

[171] 42% of respondents also cite the lack of commitment and integrity and weak overall governance as an obstacle for exiting SF support in their countries.

[172] E.g., in DRC, the MoE in Bukavu stressed the importance of "preparing a community for the day when WFP is not here anymore". A representative from one of the major NGOs in support of education in DRC stated that community participation and capacity building as part of SF programmes were key to ensure the sustainability of these efforts. The reliance on local and self-help resourcing of education in DRC in recent decades means that local capacity and will is perhaps greater than elsewhere, however.

[173] This situation was also facilitated by the choice of delivery modality in Pakistan. Biscuits do not require the same amount of community involvement as does the preparations of fresh meals at the school.

as cooks, the PTAs were involved in the management of the programme at school level – albeit to differing degrees - and other community members benefited from FFW schemes to build needed kitchens for preparing the daily school meals. Yet these same men and women were not involved in any of the key policy decisions relating to the programme.

Increased community participation activities would help to increase the sense of ownership that community members have towards the SF programmes. Ultimately, they can also be an entry point to the provision of additional interventions – most probably through WFP collaboration with other agencies - which will promote the eventual self-sufficiency of the community. These may include, for example, community gardens and food transformation activities.

As communities often do not participate in the implementation of SF programmes in the direct wake of an emergency[174], it is important to build up and phase in their cooperation over time, in step with the recovery of the community as a whole. This may nonetheless be at a relatively early stage; the 2003 study on WFP support to education in West Africa stresses the importance of starting early with efforts to bring the community into the project and to increase ownership.

2.5.3 Education sector development (including advocacy)

Ultimately, WFP's efforts to support education are part of and contribute to the development and stabilization of the education sector overall. This imperative implies that WFP has to link its SF programmes to other ongoing initiatives to strengthen the education system in the countries in which it is operating. An example from DRC showed that it may be particularly promising to develop more strategic alliances with other organizations whose missions and strategic priority overlap with the rationale of WFP's school feeding efforts: A meeting with United States Agency for International Development (USAID) representatives in Kinshasa revealed that the 'Food for Peace' program through which WFP was being supported lay somewhat outside of the USAID country assistance framework, but would in the near future be integrated into this framework, in which education is a priority sector. This may require WFP to start working within this overall programme and to support the education sector objectives that USAID is pursuing in DRC - with access and quality as clear priorities; at the same time, this shift of focus offers an opportunity to WFP to reframe ESF as a sector development project. Strategically placed as such, SF has a much higher potential to increase its effect on the stabilization of the school system overall[175].

2.5.4 SF in the progression from emergency to rehabilitation and development

The visits to schools in DRC and Sudan and the discussion with representatives from the local development and humanitarian communities helped to highlight aspects of school feeding programmes that could help to present ESF as an intial step to a Linking Relief Recovery and Development (LRRD) process. The possibility to use locally produced food commodities in school feeding programmes is one of these aspects. In various locations[176] WFP's staff and partners frequently mentioned this as an opportunity to link SF programmes to a broader

[174] WFP (2003), p. 37.

[175] In Sudan it was often expressed that SF could increase daily retention and thereby help the MoE to establish their vision of "real schools" to contribute to a stabilized "school system".

[176] E.g., the possibility of linking SF to other livelihood programmes like local procurement was suggested as an opportunity by FAO in Rumbek, Sudan.

development process in the supported area. In DRC, donor representatives stressed this as one of their clear priorities.

The challenge for WFP in this regard is to recognize and pro-actively pursue these kinds of opportunities where they exist. Because these opportunities often arise at the local level and so often stay "below the radar" of higher-level offices, it is particularly important to sensitize and empower WFP's field staff in the sub-offices to identify and pursue these opportunities – without being limited by quantitative performance targets that require to provide a certain number of students with food assistance. As discussed, quantitative targets are currently the prime measure of programme success. This kind of indicator, however, does not take into account any of the qualitative measures for project achievements, such as the progress towards establishing linkages with local producers or incremental steps towards building the capacity of communities to produce supplemental food commodities for the school meals. Only if these kinds of achievements are also taken into consideration in assessing the performance of SF programmes will staff members have an organizational incentive to actually pursue these opportunities[177]. Operationally, this also means that WFP has to take into account the actual level of capacity in its partner organizations (e.g. MoE, communities, local producers) to allow for the possibility of building their capacities further through their cooperation in the programme and not to overburden them with unrealistic performance targets.

2.5.5 Conclusions

In an emergency context, the concept of sustainability for school feeding has particular features. Under ideal circumstances, humanitarian interventions would make themselves obsolete in the course of their lifetime. However, most emergency interventions are planned to meet short-term, emergency needs with little attention to the longer-term changes required in particular contexts[178]. Humanitarian organizations therefore have to ensure that their temporary achievements in saving lives and supporting a 'return to normalcy' are maintained and expanded-upon by appropriate follow-up, including the implementation of development-oriented interventions. In the specific case of school feeding, two issues are important in this regard:

- The school feeding programme has to be part of an overall education development framework either at local, regional and/or national levels and linked to other complementary interventions to increase the chance that it can be linked to "development interventions" supporting an improvement of educational or other social variables;
- Ownership of the programme should be gradually transferred to the government, communities and schools or other local or national actors with the will and the capacity to continue supporting an improvement of enrolment, attendance and quality of learning at the schools.

[177] A donor representative in DRC mentioned another necessary change in WFP operating procedures, before the opportunity for local procurement could be pursued. Among other things, WFP would have to change the parameters of its contracts – for example by allowing the possibility to commit the organization to buying a harvest at the beginning of the planting season.

3 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation has observed a variety of challenges that WFP staff, WFP as an organization and its organizational partners face in the implementation of School Feeding projects in emergency contexts. Findings from this evaluation can be used as one of several building blocks to enhance, extend and adapt the current intervention logic and theory of SF programmes. This will help to better capture the particular characteristics and challenges of SF activities that are being implemented in emergency or post-emergency situations. Practitioners and policy makers can build on this evaluation to expand the knowledge and understanding of the functioning of school feeding programmes in emergency situations.

Figure 3 on page 64 shows the main observations of this evaluation in a causal hierarchy, tracing them from main organizational and context features over their organizational and non-organizational implications to the performance (effectiveness) of school feeding projects[179]. It is important to note that the diagram does **not implied that the listed issues were necessarily present in all countries and locations**. Quite to the contrary, the evaluators saw many good individual examples of creative implementation of SF programmes during the country visits. The diagram rather presents a **generalized picture of systemic challenges that WFP is facing that *can* lead to a reduced effectiveness** of SF programmes in emergencies. Based on the findings, the evaluation team draws the following overall conclusions:

3.1 Customized design of ESF projects is central to increased effectiveness

ESF assistance is not necessarily reaching the schools that would benefit from it most. The imprecise targeting in ESF projects results primarily from the fact that WFP is currently not optimally using the opportunities for locally appropriate, customized ESF design. This stems in part from WFP's weakness in correctly assessing specific educational needs in the design phase; in properly considering the cost implications of targeting; and in considering operational implications of the different delivery modalities.

Organizational causes for the weakness in design can be grouped into three broad categories: Firstly, a lack of expertise or **appropriate and context specific guidance and tools** (dark blue in Figure 3) contributes to the fact that the potential for context-appropriate, customized support through ESF projects is currently not being realized. The standard tools and procedures that are in place are either not specific enough to respond to the realities of emergencies or post-emergency situations or they fail to reflect the educational rationale of SF projects.

[179] The boxes on the left side of the diagram list organizational (blue) and "context" (green) issues that are thought to affect the performance of SF projects. The next column (with light blue boxes) shows what organizational or project-related implications the specific characteristics in the far left column are thought to have. The orange boxes list the programme-external consequences of the previous organizational and contextual features and processes – all of which ultimately translate into "lower than necessary effectiveness of SF projects". The boxes with red borders contain features or processes that are thought to be particularly important when SF is being implemented in emergency contexts.

Figure 3: Cause and effect model implementation challenges in ESF projects



Secondly, the prevailing **organizational culture and hierarchy within WFP** (light-blue boxes) also contributes to this situation. There is a limited understanding within WFP of the technical capacity required for effective school feeding projects and so there is limited organizational interest in having technically trained ESF staff or that such a programme should be tailored specifically for a local situation to respond to particular needs or specific context limitations. Executive Board approval for project implementation is possible without providing evidence of a needs assessment and design process. In fact, approval even seems easer to attain if Country Offices adopt the standard objectives that are being proposed in the SF Handbook and in the SF Guidelines. With low expectations for locally driven initiatives, it is not surprising that currently sub-offices often do not have the necessary leeway to act on opportunities for local initiatives, either by anticipating these opportunities in the design of their programme or by pushing for its adaptation as new possibilities for locally appropriate implementation arise. Thirdly, chances for local design are also limited by WFP's low staff capacity for tasks of this kind.

A significant gap is the **limited availability of staff with understanding of the particular comparative advantages and disadvantages, strengths, weaknesses and major challenges in the implementation of ESF.** This includes staff members who understand what challenges are involved in implementing SF, in choosing the right modalities, or in overcoming implementation difficulties caused by inappropriate or non-existent operational minimum

requirements (i.e. kitchens, water points, etc.) Additionally, however, this also includes staff members with a clear understanding of the supportive role that SF can play in the education sector.

3.2 Tension between "WFP targeting" and "provision of complementary inputs"

Imprecise targeting in SF projects and the fact that much needed "complementary inputs" are not developed are the main factors that contribute to a reduced effectiveness of ESF projects.

Precise targeting, however, will not solve the challenge of ensuring coordination with other complementary educational and nutrition/health activities. In order for WFP to more accurately respond to the combined objectives of educational access and retention and respond to the needs of the most food security vulnerable, WFP must be willing to co-ordinate with other UN agencies and NGOs and to partner around their education-related assistance to schools. However this carries the risk that WFP compromises its own targeting principles, for example, in that nutritional vulnerability considerations are omitted from the targeting process completely. In that sense, there even is a certain tension and potential trade off between both factors. Ultimately, WFP has to strike a balance between increasing the accuracy of its targeting process and improving the coordination with strategic partners. However, in both areas, improvements are needed.

3.3 Reduced effectiveness of SF programmes caused only in part by factors specific to emergencies

The performance of SF programmes in emergencies is affected by a number of organizational features of WFP that are not necessarily linked to any specific features of emergency or post-emergency situations. This evaluation observed that opportunities for locally specific design were not being used in countries with either acute emergencies or post-emergency (recovery situation). There is reason to assume that the same limitations for SF project planning are found also in other countries – in both emergency and "development" situations. Still, the enormity of challenges may exceed those in a development context and also the increased need for a timely response:

- The staff capacity of WFP is likely to be similar in all operations, whether or not ESF is identified as a programme priority. In emergency and transitional contexts WFP is primarily a "first responder" organization and the staff skills and staff expertise are tailored accordingly.
- The guidance and standardized tools that were found to neglect the educational aspects of SF programmes are also used in other countries where WFP is active. The limitations of WFP's needs assessment process for SF in general are most likely compounded in an emergency situation where rapid and careful selection of priority beneficiaries for whom ESF will have a positive impact is particularly critical.
- There are no organizational incentives for engaging in needs-based design and programming for school feeding. The fact that no document template seems to exist to capture the results of a context-specific planning process is presumably true for all countries.

3.4 The categorical distinction between SF and "E"SF is problematic.

Emergency and development situations share various similarities and often have common features. Therefore, there is no definitive line between emergency and development contexts. Governments with particularly low organizational capacity can be found in both; infrastructure can be insufficient in development situations as well as in emergency contexts. Consequently, SF programmes that are implemented in development situations can arguably experience similar context-dependent challenges and certainly are exposed to similar organizational challenges as their counterparts in emergencies. The key distinction is not that these programmes are different in kind but that they are different in degree: whatever the limitations in development situations, they will almost inevitably be exacerbated by the emergency situation, combined with an urgent demand for a timely response. In order to fully support the emergency response, WFP will need to provide more guidance and support than is necessary in development situations – not least because there are critical time factors associated with adequate emergency response programs.

3.5 Particular implementation associated with specific and individual context features

Whereas some organizational or programme challenges cut across the different operational contexts, there are challenges that are logically and systematically linked to specific context features of the programme or programme environment. For example, low levels of community and household resources are probably associated with a comparatively lower ability of communities to put in place infrastructure and other installations to meet the pre-conditions and operational requirements of particular school feeding modalities. Likewise, poor accessibility to target populations will make it harder for WFP to find co-operating partners that are willing and able to deliver the food and to provide assistance to these remote communities – independent of the question of whether these remote locations are labelled "development" or "emergency" areas. This context specificity supports the argument for more educational inputs into the design and monitoring process. Without this, the suggestion of a local design may not achieve the desired objectives.

4 RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Area for action 1: Establishing a process for context-specific SF programme design

As suggested in Figure 1, the weakness or absence of an appropriate locally-driven design process is a major factor contributing to the reduced effectiveness of SF projects or programmes. Recommendations are therefore suggested to address this issue.

4.1.1 Recommendation 1: WFP should introduce the requirement of a country-specific implementation plan to support ESF programming.

At present, there is no incentive for WFP staff to engage in locally specific project or programme design for SF activities. School feeding activities financed under EMOPs or PRROs are approved in a package with other emergency interventions that often have a higher profile, consume more food resources or focus more attention than the ESF component. In order to increase the attention that members of the board, managers and eventually staff, pay to the design of SF programmes, WFP needs to provide the technical support to COs and SOs to prepare an implementation plan that demonstrates an appropriate educational needs assessment process, detailed targeting strategy taking into account the educational criteria and considerations of availability of partners for the ESF activities that are being planned. The template of this document should require, among other things:

- Evidence of assessment of the educational needs of schoolchildren and of the primary barriers to education, in partnership with other stakeholders;
- Formulation of objectives that correspond to identified needs and justification of ESF as the appropriate tool for pursuing them, with reference to education sector needs as articulated by the education cluster or similar mechanism; an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of ESF in comparison with other tools should be included;
- An appropriate targeting strategy including justification of the ESF modality and target population and specification of required minimum standards;
- Identification of strategic partners for WFP and statement of responsibilities of all parties to ensure maximum and sustained impact.

This may be necessary at two levels – a short-term response based on perceived needs or previous experience and a longer-term response following a formal needs assessment that ensures an effective focus on educational access, quality and associated child protection issues.

4.1.2 Recommendation 2: WFP programme designers should develop objectives for ESF programmes that respond to the results of local assessments which include educational needs.

WFP's current weakness in formulating relevant objectives stems in part from the fact that the current assessment procedures and tools are not designed to systematically capture the educational needs of the target population and the situation in the education sector. Therefore, one necessary step is to amend the guidance for WFP needs assessments with advice, technical support and procedures for capturing the educational needs of potential beneficiaries.

Amending the corporate guidance in this manner, however, is not all that is necessary: any newly developed tools and guidelines need to be adapted to the specific local context and will have to be applied correctly during the needs assessment – tasks that invariably require a good understanding of educational challenges in a given context. WFP should therefore cooperate with external education experts who can provide country-specific understanding of education-related challenges. In-house technical expertise should also be enhanced to support this process.

The COs and SOs need to work more closely with the SF Handbook and the ESF Guidelines so that when modifications are made, they are made to increase the relevance of WFPs assistance strategy. For this to happen the SF Handbook and the ESF Guidelines need to include generic outlines and/or checklists that can be adapted to the local context.

The SF Handbook and the ESF Guidelines should also provide better guidance on possible objectives in emergency contexts, and the modality considerations to achieve those objectives. This is to ensure a better understanding of the principles so that when modifications are made, they are made to increase the relevance of WFPs assistance strategy. For this to happen the SF Handbook and the ESF Guidelines could outline a checklist that can be adapted to the local context.

4.1.3 Recommendation 3: The targeting process for support through ESF should ensure that WFP can reach schools in which serve the most food-insecure and educationally vulnerable children.

Improvements in the needs assessment process and the ability to capture educational needs to which a SF project can respond will help WFP COs and SOs to improve their targeting processes in SF projects. These improvements will allow WFP staff to develop clearer educational targeting indicators or criteria to complement WFP's geographic targeting process that is based primarily on food insecurity and nutritional indicators.

In addition, with the support of VAM, WFP should develop tools for mapping educational needs, identifying constraints to food deliveries and ways in which communities can contribute to projects. The purpose of these tools is to allow WFP to identify in its targeting process specific geographic areas that should receive support and to do so acknowledging the cost and logistical implications. The assessment should also include an appraisal of the resources that communities and schools can contribute to the SF project, e.g., to help install kitchens, latrines or other infrastructure elements.

In areas that are found to be difficult to access or whose communities are particularly ill-equipped to provide needed infrastructure, WFP should then adapt the design of the programme to ensure that needed infrastructure can be put in place over time or that the project foresees a sufficient budget to finance the transport of food commodities to inaccessible areas. One possible strategy here is to look for synergies between WFP and its CPs or other partners (see Section 4.2.1). Ultimately, WFP should strive for complementary programming with strategic partners in education, such as UNICEF, in recognition of the fact that WFP can only play a supportive role in education. Strengthening WFP participation in education clusters is a strategy that is also gaining in significance as the UN reform and Education Cluster establishment processes are developing at global and national levels.

Synchronizing WFP's targeting priorities and processes with those of partner organizations will be a major challenge. WFP's priorities that always have to take into consideration the nutritional vulnerability of potential target populations are not likely to be completely in concert with the priorities of education-focused organizations that concentrate on educational gaps in different

communities. Here, WFP will have to develop clear guidance on the priorities that WFP COs and SOs should adopt.

4.1.4 Recommendation 4: Modalities and minimum standards should be chosen in relation to the objectives and the context, with attention to the risk of excluding the most vulnerable.

When considering which SF modality to choose, WFP staff should consider a) the current availability of SF related infrastructure in the targeted communities, such as kitchens, latrines, etc., and b) the availability of support (either from WFP itself, community and/or from other partners) to improve weak infrastructure in the schools. In addition, WFP has to match the modality choice to the specific objectives the SF project aims to address. In order to support staff in making these decisions, however, the currently available guidance documents have to be amended with advice on which SF modalities are most suited for achieving specific objectives and how the different modalities are suited for implementation in emergency environments.

As mentioned in Section 4.1.3 above, where necessary minimum standards for SF implementation do not exist, WFP should prioritize actions to ensure that the necessary infrastructure will progressively be put in place over time. Where resources or organizational partners for this kind of investment are not available, WFP staff should then consider the selection of less demanding SF modalities and food commodities.

4.2 Area for action 2: Taking advantage of opportunities for strategic partnerships

4.2.1 Recommendation 5: ESF projects can be more effective if accompanied by complementary activities: WFP should have a strategy to ensure these are provided, considering in particular the potential of strategic partnerships

SF plays a very specific supportive role for educational improvements in the targeted schools and can act as a catalyst for bringing about progress in other areas as well, such as capacity building at community level. However, in order to realize its potential in this regard, SF programmes have to be implemented in concert with support programmes that drive these kinds of advances and therefore in coordination with partner organizations which support and/or implement such programmes.

WFP should aim for complementary programming with strategic partners in education such as UNICEF and should look for synergies with partners to ensure that minimum operating conditions can be put in place over time.

ESF project formulation should reflect the fact that school feeding can play only a supportive role in the pursuit of educational improvements. Based on the comprehensive assessment of the situation in the education sector (Section 4.1.1), the SF project document should clearly identify the current education gaps and how these may be best supported through SF interventions and/ or through WFP partnerships.

One recommended strategy is to ensure that SF is included within nationally owned and driven education sector plans, where these exist. In the absence of such plans, for example in the height of an emergency WFP should align ESF programmes with the educational support programmes developed by an education coordination group including local and international education stakeholders. Increasing WFP's participation in education clusters is gaining in significance as

the United Nations reform and establishment of education clusters is progressing and as it is institutionalized at the global, national and regional levels.

Although partnerships of this kind exist and benefit the purpose of SF activities, there is still untapped potential that WFP can access in this regard. In particular, WFP's relationship with CPs must be transformed from a "client-contractor" relationship to a partnership between organizations with complementary inputs in areas such as educational support or support for capacity strengthening and community mobilization. Several steps are necessary to ensure that this will be possible:

- WFP should consider the skills and expertise of potential CPs in areas such as community participation and mobilization or education in addition to the logistical capacities as selection criteria for CPs.
- The FLAs should be developed together with the CP so that the use of food commodities can create synergies between SF programmes and the complementary support programmes being implemented by the CP. The FLA should also consider programmatic issues more specifically, including respective budgeting.
- WFP staff at all levels need to be sensitized and trained to recognize the opportunities for synergies between ESF and other types of support programmes of the cooperating partner.

4.3 Area for action 3: Improving quality in implementation.

4.3.1. Recommendation 6: WFP should recognize the potential for nutritional benefits of ESF and optimize it in areas where severe food insecurity and malnutrition in school children hamper effective learning.

In areas where food insecurity and severe malnutrition in school-going children is limiting effective learning, the nutritional benefit of WFP support could be optimised, going beyond the aim of only alleviating short-term hunger to aiming to contribute to an improved nutrition situation of school children, and thus more effective learning. This would require the provision of a food basket, sufficient in quantity and quality helping to meet children's actual nutritional requirements better and to contribute substantially to an improved dietary intake (including, most importantly, increased energy intake, often most importantly the increase in protein, fat as well as increased intake of micro-nutrients, most importantly iron, iodine and Vitamin A). Respective guidance for the formulation of an appropriate food basket responding to the needs and intended outcomes would need to be up-dated. Further work is required to develop possible outcome indicators, feasible to be assessed within an emergency context. A possibility would be to consider proxy-indicators, such as i.e. regular provision of a planned ration to all targeted children, the provision of good quality food, increased food intake, minimised substitution effect, community/ parental perceptions of changes etc. Those proxy indicators could become an integral part of monitoring and evaluation efforts.

There is little scientific evidence of the potential nutritional benefits of school feeding programmes, of how effective SFs can be to alleviate malnutrition, nor are any appropriate indicators developed yet. It is therefore important for WFP to align with strategic partners acting in the sectors of school health and nutrition to further investigate what are possible nutritional outcomes and what the respective feasible indicators could be. Lessons from SFs in a development context would benefit SFs under an emergency context.

4.3.1 Recommendation 7: WFP should explore ways to improve SF M&E systems and to improve feedback from the field as a prerequisite for project adjustments and improvements.

The monitoring of ESF is currently significantly affected by staff time shortages and by the low availability of staff members with appropriate M&E related skills. Where possible, WFP should therefore consider increasing the number of staff (particularly FAMs) that can be trained to take over monitoring-related tasks, and should ensure that they are sufficiently skilled to identify and collect relevant ESF monitoring data. The analysis of monitoring data should also be strengthened to allow for a more meaningful but concise feedback to the management and field implementation levels. Again, more intensive strategic partnerships offer a good opportunity to mobilize additional human resources to carry out M&E-related tasks. Organizations that can use SF as a tool to improve the effectiveness of their own programmes will have an intrinsic interest to ensure that the SF commodities are being used for the purpose for which they were intended.

M&E needs to incorporate a more qualitative, result-oriented approach as well as the collection of quantitative data. This would entail monitoring in particular aspects of, for example, (i) food preparation, consumption and acceptance, (ii) timing of feeding, (iii) substitution of home meals (measuring for instance food intake at home on school days compared non-school days) and (iv) educational issues such as quality of teaching and learning (v) protection and/or risk elements of the school environment .

However, this will require that WFP broadens its contractual obligations for CPs and gives them more flexibility to design the M&E system according to their own needs.

4.3.2 Recommendation 8: That WFP design and disseminate training tools for ESF and should strategically place education experts to improve the use of technical guidance in the design and implementation of ESF activities in the field.

Training tools need to be designed and used to familiarize staff members that take on SF-related responsibilities. These need to incorporate the main features, available resources and key considerations to be taken into account in the implementation of SF programmes in emergencies. In addition, WFP should enhance its capacity to make full-time technical experts available that can function as resource persons for SF implementers in the field, to be consulted during needs assessment and design, monitoring, or expansion of ESF programmes. International expertise could be built up through studies, seminars, and training workshops that would lead to a formal or informal roster of national and international experts available to help design or improve emergency response. Where there is an ongoing SF programme in a country vulnerable to emergencies, emergency preparedness could be enhanced – ideally in collaboration with the government and other education sector actors - through workshops and strategic planning.

Annexes

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Emergency School Feeding Evaluation

Terms of Reference

Final version of 01/09/06 [180]

1. BACKGROUND

Emergency School feeding (ESF) in WFP

WFP has been supporting education since its establishment in 1964. The 1995 'Operational guidelines for WFP assistance to education'[181]: acknowledge that" In the early years food aid was seen primarily as a relief intervention; schools were convenient points through which food for hungry children could be channelled". Since then, school feeding has been taking on a longer-term benefit-building tinge. However, in view of the increasing share of WFP's humanitarian assistance portfolio, school feeding programmes has regularly been part in WFP's emergency responses

Operational Guidelines for WFP Assistance to Education developed in 1995 dealt primarily with food for education in a development context. A specific emergency context-focus has only been introduced in August 2005. These Guidelines for school feeding in an emergency situation indicate that the objectives of school feeding in emergency are similar to that of a development context, but "take on an extra dimension given the traumatic and/or disrupted conditions that children find themselves in"[182]. In emergency contexts, the primary stated purpose for school feeding is to maintain and increase access to education at a time when drop outs are increasing due to food insecurity and hardship, and thus ensure no generation misses out on education.

The objectives of ESF can be categorized as follows:

- **Educational** :

- Protect / maintain / improve performance and concentration
- Protect / maintain / improve attendance and enrolment
- Long-term human capital building [Linking Relief-Rehabilitation and Development]

- **Food security** of child (in-school feeding) or households (THR):

- Help alleviate short-term hunger,
- Tackle food shortages
- Alleviate costs on household

- **Nutrition**: provide a **vehicle** for micro-nutrient supplementation (in-school feeding) -as a 'plus'.

[180] This final version of the TORs amends the version ciculated as from 15 June 2006, and amendments bear only on sections 4 and 5.

[181] See EB document SCP 15/INF/3

[182] See "Guidelines for school feeding in an emergency situation" WFP, 2005.

- Act as a **platform** for other inputs & tool against **HIV/Aids**

- **Protection** of children / build-up of future generations:

- Psychosocial support (sense of normality, protection from work or army enrolment)
- Physical protection (security)

- Reduce **disparities** (gender/minority… wise)

Rationale of the evaluation

Evaluating ESF arises from a combination of reasons, starting by external and internal requests for more knowledge on the subject. Indeed, the scant documentation of school feeding projects in emergency contexts have been the subject does not reflect the significant number of SF projects within WFP recent emergency operations, as shown in the table below.

Year	Number of operations[183]			Number of countries of implementation	Number of beneficiaries reached
	EMOPS	PRROS	Overall		
2002	10	23	33	29	8,2 million
2003	12	31	43	41	8.8 million
2004	11	29	40	47	10.2 million

Out of these operations, some 20 to 38 percent had ESF as a main activity -i.e. representing at least 40% of their overall beneficiaries. On another perspective, 50 percent of all WFP school feeding beneficiaries in 2004 were part of an emergency response (EMOP or PRRO).

It should be noted that the preparation of specific ESF guidelines in 2004 resulted primarily from a side-initiative –the preparation of minimum standards for education in emergencies in collaboration with the INEE- and did not imply a solid appraisal of the situation on the ground. The planned evaluation would provide this assessment, analysis and modelization of situations; hence provide a basis for possibly refining the guidelines.

Eventually, this evaluation will be carried in parallel to the preparation of a policy paper on Food for Education, and will subsequently feed into the development of the latter –on its emergency aspects- as findings are made available. Tentatively, both papers will be presented to the Annual Executive Board session, in June 2007.

2. EVALUATION PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Purpose

The evaluation of ESF will primarily be carried out for purposes of learning from current practises, in view of improving them, appraising the need for further guidance; and incidentally, provide accountability to EB.

It is expected to provide a comprehensive perception and methodical analysis of the specific features and challenges of ESF, both in absolute terms, as it is implemented, and relatively to identified good practises.

[183] Including revised projects but counting regionals once.

This will be reflected within a full synthesis and a summary reports due as a first draft in January 2007.

Scope

For the purposes of this evaluation, "school feeding" will be defined as comprising both on-site feeding at schools (in-school meal at lunchtime, a breakfast or a mid-morning snack to reduce children's hunger during school day) and the provision of dry, take-home food rations.[184]

The evaluation will not include FFT or other education-related activities (such as FFT, child soldier, literacy projects…) but remain attentive to these bordering activities, notably with the concern of reviewing the relevance of WFP's current categorization and the extent to which ESF programme features apply to these other categories of activities.

The evaluation shall focus on ESF. Emergency contexts imply specific constraints and challenges which cannot be tackled via the same instruments as in a development context, nor can be evaluated along the same conceptual framework. An evaluation of one particular segment of SF will allow tackling its specific issues more rigorously.

WFP defines en emergency as a "situation that surpasses the capacity to cope… and requires that extraordinary action be taken and resources applied…"[185] It comprises sudden calamities, human-made or complex emergencies, food scarcity, severe food access or availability conditions. The evaluation scope will hence comprise EMOP and PRRO type of operations.

School feeding can be implemented in a variety of **emergency** and **operational** contexts (slow / sudden onset; natural/ man-made disaster; crisis / recovery - Camp / failed or defaulting states/ war / post-war …) with a subsequent range of context-based variables coming into play and affecting implementation. Some have evident significance, such as:

✓ Camp / displacement / refugee situations: Many of WFP's emergency school feeding projects are implemented within a camp setting, which should be reflected in the chosen case studies.

✓ Failed or defaulting states: WFP also operates in countries at war, which has implications on future prospects for the project and subsequent connectedness strategy as well as on operational matters such as security, infrastructure support, etc.

✓ Post war / post- natural disaster / reconstruction: As the ideal linkage activity between a crisis situation and development, school feeding is often implemented in contexts of recovery, where the situation is uncertain or varies according to the geographical zone.

✓ Multi-contexts operations: Post crisis settings often comprise a variety of situations, ranging from very sensitive to serene contexts. Such different contexts are at times addressed by a unique operation. In the case of school feeding, difficulties may arise from trying to apply a unique strategy to tackle heterogeneous situations.

✓ Multi-operations contexts: Emergency school feeding is also often implemented along with a "development school feeding"[186] within the same country, which also has operational

[184] See "School feeding initiative", WFP/EB.3/2000/INF/15 - This definition is currently being reviewed within WFP with the preparation of the policy paper on Food for Education already mentioned.

[185] See policy paper "definition of emergencies", WFP/EB.1/2005/4A.

[186] I.e. School feeding activity as part of a Country Programme.

implications. An ESF could build on the experience of a Country Programme school feeding activity or conversely, it could generate a developmental approach to school feeding, when phasing out. Issues can also arise from the need to articulate the two during a transitional phase of overlap.

✓ Previous context: A crisis which occurs within a high or low income country might not have to deal with the same challenges.

For the sake of maintaining the focus of the evaluation on most critical or problematic aspects at stake, the following remarks will be kept in mind:

Evaluation should keep a focus on **most emergency-like** operations (notably for PRROs), to ensure its focus will remain on issues which are specific to emergencies and avoid that the evaluation addresses overall school feeding questions.

Consideration will be made of the various **phases of emergencies** and related specific challenges, identifying indicators for each distinct stages of crisis.

The evaluation will all the same remain attentive to issues related to **transition** from emergency to development, as recommended by the advisory group.

Evaluation objective and related key issues

A comprehensive typology of emergency situation features should be developed as a starting point for the evaluation, including constraints and opportunities possibly encountered on the field (defaulting state, insecurity, access, …) ; operational framework; stakes, interests, stakeholders, ….

The evaluation intends to shed light on ways in which school feeding effectively addresses the needs of people in emergency situations, by focusing on aspects of relevance, efficiency, sustainability and other key operational issues, by answering the **following main questions:**

1. Which of the potential objectives supported by ESF are relevant in the various contexts encountered?

- Which objective(s) should be considered relevant to follow within possible emergency situations?

  Ex: To what extent is supporting education appropriate when there are no provisions for a minimum quality education?

- Is each objective relevant even when pursued independently? Or should ESF on the contrary imperatively combine more that one objective to be relevant?

  Ex: is ESF efficient as a sole support to nutrition / education / protection…?

What is the relevance of ESF with regards to considerations of duration?

On what basis should objectives of school feeding in emergencies be differentiated from those of development?

2. What are the most efficient modalities to ensure objectives are met in different contexts? I.e. based on observed effectiveness in the various cases studies.

To what extent do the various ESF modalities efficiently support its various objectives?

If ESF is implemented only for reasons of food provision, what differentiates it from GFD, what are comparative advantages?

Can school feeding be an efficient safety net, i.e. can it be "switched on and off" depending on the emergency level? If so, in which instances?

What conditions should be required to maximize performance, in terms of complementary inputs and quality standards?

What minimum quality standards for the school environment can realistically be expected in an emergency context?

What are appropriate implementation mechanisms, including the role of government authorities and parents

Are there minimum attached inputs required to ensure effectiveness?

What partnerships are recommended directly complementary activities to ESF and what are opportunities/constraints faced?

Should WFP ESF programmes be integrated into wider education sector emergency response plans and programmes?

Should ESF be combined with food for work for repair/construction of educational infrastructure affected by an emergency?

Could best practises be drawn form experience to date, according to the various situations?

3. In what way do the constraints and opportunities' inherent to emergency situations have implications on the management of ESF?

What specific difficulties or opportunities do programme managers face with regards to the implementation of ESF?

To what extent and how are management mechanisms such as needs assessments and monitoring and evaluation affected by constraints inherent to emergencies?

Do ESF projects benefit from adequate HR capacity, capacity building opportunities? If not why not?

Do ESF projects benefit from sufficient corporate support (reporting systems, guidance…)? If not why not?

Does having a development SF prior to a given ESF have positive implications on implementation mechanisms (including targeting)?

What are the usual constraints hindering targeting and possible solutions?

What are possible responses to the challenge of articulating EMOP / Development targeting strategies when both an EMOP and a CP overlap in one country?

What are possible responses to the challenge raised by tackling diverse emergency levels through a single operation –and targeting strategy (PRROs)?

What can be considered an appropriate target within the various contexts:

* Particular groups (demobilised child soldiers, displaced/resettled populations, refugees, girls, etc.)
* Age groups (pre-school age to youth and adults; etc.)
* Educational level (pre-school, primary school, secondary school, high school)

  - Types of schools should be supported (public schools, private and religious schools; etc.)
  - Types of education (formal schooling; non-formal education, vocational training, literacy and skills training)
- Should support be extended to teachers or other educational personnel?

4. What should be kept in mind regarding concerns of sustainability?

Should ESF be terminated when the emergency is over? Do they usually transition to a development SF programme and, if so does it enhance sustainability?

Advantages of having an ESF prior to establishing a CP one; ESF as a means for LRRD.

Challenge of connecting the short term visibility of some contexts of crisis (displacement / war …) with the long-term inclination of SF.

Challenges identified for the evaluation and implications:

First identified challenge for this evaluation is the lack of evident benchmarks against which to evaluate, due to the absence of a clear policy backing the implementation. The selected projects' objectives, WFP's general policy framework and Strategic Objectives as well as observed good practises will provide useful points of reference.

Given the subsequent unlikelihood of developing a common conceptual framework, the evaluation will develop around key hypothesis to verify in the chosen situations.

Secondly, although the evaluation will attempt to delineate the role played by ESF from that of other inputs on the various outcomes observed, attribution can be expected delicate taking into account that the multiple support from which schools benefit.

The evaluation will purposely leave aside questions relating to the necessity of maintaining education during emergencies, for two main reasons. First, the focus of issues to be considered would otherwise be extended much beyond WFP's scope of work (the role of food). Secondly, the subject has been rather extensively studied and the existing literature widely acknowledges the necessity of maintaining education in such context.

3. APPROACH AND PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION REGARDING METHODOLOGY

1. Approach

A concept paper was developed in order to outline the rationale for carrying an evaluation of ESF.

An **advisory group** was established with representatives of the School feeding and nutrition services, operations department and the 'emergency and transitions' unit of the policy department. The role of the group is to provide inputs and comments at key stages[187] of the evaluation process, to ensure it remains in line with main priorities and needs of WFP and ensure a quality control over its main outputs. A first discussion took place, on the basis of the concept paper, confirming general agreement on the evaluation's rationale and main issues of importance.

As thematic evaluation, this exercise should build on comprehensive **desk research** covering all relevant literature. The team therefore read through the existing documentation relevant to the subject, and a paper was produced consolidating information available to date. Relevant documentation was provided by the WFP evaluation manager to this effect, to which each expert added their personal bibliography references.

An evaluation framework will be drafted by the team leader by September 15th, 2006, with inputs from other members, in order to propose a common and methodical approach to tackle field work.

Case studies will constitute the core basis of the evaluation work and will be limited to 3 or 4, depending on needs as well as budgetary and time constraints. Countries will be selected on the basis of the initial findings of the desk review and reflect at best the range of contextual variables, with priority given to emblematic and most critically concerning instances. Each case-study should ideally encompass several aspects of interest. An average of 15 to 20 days should be spent in each country selected.

2. Methodology

The methodology will be further developed by the team leader on the basis of the conceptual framework and evaluation questions as accepted among the team members.

The evaluation is expected to combine use of quantitative and qualitative methods, to rely on various data collection tools ranging from direct observation to informal and semi-structured interviews and focus groups and should be based, as relevant, on consultation of beneficiaries, counterparts, partners, others agencies and WFP staff in the field and in the head office in Rome.

Roles of the evaluation stakeholders

The evaluation team

A three persons team will conduct three country case studies. As the education aspects have to be covered by two different consultants, the team leader and the nutritionist will be part of each mission, to ensure as much continuity from one case to the other. Team members are expected to maintain a good team spirit and to develop harmonious and professional working relationships with others, as well as to have a good written and spoken level of English and French. Although the team primarily covers the two core fields of education and nutrition, added

[187] Commenting on the concept paper, Terms of Reference, mission debriefing and final reports.

perspectives as regards to protection, gender, HIV/AIDS or other relevant issues will be favoured.

The team leader, identified in the person of Martin Steinmeyer will be particularly responsible for the evaluative process. This includes drafting an evaluation framework which will serve as basis for the field work and subsequent analysis; the supervision of the data collection process during the first week of each mission and potential adjusting of tools if necessary; the organization of the team's work in the field and during the team debriefing and the writing of main reports (full and summary) on the basis of each team member's written contributions.

A second team member should focus on the analysis of school feeding in relation to its role regarding **education**. This position will be shared between Jackie Kirk and Pamela Baxter, both experts in the field of education in emergencies, who will ensure the closest possible collaboration. A third team member, identified in the person of Silvia Kaufman, will cover issues pertaining to the **food security and** nutrition-related features of ESF.

All team members are expected to contribute to the evaluation process as per assigned responsibilities, following the approach developed by the team leader and participating fully to scheduled meetings. They will also participate fully to the final debriefing workshop with the team, and deliver a written report covering their area of focus and structured according to an agreed format, under a quasi final form.

Following their participation to a briefing in Rome, Jackie Kirk and Pamela Baxter will take a particular responsibility into the evaluation, contributing through their comments and suggestions to the development of the evaluation framework and taking over the team leader responsibility when Martin Steinmeyer is not present, including the drafting respective case studies' aide-mémoires.

An evaluation manager from the Office of Evaluation will supervise and support the overall evaluation exercise. This includes preparing the concept paper, Terms of Reference and a thorough briefing file for the evaluation team; liaising between team members, relevant WFP headquarters staff and selected country offices; preparing and participating to the field missions to assist the team leader with logistical arrangements and possibly with the data collection work. The manager will also ensure that the evaluation keeps on intended tracks and that proper support is provided to the team.

WFP staff involved in the implementation of ESF in the countries visited will be requested to take an active part in exercise as much as their availability allows, as relevant in a learning-oriented evaluation exercise such as this one.

More generally, the **Country Offices** will ensure their support to the evaluation, first by advising on main issues at stake, timing and itinerary considerations prior to the visits. Secondly, they will facilitate the team's field work by ensuring that necessary in-country material is timely prepared; providing logistical support and adequate working space and assisting in the organisation briefing/debriefing sessions. They will eventually be asked to provide their written comments on the reports.

The internal advisory group represents all relevant units of WFP and is expected to provide inputs / comments on the TORs, during the evaluation briefing and debriefing, and on the reports.

As peer reviewers, external experts in relevant fields will be asked to provide their advice at key stages of the exercise as. Their interventions could be tentatively proposed as follows:

- Written comments on final draft ToRs,

- Participation to a round-table discussion on initial findings, including also the internal advisory group (possibly 1 day and to be held in Rome),
- Written comments on the main report.

4. PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS

4.1 Tentative evaluation schedule:

School opening and seasonal constraints were taken into account for case studies planning, as well as any factors affecting implementation in the selected countries.

Timing	Evaluation task
April	Concept paper ready
May-June 2006	Team identification and contracting TORs drafting
July 2006	Desk review and inception paper drafting (TL)
August 2006 (end)	Team briefing (2 days) in Rome Finalization of ToRs including review of peers and advisory group.
Aug-Sept. 2006	Indonesia evaluation keeping a focus on ESF (TL participating)
15 Sept. 2006	Methodology framework ready and circulated among team
Oct. –Dec. 2006	Field work: three case studies (TBI)
January 2007	Debriefing workshop in Rome (team and peers) –tentatively set for 8-11 January Reports writing
31 January 2007	Handing of draft summary and full reports by TL
February 2007	Report sent for internal comments
March 2007	Finalization of reports and submission for EB editing.
June 2007	Submission to EBA.07

4.2 Tentative work breakdown

Preparation phase: For the time period 15/06/06 – 30/09/06		
Reading + desk review and inception note drafting	15 June – 31 July 2006	15 days for team leader
Briefing in Rome	TBC - late August 2006	2 days for 2/3 team members
Field work phase: For the time period 03/10/06 – 31/12/06		
Field mission to country 1 (tentatively Pakistan) (inclusive of preparation and reporting time)	10 -25 October 2006	10 –15 days for MS, PB, SK & AW
Field mission to country 2 (tentatively Sudan) (inclusive of preparation and reporting time)	10 -30 November 2006	20 days (TBC) for 2 team members
Field mission to country 3 (tentatively DRC) (inclusive of preparation and reporting time)	1 -15 December 2006	15 days (TBC) for 2 team members
Reporting phase: For the time period of 01-31/01/07		
Post-missions workshop (peers review)	Tentatively 8-10 January 2007	2 days all team members
Debriefing in Rome	Tentatively 11 January 2007	1 day all team members + peers
Reports writing (can extend beyond January with revisions post-comments)	10-30 January 2007	15 days for team leader

These Terms of Reference will be completed by the additional information provided in the methodology framework by the team leader by September 15, 2006.

A. Larmoyer/OEDE/31 August 2006

5. Inception Paper Terms of Reference

Objective:

- Specify the **issues and themes** to be considered
- Provide a detailed proposal of **approach and methods** to be followed

1. Main expected outputs

- Reviewed version of the conceptual framework proposed by evaluation manager, as agreed with team members.

- Final proposal regarding the **focus** of the evaluation, including:

→ Reformulation, amendment or restructuring of **evaluation questions** as formulated in the TORs, with an imperative to keep the number of main questions to a maximum of five (not including sub-questions) and present the questions in an organised, hierarchical manner.

Evaluation question 1		
Sub questions 1.1.		
	Indicator	**Data collection methods and sources**
1.1.1.	▪	▪
1.1.2.	▪	▪

→ Once case studies are finally selected, identification of key issues and stakeholders in each country, on the basis of team members' suggestions.

- Developed **methodological** approach, including:

→ Outlining **indicators** and relevant **sources of information**

→ (If helpful) develop sets of questions within a summarizing matrix, along following (or similar) proposed format:

→ Proposing various **methods and tools** for gathering necessary data and develop framework for analyzing it and reporting it, justifying the use of each method for a given public.

→ Assigning each team member with relevant coverage of issues, notably ensuring coverage of **cross-cutting** issues.

→ Proposing approach for ensuring a smooth synthesis of the different case-studies and additional information gathered through other means.

- Provide an indicative **implementation plan** for the evaluation, including:

→ Proposed detailed **work plan**, specifying the organization and time schedule for the evaluation process

→ Approach to ensure **quality assurance** of the evaluation products.

→ Specification of potential **opportunities and constraints** to the feasibility of the evaluation.

- Include in **annexes** any additional document such as bibliographic references, maps, database excerpts…

DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE

Background papers from aid agencies, donors, think tanks …

- On school feeding
  - 'A review of school feeding programmes', DFID, 2004.
  - 'A review of school feeding programmes', PASS & DFID, 2006
  - Notes from Food for education stakeholders' meeting, October 2000.
  - 'Is school feeding a distraction?' Pamela Baxter, in
  - 'Surviving schools, education for refugee children from Rwanda, 1994-1996', Lyndsay Bird, UNESCO 2003.

- 'Provide early, safe and equal access for girls and boys of all ages to quality, relevant, formal and / or non-formal education opportunities', IASC action sheet 10.1, no date.
- 'Selected targeting and design guidelines for school feeding and other food-assisted education programs', Catholic Relief Services (CRS), 2000

- On education in emergencies
  - 'Developing minimum standards for education in emergencies', Allison Anderson, INEE, 2004.
  - Minimum standards for education in emergency, chronic crisis and early reconstruction, INEE, 2004.
  - 'Education in emergencies, a toolkit for starting and managing education in emergencies', Susan Nicolai, Save the Children, 2003.
  - 'Education in Emergencies: A Precondition to Meeting the MDGs', Save the Children/ INEE / IRC, July 2005
  - Planifier l'éducation en situation d'urgence et de reconstruction', Margaret Sinclair, UNESCO 2003.
  - 'Education in emergencies, learning for a peaceful future', Food and Migration Review, January 2005. (various articles)
  - 'Coordinating education during emergencies and reconstruction: challenges and opportunities', Marc Sommers, IIEP, UNESCO, 2004.
  - 'Reshaping the future: education and post-conflict reconstruction', World Bank, 2005
  - 'Educating young people in emergencies', id21 insights, Aug 2005
- On emergencies:
  - 'Targeting in emergencies', special ENN issue.
  - 'Nutrition in the context of conflict and crisis', SCN news no 24, 2002. Various articles
- On the role of food aid
  - 'Getting the point: improving food security interventions in emergencies', ODI, June 2005.
- On protection of children
  - 'Protecting children in emergencies', policy brief Save the Children, 2005.

WFP background 'policy' and other information documents

- 'Operational guidelines for WFP assistance to education', WFP EB document 1995.
- 'School feeding handbook' WFP, UNESCO, WHO, 1999.
- 'Emergency field operations pocketbook', WFP, 2002 (chap. 4.6. p. 119)
- 'School feeding in an emergency situation, Guidelines', WFP, 2004.
- 'Guidelines for the preparation of a PRRO', WFP, 1999 (Annex 4.4.)

- WFP programme guidance manual: Food for education section.
- WFP information notes regarding the school feeding initiative in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004 and the 2005 'annual update'.
- 'The essential package', WFP / UNICEF booklet, no date.
- 'Supporting girls education: a study on the impact of WFP Food for Education programmes on school enrolment', WFP, 2006.
- 'Global school feeding reports' (various years), WFP

WFP Reports

- From Full report of the mid-term evaluation of the Kenyan country programme: 'The EMOP school feeding effort: can it be incorporated into the regular programme?', WFP, 2002 (ref: WFP/EB.3/2002/6/9)
- Full Report of the Evaluation of the WFP West Africa Coastal Regional Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, WFP / OEDE, 2004 (annex on ESF programme)
- 'WFP support to education in West Africa', UNESCO & WFP Regional Bureau Dakar, 2003.

Useful websites:

- http://www.**inee**site.org
- http://www.id21.org/education (see width of articles on related issues)
- http://www.wmich.edu/evalctr/jc (on educational evaluation standards)

A. Larmoyer/OEDE/01/09/06

Annex 2: Nutritional Value of ESF Food Baskets and nutritional requirements met

Example of ESF food baskets from the 3 case studies visited by the evaluation mission

	Approx. Nutrient requirements School aged children 6 to 12y	Sudan Food Basket ESF 6 commodities (2)		DR Congo PRRO 4 Commodities (3)		Pakistan PRRO Biscuits and dates (3)	
		Quant.	% of require.	Quant.	% of require.	Quant.	% of require.
Energy (Kcal)	2000	763	38%	589	29%	411	21%
Protein (in g)	50	24	47%	17	33%	9.6	19%
Fat (in g)	56	22	39%	12	22%	11	21%
Iron (mg)	24	15	62%	6.2	26%	8.6	36%
Iodine (µg)	120	120	100%	151	126%	56.3	47%
Vit A (µg RE)	550	527	96%	842	168%	188	34%
Thiamin (mg)	1	0.71	71%	0.6	64%	0.4	40%
Riboflavin (mg)	1	0.43	43%	0.3	35%	0.6	56%
Niacin (mg)	14	9.3	67%	7.3	52%	5.4	39%
Vit. C (mg)	38	20	53%	0	0	15.0	**39%**
Calcium (mg)	1000	470	47%	167	17%	197	20%

1. Computerized nutrient calculation, applying WFP/UNHCR NutVal 2004, Food Basket Calculator.

2. Source for Recommended Nutrient Intake: WHO/FAO 2002, approximate calculation based one requirement of respective age groups where FAO/WHO does not split for the specific age group.

3. Sudan: EMOP/ESF food basket: 6 commodities, planned for providing two meals:

snack as early morning (porridge on arrival)

mid day meal (cereal/beans).

Food Basket:

100g cereal (mainly red sorghum), 20 dried beans, 15g vegetable oil (Vitamin A and D fortified), 50g Corn Soy Blend, 10g sugar, 3g iodized oil.

12.4% of energy from protein (recommended 10 to 12%), and

26% of energy from fat (recommended minimum 17%).

4. DR Congo PRRO ESF Food Basket: 4 commodities, planned as mid-morning meal/snack

100g fortified maize meal, 40g beans, 10g fortified oil, 5 g salt

11% of energy from protein (recommended 10 to 12%)

19% from fat (recommended min. 17% of energy from fat).

The previous food basket, applied till early/mid 2006 consisted of:

125g maize meal and 60g beans, 10g oil and 3g salt and provided 747kcal, which makes 37% of children's energy requirements.

5. Pakistan PRRO Food Basket: 2 commodities, planned as mid morning snack:

75g Fortified Biscuits, 30g Dates

At the initial stage 100g fortified biscuits were used, which was changed soon.

Also 50g dates were replaced by 30g

9.3% of energy from protein (recommended 10 to 12%), and

25% of energy from fat (recommended minimum 17%).

Annex 3: Nutrition situation of school age children and its link to education

World wide a large number of school age children is affected by malnutrition, and malnutrition rates existing in certain areas, are likely to decline with the magnitude and duration of an emergency. Health and nutrition problems among school aged children effect their access to education as well as their learning aptitude. Many of these children have a longer-term history of malnutrition, but many of them suffer from current nutritional deficiencies as well, including micronutrient deficiencies (Iron, Iodine, Vitamin A). Parasite infestation, particularly prevalent in school age, worsens the nutritional status and contributes to impaired growth and development. Short term hunger (or temporary hunger) is widely spread, impacts concentration span and attention, hence influences learning significantly. Short term hunger, is a result of insufficient food intake, and can be a problem for previously well-nourished as well as malnourished children, still malnourished children seem to be at higher risk to its consequences. Based on clinical research, consensus exists that malnutrition or hunger impairs learning, but there is not enough evidence that school feeding programmes are effective in implementation to improve cognitive functions significantly. The table below presents most prevailing nutritional problems in school children, some of the most significant findings on the linkage between nutrition and learning as well as some promising strategies.

PROBLEM AND CAUSES	EXTENT	LINK TO EDCUATION	STRATEGIES
SHORT TERM HUNGER Here, short term or temporary hunger (STH) refers to the feeling of being hungry during classes. Among school children, it is a result of not having enough food (or no breakfast) before going to school, or of high activity levels, i.e. due long walking distances to school (Levinger 1996, Hicks 1996). STH in developing country is often determined by current food insecurity and poverty, hence becomes more prevalent in the context of an acute emergency or crisis.	STH is highly prevalent in developing countries in general and in food insecure and vulnerable areas in particular. Estimates on the number of children attending school on an empty stomach do not exist.	STH: - distracts children attention, hence influences performance and learning, resulting in poor attainment (Levinger 1996, Politt 1983, Popkin and Lim-Ybanez, UNESCO 1990). - leads to passivity and inactivity (even more apparent in malnourished suffering from STH) (Wilson 1983, Levinger 1996) Children having more adequate diets achieve better results on cognitive tests than those with less adequate intake, regardless of social and economic resources of the family (Sigman, Politt 1990). High energy diets impact learning and results in better in school performance (Latham, Cobo, Wilson 1983, Levinger 1996).	Those findings suggest that school breakfast, mid morning snack or lunch programmes are an promising investment to improve performance where STH is pervasive. The importance of such programmes increases where malnutrition rates are high.

PROBLEM AND CAUSES	EXTENT	LINK TO EDCUATION	STRATEGIES
ACUTE MALNUTRITION (WASTING) Usually a consequence of recent starvation and/or severe diseases. A current nutritional status can change relatively fast if conditions change, i.e. due to an emergency, interruption of access to food and social service. The consequences of acute malnutrition on morbidity and mortality are higher among pre-school children than among school children.	Studies on the current status of protein energy malnutrition in school children are rare. Standards are not developed yet.	Acute malnutrition correlates with lower concentration, attention and reduced cognitive test scores (Politt 1990, Levinger 1996), better nourished children are more attentive (Sigman, Politt 1990). A study in Philippines shows that performance was better among children with good nutritional status regardless the socio-economic situation of the household and quality of schooling (Florencio, Philippines, Politt 1990). Nutritonal status was identified as one of the most important determinant of scholastic performance (Agrawal 1987). A school breakfast programme improved learning outcomes particularly among poorly nourished children (Simeon and Grantham-McGregor 1989, Pollit, Jacoby, and Cueto, 1996), children of schools having school canteen performed better (Jarousse and Mignat 1991).	No universal recommendations. Efforts to combat consequences of malnutrition should focused on pre-school ages as the first priority.
CHRONIC MALNUTRITION (STUNTING) Stunting is develops mainly in early childhood (mostly by three years of age, recently even said as up to 2 years) and through a cumulative process. Children stunted at school-age are likely to have been exposed to poor nutrition in early childhood. The degree of stunting tends to increase throughout the school-age years. Stunting can reflect a broad range of insults such as prenatal under nutrition, deficiencies of macro- and micronutrients, infections and, possibly, inadequate attention by caregivers, as a results of poverty and food insecurity or other environmental factors.	Prevalence of stunting in rural school children of low income countries is estimated to be high, ranging from 48% to 56%, girls tend to be slightly better off. Underweight ranged from 34% to 62% (i.e. Ghana about 40%, Tansania 34%, Indonesia about 48%, Vietnam about 48%, India 62%).	Malnutrition in early ages impairs mental and physical development. Damages resulting from malnutrition in early childhood are largely irreversible (World Bank 2006). Stunted children enroll later; show increased absenteeism, and repetition of school years. (Politt 1990, SCN, Levinger 1996) Severe stunting is strongly associated with lower test scores in school-age children (age 8-11, SCN, Politt 1990), due to impairments in earlier ages and late or interrupted school attendance.	Consequences of chronic malnutrition can not be eradicated through nutritional support at school age. Interventions in school-age children can supplement efforts to contribute to a continued growth at school age. If implemented in areas where acute malnutrition is prevalent as well, efforts can reduce effects on children's health and education (SCN).

PROBLEM AND CAUSES	EXTENT	LINK TO EDCUATION	STRATEGIES
IRON DEFICIENCY ANAEMIA (IDA) Insufficient intake of iron rich foods is the major cause; but IDA can also be caused by parasitic infections (particularly hookworm and malaria) and deficiencies of other nutrients.	It is estimated that 53% or 210 million school age children suffer from IDA. The highest prevalence is reported in Asia (58.4%) followed by Africa (49.8%).	There is substantial evidence that IDA in children is associated with decreased physical development, impaired immune function, poor growth, increased fatigue, tiredness and low activity levels. Strong relationship between IDA cognitive function and school achievement exists (SCN, Politt 1990, Levinger 1996). Iron supplementation has eliminated differences in school performance in iron deficient children (Seshadri, Gopaldas 1989).	Daily as well as weekly iron supplementation is effective in raising haemoglobin levels. Food based approaches, provision of fortified food, are an alternative particularly where other malnutrition problems need to be tackled.
IODINE DEFICIENCY DISORDER (IDD) In many countries a persistence of goiter (the clinical symptom of IDD), in school children is being observed despite near universal iodized salt promotion and consumption.	IDD affects an estimated 60 million school age children worldwide.	Iodine deficiency is the leading cause of preventable intellectual impairment worldwide. Iodine deficiency in children results in poorer cognitive development and school achievement (SCN, Levinger 1996) and results in fewer years of participation in schools (Levinger 1996). Maternal iodine deficiency can cause cretinism and less severe but irreversible mental retardation, hindering school enrollment of future generation (Levinger 1996).	Universal iodization of salt is seen as the permanent and sustainable solution to the global IDD problem. Promotion of consumption of iodized salt is the recommended approach.
VITAMIN A DEFICIENCY (VAD) Recent studies concluded that VAD is a public health problem in school-age children in developing countries.	It is estimated that 85 million school age children are deficient in Vitamin A (SCN).	Mild or sub-clinical VAD causes impaired immune function and increased morbidity (respiratory infections, diarrhea diseases etc.), which results in decreased school participation (SCN, Levinger 1996). VAD an important cause of limited peripheral vision, night blindness) directly influencing school outcome (Levinger 1996) VAD also affects iron metabolism so that with any iron supplements taken, subsequent improvement in iron status may be limited when vitamin A status is low (SCN)	For the short term, providing vitamin A supplements, multiple micronutrient supplements or vitamin A fortified foods to school-age children are effective strategies to prevent VAD among school age children. Food-based approaches are the preferred long term strategy to prevent VAD.
HELMINTH INFECTIONS School-age children are most at risk of helminth infections. 41% of moderate and 57% of severe iron deficiency anaemia in school-age children is	It is estimated that over 35% (320 million) of school-age children are infected with roundworm; 25% (233 million) with whipworm and 26% (239 million) with hookworm. For	Parasite infections lead to health and nutrition related problems that impact school achievements (SCN, Levinger 1996). Children with moderate to heavy parasitic helminth infections have shown lower test scores of cognitive function of educational achievement (SCN). Heavy helminthic infections delays psychomotor	The WHO recommends mass treatment of children in schools where the prevalence of infections is 50% or greater. Re-infection often occurs, and are equally prevailing again after 4-6 months, if environmental conditions do not improve. This suggest

PROBLEM AND CAUSES	EXTENT	LINK TO EDCUATION	STRATEGIES
attributable to hookworm infection, it also shows a correlation to protein energy malnutrition.	girls and boys aged 5-14 years in low income countries, intestinal worms alone account for an estimated 12 and 11% respectively of the total disease burden of this age group (SCN).	development (Levinger 1996), and results in lower enrollment, attendance, and school completion (Levinger 1996). Deworming resulted in higher school participation (Kremer 2000).	that school children need regular treatment in highly endemic areas. Parasite control programmes always have to go together with hygienic measures at school, promotion of hygiene.

Source:

Information compiled mainly from SCN News:

Standing Committee on Nutrition, School Age Children, their Health and Nutrition, Number 25, December 2002 and Number 16, 1998.

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Hicks, M. K. Food security and school feeding programmes, 1996

Kremer, M. Child Health and Education: The Primary School Deworming Prject in Kenya, 2000

Levinger, B. Nutrition, Health and Education for All, Education Development Center, New York, 1996

Politt, E., Malnutrition and Infection in the Classroom. Paris: UNESCO, 1990.

Simeon D. T, Grantham-McGregor, S, Effects of missing breakfast on the cognitive functions of school children of differing nutritional status In: American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, Vol 49, 646-653, 1989

World Bank, Repositioning Nutrition as Central to Development, A Strategy for Large Scale Action, 2006

Annex 4 – Mission Itineraries for Pakistan, Sudan and DRC

Mission Itinerary; Islamic Republic of Pakistan; 13.11. – 02.12.2006

Date	Location	Agenda
09.10. – 12.10.2006	Islamabad	Meetings with WFP CO staff and UN Partner Agencies and CPs Discussions with Government of Pakistan (GoP) representatives (MoE, ERRA)
13.10. – 15.10.2006	Mansehra, NWFP	Discussions with WFP HoSO and other SO staff; Meetings with Education Department, District Earthquake Rehabilitation Authority (DERA) staff Group discussion / meeting with NGOs Representative (BEST, SDS, MEWS) Visit to WFP Assisted schools Government Girls Primary School & Government Boys Primary Departure for Muzaffarabad
15.10. – 18.10.2006	Muzaffarabad, AJK	Briefing by WFP staff in SO Muzaffarabad/Bagh Meeting with Education Department of Government of AJK and State Earthquake Rehabilitation Authority (SERA) Discussion with CPs i.e. Islamic Relief, Trust for Voluntary Organizations and National Rural Support Program and participation in education cluster meeting Visit to WFP assisted schools around Muzaffarabad Departure for Khartoum
18.10. – 20.10.2006	Islamabad	Follow-up meetings with WFP staff in CO Internal work session for preliminary analysis and synthesis of findings and preparation of de-briefing with CO staff Debriefing and departure from Pakistan

Mission Itinerary; Islamic Republic of Sudan; 13.11. – 02.12.2006

Date	Location	Agenda
13.11.2006	Arrival in Khartoum	
14. – 15.11.2006	Khartoum	Security briefing & arrangement of travel logistics for travel within Sudan Meeting with key WFP staff in Khartoum, including staff from Programme Unit, the 3 area offices Meetings with MoE of GoNU and UN partner agencies, as well as WFP cooperating partners
16. – 17.11.2006	Juba	Travel to Juba Meetings with WFP Area Office staff (South Sudan) and Juba Sub-Office staff. Meetings with Ministry of Education, Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and Ministry of Education Central Equatoria State Meetings with representatives of UN Partner Agencies and WFP cooperating partners Visit to selected schools in Juba
18.11. – 21.11.2006	Rumbek	Meetings with WFP sub-office and area office staff Internal team work session, synthesizing findings up to that point Discussions with representatives of local authorities, in particular MoE of Lakes State Meetings with representatives of UN Partner Agencies and Cooperating Partners Visits to schools within and outside of Rumbek
22.11. – 25.11.2006	Khartoum	Meeting with Darfur Office staff during Managers Meeting in Khartoum Internal work session
Team A		
26.11. – 29.11.2006	Kadugli	Travel to Kadugli Discussion with WFP Sub-Office staff, MoE, UN Partnenr Agencies Visit to selected schools in and around Kadugli Travel back to Khartoum
Team B		
25.11.2006	Khartoum	Meetings with additional WFP staff, in particular follow-up discussions with Darfur area staff
26.11. – 27.11.2006	CETA, Abyei	Travel to Abyei Meetings / briefing with Abyei WFP staff; discussions with representatives of local authorities; Visit to schools within Abyei Travel back to Khartoum
28.11. – 29.11.2006	CETA, Kosti	Travel to Kosti by car Meetings with Kosti WFP staff, discussion with MoE and representatives of local authorities, Visit of schools around Kosti Travel back to Khartoum (car)

30.11. – 03.12.2006	Khartoum	Internal team work session (preliminary analysis of field observations; preparation of de-briefing at Head-office level Debriefing with area coordinators and other WFP staff Departure for DRC / Europe

Mission Itinerary; Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); 04.12. – 13.12.2006

Date	Location	Agenda
04.12.2006	Travel from Khartoum to Bukavu (DRC) via Rwanda	
04.12. – 09.12.2006	Bukavu	Meetings with WFP Sub-Office staff, UN Partner Agencies, Cooperating Partners and headmasters, teachers, students and cooks in various schools around Bukavu
08. – 09.12.2006	Goma	Meetings with WFP Sub-Office staff, UN Partner Agencies, Cooperating Partners and headmasters, teachers, students and cooks in various schools around Goma
10. – 13.12.2006	Kinshasa	Meetings with WFP staff at DRC Country Office, the MoE of DRC, UN Partner Agencies, Donors Preparation of Debriefing Note Debriefing with WFP Country Director and other WFP staff members Departure from Kinshasa

Annex 5 – List of People met

WFP HEADQUARTERS – ROME

- Annemarie Waesche, Senior Evaluation officer, OEDE
- Aurélie Larmoyer, Evaluation manager , OEDE
- Ute Meir, Programme advisor school feeding, PDPF
- Alphonsine Bouya, Programme advisor school feeding, PDPF
- Fiorella Ceruti, Programme officer school feeding, PDPF
- Paul Buffard, Chief of programme quality group ,ODO
- Sheila Grudem, Programme officer, PDPT
- Rashad Nelms, Policy officer, PDPT
- Jutta Neitzel, Programme officer, NGO unit, PDE
- Giorgia Testolin, Programme officer gender, PDPG

Pakistan

WFP Country Office, Islamabad

- Michael Jones, CD,WFP Representative
- Maha Ahmed, Deputy Country Director
- Magdalena Moshi, Head of Programme Unit
- Zahid Majeed, Senior Programme Officer
- Rashida Amir, Programme Manager Education
- Khalida Malik, Programmer Manager M & E
- Shaib Haq, Programme Officer VAM
- Tahir Nawaz, Pipeline Officer
- Arshad Jadoon, Programme Assisstant (Livelihoods)
- Touseef Ahmed, Programme Assisstant Education
- Cyra Saeed, UNV – Programme Officer
- Lindita Bare, Logistics Officer
- Elsaied Siralkhatim, Head Logistics Unit

Government of Pakistan

- Dr. Syed Faygaz Ahmed, Joint Educational Adviser, Policy & Planning Wing, Ministry of Education
- Saqih Ali Khan, Joint Educational Adviser, Projects Wing, Ministry of Education
- Halih uz Rehman, Senior Research Officer, Policy & Planning Wing, Ministry of Education
- Shahid Ali Khan, Assistant Educational Adviser, Projects Wing, Ministry of Education
- Brig Javaid Warraich, Director General, Earthquake, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA)

- Ovais Maivzoor, Education Officer, ERRA

Non-Governmental Organizations, Islamabad

- Farooq Khan, Trust for Voluntary Organization, DY CEO
- M. Babar Khan, Trust for Voluntary Organization, Senior Programme Officer
- Ahmad Nawaz, Trust for Voluntary Organization, Senior Programme Officer
- Emily Gush, SCUSA, Program & Information Officer
- Okello Hamisi, Islamic Relief, Relief & Rehabilitation Manager
- Sabina Shahean, Islamic Relief, Monitoring & Evaluation Officer
- Jamil Ahmed Awan, Islamic Relief, Emergency Coordinator

UN agencies

- Thomas McDermott, Acting Representative, UNICEF
- Vibeke Jensen, Project Officer, Girl's Education, UNICEF
- Brenda Halpin, Emergency Education Officer, UNICEF
- Zulfiqar Ali, Assistant Project Officer, Education, UNICEF
- Ichiro Miyazawa, Programme Specialist, Education, UNESCO
- Eli Rognerud, Emergency Coordinator, UNESCO
- Umar Alam, Programme Officer, UNESCO
- Arthur M. Gaines, Deputy Security Advisor, United Nations
- Arbab Muhammad Arif, Assistant Security Officer
- Earl James Goodyear, Senior Recovery Programme Advisor, UND

WFP Sub-Office Mansehra

- Kamal Elhagfarah, Head of Sub-Office
- Salim Akhtar, Head of Programme
- Fareeda Zahid, Programme Assistant
- Ajmal Zada, Food Aid Monitor
- Tahira Rafiq, Food Aid Monitor
- Maria Daud, Food Aid Monitor
- Jan Zada, ICT Assistant

NGOs and Public Officials, Mansehra

- Mohammad Azeem, Basic Education and Employable Skills Training (NGO), Project Coordinator (District Battgram/District Kohistan)
- Imran Mustafa, Muslim Education Welfare Society (NGO), Project Coordinator
- Mustafa Hussain Siddiqui, Muslim Education Welfare Society (NGO), President
- Khaista Mohel, Shangla Development Society , Emergency Coordinator
- Ikramaullah Khan, Shangla Development Society, Rehabilitation Manager
- Shakeel Qadir, District Co-ordinating Officer
- Javed Kham, Programmer Manager, District Reconstruction Unit
- Shah Jee, Executive District Officer , Education
- Farooq Awan, District Project Manager, Education
- Muhammad Muttahir, Project manager & Deputy Director P&D Directorate of S&L Peshawar

WFP Sub-Office, Muzaffarahad

- Sarwat Khawaja Food Aid Monitor
- Khansa Mir, Food Aid Monitor
- Waheed Murad, Programme Assistant
- Sultan Mehmood, Programme Assistant
- Tanvir Khan, Food Aid Monitor
- Imtiaz Ali, Programme Assistant
- Wajahat Ahmad, Programme Assistant

NGOs, Muzaffarahad

- Muhammed Zohearoudin, CDO, Islamic Relief Pakistan
- Saeed Abbasi, Regional Officer, Trust for Volunteer Organization
- Aziz Ahmad, District Programme Officer, NRSP

Sudan

KHARTOUM

WFP Head Office

- Daniela Owen, Deputy Regional Director
- Thomas Shortley, Head Programme Unit
- Elvira Pruscini, M&E Officer
- Sarah Longford, Coordinator CETA
- Laura Turner, Deputy coordinator CETA
- Anwar Muhideen, Programme Officer, FFE focal point CETA
- Rosio Godomar, Programme Officer, nutrition focal point CETA
- Carlos Veloso, Coordinator Darfur
- Ilaria Dettori, Darfur Coordination Deputy
- Ms. Azza Mustafa, Programme Officer, FFE focal point Darfur
- Wigdan Madani, Programme officer Nutrition

WFP Staff, Darfur (met in Khartoum)

- Pablo Recalde, Head of Sub-office Geneina, Darfur
- Hokan Cullsberg, Habilah head of Field office, Darfur
- Patrick Yankuba, Kutum head of Field office, Darfur
- Chris Czerwinski, Fasher head of Sub-office, Darfur

Government of National Unity

- Dr. Ibrahim El Dasies - Director, Educational Planning, Federal Ministry of Education
- Dr. Ibtisam Mohamed Hassan - Deputy Director, Educational Planning, Federal Ministry of Education
- Ahmed El Zubair - Director, School Feeding Unit, Federal Ministry of Education

UN Partner Agencies

- Jill Zarchin, Acting Head of Education Section, UNICEF
- Dr. Sibrino B. Forojalla, PO Education Section, UNICEF
- Hamad Alfatih, UNESCO

WFP Cooperating Partners (NGOs)

- Dr. John Salibi, Director, Samaritan's Purse
- Hussein Halani, Director, Save the Children US
- Mohammed Ibrahim, Senior Programme Manager, Islamic Relief Worldwide
- Dr. Badawi El Khair, Director, SRC
- Renato Gordon, Direcgtor, World Vision
- Asha Abdalla, Coordinator

SOUTH SUDAN - JUBA

WFP staff South Sudan:

- Justin Bagirishya, South Sudan Coordinator (met in Khartoum)
- Kofi Owusu-Tieku, South Sudan Coordination Deputy (met in Khartoum)
- Theoney Kagaruki, Programme Officer FFE, South Sudan office
- Baker Mukeere, Head of SO Juba
- Rhina Dudu: Field monitor, FFE
- Pasqualina Asida: Field monitor, nutrition focal point

Government of South Sudan & Central Equatoria State

- HE Dr. Michael Hussein, Minister of Education, Government of South Sudan
- Lomole Apollo, Acting Minister of Education, MoE Central Equatoria State
- Edward Leg, Director General, MoE Central Equatoria State

UN Partner Agencies and Cooperating Partners

- Francis Mboriidie, Project Officer Education, UNICEF CES
- Achol Majk Kuer Project Officer, UNICEF Jonglei State
- Joseph Abuk, Manager, Accomplish
- Amos Longa, FFE focal point, Swedish Free Mission
- Monica Jagu Morsal, TL for Food Security Programmes, FAO
- Lawrence Sudika, Assistant to Co-ordinator Agriculture, FAO

Schools staff (Headmasters, Teachers, Cooks and Students)

- Yei Camp School
- Rumbek Boys school

SOUTH SUDAN – RUMBEK

WFP Office Staff

- Jennifer Bitonde, Head of SO
- Hans Vikoler, Head of South Sudan Field Coordination Unit
- Mari Honjo, Programme Officer, South Sudan field Coordination Unit
- Mihret Bizuneh, Programme Officer, South Sudan Assessments
- Clement Dominic, National Programme Officer
- Charles Ohuru, Food Aid Monitor
- Francis Mbuvi, Food Aid Monitor

Government of Lakes State, South Sudan

- Martin Manyang Mamun, Director of Planning and Budgeting
- Maciek Mading Mabeng, AED Volunteer
- Jame Magok Ater, Director for General Education
- Agolder Alfred Mathok, Director for Administration & Finance
- Malou A. Dhal, AED V. Advisor for Admininistration & Finance

UN Partner Agencies

- Richard T. Longa, Programme Officer Education, UNICEF
- Representative, FAO Rumbek
- Teresa de la Torre, Health Officer, Regional Office Juba, responsible for Rumbek
- Rose Achan, MMMT supervisor, Health, UNICEF

Schools staff (Headmasters, Teachers, Cooks and Students)

- Comboni Primary School, Wulu County
- Teremanga Primary School, Wulu County
- DOR Rumbek Primary School, Rumbek
- SRC Primary School, Rumbek

CETA – KADUGLI

WFP Sub-Office Kadugli

- Umberto Greco, Head of Sub-Office Kadugli
- Alessandra Gilotta, Programme officer, CETA
- Fawzia Mohamed, Programme Assistano and FFE Focal Point, Kadugli
- Awatif Elhag, Food Aid Monitor and FFW/FFT Focal Point, Kadugli
- Sawsan Mubarak, Programme Assitstant, FFE Focal Point, Kauda
- Charles Ibrahim Olori, Food Aid Monitor, Kauda

Ministry of Education, South Kordofan State

- Ibrahim, SF Focal Point
- Paul Cornelius, Director Education, Regional Education Office

Schools staff (Headmasters, Teachers, Cooks and Students)

- El Radif Boys School
- El Radif Girls School
- Lewa El Islam Boys School

Partner Agencies

- Tsehaye Haile, Education and child protection officer, UNICEF
- Save the Children
- NRRDO

CETA - ABYEI

WFP Sub-Office Abyei

- Ms. Charlotte Cuny, Head of Sub-Office Abyei
- Ms. Salmadavit, Programme Officer
- Mr. Christopher, Food Aid Monitor
- Mr. Primo Okot, Programme Officer, responsible for Abyei Area

Local Authorities, Abyei Area

- Director of Education

Schools (Headmasters, Teachers, Cooks, Students)

- Abyei Girls School
- Abyei Catholic Primary School
- Abyei Primary School

CETA - KOSTI

WFP Sub-Office Kosti

- Mohamed Nuredaiem, HoSO, WFP Kosti
- Piotr Drozdowski, Logistics Officer, WFP Kosti SO
- Rachel Masio - Food Aid Monitor, WFP Kosti
- Monylang Debol - Food Aid Monitor, WFP Kosti

Local Authorties, Kosti Area

- Director of Education, MoE, White Nile State
- Mr. Salal, HAC

WFP Cooperating Partners (CPs)

- Tahir Bakhit, DAWA
- Kamal Andel Gadir, Sudan Red Crescent Society

Schools (Headmasters, teachers, cooks, parents and students)

- Kenana Boys School, Kenana
- Kenana Girls School, Kenana
- Kosti Boys and Girls Camp School
- Kosti Primary School

Democratic Republic of Congo

Kinshasa

WFP Country Office

- Charles Vincent, Country Director
- Claude Jibidar, Deputy Country Director
- Moumini Ouedraogo, Head of Programme

- Emily Doe, Programme officer FFE country level
- Pierre Honorat, Head of logistics
- Gisele Galessami-Niambaloky, Pipeline officer
- Solange Msafiri, Field monitor FFE
- Paulin Angioni, Programme assistant Kinshasa Sub-Office

Government of DRC

- Representative, Ministry of Education

UN Partner Agencies and Donors

- Representative, UNICEF
- Representative, USAID
- Representative, Cooperation Belge

BUKAVU

WFP Sub-Office

- Innocent Mugisho, Programme assistant FFE
- Sharifa Mimi, Field Monitor FFE
- Emmanuel Kibala, Programme assistant Nutrition
- Arhamatou Diallo, Programme officer Sub-Office level
- Philippe Glauser, Logistics officer SO
- Aline Paar, Logistics assistant commodity tracking

Ministry of Education:

- Victor Ntumbe, EPSP FFE focal point.

UN Partner Agencies and Donors:

- Agnes Katavali, Education programme officer Unicef
- Donatien Muyunuga, Food security adviser FAO
- Leon Ngika, Head of sub-office FAO
- Claude Mululu, Liaison officer OCHA
- Serge Bingane, Director Caritas
- Joelle Tabaro, FFE focal point Caritas
- Pacifique Kikoko Kaluba, Coordinator FFE project CELPA
- Abbot Berchmans Mashali, FEE project manager Walungu Parish
- Charles Matanu, FFE project manager OCHA
- Doudou Kuminga, Coordinator OCHA

Implementing partners:

- Aliou Tall, PAGE project coordinator and education advisor, EDC
- Eugene Lubula I. Mumbere, PAGE project M&E officer, EDC
- Federica Gastaldillo, PAGE project capacity building officer, IRC
- Thiam Mawa, Programme manager South Kivu, Save the Children

Schools (Headmasters, teachers, cooks, parents and students)

- Schools visited in Kashumo, Murhesa, Ngomo, Nyangesi, Cibimbi, Canya and Lwami

GOMA

WFP Sub-Office staff:

- Joseph Kasonia, Field monitor FFE
- Aya Shneerson, Head of Sub-office
- Ulrich Nass, Logistics officer
- Henriette Kapinga, Programme assistant nutrition

Ministry of Education:

- Léonard Semahane Kiba Kinyere, Head of Division North Kivu I
- Sylvain Sebagenzi, EPSP FFE focal point

UN Partner Agencies and Cooperating Partners:

- Katye Marino, Head of Education section Unicef
- Simona Pari, Education officer Unicef
- Celestin Mirindi, National education officer Unicef
- Sadou Diallo, Health project officer Unicef
- Ruffin Kibajampaka Kabugoyi, Education section NRC
- Arild Karlsbakk, Education section NRC
- Dzifanu K. Nyarko-Badohu, Deputy coordinator Emergency operations FAO

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